upon the internal Light and Evidence of the thing but upon Authority and so agree in the general Nature of 〈◊〉 only as the Authority differ 〈…〉 Faith also varies and Human Authority differing from Divine just as much as Fallible differs from Infallible the same in proportion will also 〈…〉 between Human and Divine â—aith That is the former will always be a Fallible and the latter an Infallible Assent 8. Human Faith though sometimes as actually undeceiv'd as Divine is yet always liable to Error and Deception and so doubtful hazardous and uncertain even when actually true like a Conclusion drawn from uncertain Premisses in which respect it resembles Opinion and that so much that some have confounded it with it though I think illogically enough since though there be a like uncertainty in both Assents yet they differ extremely in their Formal Motives one being grounded upon Reason and the other upon Authority And the Distinction of these Assents is not taken from the degree of Certainty wherein they agree but from the Quality of the Motive wherein they differ However tho' this makes a great difference in Notion it makes None in the Affairs of Civil Life and the Faith of him that believes the Testimony of a Man will as to all real intents and purposes go for no more than his Opinion And that because though different Assents as to the Formality of their Motives they are yet Much at one rate for Certainty being both Fallible in their Grounds and so subject to Error and Deception 9. But the Case is quite otherwise as to Divine Faith whose Foundation stands too sure not only to be overturn'd but even so much as shaken This Faith is strictly and Absolutely infallible not subject to the least Error or Possibility of Erring as having the very Ground and Pillar of Truth it self the Omniscience and Veracity of God for its Security than which there neither Needs nor Can be Greater 'T is Most Certain that God is both Actively and Passively Infallible his Omniscience will not suffer him to be deceiv'd himself and his infinite Veracity and Truth will not suffer him to deceive us And therefore he that builds his Faith upon his Authority goes upon the Most sure Grounds and cannot possibly Err in his Assent And as he is secure from Error so he is also from all just reason of Scruple or Fear and leaning upon a firm and indefectible Support may stay and repose himself upon it with full Acquiescence So that there is all the Certainty that can be in this Faith both Objective and Subjective that of the Thing and that of the Person The thing assented to is most undoubtedly true in it self and he that assents to it may be most firmly assured and perswaded of the Truth of it in his own Mind and among all Temptations to Doubt and Distrust may with great Triumph and Confidence say with the Apostle I know whom I have believ'd 10. It was observ'd a little before of Humane Faith that it resembles Opinion in as much as they are both dubious and uncertain Assents as proceeding upon grounds of like uncertainty though otherwise of different Natures Now as this Faith resembles Opinion so in like manner it may be observ'd of Divine Faith that it resembles Science or rather that Second Assent for so I am forc'd to call it for want of a better Name which we lately discours'd of and plac'd between Opinion and Faith The Comparison here bears the same proportion as to Certainty as it did in the other Case as to uncertainty Divine Faith has all the Certainty that is possible and therefore to be sure as much as Science or that Second Assent can have There is as much Certainty in the thing assented to and there may be as much Assurance and firmness of Perswasion in the Assent it self or in other words what a man believes upon the Authority of God is in it self as certain as what he knows and he may also be as Certain of it For he that assents to a thing upon full evidence can but assent fully and perfectly without suspense or hesitation and so also can he that assents to a thing upon Divine Authority only His Ground is every whit as Firm and Sure as the others and why then should the Measure of his Assurance be less It cannot possibly be if he Knows and Considers upon what Ground he stands So that thus far both in regard of the Certainty of the Object and the Firmness of the Perswasion Divine Faith may be justly placed upon a level with the Most Evident Assent whatever 11. Nor I suppose will this be thought an undue Elevation of Divine Faith On the Contrary I expect to be Complain'd of for setting the Dignity of it at too low a Pitch by those who say that Divine Faith is Firmer than Science But 't is for want of the Latter that these Men so excessively exâ—ol the Former I call it excessively because 't is what strictly and exactly speaking cannot be For what I Perceive or Know is even by that very supposition unquestionably true or else I cannot be said to Know it and what I believe upon the highest Authority can be no more To say therefore that Faith is Firmer than Science is like saying that one streight Line is streighter than another But perhaps their Meaning only is that 't is safer relying upon the Autâ—ority of God than upon our own Rational Faculties which indeed is right and I heartily wish all Men were convinc'd of it For though what I do actually and really Know be to the full as true and certain as what I Believe and I can no more be out in one than in the other yet it is More Certain in the general that God cannot deceive me than that my Reason cannot be deceiv'd Not that what I assent to by Divine Faith can have a greater Objective Certainty than what I clearly and distinctly Perceive or Know but only that there is a Possibility not to say Danger of my taking that for a clear and distinct Perception which â—ndeed is Not so and so though I cannot be deceiv'd in what I do truly know yet I may be deceiv'd in thinking that I know when I do not So that Divine Faith though not more Certain than Knowledge it self is yet of greater Certainty than our Knowing Faculties and generally speaking the Believer goes upon surer grounds than the Man of Reason and Demonstration Because his Reason may possibly lead him into Error whereas the Other 's Authority cannot And when they are both in the right yet still there will be this difference between them that his Reason is only not Deceiv'd whereas the Other 's Faith is Infallible 12. And thus far we have taken a view of the more bright and perfect side of Divine Faith I mean that of its Firmness and Certainty in respect of which it stands upon a just level with Science But it has
not to be comprehended or accounted for by it But this will cross my way again in another place and therefore I shall not anticipate here what further Considerations I may have occasion to bestow upon it there 16. To return therefore I say that this Obscurity and inevidence that is in Faith and upon whose account it is commonly said to be an inevident Assent does not belong to its formal Reason which you see may be clear enough as clear as any Principle of Natural Science but only to the Matter or Object of it That is in other words the inevidence does not lie in the Reason of Believing but in the Nature of the thing Believ'd Not that the matter of Faith again is wholy and all over without Evidence for then there would be no reason to believe it but only that it has no evidence from within and from the Nature of the thing it self as was remarqu'd before Not that this again is so to be understood neither as if the Proposition to be believ'd were not so much as simply intelligible as to the very litteral sense and direct signification of its Terms No we are no more to believe we Know not what than to believe we Know not why and whatever Darkness there may be in Faith it is still so much a Luminous Assent and an Act of Reason as to require that we understand the simple Meaning of the Proposition we are to believe as well as the Grounds of Credibility upon which it Challenges our Assent For the general Object of Faith is Truth and Truth is the relation of Connexion between Ideas I say Ideas for Truth does not lie in Sounds or Words but in Things Therefore to believe such a Thing to be True is the same as to believe that there is a Connexion between such Ideas But then a Man must know what those Ideas are or else how can he believe they are connected Therefore he must understand something more than the Terms themselves he must also have the Ideas of those Terms which is the same as to under stand the Meaning and Signification of them And indeed he that has no Idea or Conception of what he believes believes he knows not what and he that believes he knows not what cannot be properly said to believe any thing In all Faith therefore the Proposition Must be simply intelligible and though the Truth of it be to be Believ'd yet the Meaning of it must be understood 17. For we are again Carefully to distinguish between the Meaning of a Proposition and the Truth of a Proposition The meaning of a Proposition is only the Determination of the Ideas that are signified by such Terms the Truth of it is the Union or Connexion that is between those Ideas Now though a Man does not see the Connexion that is between the Ideas of that Proposition he is said to Believe yet he must in some measure perceive the Ideas themselves because in believing the Proposition he is supposed to believe that such Ideas are so related and Connected together When therefore 't is said that the Matter of Faith is inevident as to the intrinsic Nature of the thing the inevidence must not be thought to lie in the Ideas whereof the Proposition to be Believ'd Consists but in the Connexion of those Ideas that is not in the Meaning of the Proposition but in the Truth of it which is properly the Object of Faith as the Ideas themselves are of Perception Which again by the way may serve to discover another Instance of Impertinency in the Reasoning of those who when they