will not always be condemned although they say only impertinent things provided they speak them after a Scientific manner What makes men capable of thinking makes them fit to discover Truth but 't is neither Honour Riches nor Dignities nor false Learning that can give them this capacity it proceeds from their Nature They are made to think because they are made for Truth Even Health it self is not sufficient to make them think well all that it can do is not to be so great an impediment as Sickness is Our Body in some manner assists us by Sense and Imagination but it does not help our Conception For although without help of the Body we might by meditation oppose out Idea's to the continual Efforts of the Senses and Passions which perplex and efface them because we can only at present overcome the Body by the Body Yet it is plain that the Body cannot illuminate the Mind nor produce the Light of Understanding in it for every Idea which discovers the Truth comes from Truth it self What the Soul receives by the Body is only for the Body it self and when it persues those Phantoms it discovers nothing but Illusions and Chimera's I mean it does not see things as they are in themselves but only as they relate to the Body If the Idea of our own greatness or littleness is often an occasion of our Error the Idea we have of external things and what has any relation to us causes not a lest dangerous impression We have just said that the Idea of greatness is always attended with a great Motion of Spirits and that a great Motion of Spirits is always accompanied with an Idea of greatness and that on the contray the Idea of littleness is always attended with a weak motion of Spirits and that a weak Motion of the Spirits is always accompanied with an Idea of littleness From this Principle 't is easie to conclude that such things as produce a great Motion of to the Spirits in us must naturally appear to us to have more Greatness that is more Power more Reality and more Perfection than others for by Greatness I mean all these things and many such like So that Sensible Things must appear to us greater and more solid than those which cannot be felt if we judge of them by the Motion of the Spirits and not by the pure Idea of Truth A great House a magnificent Train fine Furniture Offices Honours Riches c. appear to have more greatness and reality in them than Virtue and Justice do When we compare Virtue with Riches by a clear view of the Mind then Virtue gains the preference but when we make use of our Eyes and Imaginations and judge of these things only by the emotion of the Spirits that they excite in us we undoubtedly prefer Riches to Virtue 'T is from this Principle that we have so mean an Opinion of Spiritual things which do not affect the Senses That the Idea's of our Minds are less Noble than the Objects they represent That there is less reality and substance in Air than in Metals in Water than in Ice That the spaces betwixt Earth and Heaven are avoid or else that the Bodies which fill it have not so much reality and solidity as the Sun and Stars have In fine if we fall into an infinite number of Errors about the Nature and Perfection of every thing 't is because we argue upon this false Principle A great motion of Spirits and consequently a strong Passion always accompanies a sensible Idea of greatness and a small motion of Spirits and a weak Passion likewise attends a sensible Idea of littleness We apply our selves much and bestow a great deal of our time in the Study of whatever may excite a sensible Idea of greatness and neglect what gives us a sensible Idea of littleness Those great Bodies for instance which move about us have always made an impression upon us we at first adored them because of the sensible Idea we had of their greatness and brightness Some bolder Genii have examined their Motions and in all Ages the Stars have been the Object either of the Study or Veneration of many Men. We may even say that the fear of these imaginary influences which at this day terrify Astrologers and some weak Persons is a kind of adoration that a depraved Imagination pays to the Idea of greatness which represents these Coelestial Bodies The Body of Man on the contrary tho' infinitely more admirable and worthy our application than whatever can be known of Jupiter and Saturn with all the rest of the Planets is almost unknown to us The sensible Idea of the dissected parts of the flesh hath nothing great in it and even causes disgust and horror so that 't is but a few years since Ingenious persons look'd upon Anatomy as a Science which merited their application Kings and Princes have been Astronomers and proud of that Title The grandeur of the Stars seemed to agree well with the greatness of their Dignities but I don't believe they thought it any honour to understand Anatomy and to be able to dissect a Heart or a Brain well It is the same with many other Sciences Rare and extraordinary things produce greater and more sensible Motions in the Spirits than those which we see every day we admire them and consequently affix some Idea of greatness to them and thus they excite in the Spirits Passions of esteem and veneration 'T is this which overturns the Reason of many Men for some are so curious and respectful for every thing of Antiquity what comes from far or is rare and extraordinary that their Minds become Slaves to it because the Mind dares make no Judgment upon what it respects Truth I grant is in no great danger because some Men wholly employ themselves about Medals Arms the Dress of the Ancients the Chinese or Barbarians It is not absolutely useless to know the Map of Old Rome or the Roads from Tomquin to Nanquin altho' it be more useful to know those we shall have more occasion to Travel In fine we have nothing to object against the knowledge of the true History of the War of the Greeks with the Persians or of the Tartars with the Chinese or that persons shou'd have an extraordinary inclination for Thucidides and Xenophon or for any other that pleases them But we cannot suffer that Reason shou'd be so subjected to the admiration of Antiquity that we must be forbidden to make use of our Understanding to examine the Opinions of the Ancients and that those who discover and show the falseness of them shou'd pass for presumptious and rash Persons There has been Truths in all Ages if Aristotle has discovered some of them further discoveries may be also made to this day The Opinions of this Author must be proved by good Reasons for if Aristotle's Sentiments were solid in his time they will be so now 'T is a pure illusion to pretend to
of our Studies there is yet this Circumstance to be well considered Namely that we must always begin with the most simple and easie things and continue a long Time upon them before we undertake more compounded and difficult ones For if we must only reason upon distinct Idea's always to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions it is plain that we must never proceed to an Enquiry after compounded things before we have very carefully examined and made those simple ones on which they depend familiar to us Since the Idea's of compounded things neither are nor can be clear when we have only a confused and imperfect Knowledge of the more simple which compose them We know things imperfectly when we are not assured that we have considered all their Parts And we have a confused Knowledge of them when they are not familiar to the Mind although we are certain we have examined them in all their Parts When we know them but imperfectly we only reason upon Probabilities when we perceive them confusedly there is neither Order nor Understanding in out Deductions We often know neither where we are nor where we go But when we know them imperfectly and confusedly together which happens most commonly we have neither a clear Knowledge of what we enquire after nor the means of attaining it So that it 's absolutely necessary to keep strictly to this Order in our Studies To begin always with the most simple things examine all their Parts and make them familiar to us before we pass to the more compounded on which they depend But this Rule agrees not with Mens Inclinations they naturally have a Contempt for whatever appears easie and their Mind which was not made for a limited Object that may be easily comprehend cannot stop long in considering these simple Idea's which have no Character of Infinity for which they are made On the contrary and for the same Reason they have much Respect and Inclination for great things which include something of Infinity and such things as are obscure and mysterious 'T is not because they love Darkness but 't is that in this Darkness they hope to find a Good and a Truth capable of satisfying them Vanity also inclines the Mind immediately to imploy it self about great and extraordinary things and gives it a Foolish Hope of accomplishing whatever it undertakes Experience shews us That the most exact Knowledge of common things gives no Reputation in the World and that the Knowledge of such things as are uncommon how confused and imperfect soever it may be always gains Esteem and Respect to those who freely express some high Idea of what they understand not And this Experience determines all those who are more sensibly touched with Vanity than Truth who are certainly in the greatest Number to make a blind Enquiry after a specious and imaginary Knowledge of whatever is great rare and obscure How many Men reject the Philosophy of Descartes for this pleasant Reason that his Principles are too simple and easie There are no obscure and mysterious Terms in this Philosophy Women and Persons who know neither Greek nor Latin are capable of apprehending it It must therefore be of very small Consequence and it would not be reasonable for great Genii to apply themselves to it They imagine Principles so clear and simple are not extensive enough to explain the Effects of Nature which they suppose obscure and perplexed They do not immediately see the Benefit of these Principles which are too easie and simple to stop their Attention so long as it is necessary to discover the Use and Extent of them They rather choose to explain those Effects whose Causes they do not comprehend by Principles they conceive not and which it is absolutely impossible to conceive than by such as are both simple and intelligible For these Philosophers explain obscure things by Principles which are not only obscure but also intirely incomprehensible When any Persons undertake to explain things extreamly perplexed by clear and known Principles it is easie to see whether or no they accomplish it because if we conceive well what they say we can discover whether or no they speak true So the fasly Learned would not find their Expectation nor make themselves admired as they wish to be if they made use of intelligible Principles because it would evidently be discovered that they say nothing But when they make use of unknown Principles and speak of very compounded things as if they exactly knew all their Relations they are admired because what they say is not conceived and we naturally have a Respect for what passes our Understandings Now as obscure and incomprehensible things seem to be better connected than such as are clear and intelligible Incomprehensible Principles are of a greater Use than intelligible ones in the most compounded Questions There is nothing so difficult but Philosophers and Physicians give some brief Reason of it from their Principles For their Principles being yet more incomprehensible than all the Questions that can be put to them if they be once taken for granted there is no Difficulty but will soon be solved For instance they boldly and without any Hesitation answer these obscure and indetermined Questions Why is it that the Sun attracts Vapours That the Jesuits Powder cures the Quartan Feaver That Ruburb purges Choler Chymical Salt Flegm And other like Questions And the Generality of Mankind are satisfied with their Answers because obscure and incomprehensible agrees with both But unintelligible Principles do not well agree with Questions that are clearly proposed and easily resolved because it is evidently discovered that they signifie nothing These Philosophers cannot by their Principles explain how Horses draw a Chariot how Dust stops a Watch how Trepoly cleanses Metals and a Brush out Cloaths For they would make themselves ridiculous to all the World if they supposed a Notion of Attraction and attractive Faculties to explain the Reason why Chariots follow the Horses which are fastned to them and a detersive Faculty in Brushes for cleaning Cloaths and so of other Questions Therefore their great Principles are useless except in obscure Questions because they are incomprehensible We must not therefore stop at any of all these Principles which we have not an evident and clear Knowledge of and which we may think some Nations receive not We must attentively consider the Idea's we have of Extension Figure Local Motion and the Relation these things have amongst themselves If we conceive these Idea's distinctly and find them so clear that we are perswaded that all Nations have always received them we must rest here and examine all their Relations But if we find them obscure we must seek after others For if to reason without Fear of deceiving our selves it is always necessary to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions we must only reason upon clear Idea's and their Relations distinctly known In order to consider the Properties of Extension we must with M. Descartes begin with the
MALEBRANCH's Search after Truth OR A TREATISE OF THE NATURE OF THE Humane Mind AND Of its Management for avoiding Error in the SCIENCES To which is Added The Authors Defence against the Accusations of Monsieur de la Ville ALSO The LIFE of Father Malebranch of the Oratory at Paris With an Account of his Works and several particulars of his controversie with Monsieur Arnaud Dr. of Sorbonne and Monsieur Regis Professor in Philosophy at Paris Written by Monsieur Le Vasseur lately come over from Paris VOL. II. Done out of French from the Last Edition LONDON Printed for S. Manship at the Ship in Cornhil 1695. TO THE Marquess of Normanby My Lord THis Translation of the Second Volume of Father Malebranch's Recherche de la Verite Humbly begs the same Favourable Acceptance and Protection as Your Lordship was pleased to grant the First Nor could I have any Temptation to seek another Patron for it either in respect of the Author or my Self Every one that has had the Honour to know Your Lordship is very Sensible that You have Successfully Studied Mankind in General and are therefore a very good Judge of this Subject As for my Self Your Lordships preventing Goodness and extream readiness to serve me has already outdone the utmost Ambition of My Lord Your Lordships most Faithful and most Obedient Servant Richard Sault The Life of Father Malebranch of the Oratory at Paris With an Account of his Works and several Particulars of his Controversie with Monsieur Arnaud Dr. of Sorbonne and Monsieur Regis Professor in Philosophy at Paris Written by Monsieur Le Vasseur lately come over from Paris Done into English by R. S. FAther Nicholas Malebranch was Born at Paris of a considerable Family in the Year 1638. His Eldest Brother is now one of the Counsellors in the first Chamber of the Parliament at Paris where he is disinguisht by his Integrity and other Qualifications that are proper to make a good Magistrate When Father Malebranch became of Age to choose an Imployment suitable to his Birth and Inclination his Parents proposed to him to make him a Member of that August Body but he generously refused so handsome an Establishment and thought rather of retiring from the World and devoting himself to the Church To this End he chose the Congregation of the Priests of the Oratory which continually supplies France with Learned Divines Excellent Preachers and Men capable of filing the most Eminent Dignities of the Church Father Malebranch spent the first Years of his retreat in studying Divinity and Languages necessary for the understanding of Holy Scripture and other Ecclesiastic Authors But as he felt a greater Pleasure and Inclination for those Sciences that are acquired by Reasoning and Meditation than for those which depended only on Memory and were founded upon Historical Facts or the Writings of Antient Authors he resolved to content himself with reading the Holy Scripture attentively and imploying the rest of his Time in the Study of Metaphysics and the knowledge of himself The Book intituled A Search after Truth was the first Fruit of his Meditations Never was there any Book received with so great an Applause in France nor in other Countries where they are curious in matters of Reason and good Sense All the World was surprized to see a Young Philosopher who knew Man better than the Celebrated Monsieur Des Cartes his Master did at the end of his dayes and who had found the secret of writing upon abstracted things after so noble and polite a manner The Able Men of France Italy Germany England and Holland earnestly sought his Acquaintance and gave him particular Marks of the Esteem which they had conceived for him Madam the Princess Elizabeth Palatine that Illustrious Scholar of Monsieur Des Cartes was so charmed with his Search after Truth that she resolved to make it her Manual and to have it alwayes with her Notwithstanding the Esteem her most Serene Highness had for the Memory of Monsieur Des Cartes she easily confessed that Father Malebranch had out-done that great Philosopher as to what regarded the knowledge of the Humane Mind and the Consequences of the Vnion of the Soul and Body She wrote to her Sister Madam the Princess Louise Abbess of Maubuisson in France that she was surprized that having near her Abbey a Man of such merit so rare and so distinguisht that she had not sought his Acquaintance What was most great and extraordinary in Malebranch was that he alwayes preserved a Humility and Modesty that was truly Christian in the midst of all the Praises and Applauses that he had received in his own Country and elsewhere He was alwayes watchful over himself and would not so much as hearken to so refin'd a Temptation as the greatest Philosophers of Antiquity have not been able to withstand It was with extream Displeasure that Father Malebranch observed afterwards that certain Persons otherwise perswaded of the solidity of the Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy which he had so happily explained were not yet sufficiently convinced of the Truth of the Christian Religion and of the Morals of Jesus Christ Being troubled at the fatal blindness of these Philosophers he resolved to make use of the Principles in which they agreed with him to prove to them the Corruption of Mans Heart and the necessity of such a Mediator as Jesus Christ To this end he Publish'd a little Book of Christian Conversations and from that time he only applyed himself to make use of the Truths which he had discovered to prove the beauty and solidity of that Divine Philosophy which Jesus Christ teaches us in the Gospel What Glory what Honour is it for a Christian Philosopher to have set in so full and so clear a light the Reasons which we can now so advantageously use against Atheists and the Enemies of the Gospel With the Principles of Father Malebranch we may boldly defie the Atheists to explain to us how the Blood circulates in their Veins how they feel Pleasure and Pain by means of certain Motions which are excited in their Body without supposing the Existence and Action of an Infinite Perfect Being who is only capable of punishing and rewarding us And if this pretended strength of Mind of which our Atheists so much boast is baffled when they consider but a Bowl that is in motion an agreeable titillation or Pain which they feed before the Fire what if we should desire them to explain the formation and increase of an almost infinite number of Organized Bodies to tell us bow this vast Machine of the Vniverse could be formed and move of it self after so just and regulated a manner in every thing that is necessary for its Conservation What Comfort is it for us to learn that even the irregularities which appear in the World and concerning which the Enemies of our Religion reproach us with an insulting Air are certain marks of the infinite Perfection of the Author of Nature
of which it is proper to change all the motions of the Passion suddenly determine the course of the Animal Spirits to the Nerves which encompass these Arteries that by their contraction they may shut up the passage whereby the Blood ascends into the Brain and by their dilating lay open that which disperses it self through all the other parts of the Body These Arteries which carry the Blood to the Brain being free and all those which disperse it through the rest of the Body being strongly tied by these Nerves the Head will be filled with Blood and the Face coloured with it But any circumstance changing the shaking of the Brain which caused this disposition in these Nerves the Arteries that were contracted are unloosed and the others on the contrary are strongly contracted Thus the Head is void of Blood a paleness diffused over the Face and the little Blood which goes out of the Heart and which the Nerves we spoke of admit into it to maintain life descend mostly into the lower part of the Body the Brain is defective of Animal Spirits and all the rest of the Body is seized with a weakness and trembling To explain and particularly prove what we have already said it would be necessary to give a general knowledge of Physics and a particular one of Human Bodies But these two Sciences are also too imperfect to be treated of with all the exactness I could wish besides if I should push this matter farther it would soon carry me from my subject and therefore I shall only give a general and gross Idea of the Passions and am satisfied provided this Idea be not false These Shakings of the Brain and Motions of the Blood and Spirits are the fourth thing that is found in each of our Passions and they produce the fifth which is the sensible Emotion of the Soul In the same time that the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Brain into the rest of the Body there to produce the Motions that 's proper to maintain the Passion the Soul is carried towards the good that it perceives and that so much the more violently as the Spirits go out of the Brain with the more force because it is the same shaking of the Brain which acts the Soul and Animal Spirits The Motion of the Soul towards good is so much the greater as the sight of good is more sensible and the Motion of the Spirits which proceed from the Brain to disperse themselves into the rest of the Body is so much the more violent as the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain caused by the impression of the Object or Imagination is stronger so this same shaking of the Brain rendring the sight of the good more sensible it is necessary that the Emotions of the Soul in the Passions should augment in the same proportion as the Motion of the Spirits do These Emotions of the Soul differ not from those which immediately follow the intellectual sight of the good we have spoke of They are only stronger and more lively because of the union of the Soul and Body and the sensibility of the sight which produces them The sixth thing which occurs is the Sensation of Passion the Sensation of Love Aversion Desire Joy Sorrow c. This Sensation is not different from that we have already spoke of it is only more quick because the Body hath a great share in it But it is always followed with a certain Sensation of Sweetness which renders all our Passions agreeable to us and is the last thing observed in every one of our Passions as has been already said The cause of this last Sensation is thus At the sight of the Object of the Passion or any new Circumstance some of the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Head to the extream parts of the Body to put it into the gesture the Passion requires and others forcibly descend into the Heart Lungs and Bowels from thence to draw necessary assistances which has already been explained Now it never happens that the Body is in the condition it ought to be but the Soul receives much satisfaction from it whereas if the Body is in an estate contrary to its good and preservation the Soul suffers much pain Thus when we follow the Motions of our Passions and stop not the course of the Spirits which the sight of the Object of the Passion causes in our Body to put it in the condition it ought to be in relation to this Object The Soul will by the Laws of Nature receive this Sensation of delight and inward satisfaction because the Body is in the state it ought to be in On the contrary when the Soul following the Rules of Reason stops the course of the Spirits and resists these Passions it suffers pain proportionably to the evil which might from thence happen to the Body For even as the reflexion that the Soul makes upon it self is necessarily accompanied with the Joy or Sorrow of the Mind and afterwards with the Joy or Sorrow of the Senses when doing its duty and submitting to the order of God it would discover that in a proper condition or abandoning it self to its Passions it is touched with remorse which teaches it that 't is in an ill disposition Thus the course of the Spirits excited by the good of the Body is accompanied with a sensible Joy or Sorrow and afterwards with a Spiritual one according as the course of the Animal spirits is hindered or favoured by the Will But there is this remarkable difference between the Intellectual Joy that accompanies the clear knowledge of the good estate of the Soul and the sensible Pleasure which accompanies the confused Sensation of the good disposition of the Body that the Intellectual Joy is solid without remorse and as immutable as the truth which causes it whereas sensible Joy is generally accompanied with Sorrow of the Mind or remorse of Conscience whence it is unquiet and as inconstant as the Passion or Agitation of the Blood which causes it In fine the first is almost always accompanied with a great Joy of the Senses when it is a consequence of the knowledge of a great good that the Soul possesses and the other is seldom accompanied with any Joy of the Mind although it be a consequence of a great good which only happens to the Body if it is contrary to the good of the Soul It is therefore true that without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST the satisfaction the Soul tastes in abandoning it self to its Passions is more agreeable than that it feels in following the Rules of Reason and it is this Satisfaction which is the cause of all the Disorders that have followed Original Sin and it would make us all Slaves to our Passions if the Son of God did not deliver us from their servitude by the delights of his Grace For indeed what I have said on the behalf of the Joy of the Mind against the Joy of the Senses is
