Reason do affect the Will most connaturally raise Devotion heighten Contemplation and make it Solid and consequently keep the Soul Clear from Idle Fancies and set her above Light Bigotteries I have not enumerated these Particulars to boast my Performances for these are yet to be Decided by examining whether the Reasons I have all along produced will bear the Test but to bespeak my Reader 's Pardon if travelling in an unbeaten Road I happen now and then to stumble Which as I am not conscious to my self to have done at all so I shall hope I no where do in any passage that substantially concerns the METHOD TO SCIENCE Rather I must positively avow that it is impossible for any Wit of Man to invent any other Way than what I have propos'd that is Solid and Evident For 't is granted by all Mankind hitherto unless perhaps the Cartesians that Truth is fundamentally the Conformity of our Judgment to the Nature of the Thing and that it consists Formally in the Connexion of the Terms both which I have follow'd most exactly and as some Readers I doubt not will think too superstitiously Now since Rectum est mensura sui obliqui my Design engages me to show as far as the Brevity of a Preface will allow that the different Methods taken by Others do not lead us to true Science And indeed there is a kind of Necessity laid upon me to make this Charge good For since we take Different Methods if theirs be a Right one mine must be a Wrong and my Publishing it no Advantage but an Injury to Truth and to my Greatest Neighbour the World The METHODS which I pitch upon to examine shall be of two sorts viz. that of Speculative and that of Experimental Philosophers The Former of which pretend to proceed by Reason and Principles the Later by Induction and both of them aim at advancing Science Looking about for an Instance if the Former sort I did not think Epicurus and his School worth my taking notice of for he who supposes all his Principles bids Defiance to all Methods of Concluding any thing And as for our Modern School-Philosophers they have so disputed themselves quite out of breath for want of any Certain Method that they have brought all Science to an Indifferency of Opinions or maintaining any thing with Equal Evidence or rather No-Evidence a thing absolutely impossible for those who lay any right Method to Science And this Deficiency of theirs losing their Credit with our late Wits have given them occasion to east about how to model Philosophy a-new and frame it wholly in another Mould for the Schoolmen on the one side represented Aristotle wrong and on the other side his perhaps affected Obscurity won them rather to believe the Schools concerning his Doctrine than to be at the Expence of Pains and Patience to understand him right speaking by himself or by his First Interpreters The Inconsiderableness then of other Pretenders to a Method to Science and the Weakness of their Pleas throws me forcibly upon examining the Method of that Great Man Cartesius It must be confess'd his Method is vastly different from mine He pretends to a First Principle and the Self-evidence of that Principle which therefore I must either disprove or give up my Cause and condemn what I have written since it is impossible that two Methods contrary to one another can both of them be the right one or lay just Claim to Self-evidence in their Principles But with how Potent an Adversary has my Unlucky Audaciousness in attempting to lay a Demonstrative Method to Science oblig'd me to grapple It must be acknowledg'd that he was a a Man of that Prodigious Wit that scarce any Age has produced his Equal His School has dilated it self into divers Nations and his Scholars and Followers are of such Eminent Rank and Name that it would terrifie any Man to encounter his Doctrine especially his Principles which must be the solidest strongest and clearest parts of it who had not an unshaken Confidence in the Invincible Strength of TRUTH under whose â—anner he fights He dazles the Understanding of his Reader with his most Ingenious and Clear Way of Discoursing a Talent peculiar to himself and he lays his Thoughts together with such an Artificial and smoothly-flowing Currency in proper and unaffected Language that he captivates it at unawares into a Complaisant Assent and his greatest Adversary must be forced to confess that if his Doctrine be not True at least Truth was never so exactly and handsomely Counterfeited He postures his Thoughts so dextrously that nothing but perfect Evidence can break their Ranks or make a hostile Impression upon them so that if his Hypothesis be False and hap to be overthrown it will certainly be the most Glorious Victory Truth ever gain'd But all those Bug-bears cannot deter me from the Defence of Truth in such a Cause Non Divûm parcimus ulli and the more his Doctrine resembles Truth and has Greater Patrons to abet and carry iâ— on the higher Obligation it lays upon me tâ— detect its Falshood if I sincerely judge iâ— Fallacious and think I can show it to be so I would not be misunderstood to intend herâ— a Confutation of his Doctrine 't is neitheâ— a Work for a Preface nor for a Man of mâ— small Leasure but only to take Minutes oâ— some few but main Hinges of his Doâ—ctrine in order to confute his Method leaving it to others who have better parts and less Employments to carry on my slight Animadversions if they may be found of weight to farther Reflexions To begin then with his six Meditations In the first place I cannot conceive why they should be styl'd his Metaphysicks For 't is proper for that Noblest and Highest Science to treat of Ens as Ens or of sueh Notions as concern Being which I cannot discern to have been the direct Scope of those Treatises He sets himself to investigate some First Principle to fix upon by a laborious Divesting himself of all those Knowledges he is seemingly possess'd of and after much tossing his Thoughts to and froâ— a long time with doubting or pretending to doubt of all he had hitherto known he arrives at length at that odd first Principle of his Cogito ergo sum and triumphs mightily with a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at his having found it Against which Procedure waving here what I have said of it Book 2. Less 4. I have divers Exceptions as Irrational in many Respects For First he might as well have made that Inference or have found that First Principle at the very beginning when he made his first Doubt since Dubito ergo sum is full as Conclusive of his own Existence as Cogito ergo sum can be pretended to be Nor can any reason be given why Ego sum dubitans does not include in it Ego sum as well as Ego sum Cogitans does And Cartesius himself Medit 3d. confesses the same expresly To
