our Knowledge that God revealed it which in this Case where the Proposition suppos'd reveal'd contradicts our Knowledge or Reason will always have this Objection hanging to it viz. that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from GOD the bountiful Author of our Being which if received for true must overturn all our Principles and Foundations of Knowledge render all our Faculties useless wholly destroy the most excellent part of his Workmanship our Understandings and put a Man in a Condition wherein he will have less Light less Conduct than the Beast that perisheth For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer and perhaps not so clear an Evidence of any thing to be a divine Revelation as it has of the Principles of its own Reason it can never have a ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reason to give place to a Proposition whose Revelation has not a greater Evidence § 6. Thus far a Man has use of Reason and ought to hearken to it even in immediate and original Revelation where it is supposedly made to himself But to all those who pretend not to immediate Revelation but are required to pay Obedience and to receive the Truths revealed to others which by the Tradition of Writings or Word of Mouth are conveyed down to them Reason has a great deal more to do and is that only which can induce us to receive them For Matter of Faith being only Divine Revelation and nothing else Faith as we use the Word called commonly Divine Faith has to do with no Propositions but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed So that I do not see how those who make Revelation alone the sole Object of Faith can say that it is a Matter of Faith and not of Reason to believe that such or such a Proposition to be found in such or such a Book is of Divine Inspiration unless it be revealed that that Proposition or all in that Book was communicated by Divine Inspiration Without such a Revelation the believing or not believing that Proposition or Book to be of Divine Authority can never be Matter of Faith but Matter of Reason and such as I must come to an Assent to only by the use of my Reason which can never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary to it self it being impossible for Reason ever to procure any Assent to that which to it self appears unreasonable In all Things therefore where we have clear Evidence from our Ideas and those Principles of Knowledge I have above mentioned Reason is the proper Judge and Revelation though it may in consenting with it confirm its Dictates yet cannot in such Cases invalidate its Decrees Nor can we be obliged where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reason to quit it for the contrary Opinion under a Pretence that it is Matter of Faith § 7. But Thirdly There being many Things wherein we have very imperfect Notions or none at all and other Things of whose past present or future Existence by the natural Use of our Faculties we can have no Knowledge at all these as being beyond the Discovery of our natural Faculties and above Reason are when revealed the proper Matter of Faith Thus that part of the Angels rebelled against GOD and thereby lost their first happy State And that the Bodies of Men shall rise and live again These and the like being beyond the Discovery of Reason are purely Matters of Faith with which Reason has directly nothing to do § 8. But since all Things that are under the Character of Divine Revelation are esteemed Matter of Faith and there are amongst them several Things that fall under the Examen of Reason and are such as we could judge of by our natural Faculties without a Supernatural Revelation In these Revelation must carry it against the probable Conjectures of Reason because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know but is only probably convinced of is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive But yet it still belongs to Reason to judge of the Truth of its being a Revelation and of the signification of the Words wherein it is delivered Indeed if any thing shall be thought Revelation which is contrary to the plain Principles of Reason and the evident Knowledge the Mind has of its own clear and distinct Ideas there Reason must be hearkned to as to a Matter within its Province since a Man can never have so certain a Knowledge that a Proposition which contradicts the clear Principles and Evidence of his own Knowledge was divinely revealed or that he understands the Words rightly wherein it is delivered as he has that the Contrary is true and so is bound to consider and judge of it as a Matter of Reason and not swallow it without Examination as a Matter of Faith § 9. The Summ of all is First Whatever Proposition is revealed of whose Truth our Mind by its natural Faculties and Notions cannot judge that is purely Matter of Faith and above Reason Secondly All Propositions whereof the Mind by the use of its natural Faculties can come to determine and judge from natural acquired Ideas are Matter of Reason with this difference still that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence and so is persuaded of their Truth only upon probable Grounds which still admit a Possibility of the Contrary to be true without doing Violence to the certain Evidence of its own Knowledge and overturning the Principles of all Reason In such probable Propositions I say an evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent even against Probability For where the Principles of Reason have not determined a Proposition to be certainly true or false there clear Revelation as another Principle of Truth and Ground of Assent may determine and so it may be Matter of Faith and be also above Reason Because Reason in that particular Matter being able to reach no higher than Probability Faith gave the Determination where Reason came short and Revelation discovered on which side the Truth lay § 10. Thus far the Dominion of Faith reaches and that without any violence or hindrance to Reason which is not injured or disturbed but assisted and improved by new Discoveries of Truth coming from the Eternal Fountain of all Knowledge Whatever GOD hath revealed is certainly true no Doubt can be made of it This is the proper Object of Faith But whether it be a divine Revelation or no Reason must judge which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident nor prefer less Certainty to the greater There can be no Evidence that any traditional Revelation is of divine Original in the Words we receive it and in the Sense we understand it so clear and so certain as those of the Principles of Reason And therefore
