just Ground to stile these Assertors of the Trinity whom he doth distinguish from such as he doth after call Real Trinitarians Here before I pass on give me leave to observe that however most orthodox Divines tell us see Polan Syntag. p. 226. That the Distinction of the divine Persons ought to be the least Distinction Therefore Counsels and Fathers generally say that it's Relation only that makes Distinction and Number in God yet however they all agree in Opposition to Sabellius that this is not meer nominal but a true Distinction which will hereafter be further evidenced Obj. And now to come to the Chapter it self where first I shall take notice of that Passage of the Author § 35. because that being answered the Solution of his other Objections will be very Facile or rather the Objections will vanish of themselves His Words are these It contradicts our clearest Ideas to suppose the same numerical Substance that is in one Person to be at the same time in another and we can as little apprehend what we mean when we say the same numerical Substance constitutes three infinite Persons as when we say the same Substance constitutes three finite Persons Is not the reason the same between an infinite Person and an infinite Substance and between a finite Person and a finite Substance Answ As to that Homonymous Phrase three infinite Persons I have shewn before in what Sense it may be allowed and and in what Sense it may not and therefore shall not here trouble my self or the Reader with it again but as to the Remainder of his Discourse I must tell him that altho it contradicts our clearest Ideas to suppose the same numerical finite Substance that is in one finite Person to be at the same time in another yet it no way contradicts our clearest Ideas that the same numerical infinite Substance that is in one Person with one Mode of Subsistence should be at the same time in another Person with a different Mode of Subsistence Neither is the reason the same between an infinite Person and infinite Substance and between a finite Person and a finite Substance And his Mistake about this is the Foundation of all his other Mistakes and Soul-ruining Errors That the Reason is not the same between infinite Substance and infinite Person as it is between finite Substance and finite Person is evident because finite Substance does propagate modal Subsistence which in rational Nature we call Personality as it 's finite and terminated yea and where it hath its Terms but infinite Substance not being so terminated but infinitely excluding all Terms and Bounds cannot therefore propagate Personality in like manner as the finite doth for that would be to make it imperfect and if it doth not propagate this after the same manner then it follows undeniably that the Reason is not the same betwixt infinite Substance and infinite Person or Personality as between finite Substance and finite Person or Personality So that this Author 's self-evident Propositions will be found to be self-evident Untruths and his Reasoning is no better when he would infer that because the same numerical finite Substance is but in one Person therefore infinite must be so too Obj. But he would perswade that if by reason of the Difference between finite and infinite there is a Difference between the Number of Persons that the Substance is in it would follow that the Difference of Number is infinite because the infinite Distance betwixt these would suppose this Answ This Reasoning of his is vain and false as the former for as Scripture is express in it that there 's Three and no greater Number of Persons in God than three viz. Father Son and Spirit so we have shewn how sanctified Reason sweetly complies with with divine Revelation in giving us clear Ideas of it how Three and no more than Three personal Properties may emane or flow from divine Essence as terminating it self by essential internal Acts upon it self Obj. But suppose the Author should here object if three relative Properties or Personalities flow from divine Essence by means of reflex acts of Essence how comes it to pass that these do not in like manner flow from angelical or humane Essence reflecting on it self after a like manner by the like Acts Answ There 's not the like Reason for it 1. Because these internal reflex Acts of Intellection and Dilection in the angelical and humane Nature are but accidental acts and most frequently intermitted and therefore cannot propagate Personalities but in the Divine Nature these are essential eternal acts and therefore may I had almost said must propagate something viz. in that Nature whence they emane and whereon they terminate 2. These reflex acts in the Creatures at least in our selves are very imperfect and cannot produce an express Image of that which reflects on the Nature as reflected on and consequently not a Person But in God these are most perfect and therefore produce that express Image which is a Person and so the Son is stiled Heb. 1. 