are Maintaining that there can be no Article of Faith above Reason divert into pompous Flourishes and Declamations about the Intelligibility of the Objects of Faith and the utter impossibility of Believing what is not intelligible As if we denied the simple intelligibility of the Proposition or would have Men believe they know not what which certainly would be a strange degree of Implicit Faith and more Nonsensical than that of the Collier or as if that Proposition which is clear enough as to its simple Meaning might not be inevident and so above Reason as to its Truth or in other words as if Clearness of Ideas might not consist with Obscurity of their Connexion 18. But then it must be observ'd again that when we say that the Inevidence that is in the Matter of Faith respects the Truth of the Proposition not the Meaning of it or the Connexion of the Ideas and not the very Ideas themselves this is not so to be understood neither as if the Matter of Faith even thus consider'd were Absolutely and in its self necessarily inevident and such as could not possibly be known without altering its Nature and ceasing to be any longer the Object of Faith I know the contrary Supposition has prevail'd in some Schools where it passes almost for Principle and Maxim that Knowledge and Faith are mutually Exclusive of each other that the same thing cannot be at once the Object of both and that therefore if a thing be believ'd it cannot be known and if known that it cannot be believ'd St. Austin was of this Opinion and has in many places declared his mind to this purpose particularly in his XL Treatise of his Exposition upon St. Iohn's Gospel And his Authority has recommended it as it did most other things to several of the Schoolmen particularly Aquinas whence it has been transmitted down among many Modern Writers of the Systematical way both Philosophers and Divines But we must follow Reason before Authority and whoever can be prevail'd with to lay the latter quite aside and to use the other as he ought will I believe clearly perceive that nothing hinders but that the same Proposition may be at once the Object of both Faith and Science or that the Same thing may be at the same time both Known and Believ'd provided it be by different Mediums according to the diversity of the respective Acts. 19. For not to enter into the wrangle and Dust of the Schools upon this Occasion it may be sufficient to consider that there is no manner of Opposition between Faith and Knowledge or the Most evident Assent as to the Essence of the Proposition that being not supposed to be denied in the one which is Affirm'd in the other or the contrary but only as to the Medium of the Act. And that 't is not the Absolute Nature of the thing Believ'd but the Quality of the Motive that specifies Faith and distinguishes it from other Assents So that 't is no matter what the Absolute Nature of the thing be in it self whether it be evident or not evident Knowable or not Knowable provided it be assented to upon the proper Medium and Motive of Faith that is upon Authority without any respect had to the Natural evidence of the thing though otherwise never so evident in its own Absolute Nature so as to be the Object of Science
though upon a different Medium at the same time For as I said before 't is not the Nature of the thing but the Quality of the Medium that specifies Faith and tho' the same thing cannot have two Natures or be in it self at once evident and not evident yet why may it not sustain two different Relations or be consider'd in two different Mediums so as to be said to be known when perceiv'd by its Evidence and to be believ'd when assented to upon Authority Which certainly may be done as fully and with as little regard to its evidence as if there were no evidence in the thing at all So that the Evidence of the thing does not hinder the Belief of it supposing the Belief not to proceed upon that Evidence but upon its own proper Medium Authority 20. But to use a way of Arguing less Abstract though it may be with some more pressing and convincing Suppose God should reveal to me a Geometrical Truth as that two Triangles having the same Base and being within the same Parallels are equal and I who at first receiv'd it upon his bare Authority should come afterwards to be able to demonstrate it my self upon the known Principles of Art who that well considers the Natures of these things would say that my Science evacâ—â—ted my Faith and that I ceas'd to be a Believer assoon as I became a Mathematician For though I am now supposed to Know what before I only Believ'd yet why should this Knowledge destroy my Faith since I may still have as much regard for the Authority of God and as little to the Evidence of the thing as I had before the Demonstration and would still be ready to assent to it though there were no evidence to be produced for it only upon the Ground of Divine Authority And to use another Sensible though not so Artificial way of arguing I would fain know whether any one of those who are of the Contrary Sentiment would refuse a Demonstrative Account of a Reveal'd Truth suppose the Creation of the World merely for fear of injuring or destroying his Faith which yet he were bound in Conscience to do if Knowledge and Faith were so exclusive of each other and inevidence and Obscurity were so absolutely of the Essence of Faith as some pretend For then it would not be lawful to acquire the Natural Knowledge of any reveal'd Truth because 't is unlawful to destroy one's Faith and every Believer would have just reason to fear all further Light and Information about what he believes which yet I think would be acknowledg'd by all an extravagant Scruple such as can hardly enter much less stay long in any Considering head And is withal Contrary to a plain Exhortation of the Apostle who bids us add to our Faith Knowledge 21. When therefore the Matter of Faith as it is taken for the Truth of the Proposition Believ'd is charged with Obscurity and Faith it self upon that account is said as it commonly is to be of inevident things the Meaning ought not to be of an Absolute but of a Relative inevidence Not that what is Believ'd is so all over dark and obscure that it cannot while Believ'd absolutely be known but only that it cannot under that Formality and so far as it is Believ'd being necessarily in that respect inevident how bright or clear soever it may be in other respects That is in other words though the thing Believ'd absolutely consider'd may be Evident yet it is not so as Believ'd or in relation to Faith because that has no regard to the Evidence how bright soever it may shine but proceeds wholy upon another Argument between which and the Evidence of the thing there is not the least Affinity or Communication The short is the Object of Faith simply and absolutely speaking may admit of Evidence but then though it be never so evident and demonstrable in it self yet as Believ'd it is always Obscure Faith having no regard to the proper light and Evidence of the thing but only to the Testimony of the Revealer whose bare Authority is the only Motive that determines her Assent and the only Ground upon which she lays the whole weight of it though the Truth of the thing in it self absolutely Consider'd may also stand upon other Foundations be rationally accounted for by Arguments from within and so be seen by its own Light But let the Light shine never so bright upon the Object from other sides Faith lets in none nor has any regard to that which she finds there but connives at it and walks as I may say with her eyes shut contenting her self with the certainty of Revelation and leaving to Science if there be any the Evidence of the thing So that the Object is always dark to her how clear and bright soever it may be in it self or appear when absolutely consider'd to a Philosophic Eye In which respect it falls very short of the Perfection of Science though in respect of Firmness and Certainty it be equal to it as was said before All which is briefly couch'd in that excellent Account of Faith given by the Author to the Hebrews when he says that it is the Substance of things hoped for and the Argument of things not seen Where by Substance and Argument he equals it with Science in regard of the Firmness and Certainty of the Assent but by saying that 't is of things not seen he makes it vail and stoop to it in point of Evidence in which respect indeed Faith as Firm and as Certain as it is is as much inferiour to Science as Darkness is to Light 22. To gather up then what has been here discours'd at large concerning the inevidence of Faith into one view When we say that Faith is an inevident Assent we are not to understand this inevidence of the formal Reason of Faith but of the Matter of it And when we say that the Matter of it is inevident we should not intend by it that it is wholy and all over without Evidence but only that it has none from within or from the intrinsic Nature of the thing And when we say that the Matter of Faith is inevident from within this again is not to be intended of the simple Meaning of the Proposition but of the Truth of it And when we say that the Truth of it is inevident this again lastly is not to be understood as if it were always and necessarily so in its own Absolute Nature but only so far forth as it is Believ'd or as 't is consider'd under the formality of an Object of Faith Or in other words the inevidence of the Matter of Faith in respect of the Truth of the Article is not an Absolute but a Relative inevidence Not that the Matter of Faith is Never Absolutely and in the Nature of the thing inevident for it may be so too as will be seen afterwards but only that it is not necessarily so there