Certain Sense of Words For Criticks do very frequently ground the Sense of Words upon Etymologies or the Derivation of them from other words Or else on the Sense in which some few learned Writers do take them both which are Fallacious Rules to know their Sense certainly The former because the Reason why the word was Impos'd and the Sense it self of those words are many times Different Notions For example a Stone as some of them tell us is in Latin nam'd Lapis a laedendâ— pedes but the Notion or signification of that word is the very Substance it self of such a Body Nor is the latter Rule competent to give us the true Meanings of those words that express Natural Notions first because those Learned Men use to speak Learnedly or Rhetorically with Tropes and Figures and affect to deliver their thoughts neatly and finely with quaint Phrases Allusions Metaphors and other knacks of Language all which are so many Deviations from the Natural manner of Expression Common to all Mankind and consequently Unsuitable to our Natural Conceptions Besides that a Few Authors suffice the Criticks to build their Observations upon All which falls infinitely short of that Certainty and Plainness which the Common and Constant Vse of the Generality of Mankind or the Vulgar affords us 8. Equivocal Words are either Simply and Absolutely such which we call Equivocal by chance or Relatively which we call Equivocal by design Absolutely when there is no kind of Reason or Ground why the same word should have two different senses as when Far in English signifies a great way in Latin Bread-Corn or any word in one Language happens meerly casually to have a different Signification in another In which sort of Equivocation there can be no danger to Science those two Senses of the Word being so vastly disparate Relatively when there is some kind of Ground why the same word should be transferr'd from one Notion to another And this may be done for two different reasons One when it is referr'd to another for some Connexion with them as Cause and Effect as when the word Healthful which properly belongs to an Animal is transferr'd to Meat because it is the Cause of Health in the Animal and to Vrine because it is an Effect of its Health and therefore a Natural Sign of it Or as when we say there is much Art in such a Picture or Poem it means the Effect of Art for Art in proper speech is to be found only in the Understanding of the Artificer The other Reason of the words being Transferr'd from one to another and consequently Referr'd back to it again is when this is done for some Proportion or Resemblance between them As when we say of a good Governour that he is the Pilot of the Common-wealth to steer it into a safe Harbour and preserve it from splitting upon the Rocks of Division Where the word Pilot which in the First and Proper Meaning signifies a Director of a Ship is transferr'd to a Governor because he does the same in Proportion in a Common-wealth which the other does in a Ship Thus Tranquility which is properly said of the Sea in a Calm is Transferr'd to a State or Kingdom because its Peaceable Condition resembles or bears a kind of Proportion to the Undisturb'd Quiet found in a Calm Sea 9. Words Transferr'd to another for some Proportion or Resemblance between them are call'd Metaphors or Metaphorical and the best Metaphors are when the thing from which 't is Transferr'd is Eminent under that Notion we intend to express As when we call a Valiant Man a Lyon and a Meek man a Lamb because Courage and Mildness are Eminent in those Animals A Continu'd Metaphor is call'd an Allegory As in the Example lately given the word Pilot steer harbour splitting and Rocks are all Metaphors and therefore the whole speech is Allegorical 10. There is no Danger nor Detriment to Science that such words are us'd in Common Speech or Loose Rhetorical Discourses but they are exceedingly pernicious to it when we are treating of Dogmatical Tenets and searching for Truth out of the Words of Written Authors For since those Metaphors however they be True while understood to be meant in Proportion and Resemblance onely yet are Literally Tals and in delivering Doctrines or Dogmatical Tenets only Litteral Truth is aim'd at and if the Reader happen to take a Metaphorical Expression for a Literal one he will most certainly embrace an Errour for a Truth or if he takes a word Literally meant for a Metaphor he will take a Truth for an Errour hence it must Needs be most pernicious to Science not to distinguish between the Metaphorical and Literal sense of the words but mistake one for the other And therefore unless some Certain Rule be Establisht by which we may be ascertain'd when Written Words are to be taken Literally when Metaphorically 't is impossible to be Certain of any Truth meerly by those Written Words 11. Those Words which are Transferr'd from Corporeal to Spiritual Natures are by far more highly Metaphorical than can be any Transferr'd from one Body to another and therefore the Misunderstanding them must needs be very destructive to Science For since Corporeal and Spiritual are the First Species of Ens and the Division of that Genus into those Species is made by the Contradictory Differences of Divisible and Indivisible it follows demonstratively that whatever except the precise Notion of Ens is properly Affirm'd of Body must be properly Deny'd of Spirit and therefore the words Transferr'd from Bodies to Spirits which are in Different Lines are far more Improper than those which are Tranferr'd from one Body to another they being in the same Line and so less Disparate Corol. II. Hence is confirm'd the former docâ—rine that Spirits are not in place nor are Themâ—elves or their Spiritual Actions Subject to Time â—r Commensurable to it c. Since all these may â—roperly be said of Bodies and therefore must â—roperly be deny'd of Spirits Corol. III. From the two last Sections it folâ—ows evidently that no Dogmatical Tenet can be â—rov'd from Books that treat of Spiritual Natures â—r of such considerations as belong to them unless â—ome Certain Rule be first Establisht by which the Reader may know when the words are to be taken â—iterally when Metaphorically in this or that place â—nce a Mistake in this may make the Reader emâ—race a Falshood for a Truth or a Truth for a Falsâ—ood in matters of greatest Importance For exâ—mple this Proportion God is mov'd by our prayâ—rs is Literally False for to be Moved is to be Chang'd and God is Esseâ—tially unchangeable Wherefore it is only True in a Metaphorical â—ence and the Word moved is a metaphor of the last sort viz. of Words transferr'd to anoâ—her for some Proportion or Resemblance between them and so the true sense is this God tho' Unmov'd in himself yet acts in the same manner towards him that prays to him as
to Travel to London tho' he have both Clear Eyes and Strong Legs and employs both of them to his utmost should ever arrive at his Iourney 's End if he does not take the Right Way to it so it is equally Impossible any Man should arrive at Science if he takes not the right Method or Way to attain it tho' he have never so Clear a Natural Wit and a Strong Brain and labours never so industriously to make use of both to his best advantage Providence therefore is justify'd and the Ability of our Natural Faculty asserted and the Blame lies wholly at the doors of the Persons who do not first apply their Thoughts to know the Way to Truth e'er they set forwards in quest of it but chiefly in those who pretend to be Guides to others and yet are Themselves Ignorant of the Method that can bring men to it Mathematicians take the Way and so arrive at it Others a very few exeepted do not take it and therefore miss of it Whence we may establish this Fundamental and most Useful Maxim that The First and Chief Study of those who pursue true Knowledge in Philosophy is to apply their Industry to comprehend the METHOD or WAY to it that If they find not that their most earnest Study is lost Labour but that having once found it they cannot doubt of compassing their End by using such Proper Means But is not the Knowledge of this Method insuperably hard to be attain'd For if it be we are never the nearer but still at the same Loss To give a Stop to such an apprehension I must avow that no part of Mathematicks is more Demonstrable than is the Way to Demonstrate or the METHOD TO SCIENCE Nature as we