be Falsity 64. Wherefore to prove a Truth to be one is but in a right method to shew it to the Minde the Understanding apprehending a thing to be true when rightly shewed as the Eye doth see the shew to be white that is duely held before it A Notion may be true yet not acknowledged to be so because not rightly apprehended or seen and it is not rightly seen or apprehended because not rightly shewed Then Truth is rightly shewed or shewed to be Truth when 't is shewed Systomatically or Harmonically The like is to be said of Falsity But to enlighten this Point I am to shew at large what Truth and consequently what Falsity is 65. Truth in the apprehensions of some of the School-men and of others is that conformity which is in things to their original Ideas in the Divine Intellect All second Beings are but Copies of the Minde of the first in which they have their Exemplars and wherein doth the verity the truth of Copies consist but in a conformity to their Originals 66. But this notion of Truth however true it may be is not pertinent to us 't is Metaphysical Truth that it relates unto a Truth of things as standing in the Analogy of God but the Truth we treat of and whose notion we are enquiring after is Logical a Truth of things as standing in our Analogy and which is the ground of Assent Certain it is this notion that the Schools afford us is not nor can it be to us a Medium of Reasoning since we cannot say what is conformable or what is not unto the divine Exemplars He must see the Original and compare the Copy with it that on knowledge will affirm this to be true 67. Of late the old Catalepsis has seen the light again that comprehension discoursed of by Cicero in his Lucullus The meaning of which is that there is no other Criterium no other judicial note of Truth no other Rule Mark or Measure whereby to know a thing to be true than clear and distinct Perception And thus also the Cartesians 68. But on the contrary clear and distinct Perception is not the Cause and Ground of Assent but onely a Condition of causing Truth is the onely Adequate and effectual Motive or Reason of Assent but to be so it must be clearly and distinctly perceived Truth as whiteness is something in the Object that invites Assent clear and distinct Perception is not in the Object but of it and consequently is not Truth but conversant about Truth Sight is not Colour but of Colour so neither is Perception Truth but of Truth Besides that cannot be a certain mark of Truth which may be affirmed as well of Errour as of Truth I may as clearly and distinctly perceive a thing to be false as to be true A thing may be evidently false as well as evidently true 69. If any say as doubtless some will that by clear and distinct Perception they mean nothing but a clear and evident apprehension of the truth of things I answer That then either they know what Truth is by its mark and definition and by the impression that it makes on the Minde as well as what Whiteness is by the impression made thereby on the Eye or they do not If they do not how can they say they clearly and distinctly perceive a thing to be true who know not Truth They might as well say they clearly and distinctly see a thing to be white when they know not whiteness Or if they know what Truth is then that Impression that Form that Notion of Truth they have ought rather to be insisted on and not the bare Perception They should say The thing is true we see clearly the Form and Notion of Truth in it For indeed nothing makes a thing true but the Form and Notion of Truth therein For did I apprehend a thing to be true never so clearly and distinctly yet if I did but apprehend it so as I may and many do and that the Notion and Form of Truth were no wise in it it were not true by vertue of the Apprehension I had of it but onely seemed so As I clearly and distinctly see an Image in the Glass when indeed it is not there or an Oar in the Water bowed and crooked when indeed it is not so It is an Errour and a most dangerous one too to assert that seeming or intellectual sense for clear and distinct Perception signifies no more is the measure of Truth There are so many ways wherein a thing may be seen clearly and distinctly that is may seem true and yet not be so No convincing Hereticks or opinionate Philosophers if Seeming be the mark of Truth 70. To this Opinion I am now to adde another much of kin to it That of the truly-Noble and Learned the late Lord Herbert namely That Truth consisteth in the Analogy Agreement Harmony of things to our Faculties inviting a most free and full Assent Or in his own Terms Veritas est Harmonia inter object a Facultates habens sensum gratissimè lubentissimè sine ulla haesttatione Respondentem 71. All the difference between the Former and the Latter Opinion is that in the former Apprehension clear and distinct in the latter Assent Free and Full is made the Mark and Measure of Truth Of this Latter Opinion as that eminent Person last mentioned among the Moderns so among the Antients were a many noble Philosophers in Tully it is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and as described by him it hath the same Foundation that his Lordship builds on namely the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Truth That Truth