because he is infallible Infallibility then is the proper ground of Implicit Faith and accordingly the Church of Rome assuming to her self the Character of Infallible does upon that Supposition rightly require it I say upon that supposition for she is right enough in her Consequence supposing her Principle to be true But the truth of it is that is Most Extravagant and such as carries in it such matchless Arrogance and Presumption as befits only him who as God sitteth in the temple of God shewing himself that he is God For God only is Infallible and therefore he only has right to require Implicit Faith And to him indeed it is due from every one of his Creatures in the highest Measure imaginable as is also Implicit Obedience upon the same Ground Of both which we have a signal Example in Abraham who when he was call'd by God to go out into a place which he should after receive for an Inheritance is said by Faith to have Obey'd and to have gone out not knowing whither he went 26. But now what can be more dark and inevident than this Implicit Faith It s Formal Reason indeed is sufficiently clear and it resolves at last into a Ground highly Rational and so may be said in that respect to be the highest Reason For certainly nothing can be more Reasonable than to believe whatever God who is Infallible reveals There is therefore no Darkness on this Side Nay even the Light it self does not shine more Clear But as for the Matter of it if I may call it so where nothing distinctly is believ'd that is sure as dark and obscure as can well be conceiv'd so dark as even to be Invisible For a Man to believe at large without any restriction or limitation whatever God shall propose to him let it be what it will not Knowing what that is like Abraham's going not knowing whither he went is such a dark and obscure act of Faith as has nothing clear in it but the Humility and Devotion of him who so believes This is a Faith Worthy of God as well as peculiar to him and 't is the great inevidence and obscurity of it that makes it so For so far is the Matter of it from having any Evidence in it that it is not so much as Evident what the Matter of it is Here then is the very Blackness of Darkness and he that has this infolded Faith as every true Believer has and can thus trust God in the Dark where he sees nothing but only the general Reason of his so doing is not likely in any of the more explicit instances of it to plead the inevidence of the Article to excuse his Infidelity or to deny his Faith to an otherwise sufficiently clear Revelation merely because it is above his shallow Reason 27. Upon what has been hitherto discours'd it will not be difficult to give in few words a Satisfactory Resolution of a Celebrated Question which among the Schoolmen has made a great many and that is whether Faith belongs to the Vnderstanding or to the Will It is plain by the Measures already laid down that it belongs to the Latter For Faith as all acknowledge is an Assent and Assent is a Species of Judgement and Judgement as has been shewn already is an act of the Will not of the Understanding whose only Operation is Perception and consequently Faith is an act of the Will consenting to imbracing acquiescing and reposing it self in what the Understanding represents as proposed and reveal'd by God And indeed unless Judgment and consequently Faith did belong to the Will as their proper and immediate Principle 't is impossible to Conceive how a Man should be blame-worthy for any of his Opinions or how he should stand accountable either for Error on the one hand or for Infidelity and Heresy on the other For if Faith be an act of the Understanding then since the only Operation of the Understanding is Perception the greatest Fault of an Infidel or a Heretic will be Non-Perception which indeed is not Error but Ignorance whereas Infidelity and Heresie are always supposed to include Error and to be also the worst of Errors And this Non-perception is only a Negation and such as resolves into want of Parts which is not a Moral but a Natural defect whereas Infidelity and Heresie as indeed all that is Faulty are understood to be Privations and Defects of a Moral Nature But then to make them so they must be voluntary nothing being faulty but what is so that is again they must be Wilful that is they must be acts of the Will and Consequently Faith which is the Habit whereof those Sins are Privations must also belong to the same Principle or else in short there would be neither Vertue in having it nor Vice in being without it And accordingly our Saviour in upbraiding the Iews with Infidelity does all along not only by Confequence but directly and expresly Charge it upon their Wills Ye will not come to me that ye may have Life 28. And thus I have gone thorough what I intended and what indeed is of greatest Consideration upon this Subject of Faith In the account of which if I differ from any Authors of the better Character that have either professedly or occasionally written upon it particularly Baronius and Dr. Pearson 't is not that I love to lay aside great Authorities or affect to be by my self but because I follow the best Light of my Understanding write with Freedom and Ingenuity what I think and endeavour to represent things as they are without having regard to Authority any further than I think it joyn'd with Truth and Reason Which shall also be my Rule in what remains of this Treatise In the Mean time what has been hitherto discours'd concerning Reason and Faith may serve as a good Preparation in order to an Account of the Great Question Concerning the Belief of things above Reason But before we enter upon any thing of that Nature 't is fit the Distinction of Above Reason and Contrary to Reason be Consider'd and rightly Stated which is the task allotted for the next Chapter CHAP. III. The Distinction of things Contrary to Reason and above Reason Consider'd 1. THere are some Distinctions in the World that are without a Difference though Difference be the Ground of all Distinction and this by some is pretended to be of that Number who will have the Parts of it to be Coincident and that Contrary to Reason and above Reason signifie in reality alike and are but different Expressions for one and the same thing And though they may be reasonably suspected to do this to serve the interest of a Cause for whose advantage it would be to have this Distinction taken away yet they have the Confidence to Charge the same upon those that hold it pretending that it is only a dextrous Shift and Evasion invented by Subtile Men as an Expedient to relieve the Distress of
of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what has an internal Evidence and what in its self and by its own Lights is Comprehensible by us as they seem to mean or else their distinction of the Case of Reason and the Case of Revelation is here impertinent then I conceive that they set too narrow limits to our Assent in Matters of Reason when they allow it to be given only to things which in this sense are Evident to us For 't is plain that there are many things in Nature which we fee are True and must be True and so not only may but cannot help Assenting to them though at the same time we are not able to Comprehend how they are or can possibly be 7. Not that our Assent is then Blind and wholly without Evidence for then we might as well Assent to the contrary as to what we do and would do better not to Assent at all but only that it has none from within and from the intrinsic Nature of the Object but only from some External Consideration much after the same manner as it is in â—atch In both which there may be a Clear Reason why we should Assent to an Obscure thing But then as the internal Obscurity does not destroy the External Evidence so neither does the External Evidence strike any Light into the internal Obscurity or in other words as the Reason for Assenting is never the less Clear because the Matter assented to is Obscure so neither is the Matter assented to ever the less Obscure because the Reason for assenâ—ing to it is Clear And yet notwithstanding this internal Obscurity of the Matter we assent to it because of the prevailing Light of the External Evidence And this we do not only in Matters of Faith according to the Restriction of some but in the things of Nature and Reason too where we are oftentimes forced by the pressing urgency of certain External and Collateral Considerations to assent to things internally obscure and whose very possibility we cannot Comprehend as is plain in the great Question of the Divisibility of Quantity and other Instances whereof every Thinking Man's Obseâ—â—ation cannot but have already furnish'd him with variety The Incomprehensibility then of a thing is non just Objection against our Assent to it even in Matters of a Rational Nature much less then is it in Matters of Faith For if not in Matters that belong to the Court of Reason and where she sits as Judge then much less in things that are not of her proper Jurisdiction and if notwithstanding the internal inevidence of an Object we think fit to assent to it upon Rational Considerations much more may we and ought we upon the Authority of the Infallible God 8. Indeed if whatsoever is Above our Reason were also as some pretend as Contrary to it and there were nothing true but what was also Comprehensible and so the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then I conâ—ess we could not as Rational Creatures assent to an incomprehensible Proposition upon any Consideration whatsoever No not even that of Divine Authority 'T is true indeed there could then be no such Authority for Incomprehensible things But if there were 't is impossible we should regard it because we could not have greater assurance either of the Existence or of the Truth of it than we have already upon this Supposition that the things reveal'd are not true But now if this Supposition be no more than a Supposition if to be above Reason does not involve any Contrariety to it if there are incomprehensible Truths and Consequently the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument oâ— it s not being true all which has been already proved then 't is