Load-stone draws Iron and the parts of a Candle successively melting turn into flame and give us both light and heat These and the like Effects we see and know but the causes that operate and the manner they are produced in we can only guess and probably conjecture For these and the like coming not within the scrutiny of humane Senses cannot be examined by them or be attested by any body and therefore can appear more or less probable only as they more or less agree to Truths that are established in our Minds and as they hold proportion to other parts of our Knowledge and Observation Analogy in these matters is the only help we have and 't is from that alone we draw all our grounds of Probability Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently one upon another produces heat and very often fire it self we have reason to think that what we call Heat and Fire consists in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning matter◠observing likewise that the different refractions of pellucid Bodies produce in our Eyes the different appearances of several Colours and also that the different ranging and laying the superficial parts of several Bodies as of Velvet watered Silk c. does the like we think it probable that the Colour and shining of Bodies is in them nothing but the different Arangement and Refraction of their minute and insensible parts Thus finding in all the parts of the Creation that fall under humane Observation that there is a gradual connexion of one with another without any great or discernable gaps between in all that great variety of Things we see in the World which are so closely linked together that in the several ranks of Beings it is not easie to discover the bounds betwixt them we have Reason to be persuaded that in such gentle steps Things in Perfection ascend upwards 'T is an hard Matter to say where Sensible and Rational begin and where Insensible and Irrational end and who is there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely which is the lowest Species of living Things and which the first of those which have no Life Things as far as we can observe lessen and augment as the quantity does in a regular Cone where though there be a manifest odds betwixt the bigness of the Diametre at remote distances yet the difference between the upper and under where they touch one another is hardly discernable The difference is exceeding great between some Men and some Animals But if we will compare the Understanding and Abilities of some Men and some Brutes we shall find so little difference that 't will be hard to say that that of the Man is either clearer or larger Observing I say such gradual and gentle descents downwards in those parts of the Creation that are beneath Man the Rule of Analogy may make it probable that it is so also in Things above us and our Observation and that there are several ranks of intelligent Beings excelling us in several degrees of Perfection ascending upwards towards the infinite Perfection of the Creator by gentle steps and differences that are every one at no great distance from the next to it This sort of Probability which is the best conduct of rational Experiments and the rise of Hypothesis has also its Use and Influence and a wary Reasoning from Analogy leads us often into the discovery of Truths and useful Productions which would otherwise lie concealed § 13. Though the common Experience and the ordinary Course of Things have justly a mighty Influence on the Minds of Men to make them give or refuse Credit to any thing proposed to their Belief yet there is one Case wherein the strangeness of the Fact lessens not the Assent to a fair Testimony given of it For where such supernatural Events are suitable to ends aim'd at by him who has the Power to change the course of Nature there under such Circumstances they may be the fitter to procure Belief by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to ordinary Observation This is the proper Case of Miracles which well attested do not only find Credit themselves but give it also to other Truths which need such Confirmation § 14. Besides those we have hitherto mentioned there is one sort of Propositions that challenge the highest degree of our Assent upon bare Testimony whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common Experience and the ordinary course of Things or no. The Reason whereof is because the Testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived and that is of God himself This carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt Evidence beyond Exception This is called by a peculiar Name Revelation and our Assent to it Faith which has as much Certainty as our Knowledge it self and we may as well doubt of our own Being as we can whether any Revelation from GOD be true So that Faith is a setled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Hesitation Only we must be sure that it be a divine Revelation and that we understand it right else we shall expose our selves to all the Extravagancy of Enthusiasm and all the Error of wrong Principles if we have Faith and Assurance in what is not divine Revelation And therefore in those Cases our Assent can be rationally no higher than the Evidence of its being a Revelation and that this is the meaning of the Expressions it is delivered in If the Evidence of its being a Revelation or that this its true Sense be only on probable Proofs our Assent can reach no higher than an Assurance or Diffidence arising from the more or less apparent Probability of the Proofs But of Faith and the Precedency it ought to have before other Arguments of Persuasion I shall speak more hereafter where I treat of it as it is ordinarily placed in contradistinction to Reason though in Truth it be nothing else but an Assent founded on the highest Reason CHAP. XVII Of Reason § 1. THE Word Reason in the English Language has different Significations sometimes it is taken for true and clear Principles Sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those Principles and sometimes for the Cause and particularly the final Cause but the Consideration I shall have of it here is in a Signification different from all these and that is as it stands for a Faculty in Man That Faculty whereby Man is supposed to be distinguished from Beasts and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them § 2. If general Knowledge as has been shewn consists in a Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own Ideas and the Knowledge of the Existence of all Things without us except only of GOD be had only by our Senses What room then is there for the Exercise of any other Faculty but outward Sense and inward Perception What need is there of Reason Very much
current stream of Antiquity or to put it in the balance against that of some learned Doctor or otherwise approved Writer Whoever backs his Tenets with such Authorities thinks he ought thereby to carry the Cause and is ready to style it Impudence in any one who shall stand out against them This I think may be called Argumentum ad Verecundiam Secondly § 20. Another way that Men ordinarily use to drive others and force them to submit their Judgments and receive the Opinion in debate is to require the Adversary to admit what they alledge as a Proof or to assign a better And this I call Argumentum ad Ignorantiam § 21. Thirdly A third way is to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles or Concessions This is already known under the Name of Argumentum ad Hominem § 22. Fourthly The fourth is the using of Proofs drawn from any of the Foundations of Knowledge or Probability This I call Argumentum ad Iudicium This alone of all the four brings true Instruction with it and advances us in our way to Knowledge For 1. It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right because I out of respect or any other consideration but that of conviction will not contradict him 2. It proves not another Man to be in the right way nor that I ought to take the same with him because I know not a better 3. Nor does it follow that another Man is in the right way because he has shewn me that I am in the wrong I may be modest and therefore not oppose another Man's Persuasion I may be ignorant and not be able to produce a better I may be in an Errour and another may shew me that I am so This