is so Domestical and Congruous to the Faculty so Analogous and fit to it that the Inclination of the Minde thereto in Nà ture and Necessity resembles that of a Stone or whatever or other heavy Body you 'll imagine to the Center 72. But 1 a bare Congruity between the Object and the Understanding is not the ground of Truth but of Sense or Intelligibility and though there be a Congruity in all Truth because there is a sense in it and happily more Congruity because a more agreeable Sense Yet since that Congruity is unobservable unremarkable but by Assent and Assent of it self is no sufficient Evincement of Truth I lay it by as Illogical and useless 2 Nor doth the Understanding blindly incline to Truth and as it were by Sympathy or a natural Motion of Aggregation its Assent is an act of Judgement The Minde proceeds therein judicially upon Allegations and Proof judging a thing to be true that is assenting to it onely because it sees therein the Form Notion and Mark of Truth as it judges a thing to be white wherein the Eye assures it there is the form of Whiteness And 3 one may readily and chearfully assent to Falsities and Errours and mistake them for Truths and therefore free and full Assent is no sufficient evincement of Truth Not to urge that chearfulness
the King-Key unlocking all the Mysteries of Nature The Great Creator framed all things in the Universe in Number Weight and Measure Extremes in it are united by participating Middles and in the whole System there is so admirable Uniformity as ravishes every one that beholds it every thing in its place is aptly knit with what is next it and all together into one most regular Frame of most exact Proportions Every thing we look on affords Examples and Galen in his Books of the use of Parts has a Thousand to whom if in so plain a matter it be necessary I remit the Learned Reader 80. And 't is a common sense that what is congruous is true and what is true is congruous so common that none ever fancied any notion of Truth but in Congruity some School-men in Congruity to the Divine Intellect Others in Congruity to our Faculties and all men though they speak not out and it may be minde not that they do so in Consistence and Congruity of things with one another all generally concluding that Narration for instance to be probable which seems consistent and Probability being appearance of Truth if what seems consistent be probable what is so is true But to give a Mechanical instance one that would repair a broken China-dish or make up a Watch or other Engine taken abroad what Measures doth he naturally take to do so what Rule proceeds he by None verily but by that of Congruity he makes no question but that when he hath found a place for every part wherein it lies consistently and aptly with others so that in the whole there is exact Coherence and Congruity no Flaw no Unanswerableness it is truely set together and every part in its place Truth is Harmony 81. And seeing Truth is Harmony and the Universe it self as it consists in our Analogy is but one System it follows that properly there is but one Science which some will call Pansophy one Globe of Knowledge as there is of Things As also that the partition of Sciences or rather the crumbling of them into so many hath been a great impediment of Science the dependency of Things and their Relations one to another thereby becoming unobserved and unconsidered And in fine that the more large general and comprehensive our Knowledge is the more assured and evident it is It is in Science as it is in Arch-work the Parts uphold one another and mutually contribute strength and beauty The consinement of the Understanding to particular Knowledges as also the limiting of it in any unto certain Methods and Terms of Art is like too straight a swathing of the Childe and spoils its growth 82. So much for the two Topicks of natural speculative Reasoning namely Truth and Falsity It now lies on me more expresly to describe How Reasoning is performed in reference to them and so what the Nature of it is And natural speculative Reasoning is Systematical and Harmonical it is a shewing an evincing the Truth or Falsity of a thing by conferring and comparing thing with thing it is a shewing a Notion to be true or not true by representing of it in a Frame a Scheme of real Notions with all its Relations in it and so by Comparing Evidencing how it squares agrees and harmonizes or otherwise 83. That Natural Reasoning is Harmonical Systematical that it is conferring comparing is evident in the Natural Reasonings of Plain and Illiterate but Understanding men who not having other Logick but that of kinde to verifie their Tales desire but to have them heard out from end to end and who no otherwise confute their Adversaries than by telling over again in their own way the whole Relation that so both may be compared Besides the comparative method of Reasoning used by the Minde in intelligible Objects is no other than that we naturally use in those that are sensible For be it a visible Object we enqure into and examine the truth of we turn it every way and into all postures so to make a certain judgement of it and Circumspection which is Cicero's word for it or the Mindes comparing and conferring of things is no other And