plain that what is an incomprehensible may yet be a Believable Object because within the Possibility of Truth and then to render it actually believ'd there needs only some External Evidence either from Reason or Authority For what should hinder our Assent to an Incomprehensible thing when we have plain Evidence from without for it and its own internal Obscurity is no Argument against it 'T is plain therefore that we ought to give our Assent And since we do so oftentimes upon a Ground of Reason much more ought we upon that more Firm and Immoveable ground of Revelation The short is whatever is no Objection against the Truth of a thing is none against the Credibility of it since Truth is the General Object of Faith unless you will say that a thing is unfit to be believ'd upon any other account besides want of Truth and therefore since we have already shewn that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Truth of it it visibly follows that it is no Argument against the Belief of it neither Therefore an Incomprehensible thing may be believ'd and accordingly he that refuses to believe any thing is bound to give a better Reason for it than because it is Incomprehensible 9. If it be said that this is reason enough because Faith is a Rational Act and therefore what is above the Comprehension of Reason is as much above a Rational Belief to this besides what I have already remarqu'd upon this Occasion in the Chapter of Faith I here further reply that it is true indeed and on both sides agreed that Faith is a Rational Act but in what Sense is the Question There are two very different Senses according to which it may be said to be so either in regard of the Clearness of its Formal Reason or in regard of the Clearness of its Object Either because it is founded upon an External Evidence or Argument for believing or because it proceeds upon an Internal Evidence that appears in the very Nature of the thing Believ'd Iâ— Faith be said to be a Rational Act in the latter Sense the Assertion is then False for so that â—s in respect of the Object we have shâ—wn it to be an inevident Assent But i◠〈◊〉 be said to be a Rational Act in the former Sense then indeed it is true but nothing to the purpose since nothing hinders but that this External Evidence may well consist with an Internal Inevidence or in other words that the Clearness of the Reason for Believing may stand with the Obscurity of the Object Believ'd And therefore though Faith be a Rational Act yet it does not hence â—ollow that what is Above Reason is also above Faith and cannot rationally be believ'd because the Act of Faith is said to be Rational Not in respect of the Evidence of the Object but only that of its Formal Reason or Motive And therefore though there be no Evidence in the Object yet it is not thereby render'd uncapable of being the Matter of Faith because the Evidence which Faith as a Rational Act supposes is wholly of another kind There seems indeed a kind of opposition as to the Sound between Faith's being an Act of Reason
Perusal of the Candid and Considerate Reader and to the Blessing of God THE CONTENTS Chapter I. OF Reason Page 18. Chapter II. Of Faith p. 53. Chapter III. The Distinction of things Contrary to Reason and above Reason Consider'd p. 100. Chapter IV. That Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth p. 137. Chapter V. That therefore a things being Incomprehensible by Reason is of it self no Concluding Argument of its not being true p. 230. Chapter VI. That if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being True Human Reason would then be the Measure of Truth p. 243. Chapter VII That therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no just Objection against the Belief of it With an Account of the Cartesian Maxim that we are to Assent only to what is Clear and Evident p. 251. Chapter VIII Wherein is shewn what is the true Vse of Reason in Believing p. 282. Chapter IX An Application of the foregoing Considerations to the Mysteries of Christianity p. 294. Chapter X. The Conclusion of the Whole with an Address to the Socinians p. 307. Post-script p. 339. The Introduction 1. AMong the various Conjectures Men of a Prophetic Spirit have fall'n into Concerning the last events we have had this Opinion not long since advanc'd for one that as God formerly by rejecting the Iews made way for the Gentiles so in the latter days he will in like manner by rejecting the Gentiles make way for the Iews to enter into the Christian Church That the state of Christianity being become intirely Corrupt and all over Anti-christianiz'd the First of those Viols of the Divine Wrath that are to exterminate the Wicked and usher in the Terrours of the Great Day shall fall upon the Christian World that Christendom shall be utterly dissolv'd broken in pieces and destroy'd and that the Iews shall be replaced and reâ—establish'd upon its Ruins And to render it Worthy of so Sore a Calamity that the generality of its Professors shall not only greatly depart from the Primitive Power of the Evangelic Spirit by Apostatizing from the Purity and Perfection of both Christian Faith and Life which we have already seen come to pass but shall even lay down their Holy Profession renounce their very Faith and Religion and turn Infidels Upon the latter part of which Opinion those Words of our Saviour seem to cast a very suspicious Aspect VVhen the Son of Man cometh shall be find Faith upon the Earth As upon the Former do also those words of St. Paul Thou wilt say then The Branches were broken off that I might be graffed in VVell because of unbelief they were broken off and thou standest by Faith Be not high-minded but fear For if God spared not the Natural Branches take heed lest he also spare not thee Behold therefore the Goodness and Severity of God On them which fell Severity but towards thee Goodness if thou continue in his Goodness Otherwise thou also shalt be cut off that is as a dead wither'd and unfruitful Branch as were the Iews for the same Reason before and as our Saviour tells us every unfruitful Branch shall be 2. And truly if one were to judge of these Mens Opinion by the present face and state of things one would be inclined to think it true and that they had the right Key of Prophecy in their hands For sure by all Signs and Appearances the Course of the World seems to drive this way and if there be such a Fatal Revolution to come no doubt but that we are with large steps hastening to it For how are the Vitals of Religion continually struck at the Foundations of it unsettled and undermined its venerable Articles disputed and ridiculed and by what a slender thread does Christianity hang The great Complaint for a long while has been of the Decay of Christian Piety and the Universal Corruption of Manners But now our Religion is corrupted as well as our Manners and we every day make shipwrack of our Faith as well as of a good Conscience So that we have now fill'd our measure and are every way ripe for Destruction Some deny all Reveal'd Religion and consequently the Christian others allowing the Divinity of the Religion deny that of its Author together with the Doctrines of the Trinity Incarnation and Satisfaction others again owning his Divinity deny the necessity of Believing it others again granting that and the other Points deny the necessity of his Satisfaction which is not only resolv'd into mere Prudential Reasons as formerly instead of being grounded upon the Essential Order and Iustice of God but is brought down so low of late as to be made an Accommodation and Condescension to and a gracious Compliance with the common Weaknesses and Prejudices of Mankind Thus is the Christian Religion so mangled and dismember'd by some and so odly and insidiously represented by others that between them both the general Faith of the thing is indanger'd and a ready way prepared to Scepticism and Infidelity 3. Not that I think it ought to be any just matter of Scandal to any considering Christians or Prejudice to their Holy Religion to see so many Corruptions of it and Apostacies and Revoltings from it since this is no more than what the Holy Spirit of God has often forewarn'd us shall come to pass in the latter days wherein we are expresly told that perillous times shall come and that Men shall resist the Truth be proud and high-minded of corrupt minds and reprobate concerning the Faith And moreover that they shall privily bring in damnable Heresies even denying the Lord that bought them This therefore I say ought in reason to be no matter of scandal to any Christians And so neither ought the poor humble suffering condition of Jesus Christ to have been any to the Iews since this also was plainly foretold of the Messias and made a notable part of his Character And yet we find that the Cross of Christ was a stumbling-block to the Iews and so no doubt are the present sufferings I may say Crucifixion of his Religion to many Christians the generality of which measure the certainty of their Faith by the firmness and constancy of its Professors and are apt more to stagger and take offence at the untoward appearance of any Event than to be confirm'd in their belief from its agreement with Antient Prophecies 4. In the mean time what do those without think of us Particularly the Heathens among whom no doubt there are some that neither want Intelligence nor Curiosity to acquaint themselves with the present state of Christendom What a confirmation must it be to these Men in their Infidelity to see Christians grow weary of their own Religion and willing to part with those great and weighty Articles of it for which the holy Martyrs shed their Blood and which could not be extorted from them by all the might and power of their cruel Emperours Can it