Conversations towards the end The Stoics who had but a confused knowledge of the disorders of original Sin could not confute the Epicureans their happiness being but barely Ideal since there is no felicity without Pleasure and they could not relish Pleasure in the meer persuit of vertuous actions 't is true they might find some satisfaction in following the Rules of their imaginary Virtue because it is a natural consequence of the knowledge our Soul has that she 's in the most eligible condition she can be in This joy of the Mind might maintain their Resolutions for some time but it was not strong enough to resist Pain and conquer Pleasure 'T was secret Pride and not Joy that made them keep their Countenance for when no one was present they soon lost all their Power and Wisdom like Kings upon the Theatre whose Grandeur vanishes in a moment It is very different with those Christians who exactly follow the Rules of the Gospel Their Joy is solid because they most certainly know they are in the happiest condition they can possibly be at present Their Joy is also great because the Good they taste through Faith and Hope is infinite For the Hope of a great Good is always attended with a sensible Joy and this Joy is so much the more vigorous as the Hope is stronger because a strong Hope representing the Good as present necessarily produces that Joy and sensible Pleasure which always accompanies the presence of Good Nor is their Joy uneasie because it is founded upon the promises of God by the Blood of whose Son it is confirmed and maintain'd by the inward Peace and inexpressible sweetness of Charity which the Holy Ghost diffuses in their Hearts Nothing can separate them from the true Good when they taste and are pleased with it through the Delectation of Grace The Pleasures of Corporeal Enjoyments are not so great as those they feel in the love of God rather than quit them they choose Contempt and Pain they are not affrighted at Reproaches and Disgrace and the Pleasures they find in their Sufferings or to speak more properly those they meet with in God when they contemn every thing to be united to him are so violent that they transport them and makes them speak a new Language and with the Apostles boast of the Miseries and Injuries they suffer The Scripture tells us That when the Apostles departed from the Council they were filled with Joy that they were accounted worthy to suffer shame for the Name of JESUS And this is the disposition of Mind in true Christians when they have received the greatest Affronts for defending the Truth JESVS CHRIST being come to reestablish that Order that Sin had overthrown and Order requiring that the greatest Goods should be accompanied with the most solid Pleasures it is plain that things ought to happen after the manner we have related But besides Reason Experience confirms it for a Person no sooner takes a resolution of contemning every thing for God but he is commonly so affected with a Pleasure or inward Joy that he as sensibly feels God to be his Good as before he evidently knew him to be so True Christians assure us every day that the Joy they have in the Love and Service of God is inexpressible and 't is very reasonable to believe them concerning what passes in themselves The wicked on the contrary are perpetually tormented with mortal Disquiets and such as are divided betwixt God and the World partake also of the Joys of the Righteous and Dissatisfactions of the Wicked They complain of their Miseries and 't is likewise just to believe their Complaints are not groundless God strikes Men to the very quick when they make choice of any other object for their chief Good but himself and 't is this wound that makes them really miserable But fills the Mind of those with excessive Joy who only unite themselves to him and 't is this Joy which gives the true Felicity The abundance of Riches and possession of Honours and Dignities being external cannot cure the wound God makes And as Poverty and Contempt are also without us so they cannot hurt us when the Almighty protects us It is evident by what has been said that the objects of our Passions are not our Good and that we must only follow their Motions for the preservation of our Lives That sensible Pleasure in respect of our Good is what our Sensations are in relation to the Truth and even as we find our Senses deceive us in matters of Truth so our Passions deceive us concerning our Good That we must submit to the Delectation of Grace because it evidently enclines us to love the true Good nor is followed with the secret reproaches of Reason like the blind instinct and confused pleasure of the Passions but is always attended with a secret Joy agreeable to the condition we are in And last of all since God only can act upon our Mind we can find no Felicity out of God except we would suppose that God rewards none but the Disobedient or Commands us to love that most which least deserves our love CHAP. V. That the Perfection of the Mind consists in its Vnion with God by the knowledge of Truth and love of Virtue And that on the contrary its Imperfection proceeds only from its dependance on the Body because of the disorder of its Senses and Passions THE least reflexion is enough to discover to us that the good of the Mind must necessarily be something Spiritual for Bodies are much inferior to the Mind and cannot act upon it by their own strength They are not able immediately to unite themselves to it nor are they intelligible of themselves and therefore cannot be its good On the contrary Spiritual Things are intelligible from their own Nature and may unite themselves to the Mind consequently be its good if we suppose them superior to it for that a thing may be the good of the Mind it is not enough to be Spiritual like that it must be above it that it may be able to act upon it instruct and recompence it otherwise it cou'd neither make it more happy nor more perfect and therefore cou'd not be its good Of all things both Intelligible and Spiritual there is none but God that is thus superior to the Mind from whence it follows that nothing but he is or can be its true good nor can we therefore become more perfect or more happy but in the enjoyment of God Every one is convinced that the knowledge of the Truth and love of Virtue makes the Mind more perfect and that the blindness of the Mind and irregularity of the Inclinations renders it more imperfect The knowledge of Truth and love of Virtue then can be nothing else but the union of the Mind with God and even a kind of possessing of him And the blindness of the Mind and irregularity of the Heart can likewise be nothing else but the separation
of the Mind from God and the uniting the Mind to something inferior to it like the Body since only this union can make it imperfect and unhappy Thus to be acquainted with Truth to know things that are the most agreeable or consonant to the Rules of Virtue is to know God himself The Mind is as it were placed between God and the Body Good and Evil between what instructs and blinds it regulates and disorders it what can make it perfect and happy and what can make it imperfect and miserable When it discovers any Truth or sees things as they are in themselves it sees them in the Idea's of God that is by a clear and distinct view of what it is in God that represents them For as I have before intimated the Mind of Man does not in it self include the Perfections or Idea's of all the Beings it is capable of considering 'T is not the Universal Being and therefore does not see in it self such things as are distinct from it by consulting it self it is neither capable of enlightening or instructing it self for 't is neither its own Perfection nor Light it stands in need of the immense Light of Truth by which it is united to and possesses God in some manner But we cannot only say that the Mind which is acquainted with Truth does in some manner know God who includes it but we may likewise add That in part it knows things as God himself knows them for the Mind knows their true Relations and God knows them also the Mind discovers them by viewing the Perfections of God who represents them God sees them likewise by the same means For in short God neither sees nor imagines but perceives in himself as he is the Intellectual World the Material and Sensible one which he has created It is the same with the Mind in its knowledge of Truth it perceives it not by Sensation and Imagination Sensations and Phantoms only represent false Relations to the Mind and whoever discovers the Truth can only see it in the Intellectual World to which 't is united and in which God himself sees it for this Material and Sensible World is not intelligible of it self The Mind then sees in the Light of God what e'er it sees clearly thô it sees them but imperfectly and in that respect very differently from what God sees them So that when the Mind discovers the Truth it is not only united to God but possesses and beholds him and in one sense sees the Truth as God himself does Likewise when our Love is regulated by Virtue we love God for when we love according to these Rules the impression of love that God continually produces in our hearts inclines us towards him and is neither diverted by Free-will nor changed into Self-love The Mind then does only with the greatest freedom follow this impression that God gives it and the Almighty never giving it any impression but what tends towards him since he only acts for himself It is evident that when we love according to the Rules of Virtue we love God But 't is not only to love God 't is also to love as God does who only loves himself and his Works because they relate to his Perfections and loves these Works proportionably to the relation they have to these Perfections And indeed 't is the same love whereby God loves himself and whatever he has created To love according to the Rules of Virtue is to love God only and to love God in every thing is to love every thing so far as it partakes of his Goodness and Perfection since that is to love them in proportion to their Amiableness In short 't is to love by the impression of the same love whereby God loves himself for 't is that love by which God loves himself and whatever relates to him which animates us when we love as we ought to do And therefore we then love as God loves It is then evident that the knowledge of Truth and regulated love of Virtue produces all our Perfections since they are commonly the consequences of our Union with God and even lead us to the enjoyment of him as much as we are capable in this life And on the contrary the blindness of our Minds and irregularity of our Inclinations are the cause of all our imperfections being the Natural effects of the union of our Mind with our Body as I have before proved in shewing that we never discover the Truth nor love the true Good when we follow the impressions of our Senses Imaginations and Passions Tho' these things are so evident yet Men who ardently desire to perfect their Being take very little pains to encrease their union with God but continually endeavour to strengthen and enlarge that they have with Sensible things The cause of this strange irregularity cannot be too fully explain'd The possession of Good must naturally produce these two effects in him that enjoys it it makes him more perfect and at the same time more happy Yet it does not always happen so I confess 't is impossible that the Mind shou'd actually possess any good and not be actually more perfect but it may actually enjoy a good without being made more happy by it Those who are best acquainted with the Truth and have the greatest love for the most amiable good are always actually more perfect than those that are still subjected to blindness and disorder yet are they not always actually more happy It is the same thing in respect to Evil it makes men both imperfect and unhappy at the same times yet tho' it always renders them more imperfect it does not always make them more unhappy or at least it does not make them unhappy in proportion to the imperfection it gives them Virtue is often unpleasant and bitter and Vice sweet and agreeable so that 't is chiefly through Faith and Hope that good Men are truly happy whilst the Wicked actually enjoy Pleasure and Delights It ought not to be thus 't is true but so it is Sin having caused this disorder as I have shew'd in the preceding Chapter and 't is this disorder that is the chief cause not only of all the irregularities of our Hearts but also of the blindness and ignorance of our Minds Our Imagination is by this disorder perswaded that the Body may be the good of the Mind for Pleasure as I have many times intimated is the Character or Sensible Mark of Good and the most sensible Earthly enjoyments are those which we imagine we receive from the Body Wherefore without much reflexion we judge that Bodies may be and even truly are our Good And 't is so difficult to oppose the Instinct of Nature and to resist the Proofs of Sensation that we never so much as think of it We reflect not upon the disorders that Sin has produced and consider not that Bodies can only act upon the Mind as occasional Causes That the Mind cannot immediately or of it self
to the carnal and most ignorant That he might instruct them by that which caused their blindness and encline them to love him and loose them from sensible Objects by the same things that had captivated them For when he had to do with Fools he made use of a kind of simplicity to make them wise so that the most Religious and Faithful have not always the greatest Understanding They may know God by Faith and love him through the assistance of his Grace without discerning him to be their All after the same manner as Philosophers do and without reflecting that the abstracted knowledge of Truth is a kind of union with him We must not therefore be surprized if there are but few Persons who endeavour to strengthen their Natural Union they have with God by seeking after the Truth since to this end it would be necessary constantly to oppose the impression of the Senses and Passions after a very different manner from that which is familiar to the most Virtuous Persons for most good Men are not always perswaded that the Senses and Passions deceive us after the manner we have explained in the precedent Books Those Sensations and Thoughts wherein the Body has any share are the true and immediate cause of our Passions because 't is only the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain that excites any particular emotion in the Animal Spirits so that only our Sensations can sensibly convince us that we depend on certain things which they excite us to love But we feel not the Natural Union we have with God when we discover the Truth nor so much as think upon him for he is within us and operates after such a secret and insensible manner that we perceive him not Our Natural Union with him therefore does not excite us to love him But our Union with Sensible Things is quite different All our Sensations declare this Union and Bodies present themselves to our Eyes when they act in us nor is any thing they do concealed Even our own Body is more present to us than our Mind and we consider it as the best part of our selves Thus the Union we have with our Body and through that with all sensible Objects excites a violent love in us which increases this Union and makes us depend upon things that are infinitely below us CHAP. VI. Of the most general Errors of the Passions Some particular Examples of them IT 's the part of Moral Philosophy to enquire into all the particular Errors wherein our Passions engage us concerning good to oppose the irregularities of Love to establish the sincerity of the Heart and regulate the Manners But our chief intent here is to give Rules for the Mind and to discover the causes of our Errors in respect of Truth so that we shall pursue no further those things already mentioned which relate only to the love of the true Good We will then proceed to the Mind but shall not pass by tne Heart because it has the greatest influence over the Mind We will enquire after the Truth in it self and without thinking on the relation it has to us only so far as this relation is the occasion that Self-love disguises and conceals it from us for we judging of all things according to our Passions deceive our selves in all things the Judgments of the Passions never agreeing with the Judgments of the Truth 'T is what we may learn from these admirable words of St. Bernard * Amor sicut nec odium veritatis judicium nescit Vis judicium veritatis audire Joan 5.30 Sicut audio sic judico Non sicut odi non sicut amo non sicut timeo Est judicium odii ut illud Nos legem habemus secundum legem Nostram debet mori Joan 19.7 Est timoris ut illud si dimittimus eum sic venient Romani tollent Nostrum locum gentem Joan 11.48 Judicium vero amoris ut David de filiô parricidâ Parcite inquit puero Absalom 2 Reg. 18.5 St. Bern. de grad humilitatis Neither love nor hatred says he know how to judge according to truth But if you will hear a true Judgment I judge according to what I hear not as I hate love or fear This is a Judgment of hatred We have a law and according to our law he ought to die This is a Judgment of fear If we let him alone the Romans will come and take away our Place and Nation This is a Judgment of love as David speaks of his parricide son Spare the young Man Absalom Our Love Hatred and Fear cause us to make false Judgments only and nothing but the pure Light of Truth can enlighten our Mind 'T is only the distinct Voice of our common Master that instructs us to make solid Judgments and he will infallibly do it provided we only judge of what he says and according to what he says Sicut audio sic judico As I hear I judge But let us see after what manner our Passions seduce us that we may the more easily resist them The Passions have so great a relation to the Senses that 't will not be difficult to discover after what manner they engage us in Error if we but remember what has been said in the First Book For the general Causes of the Errors of our Passions are entirely like those of the Errors of our Senses The most general cause of the Errors of our Senses is as we have shewn in the First Book our attributing to our Body or to External Objects those Sensations which belong to our Soul affixing Colours to the Surfaces of Bodies diffusing of Light Sounds Odours in the Air and assigning Pain and Pleasure to those parts of our Body which receive any change by the motion of other Bodies which meet them The same thing may be said of our Passions we imprudently attribute to those Objects which cause or seem to cause them all the dispositions of our Heart Goodness Meekness Malice Ill-nature and all the other Qualities of our Mind Whatever Object produces any Passion in us in some manner seems to include in it self what it stirs up in us when we think upon it Even as sensible Objects appear to us to include the Sensations their presence excites When we love any Person we are naturally inclined to believe they love us and 't would be difficult for us to imagine that they had either any design to hurt us or to oppose our desires But if hatred succeeds love we cannot believe that they design us any good we interpret all their actions in the worst sense and are always suspicious and upon our guard although perhaps they think not of us or else intend to do us some service In short we unjustly attribute all the dispositions of our Heart to those Persons who excite any Passion in us even as we imprudently ascribe all the qualities of our Mind to sensible Objects Moreover by the same
that all the Passions which are excited in us at the sight of some external object does Mechanically imprint upon the face of those that are struck with it a suitable Air that is an Air that Mechanically disposes all those who see it to such Passions and Motions as are useful to the good of Society nay Admiration it self when it is only caused in us by the fight of something External and which others may consider as well as we diffuses through our Face an Air which Mechanically imprints Admiration in others and which even acts upon their Brain after so regulated a manner that the Spirits which are contained in it are impelled into the Muscles of their Face to form there an Air like ours This Communication of the Passions of the Soul and Motions of the Animal Spirits to unite Men together in relation to good and evil and to make 'em resemble each other not only by the disposition of their Minds but also by that of their Body is so much the greater and more observable as the Passions are more violent because then the Animal Spirits are agitated with more force Now this is necessary because the Evils being greater or more present we must apply our selves the more and be strongly united amongst our selves to shun or to discover them But when the Passions are very moderate as Admiration commonly is they don't sensibly communicate themselves nor produce such an Air by which they are accustomed to do it For since there 's no extraordinary occasion 't would be unnecessary to put any force upon the imagination of others or to divert them from their employments on which perhaps 't is more requisite they should be engag'd than in considering the Causes of these Passions There is nothing more surprising than this Oeconomy of our Passions and disposition of our Body in relation to those objects which encompass us Whatsoever is Machinally performed in us is most worthy the Wisdom of him who Created us And as God has made us capable Of all the Passions which act in us chiefly to unite us to all sensible things for the preservation of Society and of our own Bodies and his design is so faithfully executed by the construction of his work so we cannot but admire the Springs and curiosity thereof Yet our Passions and all these imperceptible Bands by which we are united to whatever is about us often prove through our faults very considerable Causes of our Errors and Irregularities For we make not that use we ought of our Passions we permit them every thing and do not so much as know the limits that should be prescribed to their Power Thus even these Passions which like Admiration are but weak and agitate us the least have yet power enough to lead us into Error Of which here follows some instances When Men and chiefly those who have a vigorous Imagination consider themselves on the best side they are commonly very well satisfied with themselves and their inward satisfaction never fails of encreasing when they compare themselves with such as are more dull and heavy than they Besides there is many Persons that admire 'em too and very few who oppose them with any success or applause for Reason is scarcely ever applauded in opposition to a strong and lively imagination and in short such a sensible Air of submission and respect is form'd upon the Face of all their Hearers who have likewise such lively traces of admiration at every new word they speak that they also admire themselves and their Imagination swells them up with all these advantages and makes 'em extreamly satisfied in their own Abilities For if we cannot see a Passionate Man without receiving some impression from his Passion or in some measure engaging our selves in his Sentiments how could it be possible for those who are surrounded with a great number of Admirers to give no reception to a Passion which so agreeably flatters Self-Love Now this high esteem that Persons of a strong and lively Imagination have of themselves and their good Qualities swell 'em up with Pride and makes them assume a Majestic and Decisive Air They hear others with Contempt answer 'em in Raillery and only think in relation to themselves Looking upon the attention of the Mind as a kind of Servitude even where 't is necessary to discover the Truth they become wholly Indocible Pride Ignorance and Blindness are always Companions The Mighty Wits or rather the Proud and Vain-glorious ones will never be Disciples of the Truth They never retire within themselves but to admire and applaud their own Acquirements So that he who resists the Proud shines in the midst of their darkness without dissipating it There is on the contrary a certain disposition in the Blood and Animal Spirits which gives us too mean an opinion of our selves Their scarcity heaviness and fineness joined to the grossness of the Fibres of the Brain make our Imagination weak and languishing And the Sight or rather confused Sensation of this weakness and languor of our Imaginations creates such a vicious humility in us as we may call meanness of Spirit All Men are capable of the Truth but do not apply themselves to him who is only able to teach them The Proud depend upon themselves and hearken to none else And these mistaken humble ones address themselves to the Proud and submit to all their Decisions Thus both listen only to Man The Mind of the Proud obeys the fermentation of their own Blood that is their own Imagination And that of the mean spirited submits to the commanding Air of the Proud so that both are subjected to Vanity and Lyes The Proud are like a rich and powerful Man who having a great Equipage measures his own greatness by the number of his Followers and his strength by that of his Horses which draw his Coach These mistaken humble ones having the same Spirit and same Principles resemble a poor miserable languishing wretch who imagines himself almost nothing because he possesses nothing Yet our Equipage is not our selves and so far is the abundance of the Blood and Spirits vigour and impetuosity of the Imagination from leading us to Truth that on the contrary there is nothing which diverts us more from it It is the dull if I may call them so the cold and sedate Minds which are most capable of discovering the most solid and intricate Troths In the silence of their Passions they may hearken to that Truth which teaches them in the most secret recesses of their Reason but unhappily they think not of applying themselves to its word because it speaks without a sensible lustre and in a low voice and nothing affects them but a noise Nothing convinces them but what seems sparkling great and magnificent to the Judgment of the Senses they are not pleased without they are dazled and choose rather to hearken to those Philosopbers who relate their Visions and Dreams to them and who with the false