if Truth indeed be Harmony Proportion Congruity an Object cannot be evinced true but by being evinced Harmonical Congruous Proportionable and it cannot be evinced Harmonical Congruous Proportionable but by being conferred and compared and upon collation and comparison shewn to be so 84. To prove Harmonically is in a Scheme and Frame of Notions bottomed on things to shew the thing to be proved to quadrate lie even and to be entirely congruous and answerable To disprove a thing Harmonically is in a Frame and Scheme of Notions bottomed on things to shew it not to quadrate but to be incongruous unanswerable and unadequate 85. The best way of Confuting Errour is to do it by shewing the Truth There is so great a delicacy in Proportions that a Scheme of Thoughts may seem congruous and agreeing by it self which compared with another is observed no longer so as two pieces of fine Cloath looked on at a distance and not compared together may be judged equally fine and one no better than the other whereas when put together and felt and so compared the difference is plain and discernible 86. The Effect of Reasoning and as it were the Conclusion is Assent or Dissent according to evidence Evidence is the Assurance we have a thing is true or false and so is either of Truth or of Falsity and answerably bottomes either Assent or Dissent 87. Assent is the judgement of the Minde upon evidence of Truth that the thing is true Dissent is the judgement of the Minde upon evidence of Falsity that the thing is false 88. Evidence of Truth is either certain or probable Certain Evidence is full Assurance Probable Evidence is good Assurance but not full Certain Evidence is evidence of certain Truth Probable Evidence is evidence of probability Probable Evidence is now a-days termed a Motive of Credibility 89. In Proportion as the Evidence is so is the Assent If the Evidence be certain that is indubitable and unquestionable and that is to be understood to be so of which there is no cause to doubt or make any Question then the Assent is firm and certain and without doubting but if the Evidence be but probable the Assent then is infirm and with doubting more or less as the Evidence is lesser or greater To Doubt is to fear lest the thing to which Assent is given should not be true 90. Evidence of Certainty is to the Minde as to its Assent all as much as Evidence of Infallibility For the Minde as firmly adheres to what it hath all reason for and no reason against all reason to believe it to be so or so and no reason to believe it to be otherwise as to what it apprehends impossible to be otherwise seeing it were unreasonable and contradictious for Reason any wise to doubt when it hath no reason at all
the prejudices that either Education Custom Passion or false Reasoning have imbibed it with Prejudices are erroneous or false Anticipations and are in the Minde as Tinctures in the Eye which falsisie its Vision Other Diseases of the Minde there are besides Prejudice as Levity Curiosity Scepticism c. in an Exemption from which also Sanity of Minde consists but the principal is Prejudice And besides Sanity of Minde there is for the apprehending of some particular Objects necessary also a Sanctity of Minde The pure in heart onely see God 51. A Due Distance from the Object not to look too neer nor at too Remote a Distance 52. Not too near Too near looking is a cause of much entanglement and errour both in forming of Philosophical and Theological Notions he that looks too near doth either see nothing at all or but confusedly he looks too near to things that not contented with common Notions of them wherein all the world agrees will have more exact ónes or that not contented with the knowledge of things according to appearances as he may see them is always attempting to know them in their Realities in which he cannot As in Quantity the common Notion of it how evident is it 'T is evident to all men and none but knows what is meant by it and he that looks on Quantity but so observes a due distance but whosoever looks nearer looks too near and is confounded with the composition of the Continuum and well he may that takes a Phaenomenon a Spectrum an Appearance for a Reality 53. Not at too remote a distance He considers Objects at too remote a distance that looks on them but in second Notions or contents himself with general ones which at best are but confused and uncertain and being so no wonder if they cause mistakes the more particular and distinct the surer the knowledge is we are often deceived with appearances and take one thing and person for another when we only see them afar off 54. Due attention is a fixed and steady beholding of the Object in order to a framing clear and distinct conceptions about it and 't is opposed to Inadvertency or a precipitate and hasty skipping from thing to thing without a due considering of any A Distemper of Minde to which Youth and warm Complexions are subject which though they may be more ingenious and witty and more prompt and ready are yet for that reason seldom so judicious prudent and weighty as those of cooler Tempers and of more Age. 55. So much for Apprehension the first Act of Understanding I now pass on to the second which is Judgement 56. Judgement is that Act of the