may dispose me perhaps for the reception of Truth but helps me not to it That must come from Proofs and Arguments and light arising from the nature of Things themselves and not from my Shamefacedness Ignorance or Errour § 23. By what has been before said of Reason we may be able to make some guess at th◠distinction of Things into those that are according to above and contrary to Reason 1. According to Reason are such Propositions whose Truth we can discover by examining and tracing those Ideas we have from Sensation and Reflexion and by natural deduction find to be true or probable 2. Above Reason are such Propositions whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles 3. Contrary to Reason are such Propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcileable to our clear and distinct Ideas Thus the Existence of one GOD is according to Reason the Existence of more than one GOD contrary to Reason the Resurrection of the Body after death above Reason Above Reason also may be taken in a double sense viz. Above Probability or above Certainty and in that large sense also Contrary to Reason is I suppose sometimes taken § 24. There is another use of the word Reason wherein it is opposed to Faith which though it be in it self a very improper way of speaking yet common Use has so authorized it that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it Only I think it may not be amiss to take notice that however Faith be opposed to Reason Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind which if it be regulated as is our Duty cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good Reason and so cannot be opposite to it He that believes without having any Reason for believing may be in love with his own Fansies but neither seeks Truth as he ought nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him to keep him out of Mistake and Errour He that does not this to the best of his power however he sometimes lights on Truth is in the right but by chance and I know not whether the luckiness of the Accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding This at least is certain that he must be accountable for whatever Mistakes he runs into whereas he that makes use of the Light and Faculties GOD has given him and seeks sincerely to discover Truth by those Helps and Abilities he has may have this satisfaction in doing his Duty as a rational Creature that though he should miss Truth he will not miss the Reward of it For he governs his Assent right and places it as he should who in any case or matter whatsoever believes or disbelieves according as Reason directs him He that does otherwise transgresses against his own Light and misuses the Faculties which were given him to no other end but to search and follow the clearer Evidence and greater Probability But since Reason and Faith are by some Men opposed we will so consider them in the following Chapter CHAP. XVIII Of Faith and Reason and their distinct Provinces § 1. IT has been above shewn 1. That we are of necessity ignorant and want Knowledge of all sorts where we want Ideas 2. That we are ignorant and want rational Knowledge where we want Proofs 3. That we want general Knowledge and Certainty as far as we want clear and determined specifick Ideas 4. That we want Probability to direct our Assent in matters where we have neither Knowledge of our own nor Testimony of other Men to bottom our Reason upon From these things thus premised I think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries between Faith and Reason the want whereof may possibly have been the cause if not of great Disorders yet at least of great Disputes and perhaps Mistakes in the World For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by Reason and how far by Faith we shall in vain dispute and endeavour to convince one another in Matters of Religion § 2. I find every Sect as far as Reason will help them make use of it gladly and where it fails them they cry out 'T is matter of Faith and above Reason And I do not see how they can ever be convinced by any who makes use of the same plea without setting down strict boundaries between Faith and Reason which ought to be the first point established in all Questions where Faith has any thing to do Reason therefore here as contradistinguished to Faith I take to be the discovery of the Certainty or Probability of such Propositions or Truths which the Mind arrives at by Deductions made from such Ideas which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties viz. by Sensation or Reflexion Faith on the other side is the Assent to any Proposition not thus made out by the Deductions of Reason but upon the Credit of the Proposer as coming immediately from GOD which we call Revelation § 3. First Then I say That no Man inspired by GOD can by any Revelation communicate to others any new simple Ideas which they had not before from Sensation or Reflexion For
whatsoever impressions he himself may have from the immediate hand of GOD this Revelation if it be of new simple Ideas cannot be conveyed to another either by Words or any other signs because Words by their immediate Operation on us cause no other Ideas but of their natural Sounds and 't is by the Custom of using them for Signs that they excite and revive in our Minds latent Ideas but yet only such Ideas as were there before For Words seen or heard recall to our Thoughts those Ideas only which to us they have been wont to be Signs of but cannot introduce any perfectly new simple Ideas which were never there before The same holds in all other Signs which cannot signifie to us Things of which we have before never had any Ideas at all Thus whatever Things were discovered to St. Paul when he was rapp'd up into the Third Heaven whatever new Ideas his Mind there received all the description he can make to others of that Place is only this That there are such Things as Eye hath not seen nor Ear heard nor hath it entred into the Heart of Man to conceive And supposing God should discover to any one supernaturally a Species of Creatures inhabiting For Example Iupiter or Saturn for that it is possible there may be such no body can deny which had six Senses and imprint on his Mind the Ideas convey'd to theirs by that sixth Sense he could no more by Words produce in the Minds of other Men those Ideas imprinted by that sixth Sense than one of us could convey the Idea of any Colour by the sound of Words into a Man who having the other four Senses perfect had always totally wanted the fifth of Seeing For our simple Ideas then which are the Foundation and sole Matter of all our Notions and Knowledge we must depend wholly on our Reason I mean our natural Faculties and can by no means receive them or any of them from Traditional Revelation I say Traditional Revelation in distinction to Original Revelation By the one I mean that first Impression which is made immediately by GOD on the Mind of any Man to which I pretend not to set any Bounds and by the other those Impressions delivered over to others in Words and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another § 4. Secondly I say that the same Truths may be discovered and conveyed down from Revelation which are discoverable to us by Reason and those clear Ideas we have So God might by Revelation discover the Truth of any Proposition in Euclid as well as Men by the natural use of their Faculties come to make the discovery themselves In all Things of this Nature there is little need