experience gives us our Notions on which as on its Elements all Science is grounded To make these Clear and Distinct we can distribute them under Common Heads and Divide those Heads by Intrinsecal Differences or such as are Proper to each of them till we come to the Notion we are to discourse of While we thus Divide them we at the same time and with the same labour frame Denitions of each Notion comprehended under those respective Heads by doing which we gain a Distinct and Clear Conception of them which does to a fair degree facilitate our Judging whether such or such of them may be with Truth connected in Propositions or in such Speeches as Affirm or Deny in which Truth does Formally consist To do this more exactly we consider that those Propositions must either be such as show of themselves that the Two Notions call'd it Terms must be Connected and then they are Self-connected or Self-evident Or else they need to be shown Connected by means of some other Notion which is Connected with them both to show which we call Proving Those of the Former sort if perfectly such are fit to be First Principles whose Nature as Common Sense tells us is not to need or admit of Proof The Connexion of the later sort is made known by Proof or by their joint Connexion with a Third which we call the Middle Term Medium or Argument to do which is the Proper work of Discourse or Ratiocination These Three Terms rightly placed or put together compound that most Close and Exact Discourse call'd a Syllogism Certain and most Evident Rules may be assign'd how to place those Three Terms in the two first Propositions so as that Discourse may be most Clear and Perspicuous as also how to find out such a Middle Term as is Proper to Connect the other Two whose Connexion or Truth is under Dispute and to show the Force of the Consequence and why a New Proposition call'd the Conclusion must most necessarily follow out of the Former ones All which being Demonstrated as I have reason to presume is done in this following Treatise and the Equivocation of the Words that express our Notions being avoided I see not what more can be substantially necessary to the METHOD TO SCIENCE For our Notions being Clear'd First Principles establish'd the true Form of a Syllogism manifested Proper Middle Terms found and the Necessity of the Consequence evidenced all those Conclusions may be Deduced with Demonstrative Evidence which ly within our Ken or which we can have occasion to enquire after that is all that we have Notions of provided those Notions be not meerly Accidental or very Remote from one another and therefore Incapable of being Connected Yet still there is one Difficulty that sticks and lies in our way and which is more seems hard to be remov'd For LOGICK or the Art of Reasoning rightly being the Skill which is to teach us this Method to Science and so many Logicks being written by Learned Men and studied by such Multitudes how comes it that notwithstanding such Helps men do still differ in their Tenets that is many or most of them do still err as much as if they had never had such Proper Assistances For if Logick shows them the way to Science and they take that way and have a Natural Ability to follow it or walk in it they must all arrive at Science and their Thoughts center in the same Truths without any Disagreement the contrary to which we do notwithstanding Experience To give an Answer to this I shall be hard put to it how to bear my self between the two Extremes of Modesty Dissimulation and Boasting For if I grant those Logicks are as they ought to be that is Full and Evident and follow'd by Men of divers Sentiments I must confess I know not how to reply or solve the Objection On the other side to condemn all the Logicks since Aristotle's time or all Logicks which are not according to his Grounds is to set up our selves and savours of Arrogancy In this porplexity I have no way to secure my self but to speak the plain Truth and to hope it will bear me out I must then in behalf of Truth declare that the Pretended Logicks themselves are in the greatest Fault For 't is easie to observe that they do indeed give many dry and unprov'd Rules and Maxims they afford many Definitions some right some wrong being oftentimes Illogical and fram'd out of Fancy they pester their Books with many unnecessary Divisions and Subdivisions they treat very largely of the Predicaments of Single Opposit and Aequipollent Propositions they are prolix and superfluous in their Doctrine about Syllogisms their Moods Figures several sorts of idle Fallacies c. All which look very Learned to New Beginners who do therefore take much pains to lay them up in their Memory I say in their Memory for none of those passages being Demonstrated they never sunk into or settled in their Reason And therefore notwithstanding all this when they have as it were got without Book all these particulars the Readers are no wiser how to demonstrate any point practically or how to set himself about it than he was before he read those Treatises I
than this which is or should be the chief Subject of their Physicks I shall dare to affirm that they are in plain Terms most ridiculous and most unintelligible Fopperies as I have shown at large in my Appendix And indeed how should we make any Clear Idea of their Matter when themselves speak Contradictions concerning it as may be seen hereafter p. 417. where I shall hope I have demonstrated that their Forc'd Silence Open Prevarications and perfect Inconsistency in telling us the Intrinsecal Nature of that First Matter of theirs has render'd them utterly Incapable of explicating any Body in Nature Nor can we need any greater Confirmation that their Natural Philosophy is utterly Unprincipled and Unaccountable in the most Essential part of it than to observe that neither Cartesius himself nor Regius Rohault Regis Le Grand nor any of that School I have met with have as I must think been Able to give us any Light of it since they neither Attempt nor Mention it which shows they are at an utter Loss about the Primordial Constitution of their First Matter of which notwithstanding they acknowledge all their Three Elements and consequently all Nature was made These few Particulars omitting innumerable others I have thought fit to hint to show that the Method to Science which the Great Cartesius follows is utterly Incompetent to attain it and that the Scheme of his Doctrine is merely a piece of Wit That which gives it most Credit is that his Suppositions granted he proceeds consequently in the subsequent parts of it which are purely Mathematical But what signifies that if he neither observes True Logick in laying his Principles nor Nature in his Physicks which he cannot pretend to do unless he gives us a particular account of the Intrinsecal Constitution of his First Matter upon which all depends A Task I say again his Followers neither will ever attempt nor can possibly perform by his Principles as is shown at large in my Appendix Yet it must be confess'd that those kind of Discourses are very Plausible and Taking with the Middling sort of Readers and with such who are much pleas'd with a Melodious Gingle of Words prettily laid together with Neat Eloquence Quaint Wit and Unusual Remarks For those kind of Embellishments do divert the Reader make the Authours pass for Curious men and bear a fine Appearance of Truth till they come to be scann'd Exactly and grasp'd close by Severe Reason reducing them to Principles and Connexion of Terms Which done it will be found that they afford to the Learner who