Selected quad for the lemma: truth_n
Text snippets containing the quad
|
ID |
Title |
Author |
Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) |
STC |
Words |
Pages |
|
A59810
|
A defence of Dr. Sherlock's notion of a Trinity in unity in answer to the animadversions upon his vindication of the doctrine of the holy and ever Blessed Trinity : with a post-script relating to the calm discourse of a Trinity in the Godhead : in a letter to a friend.
|
Sherlock, William, 1641?-1707.
|
1694
(1694)
|
Wing S3282; ESTC R33885
|
67,085
|
115
|
were not unius Substantiae of one and the same Substance as St. Austin and all the Fathers assert because they are Two distinct Men and each of them has a distinct Nature of his own Or if he will call this a Difference as if to differ in number and in Substance or Nature were the same thing or as if to differ in number proved a diversity of Nature too It is a tedious thing to dispute with Men who must be taught to construe the Fathers and to understand common Sence But if Authority will not do this he is resolved Reason shall and he has as peculiar a Talent at Reason as he has at Authorities He proves That the Three Persons can't be Three distinct Minds because they are not Three distinct Substances Now the Dean may very safely deny this Consequence and try how the Animadverter will prove it That if Three Minds are Three intelligent Persons and a Mind is a Substance therefore Three distinct Minds or Persons are Three distinct Substances for Three distinct Minds may subsist distinctly and yet inseparably in One Eternal and infinite Substance as Three intelligent Persons do Though the true and short Answer is That the same Substance repeated in Three distinct Subsistences is not Three Substances but One as I have often observed in the Case of the Man and his Image But suppose Three Persons were Three distinct Substances inseparably united in One What then What then It is a Terrible then For then Two Substances will concur in and belong to each Person to wit that Substance which is the Divine Essence and so is communicable or common to all the Persons and the Substance which constitutes each Person and thereby is so peculiar to him as to distinguish him from the other and consequently to be incommunicable to any besides him to whom it belongs I am heartily ashamed and sorry to see such Stuff as must necessarily expose our Holy Faith to the scorn of Atheists and Infidels and that I may not contribute to it all this Nonsence shall escape the lash of my Pen. In short the Dean knows no Divine Substance or Essence distinct from the Three Divine Persons nor knows any distinction between the Divine Essence and a Divine Person but that the Essence makes the Person That the whole Divine Essence or Nature is originally in God the Father that this same whole Divine Nature and Essence was by eternal Generation communicated by the Father to the Son and subsists distinctly in him That this same whole Divine Nature by eternal Procession is communicated by the Father and the Son to the Holy Ghost and subsists distinctly in him and these Three Divine Persons by an inseparable Union dwelling in each other is that Supream and Sovereign Being who is the One God or a Trinity in Unity It is amazing to think what strange Conceits this Man must have of a Trinity of Persons and Unity of Essence or Substance For I am sure no Man has any Idea of an intelligent Nature and Essence distinguished from a Person or of Persons distinguished from a rational Nature of a Divine Essence and Substance which is no Person and of Divine Persons which are no Substances as it seems they cannot be in the Animadverter's way unless he also will compound every Person of Two Substances What is the Divine Essence and Substance but an infinite and eternal Mind And is not an infinite and eternal Mind a Person The Divine Essence then must be acknowledged to be a Person and to be a substantial Person or the Divine Substance so that there is a Person that is a Substance and if there be but One such single and solitary Divine Essence there can be but One such single and solitary Person Will he then make four Persons in the Godhead the Divine Essence which is a substantial Person and Three Persons which are no Substances Or will he own God to be what Pascentius objected to St. Austin and he rejected with Scorn Triformis Persona One Divine Person under Three Forms this or something more Senceless is the Truth of the Case as may appear more hereafter but I will now proceed 3. His third Argument is this If it be truly said that one and the same infinite Mind or Spirit is Father Son and Holy Ghost I mean all Three taken together and it cannot be truly said that one and the same infinite Mind or Spirit is Three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits then it follows that Father Son and Holy Ghost are not Three distinct infinite Minds or Spirits This Logick is a very troublesome thing when Men want Sence The whole of this Argument is this That One infinite Mind can't be Three infinite Minds nor Three infinite Minds One infinite Mind and that Three Persons who are One infinite Mind can't be Three infinite Minds that is That Three can't be One nor One Three which if it be universally true there is an end of a Trinity in Unity if it be not universally true that is if Three may be One and One Three the meer opposition between Three and One which is the whole force of his Argument is childish Sophistry For if they be Three and One in different Respects this is no Contradiction Every Divine Person is an infinite Mind and as distinctly so as he is a distinct Person and yet by their essential and inseparable Union to each other all Three are but One eternal infinite Mind as they are but One God But when these Three Divine Persons are said to be Three and to be One eternal and infinite Mind they are Three and One Mind upon different Respects every Person by himself as a distinct Person is an eternal infinite Mind that is is a knowing intelligent Being and has all the Perfections of an infinite Understanding distinguished from the other Persons by Self-consciousness and all Three Persons by their inseparable Union to each other are but One eternal infinite Mind as having each other in themselves by Mutual-consciousness and let the Animadverter shew where the Contradiction is That there should be Three Self-conscious infinite Minds as there are Three infinite Persons united into One mutualconscious Mind as Three distinct Persons are united in the Unity of the Godhead especially when this One eternal Mind is entirely and perfectly repeated without the least change in Three eternal intelligent Subsistences each of which is distinctly an eternal Mind but the same One individual eternal Mind 4. His fourth and last Argument is this Whatsoever Attribute may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Persons in the Athanasian Form so belongs to them all in common that it can belong to none of them under any Term of distinction from the rest But the attribute infinite Mind or Spirit may be truly predicated of all and each of the Divine Persons in and according to the Athanasian Form And therefore it can belong to none of them under any Term