to be this They first set their Reason above all things and then will believe nothing that is above their Reason And if this be not in an unreasonable measure to exalt that Faculty to carry it beyond its due bounds nay to set it no bounds at all but strictly to make it Infinite and so to ascribe to it no less than a Divine Perfection I must profess my despair ever to know what is 8. To be the adequate Measure of all Truth so as to have no one Truth above the comprehension of it is as much as can be said of the Reason and Understanding of God himself His Infinite Understanding is indeed truly and necessarily so and whatever is above his Reason is for that very reason most certainly not true Because he essentially comprehending all that truly is it must necessarily follow that whatever he does not comprehend must be nothing But to say the same of the Reason of a Man or of the Intelligence of the most illuminated Angel would be to confound all distinction between Finite and Infinite God and Creature and to advance the most absurd and withal the most impious and blaspemous Proposition imaginable And yet this is the general Principle upon which the Body of Socinianism turns and by which it would be most directly and most compendiously confuted 9. I shall therefore take hold of it by this handle And since that which is a Principle one way as we argue forwards from the Cause to the Effect may be considered as a Consequence another way as we argue backwards from the Effect to the Cause and since there are these two general ways of Reasoning I shall therefore proceed both these wayes in the management of the present Argument which accordingly shall turn chiefly upon this double Hinge First I shall overturn their Principle I call it theirs because 't is what they must at last necessarily come to by shewing that Humane Reason is not the measure of Truth or that there may be some things True which are above the comprehension of Humane Reason and that therefore a things being above Reason is no concluding Argument of its not being True Secondly I shall argue ab Absurdo by shewing that if a things being above Reason were an Argument of its not being True then it will follow that Humane Reason is the Measure of all Truth which if I bring them to I shall think them reduced to a sufficient Absurdity These I intend as the two great Pillars of this Work which like the sides of an Arch will strengthen and bear up one another that which is liable to exception in the former part being made out in the latter and that which is liable to exception in the latter being made out in the former For if it be questioned in the First Part whether this be indeed their Principle That Humane Reason is the Measure of all Truth that will appear in the Second wherein it will be shewn to follow from their supposition And if it be question'd in the Second Part whether this their Principle be absurd and so whether they are reduced to an Absurdity that will appear in the First wherein this Principle is shewn to be False 10. And when by this Method I have shewn in general both a Priori and a Posteriori that a things being above Humane Reason is of it self no sufficient Argument of its not being true I shall then make application of all to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion which I shall shew may be true notwithstanding their being above Humane Reason and so that their being above it is no just ground to conclude them False and that therefore they ought to be believed notwithstanding their being above our Reason which in this case ought to be no prejudice to our Faith supposing them otherwise sufficiently revealed Which whether they are or no I shall not discuss my design at present not being to enter into the detail of the Controversie to prove the particular Mysteries of the Christian Faith such as the Trinity Incarnation or the like but only to lay a general ground and foundation for the belief of those Articles and to destroy that upon which the Body of Socinianism stands The Great and General Principle of which I take to be That nothing is to be believ'd as reveal'd by God that is above the comprehension of Humane Reason or That a Man is to believe nothing but what he can comprehend Which Principle I hope by the help of God with the utmost Evidence and Demonstration to overthrow And because in order to this I must first give a direct and profess'd Account of Reason and Faith besides what will be said Incidentally and Occasionally of them in the Course of the Treatise whose main design is so to adjust and accommodate the Natures and Properties of these two things together as to shew the Reasonableness of believing the Mysteries of the Christian Religion thereupon it is that I intitle the whole An Account of Reason and Faith in relation to the Mysteries of Christianity This is the Gross of what I design the Particulars of which will be more distinctly laid down and accounted for in the following Chapters CHAP. I. Of Reason 1. AMbiguity of Words being one great occasion of Confusion of Thoughts whoever will Discourse clearly and distinctly of any Subject must in the first place fix and settle the signification of his Terms in case they are Ambiguous that is if one and the same Term be applyed to different Ideas In this case Definition of the Name is to go before the Definition of the Thing between which two I conceive the difference to be this That in a Nominal Definition the word is only determin'd to such a certain Idea whereas in a Real one the Idea it self is opened and explained by some other Ideas that are supposed to be contain'd and involv'd in it Upon which account it is that Nominal Definitions are Arbitrary and therefore incontestable and therefore may be used as Principles in Discourse as they are in Geometry whereas Real Definitions are not Arbitrary but must be conform'd to the Nature of things and so are not to be taken for Principles whose Truth is to be supposed but for disputable Propositions whose Truth is to be proved 2. Reason therefore being an ambiguous word and of various acceptation before I proceed to give an account of the Nature of the thing it will be necessary that I define the Name which will also be the better defined if it be first distinguisht Now all Distinction being a sort of Division in which according to the Rules of Logick the Distribution ought to be into the most general and most immediate Members I shall accordingly distinguish of the several meanings of this word Reason by the same measure as I would divide any whole into its parts 3. I consider therefore that the most general distribution of Reason is into that of the Object and
also a more dark side in which respect it comes short of it and must give it the Precedency And I think it may be very properly call'd a Dark side because it consists in Darkness and Obscurity and which is still so much the darker because 't is so peculiar to Faith and makes so great a part of its Character being the Main Difference that distinguishes it from Science or that Second Assent before spoken of For as to Firmness and Certainty therein they agree For Faith may be Firm because he that believes in God may be supposed not in the least to hesitate or doubt of the truth of what he reveals And 't is also certain because it relies upon the most certain Foundation the Testimony of God who is Infallible himself and cannot deceive And hitherto they run parallel one to the other But here begins both the difference and the disproportion that there is Clearness and Evidence on the side of Science and that Second Assent whereas there is none on the side of Faith which walks indeed upon firm Ground but altogether in the dark For he that Believes does not give his Assent because either by Sense or Reason he perceives the Object of his Faith to be thus or thus but merely because he has the Word and Authority of God for it Which though it be sufficient to found a Firm and Certain is yet however not enough to beget a Clear and Evident Assent So that the great and distinguishing Character of Science and the Second Assent is Light and Evidence and that of Faith inevidence and Obscurity which accordingly is commonly said to be an inevident Assent But how and in what sense it is so seems not commonly to be so well understood and for the Consequence of what depends upon the right stating of it deserves to be explain'd with all possible exactness 13. In order to which we are carefully to distinguish between the thing believ'd and the Reason or Motive that induces us to believe it even as in Knowledge we distinguish between the thing Known and the Argument or Medium by which it is Known the Scitum and the Formalis ratio Sciendi The thing Believ'd I would call the Matter or the Object of Faith and the Motive that induces me to believe it I would call the Formal Reason of Faith Aquinas I know calls them both Objects and then after distinguishes them by calling the Former the Material Object and the latter the Formal Object of Faith Accordingly he says that the Formal Object of Faith is the First Truth meaning as he afterward explains himself that Faith relies upon the Truth of God as its Medium or Argument Which Medium I chuse rather to call and I think more intelligibly the formal Reason than the formal Object of Faith Since the Term Object seems more properly to design the Matter of Faith or the thing Believ'd and is hardly applicable to the Motive or Reason of Believing However since we both mean one and the same thing there need be no debate upon the different manner of expressing it especially since if any one think his Term more intelligible and expressive of the Notion intended by it or has any reverence for it upon any other Consideration he is at liberty to substitute it in the room of the other 14. This necessary Distinction being premised 't is in the first place to be well heeded that when Faith is said to be an obscure and inevident Assent this Obscurity or inevidence is not to be applied to the formal Reason or Motive of Faith but only to the Matter or Object of it I say not to the formal Reason of it For as there may be in general a clear