sincerely seeks for Truth nothing but certain Bright Flashes or Coruscations which do indeed for a time dazle the Fancy but they settle in the Iudgment no Constant Steady Light to direct them in their Way to true Science Farther I must declare for the Honour of our English Genius that tho' we do not match the French in the Finery Gayity and Neatness of their delivering their Conceptions a Talent in which they are very Excellent any more than we do in our Outward Garb and Dress yet that there are more Solid Productions well built Truths and more Iudicious and Ingenious Thoughts of his own in our Learned Countryman Mr. Locke's Treatise Entituled An Essay concerning Human Understanding than as far as I have observ'd is found in great Multitudes of such slight Discoursers put together We are come now to consider the Other pretended Method to Science which is the Way of Experiments or Induction Concerning which not to repeat what I have occasionally by way of Reason alledg'd against it in my following Book I need say no more but that Matter of Fact shows evidently that this Method alone and Unassisted by Principles is utterly Incompetent or Unable to beget Science For what one Universal Conclusion in Natural Philosophy in knowing which kind of Truths Science consists has been Demonstrated by Experiments since the the time that Great man Sir Francis Bacon writ his Natural History The very Title of which laborious Work shows that himself did not think Science was attainable by that Method For if we reflect well on what manner such pieces are writ we shall find that it is as he calls it meerly Historical and Narrative of Particular Observations from which to deduce Universal Conclusions is against plain Logick and Common Sense To aim at Science by such a Method may be resembled to the Study of finding out the Philosopher's Stone The Chymist lights on many Useful and Promising things by the way which feed him with false hopes and decoy him farther but he still falls short of his End What man of any past or of our present Curious Age did ever so excell in those Industrious and Ingenious Researches as that Honour of our Nation the Incomparable Mr. Boyle yet after he had ransack'd all the hidden Recesses of Nature as far as that Way could carry him he was still a Sceptick in his Principles of Natural Philosophy nor could with the utmost Inquisitiveness practic'd by so great a Wit arrive at any Certain Knowledge whether there was a Vacuum or no And certainly we can expect no Science from such a Method that can give us no Certain Knowledge whether in such a Space there be Something or Nothing which of all others should be the most easily Distinguishable and Knowable Lastly we may observe that when an Experiment or which is the same a Matter of Fact in Nature is discover'd we are never the nearer knowing what is the Proper Cause of such an Effect into which we may certainly refuâ—d it which and onely which is the Work of SCIENCE For Gassendus will explicate it according to his Principles Cartesius according to his the Noble Sir Kenelin Digby and his most Learned Master Albius whom I Iudge to have follow'd the true Aristotelian Principles according to theirs So that after all the assigning the True Natural Cause for that Effect and explicating it right must be Decided by way of Reason that is by Demonstrating first whose Principles of Natural Philosophy are True and Solid and onely He or They who can approve their Principles to be such can pretend to explicate that Natural Production right by resolving it into its Proper Causes or to have Science how 't is done and however the Experimental Men may be highly Commendable in other Respects yet onely those who can lay just Claim to True Principles and make out their Title to them can be truly held Natural PHILOSOPHERS Which sufficiently shows that the Way of Experiments cannot be a True METHOD TO SCIENCE But to leave other Men's Failings and Return home to my Self To obviate the Superficial ways of Reason so magnify'd by other Speculaters I have endeavour'd to take the quite Contrary Method and have laid my Discourses as deep as I could possibly and perhaps it will be thought I have over-done in those about Identical Propositions for which yet I shall hope the Reasons I have given there for that
a good Man here who is properly Mov'd would act towards one that Petitions him Corol. IV. Hence also is demonstrated that all the Names and Words we can use when we speak of the Divine Nature and its Attributes are in the highest manner Metaphorical and Improper For since we can no other wise name or speak of a thing but as we Conceive it and all our Conceptions are Notions taken from Natural Objects and onely said of them with Propriety and no otherwise said of Created Spirits but onely Metaphorically and that God's Infinite Perfections do far more excel Created Spirits than those Spirits do Bodies it follows that all the Names and Words we can make use of to speak of the Divine Nature and its Attributes are in the highest manner Metaphorical and Improper as may be farther shewn in Metaphysicks 12. The Word Ens as apply'd to Substantial and Accidental Notions is of the former sort of Equivocal words and Analogically spoken of them that is first and properly of Substance and Secondarily or Improperly of Accidents For since as was shewn above Ens signifies Capable of being and none of the Accidents is of itself Capable of Being but onely comes to have some Title to Existence by the Substance from whose Being they have entirely all the Being they have and that Its being it follows that the word Ens must be Analogically said of them that is Properly of Substance and Improperly of Accidents 13. Since it appears from what is said hitherto that the Equivocation of words is most highly Prejudicial to Science it is one necessary part of of the Method to Science to detect the Snares it lays in the way of our Discourse that we may avoid them And this may be done 14. First by observing the Explication we make of the Word that is apply'd to different Notions that so we may know which is the proper Signification of it For by doing this we shall certainly find that the less proper Notion when the word is explicated will still include the Notion of the Proper one and bear up to it As if we would Explicate the word Strong as 't is spoken of Ale or Wine we shall be forced to say if we be put to express our selves Literally and tell what it means that as he is call'd a Strong Man who is able to overthrow his Enemy so we call Wine or Beer Strong when it is able to overpower our Brain Or if we call a man Hard-hearted it would be explicated thus that his Humour is as Hard and Inflexible considering the Temper of a Rational Creature which ought to be mov'd by Reason as Hard things which are very difficult to bend are among Natural Bodies for which reason they sometimes call such men Stony-hearted or Iron-hearted in both which we see that Strength is properly in Man and Hardness in such Bodies as Stone or Iron and improperly in Wine or the Heart And the same may be observ'd in the word Pilot apply'd to a Governour in Moved apply'd to God in Healthful to Meat or Urine Thus the word Religious Honour Worship or Respect is first and properly apprehended as belonging or Due to God the sole End and Author of all Religion and Analogically or Improperly to Holy Persons either on Earth or in Heaven as his Servants and to Sacred Books Pictures and Churches as either Causing Exciting Increasing or Belonging to the Religious Honour due