One infinite Essence or One Supream God but the Question still remains what these Three Persons are into which this One Being or Essence is distinguished by these Three distinct Relations Three Relatives are not Three Relations but Three things related to each other What then are these Three Persons in the Unity of the Divine Essence Three Relations Three Modes Three Respects without some Being which tho' essentially One is really and substantially Three is Nonsence in Logick for there must be as many real substantial Relatives and Correlates as there are Relations unless the Relation between Father and Son can subsist without a real Father and Son The Person then of the Father the Person of the Son and the Person of the Holy Ghost are not the Relations between Father Son and Holy Ghost but real substantial Persons thus related to each other And if these are Three intelligent Persons let him make if he can Three Gods of Three Minds and excuse Three real intelligent Persons from the same Charge But the Truth is to prevent the Charge of making Three Gods he distinguishes the Three Divine Persons into Three Logical Relations or Modes of Subsistence and if we will be contented with a Trinity of Modes he is for us but this looks very like renouncing a Trinity of Persons to secure the Unity of the Godhead and I fear will prove no better when thoroughly examined In what Sence the Three Divine Persons are Three Relatives or Three Relations I have explained above their Nature is compleat and absolute if the Divine Nature be so but their Subsistence is Relative as it must of Necessity be when the same individual Nature is repeated and subsists distinctly in Three If it be essential to the Father to be a Father he subsists with a necessary Relation to his Son if it be essential to the Son to be a Son the perfect living Image of the Father his Subsistence is wholly Relative as the Subsistence of an Image is which depends upon the Prototype And therefore though each Divine Person be eternal and infinite Mind and with respect to their Three real Subsistences may be called Three infinite eternal Minds as the Dean ventured to call them yet these Three are not Three absolute simple Beings or Essences which stand distinguished from one another by their whole Beings or Natures but One absolute eternal Mind repeated in Three Relative Subsistences without multiplication As a Man and his living Image though each of them have distinctly Humane Nature and upon that account might be called Two Men yet they have but One compleat absolute Humane Nature though it be repeated in the Image and are but One Man in Two Persons or Two Humane Subsistences Had the Dean indeed made Three compleat absolute eternal Minds he had been justly chargeable with making Three Gods but the same eternal and infinite Mind repeated in Three Subsistences necessarily and essentially related to each other are but One eternal God 2. His second Argument is this Three distinct Minds or Spirits are Three distinct Substances But the Three Persons in the Blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Substances And therefore they are not Three distinct Minds or Spirits The Dean does not pretend to know any thing of the Substance of a Mind much less of God who is an infinite Mind He is contented to know That a Mind is a thinking and understanding Being and though Understanding and Being and Nature or Substance may be distinguished in finite created Minds yet St. Austin has taught him that in God to be is not One thing and to understand another or whatever else can be said of the Divine Nature and therefore not Substance neither So that if in the Unity of the Godhead there be but Three such distinct Understandings or Minds or intelligent Persons who are not each other and do not understand by each other but distinctly by themselves as St. Austin expresly observes That no man will say That the Father does not understand by himself but by his Son he is not concerned about distinct Substances which are the same with to be and to understand in God But his Proofs of both Propositions are entertaining His Major That Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Substances he proves from the Definition of a Mind or Spirit that it is Substantia incorporea intelligens an intelligent incorporeal or immaterial Substance and therefore Three distinct Minds or Spirits must be Three such distinct Substances Now if a Man should deny his Definition and say That a Mind is res cogitans a thinking Being he would be undone for want of his Substances but I shall only cap Definitions with him at present That a Person is Substantia individua naturae rationabilis the individual Substance of a Rational Nature And therefore if there be Three distinct Persons there are Three such distinct Substances in the Godhead and let us see how he will bring off Three Persons from being Three distinct Substances and I will undertake the Dean shall do as much and do it as well for Three Minds But if a Mind were not a Substance what could it be else Let us know first what Substance is and then we 'll tell him Not quod substat accidentibus I hope for then he immediately proves That God is no Substance because no accident can be in God nor need he fear that the Dean will make a Mind a Mode of Subsistence in his Sence of it but a true and real Mind which does really and actually subsist though these Three eternal Minds are but Three eternal Subsistences of the same One individual eternal Mind As for the Minor viz. That the Three Divine Persons in the blessed Trinity are not Three distinct Substances he proves first from Authority and he is as dangerous a Man at Authorities as ever I met with He cites Tertullian St. Ierom St. Austin and some others and he might have produced the Authority of all the ancient Fathers to prove that there is but One Substance in God but this is nothing to his purpose for by One Substance they plainly meant the Homoousion that Father Son and Holy Ghost were of the same Nature and by denying Three Substances they principally rejected Three divers Natures of different Kinds and Species in opposition to Arianism which denied the Son to be of the same Nature with his Father this he might have learnt from what he cites from his Orthodox Father Bellarmine That to assert that the Father and the Son differ in Substance is Arianism for the difference the Arians made and the Catholicks opposed was not in the real distinction of their Persons but in the diversity of their Natures and the Reason he adds will not help it out And yet he adds if they were Two distinct Substances for them not to differ in Substance would be impossible as if to be distinct and to differ in Substance were the same thing As if Two Men