Reason why a Man should believe an Obscure thing so 't is most Certain that the formal Reason for which we assent to the things of Faith is very clear For this formal Reason is no other than the Authority of God Or rather since this includes the Truth of the Revealer as well as the Revelation it self for otherwise of what Authority would be the Revelation I would chuse to say that the Truth and Revelation of God do jointly make up the formal Reason of Divine Faith which accordingly proceeds upon this double Principle 1. That whatever God reveals is true 2. That this or that thing in particular is reveal'd by God For Faith has its Reasons as well as Science though of another Nature and its Reasons are these two as will more distinctly appear by disposing the Process of Faith into a Syllogistical Form which will be this Whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is Reveal'd by God Therefore this is true The Conclusion of this Syllogism contains both the Matter and the Act of Faith as it is an Assent to such a thing upon such a ground which is implied by the Illative Particle Therefore The two other Propositions contain the Ground it self or the formal Reason of Faith which you see consists of the double Principle before-mention'd Now 't is most apparent that these two Principles are both of them sufficiently clear or at least may be so 'T is clear in the first place that whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is either self-evident or may be proved from the Idea of God and so has either the Light of a Principle or of a Conclusion either an immediate or a Mediate Evidence And it may be also clear and to be sure is so whenever our Faith is well-grounded that such a thing in Particular is reveal'd by God And in both these respects it is true what is commonly said that Faith is the Highest Reason For you see it is perfectly reasonable in its Fund and Principle and does at last resolve as much as any Mathematical Conclusion into a rational ground of unquestionable Light and Evidence With this only difference that a Conclusion in Geometry is founded upon a Ground taken from within from the intrinsic Nature of the thing whereas our Conclusion of Faith proceeds upon a ground taken from without viz. from the Authority of God but such as however in Light and Evidence is no way inferiour to the other 15. This by the way may serve to shew the vanity and impertinence of those who when they are to prove that there is nothing in Christianity above Reason run out into a Popular Veâ—â— of Harangue about the Reasonables of the Christian Religion and its great Accommodation to Human Nature crying out with repeated importunity that Man is a Reasonable Creature Christianity a reasonable Service and Faith a Rational Act nay even the Highest Reason and the like As if we were for a Blind and unaccountable Faith and denied the use of Reason in Religion or that Faith was founded upon Reason Or as if because there is a Reason from without for Believing therefore the thing Believ'd might not from within and as to the inward Matter of it be above Reason so as
and so much Contested whether true or no can never be made too Clear and sometimes a different though not better Representation of a thing may contribute to its further Illustration every Reader having his particular Point of View so as that the very â—ame Notion or Truth that does not Meet with him in one Posture may shine full in his Face and strike him with success in another I shall therefore under the Shelter of Mr. Boyle's Authority and by the advantage of his Light venture to set down my own Thoughts concerning this weighty Point applying my self chiefly to that part of it wherein I think the other Account Most defective 14. And first though it should be true that to be above Reason is to be Incomprehensible and to be Contrary to Reason is to appear repugnant to some Principle or Conclusion of Right Reason yet I do not think this of it self sufficient either to Clear or to Justifie the Distinction since it may be both again demanded what it is to be incomprehensible and what repugnant and again disputed whether incomprehensible and repugnant be not the same as well as whether that which is above Reason be not also Contrary to it And then we are but where we were before This Account of the Matter is then too Gross and General to be rested in and we must be therefore more minute and particular in our Explanation of it if we would be more Clear 15. However since Generals are to go before and do also prepare the way for Particulars I shall first propose the general Idea of things above Reason and contrary to Reason and then particularize upon that Idea by opening and unfolding more distinctly and explicitly what is contain'd in it and by so comparing and collating together the two parts of the Notion as to shew the real Difference that is between them So that I shall make but one work of the Explanatory and Iustificatory parts supposing that there needs no more to the Justification of the Distinction than only to have the Members of it well explain'd For if the Idea of Above Reason be distinct from the Idea of Contrary to Reason as the Explanation of them will shew that it is then the Distinction proceeds upon a real Difference is grounded upon the Nature of things and has all that is necessary to a true and good Distinction 16. By things above Reason then as the Expression is used in this Distinction I conceive to be Meant Not such as Reason of it self cannot Discover but such as when proposed it cannot Comprehend And by things Contrary to Reason I conceive such as it can and does actually comprehend and that to be absolutely Impossible Or in other words a thing is then above Reason when we do not comprehend how it can be and then Contrary to Reason when we do positively comprehend that it cannot be Thus in the General 17. But to be a little more Particular we are to Consider upon the first Part that when we speak of things above Reason the word Reason here as was shewn in the first Chapter signifies the same as Vnderstanding and there being but one only Operation of that namely Perception by Comprehend here must be meant the same as by Perceive So that when we say of things above Reason that they are such as Reason cannot Comprehend 't is the same as to say they are such as the Understanding cannot Perceive But then when we say Cannot Perceive 't is to be carefully noted that this is not to be understood of the literal and Grammatical Meaning of the Proposition as if the thing said to be Above Reason were perfectly unintelligible but only of the Truth of it as was observ'd before concerning Faith And then again when we say that Above Reason is when we do not Comprehend or Perceive the Truth of a thing this must not be meant of not Comprehending the Truth in its whole Latitude and Extent so that as many Truths should be said to be above Reason as we cannot thus thorougly comprehend and pursue throughout all their Consequences and Relations to other Truths for then almost every thing would be Above Reason but only of not comprehending the Union or Connexion of those immediate Ideas of which the Proposition supposed to be above Reason consists And which is therefore said to be above Reason not because the simple and direct Meaning of its Terms is unintelligible or because the Truth of it is not comprehensible in its remotest and utmost Extent but purely because the Connexion of its Ideas or the manner of it is not discernible and that partly for want of sufficient clearness of the Ideas themselves so as to be able to perceive their Union Intuitively and partly for want of a due and proper Medium whereby to compare them so as to discern their Union in the way of Science and Demonstration 18. 'T is also to be Observ'd upon the Second part of the Explanation that I chuse rather to say that things contrary to Reason are such as we Perceive to be Impossible than such as appear contrary to some Principle or some Conclusion of Right Reason This being the more General and Absolute Idea whereof the two other are but Instances and Specifications For then is a thing said to be Impossible when its Ideas cannot stand together or be united Which may be either because of the immediate Opposition and Inconsistency of the Ideas themselves with themselâ—â—s so as Mutually to Exclude each other as in a Contradiction or because of their inconsistency with some other Truth with which it cannot Comport Or in other words either because one of the Ideas cannot consist with the other by reason of the immediate opposition that is between them or because the Union of both is inconsistent with some Truth or other which therefore will not suffer them to be United Which Truth will be indeed either a Principle or a Conclusion of right Reason And then we are said to Perceive a thing to be Impossible when we perceive that its Ideas cannot stand together and that either immediately by the very inconsistency of the Ideas themselves or mediately by the Repugnance that they carry to some other Truth whether Principle or Conclusion Which Repugnance I take to consist in this that the supposed Principle or Conclusion cannot stand with the Union of such Ideas and that therefore if such a Principle or such a Conclusion be true as is supposed then such Ideas are not United and indeed are as uncapable of Union that is as impossible as if there were an immediate inconsistency between the Ideas themselves So that for a thing to be Contrary to Reason is in short for the Understanding to perceive the Absolute impossibility of it or that its Ideas cannot stand together which it does either Immediately by perceiving the direct inconsistency of those Ideas or Mediately by perceiving their inconsistency with some evident and incontestable Truth