Understanding whereby it having compared and considered things presented to it and apprehended by it comes in the end and upshot either to Assent or Dissent So that Judgement is a compounded Act and as it were made up of two one of which is Mediate and Inchoate the other Ultimate Compleat the first is Comparing and Considering the second Resolving and Decreeing That the Premisses this the Conclusion The former properly is Reasoning the later Resolving according to Reason 57. Reasoning is a producing or shewing of a Reason A Reason is the Ground of Intellectual Judgement or the Cause why the Understanding either assents or dissents Assent is the Approving Judgement of the Understanding Dissent is the Disproving Judgement of the Understanding To shew Reason for a thing is to prove it to shew Reason against a thing is to disprove it Plain Reason is that which convinceth Forced Reason is that which only confutes To confute is so to entangle a person that he cannot answer To convince is so to shew him Reason that he cannot deny it to be so A man is often confuted when yet he is not convinced 58. Method of Reasoning is called Logick and is either Artificial or Natural Artificial is the Logick of Schools of which the chiefest is Aristotle's and is useful many waies but among others mainly as a Whetstone to acute and sharpen the Wit and to render it more sagacious circumspect and wary both in making and admitting Deductions and Consequences Natural Logick that of plain and illiterate men of which I designe to discourse is the natural method of Reasoning in relation whereunto the Scots are said to have a Proverb That an Ounce of Mother-wit is worth a Pound of Clergy 59. Natural Logick is universal a Logick of the whole kinde so that what in Natural Logick is reason to one man is so to all for all having the same Faculties and using them in the same Method must needs come to the same issue and by the same Principles arrive to the same Conclusion 60. As one naturally by often seeing and attending to his own acts acquires a method how to look to see to the best advantage as also Optical Rules by which he judges of Objects which Method and which Rules are to speak generally the same among all men So may he by frequent reasoning and attending to his own and others reasonings easily and insensibly acquire a Method which as reasoning itself will for the general be the same with all men how to use his Reason to the best advantage to reason out things This common method of Reasoning which because common and in some measure acquired without assistances of Art I call natural is natural Logick 61. All Reasoning is either Speculative or Practical Speculative Reasoning is shewing a thing is true or false Practical Reasoning is shewing a thing is to be done or not to be done A Speculative Reason is the ground of Speculative Judgment A Practical Reason the ground of Practical Judgment Speculative Judgment is judgment that a thing is true or false Judgment that it is true is Speculative Assent that 't is false Speculative Dissent Practical Judgment is Judgment or Decree that a thing is to be done or not to be done Judgment that a thing is to be done is Judgment for it or practical Assent Judgment that a thing is not to be done is Judgment against it or practical Dissent 62. Speculative Reasoning is either Proving or Disproving To prove is to shew a thing to be true to disprove is to shew a thing to be false So that in natural Logick as to speculative Reasoning there are but two Topicks or principal places of Arguments and those are Verity and Falsity The one affords us a medium of Proving the other a medium of Disproving I prove what I say by shewing the Truth I disprove what another says by shewing the Falsity of it 63. Truth and Falsity are to the Minde as white and black to the Eye as these are kinds of Colours and so the objects of the Eye so the former are kinds of Sense and consequently objects of the Minde And as the Eye rightly circumstanced and condition'd sees white to be white and black to be black so the Understanding sees Truth rightly shewn to be Truth and Falsity to
of Assent that readiness and promptness we many times observe in it is oftner an effect of a Passion bribing of the Understanding than of a pure clear impartial Reason 73. Wherefore others of the Antients as well as of the Moderns abundantly convinced of the insufficiency both of Perception clear and distinct and of Assent free and full to ascertain them of Truth and yet unwilling to have Nature so liberal in other matters exposed to the reproach of Deficiency in One so important as intellectual Judgement They have conceited humane understanding furnish'd by her with certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipations that is with Connatural and Ingrafted Notions Principles designedly implanted in the Minde to be a rule to it to direct it Thus in the speculative Understanding they have set up a habit which they call Intelligence in the Practical another which is called Synteresis in both a Constellation of Principles shining with their own Light and imparting it to others that want it not much unlike to what is affirmed of Dionysius in his Celestial Hierarchy concerning Spirits that those of superiour