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truth_n divine_a reveal_v revelation_n 1,705 5 9.2853 5 false
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ID Title Author Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) STC Words Pages
A48871 An abridgment of Mr. Locke's Essay concerning humane [sic] understanding; Essay concerning human understanding Locke, John, 1632-1704.; Wynne, John, 1667-1743. 1696 (1696) Wing L2735; ESTC R23044 115,066 330

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Probability of such Propositions or Truths which the Mind arrives at by deductions made from such Ideas which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties viz. by Sensation or Reflection Faith on the other side is the Assent to any Proposition upon the credit of the Proposer as coming immediately from God which we call Revelation concerning which we must observe First That no Man inspired by God can by any Revelation communicate to others any new Simple Ideas which they had not before from Sensation or Reflection Because Words by their immediate Operation on us cannot cause other Ideas but of their natural Sounds and such as Custom has annexed to them which to us they have been wont to be signs of but cannot introduce any new and formerly unknown Simple Ideas The same holds in all other Signs which cannot signify to us Things of which we have never before had any Idea at all For our Simple Ideas we must depend wholly on our natural Faculties and can by no means receive them from Traditional Revelation I say Traditional in distinction to Original Revelation By the One I mean that impression which is made immediately by God on the Mind of any Man to which we cannot set any bounds And by the Other those Impressions delivered over to others in Words and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another Secondly I say that the same Truths may be discovered by Revelation which are discoverable to us by Reason but in such there is little need or use of Revelation God having furnished us with natural means to arrive at the knowledge of them and Truths discovered by our natural Faculties are more certain than when conveyed to us by Traditional Revelation For the Knowledge we have that this Revelation came at first from God can never be so sure as the Knowledge we have from our own clear and distinct Ideas Th●s also holds in matters of Fact know●●le by our Senses as the History of the Deluge is conveyed to us by Writings which had their Orignal from Revelation and yet no bo●y I think will say he has as certain and clear Knowledge of the Flood as Noah that saw it or that he himself would have had had he then been alive and seen it For he has no greater assurance than that of his Senses that it is writ in the Book supposed to be writ by Moses inspired But he has not so great an assurance that Moses writ that Book as if he had seen Moses write it so that the assurance of its being a Revelation is still less than our assurance of his Senses Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of Reason For since no evidence of our Faculties by which we receive such a Revelation can exceed if equal the Certainty of our Intuitive Knowledge we can never receive for a Truth any that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge The Ideas of One Body and One Place do so clearly agree that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms the same Body to be in two distinct places at once however it should pretend to the Authority of a Divine Revelation Since the Evidence First That we deceive not our Selves in ascribing it to God Secondly That we understand it right can never be so great as the Evidence of our own Intuitive Knowledge whereby we discern it impossible for the same Body to be in two places at once In Propositions therefore contrary to our distinct and clear Ideas it will be in vain to urge them as matters of Faith For Faith can never convince us of any thing that contradicts out Knowledge Because thô Faith be founded upon the Testimony of God who cannot lye yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a Divine Revelation greater than our own Knowledge For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer Evidence of any thing to be a Divine Revelation than it has of the Principles of its own Reason it can never have a ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reason to give place to a Proposition whose Revelation has not a greater Evidence than those Principles have In all things therefore where we have clear Evidence from our Ideas and the Principles of Knowledge above-mentioned Reason is the proper Judge and Revelation cannot in such cases invalidate its Decrees nor can we be obliged where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reason to quit it for the contrary Opinion under a pretence that it is Matter of Faith which can have no Authority against the plain and clear dictates of Reason But Thirdly There being many Things of which we have but imperfect Notions or none at all and other things of whose past present or future Existence by the natural use of our Faculties we can have no knowledge at all These being beyond the discovery of our Faculties and above Reason when revealed become the proper matter of Faith Thus that part of the Angels rebelled against God that the Bodies of Men shall rise and live again and the like are purely matters of Faith with which Reason has directly nothing to do First then Whatever Proposition is revealed of whose Truth our Mind by its natural Faculties and Notions cannot judge that is purely Mater of Faith and above Reason Secondly All Propositions whereof the Mind by its natural Faculties can come to determine and judge from natural acquired Ideas are Matter of Reason but with this difference that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence and so is perswaded of their Truth only upon probable grounds in such I say an Evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent even against Probability Because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive But yet it still belongs to Reason to judge of the truth of its being a Revelation and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered Thus far the Dominion of Faith reaches and that without any violence to Reason which is not injured or disturbed but assisted and improved by new discoveries of Truth coming from the Eternal Fountain of all Knowledge Whatever God hath Revealed is certainly true no doubt can be made of it This is the proper object of Faith But whether it be a Divine Revelation or no Reason must judge which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident nor prefer less Certainty to the greater There can be no Evidence that any Traditional Revelation is of Divine Original in the words we receive it and the Sense we understand it so clear and so certain as those of the Principles of Reason and therefore Nothing that is contrary to the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason has a right to be