nor Consequently against its being Believ'd and if the only Use and Imployment of Reason in Believing be to Consider not the Internal Evidence of the thing whether the Article be Comprehensible or no but whether it be truly reveal'd by God I say if these things are so as we have abundantly prov'd them to be then from these Premises the Clear and undeniable Consequence is that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just reason why they should not be Believ'd and so thaâ— we may Believe them though we should suppose them what yet some deny to be Incomprehensible 2. Nay so far is the Incomprehensible Sublimity of these Mysteries from being a sufficient Objection against the Belief of them that Accidentally and indirectly it may be improved into a Considerable Argument for them and such as may serve to recommend them to our Faith inasmuch as it is a very strong Presumption that they are of no Human Origin but have God for their Authour it being reasonable to suppose that what does so very much transcend the Capacity of Man to Comprehend does no less exceed his Ability to invent And accordingly the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries for which some will have them to be false is made use of by a very Rational Authour as an Argument of their Truth And it may be worth while to let the Reader see how he Manages it in relation to One of the Most Sublime of them The more Obscure are our Mysteries Strange Paradox the more Credible they now appear to me Yes I find even in the Obscurity of our Mysteries receiv'd as they are by so many different Nations an invincible Proof of their Truth How for instance shall we accord the Vnity with the Trinity the Society of three different Persons in the perfect Simplicity of the Divine Nature This without doubt is Incomprehensiblâ— but not Incredible It is indeed above us but let us Consider a little and we shall believe it at least if we wâ—ll be of the same Religion with the Apostles For supposing they had not known this ineffable Mystery or that they had not taught it to their Successours I maintain that it is not Possible that a Sentiment so extraordinary should find in the Minds of Men such an Vniversal Belief as is given to it in the whole Church and among so many different Nations The More this Adorable Mystery appears Monstrous suffer the Expression of the Enemies of our Faith the More it Shocks Human Reason the More the Imagination Mutinies against it the more Obscure Incomprehensibâ—â— and Impenetrable it is the less Credible is it that it should Naturally insiâ—â—ate it self into the Minds and 〈◊〉 of all Christians of so many and so distant Countries Never do the same Errours spread universally especially such sort of Errours which so strangely offend the Imagination which have nothing sensible in them and which seem to Contradict the most Simple and Common Notions If Iesus â—hrist did not Watch over his Church the Number of the 〈…〉 would quickly exceed that of 〈◊〉 â—â—â—hodox Christians For 〈…〉 in the Sentimen◠〈…〉 that does not 〈…〉 the Mind And 〈…〉 that 〈…〉 to our Vnderstandings may establish themselves in time But that a Truth so Sublime so far removed from Sense so Cross to Human Reason so Contrary in short to all Nature as is this great Mystery of our Faith that a Truth I say of this Character should spread it self Vniversally and Triumph over all Nations where the Apostles had Preach'd the Gospel supposing that these First Preachers of our Faith had neither known any thing nor â—aid any thing of this Mystery this Certainly is what cannot be Conceiv'd by any one that has never so little knowledge of Human Nature That there should be Heretics that should oppose a Doctrine so Sublime is nothing strange nor am I surprized at it On the Contrary I should be very much if never any body had opposed it This Truth wanted but little of being quite oppress'd 'T is very possible For 't will be always reckon'd a Commendable Vndertaking to attaque that which seems to Clash with Reason But that at length the Mystery of the Trinity should prevail and should establish it self Vniversally wherever the Religion of Iesus Christ was receiv'd without its being known and taught by the Apostles without an Authority and a Force Divine there needs methinks but an Ordinary Measure of good Sense to acknowledge that nothing in the World is less Probable For it is not in the least likely that a Doctrine so Divine so above Reason so remov'd from whatever may strike the Imagination and the Senses should Naturally Come into the Thought of Man 3. You see here how this Excellent Person strikes Light out of Darkness by improving even the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries into an Argument for the Truth and Credibility of them and so turning the Artillery of our Adversaries against themselves This indeed is a bold Atchievement anâ— as Fortunate a one too for I think there is a great deal of Force and Weight in his Reasoning But I need not push the Matter so far nor follow so home into the Enemies Camp as to plant their own Cannon against them 'T is sufficient to the design of the present undertaking and as much as I am led to by the Principles before Establish'd to Conclude that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no Argument against them This therefore I insist upon and if my Reason mightily deceive me not dare ingage finally to stand to For if as it has been shewn the Incomprehensibility of a thing in general be no Conclusive Argument against either the Truth or the Credibility of it then since Negative Propositions do separate the Attribut from the Subject according to all the Extent which the Subject has in the Proposition what Consequence can be more Clear than that the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries is no Argument against the Belief of them I Conclude therefore that it is None and that they ought never the less to be believ'd for their being Incomprehensible supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd 4. Whether they are so or no is besides my Undertaking at present to examin nor need I ingage my Pen in this Question since the Affirmative side of it is so Obvious to every Eye that can but read the Bible and has been withal so abundantly and convincingly made good by those abler hands which have gone into the Detail of the Controversie and undertaken the particular defence of the Christian Mysteries This part of the Argument therefore being so well discharged already I shall Concern my self no further with it than only in Consequence and Pursuance of the Former Principles to bestow upon it this one single Necessary Remarque viz. That as the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just Objection against the Belief of them supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd so neither is it a just Objection
Consideration viz. That therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Belief of it neither where also I Consider that seemingly Opposite Maxim of Des Cartes that we are to Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident and reconcile it to the other Position Whence my next step was to state the true use of Reason in Believing which I shew'd to Consist not in examining the Credibility of the Object but in taking account of the Certainty of the Revelation which when once resolv'd of we are no longer to Dispute but Believe In fine I have made an Application of these Considerations to the Mysteries of the Christian Faith by shewing that they are never the less to be Believ'd for being Mysteries supposingâ— them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd against which also I have shewn their Incomprehensibility to be no Objection So that every way the Great Argument against the Mysteries of the Christian Faith taken from the Incomprehensibility of them vanishes and sinks into nothing In all which I think I have effectually overthrown the General and Fundamental Ground of Socinianism and truely in great Measure that of Deism too whose best Argument against Reveal'd Religion in general is because the Christian upon all Accounts the most preferable of those that pretend to be Reveal'd Contains so many things in it which transcend the Comprehension of Human Understanding But whether this Best Argument be really a good one or no the whole Procedure of this Discourse may sufficiently shew and whoever knows how to distinguish Sophistry from good Reasoning may easily judge 2. And now you Gentlemen for whose sakes I have been at the pains to write this Treatise give me leave in a few words to Address my self a little more particularly to you and to Expostulate with you Whether it be the good opinion you have of your Cause or the present Opportunity you have to appear in the behalf of it that invites you so freely to Come abroad as you have done of late you have certainly to give your Courage its due taken a very rational and Polite Age for it and I hope the Wise Conduct of Providence may turn this juncture to the Advantage of the Truth and that the Light to which you have adventur'd to expose your Novel Opinions may serve to make you see their Absurdities if you do not too Obstinately shut your Eyes against it Some of you are Considerable Masters of Reason otherwise truly I should not think it worth while to argue with you and you all profess great Devotion to it I wish you do not make it an Idol and to be very Zealous and Affectionate Disciples of it Reason is the great Measure by which you pretend to go and the Judge to whom in all things you appeal Now I accept of your Measure and do not refuse to be tried in the Court of your own Chusing Accordingly you see I have dealt with you all along upon the Ground of Logic and in a Rational way being very Confident that Reason alone will discover to you your undue Elevations of it and the Errours you have been misled into by that Occasion if you do but Consult even this Oracle of yours as you ought and make a right use of its Sacred Light 3. But I am afraid you do not Instead of imploying your Reason in the first place to examin