Orders enlighten all beneath them in the inferiour 74. But were there really such a System of Notions and first Principles ingrafted in the Minde by Nature in whose Light all others were to shine and to be seen it would follow that Contemplation of our own mindes acquainting us with the Chain Concatenation and Sorites of the Principles therein and Propositions deducible therefrom would more import to the rendring us Philosophers not to say Divines also than observation of the World and Experience and so the greatest School-men those Metaphysical Alchymists that insisted much on this Method and spun out all their notions of their own Bowels should have been the wisest and most fruitful of men Whereas we know the men and the manner of their Communication all their Discourses are indeed subtle and acute but also empty and barren and no more agreeing with Realities and in our Analogy than Light with Darkness Again the Soul in its state of Union and Conjunction with the Body is so dependent on it in all its Operations that it exercises none without the Aids of it Ratiocination it self it is an Animal act not an abstract Action of the Soul but a Concrete act of the Animal it is the Man reasons And in the ordinary method of Nature we receive into our Mindes no Impressions no Images but what are handed to them by our Senses I am apt to think that person who should never have seen nor heard nor tasted nor smelt nor felt any thing would have his minde as little furnish'd with Idea's or Notions as his Memory with Images and would understand as little as he had sensed Besides those very Principles themselves we call First ones or Anticipations shining with their own lustre and light Propositions which we cannot but assent to assoon as we hear them or minde them It will appear if we reflect warily on what doth pass in our Mindes that even these are not assented to but on the Evidence they bring I mean not assented to naturally but as other Propositions are judicially For instance that the whole is greater than the part we assented not unto it on the first hearing but first considering what was meant by Whole what by Part what by Greater what by Lesser and then having sensibly either by Eye-sight or by Imagination compared one unto the other we evidently saw it to be so that the Notion of Greater even to Sense ever agreed to the whole and that of Less to the Parts The like that Two and Two make Four This is the way we first admitted to belief the Propositions which are called Principles and it is no other than that wherein we admit all others Onely the Propositions which are call'd Anticipations or first Principles are Propositions of so easie sensible and plain an evidence and so obvious that we early admitted them so early that we cannot well remember when we first did so and therefore they are stiled Anticipations or proleptick Notions for being of so early an admission and existence in our Mindes they preceded all our after knowledges whose acquirement we well remember Further Beings are not to be multiplied without Necessity and there is none of faigning such Anticipations and Habits of Principles to direct the Minde in inquisitions after Truth since all acknowledge there are no such principles in the Eye the Ear the Nose the Tongue to direct them and why then in the Minde Besides Reflection on our ordinary reasonings evinces that in them we seldom attend to such Principles but to the Object discoursed of nor need we to do otherwise if it can be evidenced that there is a certain Notion Form Ground of Truth that runs through all things true which Form or Notion of Truth assoon as the Understanding rightly circumstanced and conditioned apprehends in an Object it cannot but acknowledge it to be true as it would another to be white or black wherein it is assured by the Eye rightly circumstanced and conditioned that there is the Form of Whiteness or Blackness As for Anticipations they are too particular and not of a nature so large and comprehensive as to be the Rules and Measures of Truth which is infinite Let those Anticipations be reckoned and then Experiment be made upon comparison with the immense Latitude of Questions and of Truth relating to them 75. Thus I have shewn the Indications Marks and Notions of Truth that in my judgement are not proper adequate or useful it now remaineth that I shew one that is And Truth as it is the Ground Motive and Reason of Assent is objective Harmony or the Harmony Congruity Even-lying Answerableness Consistence Proportion and Coherence of things each with other in the Frame and Scheme of them in our Mindes Truth is universal and exact Agreement or Harmony 76. On the other hand Falsity as the ground motive and reason of Dissent is Objective Disharmony or the disharmony incongruity inequality unanswerableness inconsistence disproportion and incoherence of things in the Frame and Scheme of them in our Mindes Any Disagreement or Disharmony is Falsity 77. Probability or Likelihood of Truth is an appearance of Congruity A thing is probable when it hath some consistence and agreement it Quadrates and lies even with what we do know but in regard there are particulars relating to the same Systemes and Frames of Thoughts which yet we do not know therefore we know not if it will lie even and square with them Improbability is apparent Incongruity 78. That Truth is Harmony and Proportion and consequently that Probability is apparent Harmony apparent Proportion and Falsity Disharmony Disproportion cannot be but very evident to him that shall consult with Nature and common sense 79. In Nature it is plain For Harmony it is the Reason of the World the World was made by it cannot be known but by it The rule of Proportion is