prove Natural Truths by Humane Authority perhaps we may prove that Aristotle had such and such thoughts upon certain Subjects but 't wou'd not be very reasonable to read Aristotle or any other Author whatever with much assiduity and pains only to learn his Opinions Historically and to instruct others after the same manner We cannot without some dislike consider certain Universities which were Established only for an Enquiry into and Defence of the Truth that have now Espoused a particular Sect and Glory in studying and defending the Opinions of some Men Nor can we without some regret read those Philosophers and Physicians who fill their Books with lo many Citations that one wou'd rather take them for Commentaries upon Divinity and Civil Law than Treatises of Physicks or Medicine For who can be content to quit Reason and Experience blindly to follow the Imaginations of Aristotle Plato Epicurus or any other Philosopher whatever However we might perhaps continue unmoved and without reply at the sight of so strange a Conduct if we did not feel our selves offended by it I mean if those Gentlemen did not oppose themselves to the Truth to which only they ought to be united But their Admiration for the Visions of the Ancients inspires them with a blind Zeal against any new discoveries of the Truth they decry them without knowing them oppose them without apprehending them and by the power of their Imaginations infuse into the Mind and Heart of those who hear and admire them the same Sensations wherewith they are affected As they judge of these new Discoveries only by the esteem they have of their Authors and since those they have seen and with whom they converse have not this great and extraordinary Air that the Imagination attributes to Ancient Authors they cannot esteem them For the Idea of the Men of our own Age not being attended with these extraordinary motions which strike the Mind it naturally excites nothing but Contempt Limners and Statuaries never represent the Ancient Philosophers like other Men They make them great Heads large and high Foreheads long and magnificent Beards This is a good proof that the generality of Men naturally form a like Idea of them for Painters draw things as they appear to them they follow the natural motions of their Imaginations Thus we generally look upon the Ancients as extraordinary Men but on the contrary the Imagination represents the Men of our time like those we see every day and that producing no extraordinary motion in the Spirits it only excites in the Soul a contempt and indifferency for them I have seen D'Cartes says one of these Learned Men who only admire Antiquity I have known and discoursed with him many times he was an honest Man nor did he want Wit yet he had nothing extraordinary Thus he has a mean Idea of D'Cartes Philosophy because he had discoursed some moments with him and discovered nothing of this great and extraordinary Air in him which heats the Imagination He even thinks it a sufficient answer to any difficult Arguments of this Philosopher which perplex'd him a little to say considently that he had formerly known him It were to be wished that these sort of Men cou'd see Aristotle otherwise than in Painting and have an hours Conversation with him provided he spoke not to them in Greek but in their own Tongue without knowing who he was till after they had made a Judgment of him Whatever bears the Character of Novelty whether because it is new in it self or that it appear in a new order or situation it agitates us much for it affects the Brain in places which are so much the more sensible as they are less exposed to the course of the Spirits and such things as have a sensible mark of greatness also affects us much because they excite a great Motion of Spirits in us But what at the same time bears the Character of Greatness and Novelty too does not only agitate us it confounds elevates and astonisheth us by its violent agitations Those for Instance who speak Paradoxes make themselves admired for they say only such things as have the Character of Novelty Such as speak in Sentences and only use choice and proper Words cause themselves to be respected for they seem to say something great But those who join Eloquence to Novelty the Great to the Extraordinary seldom ever fail of ravishing and astonishing the vulgar sort altho' they speak nothing but impertinencies This pompous and magnificent Jargon insano fulgoret these false Lights of Orators commonly dazle weak Minds they make so lively and surprizing an impression upon their Imagination that they remain confounded and respect this power which abases and blinds them and admire as the brightest Truths such confused Sentiments as cannot be expressed CHAP. VIII A Continuation of the same Subject of the good Vse that may be made of Admiration and the rest of the Passions All the Passions have two very considerable Effects they apply the Mind and gain the Heart By the former they may be very useful to the discovery of Truth provided we know how to make use of them for application produces knowledge and knowledge discovers the Truth But in respect to their gaining the Heart they always produce an ill Effect because they only win it by corrupting the Reason and representing things to it not as they are in themselves or according to truth but according to the relation they bear to us Of all Passions that which least affects the Heart is Admiration For 't is the prospect of things that are either good or evil which agitates us for the sight of things as they are great or small without any other relation to us affects us very little or not at all Thus Admiration which accompanies the knowledge of the greatness or smallness of new things which we would consider corrupt the Reason much less than any other Passion and. it may even be of great use in the knowledge of the Truth provided we take care to hinder its being followed by any of the other Passions as it commonly happens In Admiration the Animal Spirits are forcibly impelled towards those places in the Brain which represent the new Object as it is in it self They make distinct Traces there and deep enough to continue a long time consequently the Mind has a clear Idea of them and can easily resolve them Thus we cannot deny but Admiration may be very useful in the Sciences since it applies and instructs the Mind It is not so with the rest of the Passions they apply the Mind but instruct it not They apply it because they stir up the Animal Spirits but they instruct it not or else do it by a false and deceitful light since after such a manner they impel these same Spirits as they represent Objects only according to the relation they have to us and not as they are in themselves There is nothing so difficult as to apply our selves long to
into the same Errors because they fill their Minds with a great number of such Truths as have more lustre than power and are fitter to dissipate and divide their Minds than to fortifie it against Temptation whereas unlearned and ignorant Persons are faithful in their Duty because they make some great and serious Truth familiar to them which fortifies and upholds them in all Occurrences CHAP. IX of Love and Aversion and of their principal kinds LOve and Aversion are the first Passions which succeed Admiration We do not long consider an object without discovering the Relations it has to us or to something that we Love The object that we Love and to which consequently we are united by Love being almost always present to us as well as that which we actually admire our Mind without any pain or great reflection makes the necessary Comparisons to discover the Relations they have to each other and to us or else it is naturally advertized of 'em by the preventing Sensations of Pleasure and Complacency And then the motion of Love we have for our selves and the object that we Love extends it self unto that we admire if the relation that it immediately has with us or with any thing we are united to appears advantagious to us either by Knowledge or Sensation Now this new motion of the Soul or rather motion of the Soul newly determined being joined to that of the Animal Spirits and followed with the Sensation which accompanies the new disposition that this new motion of Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion that we here call Love But if we feel by any Pain or discover by a clear and evident Knowledge that the union or relation of the object we admire is disadvantageous to us or to any thing we are united to Then the motion of Love that we have for our selves and for what is united to us is limited in us or carried towards it and follows not the sight of the Mind nor employs it self on the object of our Admiration But as the motion towards good in general which the Author of Nature continually imprints in the Soul carries us towards what we know and feel to be so because what is intelligible and sensible is good in it self We may say that the resistance which the Soul makes against this natural motion that draws it away is a kind of voluntary motion which terminates in Nothingness Now this voluntary motion of the Soul being joyned to that of the Spirits and Blood That we may not be mistaken in respect to what I here call voluntary Motion it is requisite to read the first explanation upon the first Chapter and followed with the Sensation which accompanies the new disposition that this motion of Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion that we here call Aversion This Passion is absolutely contrary to Love yet is never without Love It is wholly contrary because this separates I should only perplex the thought if I spoke whatever related to it to satisfie some difficult Persons and that unites The former has Nothingness for its object and the latter always some Being whereby 't is excited Aversion refists natural Motion and makes it of no effect whereas Love yields to it and makes it victorious But it is never separated from Love for if evil which is its object is taken for a privation of good to fly evil is to fly the privation of good that is to incline towards good and so that to hate the privation of good is to love good it self But if evil is taken for Pain and the aversion of Pain is not an aversion of the privation of Pleasure since Pain is as real a Sensation as Pleasure it is not therefore the privation of it but the aversion of Pain being the aversion to some inward Misery we should not have this aversion if we had not love Indeed evil may be taken for whatever causes Pain in us or deprives us of good and then aversion depends upon the love of our selves or of something to which we wish to be united Love and Hatred are then the two Mother Passions and opposite to each other but Love is the first chief and most Universal Being also since the Fall so far removed and separated from good as we are and looking upon our own being as the chief part of every thing we are united to we may in one Sense say that the motion of Love which we have to all things is only a consequence of Self-Love We love Honours because they raise us above others Riches because they defend and preserve us Our Relations Prince and Country because we are interested in their preservation The motion of love that we have for our selves extends to every thing that relates to us and to whatever we are united For 't is even this motion which unites and diffuses if I may so say our Being into those which encompass us in proportion as we discover by Reason or discern by Sensation that 't is advantageous to be united to them So that we must not think that since the Fall Self-Love is only the cause and rule of all other Loves but that most Loves are only kinds of Self-Love For when we say a Man loves a new object we must not think that a new motion of love is produced in this Man But rather that knowing that this object has some relation or union with him he loves himself in that object and by a motion of Love as old as himself For indeed without Grace there is only Self-Love in the Heart of Man For the love of Truth Justice and even of God himself and every other Love that has been in us from the first Inftitution of Nature is ever since the fall the Sacrifice of self-love We doubt not nevertheless but the most wicked and barbarous Men as Idolaters and even Atheists themselves are united to God by a Natural Love and of which consequently Self Love is not the cause By Love they are united to Truth Justice and Virtue They praise and esteem good Men and 't is not because they are Men that they love them but because they see good qualities in them which they cannot avoid loving since they cannot hinder themselves from admiring and judging them aimable Thus we love something else besides our selves but Self-Love is always predominant over all other loves Men abandon Truth and Justice for triffling Interests and if by their natural Powers they hazard their Lives and Fortunes to defend oppressed innocency or any other occasion They are induced by little else than Vanity and to make themselves considerable by the apparent possession of some Virtue which all the world reverences They love Virtue and Justice but never when 't is against themselves They may love them when they agree but never when they are opposite to their Interest for they can never without Grace gain the least conquest over Self-Love There are also many other natural
viz. Joy Desire and Sorrow For we have Joy when a Good is present or an Evil past We feel Sorrow when Good is past and Evil present and are agitated with Desire when Good and Evil are to come The Passions which regard Good are particular determinations of the motion which God gives us towards Good in general and therefore their object is real But others who have not God for the cause of their motion terminate only in nothingness CHAP. X. Of the Passions in particular the manner of explaining them in general and of discovering the Errors of which they are the cause IF we consider how compound the Passions are we shall plainly discover that their number cannot be determined and that there are many more of them than we have terms to express The Passions do not only draw their differences from the various Combinations of the three first for then there wou'd be but a few of them but their difference proceeds likewise from the different Perceptions and different Judgments which cause or accompany them The different Judgments which the Soul makes of Good and Evil cause different Motions in the Animal Spirits to dispose the Body in relation to the Object and consequently create such Sensations in the Soul as are not absolutely alike Thus they are the cause as we have observed of the difference between certain Passions whose emotions resemble each other However the emotion of the Soul being the chief thing which occurs in each of our Passions it is much better to refer them all to the three Original ones in which these emotions are very different than to treat of them confusedly and without order in relation to the different perceptions that we may have of the Good and Evil which causes them for we may have so many different perceptions of Objects in relation to time to our selves to what belongs to us in relation to Persons or Things to which we are united either by Nature or the choice of our Will that it is absolutely impossible to make an exact enumeration of them When the Soul perceives a Good which she may enjoy we may perhaps say she hopes for it altho' she desires it not But it is plain this Hope is not a Passion but a simple Judgment So that 't is the emotion which accompanies the Idea of Good the possession of which we judge to be possible which makes this Hope to be a true Passion When Hope is changed into Security 't is still the same thing it is not a Passion only because of the emotion of Joy which is then mixt with that of Desire for the Judgment of the Soul which considers a Good as not being likely to fail of it is a Passion only because the foresight of Good agitates us In short when Hope diminishes and Despair succeeds it it is also plain that this Despair is a Passion only because of the emotion of Sorrow which is then mixt with this Desire for the Judgment of the Soul which considers a Good as not being able to happen is not a Passion except this Judgment agitates us But because the Soul never considers Good or Evil without some emotion and even without some change happen in the Body we often give the Name of Passion to the Judgment which produces this Passion because we confound whatsoever passes in the Soul and Body at the sight of any Good or Evil for the words Hope Fear Rashness Shame Impudence Anger Pity Derision Regret in short the Names we commonly give to all the other Passions are short expressions whereby we can expalain in particular whatever the Passions include By the word Passion we understand the view of the relation that any thing has with us the emotion and sensation of the Soul the shaking of the Brain and motion of the Spirits a new emotion and new sensation of the Soul and in fine a sensation of Complacency which always attends the Passions and makes them agreeable All these things we mean by it But sometimes by the Name of Passion we only understand either the Judgment that excites it or the emotion of the Soul or the motion of the Spirits and Blood or something else which attends the emotion of the Soul To abridge Idea's and their expressions is a very useful thing in the knowledge of Truth yet it is often the cause of some great Error when these Idea's are abridged through Popular Custom for we must never abridge our Idea's but when we have made them clear and distinct by a great application of Mind and not as we commonly do by the Passions and all sensible Things when once we have made them famillar by Sensations and the meer action of the Imagination which deceives the Mind There is a great deal of difference between the pure Idea's of the Mind and the sensations or emotions of the Soul The pure Idea's of the Mind are clear and distinct but difficultly made familiar whereas on the contrary the sensations and emotions of the Soul are very famillar but impossible to be discern'd clearly and distinctly Numbers extension and their Properties we clearly know but before we have made them sensible by some Characters which express them 't is difficult to present them for whatever is abstracted affects us not Sensations and the emotions of the Soul on the contrary are easily represented to the Mind altho' we only know them after a very confused and imperfect manner and all the terms which excite them strongly agitate the Soul and render it attentive From whence it happens that we often imagine we very well apprehend such Discourses as are absolutely incomprehensible and when we read certain descriptions of the Sensations and Passions of the Soul we perswade our selves that we understand them perfectly because we are livelily touched with them for all the words we read agitate the Soul We have no sooner pronounced the words Shame Despair Impudence but it as soon stirs up in our Minds a certain confused Idea and obscure Sensation which strongly applies us and because this Sensation is very familiar and represented to us without any trouble or effort of the Mind we perswade our selves that it is clear and distinct Yet these words are the Names of compounded Passions and consequently the abridged expressions that vulgar Custom has made of many confused and obscure Idea's As we are obliged to make use of such terms as are approved by Custom so we must not be surprised to find obscurity and sometimes a kind of contradiction in our words And if we reflected that the sensations and emotions of the Soul which answered to the terms we make use of in the like Discourses are not perfectly the same in all Men because of their difference dispositions of Mind we shou'd not so easily condemn others when they are not of our Opinions I don't say this so much to prevent the Objections which may be made against me as to make the Nature of the Passions be
Truth ought to be very careful to shun as much as possible all strong Sensations as a great Noise too brisk a Light Pleasure Pain c. and continually to stir up the Purity of their Imagination and prevent its making in their Brain such deep Traces as continually disquiet and dissipate the Mind And above all to put a Stop to the Motions of their Passions which cause such powerful Impressions in the Body and Soul that 't is generally impossible the Mind shou'd think of any thing else For although the pure Idea's of Truth are always present to us we cannot consider them when the Capacity we have of thinking is filled with these Modifications which possess us However as it is impossible that the Soul shou'd exist without Passion Sensation or any other particular Modification We must make a Virtue of Necessity and even draw from these Modifications some Helps to render us more attentive Yet must we make use of much Artifice and Circumspection in the applying these Helps to gain some Advantage from them The need we have of them must be well examined and we must only make use of 'em so far as the Necessity of rendring our selves attentive constrains us to CHAP. III. Of the use that may be made of the Passions and Senses to preserve the Attention of the Mind THE Passions which it is necessary for us to make use of to excite us to an Enquiry after Truth are those that give us Strength and Courage enough to surmount all the Trouble we may meet with in endeavouring to render our selves attentive some of which are good and some bad of which the good are a Desire to find the Truth to acquire a sufficient Knowledge to conduct our selves to render us useful to our Neighbour and some others of the like Nature But the bad or dangerous ones are such as a desire to acquire Reputation to make some Establishment of our Fortune to raise our selves above our Neighbours and some others that are yet more irregular of which it is not necessary to speak In the unhappy Estate we now are in it often happens that the most unreasonable Passions do most powerfully excite us to search after the Truth and give us a more agreeable Satisfaction for all the Pains we take in our Pursuit than the most just and reasonable Passions do Vanity for instance excites us much more than the Love of Truth and we every Day see some continually applying themselves to Study when they find Persons to whom they may relate what they have learnt but who intirely abandon their Studies when they have not an Opportunity to discover their Acquirements The confused Prospect of some Glory they gain when they put off their Opinons maintains their Courage in the most barren and tiresome Studies But if by Chance or Necessity of their Affairs they find themselves far distant from their little flock of Admirers their Ardour is soon cooled and even the most solid Studies cannot attract them Disgust Wearisomness and Chagriu seizes them and they quit all Vanity triumphs over their natural Laziness but Laziness in its turn triumphs over the Love of Truth for Vanity sometimes resists Idleness but Idleness is generally victorious over the Love of Truth Yet the Passion for Gloty may be subservient to a good End since we may make use of it for the Glory of God and the Profit of others Some Persons may be permitted on several Occasions to make use of this Passion as an Help to make the Mind more attentive but we must take great Care to use it only when those reasonable Passions we have already mentioned are not sufficient and when our Duty obliges us to apply our selves to such Subjects as we are discouraged from First because this Passion is very dangerous in respect of the Conscience Secondly because it insensibly engages us in unprofitable Studies which have a more tempting Appearance than either Usefulness or Truth in them In fine because this Passion is very difficult to be moderated we are often abused by it and while we believe our Mind is illuminated by it we often strengthen our Concupiscence which not only corrupts the Heart but disperses such a Darkness through the Mind as is morally impossible to be dissipated We ought to consider that this Passion is insensibly encreased fortified and established in the Heart of Man and that when it is too violent instead of assisting the Mind in a Search after Truth it strangely blinds it and makes it believe things even as it wishes them to be Without doubt we shou'd not have met with so many false Inventions and imaginary Discoveries if Men had not suffered their Brains to be disordered by their Zeal of appearing Inventers For the firm and obstinate Perswasion many Men have had that they have found for instance the perpetual Motion the squaring of the Circle and Duplication of the Cube by common Geometry has apparently proceeded from the great Desire they had of appearing to have effected what many Persons had unsuccessfully attempted It is therefore better to excite those Passions in us which are so much the more useful in the Search after Truth as they are more strong and in the Excess of which there is least to be feared as the Desires of making a good use of our Wit of delivering our selves from Prejudices and Errors of acquiring so much Wisdom as will enable us to conduct our selves through whatsoever Condition we are in and other the like Passions which engage us not in unuseful Studies nor incline us to make too precipitate Judgments When we begin to taste the Pleasure that is found in the Exercise of the Mind discover the Advantage that recurs from it destroy those violent Passions and disdainfully reject those sensible Pleasures which whilst we imprudently permit them to tyrannize over our Reason we have no need of any other Passions than those we have before mentioned to make us attentive upon whatsoever Subject we wou'd consider But the Generality of Mankind are not in this Condition They have no good Relish of any thing but only what touches the Senses Their Imagination is corrupted with an almost infinite Number of deep Traces which only stir up false Idea's For they are united to every thing that falls under the Senses and Imagination and judge always according to the Impression they have received from them in Relation to themselves Pride Debauchery Engagements unquiet Desires to raise their Fortune so commonly obscure the Discovery of Truth in the Men of this World that it stifles in them the Sentiments of Piety because they separate them from God who only can enlighten us as he only can govern us For we cannot encrease our Union with sensible things without diminishing that which we have with intellectual Truths Since in the same Time we cannot be so strictly united to things that are so different and opposite Those therefore who have a pure and chaste Imagination I mean