or use of Revelation GOD having furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at the Knowledge of them For whatsoever Truth we come to the discovery of from the Knowledge and Contemplation of our own clear Ideas will always be certainer to us than those which are conveyed to us by Traditional Revelation for the Knowledge we have that this Revelation came at first from GOD can never be so sure as the Knowledge we have from our own clear and distinct Ideas As if it were revealed some Ages since That the three Angles of a Triangle were equal to two right ones I might assent to the Truth of that Proposition upon the Credit of the Tradition that it was revealed but that would never amount to so great a Certainty as the Knowledge of it upon the comparing and measuring my own clear Ideas of two right Angles and the three Angles of a Triangle The like holds in Matter of Fact knowable by our Senses v. g. the History of the Deluge is conveyed to us by Writings which had their Original from Revelation and yet no body I think will say he has as certain and clear a Knowledge of the Flood as Noah that saw it or that he himself would have had had he then been alive and seen it For he has no greater an assurance than that of his Senses that it is writ in the Book supposed writ by Moses but he has not so great an assurance that Moses writ that Book as if he had seen Moses write it so that the assurance of its being a Revelation is less still than the assurance of his Senses § 5. In Propositions then whose Certainty is built upon clear and perfect Ideas and evident Deductions of Reason we need not the assistence of Revelation as necessary to gain our Assent and introduce them into our Minds Because the natural ways of Knowledge could settle them there or had done it already which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of any thing unless where God immediately reveals it to us and there too our Assurance can be no greater than our Knowledge is that it is a Revelation from God But yet nothing I think can under that Title shake or over-rule plain Knowledge nor rationally prevail with any Man to admit it for true in a direct contradiction to the clear Evidence of his own Understanding For since no Evidence of our Faculties by which we receive such Revelations can exceed if equal the Certainty of our intuitive Knowledge we can never receive for a Truth any thing that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge v. g. The Idea of one Body and one Place does so clearly agree and the Mind has so evident a Perception of it that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms the same Body to be in two distant Places at once however it should pretend to the Authority of a divine Revelation since the Evidence First That we deceive not our selves in ascribing it to GOD Secondly That we understand it right can never be so great as the Evidence of our own intuitive Knowledge whereby we discern it impossible for the same Body to be in two Places at once And therefore no Proposition can be received for divine Revelation or obtain the Assent due to all such if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledge Since this would be to subvert the Principles and Foundations of all Knowledge Evidence and Assent whatsoever and leave no difference between Truth and Falshood no measures of Credible and Incredible in the World if doubtful Propositions shall take place before self-evident and what we certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in In Propositions therefore contrary to our distinct and clear Ideas 't will be in vain to urge them as Matters of Faith They cannot move our Assent under that or any other Title whatsoever For Faith can never convince us of any thing that contradicts our Knowledge Because though Faith be founded on the Testimony of God revealing any Proposition to us who cannot lie yet we cannot have an assurance of the Truth of its being a divine Revelation greater than our own Knowledge since the whole strength of the Certainty depends upon
ult rightly 162 9 particular Species 170 38 Ideas so which 171 26 Qualities in 174 41 not their 178 44 use stand 179 12 Names 15 Names 187 32 Conceptions 188 47 them did 204 21 other Murther 209 16 burg from 42 no more 44 the name 212 53 ings 213 3 selves to them in 7 which we ult no distinct 221 17 Numbers 224 46 others to their received 227 45 them But men 230 5 Idea to be 38 of mistaken Pretenders 232 27 communication it is 233 2 them What 234 19 of those 237 49 observe several Properties 240 8 in this way 241 46 of the World 242 35 subtlety 243 30 subtlety 248 5 use them in 271 3 Diversity in this way of 20 not know what other 272 7 Qualities 30 so few 275 3 cation always and in thinking often does not steadily 277 8 Or confines 278 3 Minds 18 Triangle And 23 more did 26 wheels The 279 18 Ideas we by reflexion 46 smell which we 287 20 Spirit upon 298 5 which is in truth 7 which I think 300 19 more to these 301 21 and fully convinced 308 16 signification 47 one more or 320 42 waking Man should answer him 321 38 for man 324 32 and proved in 327 10 adapted 328 10 at that end 330 28 three four and 331 5 place us in 11 were revelation silent 334 2 else and that 344 42 obscurity 352 44 no room 362 11 makes OF Humane Understanding BOOK I. CHAP. I. Introduction § 1. SInce it is the Vnderstanding that sets Man above the rest of sensible Beings and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion which he has over them it is certainly a Subject even for its Nobleness worth our Labour to enquire into The Understanding like the Eye whilst it makes us see and perceive all other Things takes no notice of it self And it requires Art and Pains to set it at a distance and make it its own Object But whatever be the Difficulties that lie in the way of this Enquiry whatever it be that keeps us so much in the Dark to our selves sure I am that all the Light we can let in upon our own Minds all the Acquaintance we can make with our own Understandings will not only be very pleasant but bring us great Advantage in directing our Thoughts in the search of other Things § 2. This therefore being my Purpose to enquire into the Original Certainty and Extent of humane Knowledge together with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief Opinion and Assent I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind or trouble my self to examine wherein its Essence consists or by what Motions of our Spirits or Alterations of our Bodies we come to have any Sensation by our Organs or any Idea's in our Understandings and whether those Idea's do in their Formation any or all of them depend on Matter or no. These are Speculations which however curious and entertaining I shall decline as lying out of my Way in the Design I am now upon It shall suffice to my present Purpose to consider the discerning Faculties of a Man as they are employ'd about the Objects which they have to do with and I shall imagine I have not wholly misimploy'd my self in the Thoughts I shall have on this Occasion if in this Historical plain Method I can give any Account of the Ways whereby our Understandings come to attain those Notions of Things we have and can set down any Measures of the Certainty of our Knowledge or the Grounds of those Perswasions which are to be found amongst Men so various different and wholly contradictory and yet asserted some where or other with such Assurance and Confidence that he that shall