3. The express Image of the Father's Person 3. We have shew'd before that angelical or humane Essence being finite and having Terms must therefore where-ever it terminates or where the utmost Bounds of its Extension are propagate Modal Subsistence or Personality for to terminate such Essence but the divine Essence infinitely exceeding all such Bounds and Limits cannot in this way suited only to a finite Creature propagate the same but doth it after an higher way suited to infinite immense Being And here I would demand of the Author either to shew us the way wherein infinite essence doth this seeing it's undenyable that it must be different from this of finite Beings or else give us some pregnant Reasons why it may not do it by terminating it self upon it self with the aforesaid reflex acts or else ingenuously confess that a Trinity of Persons or which is the same Father Son and Spirit in one and the same singular divine Essence is not only clearly reveal'd in the written Word but is likewise very fully consistent with true Reason and the Light of Nature as elevated and improved by divine Revelation and that he hath greatest Cause to be humbled for his bold blasphemous Oppositions to so great and clear a Truth Obj. And thus having discovered the Falsehood of his grand Conclusion § 35. I proceed to take notice of some few things more in this Chapter especially in § 33. where we find him thus reasoning If a Person be a Substance there must be three Substances because Substance is contained in the Idea of Person and consequently as many Substances as Persons all that we apprehend of a divine Substance is that he is a Subject in which all the divine Attributes exist that Person is the very same and these are only different Words to express the divine Being by whence he would infer most blasphemously § 34. That a Trinity of Persons in one Substance is
learned School-men and reformed Divines to be a Pack of such silly Fools as to contradict themselves to say a thing and unsay it again which is saying nothing at all and to teach the People like Parrots Propositions without apprehending them and such as are wholly unintelligible and the last of which is a Negation of the first See N. 11. How comes I say this Man to have this Confidence or rather bold Impudence Is it from the Strength of his Reason or rather of his Folly I would willingly reduce his Reasonings if they will bear it to some Heads and then severally consider the Strength of each of them for they are but a few the far greatest Part of his Book being made up of meer Tautologies His first Reasoning P. 6. § 10. is grounded on his own grand Mistake viz. That God absolutely considered and Person are convertible Terms so that there must be as many Gods as Persons How false this is hath been before declared and evidenced so that I shall not trouble my Reader with it again Object His second Reasoning immediately follows in the same Page and it seems to be to this purpose If there are Three each of whom is God or each of whom is Infinite Almighty Incomprehensible then there are three Gods three Almighties three Infinites c. His Consequence is most absurd and false because all the three Persons have but one and the same singular or numerical God-head Infinity Omnipotency c. for neither is the divine Essence or any Essential Attribute of God multiply'd as Personality is But the Author asks How do you prove that there are three Almighties three Incomprehensible Persons Answ We affirm no such thing let such prove it as do asfirm it for tho three may be affirmed of Persons because multiplicable yet not of infinite or eternal which cannot be multiplied so that his Argument is a meer Sophism viz. such as ariseth e Conjunctione eorum quae dividenda sunt and may be answered thus God is three Persons but not three Infinites or Eternals neither will he ever be able if he had more Skill than he hath from a Trinity of Persons in God if rightly understood to infer Polytheism or a Plurality of Gods Object His third way of Reasoning if we may call it such is P. 7. § 13. The former Part of the Section is a meer Repetition of what went before and hath been fully answered But in the latter Part of it he tells us That God and Man he means according to the Trinitarian Doctrine are Vniversals and so predicated of more Persons than one and each Divine Person is as much of himself God he means a distinct God as each Human Person is Man i. e. distinct Man Answ Never any Trinitarian yet did assume God to be an Universal or to be predicated of Father Son and Spirit per Modum Generis seu Vniversalis We say as in the Creed The Father is God the Son is God and the Holy Ghost is God that is the Father is Eternal God as with the Personal Property of Father the Son is the same Eternal God but with a distinct Personal Property viz. that of Son the like we say of the Holy Spirit Therefore his Inference That Divine Persons must be as much distinct as Humane Persons is idle and vain and it stands firm for all he hath said that there are not three Gods but one God As to what he adds § 15. That Father and Son being Relatives cannot subsist in the same Subject I must tell him that had he learned his Logick better he would have found they may provided they be not predicated de eodem respectu ejusdem which these are not Object His fourth way of arguing is § 16. If the Son is the same God as he is that begat a Son he must beget a Son too except the same God did and did not beget a Son Answ Although the Son be the same as he is that begot yet he does not beget because God as begetting is God as cloathed with the Relative Property of Father