much of that Great and Majestick Air as is only fit for Sovereigns But to give a greater Example I say that Truth must be so manifested by others as it hath manifested it self All Men since the Fall of their first Parents have too weak a Sight to consider Truth in it self therefore the Sovereign Truth has rendred it self sensible by taking upon it our Humanity that it may attract our Thoughts enlighten us and make it self amiable in our Eyes Thus by its Example we may cover With any sensible thing those Truths that we wou'd comprehend our selves or teach to others Co that we may attract the Mind which loves what is sensible and which is not easily taken with any thing that does not flatter the Senses The Eternal Wisdom has made it self Sensible but not Resplendent It is become sensible not to make us acquiesce in sensible things but to raise us to intelligible things It became sensible to condemn and sacrifice in its own Person all sensible things we ought therefore in our Pursuit after the Truth to make use of such sensible things as dazle not too much or stop us at the Sensible Part But such as can only maintain the Presence of our Minds in the Contemplation of Truths purely intelligible Such sensible things we must make use of as we can dissipate annihilate or sacrifice with Pleasure as soon as we shall have discovered those Truths for which we made use of it The Eternal Wisdom has presented â—t self externally in a sensible manner to us not to deâ—ain us abroad but to recall us into our selves and â—hat according to the inward Man we might consider tt after an intelligible manner Thus in an Enquiry after Truth we ought to make use of such sensible things as may not stop us at their external Brightness but cause us to enter within our selves make us attentive and unite us to the eternal Truth which alone presides over the Mind and can instruct it in any Subject whatsoever CHAP. IV. Of the use that may be made of the Imagination to preserve the Attention of the Mind and of the Advantage of Geometry GReat Circumspection must be used in the Choice and Use of such Helps as may be drawn from our Passions and Senses to render us attentive to Truth Because our Passions and Senses too livelily affect us and after such a manner fill the Capacity of the Mind that we often see only our own Sensations when we think we have discovered the things themselves that we sought for but it is not the same with those Advantages that may be drawn from the Imagination They make the Mind become attentive without fruitlessly dividing its Capacity and so wonderfully assist us to perceive Objects clearly and distinctly that 't is for the most part beneficial to make use of them But we shall make this plain by some Instances We know that a Body is moved by two or many different Causes towards two or many different Places that these Forces impel it equally or unequally that they encrease or diminish continually according to such a continued Proportion And it may be demanded what is the Line this Body ought to move in the Place it must be in such a Moment what its Swiftness when arrived to such a Place and other things of the like Nature From the Point A where suppose it to be when this Body begins to move draw the indefinite Lines A B A C which make the Angle B A C is they cut each other for A B and A C are direct and cut not each other when the Motions they express are directly opposite After this manner is distinctly represented to the Imagination or if you will to the Senses the Way that this Body wou'd follow if there was only one of these forces which pushed it towards one of these Sides C or B. 2. If the Force which moves this Body towards B is equal to that which moves it towards C we must divide the Lines A B and A C into the Parts 1 2 3 4 and I II III IV equally distant from A. If the Force which moves it towards B is double to that which moves it towards C then take the Parts in A B double to those that are in A C. If this Force is subduple they must be taken subduple If three times greater or less they must be taken proportionably The Division of these Lines furtheâ— express to the Imagination the Magnitude of the different Powers which move these Bodies and in the same Time the Space they shall cause the Body to run through 3. Through these Divisions draw Parallels upon A B and A C to have the Lines 1 X 2 X 3 X c. equal to A I A II A III c. and I X II X III X equal to A 1 A 2 A 3. which express the Spaces that these Forces are capable of causing this Body to run through and through the Intersection of these Parallels draw the Line A X Y E which represents to the Imagination first the true Magnitude of the compound Motion of this Body that in the same time we conceive to be pushed towards B and towards C by two different Forces according to such or such a Proportion Secondly the Way it ought to keep In fine every Place where it must be in such a determined Time so that this Line serves not only to maintain the Presence of the Mind in the Enquiry after all Truths that we wou'd discover concerning the Question proposed But even represents the Resolution after a very sensible and convincing manner See the first Figures First This Line A X Y E expresses the true Magnitude of the compound Motion for we see sensibly if the Forces that produce it can each make this Body advance a Foot in a Minute its compound Motion shall be two Foot in a Minute if the compounding Motions perfectly agree For in this case it suffices to add A B to A C and if these Motions do not entirely agree the compounded A C shall be greater than one of the compounding A B or A C by the Line Y E. But if these Motions are opposite in any thing the compounded will be less than either of the compounding by the Line Y E and if they are intirely opposite it will be nothing at all Secondly This Line A X Y E represents to the Imagination the Way that this Body ought to follow and sensibly shows according to what Proportion it advances more on one Side than another It is evident also that all the compounded Motions are right when each of the compounding is always the same although they be unequal amongst themselves or else when the compounding are equal amongst themselves altho' they are not always the same In fine it is visible that the Lines which describe these Motions are Curves when the compounding are unequal amongst themselves and are not always the same This Line further represents to the Imagination
in the same Men at different Times They change according to the different Motions of the Spirits so that there is nothing more uncertain As for what respects Astronomy there is no perfect Regularity in the Course of the Planets Moving in these great Spaces they are disorderly hurried by the fluid Matter which encompasses them So that the Errors we are subject to in Astronomy Mechanicks Musick and in all the Sciences to which we apply Geometry Proceeds not from Geometry which is an indisputable Science but from the false Application we make of it We suppose for instance that the Planets by their Motions describe Circles and Elipses perfectly regular which though it is not true yet 't is necessary to reason from it for the Error misses but very little of truth but we ought always to remember that the Principle upon which we reason is but a Supposition So in Mechanicks we suppose that Wheels and Levers are perfectly hard and like Mathematical Lines and Circles without Gravity and Attrition or rather we do not sufficiently consider their Gravity Attrition Matter or the Relation that these things have amongst themselves that Hardness or Magnitude increases Gravity that Gravity increases Attrition and Attrition diminishes the Machine Thus what is often accomplished in a small Portion of Matter is seldom ever affected in a greater It is no Wonder then if we deceive our selves when we wou'd reason upon Principles that are not exactly known Nor can we conclude Geometry to be unuseful because it delivers us not from all our Errors Suppositions established make us argue consequently rendring our selves attentive to what we consider make us know it evidently We even by that means discover when our Suppositions are false for being always certain that our Reasonings are true and Experience agreeing not with them we discover that our Principles are false But without Geometry and Arithmetick we can discover nothing exactly if there is never so little Difficulty in it although we have certain and indisputable Principles Therefore we ought to look upon Geometry as a kind of universal Science which inlarges the Mind makes it attentive and gives it the Art of regulating the Imagination and from whence may be drawn all the Helps that it can receive For by the Assistance of Geometry the Mind regulates the Motion of the Imagination and the Imagination thus regulated maintains the Presence and Application of the Mind But that we may make a good use of Geometry we must observe that all things which fall under the Imagination cannot be imagined with an equal Facility for all Images do not equally fill the Capacity of the Mind It is more difficult to imagine a solid than a plane and a plane than a simple Line for there is more Thought in the clear View of a solid than in that of a Plane or Line It is so likewise with different Lines more Thought is requisite that is a greater Capacity of Mind to represent a Parabolick Eliptical or some other Line more compounded than to represent the Circumference of a Circle and more for the Circumference of a Circle than for a right Line because 't is more difficult to imagine Lines which are described by very compounded Motions and which have many Relations than those which are described by the most simple Motions or which have fewer Relations For Relations cannot be clearly perceived without the Attention of the Mind to many things and so much the more Thought is required to perceive them as they are in greater Number There are some Figures so compounded that the Mind has not Extension enought to imagine them distinctly but there is also some others that the Mind very easily imagins Of the three kinds of right lined Angles the acute the right and obtuse it is only the right that raises a very distinct and fixed Idea in the Mind There is an infinite Number of acute Angles which differ amonst themselves it is the same also with the obtuse So that when we imagine an acute or an obtuse Angle we imagine nothing exact or distinct but when we imagine a right Angle we cannot deceive our selves the Idea is very distinct and even the Image that we form of it in the Brain is commonly exact enough It is true we may also determine the general Idea of an acute Angle by a particular Idea of an Angle of thirty Degrees and the Idea of an Angle of thirty Degrees is as exact as that of an Angle of Ninety or of a right Angle But the Image that we form of it in the Brain would not be near so Just as that of a right Angle We are not accustomed to represent this Image to our selves and we can trace it only by thinking upon a Circle or such a determined Portion of a Circle divided into equal parts But to imagine a right Angle it is not necessary to think on this Division of the Circle the Idea only of a Perpendicular is sufficient for the Imagination to trace the Image of this Angle and we find no difficulty to represent Perpendiculars because we are accustomed to see all things stand upright It is therefore very easie to judge that to have a simple distinct and well-determined Object proper to be easily conceived and consequently to make the Mind attentive and preserve evidence in the Truths it enquires after we must compare all Magnitudes as we consider them to simple Surfaces determined by Lines and right Angles as perfect Squares and other right-lined Figures or else to simple right Lines for these are the Figures whose Nature we know We do not pretend that all Subjects whose Knowledge we may enquire into can be expressed by Lines and Geometrical Figures There are many that cannot nay that ought not to be subjected to this Rule For instance The Knowledge we have of a God infinitely Powerful infinitely Just upon whom all things depend in all respects who wills that all his Creatures should execute his orders to make themselves capable of Happiness This Knowledge I say is the Principle of all Morality and from hence may be drawn an infinite number of certain and indisputable Consequences and yet neither this Principle nor its Consequences can be expressed by Geometrical Figures neither is it possible to determine or represent by Lines an infinite number of Physical Notions which may nevertheless evidently discover several Truths to us Yet is it certain that there are a great many things which may be examined and learned by this Geometrical Method and that it is always advantageous to use it because it accustoms the Mind to Attention by causing it to make a regular use of the Imagination and that things which are learned by this way appear more clearly demonstrated and are more easily remembred than others I might have attributed to the Senses the Assistance which is drawn from Geometry but I thought that Geometry did rather belong to the Imagination than to the Senses although Lines are something
of nothing than when we think of any thing in particular we should have as much Facility to think of what we would when we vigorously apply our selves to any particular Truth as when we apply our selves to nothing which is contrary to Experience For instance When we are attentive to any Proposition in Geometry we cannot so easily think of any thing else as when we are diverted by no particular Thought So we think more upon the General and Infinite Being when we think least on Particular and Finite Beings Thus we think as much at one time as another We cannot therefore increase the Extension and Capacity of the Mind by swelling it up if we may so say and in giving it more Reality than it Naturally has but only by managing it artificially which is perfectly done by Arithmetick and Algebra For these Sciences afford means of abridging our Idea's so methodically and considering them in such an order that although the Mind hath little Extension it is able by the help of these Sciences to discover the most compounded Truths which at first appear incomprehensible But we must take things in their first Principles to explain them with the utmost Clearness and Certainty Truth is nothing else but a real Relation of Equality or Inequality Falshood is only a Negation of Truth or a False and Imaginary Relation Truth is that which Exists Falshood has no Being or if you will it is that which is not We never deceive our selves when we see real Relations since we are not deceived when we see the Truth We always deceive our selves when we judge that we see certain Relations and these Relations are not For when we see Falshood we see what is not or rather we see nothing at all Whosoever sees the Relation of Equality between twice two and four sees a Truth because he sees a relation of Equality which is what he sees it to be So whosoever sees a relation of Inequality between twice two and five sees a Truth because he sees a relation of Inequality which truly Exists But if any one judges he sees a relation of Equality between twice two and five he deceives himself because he sees or rather thinks he sees a relation of Equality which is not Truths are only Relations therefore and the Knowledge of Truth is the Knowledge of these Relations But Falshood is not and the Knowledge of Falshood or a False Knowledge is the Knowledge of what is not if we may so speak for as we cannot know what is not only in relation to what is we can discover Error only by comparing it with Truth We may distinguish as many different kinds of Falshood as of Truth And as there are relations of three sorts viz. of one Idea to another of an Object to its Idea or of an Idea to its Object and lastly between one Object and another so there are Truths and Falsities of three sorts There are some between Idea's between Things and their Idea's and between Things only It is true that twice two is four it is false that twice two are five Here is a Truth and a Falsity between Idea's It is true that there is a Sun it is false that there is two Here is a Truth and a Falshood between Things and their Idea's It is true also that the Earth is greater than the Moon and it is false that the Sun is less than the Earth Here is a Truth and a Falshood which is only between Things Of these three sorts of Truths those that are between Idea's are Eternal and Immutable and because of their Immutability they are also the Rules and Measures of all other for all Rules and Measures ought to be unchangeable And therefore in Arithmetick Algebra and Geometry we only consider these sorts of Truths because these general Sciences regulate and include all particular Sciences All Relations or Truths which are between created things or between Idea's and things created are subject to the Changes that all Creatures are capable of The Truths only which are between our Idea's and the Supream Being are immutable as are those that are between Idea's only because God is no more subject to Change than the Idea's which he includes The Truths also that are between Idea's are only those that we endeavour to discover by the Exercise of the Mind for we generally make use of our Senses to discover others we prove the Existence of things by our Eyes and Hands and by them discover the Relations of Equality or Inequality that there is betwixt them 'T is the Relations between Idea's only that the Mind can Discover of it self without the use of the Senses But ther are not only Relations between Idea's but also between the Relations that are between Idea's between the Relations of the Relations of Idea's and in fine between the aggregate of many Relations and between the Relations of these Aggregates of Relations and so on ad infinitum that is There are compounded Truths ad infinitum A simple Truth of Geometry or the Relation of one entire Idea to another as the Relation of four to two or to twice two is called a Geometrick or simple Ratio for the Excess or Defect of an Idea or to use the common Terms The Excess or Defect of a Magnitude is not properly a Ratio nor are equal Excesses or Defects equal Ratio's When Idea's or Magnitudes are equal 't is a Ratio of Equality when they are unequal the Ratio is of Inequality The Relation that is between the Relation of Magnitudes that is between their Ratio's is called a Compounded Ratio because it is a compounded Relation As the Relation that is between the Relation of 6 to 4 and of 3 to 2 is a compounded Ratio and when the compounded Ratio's are equal this compounded Ratio is called Proportion or double Ratio The Relation that is between the Relations of 8 to 4 and of 6 to 3 are a Proportion because these Relations are equal Now it must be observed that all Relations or Ratio's whether Simple or Compounded are true Magnitudes and that the Term Magnitude is relative and necessarily includes some Relation for there is nothing great of it self and without Relation to any thing else except Infinity and Vnity All whole Numbers are as really Relations as fracted Numbers or Numbers compared to or divided by others Although we cannot reflect thereon because these whole Numbers may be expressed by one Arithmetick Designation For instance 4 1 or 8 2 is as real a Relation as ¼ or 2 8 The Unity to which 4 reates is not expressed but it is understood for 4 is a Relation as well as 4 1 or 8 2 since 4 is equal to 4 1 or to 8 2. All Magnitudes then being a Relation or all Relations a Magnitude it is evident that all Relations may be expressed by Figures and represented to the Imagination by Signs Thus all Truths being only Relations to discover exactly all Truths as
well Simple as Compound we should know all Relations as well Simple as Compound There are two sorts of them as we have already said Relations of Equality and Inequality It is plain that all Relations of Equality are alike and as soon as we know one thing is equal to another known thing we know exactly the Relation of it But it is not the same with those of Inequality we know that a Tower is commonly higher than six feet and lower than a thousand and yet we know not its just Magnitude nor the Relation it has to six Feet To compare things amongst themselves or rather exactly to measure the Relations of Inequality we must have an exact measure we must have a simple and infinitely Intelligible Idea which may be accommodated to all forts of Subjects This Measure is Unity by that it is that we exactly measure all things and without it is impossible to know any thing exactly But all Numbers being compounded of Unity it is self-evident that without the Idea's of Numbers and manner of comparing and measuring these Idea's that is without Arithmetick it is impossible to advance to the Knowledge of compounded Truths Idea's or the Relations between Idea's in a word Magnitudes when they are greater or less than other Magnitudes cannot be made equal except by More or Less which is compounded of Unity so many times repeated as is necessary So it is only by Addition and Substraction of Unity and the parts of Unity when we conceive it divided that we exactly measure all Magnitudes and discover all Truths Now of all the Sciences Arithmetick and Algebra are principally the only ones which teach us to make these Operations artificially instructively and admirably to manage the Capacity of the Mind since they furnish it with all the Perfection and Extension it is capable of because 't is by them only that we discover all knowable Truths with the greatest Exactness Common Geometry perfects the Imagination more than it does the Mind and the Truths which we discover by this Science are not always so evident as Geometers imagine For instance They think they have expressed the value of certain Magnitudes when they have proved them equal in value to certain Lines as the Hypothenusa's in right Angle Triangles whose Legs are known or of others which are determined by some of the Conick Sections But it is plain they deceive themselves for these Hypothenusa's for instance are themselves unknown We more exactly know the √ 8 or √ 20 than a Line that we imagine or describe upon Paper for the Hypothenuse of a right-angled Triangle whose sides are two whereof one is two and the other four We know at least that √ 8 approaches very near to 3 and that √ 20 is about 4 ½ and by certain Rules we can approach Infinitely nearer and nearer to their true Magnitude and if we cannot arrive to it 't is only because the Mind cannot comprehend Infinity But we have only a very confused Idea of the Magnitude of Hypothenusa's and we are even obliged to have recourse to √ 8 or √ 20 to express them Thus Geometrick Constructions which serve to express the values of unknown quantities are not so useful in regulating the Mind and discovering the Relations or Truths which we enquire after as to regulate the Imagination But as we are much more pleased to make use of our Imagination than our Mind Studious Persons have commonly more Esteem for Geometry than for Arithmetick and Algebra To Make it perfectly apprehended that Arithmetick and Algebra together are the true Logick which serves to discover things as they are and to give the Mind all the Extension it is capable of It ill be sufficient to make some Reflections upon the Rules of these Sciences We have a little before said that all Truths are only Relations that the most simple and best known is that of Equality That this is the begining from whence others must be measured to have an exact Idea of Inequality that the Measure we are obliged to make use of is Unity that we must add of substract it as many times as is necessary to measure the Excess or Defect of the Inequality of these Magnitudes From thence it is plain that all Operations which may be of use to discover the Relations of Equality are only Additions or Substractions Additions of Magnitudes to Equal Magnitudes Additions of Relations to equal Relations or to place Magnitudes in Proportion In short Addition of relations to equal relations or to put Magnitudes in compounded Proportion To equal 2 to 4 it is only requisite to add 2 to 2 or cut off 2 from 4 or to add unity to 2 and substract it from 4. To make the relation of 8 to 2 equal to the relation of 6 to 3 we must not add 3 to 2 nor substract 3 from 8 so that the excess of one number to the other may be equal to 3 which is the excess of 6 above 3 that would be only an Addition and equalling simple Magnitudes We must first see what is the Magnitude of the Ratio of 8 to 2 or which is all one 8 2 and we find by dividing 8 by 2 that the Quote of this Ratio is 4 or that 8 2 is equal to 4 we must also examine what the Magnitude of the Relation of 6 to 3 is and fin that 't is equal to 2. Thus we discover that these twe Ratio's 8 2 is equal to 4 and 6 3 equal to 2 differ only by 2 so that to equal them we may either add 6 3 equal to 2 to 6 3 which makes 12 3 which is a relation equal to 8 2 or else substract 4 2 equal to 2 from 8 2 and there remains 4 2 which will be a Ratio equal to 6 3 or in fine add unity to 6 3 and substract it from 8 2 and we shall have 9 3 and 6 2 which are equal Ratio's for 9 is to 3 as 6 to 2. Lastly To find the Magnitude of the Inequality between Relations which result the one from a compounded Ratio or from the relation of the relation of 12 to 3 and of 3 to 1 and the other of the compounded Ratio or of the relation of the relation of 8 to 2 and of 2 to 1 the same method must be taken First The Magnitude of the Ratio of 12 to 3 is design'd by 4 or 4 is the Quote of the Ratio of 12 to 3 and 3 is the Quote of that of 3 to 1 and the Quote of the Ratio of the Quotes of 4 and 3 is 4 3. Secondly The Quote of 8 to 2 is 4 and that of 2 to 1 is 2 and the Quote of the Quotes 4 and 2 is 2. In fine The Inequality between the relations which result from the relations of the relations is the difference between 4 2 and 2 viz. 2 3. Therefore 2 3 added to the relation of the Ratio's of 12 to 3 and 3 to 1 or substracted
of sensible Idea's there is hardly any body who discovers that they are equivocal Aristotle and the ancient Philosophers have not so much as thought of it as will easily be granted if we read any thing of their Works and distinctly know the Cause why these Terms are equivocal For there is nothing more evident than that the Philosophers have received the contrary to what ought to be believed upon this Subject For instance when they say Fire is hot Grass green Sugar sweet c. they think with Children and the Vulgar that the Fire contains what they feel when they Warm themselves that Herbs have the same Colours upon them as they believe they see and that Sugar includes the Sweetness in it that we taste in eating and so of all things which we see or feel It is impossible to doubt of this if we read their Writings They speak of sensible Qualities as of Sensations They take Heat for Motion and thus because of the Equivocation of Terms they confound the Modifications of Bodies with the Modifications of Spirits 'T is only since Descartes that these confused and indetermined Questions whether Fire is hot Herbs green Sugar sweet c. have been answered by distinguishing the Equivocations of sensible Terms which express them If by Heat Colour Taste you mean such or such a Motion of insensible Parts Fire is hot Herbs green Sugar sweet c. But if by Heat and the other Qualities you mean what I feel near the Fire what I see when I look upon Herbs c. Fire is not hot nor Herbs green c. for the Heat that we feel and Colours which we see are only in the Soul as I have proved in the first Part of this Book Now as Men think what they feel is the same thing as what is really in the Object They think they have a Right to judge of the Qualities of Objects by the Sensations they have of them So they speak not two Words without saying something false nor ever speak any thing upon this matter which is not obscure and confused as many following Reasons will evince The first because all Men have not the same Sensations nor one Man at different Times or when he feels the same Objects by different Parts of his Body What seems sweet to this Man is bitter to another what is cold to this the same is hot to another what seems hot to one that is cold seems cold to the same Person when he has warmed himself or if he feels it in different Parts of his Body If Water seems hot to one Hand it often seems cold to the other or to some Part near the Heat if washed therewith Salt seems savoury to the Tongue and sharp to a Wound Sugar seems sweet to the Mouth and Aloes extreamly bitter but nothing is either sweet or bitter to the rest of the of the Senses So that when we say such a thing is cold sweet bitter it determines nothing certainly The second because different Objects may produce the same Sensation Plaister Bread Snow Sugar Salt c. produce the same Sensation of Colour Yet their Whiteness is different if we judge otherwise of them than by the Senses So when we say Flower is white we say nothing distinctly The third because the Qualities of Bodies which cause in us Sensations perfectly different are almost the same and on the contrary those of which we have almost the same Sensations are often very different There is scarcely any Difference in the Qualities of Sweetness and Bitterness that is in Objects and yet the Sensations of them are essentially different The Motions which cause Pain or Titilation differ only as to the more or less and yet the Sensations of Titilation and Pain are essentially different On the contrary the Sharpness of Fruit differs not so much from Bitterness as Sweetness does and yet this Quality is the most distant from Bitterness that can be Since it is requisite that a Fruit which is sharp because it is too green must receive a great Number of Changes before it grows bitter for being too much ripe or rotten When Fruits are too ripe they seem sweet and when they are a little too ripe they seem Bitter Bitterness and Sweetness in Fruits differ then only as to the more or less and that is the reason that some Persons think them sweet when others think them bitter For some there are who think Aloes as sweet as Honey It is the same with all Sensible Idea's The Terms of sweet bitter salt sharp sower c. of red green yellow c. of such and such Smells Tasts Colours c. are therefore all equivocal and stir up no clear and distinct Idea in the Mind Yet School Philosophers and the vulgar judge of all the Sensible Qualities of bodies only by the Sensations they receive from them These Philosophers not only judge of Sensible Qualities by the Sensations they receive of them but of things by a Consequence of the Judgments they have made concerning Sensible Qualities For what Sensations they have essentially different from certain Qualities they believe is owing to a Generation of new Forms which produce these Imaginary Differences of Qualities Corn appears yellow hard c. Flower white soft c. And from thence they conclude from the Relation of their Eyes and Hands that these are Bodies essentially different not considering of the manner whereby Corn is changed into Flower yet Flower is only Corn broken and ground as Fire is only Wood divided and agitated and Ashes the grossest Part of the Wood separated without Agitation and Glass only Ashes whereof each Part is polished and made a little round by the Attrition caused by Fire and so of other Transmutations of Bodies It is then evident that Sensible Terms and Idea's are wholly useless for a just proposing and clear resolving of Questions or the Discovery of Truth Yet is there no Question however perplexed by the Equivocal Terms of the Senses but Aristotle and the greatest Part of the Philosophers pretend in their Books to resolve it without these Distinctions that we have given not considering they are Equivocal through Ignorance and Error For instance if we demand of those who have passed their whole Lives in reading the ancient Philosophers or Physicians and who have intirely espoused their Sentiments whether Water is moist Fire dry Wine hot the Blood of Fishes cold if Water is more crude than Wine Gold more perfect than Quicksilver whether Plants and Beasts have Souls and a thousand other undetermined Questions They will easily answer without consulting any thing but the Impression these Objects have made upon their Senses or what their Memories have retained of their reading They do not perceive that these Terms are equivocal They think it strange that they must define them and are impatient if we endeavour to discover to them that they go a little too fast and that their Senses are deceived They 'll make Distinctions