properly to Him Alone Whence Religious Honour given to any other things cannot be Explicated but in Reference to God the only proper Object of Religion which therefore will be found Included in the Explication of that Religious Honour which is given to any thing else And yet what Endless Squabbles Contests and Animosities has this one Equivocation produced while Passionate or Ignorant men will needs take the word Religious when spoken of those Different things to be Vnivocal which is most clearly Analogical 15. The next way is to observe the Notions any way Connected in our Common Speech with that Word whose Equivocalness we doubt of that is to consider the Causes Effects Antecedents Consequents Contraries its Superiour and Inferiour Notions its Circumstances c. For if some or any of these do not agree to the Meaning of any Word when spoken of more things or found in diverse Contexts then we may be sure 't is spoken in diverse Senses and is Equivocal and then by the foregoing Rule we may certainly come to know its proper Signification So in the Notion of Religious Honour apply'd to God as properly due to him and Adoration of him the chief part of which is an humble Acknowledgment of him to be our Creator Redeemer Sanctifier the Supreme Lord of Heaven and Earth the Searcher of Hearts and Judge of all our Actions c. none of these are possible to be Connected or Agree to any of the other Improperly called Objects of Religious Worship So when we stile any Eminent Person for Learning a Great Man we shall easily find it is Equivocal and Improper because Greatness means in Proper Speech much of Quantity and has that Common Head for its Genus whereas a very Little Man in Quantity may be Great in the sence in which we meant it 16. The Third way is to attend to what True Science or Faith teach us For since one Truth cannot contradict another therefore we may be assur'd that in case we be Certain that what the Writer meant is True his Words must be taken in that sence which is Agreeable to True Science or Faith Hence when it is said that God made two Great Lights the Sun and the Moon it being Evident by Science that Other Stars are incomparably Greater than the Moon hence the words Great Lights in that place cannot be meant of Great in it self but as to their Appearance to us But care is to be taken that we have true Science of the thing exprest by such words and that the Subject be not such as exceeds our pitch of Knowledge 17. The Context may help much to give us the right Notion of the Words especially when the Literal Truth is aim'd at Axioms and evident Principles are laid and the Discourse is perfectly Connected or Coherent For in that case the Symmetry found in the parts of the whole Discourse forbids any word to be taken in a wrong signification as we experience in Mathematicks and other Close Discourses 18. The Intention of the Author and the Argument and Scope of the Book avail much to direct us to the right sense of those words in it which are most Material and Significant For the Notions meant by such words are as it were the steps which lye level all the way and lead to the End at which the Author aim'd them and therefore cannot easily permit a Deviation from their true Sence or suffer their Meaning to be mistaken 19. The Words in which Laws are conceiv'd are best interpreted by the Common Practice of those
their Identicals And the same may be said of other Qualities that affect our Senses very distinctly as Heat Cold Moist Dry c. Note that in such as these if it be too laborious to arrive at their Definitions by dividing the Common Genus as it often happens when the Dividing Members are more than Two and are not Contradictory to one another then we may frame our Definitions of them by observing the carriage of the Vulgar towards them or their Sayings concerning them For such Qualities being sensible ones are the Objects of the Senses of Mankind and do imprint Lively and Distinct Notions of themselves in all men Wherefore their Sayings being the Effect of the true Notions they have of them they if enow of them be collected must give us the true Notion of them or which is all one of what they mean by the Word that expresses them which is equivalent in Sense to a perfect Definition For example when they speak of those Qualities we call Dry and Moist we shall observe that they are sollicitous lest Moist things should squander and run about and therefore they are careful themselves to put such things in some Receptacle or Vessel that may keep them from doing so or they bid their Servants do it On the Contrary they bid them set Dry things on the Cupboard or on a Shelf and never put them in a Vessel or be at the needless labour of pounding them into a Pot or Tub out of fear they should squander about Which sayings and behaviour of theirs gives us the Definitions of both those Qualities viz. that Moist is that which difficultly keeps its own bounds or Figure and is easily accommodated to the bounds of another thing and Dry is that which easily retains its own bounds or Figure and is Difficulty accommodated to the bounds of another which are the very Definitions which that great Observer of Nature Aristotle gives us of those two Qualities Note II. Whence we may with a humble Acknowledgment and Thanks reflect on the Infinite Goodness of the God of Truth who unenviously bestows knowledge on all who will dispose themselves to receive it that where-ever Art by reason of our Shortness is at a plunge he supplies it by Practical Self-evidence or the naturally instill'd Knowledge of the Vulgar whence it is a high Pride in the greatest Men of Art to conceit that they are above being still the Children of Nature whereas 't is the best Title they have to True and Solid Learning Sus Minervam 8. All Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses For since the Premisses by Means of the Middle Term and the right Placing of it have in them the whole force of the Consequence and the Consequence cannot be of nothing but must be of some Determinate Proposition which can be nothing but the Conclusion it follows that all Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses Again since before we Conclude Determinately and Expresly we must know what to Conclude and we know what to Conclude by knowing the Premisses and the Conclusion is that Proposition which is to be Concluded it follows evidently that since we know the Conclusion e'er we Actually Inferr and Express it to be in the Premisses it is there virtually 9. All Deduced Truths are virtually in one another For since all Deduced Truths are Conclusions and the Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses and the same reason holds for all the following Conclusions as for the first or for one single one it follows that let there be never so many orderly-succeeding Syllogisms necessary to prove any point the Conclusions are still in the Premisses and the following ones in those that went before them 10. All Truths are virtually in the Identical Propositions and consequently in the Definitions For since all Truths are taken from the Nature of the Things and from their Metaphysical verity and consequently are in the Nature of the Thing fundamentally and This is Contain'd and Exprest in the whole by Identical Propositions and in all its parts by the Definitions it follows that all Truths are Virtually contain'd in Identical Propositions and consequently in the Definitions 11. From what 's lately said 't is evinced that if a Middle Term be taken which is a Proper Cause or Proper Effect the