now the Son not being cloathed with that Property doth not beget His fifth way of Reasoning § 18. is as foolish and absurd viz. That if God be three Persons and each Person God there must be nine Persons because each single Person must be three Persons Had the Author but known and weighed the Description given of a Divine Person viz. that he is essentia Dei prout est cum Proprietate Hypostatica he would not have troubled us with such a trifling Argument For altho God absolutely considered and not limited by a Personal Property may by Addition of those Properties be Three Persons yet a Divine Person being God limited by Personal Property cannot be Three Persons His sixth way of arguing is § 20. Those things according to the common Sense of Mankind are the same with themselves that are the same with a third and all Knowledge but Intuitive depends upon the Truth of it We grant him all this But what is it he would infer It 's this that if three Persons and one Person first second and third are the same with God they are the same with one another Is this his Demonstration I must tell him that through Abuse of a good Rule there 's nothing but Confusion and Deceit in it For 1. He confounds three Persons and one as if they were the very same 2. He would make us believe that they do both alike agree in a third which is absurd and false because that Notion we have of the three Persons jointly considered is adequate to the Notion we have of God because the Divine Essence is not communicable to more than three Persons But the Notion we have of a single Person is not adequate to the Notion we have of God who is communicable to more than a single Person Do these then agree entirely in a third when this third hath it self after a different manner with respect to them It cannot be So that the Argument may be retorted upon himself and the quite contrary Conclusion inferred from the foresaid Rule Thus if one Person and three Persons do not agree in a third then they do not agree between themselves but they do not agree in a third as hath been shewn therefore not between themselves His seventh way of arguing § 21. is to as little purpose If the Persons saith he are really distinct and each is God must not each be God distinct from the other For nothing can be distinctly predicated of three distinct Persons if it do not distinctly belong to each As to the phrase of real Distinction we refer the Reader to what hath been said upon § 8. But as to what follows we say That altho God be predicated of three distinct Persons yet not distinctly or after a distinct manner but one and the same God is after one and the same manner equally predicated of three therefore it follows quite
as it is with the personal Property of Father be said to be unbegotten as it is with the personal Property of Son be said to be begotten or conceived and if he mean no more by his self-existent and not self-existent then the Case is alike But if he take them in a different Sense they will not be found to be the distinct Predicates of the divine Persons and so why may not the same divine Essence under a different Mode or personal Property or as belov'd with a Love of infinite Delight and Complacency be still the same Essence but neither as unbegotten nor as begotten but as proceeding And so in like manner may not the divine Essence as it is with the personal Property of the Son be incarnate yet the same divine Essence as it is with the personal Property of Father and Holy Ghost be not incarnate Is there any thing of Contradiction in all this No Man that knows what a Contradiction is unless a deceitful Sophister who would impose on others his own Sophisms would assert it when these contrary Predicates are predicated of the same Subject not in one and the same respect but under such different Respects as that Subject hath to different Persons Are not these very Predicates viz. to be begotten and not begotten to beget and not to beget to use a familiar Instance in like manner truly attributed to the Nature of Isaac Do we not truly say that as it related to Abraham it was begotten but did not beget and as it related to Jacob that it did beget but was not begotten As to what he adds that there could not any Attributes or Modes or anything that inheres in a Substance be begot because they cannot subsist by themselves How false this is and contrary to all sound Reason may appear even from physical Generations which are no other than several progressive Motions from one essential Mode to another for the Matter it self is not generated but only the essential Mode or Form which being educed out of the Power of the Matter does not subsist of it self but inheres in the Matter by Vertue whereof the Compound itself is said to be generated as being specificated by it His Discourse in the last § of this Chapter viz. 38. is as vain as the former yea it is such as is grounded on a meer Sophism viz. that there 's no Distinction of Persons in God because every Person is the divine Substance which is three different ways the same that is three different ways one whereas if he would have reasoned fairly he should have said that every Person is the divine Substance as it three different ways the same or one but then this Conclusion as hath been shewn being false which should be the Foundation