But when we come to consider attentively the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of Sovereign Divinity and the Idea of a Subordinate Power is the Idea of an inferiour but a true Divinity at least according to the Opinion of the Heathens if it be the Idea of a Power or true Cause We admit therefore something Divine in all Bodies which encompass us when we admit Forms Faculties Qualities Vertues and real Beings capable of producing certain Effects by the Power of their own Nature And thus they insensibly enter into the Opinions of the Heathens by the Respect they have for their Philosophy Faith indeed works it but it may perhaps be said that if we are Christians in our Hearts we are Heathens in our Minds Moreover it is difficult to perswade our selves that we ought neither to love or fear true Powers and Beings who can act upon us punish us with Pain or recompense us with Pleasure And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration 't is also difficult to perswade our selves that we ought not to adore them For whatever can act upon us as a real and true Cause is necessarily above us according to St. Austin and right Reason The same Father and the same Reason tells us 't is an immutable Law that Inferiour things should submit to superiour And from hence Ego enim ab animâ hoc corpus animari non puto nifi intentione facientis Nec ab isto quicquam illam pati Arbitror sed facere de illo in illo tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae l. 6. mus c. 5. * this great Father concludes that the Body cannot act upon the Soul and that nothing can be above the Soul but God In the Holy Scriptures when God proves to the Israelites that they ought to adore him that is that they ought to fear and love him the chief Reasons he brings are taken from his Power to recompence and punish them He represents to them the Benefits they have received from him the Evils wherewith he hath chastised them and that he has still the same Power He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens because they have no Power over them and can do them neither Good nor Hurt He requires them to honour him only because he only is the true Cause of Good and Evil and that there happens none in their City according to the Prophet which he has not done for Natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Evil that appears to be done to us 'T is God alone that acts in them and 't is he only that we must fear and love Soli Deo Honor Gloria In short this Opinion that we ought to fear and love whatsoever is the true Cause of Good and Evil appears so natural and just that it is impossible to destroy it so that if we suppose this false Opinion of the Philosophers which we endeavour here to confute that Bodies which encompass us are the true Causes of the Pleasures and Evils which we feel Reason seems to justifie a Religion like to that of the Heathens and approves of the universal Irregularity of Manners It is true that Reason does not tell us that we must adore Onyons and Leeks as the Sovereign Divinity because they cannot make us intirely happy when we have of them or intirely unhappy when we want them Nor have the Heathens ever done to them so much Honour as to the great Jupiter upon whom all their Divinities depend or as to the Sun which our Senses represent to us as the universal Cause which gives Life and Motion to all things and which we cannot hinder our selves from regarding as a Sovereign Divinity if with the Heathen Philosophers we suppose it includes in its being the true Causes of whatever it seems to produce not only in our Bodies and Minds but likewise in all Beings which encompass us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Honour to Leeks and Onyons yet we may always render them some particular Adoration I mean we may think of and love them in some manner if it is true that in some sort they can make us happy we must honour them in Proportion to the Good they can do us And certainly Men who give Ear to the Reports of their Senses think that Pulse is capable of doing them good for else the Israelites for instance would not have regretted their Absence in the Defect nor considered it as a Misfortune to be deprived of them if they did not in some manner look upon themselves happy in the Enjoyment of them These are the Irregularities which our Reason engages us in when it is joyned to the Principles of the Heathen Philosophy and follows the Impressons of the Senses That we may longer doubt of the Falseness of this Miserable Philosphy and the Certainty of our Principles and Clearness of the Idea's we make use of It is necessary clearly to establish those Truths which are opposite to the Errors of the ancient Philosophy and to prove in short that there is only one true Cause because there is only one true God That Nature or the Power of every thing proceeds only from the Will of God That all Natural things are not true Causes but only occasional ones and some other Truths which will be the Consequences of these It is evident that all Bodies both great and small have no power of removing themselves A Mountain an House a Stone a grain of Sand and in short the least or biggest Bodies we can conceive have no power of removing themselves We have only two sorts of Idea's that of Bodies and that of Spirits whereas we ought to speak only of those things which we conceive we should reason according to these two Idea's Since therefore the Idea we have of all Bodies shows us that they cannot move themselves it must be concluded that they are moved by Spirits only But when we examine the Idea we have of all finite Minds we do not see the necessary Connexion between their Wills and the Motion of any Body whatsoever it be On the contrary we see that there is none nor can be any whence we ought to conclude if we will argue according to our Knowledge that as no body can be able to move it self so there is no created Spirit can be the true or principal cause of the Motion of any body whatever But when we think of the Idea of God viz. of a Being infinitely Perfect and consequently Almighty we know that there is such a Connexion between his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that 't is impossible to conceive he should Will the Motion of a Body that should not be moved We must then say that his Will only can move Bodies if we will speak things as we conceive them and not as we feel them The moving
only upon the false and confused Idea's of the Senses since this Rule which preserves Light and Evidence in all just and solid Arguments only breeds Confusion in their Discourses It is not possible to expose the Fantasticalness and Extravagances of the Explanations that Aristotle gives of all sorts of Matters when the Subjects he treats of are simple and easie his Errors are simple and very easily discovered but when he pretends to explain compounded things and such as depend upon many Causes his Errors are at least as compounded as the Subjects he treats on and it is impossible to take them in Pieces so as to discover them all to others This great Genius which they pretend has done so well in his Rules for Definitions did not so much as know what things were necessary to be defined Because putting no Distinction between a clear and distinct knowledge and a Sensible one he imagined he was able to know and explain things to others which he had no distinct Idea of himself Definitions must explain both the Nature of Things and the Terms which compose them and stir up in the Mind distinct and clear Idea's of them But 't is impossible after this manner to define the Sensible Qualities of Heat Cold Colour Taste c. when we confound the Cause with the Effect and the Motion of Bodies with the Sensation which accompanies it because Sensations being Modifications of the Soul which we know not by clear Idea's but only by an inward Sensation as I have explained in the third Book it is impossible to affix Words to Idea's we have not As we have clear and distinct Idea's of a Circle a Square a Triangle and so distinctly know the Nature of them we may give good Definitions thereof We can even deduce the Idea's we have of these Figures all their Properties and explain them to others by Terms to which these Idea's are affixed but we cannot define either Heat or Cold being only Sensible Qualities for we know them neither distinctly nor by Idea but only by Conscience or Internal Sensation Nor must we define Heat which is external by any Effects For if we substitute in its Place the Definition that we shall give it we shall soon see that this Definition will only deceive us If for instance we define Heat to be what assembles things of the same kind without saying any thing more we may in following this Definition take such things for Heat as have no Relation to it We may say that the Loadstone assembles the Filings of Iron and separates them from those of Silver because it is hot that a Pigeon eats Hemp-Seed and leaves other Grain because she is hot That a Covetous Man separates his Gold from his Silver because he is hot In fine there is no Extravagancy that this Definition will not engage us in if we were stupid enough to follow it This Definition then does not explain the Nature of Heat nor can we make use of it to deduce all its Properties since if we keep precisely to its Terms we conclude Impertinences and if we put it in the Place of the thing defined we shall have a strange Piece of Nonsence Yet if we carefully distinguish Heat from the Cause of it although we cannot define it since it is a Modification of the Soul whereof we have no Idea we may define the Cause of it since we have a distinct Idea of Motion But Care must be had that Heat taken for such a Motion does not always cause the Sensation of Heat in us For Water for instance is hot since its Parts are fluid and in Motion and 't is apparent that Fish feel it warm at least warmer than Ice whose Parts are more in Rest but it is cold in relation to us because it has less Motion than the Parts of our Bodies For what hath less Motion than another Body is in some manner in rest in respect to that Body So that 't is not in Relation to the Motion of the Fibres of our Bodies that we must define the Cause of Heat or the Motion which excites it We must if we can define this Motion absolutely and in it self and then the Definitions we shall give may serve to discover the Nature and Properties of Heat I do not think my self obliged to examine the Philosophy of Aristotle any further and to unravel the extreamly confused and perplext Errors of this Author It seems to me that I have already shewn that he does not prove his four Elements and that he defines them ill That his Elementary Qualities are not such as he pretends that he knows not the Nature of them and that all second Qualities are not compounded of them And lastly although we should grant him that all Bodies were composed of four Elements as second Qualities of the first his whole System would be useless in a Search after Truth since his Idea's are not clear enough always to preserve Evidence in our Ratiotinations If 't is doubted that I have not related the true Opinions of Aristotle it may easily be seen by examining the Books he has writ of the Heavens of Generation and Corruption for 't is from them that I have taken almost all that I have said I had no Design to relate any thing of his Eight Books of Physicks because there is some learned Men who pretend that 't is only a Discourse of Logick And 't is very probable since we find there many indetermined and trifling Words As Atistotle often contradicts himself and as we may maintain almost any manner of Opinion from some Passages taken out of him I doubt not but we may prove by Aristotle even some Opinions contrary to those I have attributed to him but I am not afraid of it it is sufficient that I have the Book by me I cited him from to prove what I have said Nay I shall not give my self any great Trouble to examine whether these Books are Aristotle's or not I take them as for such and as they are commonly received For we ought not to disquiet our selves to know the true Genealogy of things for which we have no Esteem CHAP. VI. Some general Advices which are necessary to conduct us regularly in a Search after Truth and in a Choice of the Sciences THAT it may not be said I only destroy without establishing any thing certain and indisputable in this Work It will be proper to shew in a few Words the Order we ought to keep in our Studies to avoid being deceived and that I even note some most necessary Truths and Sciences in which we may meet with such Evidence as we cannot hinder our selves from consenting to them without suffering the secret Reproaches of our Reason I shall not explain these Truths and Sciences at large because 't is already done I do not pretend to make a new Impression of other Persons Works but content my self with referring to them I will only shew the Order we ought to
We have in our selves the Idea's of Numbers and Extension whose Existence is undoubted and whose Nature is immutable which would eternally furnish our Thoughts if we would know all their Relations And it is necessary for us to begin to exercise our Minds upon these Idea's for Reasons that will not be unnecessary to remark whereof the chief are these three The first is That these Idea's are the most clear and evident of all For if to shun Error we ought always to preserve Evidence in our Reasonings it is plain that we ought rather to reason upon the Idea's of Numbers and Extension than upon the confused and compound Idea's of Physicks Morality Mechanicks Chymistry and all other Sciences The second is These Idea's are the most distinct and exact of all chiefly those of Numbers So that the Habit we gain in Arithmetick and Geometry of not contenting our selves without knowing precisely the Relations of things gives the Mind a certain Exactness that those have not who content themselves with the Probability that is to be met with in other Sciences The third and greatest of all is That these Idea's are the immutable Rules and common Measures of all other things that we know or can know Those who perfectly know the Relations of Numbers and Figures or rather the Art of making the Comparisons necessary for the knowing their Relations have a kind of universal Science and a most certain means to discover evidently and certainly whatsoever exceeds not the common limits of the Mind But those that have not this Art can never certainly discover any Truths if but a little compounded although they have very clear Idea's of those things whose compounded Relations they endeavour to know These or the like are the Reasons which induced the Ancients to make young Men study Arithmetick Algebra and Geometry Without doubt they knew that Arithmetick and Algebra gave a certain Penetration to the Mind that could not be acquired by other Studies and that Geometry so well regulates the Imagination that it is not easily confounded for this Faculty of the Soul so necessary for the Sciences acquires a certain just Extension by the use of Geometry which promotes and preserves the clear view of the Mind in the most perplexing Difficulties If we would then always preserve Evidence in our Perceptions and discover the pure Truth without any Obscurity or Mixture of Error we ought first to study Arithmetick Algebra and Geometry at least after having acquired some Knowledge of our selves and the Soveraign Being If we would have any Book which Facilitates these Sciences I would prefer Descartes's Meditations to know God and our selves and to learn Arithmetick and Algebra we may read the Mathematical Elements for common Geometry Tacquet's Elements and for Conick Sections and the Resolution of Geometrick Problems De la Here 's Conicks his Geometrick Places and Construction of Equations to which we may add Descartes's Geometry I would not advise to the reading of the Mathematical Elements for Arithmetick and Algebra if I knew of any Author that had clearly demonstrated these Sciences but the Truth obliges me to a thing which some Men will oppose Algebra and Arithmetick being absolutely necessary to discover compounded Truths I believe it a Duty to testifie some Esteem for a Book which directs very far in these Sciences and which according to the Opinion of some Learned Men explains them more clearly than any one has yet done When with Care and Application we have studied these general Sciences we shall evidently discover a great number of Truths that are for all exact and particular Sciences Afterwards we may study Physicks and Morality because these Sciences are very useful although they are not so fit to make the Mind exact and penetrating And if we would always preserve Evidence in our Perceptions we must be very careful that we are never prejudiced in favour of any Principle that is not evident and from which the Chinese for instance would not be supposed to dissent after having throughly weighed and considered it So for Physicks we must only admit the Notions common to all Men viz. The Axioms of Geometricians and clear Idea's of Extension Figure Motion and Rest or any others as clear as these It may perhaps be said That the Essence of Matter is not Extension but what signifies that It is enough that the World which we conceive to be formed of Extension appears like to that which we see if it be not of this matter which is useless and unintelligible although we make such a noise about it It is not absolutely necessary to examine whether there are indeed External Beings which answer to these Idea's for we reason not upon these Beings but upon their Idea's We ought only to take care that the Reasonings we make upon the Properties of things agree with the Sensations we have of them viz. That what we think perfectly agrees with Experience because we endeavour in Physicks to discover the Order and Connection of Effects with their Causes or in Bodies if they Exist or in the Sensations we have of them if they have no Being Indeed we cannot doubt whether there are actually any Bodies when we consider that God is no Deceiver or reflect upon the just Order which he hath instituted in our Sensations whether in Natural Occurrences or in those things only that happen to make us believe what we could not naturally comprehend But it is not necessary at first sight to make deep Reflections upon a thing which no body doubts of and which is not very useful in the Knowledge of Physicks if considered as a true Science Nor must we trouble our selves much to know whether there is or is not any other Qualities in those Bodies that surround us than such as we have clear Idea's of for we must reason only according to our Idea's And if there is any thing else of which we have not a dear distinct and particular Idea we can never know any thing of it nor reason justly upon it Whereas if we reason according to our Idea's we follow Nature and discover that it is not so hidden as we commonly imagine So those that have not studied the Properties of Numbers often imagine that 't is not possible to resolve certain Problems although most Simple and Easie and those that have not thought upon the Properties of Extension Figure and Motion are extreamly inclined to believe and maintain that Physical Questions are inexplicable We must not stop at the Opinion of those that have examined nothing or have examined nothing with a necessary Application For although there are few Truths concerning Natural Things which are fully demonstrated it is certain that there are some general ones of which it is not possible to doubt although it is very possible not to think of them be ignorant and deny them If we would meditate regularly and with all necessary Application we should discover many of these certain Truths that I speak
Agitation of this Matter by what I have said of Gunpowder It will not be difficult to see that 't is absotutely necessary that the Matters acting infinitely more upon the Surface of hard Bodies that it encompasses and compresses than within the same Bodies it must be the Cause of their Inflexibility or the Resistance we feel when we endeavour to break them Now as there is always many Particles of this Invisible Matter which passes through the Pores of hard Bodies they make them not only hard as we have already explained but further are the Cause that some are Springy and Elastick others stand bent and that others are fluid and liquid and in fine that they are not only the Cause of the Force that hard Bodies have to continue united together but also that fluid Bodies have to separate that is are the Cause that some Bodies are hard and others fluid But because 't is absolutely necessary to know distinctly the Physicks of Descartes the Figure of his Elements and Parts which compose particular Bodies to give a Reason why certain Bodies are stiff and some others pliable I shall not stay here to explain it Those who have read the Works of this Philosopher will easily enough imagine what may be the Cause thereof which I could not explain without great Difficulty and those who are unacquainted with this Author would but confusedly understand the Reason that I might bring for it Nor shall I also stop here to resolve a great Number of Difficulties that I foresee may be brought against what I have established Because if those that raise them have no Knowledge of true Physicks I should only tire and displease them instead of satisfying them But if they are learned Persons their Objections being stronger I could not answer them but by a great Number of Figures and long Discourses so that I believe I ought to desire those that find any Difficulty in what I have advanced very carefully to read this Chapter over again for I hope if they do so and meditate on it as much as is necessary all their Objections will vanish But if they find my Request incommodious they may omit it for there is no great Danger in being ignorant of the Cause of Bodies inflexibility I speak not here of Contiguity For 't is plain Contiguous things touch so little that there is always much Subtle Matter which passes between them and which endeavours to continue its Motion in a right Line to prevent their uniting For the Union that is observed between Marbles which have been polished one upon another I have explained it and 't is easie to see that although this Subtle Matter always passes between these two Parts how united soever they may be the Air cannot pass it and therefore 't is that which compresses and binds those two Pieces of Marble together and causes some Trouble to disunite them if we do not make them slide off one another It is plain from all this that the Continuity Contiguity and Union of two Marbles will only be the same thing in a Void neither have we different Idea's of them so that 't is as much as to say we do not understand them if we make them absolutely differ without any Relation to the Bodies which surround them Here now follows some Reflexions upon Descartes's Sentiment and the Original of his error I call his Opinion an Error because I find no Expedient to defend what he says of the Rules of Motion and Cause of the Hardness of Bodies in many Places at the End of the Second Part of his Principles and it seems to me that I have sufficiently proved the Truth of the contrary Opinion This great Man very distinctly conceived that Matter could not move of it self and that the Natural moving Power of all Bodies was nothing else but the general Will of the Author of Nature and that the Communications of the Motions of Bodies at their mutual Meeting could only proceed from this same Will If we take this for granted we can give no Rules for the different Communication of Motions but by the Proportion that is found between the different Magnitude of Bodies which beat against them since it is impossible to penetrate the Designs of God's Will And because he judges that every thing had Power to continue in the State it was in whether in Motion or Rest because that God by his Will determined this Power always to act after the same manner he concludes that Rest has as much Power to act as Motion So he measures the Effects of the Power of Rest by the Magnitude of Bodies which possessed it as those of the Power of Motion and hence he gave the Rules for the Communication of Motion that are in his Principles and the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies which I have endeavoured to refute It is difficult enough not to be of Descartes's Opinion when we look upon it as he did for once more since the Communication of Motions proceed only from the Will of the Author of Nature and that we see all Bodies continue in the State they are once placed in whether it be Motion or Rest It seems we ought to seek the Rules of the different Communication of Motions at the meeting of Bodies not in the Will of God which is unknown to us but in the Proportion there is between the Magnitudes of these Bodies I do not therefore wonder that Descartes had this Thought but I only wonder that he did not correct it when he had made a farther Advance in his Discoveries and found both Existence and the Effects of the Subtle Matter which environs all Bodies I am surprized that in the 132 Article of the 4th Part he attributes the Elastick Force that certain Bodies have to this subtle Matter and that in Articles 55 and 43 of the Second Part and in other Places he does not attribute it to their Hardness or the Resistance they make when we endeavour to bend or break them but to the rest of their Parts It appears evident to me that the Cause of the Elasticity and Stiffness of certain Bodies is the same with that which gives them the Power of Resistance when we would break them for indeed the Force that we use to break Steel differs but insensibly from that by which we bend it I will not here bring all the Reasons that might be urged to prove these things nor answer to any Difficulties that we might form from hard Bodies making no Sensible Resistance and yet we have some Trouble to bend them For it will be enough to make these Difficulties vanish to consider that the Subtle Matter cannot easily take a new course in Bodies which break when we bend them as in Glass and in tempered Steel and that it cannot more easily do it in Bodies that are composed of branchy Parts which are not brittle as in Gold and Lead And indeed there is no hard bodies which make not some