Conclusion is seen to be in the Premisses For though the Proper Causes and Effects be not the very Essence of the Thing yet since an Effect is a Participation of the Cause and so is apt to manifest the Nature of the Proper Cause that produced it and the Operation of a Proper Cause is nothing but the Existence of such a Cause which is sutable to its Essence imprinted upon the Patient hence such Mediums do Demonstrably and Mutually inferr one another and therefore nothing hinders but that the Conclusions may be seen to be in the Premisses as well in such Syllogisms as in those which have an Essential Notion for their Middle Term. 12. Hence all Natural Truths and this throughout the whole Course of Nature from the very Creation are virtually in one another For since as will be more clearly seen hereafter all those Natural Effects were Demonstrative of their Proper Causes and those Causes Demonstrative of their proper Effects and this from the First starting of Nature into Motion and so were apt to Inferr one another all along that is new Conclusions were still apt to spring from such Middle Terms Connected with the two Extremes in the Premisses and consequently the Truth of those Conclusions were all along Virtually in those several Premisses it follows that all Natural Truths are in one another and this throughout the whole Series or Course of Nature from the very Creation 13. Hence had we liv'd in every Place and in every part of Time where and when those several Causes wrought those several Effects and had been endowed with Capacity Sufficient for such a performance and not been diverted with other thoughts from Application to that work we might have actually Demonstrated those Effects by their Proper Causes or those Causes by their Proper Effects through the whole Series or Course of the World from the beginning to the end except Miracle had alter'd that Natural Course For in that case all those Subjects had afforded us Matter or fit Mediums for Demonstration as well as any single Subject does now Wherefore if we had had wit enough to demonstrate as aforesaid and that wit sufficiently apply'd in every circumstance it had been done 14. Hence every Soul separated from the Body that knows any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once at the first Instant of her Separation For since all Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes and Proper Effects and those Mutually inferr one another that is the Truth grounded on the one is seen to be in the Truth grounded on the other as being Virtually in one another and we experience that the Capacity of the Soul to know Truths is not
all a long produce such Effects yet since we know and can demonstrate the An est of this Order or that the Course of Nature is still carry'd on by Proper Causes and Effects hence we can demonstrate there is no such thing as that Chimerical Cause call'd Chance governing the World which Fantastick whimsy is imputed to the Epicureans Corol. 7. Hence we can Demonstrate that every the least motion of a Fly or an Insect the Figure of every leaf of a Tree or grain of Sand on the Sea Shore do come within the Compass of this Course of Nature or Gods Providence which neglects not the least of his Creatures but has a Superintendency over all Which Considerations tho' they may at first sight seem Incredible and paradoxical and Stun our Reason yet after that by recourse to our Principles we have recover'd our dazled sight and clearly see they must be True will exceedingly conduce to raise our Souls connaturally to deep Contemplations of Gods Infinit Wisdom Goodness and Providence and ground in us a perfect Resignation to his Will in all occurrences and let us see and be asham'd of our froward proud peevish and selfish humour which nothing will content but the having the Whole Course of Nature alter'd for our sakes as if the World were made meerly for us or that Causes should not have their Proper Effects Which being a Contradiction is therefore as Unreasonable and Foolish as it is in a Man that wants Money to be angry that Two and Three Shillings do not make Forty Corol. VIII Hence none can have just occasion to grumble at God's Providence for Ill Successes For since we know à priori that God he being Infinitely wise casts the whole Frame of the World or the Course of Causes in the most perfect and best Order to wish we should be otherwise after we see that no Causes can bring our endeavouring it to Effect is to wish the Whole World should be worse for the Interest of one Inconsiderable piece of it which is against Common sense and the Light of Nature to expect from a Common Governour who is to provide in the first place for the Common Good and is even against the Judgment and Generous Practice of diverse Heathens who for the Common Good of a Small part of the World their own Country have not car'd to ruine their Private Concerns nay to Sacrifice their Lives Corol. IX On this Doctrine is grounded the Duty of Gratitude we owe to God for all the Good we have of what nature soever For it is hence seen demonstratively that God is as much the Giver of that Good by laying such a steady Course of innumerable Causes to convey it to us as if he had given it by his own hand Immediately nay it ought more to increase our Gratitude to see that he has Ordered such an Infinity of Causes from the beginning of the World to be Instrumental to our Good Corol. X. Hence lastly is shewn the Wisdome of Christianity which instructs all its Followers to express in their Common Language and to put in practise all the Substance of those Truths which we have with so much labour Speculatively Demonstrated As when they say that Every thing that happens is Gods Will pray his Will may be done Resign to it Acknowledg that all the Good they have comes from God thank him for it free him from all Imputation of Injustice when any Harm lights to them and bear it with a Humble Patience c. 9. There is a certain Order or priority of Nature in our Notions taken from the same subject by which one of them or which is the same the Subject as grounding one of those Notions is conceiv'd to be kind of Efficient Cause of Another of them For it is Evident that the First Efficiency of Fire is the making that smart Impression on our Feeling Sense which we call Heating out of which if continu'd it follows that it dissipates or shatters asunder all the parts of the mixt Body on which it works To which 't is Consequent that it Disgregates the Heterogeneous parts of it and Congregates the Homogeneous ones from which latter Effects of Heating as being most obvious and discernible to Mankind Aristotle takes his Definition of Hot things Thus out of Rationality springs a Solid and Serious Content in Discovering new Truths which are the Natural Perfection of a Soul and from this Content a greater degree of the Love of seeing still more Truths Thus Risibility springs from Rationality the Object of which is not a Solid Food nourishing and dilating the Soul as is this later which causes some increase of Science in her but as it were a kind of Light Repast and Recreation to her sprung from the Observing some trifling particulars which were Odd Aukward and Sudden or Unexpected and withal not Harmful or Contristating 10. In those Subjects which have many Accidents in them we must Separate those Accidents from the Subject and consider attentively according to which of them it produces such an Effect which found we shall discover a Proper Cause and its Proper Effect For example put case we experience Aloes purges Choler