the Certainty of the Revelation whether such a thing be truly Reveal'd and if so to believe it notwithstanding its being incomprehensible your Method is to begin with the Quality of the Object to Consider whether it be Comprehensible or no and accordingly to proceed in your Belief or Disbelief of its being Reveal'd 'T is true indeed you are not so gross as to argue thus this is Comprehensible therefore 't is Reveal'd But you cannot deny but that you argue thus this is Incomprehensible therefore 't is not Reveal'd proceeding upon this general Principle that though whatever is Comprehensible is not therefore presently Reveal'd yet whatever is Reveal'd must be Comprehensible But now judge you whether this be not to make your Reason the Rule and Measure of Divine Revelation that is that God can reveal nothing to you but what you can Comprehend or that you are able to Comprehend all that God can possibly Reveal for otherwise how is your not being able to Comprehend any thing an Argument of its not being Revealâ—d I say Consider whether this be not to set up your Reason as the Rule of Revelation and Consider again whether this does not resolve either into a very low Opinion you have of God and his Infinite Perfections or an extravagantly high one you have of your selves and your own Rational indowments 4. And yet as if this were not Presumption enough do you not also make your Reason the Rule of Faith as well as of Revelation To be the Rule of Faith is a very Great thing and yet so far 't is plain that you make your Reason the Rule of Faith that you will allow nothing to be believ'd but whose Bottom you can Sound by that Line this being an avow'd Principle with you that you are to believe nothing but what you can Comprehend But hold a little before your Reason can be the Measure of Faith must it not be the Measure of Truth And I pray Consider seriously and tell me truly do you verily think in your Consciences that your Reason is the Measure of Truth Do you think your Rational Faculties proportion'd to every intelligible Object and that you are able to Comprehend all the things that are and that there is nothing in the whole extent of Science too high too difficult or too abstruse for you no one part of this vast Intellectual Sea but what you can wade through If you say yes besides the Blasphemous Presumptions and Luciferian Arrogance of the Assertion and how little it falls on this side of Similis ero Altissimo which banish'd the vain-glorious Angel from the Court of Heaven because nothing less would Content his Aspiring Ambition than to be as God there though by the way there is more Sense and Congruity of Reason in pretending to be a God in Heaven than to be a God upon Earth I say besides this I would put it to your more sober thought to Consider whether it be not every whit as great an Extremity in the way of Rational Speculation to Dogmatize so far as to pretend to Comprehend every thing as to say with the Sceptics and Pyrrhonians that we know nothing The latter of which however in regard of its Moral Consequences may be more innocently and safely affirm'd than the Former since in that we only humbly degrade our selves and are Content to sink down into the Level of Brutes whereas in this we aspire to what is infinitely above us and advance our selves into the Seat of God And you know an Excess of Self-dejection is of the two the more tolerable Extreme But if
you say that your Reason is not the Measure of Truth as upon this and the other Considerations there lies a Necessity upon you to Confess how then I pray comes it to be the Measure of your Faith and how come you to lay down this for a Maxim that you will believe Nothing but what you can Comprehend Why if your Reason be not the Measure of Truth and you your selves Care not and I believe are asham'd in terms to say that it is then do you not evidently discern that there is no Consequence from the Incomprehensibility of a thing to the incredibility of it and that you have no reason to deny your Belief to a thing as true merely upon the account of its incomprehensibility And do you not then plainly see that your great Maxim falls to the ground that you are to believe nothing but what you can Comprehend But if yet notwithstanding this you will still adhere to your beloved Maxim and resolve to believe Nothing but what you can adjust and clear up to your Reason then I pray Consider whether this will not necessarily lead you back to that Absurd and withal Odious and Invidious Principle and which therefore you your selves care not to own viz. That your Reason is the Measure of Truth 5. But why do you not care to own it Do you not see at the first cast of your Eye that you are unavoidably driven upon it by your profess'd Maxim Or if you do not think fit to own it as indeed it is a good handsom Morsel to swallow why do you not then renounce that Maxim of yours which is the immediate Consequence of it and necessarily resolves into it Why will you whose Pretensions are so high to Reason act so directly against the Laws of it as to own that implicitly and by Consequence which neither your Head nor your Heart will serve you to acknowledge in broad and express Terms Be a little more Consistent with your own Sentiments at least if not with Truth and be not your selves a Mystery while you pretend not to believe any If you do not care to own the Principle then deny the Consequence or if you will not let go the Consequence then stand by and own the Principle Either speak out boldly and roundly that your Reason is the Measure of Truth or if you think that too gross a defiance to Sense Experience Religion and Reason too to be professedly maintain'd then be so ingenuous to us and so Consistent with your selves as to renounce your Maxim of Believing Nothing but what you can Comprehend since you cannot hold it but with that Absurd Principle And which is therefore a Certain Argument that you ought not to hold it 6. And are you sure that you always do I mean so as to act by it that you hold it in Hypothesi as well as in Thesi Do you never assent to any thing but what you can Comprehend Are there not many things in the Sciences which you find a pressing Necessity to Subscribe to though at the same time you cannot conceive their Modus or account for their Possibility But you 'l say perhaps these are things of a Physical and Philosophical Consideration and such as have no relation to Religion True they are so but then besides that this visibly betrays the weakness of your ground since if the incomprehensibility of a thing were a good Argument against assenting to the Truth of it it would be so throughout in the things of Nature as well as in the things of Religion I would here further demand of you why you are so particularly shy of admitting incomprehensible things in Religion why is it there only that you seem so stiffly and zealously to adhere to your Maxim of Believing nothing but what you can Comprehend Since there are so many inconceivable things or if you please Mysteries in the Works of Nature and of Providence why not in Religion Nay where should one expect to find Mysteries if not there where all the things that are Reveal'd are Reveal'd by God himself and many of them concerning Himself and his own Infinite Perfections And what deference do we pay to God more than Man if either we suppose that he cannot reveal Truths to us which we cannot Comprehend or if we will not believe them if he does Nay may it not be rather said that we do not pay him so much since we think it adviseable to receive many things from our Tutours and Masters upon their Authority only though we do not Comprehend them our selves and justifie our doing so by that well known and in many Cases very reasonable Maxim Discentem oportet Credere But as there is no Authority like the Divine so if that Motto become any School 't is that of Christ. 7. Now 't is in this School that you profess to be Scholars and why then will you be such Opiniative and uncompliant Disciples as to refuse to receive the Sublime Lectures read to you by your Divine and Infallible Master merely because they are too high for you and you cannot Conceive them when at the same time any one of your that is not a Mathematician pardon the Supposition would I doubt not take it upon the word of him that is so that the Diameter of a Square is incommensurable to the Side though he did not know how to demonstrate or so much as Conceive it himself Since then you would express such implicit regard to the Authority of a fallible though Learned Man shall not the Divine weigh infinitely heavier with you and since you would not stick to assent to things above your Conception in Human and Natural Sciences why are you so violently set against Mysteries in Religion whereof God is not only the Authour but in great Measure the Object too 8. You know very well that in the great Problem of the Divisibility of Quantity there are Incomprehensibilities on both sides it being inconceivable that Quantity should and it being also inconceivable that it should not be divided infinitely And yet you know again that as being parts of a Contradiction one of them must necessarily be true Possibly you may not be able with the utmost Certainty and without all hesitation to determine which that is but however you know in the general that One of them indeterminately must be true which by the way is enough to Convince you that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the truth of it and you must also further grant that God whose Understanding is infinite does precisely and determinately know which of them is so Now suppose God should Reveal this and make it an Article of Faith 'T is not indeed likely that he will it being so much beneath the Majesty and besides the End and Intention of Revelation whose great Design is the direction of our Life and Manners and not the improvement of our Speculation But suppose I say he should would you not believe it