take a view of the Opinions of Mankind observe their Opposition and at the same time consider the Fondness and Devotion wherewith they are embrac'd the Resolution and Eagerness wherewith they are maintain'd may perhaps have Reason to suspect That either there is no such thing as Truth at all or that Mankind hath no sufficient Means to attain a certain Knowledge of it § 3. It is therefore worth while to search out the Bounds between Opinion and Knowledge and examine by what Measures in things whereof we have no certain Knowledge we ought to regulate our Assent and moderate our Perswasions In Order whereunto I shall pursue this following Method First I shall enquire into the Original of those Idea's Notions or whatever else you please to call them which a Man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his Mind and the ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them Secondly I shall endeavour to shew what Knowledge the Understanding hath by those Idea's and the Certainty Evidence and Extent of it Thirdly I shall make some Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds of Faith or Opinion whereby I mean that Assent which we give to any Proposition as true of whose Truth yet we have no certain Knowledge And here we shall have Occasion to examine the Reasons and Degrees of Assent § 4. If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Understanding I can discover the Powers thereof at how far they reach to which things they are in any Degree proportionate and where they fail us I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busie Mind of Man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its Comprehension to stop when it is at the utmost Extent of its Tether and to sit down in a quiet Ignorance of those Things which upon Examination are found to be beyond the reach of our Capacities We should not then perhaps be so forward out of an Affectation of an universal Knowledge to raise Questions and perplex our selves and others with Disputes about Things to which our Understandings are not suited and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any clear or distinct Perceptions or whereof as it has perhaps too often happen'd we have not any Notions at all If we can find out how far the Understanding can extend its view how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty and in what Cases it can only judge and guess we may learn to content our selves with what is attainable by us in this State § 5. For though the Comprehension of our Understandings comes exceeding short of the vast Extent of Things yet we shall have Cause enough to magnifie the bountiful Author of our Being for that Portion and Degree of Knowledge he has bestowed on us so far above all the rest of the Inhabitants of this our Mansion Men have Reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them since he has given them as St. Peter says 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whatsoever is necessary for the Conveniences of Life and Information of Vertue and has put within the reach of their Discovery the Provisions that may support or sweeten this Life and the Way that leads to a better How short soever their
themselves do this one amongst another but 't is without receiving these as the innate Laws of Nature They practice them as Rules of convenience within their own Communities But it is impossible to conceive that he imbraces Justice as a practical Principle who acts fairly with his Fellow-High-way-men and at the same time plunders or kills the next honest Man he meets with Justice and Truth are the common ties of Society and therefore even Outlaws and Villains who break with all the World besides must keep Faith and Rules of Equity amongst themselves or else they cannot hold together But will any one say That those that live by Fraud and Rapine have innate Principles of Truth and Justice which they allow and assent to § 3. Perhaps it will be urged That the tacit assent of their Minds agrees to what their Practice contradicts I answer First I have always thought the Actions of Men the best Interpreters of their thoughts But since it is certain that most Men's Practice and some Men's open Professions have either questioned or denied these Principles it is impossible to establish an universal consent though we should look for it only amongst grown Men without which it is impossible to conclude them innate Secondly 'T is very strange and unreasonable to suppose innate practical Principles that terminate only in Contemplation Practical Principles derived from Nature are there for Operation and must produce Conformity of Action not barely speculative assent to their truth or else they are in vain destinguish'd from speculative Maxims Nature I confess has put into Man a desire of Happiness and an aversion to Misery These indeed are innate practical Principles which as practical Principles ought do continue constantly to operate and influence all our Actions without ceasing These may be observed in all Persons and all Ages steady and universal but these are Inclinations of the Will and Appetite not Impressions and Characters on the Understanding I deny not that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the Minds of Men and that from the very first instances of sense and perception there are some things that are grateful and others unwelcome to them some things that they incline to and others that they fly But this makes nothing for innate Characters on the Mind which are to be the Principles of Knowledge regulating our Practice Such natural Impressions on the Understanding are so far from being confirmed hereby that this is an Argument against them since if there were certain Characters imprinted by Nature on the Understanding as the Principles of Knowledge we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us and influence our Knowledge as we do those others on the Will and Appetite which never cease to be the constant Spring and Motives of all our Actions to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us § 4. Another Reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical Principles is That I think there cannot any one moral Rule be propos'd whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd if they were innate or so much as self-evident which every innate Principle must needs be and not need any Proof to ascertain its Truth nor want any Reason to gain it Approbation He would be thought void of common Sense who asked on the one side or on the other side went about to give a Reason Why it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be It carries its own Light and Evidence with it and needs no other Proof He that understands the Terms assents to it for its own sake or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it But should that most unshaken Rule of Morality and Foundation of all social Virtue That one should do as he would be done unto be propos'd to one who never heard it before but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning Might he not without any absurdity ask a Reason why And were not he that propos'd it bound to make out the Truth and Reasonableness of it to him Which plainly shews it not to be innate for if it were it could neither want nor receive any Proof but must needs at least as soon as heard and understood be received and assented to as an unquestionable Truth which a Man can by no means doubt of So that the truth of all these moral Rules plainly