to do so I am as sure that once there were such persons as William the Conquerour and Henry the Eight and that there are or lately were such Cities as Rome and Constantinople as I am that Two and Two make Four or that the Whole is greater than the Parts 91. Firm Assent in matters in themselves mutable and of a contingent nature may be called Confidence but in matters of a necessary firm and immutable nature it is Science Infirm Assent or Assent with Dubitation is called Opinion Suspition is a beginning Assent or an inclination to believe a thing and is short of Opinion Suspition on grounds is called just suspition Suspition on no grounds is mere suspition Probability is appearance of Truth And ground of Suspition is Appearance of Probability Suspition is also called Presumption 92. Assent on Evidence by the testimony of our own Senses rightly circumstanced and conditioned is as firm as firm can be and is called Knowledge Assent to a thing upon anothers knowledge and not our own is called Belief To Believe is to take a thing upon anothers word and if that word be divine the belief is called Faith or if but humane it is called simply Belief or Credit Belief is grounded on the wisdom and veracity of the person believed for he that believes another believes him to have wisdom enough not to be imposed upon or deceived himself and Veracity or Truth which among men is called Honesty enough not to impose upon or to deceive him The Word of God therefore is the most proper object of belief God being so wise he cannot be deceived and so true he cannot deceive Notoreity of a thing of a fact is the certainty of it on Common Knowledge It is not Presumption nor Probability but Certainty 93. Assent to Falsity under the notion of Truth if it be firm is called Errour If infirm and with dubitation it is erroneous Opinion 94. Ratiocination Speculative is either Euretick or Hermeneutick Inventive or Interpretative and this latter again is either interpretative of the World the Book of Nature or of the Scriptures the Book of God But of these perhaps another time as also of the method of Reasoning which I called Practical and is either that of Prudence 1. Humane or 2. Christian or of Conscience Now on the whole Matter who seeth not the share and interest that Reason hath in matters of Religion Men are reasonable Creatures and therefore their Religion must be reasonable Every Tree must bring forth Fruit in its kinde Faith it self it is a rational Act If I have any reason to believe Men I have all reason to believe God and Ratiocination is as much imploy'd in points of Revelation as in points of mere Reason Truth is the immediate reason of Assent in matters of Revelation as well as in others and there is an Analogie of Faith as well as of Nature the Mediums are different but Ratiocination is the same in both We are as well obliged to compare Spiritual things with Spiritual in the one as Natural things with Natural in the other Thus are the Bereans applauded as persons of nobler and more generous Mindes than those of Thessalonica because they took not all on trust as these did but examined the things were told them and compared them with the Scriptures It is easie also to infer that if any person shall give himself the trouble of disproving what in my Apologie I presented to the World to do it to Conviction he must produce a frame and Scheme of Thoughts more Congruous and Harmonical than mine and must account for those Phaenomena which I therein essay'd to solve in a method more perspicuous and natural and with more agreeableness and uniformity of Notions than I have or else he will not Confute but confirm it I say this to shew the fairer play to those that undertake to answer me if after I have said it any shall resolve to do so and I say no more to shew the Opinion I yet avow to be mine of all the Objections whispered up and down that in themselves they have as little force and evidence and as little conviction as those that make them have yet had either Courage to own them to the world or Candour to own them to me Thus Sir I have performed what I principally designed I have shew'd the nature of Reason I have shewed the true method of Reasoning as also the nature of Truth and up and down my Discourse dispersedly the causes of Errour and I have shew'd the extent of Reason In which performance whatsoever other Incongruity or Errour I may have been guilty of sure I am I have committed none in dedicating it For to whom could I address a Discourse of Reason and of Truth more properly than to a Person who is so great a Lover and owner of both and withal who is so perfectly honoured as you are by all that have the happiness to know you But by none more than Sir Bowdon Aug. 14. 1677. 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