we must separate its Colour Smell Hardness Bitter Tast and the rest of its Accidents and endeavour to find out according to which of them it produces that Effect and if we can find it does this precisely as Bitter we shall discover that Bitterness is the proper Medicine against Choler and thence we can gain this Certain Knowledge and establish this Universal Conclusion that Every Bitter Thing is good against Choler according to that Solid Maxim in Logick A Quatenus ad Omne valet consequentia Note That Induction in such cases gives great light to a Man already well vers'd in Natural Principles But this former Maxim must be Understood with this Provis◠that it be meant to hold per se loquendo as the Schools phrase it that is if nothing hinders as it does often in the Practise of Physick For in Mixt Bodies there is a Strange Variety and Medly of Accidents or Qualities divers of which are of a Disparate and sometimes of a Sub-contrary or Contrary nature to one another so that it requires a great Sagacity to add to them such other Mixts as may obviate their Interfering and make the intended Effect follow Thus much of Demonstration from the thing as it is Active or from the Efficient which is the first of the Four Causes 11. Demonstrations may be taken also from the Matter or Material Cause that is from the Thing or Subject as it is Passive For from the Divisibility of a Thing whether that Divisibility be Metaphysical or Physical we may demonstrate the Corruptibility of it which necessarily following out of the Thing as 't is Divisible is therefore a Property of it Thus capable of Admiring is a Property necessarily Inferring Rationality in it's Subject Admiration being nothing but a Suspension of the Rational Faculty at
continue the same Effect and bring the Knowledge of them down to our times 25. Practise if Frequent and Obligatory to be Continu'd will most certainly bring down the Tradition of Former Matters of Fact This is Evident for it is Impossible that the Martyrdom of King Charles the First or the horrid Powder Treason should ever be forgotten if the Anniversary of them have a Continu'd Obligation of celebrating such Matters of Fact but once a Year much more were such Practises often repeated 26. Such a Tradition of such Matters of Fact is Equally Certain tho' the thing Attested had happen'd some Thousands of Years ago as if it had happen'd but an Hundred Years since For since it is equally Easie for the succeeding Age to understand the Attesters Witnessing still all along that they had been told it as it was to understand the First Attesters relating they had seen it Their Testimony as far as concerns their Knowledge of what was transmitted has equal force as had the First Attestation And since the Wills of the Intermediate Attesters had the same Object viz. an Apparent Good which they could not desert or go against or act without it and an Evident Impossibility could not be an Apparent Good and it was equally acting for an Evident Impossibility to conspire to say they had such a thing Universally Testify'd to them by their Fore-fathers or to hope to gain Belief of it if it had not been so Attested their Veracity in Attesting they thus received it was no less Assur'd Wherefore the same Causes being put all along in each succeeding Age as were at the first the same Effect of Delivering it down with the same Certainty must still be Continu'd though for some thousands of Years 27. No Dead Testimony or History has any Authority but by virtue of Living Testimony or Tradition For since Falshoods may be Written or Printed as well as Truths it follows that nothing is therefore of any Authority because 't is Written or Printed Wherefore no Book or History can Authenticate another Book whence follows that if it have any Authority it must have it from Living Authority or Tradition continuing down to us the Consent of the World from the time that Author Writ or the matters of Fact it relates were done that the things it relates are True in the main and consequently that the Book that relates them deserves Credit or is as we use to say an Authentick History For example had a Romance soberly penn'd and Curtius's History been found in a Trunk for many Hundreds of Years after they were writ and the Tradition of the former Ages had been perfectly Silent concerning them both and the Matters they relate we must either have taken both of them for a Romance or both for a True History being destitute of any Light to make the least difference between them 28. Tradition not only authenticates Books in the bulk but it gives moreover the dâ—stinct degrees of Credibility to divers passages in the same Book already authenticated in gross For no wise Man can give the same degree of Credibility to Alexander's cutting the Gordian Knot or to his speaking such and such words to Hephaestion or Parmenio as he is forc'd to give to his Conquest of Asia And why all of them being Equally in the Books Certainly because the latter being Visible Remarkable and of great Concern to Innumerable Attesters of it at first so vast a source of Original Attesters did consequently carry down a Matter of fact so hugely Notorious with a vast sway whereas the others being particulars of small Concern or Note and seen or heard but by a few at first wanted a strong Tradition to recommend them for Certain Truths Whence for ought we know they were grounded and writ upon Hear-say as our News and many particular Actions and Sayings of Great Men are now adays which oftentimes prove False 29. Hence appears that Historical Faith meerly as Historical that is in passages Vnabetted by Tradition is not Absolutely Certain but is liable to be False or Erroneous and so is not without some Degree of Levity to be absolutely Assented to tho' we cannot generally with prudence Contradict them but let them pass as if they were Truths till some good occasion awakens our Doubt of them The reason is given in our last Paragraph from this that all Particulars are of slight Credit that were not Abetted by a Large and well-grounded Tradition 30. Tradition thus qualify'd as is above-said viz. So that the Matters of Fact were Certainly Experienced by very great Multitudes of the First Attesters that they were of great or universal Concern and so prompting them still to relate them to the next Age that they were Abetted by some obligatory Practise and lastly Impossible to gain a Belief if they had not been and thence Obliging the Attesters to Veracity Such a Tradition I say is more than Morally that is Absolutely Certain To omit the foregoing reasons which have evinc'd the force of each of these particulars This will be Evidently seen or rather Experientially felt by Reflecting on our own Interiour and by observing how Nature works in Mankind and forces them to Assent firmly to the points which such a Tradition recommends and to Suspend as to the other For Instance Let us take some Particular that is only Morally Certain as that I shall not dye this Night or that when I walk abroad a Tile shall not fall from a House and kill me or that the House I live in shall not fall down and crush me or such like I find at first sight that these are highly Vnlikely because it very seldom happens and many reasons may occurr why I think it will not be Yet if I severely call to account my most Serious and Deliberate thoughts to find any Absolutely Certain Reason why that may not happen to me which has happen'd to others I shall perceive that I can find none such Whence I can entertain some Degree of Suspence whether it may not possibly happen to me or no which restrains me from Assenting absolutely that it will not This duely reflected on let us propose to our selves Another Particular to be scann'd likewise by our most strictly-examining Thoughts viz. whether there was a Henry the 8 th a Julius Caesar or that Alexander conquer'd Asia Which being propos'd to our Examination let us again consult our Thoughts and put on the most Sceptical Disquisitiveness we are able to find out some reason why these may not possibly be False as well as the others might And in despight of all our most Exact search and our utmost endeavours to put our selves upon doubting of these said particulars we shall still find the Affirmative of each of them writ in our Breast in such Indelible Characters and so Solidly Imprinted there by Nature I say by Nature for that Certainty was not Acquir'd by Study and Speculation that we can never be able to invent any kind of