little Resistance It is difficult enough to perswade our selves that Descartes positively believed the Cause of Hardness was different from that of Elasticity And what appears most probable is that he has not sufficiently reflected upon the Matter When we meditate long upon any Subject and are satisfied in things we would know we often think no more of them We believe that the Thoughts that we have had are undoubted Truths and 't is useless to examine farther But in Men there are many things which disgust them against Application incine them to a rash Assent and make them subject to Error and although the Mind continues apparently satisfied it is not always because it is well informed of the Truth Descartes was a Man like us I confess we never saw more Solidity Exactness Extension and more Penetration of Mind than what appears in his Works yet he was not infallible So that it is probable he was so very strongly perswaded of his Opinion from not sufficiently reflecting that he asserted something elsewhere in nis Principles contrary to it He maintained it upon very specious and probable Reasons but such however as were not of sufficient Force to make us submit and therefore he might and ought to have suspended his Judgment It is not enough to examine in a hard Body what might be the Cause that made it so We ought also to think of the invisible bodies which might render them hard as he has done at the End of his Philosophical Principles when he attributes the Cause of Resistance to them He ought to have made an exact Division which comprised whatsoever might contribute to the Inflexibility of bodies It is not sufficient still to seek the Cause in God's Will he ought also to have thought of the Subtle Matter which environed them For although the Existence of this extreamly agitated Matter was not yet proved in that Place of his Principles where he speaks of Hardness it was not then rejected He ought then to have suspended his Judgment and to have remembered that what he had writ of the Cause of Hardness and Rules of Motion ought to have been reviewed anew which I believe he did not do carefully enough Or else he did not sufficiently consider the true Reason of a thing that is very easie to discover and which yet is of the utmost Consequence in Physicks I will explain it Descartes well knew that to maintain his System of the Truth which he could not reasonably doubt It was absolutely necessary that great bodies should always communicate their Motion to the lesser bodies they should meet and the less reflect at their meeting with the greater without a like Loss on their Side For without that the First Element would not have all the Motion that it is necessary it should have above the Second nor the Second above the Third and his whole System would be absolutely false as is sufficiently known to those that have but thought a little upon it But in supposing that Rest had Force enough to resist Motion and that a great Body in Rest could not be moved by another that is less than it although it strike it with a furious Agitation It is plain that great Bodies must have much less Motion than a like Mass of little Bodies since according to this Supposition they can always communicate what they have and cannot always receive from the lesser Thus this Supposition not being contrary to whatsoever Descartes has said in his Principles from the Beginning unto the Establishment of his Rules of Motion and agreeing very well with the Sequel of his Principles he believed that the Rules of Motions which he thought he had demonstrated in their Cause were also sufficiently confirmed by their Effects I agree with Descartes that great Bodies communicate their Motion much more easily than little Bodies do and therefore his First Element is much more agitated than the Second and the Second than the Third But the Cause of it is clear without having any Regard to his Supposition Little and fluid Bodies as Water Air c. can only communicate to great Bodies an uniform Motion which is common to all their Parts The Water in a River can only communicate to a Boat the Motion of Descent which is common to all the little Parts of which the Water is composed and every one of these Parts besides this common Motion has also an infinite Number of other Particulars Thus by this Reason 't is plain that a Boat for instance can never have so much Motion as an equal Bulk of Water since the Boat can only receive from the Water that Motion which is direct and common to all the Parts that compose it If Twenty Particles of a fluid Body push any other Body on the one Side and as many on the other it will continue immoveable and all the little Particles of the fluid Body in which it swims rebound up without losing any thing of their Motion Thus great Bodies whose Parts are united can only receive the Circular and Uniform Motion of the Vortex of the Subtle Matter which environs them This Reason seems sufficient to them to make it comprehended how great Bodies are not so much agitated as the lesser and that there is a Necessity for an Explanation of these things to suppose any Force in Rest to resist Motion The Certainty of Descartes's Principles cannot be a sufficient Proof to defend his Rules of Motion and we may believe that if Descartes himself had again without Prejudice examined his Principles and compared them with such Reasons as I have brought he would not have believed that the Effects of Nature had confirmed his Rules nor have fallen into a Contradiction by attributing the Hardness of Bodies only to the rest of their Parts and their Elasticity to the Force of a Subtle Matter Here follows now the Rules of the Communication of Motions in a Void which are only the Consequences of what I have established about the Nature of Rest Bodies not being hard in a Void since they are only hard by the Pressure of the Subtle Matter which surrounds them if Two Bodies meet they would flatten without rebounding we must therefore give these Rules Suppose them hard of themselves and not by the Pressure of this Subtle Matter Rest having no Power to resist Motion and many Bodies before being considered as one only in the moment of their meeting it is plain they ought not to rebound when they are equal in Magnitude and Velocity or that their Velocity supplies the Desect of their Magnitude or their Magnitude the Defect of their Velocity And it is easie from thence to conclude that in all other Cases they must always communicate their Motion A general Rule for the Communication of Motion so that they may afterwards proceed with an equal Swiftness So that to know what must happen in all the different Suppositions of Magnitude and Swiftness of Bodies which meet one another we need
distinction between Acting and Thinking they commonly are displeas'd that any body should oppose Prejudices They fancy that it is not sufficient to observe the Rules of Civil Society to conform outwardly to the Opinions and Customs of the Country they live in They think it a prece of Temerity to examine Common Opinions and that to consult Truth is a breach of Charity because it is not so much Truth which unites Civil Societies as Opinion and Custom Aristotle is receiv'd in Universities as the Rule of Truth he is Quoted as Infallible It is a Philosophical Heresie to deny what he advances In a word he is respected as the Genius of Natures and those who are best vers'd in his Physicks can give no reason for any thing and perhaps are convinc'd of nothing and Scholars that have read their course of Philosophy dare hardly say before Men of Sense what they have learnt of their Masters That perhaps may make those who reflect upon it sensible of what we are to think of those sorts of Studies for a Science which we must forget to become reasonable does not seem very solid Nevertheless those would be look'd upon as inconsiderate and rash who should attempt to discover the falsity of the Reasons which Authorise so extraordinary a Conduct and they should not fail of being troubled by those who receive advantage by them if they were so happy as to undeceive the Public Is is not evident that the way to learn what we do not know is to use what we do know And that it would be a Jest to give a Frenchman a German Grammar in Verse to teach High Dutch Yet it is customary to give Children the Latin Verses of Despauterius to teach them Latin obscure Verses in all respects to Children who have much ado to apprehend the easiest things Reason and Experience are visible against that Custom for Children are a long while a learning Latin ill Nevertheless 't is Impudence to find fault with it should a Chinese hear this Custom he could not forbear laughing at it whilst on this part of the World we Inhabit the Wisest and the most Learned cannot forbear approving it If such false and such absurd Prejudices and Customs that are so unreasonable and of such great consequence have a World of Protectors how is it to be expected that People should submit to Reasons which engage Prejudices that are purely Speculative A little attention is sufficient to discover that the Method which is used to teach Children is none of the best and yet it is not minded Opinion and Custom prevail over Reason and Experience How then could any body expect that Works which overthrow a great number of Prejudices should not be condemn'd in many things even by those who pass for the most Learned and for the Wisest It is observable that those who pass in the World fox the best Judges and the best Scholars are those who have study'd most Books both good and bad they are those who have the Memories and whose Imagination is more lively and more extended than others Now those Men commonly Judge of things rashly and without deliberation They consult their Memory in which they find immediately the Law or the Prejudice according to which they decide without much Reflection As they think themselves Wiser than others they give but little heed to what they read Therefore it happens often that Women and Children discover the falsity of certain Prejudices which have been controverted because they dare not pass their Judgments upon them without Examination but use all the attention they are capable of in what they read whereas on the contrary the Learned persist in their Opinions because they will not give themselves the trouble to examine those of others when they are directly opposite to what they think already As for those that live with great Men they depend on so many things that they cannot easily retire into themselves nor afford a sufficient attention to distinguish what is true from what is likely Nevertheless they are not much wedded to certain Prejudices for the best way to hold strongly with the World is neither to be wedded to Truth nor Probability As apparent humility or good breeding and external moderation are qualifications that please every body and which are absolutely necessary to maintain Society among those who have a great deal of Pride and Ambition the Men of the World affect not to affirm any thing or to believe any thing as undeniable It ever was and ever will be the fashion to look upon all things as Problematical and to speak at random even of the most holy Truths lest they shou'd seem wedded to any thing For as those I am speaking of apply themselves to nothing and mind nothing but their Fortune no disposition can seem so convenient and so reasonable to them as that which custom justifies Therefore those who attack Prejudices flattering on the one hand the Pride and Laziness of the Men of the World they are well receiv'd by them but when they pretend to affirm any thing as undeniable and to discover the Truth of Religion and of Christian Morality they look upon them as conceited Men and as Persons who to avoid one precipice leap into another What I have said in my Opinion is sufficient to show what I could answer to the different Judgments divers persons have given against the Book Intituled A Search after Truth and I will forbear making an application which every one may make usefully and easily I am sensible that every body will not do it but it would look perhaps as if I would do my self Justice in defending my self as much as I could therefore I abandon my Right to the Judicious Readers who are the Natural Judges of Books And I conjure them to remember my Request in the Preface to the Search after Truth and elsewhere Only to Judge of my Sentiments according to the clear and distinct Answers they shall receive from the only Master of all Mankind after having made their application to him by a serious attention For if they consult their Prejudices as the decisive Laws of what they are to believe of the Book Intituled A Search after Truth I own that it is a very ill Book since it is written oh purpose to discover the Falsity and Injustice of those Laws Advertisement BEcause the following Explanations were writ to satisfy some particular Persons who desired a more special Explication of some Material Truths I think fit to premise that what I shall say may be clearly understood it will be necessary for every one to have some knowledge of the Principles I 've explain'd in the Search after Truth Therefore 't will be best not to meddle with these Observations till we 've first carefully read the whole Work for which they were written and at the second reading only examine them as they are referr'd to in the Margent Yet is not this Caution absolutely necessary to
the condemning of secret Intentions we may perhaps judge that what I say is improbable But I do not think that any one can be offended at it since I endeavour thus to satisfie Mens minds even those who are the most troublesome in the difficulties they propose about Original Sin AN EXPLANATION OF THE Third Chapter of the Third Part of the Second Book In which I speak Of the Power of the Imagination of some Authors and particularly of Tertullian AS I am convinced that the most general and most exuberant Principle of the Errors we meet with in Sciences and particularly in Morality is the Impression which lively Imaginations make upon Mens Minds who are guided more by Mechanism than by Reason I thought my self obliged to make the World so sensible of this Truth as to awaken Men out of their Lethargy in relation to it And whereas Examples are most powerful over us especially when there is something great and extraordinary in them I have thought that the celebrated Names of Tertullian Seneca and of Montagne would be capable of exciting their Attention and convince them sensibly of the contagious power of the Imagination over Reason For in fine if dead Words which are not animated by the Air and sensible Behaviour of those famous Authors have still more force than the Reason of certain Persons If the turn of Expression which gives but a weak Idea of the sensible Action which the Imagination diffuses livelily upon the Face and the rest of their Body who are perswaded of what they say is capable of agitating penetrating and convincing many certainly it must be granted that nothing can be more dangerous than a respectful attention to Persons whose Imagination is strong and lively For their Air and manner of speaking is a Natural Language so strong and convincing they know how to draw things so much to the Life that they commonly make the Passions and the Senses rise against Reason that they infuse as it were conviction and certainty into all those who look upon them I was very sensible that in producing these great Examples I should not cure all those who had been struck with astonishment and admiration at the reading of these three famous Authors For there is no need to very well acquainted with the Nature of Man to know that the Wounds which the Brain has received are harder to be cured than those of the other parts of the Body and that it is easier to close a Wound which is not exposed to the Action of some Body that may renew it than perfectly to cure certain Prejudices which are justified every moment by very probable Reasons It is very difficult to close up the Traces of the Brain exactly because they are exposed to the course of the Spirits and may be continually renewed by a vast number of Traces which may be called accessories Those kind of Wounds cannot commonly be cured or closed up unless it be when the Brain having received others that are deeper and opposite to them a strong and continual revulsion is made in the Spirits For we must not imagine that a Prejudice is absolutely cured as soon as we fancy it is because we are not actually affected with it A Prejudice is only absolutely cured when the Trace is perfectly closed up and not so soon as the Spirits begin no longer to take their course that way for some particular Reason Therefore I was very sensible that those who had been overcome by the Force and Motions of Tertullian say'd and dazzled by the Greatness and Beauties of Seneca charm'd and corrupted by the free and natural Expressions of Montaigne would not change their Sentiments after the reading of a few Pages of my Book I judg'd on the contrary that they would be displeased at my Endeavours to dissipate the Spell which charms them But whereas I was in hopes that these Examples would prove of use to my Design for the Reasons I have alledged I thought my self obliged to have more regard to the Advantage many persons may derive by it who are unprejudiced than to the Uneasiness of some others whom I thought would criticize upon the Liberty I have taken I considered also that there are few Men so much prejudiced in favour of their Authors as to despair of prevailing with them to side with Reason again Lastly I thought that as there are perhaps no Men prejudiced in favour of all three of them by reason of the diversity of the Character of their Imaginations the most obstinate might think that I am in the right in many things I know the respect I owe to the Works of Tertullian as well upon the account of the Subjects he treat of as the approbation they have had from several persons who ought to be Judges of them And I have sufficiently discovered this disposition of my Mind by what I have said concerning them and by the quality of the Book de Pallio the only one I have freely spoken of though there are others which perhaps would have been fitter for my Design But after all I do not think that Time ought either to magnifie or alter the Ideas of things that all Antiquities are Venerable and that false Reasons and extravagant Expressions deserve Respect because they have been introduced into the World long before us I do not think we are obliged to receive Affected Obscurities like Sacred Mysteries Sallies of Imagination like evident Truths The Hearts of Africk which Labour in a Mind naturally full of Fire like the Motions of the Prophetical Spirit which can only teach Sublime Truths I am sensible that even those who have most respect for Tertullian's Works allow all this and that they are too Equitable to Justifie the irregularities of Imagination against Reason But perhaps they are like those Judicious Persons who are great Lovers of Truth and yet are taken with the Stile For I have often met with some of them who were so much inchanted by some strong lively great and magnificent Expressions of Tertullian that after having proved to them that the Author was neither Judicious not very Reasonable they did nothing but repeat them to me to surprize and perswade me I own that Tertullian has very bold and strong Expressions and that they produce very Lively and Sprightly Images in the Mind And 't is for that Reason I take him for an Example that strong Imaginations have much power to act and convince by Impression Therefore those who make those kind of Objections to me confirm my Opinion while they oppose it The Prepossession or Esteem they have for Tertullian justifies my Conduct The frequent Quotations and the Pompous Words they alledge from him prove what I say For men seldom quote in Discourse intire Arguments But they often quote strong and lively Expressions to dazzle and to convince by sensible Impression I suppose no body will imagine that I pretend to censure so many Great Men who daily quote Tertullian in their
Desires as greatness excites our admiration and esteem those Expressions prevail upon us by the Motions they produce in us When Men understand or think they understand a difficult obscure Author they think better of themselves than of those who do not understand him they look upon them as ignorant Persons The pains they have been at to understand him ingages them in his defence They justifie their study in revering him and making others do the same And as Men delight in justifying themselves they never fail to praise and to defend such an Author zealously and after a very lively and sensible manner These Reasons and some ethers that are less strong are sufficient in my Opinion to show that Tertullians Obscurity is no wise disadvantageous to him in the minds of some Persons and that probably they would never have admired him so much had the Truths which are dispersed through his Works been reduced to their plainest and most clear Ideas We alwayes reduce Mathematical Relations and Truths to their Exponents I mean to the plainest Terms that can express them and we disingage them from whatever might perplex or obscure them For Geometricians love plain Truth they do not desire to convince by Impression but by Evidence and Light What would become of many of Tertullians Thoughts should any one reduce them to their Exponents according to the Rules of Geometricians and Logicians and also strip them of that sensible show which dazzles Reason We ought to try that Experiment if we design to judge solidly of that Authors Arguments However I do not pretend that Tertullian ought to have written like a Geometrician Figures which express our Sentiments and Motions in relation to Truths which we expose to others are absolutely necessary And I am of Opinion that particularly in Discourses of Religion and Morality we ought to make use of such Ornaments as are proper to make Men pay that respect to Truth which is due to it and of such Motions as are fit to move the Soul and incline it to Vertuous Actions But we ought never to adorn Phantasms which are without substance or reality We must never excite useless Motions and if we would forcibly imprint conviction and certainty on the Minds of those who hearken to us that Conviction must have a relation to something that is true and solid We must never convince nor suffer our selves to be convinced without knowing evidently distinctly and precisely of what it is we convince People or what it is we are convinced of We must know what we say and what we believe And we must love Truth and Knowledge and not blind others after having suffered our selves to be blinded AN EXPLANATION OF THE Nature of IDEAS In which I Shew How we see all things in God both Eternal Truths and Laws I Was in hopes that what I have said about the Nature of Ideas would be enough to make Men apprehend that it is God who inlightens us But I find by Experience that there are many Persons who are incapable of sufficient attention to conceive the Reasons I have given of that Principle Whatever is abstracted is incomprehensible to most Men nothing affects them but that which is sensible and fixes and maintains the light of their Mind They cannot consider and consequently cannot apprehend that which falls not under the apprehension of their Senses nor Imagination This is what I have often said and what I can never respect too much It is evident that Bodies are not visible of themselves that they cannot act over our Mind nor represent themselves to it This wants no Proof But is infinitely more certain than that Bodies communicate their Motions to each other when they meet But this is only certain to those who silence their Senses to hearken to their Reason All Men fancy that Bodies push one another because the Senses tell them so But they do not believe that Bodies are of themselves absolutely invisible and incapable to act on the Mind because the Senses do not say it but seem to intimate the contrary There are nevertheless some Persons whose solid and steady Reason elevates it self to the most abstracted Truths They contemplate them with attention and resist the impression of their Senses and Imagination with great Courage But by degrees the Body stupifying the Mind they relapse Those Ideas are dissipated and their Imagination exciting others that are more lively and more sensible those first are no longer like any thing but Spectors which Men mistrust and of which they dread the illusion We easily doubt Persons or things that are not familiar to us or that have not afforded us some sensible Pleasures For 't is Pleasure that wins the Heart and Familiarity removes Trouble and disquiet from the Mind Therefore those who are not used to Metaphysical and Abstracted Truths are very much inclined to believe that those have a mind to seduce them who only study to inform them They look with a kind of diffidence and horrour on such Ideas as have nothing that is agreeable or sensible in them and the love they have for Quiet and Felicity soon delivers them from a sight which disturbs them and which seems incapable of contenting them Were not the present question of the utmost consequence the Reasons abovesaid and some others which are not necessary to be related would oblige me to speak no further of it For I foresee that whatever I may say upon that subject will never enter into the mind of certain Persons But this Principle that there is none but God who inlightens us and that by the manifestation of an immutable and necessary Reason or Wisdom appears to me so conformable to Religion that I think my self indispensibly obliged to explain and maintain it as much as I can I had rather be called a Visionary a Lunatick and bear all the Ridicule that the Imagination which in little Souls is alwayes sarcastical opposes to such Reasons it does not apprehend or cannot defend it self against than to grant that Bodies are capable of inlightning me that I am my own Master Reason and Light and that to get a solid knowledge of all things I need only consult my self or Men who perhaps may make a great deal of Noise at my Ears but who certainly cannot inlighten my Mind Therefore I yet here advance some Reasons to maintain the Sentiment I have established in the Chapters to which this belongs Every one agrees that all Men are capable of knowing Truth and the Philosophers nay even the least among them own that Man participates of a certain Reason which they do not determine Therefore they define him Animal RATIONIS particeps for every one knows at least confusedly that the Essential difference of Man consists in the necessary union he has with the Universal Reason though it is not commonly known who it is that includes that Reason which Men take but little care to discover I see for instance that two and two make four