of all that follows the whole Superstructure built on it as his Multiplication without Addition and his Substraction without Diminution must fall with it and so the Falsehood and Sophistry of his other Reasoning would clearly have been detected as now it is there being a vast Difference betwixt those two ways and Modes of speaking viz. every Person is that divine Substance which is three different ways the same which imports no more than that it is that divine Substance which subsists in three Persons and which is common to three which is a manifest Truth and that every Person is the divine Substance Substance as it is three different ways the same which imports that every Person being the same with the divine Substance as subsisting in one way as for example with that Mode of Subsistance which is peculiar to the Son is the same with that divine Substance as subsisting in another way as for example with that Mode of Subsistence which is peculiar to the Father which is a manifest Untruth And so to father Contradictions on us he 'll speak them himself and then make us speak them whether we will or no. Obj. Thus having done with his third Chapter we proceed to his Reflections on the Adimadverter's Hypothesis chap. 4. p. 12. where I shall briefly take notice of his trifling Discourse without taking on me to defend the Animadverter's Hypothesis which I have not seen save only so far as to vindicate it as here represented by the Author from some unjust Aspersions which he seeks to cast upon it and whereas § 39. he tells us the common Opinion of the Trinitarians even from the Beginning if we may believe the Animadverter has been that the three Persons are not three Substances Attributes Properties or any real but incompleat Beings viz. three Modes and if the Persons are no more than three Modes then the Difference is but a trifling Difference Answ But doth not this Author shamefully wrong the Animadverter in making him say that the three Persons are no more than three Modes Did ever any Trinicarian or Man of common Sense talk at that rate But as if he were afraid of being call'd to account for such false Aspersions he tells us afterward in the same Section viz. But it 's said a Person is not a meer Mode but the divine Substance with a peculiar Mode It 's well he 's brought at last to make a true Representation of the Trinitarians Doctrine and thereby to confute his own Calumny And what hath he now to say against this that a Person is not a meer Mode but the divine Substance with a peculiar Mode He saith that if each Person is the divine Substance he must have in him all the Modes an admirable Inference If Person be divine Substance with one Mode then he 's divine Substance as with all Modes If this be not to speak Contradictions I know not what is but he would back his absurd Inference with a Reason That Person must have all the Modes because he is the divine Substance in which the Modes subsist this Reason is just like the former as if Person who is the divine Substance as limited with one Mode or relative Property is the divine Substance not as limited with one but three relative Modes or Properties A downright Contradiction One should think this Man who is so ready to charge others with flat Contradictions should better have senced himself against venting Contradictions at this rate but before I pass on I would take notice of another Passage of his in this Section not much short of the former for Absurdity wherein speaking of these relative Modes he saith two of which may be absent without the least Alteration in the divine Substance or Properties He might as well have said that where there is the Foundation of Sonship yet the relative Property of Son doth not result or flow from it which according to the Sense of all Mankind is impossible Obj. What the Author saith § 40. I shall take up when I come to the following Chapter and so shall next consider what he saith § 41. where he reasons thus If there be any Thought Word or any of those Actions that
blessed God Object 3. Let me add Is it only these Divines that speak thus or is it not the divinely inspired Pen-men of the Holy Scripture who speak the same The Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews doth he not tell chap. 1. v. 3. That the Son is the express Image of his Father's Person and can he be a Son representing as a lively Image the Person of his Father and yet not a distinct Person Doth not St. John chap. 1. expresly tell us that the Word was made Flesh and was this the Father or the only begotten of the Father See v. 14. This only begotten of the Father when in the Humane Nature he was baptized was he not a distinct Person from the Person of the Father testifying of him by a Voice from Heaven This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased And was he not a distinct Person from the Holy Ghost who descended in a bodily Shape like a Dove upon him Luke 3. 21 22. And does not our Lord Christ himself when speaking of Father Son and Holy Ghost clearly distinguish these as Three Persons in telling us John 14. 