turn it to a quite different Sense For Mr. Le Graud coming to give us account of the Divisibility of this Matter where it was the Proper place to acquaint us to what degree it was Divisible into particles by Natural Causes he starts aside to tell us that being Quantitative 't is Divisible in Infinitum which is quite besides our purpose This is a Mathematical Divisibility whereas a Physical Divisibility or a disposition to be divided by the Motion of the first-made parts is only that which can concern his Scheme or do it any service For had it been insuperably Dense or Hard as Epicurus fancies his Atomes they could not have been Divided at all nor consequently his Three Elements have been made Or had it been Rare or Soft one part would have stuck to another and could not have been shatter'd and crumbled into those most subtil parts which make his First Element To declare then how and of what nature it was in this respect should have been one of the First Principles in his Physicks his whole Hypothesis depending on it whereas it was not a straw's matter whether it were Divisible in Infinitum or no so it were but Divisible into parts little enough to make their First Element and the rest I must then in behalf of Truth declare that their Avoiding this point so necessary to their own Scheme and to the explication of Nature is a most manifest prevarication arising hence that they cannot notwithstanding they are Men of great Wit make any sense of it according to their Principles 36. But tho' they do not treat of the Divisibility of their Matter de professo and purposely as they ought yet it is scarce possible but they must against their Wills be forc'd to say something at unawares of the Intrinsecal Nature of their Matter as either Easily or Hardly Divisible while they go about to explicate themselves Errour then being the best Confuter of it self let us see what they say of it The Ingenious Gentleman now mention'd tells us that their First Element is made of Particles which like shavings are rubbâ—d off by Motion from Bodies Now since their Matter is held by them to be Homogeneous or Uniform a man would verily think by those expressions that the Nature of their Matter is Dense Hard or in a Manner Friable or Crumbling For what is Rare Soft and Tenacious cannot be conceiv'd Proper or Fit to be Crumbl'd or Shatter'd into such very small dust by Rubbing Yet the same Author tells us the particles of their First Elements are slender and Flexible accomodate themselves to the Figures of the Bodies they are contiguous to By which expressions one would verily imagine them to be Fluid Soft Moist or Yielding rather than of a Solid or Hard Nature for only such can accomodate themselves to other Bodies on all occasions So that he makes it at once to be both Hard and Soft as being very apt to break and yet at the same time very apt to ply and bow too that is he puts Contrary qualities in the same Uniform Matter Which shews manifestly that they know not what to make of it nor how to speak coherently concerning it and withal that which is the true Genius of Hypothetical Philosophers they blow and sup at once and say any thing that suites with their present occasion It was for their turn to make them very Flexible for otherwise it had been impossible to avoid Vacuum whenas Millions of those Atomes were jumbled together which had they been Solid had retain'd their Figure and then Vacuum must have fill'd the little Interstices And it was very fitting too they should be Hard and Friable otherwise they could never have been Shatter'd by Rubbing into such minute dust as they had design'd to make their First Element of So that they play fast and loose with their Reader and no wonder we know not where to have them when they do not know where they are themselves 36. The same untoward way they take in expressing themselves sometimes as if they and we did perfectly agree in our sentiments And because the Goodness of our common Reason teaches us that the Nature of a Thing is in it they do therefore allow our well-meant words and talk of Intrinsecal Forms both Essential and Accidental which granted they cannot deny Formal Mutation Mr. Le Grand Part 6. cap. 24. § 9 10 11. gives us all these good words tho' he chuses sometimes rather to use the word Modification than Form and in his § 10 11. he discourses altogether as if he were an Aristotelian But alas what trust is to be given to meer Words For coming to the § 12. he tells us plainly his true Meaning which is as opposit to ours tho' using the same Words as the two Poles are to one another viz. that in the Generation of Plants and Beasts a new Substance is no more produced than in the Framing a Statue or building a House which he there exemplifies in some particulars and then concludes that Generation is nothing but the Translation or new Ranging of the parts of the Matter and that This is alike in Natural and Artifieial Compositions But by his leave if he that builds a House does not know the Intrinsecal temperament or Consistency of his materials viz. that Stones are Dense or Hard and therefore most fit to be the Foundation that Wood is Dense and Lighter and so more fit for the Superstructures Lastly that Mortar is Soft at first but Hard when it comes to be dry and so is most fit to bind the Stones together I am afraid that if he be ignorant of these and such like particulars he will make but a ruinous and bungling piece of work of it tho' he be never so well verst in the Act of ranging the parts of the several Materials artificially or mathematically And as has been shown no man living no not themselves can give any account of the Consistency of their Matter which is the only Material of which they build pardon the Bull they force us to their Natural-Artificial Structures 37. This then being his true sense and consequently the true doctrin if we may believe him of the Cartesian School and the word Form bearing in its notion that it is in the Matter and therefore is Intrinsecal to the Thing and makes it either Another if it be an Essential Form or Intrinsecally otherwise or Alter'd if it be an Accidental one and it being likewise Evident that the Ranging the parts of Matter is only an Outward Application of them to one another which is meerly an Extrinsecal Notion we may hence clearly discover that they do not use the words Form and Intrinsecal in a proper and Natural sense but utterly pervert and abuse them 38. By these expressions of his lately mention'd and their putting nothing but Extension in their Matter which abstracts from Motion and Natural Action one would think they intended in stead of