Idea of Extension must be consulted with application and we must discover that it is not a Modification of Body but the Body it self since it is represented to us as a Thing subsisting and the principle of whatever we clearly conceive in Bodies And that as the Modifications of Body is not capable of having any relations to sensible Qualities so it is necessary that the Subject of these Qualities or rather the Being whereof these Qualities are Modifications should be very different from Body The like Arguments are necessary to be urged to prevent the confounding our Souls with our Bodies But if we had as clear an Idea of the Soul as we have of the Body certainly we need not be at all this trouble to distinguish them since we should discover their essential difference by one simple view and with as much facility as we perceive the difference between a Square and a Circle I shall not stand to prove more at large that we have no clear Ideas either of the Soul or its Modifications for what ever way we consider our selves we sufficiently discover it Nor had I added this to what I have already said of it in the Search after Truth but that some Cartesians objected against it If this does not satisfie them I shall expect that they discover to me this clear Idea which I have not been able to find in my self although I have done what I could to discover it AN EXPLANATION OF THE Eighth Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book Of Loose and General Terms which signifie nothing how they are distinguished from others TO comprehend what has been said in some places how such as explain Things by Logical and General Terms give no Reason of them we need only to consider that whatever is may be reduced to Being or Manner of Being whatever Term signifies neither of these signifies nothing at all and whatever Term signifies neither of them distinctly and particularly signifies nothing distinct this seems to me very clear and evident but what is so in it self is not so to every one Words are a sort of Coin wherwith Men pay themselves and others all Terms that offend not the Ear are currant and there is so little Truth in the Business of the World that those who speak or hear it have commonly no respect to it The Gift of Speech is the greatest Talent and the Language of the Imagination is the surest Means and a Memory filled with Unintelligible Terms will always appear advantagiously whatever Cartesians may say of it When Men shall love Truth only they will be cautious what they say carefully examine their Intentions and scornfully reject Empty Terms closely adhering to clear Ideas But when will this come to pass Then only when their dependance upon the Body is broke when their necessary relation to sensible Objects ceases when they shall no longer corrupt one another but faithfully consult their Master who instructs them inwardly but this is not to be expected in this life Yet all are not equally indifferent for Truth some speak without reflection hear without distinction and attend on that only which affects them others industriously labour to inform themselves and convince others of the Truth 'T is to these chiefly that I address my self for it was at their Requests I began these Remarks I say then Whatever is whether it actually exists or not and consequently whatever is intelligible is either Being or a Manner of Being By Being I intend something that is absolute or that may be conceived alone independent of any thing else by Manner of Being I mean something relative or what cannot be conceived alone Now there are two Manners of Being one consists in the relation of the parts of any Whole to some part of the same Whole the other in the relation of one Thing to another which are not parts of the same Whole An Instance of the first is Roundness in Wax which consists in the Equality of distance that all the Superficial parts have in respect to that at the Center The Motion or Situation of the Wax is an Instance of the second which consists in the relation which the Wax has to the Bodies that are about it By Motion I mean not a Moving Power for 't is evident that Power neither is nor can be a Manner of a Bodies Existence for let it be Modified how it will we cannot conceive it as a Moving Power Whatever then is intelligible is either Being or a Manner of Being for it is certain that every Expression that signifies neither of these signifies nothing at all and every Term that signifies not this or that particular Being or Manner of Being is obscure and confused danglam And therefore whatever we say to one another is unconceivable if we have no distinct Idea of Being or Manner of Being which respectively answer to the Terms made use of However I confess we may and ought sometimes to use such Words as do not excite distinct Ideas We may because 't is not always necessary to put the Definition instead of the Thing defined and because we may sometimes profitably use abridg'd Expressions though in themselves confused We must as when we are obliged to speak of such Things whereof we have no distinct Idea and which we conceive not by an inward sensation as of the Soul and her Modifications only we ought to be careful that we use not obscure and equivocal Terms we having clear ones or even any which may excite false Ideas in those we speak to For Instance It is more intelligible to say that God created the World by his Will than his Power This last Word is a Logical Term which stirs up no distinct and particular Idea but leaves us at liberty to imagine that the Power of God may be distinct from the Efficacy of his Will We speak more intelligibly when we say God pardons Sinners through Jesus Christ than by absolutely saying He forgives them through his Clemency and Mercy These Terms are equivocal and may occasion us to think that the Mercy of God may be contrary to his Justice that Sin may go unpunisht and that the Satisfaction of Jesus Christ is not necessary c. Men often make use of loose and Indefinite Terms when they speak of the Divine Perfections which is not blameable since Philosophical Rigour is not always necessary but by a criminal Stupidity and Negligence they abuse these General Expressions and draw so many false Consequences from them that though they all have the same Idea of God and confider him as an infinitely perfect Being yet there was scarcely any Imperfection that was not attributed to him in the Times of Idolatry and Men often spoke of him after a very unworthy manner for want of comparing their Expressions with the Ideas they had of him or rather with himself But 't is chiefly in Phisics that these Loose and General Terms are abused which stir up no distinct Idea either
to fight against himself but because he designed to make use of this shocking of Bodies as an occasion to establish the general Law of the communication of Motions by which he foresaw he might produce an infinite number of admirable Effects For I am perswaded that these two Natural Laws which are the most simple of all Viz. That all Motion inclines to put it self in a right Line And That in the time of concurrence Motions are communicated in proportion to the magnitude of the Bodies which are shockt are sufficient to produce the World as we see it at this day I mean the Heavens the Stars the Planets Comets Earth and Water Air and Fire In a word the Elements and all inorganized or inanimate Bodies For organized Bodies depend upon many other Natural Laws which are wholly unknown to us It may be also that animate Bodies are not formed like others by a certain number of Natural Laws For 't is very probable they were all formed at the Creation of the World and that by time they only received that growth which was necessary to make them visible to our eyes Let it be how it will 't is certain they receive this growth from the general Laws of Nature according to which all other Bodies are formed upon which account their growth is not alwayes regular I say then that God by the first Natural Law positively will'd and consequently produced the Collision of Bodies and that he afterwards made use of it as an occasion to establish the second Natural Law which regulates the communication of Motions and that thus the actual shock is a Natural or Occasional Cause of the actual communication of Motions If we consider this well it will be visibly discovered that nothing could be better ordered But supposing God had not ordained it thus and that he had diverted Bodies when ready to hit each other as if there were a void to receive them First Bodies would not then have been subject to this continual vicissitude which causes the Beauty of the Universe for the generation of certain Bodies is only produced by the corruption of some others and 't is the contrariety of their Motions which produces their variety Nor Secondly Would God then act by the most simple wayes For that Bodies ready to shock each other might continue their Motion without striking it would be necessary that they should variously describe an infinite number of Curve-Lines and consequently we must admit different Wills in God to determine their Motions Lastly If there was no uniformity in the action of Natural Bodies and if their Motion was not performed in a right Line there would be no certain Principle for us to Reason upon in Natural Philosophy nor to guide us in many Actions of our Lives 'T is no disorder for Lyons to eat Wolves Wolves Sheep and Sheep the Grass which God has taken so much care of that he has given it all things necessary for its own preservation and also a Seed to preserve its Kind Yet this proves Second Causes no more than the Plurality of Causes or contrary Principles of Good and Evil which the Manichees invented to give a Reason for these Effects But 't is a certain Mark of the Wisdom Greatness and Magnificence of God for he does nothing unbecoming an Infinite Wisdom and performs all things with such a Munificence as sufficiently shows his Power and Greatness Whatever is destroy'd is again repair'd by the same Law which destroy'd it so great is the Wisdom Power and Fruitfulness of this Law God does not prevent the destruction of Beings by a New Will not only because the first is sufficient to repair them but chiefly because his Wills are much more valuable than the reparation of these Beings They are of much more value than all they produce And if God made this visible World although in it self unworthy of the action whereby it was produced 't was for ends unknown to Philosophers and to Honour himself in JESVS CHRIST with such an Honour as the Creatures are uncapable of giving him When a House by its fall crushes a good Man to death a greater Evil happens than when one Beast devours another or when one Body is forced to give way by the shock it receives at the meeting of another But God multiplies not his Wills to redress such disorders real or apparent as are necessary consequences of Natural Laws He ought neither to correct nor change these Laws although they should sometimes produce Monsters He must not confound the order and simplicity of his wayes He ought to neglect inconsiderable things I mean he should not have particular Wills to produce Effects of no value or unworthy the action of him who produces them God works Miracles only when the Order he always follows requires it and this Order wills that he should act by the most simple wayes and that there should be no exceptions in his Wills but when 't is absolutely necessary to his designs or on certain occasions which are wholly unknown to us For although we are all united to the Order or Wisdom of God we know not all the Rules of it We see in it what we ought to do but comprehend not by it what God ought to Will nor must we be too solicitous about it We have a great instance of what I have been saying in the damnation of an infinite number of persons that God has permitted to perish in times of Ignorance God is infinitely good loves all his works would have all Men be saved and come to this knowledge of the Truth for he has Created them to injoy him And yet the greatest number are damn'd They live and dye in blindness and will continue in it to all Eternity And does not this proceed from Gods acting by the most simple wayes and from his following Order We have shown that according to Order God ought not by preingaging Pleasures to have prevented the Will of the First Man although his Fall caused the disorder of Nature See the Explanation of the fourth Chapter of the Second Part Of Method It was requisite that all Men should descend from one not only because this is the most simple way but for Reasons too Theological and abstracted to be here explained See also the First Explanation of the Fifth Chapter In fine We ought to believe that this is conformable to the Order which God follows and the Wisdom he alwayes consults in the intention and execution of his designs The Sin of the first Man has produced an infinite number of Evils 't is true but certainly Order required that God should permit it and that he should place Man in an estate wherein he was capable of sinning God is willing to repair his work but rarely gives those victorious Graces which conquers the Malice of the greatest Sinners He often gives Graces that are useless to the Conversion of those who receive them although in respect to them he foresees
the execution of his designs Therefore 't will not be useless for me to prove and explain this Truth for 't is of the greatest consequence not only for the knowledge of Nature but much more for the knowledge of Religion and Morality By the word God we understand a Being infinitely Perfect whose Wisdom and Knowledge have no limits and who consequently knows all the means whereby he can execute his designs This being granted I say God acts alwayes by the shortest means and most simple wayes That I may be the better understood I 'll make use of a sensible Example I suppole that God wills the Body A should strike the Body B. Since God knows every thing he perfectly knows that A. can go to strike B. by an infinite number of Curve-Lines and but by one Right-Line only Now God only wills the shock of B. by A. and we suppose that he only wills the transferring of A. to B. to effect this shock Therefore A. must be transferred to B. by the shortest way or by a Right-Line For if the Body A. were transported to B. by a Curve Line that would show either that the Transporter knew no other way or else that he not only will'd the concurrence of these Bodies but also the means to produce it which is against the supposition There 's as much more action requisite to transfer a Body A. to B. by a Curve-Line than by a Right-Line as the Curve is greater than the Right If God therefore should transfer A. to B. by a Curve-Line which is double to a Right half the Action of God would be wholly useless consequently produced without design or end as well as without effect Moreover Action in God is Will therefore there must be more Will in God to cause A. to be transported circularly than directly Now we have already supposed that God had no Will in respect to the motion of A but only as it relates to the shock Therefore there is not Will enough in God to move A. by a Curve-Line And consequently this motion of A. to B. is a contradiction Thus 't is a contradiction that God should not act by the most simple wayes except we suppose that God in the choice of wayes he makes use of to execute his designs has something else in view besides these designs which is a contradiction in our supposition When I say there is more Will in God to transfer a Body from A. to B. by a Curve than by a Right Line we must from thence conclude nothing against the simplicity of the Being and Action of God For it must be confessed that it cannot be comprehended either how the simplicity of an Infinite Being includes all the different Perfections of Finite Beings nor how his Will continuing alwayes the same and alwayes conformable to Order changes with reference to the different Beings it produces and preserves I speak only according to our manner of conceiving It seems to me now that we clearly conceive when God Wills and for instance creates a Cubic Foot of Matter he Wills another thing than if he creates two For 't is evident that God could not create two different things nor know whether he had created one or two feet of Matter or if he conveyed a Body circularly or directly if there was not some difference in his Wills in respect to Matter or to its Motion since God sees only in himself and in his Wills the variety of his Creatures Now whatever that Action is in God which relates to the different Beings he produces or preserves I call it the differences augmentations and diminutions of Wills in God And according to this manner of conceiving things I say God cannot imploy more Will than is necessary to execute his designs So that God alwayes acts by the most simple wayes in reference to them I don't deny however but God may have a great number of wayes equally simple to produce the same effects or that he may produce them by different means but he alwayes produces them by the most simple provided they are all of the same kind for 't is a contradiction that a Being infinitely Wise should have useless and irregular Wills If we would apply this Principle to Morality we shall see that those secure their Salvation who so prepare themselves for Grace by Self-denyal Repentance and an exact Obedience to the Commands of our Saviour that God acting in them by the most simple wayes I mean by giving them but few New Graces operates very much in them For although God would have all Men be saved he will only save those that can be saved by the most simple means which have relation to the great design he has of Sanctifying through JESVS CHRIST a certain number of the Elect and he will multiply the Children of Eve till that number be fulfilled for 't is because God is willing to sanctifie us through the most simple means that after Sin it was necessary for him to multiply the Children of Men to compleat the number of his Elect since there are many persons who cause their own Damnation by withdrawing themselves from the Order of God Now as God acts not as a particular Cause we must not imagine that he has like us particular Wills for every thing he produces for if it were so it appears evident to me that the generation of Monsters would be impossible and that it would never happen that one work should destroy another As God cannot have contrary Wills we should have recourse to a Principle of Evil as the Manichses had for instance to freeze the Fruits produced by God This being so we are methinks obliged to suppose that there are some general Rules according to which God predestinates and sanctifies the Elect and that those Laws are what we call the Order of Grace as his general Wills whereby God produces and preserves whatever is in the World are the Order of Nature I don't know whether I am not mistaken but methinks from this Principle a great many Consequences may be drawn which perhaps would resolve some Difficulties about which there has been much Controversie some years since but I don't think my self obliged to deduce them every one may do it according to his own Capacity 'T is more convenient to be silent than to say such things as are not necessary to be known and which perhaps will one day be more easily agreed upon than they would now I would only have it known that the most simple ways of our Sanctification are Self-denyal and Repentance or that at least we should continually reflect that our Blessed LORD distinctly knowing the Laws of the Order of Grace we run perpetual dangers when we don't follow the wayes that he has showed us not only by his Words but also by his Actions But as in the course of our Lives there happens particular Occurrances wherein we don't know which way to determine our selves because of the contrary Reasons that may be
these Gentlemen and confess their Reasons were very solid but I would desire them to believe that if I did not comply with them 't was because others were of a much different Opinion which to me appeared also very reasonable and for which indeed I had a greater inclination for I am not willing to decide about the solidity of their Reasons Moreover as Monsieur de la Ville is not very tender in matters of Faith I very well foresaw that his Treatise would make more Noise than it would do Injury to the Truth and as for my self I believe he did me no Injustice in despising me I can assure him I contemn my self more than he desires 'T is true my self-contempt is not grounded upon the same Ideas that inclined him to treat me so disdainfully as he did but I could indeed wish that the Reasons I have for despising my self were not true and I would freely consent that all my ill Qualities were changed into those which he has been pleased to bestow upon me provided he would except that of Heretick or of a Person of a suspicious Faith Since I know there 's nothing so dangerous as to stir up Mens Passions especially on certain Subjects which defend the most violent and unreasonable from the Reproofs of Reason I believed I ought to be silent lest I should increase the Passion I saw in some Minds but since the Heat is abated and little Mischief is to be feared I think I ought to satisfie my Friends and please my self I would not affect a disdainful Silence in respect of Monsieur de la Ville I confess sincerely that he has sensibly offended me for I am neither a Stoic nor Stupid I feel when I am hurt and am not ashamed to confess it Publick Accusation of Heresie is not easie to be born especially by Ecclesiasticks which however unjust it may be yet it fails not to make the Faith of the Accused suspected in this Age more than any other and no one can be prodigal of this kind of disreputation unless Charity oblige him to it which seldom or never happens I shall not therefore Answer any thing to the Calumnies wherewith this Author endeavours to blacken me I shall not cite him before the Common Magistrate for Publick Reparation nor will I make use of any other Methods permitted by the Law of Nature for the restitution of that which I can in Conscience give up I am whatever he pleases Ignorant a Visionary but I am no Heretick I am not suspected of Heresie at least by those who know me I confess I cannot avoid having my Faith suspected if a Stranger be permitted to treat me as a Heretick upon such Consequences as he pleases to draw from my Principles for its impossible but the Treatise of Monsieur de la Ville should have deceived somebody If at present I am suspected of Heresie it is an unhappiness which I cannot help But if it be a Crime 't is not I that have committed it t is he rather who has drawn such Consequences from a Principle as are not in it As for me I disown them believe them false and Heretical and if I saw clearly that they were directly drawn from any one of my Principles I would abandon it for this Principle would be false Truths being not contrary to one another But supposing that Monsieur de la Ville had reasoned justly and fairly deduced Heretical Consequences from my Principle neither I nor many others whom he treats unhandsomely saw not before he had wrote his Book that these Consequences were contained in the Principle so that his Conduct is unjustifiable which way soever it be examined For in fine the Articles of Faith depend not upon the Penetration and Extension of the Mind of one particular Divine as I am going to show And though we should be certain that some Principles included impious Consequences yet no one has thereby a right to treat those as Hereticks who maintain these Principles I confess I have seen in the Fathers and especially in St. Angustine the Ep. 3. Ch. 2.28 Ch. 2.57 contra Epist Manich. Chap. 16. de Trin. L. 10. c. Principle I have Advanced but I never found there that of Monsieur de la Ville It appeared to me that this was a Common Notion That if God should Annihilate all Extension in the World all the Matter whereof the World is composed would be Annihilated I consulted several Persons upon this to see if they had the same Idea as I had upon the Matter and their Answers confirmed me in my Opinion I judged by Reasons which I shall soon declare That we could no longer have any direct and natural Demonstration that the Soul is distinct from the Body or that she is Immortal if this Principle be given up I have said in the Search after Truth that I believed that no Consequence contrary to Faith could be drawn from this Principle which before me was Maintained in Sorbonne in the Public Theses I had almost said that if it were proper I could explain how this Opinion might be reconciled with what the Fathers and Councils have left us as Matter of Faith upon the Mystery of Transubstantiation In sine I disavowed all Heretical Consequences and even the Principle it self if it included them which I did not nor yet do believe What should I say more to clear my Faith from the Suspicion of Heresie even to the most Malicious Could I imagine that any one would be bold enough to place St. Austin and other Fathers among the Calvinists by condemning in the Persons of the Cartesians and Gassendists the Opinion of this Holy Doctor as contrary to Transubstantiation No doubtless nor durst Monsieur de la Ville himself do it but after an indirect manner St. Austin advances the present Question in an hundred places as an incontestable Principle he never goes to prove it since it appears not that any Man doubted of it in his Time For indeed it is a Principle which ought to pass for a Common Notion with all such whose Minds are not prepossest with False Studies From thence this Holy Doctor concludes That the Soul is Immortal that it is more Noble than the Body that it is distinct from it and many other Truths of the greatest consequence Part 2. Chap. 3. Art 6. And Monsieur de la Ville advances under Equivocal Terms That this Principle is not to be found in St. Augustine He Answers one place only in the Works of this Father and to explain him makes this Learned Man reason after an extravagant manner In fine he opposes to the Constant Doctrine of St. Austin the only Book of Categories as if he knew not that this Work was none of this Fathers and that it belonged rather to Logic than Phisics I will not stand to prove this in particular for I see no necessity of Answering Monsieur de la Ville's Book I design to preserve inviolable