26. But the Comforter which is the Holy Ghost whom the Father will send in my Name he shall teach you all things have we not here the Person sending the Person sent and the Person in whose Name he 's sent But what need I thus argue for a Distinction of Persons I don 't at all question here but this Author will readily grant that the Father the Word and the Holy Ghost as set forth in Scripture are three different Persons for he tells us P. 32. § 94. It is evident that in Scripture God the Father is as much distinguish'd from the Son as two Men or Angels can be and Mankind that are incapable of apprehending Metaphysical Niceties cannot but conceive them so and hence it is as we have shewn before that he makes God and the Father or Person of the Father equivalent Terms so excluding the Son and blessed Spirit from being God or equal to the Father so that he owns them no otherwise to be Three Persons than as three Beings or Substances which do really differ one from another Answ You will thus see at length what this Author is and how his sometimes seemingly applauded Unitarianism ends in Arianism and the Truth is the very worst Dregs of the Poyson of his Doctrine lye here not in his denying any Trinity of Persons but his denying a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the divine Essence he can be well enough content that the Word be the Person incarnate the Holy Ghost the Comforter or Person sent so he can but strip them of their Divinity or make that Divinity which the Scripture seems as he grants to ascribe to them to agree to them only in a tropical or figurative Sense but to ascribe this truly to them together with proper divine Worship this he makes to be Idolatry Here 1. I would have it noted that I may meet with and refute his Railery which hath diffused it self through a great Part of his Pamphlet that when this Author speaks of the Trinitarian's worshiping the Three Persons as Three distinct Almighty Beings as Three Gods as Three compleat distinct Objects of Worship and as paying at other times divine Worship to one of them and at the same time not paying it to another that all this is meer Calumny and hath not a Word of Truth in it they worship indeed Three Persons as they are one and the same Almighty Being or God but not as Three Almighty Beings or Gods such Tritheism they abhor as much as himself or any other They worship Three Persons what as three distinct Objects of Worship No but as all three in Conjunction making up the one great compleat and adequate Object of our Worship they worship the Son and blessed Spirit as well as Father but do they when they worship the Son not worship the Father and blessed Spirit at the same time Or when they worship the blessed Spirit do they not worship the Father and the Son at the same time as this Author would Persuade That 's false yea it 's impossible that divine Worship should be paid to one of these and not to another when the Three are but one and the same God blessed for ever Obj. Here I would ask this Author when he does in Worship apply himself to God as our great Redeemer does he in his so doing exclude God our Creator from sharing in that Worship Or when he doth in a more special manner apply himself to God as our Sanctifier doth he by so doing exclude God our Creator and Redeemer from sharing in that Worstip And must he for this his applying himself unto God under these different Respects needs be a Polytheist and an Idolater If not why then must Trinitarians be such for applying themselves in divine Worship to the Person of the Son or of the blessed Spirit If he say it is because three divine Persons are three Gods Answ This is most false most repugnant to Descriptions given by all sound Trinitarians of divine Persons and hath fully been answered and therefore I shall here pass it over as a meer Calumny 2. I would have it noted that when the Author tells us § 47 that the Notions of the Trinitarians when apply'd to the Incarnation and Satisfaction must be very uncouth and further that when they speak of these and when they endeavour to prove the Spirit and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be Persons that then they are real Trinitarians that is such in his Language as set up three Gods and further adds § 48. that these who will be thought to be neither real nor nominal Trinitarians cannot properly be said to believe any Trinity except at the most a Trinity of Cyphers and that as he thinks it cannot be presumed that Men of so great Sense to mention no other than Sarum and Worcester would assert so absurd a thing but that they knew if they declared what they suppose the three to be they must inevitably run into Polytheism or Vnitarianism Answ 1. And is there then no Medium betwixt these two Extreams One would have thought that the Writings of so many learned Men as have writ on this Subject if he had not resolved to have shut his Eyes against clearest Light should have convinced him that there is Do not these expresly tell if we must repeat things again that these three are three Persons that however three Persons cannot exist in one singular finite Essence where Personality flows from the Termination of Essence yet three Persons may exist in one singular infinite immense Essence where Personality flows from Essence after a different manner which the boldest Arians and Sacinians dare not deny And if Personality does not result from divine Essence as it does from created Essence why there may not exist three Persons in the one when yet there can but