depends upon some other antecedent to them and from which they must be deduced which could not be if either they were innate or so much as self-evident § 5. That Men should keep their Compacts is certainly a great and undeniable Rule in Morality But yet if a Christian who has the view of Happiness and Misery in another Life be asked why a Man must keep his Word he will give this as a Reason Because God who has the Power o◠eternal Life and Death requires it of us But if an Hobbist be asked why he will answer Because the Publick requires it and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not And if one of the old Heathen Philosophers had been asked he would have answered Because it was dishonest below the Dignity of a Man and opposite to Vertue the highest Perfection of humane Nature § 6. Hence naturally flows the great variety of Opinions concerning Moral Rules which are to be found amongst Men according to the different sorts of Happiness they have a Prospect of or propose to themselves Which could not be if practical Principles were innate and imprinted in our Minds immediately by the Hand of God I grant the existence of God is so many ways manifest and the Obedience we owe him so congruous to the Light of Reason that a great part of Mankind give Testimony to the Law of Nature But yet I think it must be allowed That several Moral Rules may receive from Mankind a very general Approbation without either knowing or admitting the true ground of Morality which can only be the Law of a God who sees Men in the dark and has Power enough to punish the proudest Offender For God having by an inseparable connection joined Vertue and publick Happiness together and made the Practice thereof necessary to the preservation of Society and visibly beneficial to all with whom the vertuous Man has to do it is no wonder that every one should not only allow but recommend and magnifie those Rules to others from whose observance of them he is sure to reap Advantage to himself He may out of Interest as well as Conviction cry up that for Sacred which if once trampled on and prophaned he himself cannot be safe nor secure This though it takes nothing from the Moral and Eternal Obligation which these Rules evidently have yet it shews that the outward acknowledgment Men pay to them in their Words proves not that they are innate Principles Nay it proves not so much as that Men assent to them inwardly in their own Minds
ordered as to reflect the greater number of Globules of Light and to give them that proper Rotation which is fit to produce this Sensation of White in us the more White will that Body appear that from an equal space sends to the Retina the greater number of such Corpuscles with that peculiar sort of Motion I do not say that the nature of Light consists in very small round Globules nor of Whiteness in such a texture of parts as gives a certain Rotation to these Globules when it reflects them for I am not now treating physically of Light or Colours But this I think I may say that I cannot and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did conceive how Bodies without us can any ways affect our Senses but by the immediate contact of the sensible Bodies themselves as in Tasting and Feeling or the impulse of some insensible Particles coming from them as in Seeing Hearing and Smelling by the different impulse of which Parts caused by their different Size Figure and Motion the variety of Sensations is produced in us § 12. Whether then they be Globules or no or whether they have a Verticity about their own Centres that produce the Idea of Whiteness in us this is certain that the more Particles of Light are reflected from a Body fitted to give them that peculiar Motion which produces the Sensation of Whiteness in us and possibly too the quicker the peculiar Motion is the whiter does the Body appear from which the greater number are reflected as is evident in the same piece of Paper put in the Sun-beams in the Shade and in a dark Hole in each of which it will produce in us the Idea of Whiteness in far different degrees § 13. Not knowing therefore what number of Particles nor what Motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of Whiteness we cannot demonstrate the certain Equality of any two degrees of Whiteness because we have no certain Standard to measure them by nor Means to distinguish every the least real difference the only help we have being from our Senses which in this point fail us But where the difference is so great as to produce in the Mind clearly distinct Ideas whose differences can be perfectly retained there these Ideas of Colours as we see in different kinds as Blue and Red are as capable of Demonstration as Ideas of Number and Extension What I have here said of Whiteness and Colours I think holds true in all secundaries Qualities and their Modes § 14. These two viz. Intuition and Demonstration are the degrees of our Knowledge whatever comes short of one of these with what assurance soever embraced is but Faith or Opinion but not Knowledge at least in all general Truths There is indeed another Perception of the Mind employ'd about the particular existence of finite Beings without us which going beyond bare probability and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the fore-going degrees of Certainty passes under the name of Knowledge There can be nothing more certain than that the Idea we receive from an external Object is in our Minds this is intuitive Knowledge But whether there be any thing more than barely that Idea in our Minds whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us which corresponds to that Idea is that whereof some Men think there may be a Question made because Men may have such Ideas in their Minds when no such Thing exists no such Object affects their Senses But yet here I think we are provided with an Evidence that puts us past doubting For I ask any one Whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different Perception when he looks on the Sun by day and thinks on it by night when he actually tastes Wormwood or smells a Rose or only thinks on that Savour or Odour We as plainly find the difference there is between any Idea revived in our Minds by our own Memory and actually coming into our Minds by our Senses as we do between any two distinct Ideas If any one say a Dream may do the same thing and all these Ideas may be produced in us without any external Objects he may please to dream that I make him this answer 1. That 't is no great matter whether I remove his Scruple or no Where all is but dream Reasoning and Arguments are of no use Truth and Knowledge nothing 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in a Fire and being actually in it But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain that what I call being actually in the Fire is nothing but a dream and that we cannot thereby certainly know that any such thing as Fire actually exists without us I answer That we certainly finding that Pleasure or Pain follows upon the application of certain Objects to us whose Existence we perceive or dream that we perceive by our Senses this Certainty is as great as our Happiness or Misery beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be So that I think we may add to the two former sorts of Knowledge this also of the existence of particular external Objects by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of Ideas from them and allow these three degrees of Knowledge viz. Intuitive Demonstrative and Sensitive in each of which there are different degrees and ways of Evidence and Certainty § 15. But since our Knowledge is founded on and employ'd about only our Ideas Will it not follow from thence that it is conformable to our Ideas and that where our Ideas are clear and distinct or obscure and confused our Knowledge will be so too To which I answer No For our Knowledge consisting in the perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that Perception and not in the clearness or obscurity of the Ideas themselves v. g. a Man that has as clear Ideas of the Angles of a Triangle and of Equality to two right ones as any Mathematician in the World may yet have but a very obscure Perception of their Agreement and so have but a very obscure Knowledg of it But obscure and confused Ideas can never produce any clear or distinct Knowledge because as far as any Ideas are confused or obscure so far the Mind can never perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree CHAP. III. Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge § 1. KNowledge as has been said lying in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas it follows from hence That First We can have Knowledge no farther than we have Ideas § 2. Secondly That we can have no Knowledge farther than we can have Perception of that Agreement or Disagreement Which Perception being 1. Either by Intuition or the immediate comparing any two Ideas or 2. By Reason
and Operations one upon another that perhaps Things in this our Mansion would put on quite another face and cease to be what they are if some one of the Stars or great Bodies incomprehensibly remote from us should cease to be or move as it does This is certain Things however absolute and entire they seem in themselves are but Retainers to other parts of Nature for that which they are most taken notice of by us Their observable Qualities Actions and Powers are owing to something without them and there is not so complete and perfect a part that we know of Nature which does not owe the Being it has and the Excellencies of it to its Neighbours and we must look a great deal farther than the Surface of any Body to comprehend perfectly those Qualities that are in it § 12. If this be so it is not to be wondred that we have very imperfect Ideas of Substances and that the real Essences on which depend their Properties and Operations are unknown to us We cannot discover so much as the size figure and texture of their minute and active Parts which is really in them much less the different Motions and Impulses made in and upon them by Bodies from without and the Effects of them upon which depend and by which is formed the greatest and most remarkable part of those Qualities we observe in them and of which our complex Ideas of them are made up This consideration alone may set us at rest as to all hopes of our having the Ideas of their real Essences which whilst we want the nominal Essences we make use of instead of them will be able to furnish us but very sparingly with any general Knowledge or universal Propositions capable of real Certainty § 13. We are not therefore to wonder if Certainty be to be found in very few general Propositions made concerning Substances Our Knowledge of their Qualities and Properties go very seldom farther than our Senses reach and inform us Possibly inquisitive and observing Men may by strength of Iudgment penetrate farther and on Probabilities taken from wary Observation and Hints well laid together often guess right at what Experience has not yet discovered to them But this is but guessing still it amounts only to Opinion and has not that certainty which is requisite to Knowledge For all general Knowledge lies only in our own Thoughts and consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract Ideas Wherever we perceive any agreement or disagreement amongst them there we have general Knowledge and by putting the Names of those Ideas together accordingly in Propositions can with certainty pronounce general Truths But because the abstract Ideas of Substances for which their specifick Names stand whenever they have any distinct and determinate signification have a discoverable connexion or inconsistency with a very few other Ideas the certainty of universal Propositions concerning Substances is very narrow and scanty in that part which is our principal enquiry concerning them and there is scarce any of the Names of Substances let the Idea it is applied to be what it will of which we can generally and with certainty pronounce that it has or has not this or that other Quality belonging to it and constantly co-existing or inconsistent with that Idea where-ever it is to be found § 14. Before we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind we must first know what Changes the primary Qualities of one Body do regularly produce in the primary Qualities of another and how Secondly we must know what primary Qualities of any Body produce certain Sensations or Ideas in us which in truth to know all the Effects of Matter under its divers modifications of Bulk Figure Cohesion of Parts Motion and Rest which is I think every body will allow is utterly impossible to be known by us without revelation Nor if it were revealed to us what sort of Figure Bulk and Motion of Corpuscles would produce in us the Sensation of a yellow Colour and what sort of Figure Bulk and Texture of Parts in the superficies of any Body were fit to give such Corpuscles their due motion to produce that Colour Would that be enough to make universal Propositions with certainty concerning the several sorts of them unless we had Faculties acute enough to perceive the Bulk Figure Texture and Motion of Bodies in those minute Parts by which they operate on our Senses and so could by those frame our abstract Ideas of them I have mentioned here only corporeal Substances whose Operations seem to lie more level to our Understandings For as to the Operations of Spirits both their thinking and moving of Bodies we at first sight find our selves at a loss though perhaps when we have applied our Thoughts a little nearer to the consideration of Bodies and their Operations and examined how far our Notions even in these reach with any clearness beyond sensible matter of fact we shall be bound to confess that even in these too our Discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect Ignorance and Incapacity § 15. This is evident the abstract complex Ideas of Substances for which their general Names stand not comprehending their real Constitutions can afford us but very little universal Certainty they not being that on which those Qualities we observe in them and would inform our selves about do depend or with which they have any certain connexion v. g. Let the Idea to which we give the name Man be as it commonly is a Body of the ordinary shape with Sense voluntary Motion and Reason join'd to it This being the abstract Idea and consequently the Essence of our Species Man we can make but very few general certain Propositions concerning Man standing for such an Idea Because not knowing the real Constitution on which Sensation power of Motion and Reasoning with that peculiar Shape depend and whereby they are united together in the same Subject there are very few other Qualities with which we can perceive them to have a necessary connexion and therefore we cannot with Certainty affirm That all Men sleep by intervals That no Man can be nourished by Wood or Stones That all Men will be poisoned by Hemlock because these Ideas have no connexion nor repugnancy with this our nominal Essence of Man with this abstract Idea that Name stands for We must in these and the like appeal to trial in particular Subjects which can reach but a little way We must content our selves with Probability in the rest but can have no general Certainty whilst our specifick Idea of Man contains not that real Constitution which is the root wherein all his inseparable Qualities are united and from whence they flow whilst our Idea the word Man stands for is only an imperfect Collection of some sensible Qualities and Powers in him there is no discernible connexion or repugnance between our specifick Idea and the Operation of either the Parts of Hemlock or Stones upon his Constitution There are Animals