is Just and Wise that He loves not Disorder that Nature is Corrupted that the Soul of Man is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts is Mortal Because indeed 't is not a Substance distinct from their Bodies Therefore in the Language of Monsieur de la Ville which condemns Men from Consequences which he draws from their Principles the Cartesians may represent him as criminal and all Mankind besides because they believe that Beasts have Souls What would Monsieur de la Ville say if from his own way of Arguing we should accuse him of Impiety because he maintains Opinions from whence we deduce That God is not Just Wise Powerful Sentiments which overthrow Religion which oppose Original Sin which take away the only Demonstration that Reason furnishes us with to prove the Immortality of the Soul What would he say if we should treat him as unjust and cruel for making innocent Souls suffer and even Annihilating them for the Nourishment of Bodies which they Animate He is a Sinner they are innocent 'T is only to nourish his Body that he kills Bodies and Annihilates their Souls which are of more value than bodies Again If his Body could not subsist but by the Flesh of Animals or if the Annihilation of one Soul could make him immortal this Cruelty however unjust it is might perhaps be pardonable but how many Substances wholly innocent does he Annihilate only to preserve for a few days a Body justly condemned to death for sin Would he be so little a Philosopher as to excuse himself upon the Custom of the places where he lives But if his Zeal had carried him to the Indies where the Inhabitants build * Linsch ch 37. Hospitals for Beasts where the Philosophers and many of the best Sort of Men are so charitable even in respect to Flies that for fear of killing them by breathing or walking they wear a fine Cloath before their Mouths and fan the Ways in which they pass would he then be afraid to make innocent Souls suffer or Annihilate them for the preservation of a Sinners Body Would he not rather choose their Opinion who allow the Soul of a Beast to be no more Noble than their Body nor distinct from it and by publishing this Sentiment acquit himself of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injustice whereof these People would accuse him if having the same Principles he followed not their Custom This Example might be sufficient to show That we ought not to treat Men as Heretics and dangerous persons because we may draw impious Consequences from their Principles even when they disavow these Consequences But be it as it will I think it is infinitely more difficult to Answer these Consequences that I have now drawn than these of Monsieur de la Ville The Cartesians would ve very ridiculous if they treated Monsieur de la Ville and other persons who are not of their Opinion as Impious and Heretical 'T is only the Authority of the Church which may decide in Matters of Faith and the Church has not obliged us and probably whatever Consequences shall be drawn from Common Principles will not oblige us to believe That Dogs have a Soul more Noble than their Bodies that they know not their Masters that they neither Fear Desire nor suffer any thing Because it is not necessary that Christians should be instructed in these Truths The Second Proof Almost all Men are perswaded that sensible Objects are true Causes of the Pleasure and Pain which is felt by their means They believe that Fire disperses that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us That Nourishments act in us and give us the agreeable Sensations of Tasts They doubt not but 't is the Sun which ripens Fruits that are necessary for Life and that all Sensible Objects have a Vertue which is proper to them by which they can do us much Good or Evil. Let us see whether we cannot draw from these Principles such Consequences as are contrary to what Religion obliges us to believe A Consequence impugning the First Principle of Morality by which we are obliged to love God with all our Power and to fear him only 'T is a Common Notion according to which all Men act That we should love or fear whatever has Power to do us good or hurt to make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain to make us Happy or Unhappy This is a supposed Principle we ought therefore to love and fear them This is a Reasoning which all the World Naturally makes and which is yet a general Principle of the Corruption of Manners It is evident by Reason and the first of Gods Commandments that all the Motions of our Soul whether Love or Fear Desire or Joy should tend towards God and that all the Motions of our Body should be regulated and determined by External Objects By the Morion of our Body we may approach to Fruit avoid a Blow fly a Beast that would devour us But we ought to love and fear God only All the Motions of our Soul ought to tend towards him alone We ought to love him with all our Power This is an indispensible Law We can neither love nor fear what is below us without being disordered and corrupted To be afraid of a Beast ready to devour us or to fear the Devil is to do them honour To love Fruit to desire Riches to rejoyce in the Heat of the Sun as if it were the true Cause thereof nay even to love ones Father Protectour Friend as if they were capable of doing as good this is to give them that honour which is due to God only We must not love any one in this sense 'T is permitted and we ought to love our Neighbour by wishing or procuring for him as a Natural or Occasional Cause whatever may conduce to his Happiness but not otherwise We must love our Brethren not as capable of doing us good but as of enjoying with us the true Good These Truths appear evident to me but Men strangely obscure them when they suppose that Bodies which are about us can act in us as true Causes Indeed the greatest part of Christian Philosophers pretend that Creatures can do nothing if God did not concur to their Action and so Sensible Objects cannot act in us without the Efficacy of the First Cause We ought neither to fear nor love them but God only on whom all things depend This Explication shows Men condemn the Consequences which I have drawn from their Principle But if I should say with Monsieur de la Ville that 't is a slight of Philosophers to cover their Impiety if I should charge them with the crime of maintaining at the expence of Religion Aristotles Opinions and the Prejudices of their Senses if by examining their Heart I should impute to them a secret desire of debauching Mens Morals by the defence of a Principle which justifies all sorts of disorders and opposes the first Principle of Christian Morality by the Consequences
of these two parts of our selves proved by clear Ideas is the most fruitful and necessary of all Truths in Philosophy perhaps even in Divinity and Christian Morality But this distinction is more fully shown in many places of the * Lib. 4. ch 2. lib. 6. p. 2. ch 7. lib. 3. p. 2. ch 8. Search after Truth And I maintain to Monsieur de la Ville notwithstanding his Answer which is full of Equivocations Figures and Contradictions or rather I maintain to the Libertines for as for him I believe him so settled in his Faith that he wants not such Proofs I say I maintain to Libertines that they will never find any Parallogism in my Demonstration that 't is impossible to conceive it clearly and distinctly without yielding to it and that all the Proofs they bring to confound the Soul with the Body are drawn from Sense that they are confused and obscure Proofs and will never convince those who judge of things upon clear and distinct Ideas From this Principle That the Essence of Body consists not in Extension and that the Essences of Things are unknown I might draw yet many Consequences contrary to Faith but 't is unnecessary I would rather if it were possible reconcile all true and false Philosophies with Religion and however Impious and Heretical the Consequences might be which I could deduce from the Opinions of Philosophers I should think I wanted the Charity I owe them if I endeavoured to bring their Faith in question much less would I imitate the conduct of Monsieur de la Ville who leaving a Principle fully demonstrated and received in all Ages and busies himself in drawing Heretical Consequences therefrom which only serve to confirm the Calvinists by increasing their number and troubling the Faith of the Faithful I would on the contrary that no one should think on these Consequences or disown them as false and unfairly deduced from this Principle All Truths agree together One cannot maintain a false Principle but every one that knows but a little of the Art of Reasoning may infer from thence many Consequences repugnant to Religion so that if it were permitted to call in question the Faith of others upon Consequences drawn from Principles by them believed as there 's no one that is not deceived in something all the World would soon be Heretical This would be to open the way to an infinite number of Quarrels Schisms Disturbances and even Civil Wars and all Mankind is concerned to look upon the Abettors of such a Conduct as Calumniators and Disturbers of the publick Peace For in short different Parties in Religion which are almost alwayes found upon such like Consequences produce strange Events in a State Histories are full of them but the liberty of Philosophizing and Reasoning upon common Notions ought not to be taken away from Men 't is a right which is as Natural to them as 't is to breathe Divines ought to distinguish between Theology and Divinity between the Articles of Faith and Mens Opinions between the Truths which God teaches to all Christians by a visible Authority and those which he discovers to some persons as a recompence of their attention and pains They ought not to confound things which depend upon such different Principles No doubt Humane Sciences ought to be made serviceable to Religion but with a Spirit of Peace and Charity without condemning one another so long as we agree in Truths which the Church has decided for this Truth will shine forth and by adding new discoveries to those of the Antients all Sciences will be brought more and more to perfection But the imagination of the most part of Men is not adapted to new Discoveries but Novelties of Opinions never so advantageous to Religion affrightens them and they are easily familiarized with the most false and obscure Principles if but advanced by the Antients But when they are grown familiar with these Principles they find them evident though they are never so obscure they look upon them as very useful though they are very dangerous and they accustom themselves so much to speak and hear what they understand not and to pass over a real difficulty by an imaginary distinction that they are alwayes well satisfied with their false Ideas and can never indure to be spoke to in a clear and distinct Language Like persons who coming out of a dark place are too apprehensive of the Light and cannot indure it they imagine we blind them when we indeavour to dissipate the Darkness which surrounds them Thus although I have showed by many Consequences that it is dangerous for example to maintain That Beasts have a Soul more noble than their Body yet this Opinion is antient and most Men are accustomed to believe it whilst the contrary is stigmatized with the Character of Novelty Those who judge of the harshness of Opinions rather by the Fear they produce in the imagination than by the Evidence and Light which they diffuse through the Mind will not be wanting to look upon the Opinion of the Cartesians as dangerous and condemn them as rash and presumptuous rather than those who even maintain that Beasts are capable of Reasoning Let a Man but say in company with a grave Air or rather with such a one as the Imagination forms when 't is frightened by something extraordinary Indeed these Cartesians are strange Men They maintain that Beasts have no Soul I am very apprehensive they will soon say as much of Man And this will be enough to perswade many that this is a dangerous Opinion No Reasons can prevent the effect of this Discourse upon weak imaginations and if there happens not to be a brisk Wit and who by a merry Air reimboldens the Company and frees them from the fear they were in let the Cartesians torment themselves as much as they please they shall never efforce by their Reasoning the Character which is thus given of them Yet there needs no more to show them the extravagance of this Discourse than to put the definition in the place of the thing defined For if a Man said seriously These Cartesians are strange Men They assure us that Beasts neither think nor feel I am very apprehensive they will soon say as much of us Certainly one would judge that this Man would have very little ground for his apprehension but the greatest part of Men are incapable of extricating the least difficulty especially when their Imagination is frightened by the Idea of some Novelty which is represented as dangerous Besides the Air and Deportment easily and even pleasantly perswade us But Truth is not discovered without some application of Mind of which the greatest part of Mankind is incapable Certainly Men who know most and whose Opinions are blindly imbraced by the Vulgar ought not so easily to condemn their Brethren at least before they had examined their Sentiments with a serious attention They ought not to inspire those who respectfully hear them with
the greatness and perfection of my Being and therefore I have reason to admire it Others also ought to admire me if they would do me justice since I am something great through the relation I have to great things I in some measure possess them by the admiration I have for them and I feel the good by a foretaste that a kind of hope makes me enjoy Other Men would be happy as well as I if knowing my greatness they like me applied themselves to the Cause which produced it but they are blind and have no knowledge of either great or fine things and know not how either to raise or make themselves become consider able We may say the Mind naturally reasons after this manner without making any reflexion when it permits it self to be guided by the deceitful lights of its Passions These Arguments have some probability bus 'tis plain they have no solidity in them And this appearance or rather confused Sensation of it which attends these Natural Reasonings made without reflexion have so much power that if we don't take great care they will never fail of seducing us For instance when Poetry History Chimistry or any other Humane Science has struck the Imagination of a young Man with any Motions of Admiration if he don't carefully watch the efforts these Motions make upon his Mind If he does not throughly examine what the advantages of these Sciences are and compare the troubles he shall have in the learning with the profit he shall afterwards receive from them and in short if he is not as curious as is requisite to judge well there is a great deal of danger that his Admiration will not only shew him these Sciences with the fairest side outwards but seduce him also It is likewise very much to be feared that it will corrupt his Heart after such a manner that he shall not be able to destroy the illusion tho' he afterwards come to know it to be such because 't is impossible to efface such deep Traces out of his Brain as a continual Admiration shall have wrought there For that reason he must continually stir up the purity of his Imagination he must hinder these dangerous Traces from being formed which will corrupt the Mind and Heart I shall here prescribe a very useful way to prevent not only the excess of Admiration but also of all other Passions in general When the Motion of the Animal Spirits is violent enough to make such deep Traces in the Brain as corrupt the Imagination it is always attended with some emotion of the Soul Thus the Soul cannot be moved without being sensible of it it is sufficiently advertised to take care or it self and to examine whether it is advantageous that these Traces should be strengthned and made compleat But in the time of the emotion the Mind not being free enough to judge of the usefulness of these Traces because this emotion deceives and inclines it to favour them it must make its utmost endeavour to stop this emotion or else divert the motion of the Spirits which cause it and in the mean time it is absolutely necessary for it to suspend its Judgment Now it must not be imagined that the Soul can always barely by its own Will stop this course of Spirits which hinder it from making use of its Reason It s common powers are not sufficient to make such Motions cease which it has not excited So that it must make use of artifices to endeavour to deceive an Enemy that attacks it only by surprize As the motion of the Spirits stir up certain thoughts in the Soul so these Thoughts also excite certain motions in our Brain Thus when we would stop any motion of the Spirits which is stirred up in us it is not sufficient to will that it should cease for that is not always capable of stoping it We must make use of some Artifices and represent things contrary to those which excite and maintain this motion and this would cause a Revulsion But if we would only determine a motion of Spirits already excited to some other place we must not think of contrary things but only on such things as differ from those which produce it and this will undoubtedly divert them But because a Diversion and Revulsion will be great or little in proportion as our new thoughts shall be attended with a great or less motion of Spirits we must be very careful in observing well what those Thoughts are which agitate as most that in pressing occasions we may be able to represent them to our Imagination which seduces us and we must endeavour to form so strong an habit of resistance by this method that the motion which surprizes us may be no more excited in our Souls If we take care to make an intent application of the Idea of Eternity or any other serious Thoughts to these extraordinary motions which are excited in us those violent and great motions will never happen again without stirring up in us at the same time this Idea and which will consequently furnish us with the means to resist them Those things are proved both by Experience and the Reasons brought in the Chapter Of the Connection of Idea's So that we ought not to think it absolutely impossible by any Artifice to conquer the efforts of our Passions when our Wills are firmly determined to do it However we must not pretend that we can become Impeccable or shun all error by this manner of Resistance For first 't is difficult to acquire and preserve such an habit as that our extraordinary Motions shall stir up in us such Ideas as are proper to oppose them Secondly supposing we have acquired it these motions of the Spirits would directly excite those Ideas which we must oppose and but indirectly those which we must oppose to them So that the ill Idea's being the principal they will always have more power than those which are only accessary and it will be always necessary for the Will to assist the latter In the third place these motions of the Spirits may be so violent that they may fill the whole capacity of the Soul so that there remains no more room if we may be permitted so to speak to receive the accessary Idea that is fit to make a Revulsion in the Spirits or to receive it after such a manner as we may consider it with any attention In fine there are so many particulas circumstances which may make this remedy useless that we must not too much confide in it although on the other side we ought not to neglect it We must continually have recourse to Prayer that we may receive from Heaven those assistances as are necessary in the time of Temptations and also endeavour to present to the Mind some Truth that is so solid and strong that by this means we may conquer the most violent Passions For I must needs advertize by the way that several pious Persons often fall again
So to be able well to distinguist such visible Objects as are presented to us it is necessary on our Part to have a good Sight and to consider them stedfastly But because the Objects that we consider have often more Relations than we can be able to discover at one View by a simple Effort of the Mind We have yet need of some Rules to assist us in the disentangling all Difficulties so well that being helpt by those Rules which will make our Mind more attentive and capacious we discover with an intire Evidence all the Relations of those things that we examine We shall therefore divide this Book into two Parts In the first we shall treat of the Helps the Mind may make use of to become more attentive and capapacious And in the second give those Rules that ought to be followed in the Enquiry after Truth to form solid Judgments thereof without Fear of deceiving our selves CHAP. II. Attention is necessary to preserve Evidence in all our Perceptions that the Modifications of the Soul make it attentive but do much divide its Capacity of Perception WE have shewed in the Beginning of this Work That the Understanding only perceives and that in respect to the Understanding there is no Difference betwen simple Perceptions Judgments and Reasonings except that Judgments and Reasonings are much more compound than simple Perceptions are because they do not only represent many things but even the Relations that these things have amongst themselves For simple Perceptions only represent things to the Mind but Judgments represent to the Mind the Relations that are betwixt these things and simple Reasonings represent the Relations which are between the Relations of things But compound Reasonings represent the Relations of Relations or the compound Relations which are between the Relations of things and so on ad Infinitum For whilst these Relations are multiplied the Reasonings which represent them to the Mind become more compounded But Judgments simple and compound Reasonings are only pure Perceptions in respect to the Understanding because the Understanding only simply perceives as has been before intimated Thus Judgments and Reasonings as to the Understanding being pure Perceptions It is plain that the Understanding never falls into any Error since there is none in Perceptions neither is Error so much as intelligible For as we have often said already it consists only in a precipitate Consent of the Will which suffers it self to be dazled by some false Light and instead of preserving its Liberty as long as it can negligently relies on the Appearance of Truth Nevertheless since it commonly happens that the Understanding hath only confused and imperfect Perceptions of things we may say it is certainly the occasional Cause of our Errors For as our Eyes often deceives us because they represent external Objects very confused and imperfectly to us Confused when they are too distant from us or for want of a due Light and imperfectly because they only represent to us those Sides which are towards us So the Understanding having often only a confused and imperfect Idea of things because they are not sufficiently represented to it and because it discovers not all their Parts causes the Will to fall into a great Number of Errors in yielding too easily to these obscure and imperfect Perceptions It is therefore necessary to find some means to hinder our Perceptions from being confused and imperfect and because nothing can make them more clear and distinct than Attention which all the World is convinced of our Care must be to find such a Method as will make us become more attentive than we yet are This will be a Way to preserve Evidence in all our Reasonings and make us able at one View to perceive a necessary Connection between all the Parts of our longest Deductions In order to find this means 't is necessary that we shou'd be well convinced of what has already been said elsewhere That the Mind carries not an equal Attention to every thing it perceives for it applies it self infinitely more to those that affect modifie and penetrate it than to those that are present to it but affect it not nor belong to it And in fine it imploys it self much more about its own Modifications than about the simple Idea's of Objects which are something different from it self This is the Reason that with some Uneasiness and without much Application we consider the abstracted Idea's of the pure Understanding and apply our selves much more to such things as fall under our Imagination especially if our Imagination is strong enough to make deep Traces in our Brain And indeed it is the Cause why we entirely employ our selves about sensible Qualities even without being able to apply our selves to the pure Idea's of the Mind whilst we feel any thing that 's either very agreeable or very painful for Pain Pleasure and the rest of the Sensations being only the Modifications of the Mind it is impossible that we shou'd exist and not perceive them and that the Capacity of our Mind shou'd not be employed about them since our Sensations are only simple Perceptions But it is not the same with the pure Idea's of the Mind since they may be intimately united to it without considering them with the least Attention For although God be most intimately united to us and comprehends the Ideas of whatsoever we see Yet these Idea's though present and within our selves are hid from us when the Motions of the Spirits stir up no Traces of them or when our Will applies not our Mind thereto I mean when it forms no Acts to which the Representation of these Idea's are connected by the Author of Nature This is the Foundation of whatsoever we shall propose about such Assistances as may render our Minds more attentive so that these Helps will be founded upon the very Nature of the Mind and there is some Reason to hope they will not be so chimerical and useless as many others which more perplex than assist the Mind But if they are not so useful as might be wished all the Time that is imployed about the reading them will not be lost since by it the Reader will be better acquainted with the Nature of his Mind The Modifications of the Soul have three Causes the Senses Imagination and Passions Every one knows by his own Experience that Pleasures Pains and in general all Sensations strong Imaginations and great Passions so much possess their Mind that it is not capable of Attention when it is too livelily touched by these things because then its Capacity or Faculty of perceiving is wholly filled And although these Modifications shou'd be moderated they wou'd nevertheless in some manner divide the Capacity of the Mind so that it cou'd not wholly imploy it self in considering the Truth of things that are never so little abstracted It will be necessary to draw this important Conclusion That all those that wou'd seriously apply themselves to a Search after