saw nor heard of any such thing before there the whole Probability relies on Testimony And as the Relators are more in number and of more Credit and have no Interest to speak contrary to the Truth so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief Though to a Man whose Experience has been always quite contrary and has never heard of any thing like it the most untainted Credit of a Witness will scarce be able to find belief As it happened to a Dutch Ambassadour who entertaining the King of Siam with the particularities of Holland which he was inquisitive after amongst other things told him that the Water in his Country would sometimes in cold weather be so hard that Men walked upon it and that it would bear an Elephant if he were there To which the King replied Hitherto I have believed the strange Things you have told me because I look upon you as a sober fair Man but now I am sure you lye § 6. Upon these grounds depends the Probability of any Proposition And as the conformity of our Knowledge as the certainty of Observations as the frequency and constancy of Experience and the number and credibility of Testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it so is any Proposition in it self more or less probable There is another I confess which though by it self it be no true ground of Probability yet is often made use of for one by which Men most commonly regulate their Assent and upon which they pin their Faith more than any thing else any that is the Opinion of others though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on nor more likely to mislead one since there is much more Falshood and Errour amongst Men than Truth and Knowledge And if the Opinions and Persuasions of others whom we know and think well of be a ground of Assent Men have Reason to be Heathens in Iapan Mahumetans in Turkey Papists in Spain Protestants in England and Lutherans in Sueden But of this wrong ground of Assent I shall have occasion to speak more at large in another place CHAP. XVI Of the Degrees of Assent § 1. THe grounds of Probability we have laid down in the foregoing Chapter as they are the foundations on which our Assent is built so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are or ought to be regulated only we are to take notice that whatever grounds of Probability there may be they yet operate no farther on the Mind which searches after Truth and endeavours to judge right than they appear at least in the first Judgment or Search that the Mind makes I confess in the Opinions Men have and firmly stick to in the World their Assent is not always from an actual view of the Reasons that at first prevailed with them It being in many cases almost impossible and in most very hard even for those who have very admirable Memories to retain all the Proofs which upon a due examination made them embrace that side of the Question It suffices that they have once with care and fairness examined the matter as far as they could and that they have searched into all the Particulars that they could imagine to give any light to the Question and with the best of their Skill cast up the account upon the whole Evidence and thus having once found on which side the Probability appeared to them after as full and exact an enquiry as they can make they lay up the conclusion in their Memories as a Truth they have discovered and for the future they remain satisfied with the Testimony of their Memories that this is the Opinion that by the Proofs they have once seen of it deserves such a degree of their Assent as they afford it § 2. This is all that the greatest part of Men are capable of doing in regulating their Opinions and Judgments unless a Man will exact of them either to retain distinctly in their Memories all the Proofs concerning any probable Truth and that too in the same order and regular deduction of Consequences in which they have formerly placed or seen them which sometimes is enough to fill a large Volume upon one single Question Or else they must require a Man for every Opinion that he embraces every day to examine the Proofs both which are impossible It is unavoidable therefore that the Memory be relied on in the case and that Men be persuaded of several Opinions whereof the Proofs are not actually in their Thoughts nay which perhaps they are not able actually to re-call Without this the greatest part of Men must be either very Scepticks or change every moment and yield themselves up to whoever having lately studied the Question offers them Arguments which for want of Memory they are not able presently to answer § 3. I cannot but own that Men's sticking to their past Iudgment and adhering firmly to Conclusions formerly made is often the cause of great obstinacy in Errour and Mistake But the fault is not that they rely on their Memories for what they have before well judged but because they judged before they had well examined May we not find a great number not to say the greatest part of Men that think they have formed right Judgments of several matters and that for no other reason but because they never thought otherwise That imagine themselves to have judged right only because they never questioned never examined their own Opinions Which is indeed to think they judged right because they never judged at all And yet these of all Men hold their Opinions with the greatest stiffness those being generally the most fierce and firm in their Tenets who have least examined them What we once know we are certain is so and we may be secure that there are no latent Proofs undiscovered which may overturn our Knowledge or bring it in doubt But in matters of Probability 't is not in every case that we can be sure that we have all the Particulars before us that any way concern the Question and that there is no evidence behind and yet unseen which may cast the Probability on the other side and out-weigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us Who almost is there that hath the leisure patience and means to collect together all the Proofs concerning most of the Opinions he has so as safely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view and that there is no more to be alledged for his better information And yet we are forced to determine our selves on the one side or other The conduct of our Lives and the management of our great Concerns will not bear delay for those depend for the most part on the determination of our Judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative Knowledge and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side or the other § 4. Since therefore it is unavoidable to the greatest