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A87710 The idiot in four books. The first and second of wisdome. The third of the minde. The fourth of statick experiments, or experiments of the ballance. By the famous and learned C. Cusanus.; Idiota. English. Nicholas, of Cusa, Cardinal, 1401-1464. 1650 (1650) Wing K394; Thomason E1383_1; ESTC R202666 78,826 217

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And this order they give that first according to the order of Nature is humanity in it self and of it self namely without any praejacent matter and then man by Humanity and that he falls under a name and afterwards the species in reason and that therefore all men being destroyed humanity as it is a species that falls under a name and is a being of reason which reason hath found out by the sinilitude and likelinesse of men cannot subsist for it depended of men which are not but for all this that humanity by which men were doth not cease to be which humanity falls not under the name of species as names are imposed by the motion of reason but is the truth of that species that falls under a name whereupon though the image be destroyed the truth remains in it self And all these deny that the thing is nothing but as it falls under a name for in that manner as it falls under a name Logick and reasonable discourse considers of them and accordingly they do logically enquire into the nature of the thing and commend this way of so doing but they rest not there because reason or Logick is onely conversant about the images of the forms But they that labour Theologically to look into matters beyond the power of the name turn themselves to samplars and Ideas And beyond these I think there can no more wayes of inquisition be given If thou that art a Philosopher hast read other thou mayest peradventure know them but this I think Phil. Thou doest wonderfully handle all Sects of Philosophers both Peripateticks and Academicks Id. All these and what differences of wayes soever may be imagined are easily agreed when the mind lifts it self up to infinity For as this Oratour can more at large inform thee by what he hath heard of me the infinite form is the one onely and most simple which shineth in all things as the most adequate samplar of all and every thing formable Whereupon it shall also be most true that there are not many separate samplars and Ideas of things which infinite form no reason can reach therefore being unspeakable it is not comprehended by all names imposed by the motion of reason And so the thing as it falls under a name is the image of its unspeakable proper and adequate samplar There is therefore one unspeakable word which is the precise name of all things as by the motion of reason they fall under a name which unspeakable name after its manner shineth in all things being the infinite nominability of all names and the infinite word of all things possible to be by word expressed so that every name is the image of the precise name And this was all which they all laboured to say though peradventure it might have been better and clearlier spoken for they all necessarily agreed that there is one infinite power which we call God in which all things must needs be complicated Nor did he mean any other thing that said humanity as it fals under a name is the precision of truth then that unspeakable infinite forme which while we looke upon the forme of man we call the precise samplar thereof that so the unspeakable whilest we look upon the images thereof may be named by the name of all things and one most simple samplar according to the specificall differences of things exemplified and by our reason formed may seeme to be many samplars CHAP. III. How the Philosophers are to be understood and accorded of the name of God and precision how one precise name being known all are known of the sufficience of things knowable and how the conception of God and our conception do differ Phil. THou hast wonderfully explained that saying of Hermes Trisimegistus that God may be called by the names of all things and all things by the name of God Id. Do but complicate this word To name into the coincidence of the highest by thy understanding and all things will be plain for God is the precision of every thing and therefore if we had precise knowledge of any one thing we must necessarily have the knowledge of all things So if the precise name or one thing were known then would the names of all things be known because precision cannot be on this side God Hereupon he that could reach on precision might reach God who is the truth of all things that may be knowne Orat. Declare thy self I pray thee concerning the precision of a name Id. Thou knowest Orator how we forge mathemeticall figures out of the power of the minde And therefore when I would make tryangularity visible I make a figure in which I make three Angels that in that figure so habituated and proportioned triangularity may appear whehewith the name is united which let it be supposed to be a Trigonus I say then if Trigonus be the precise name of a tryangulare figure then I know the precise names of all polygones or many corner'd figures for then I know that the precise name of a quadrangulare figure ought to be a Tetragone and of a five corner'd figure a Pentagone and so forward And by the knowledge of one name I know the figure named and all polygones that may be named and the differences and concordances of them and whatsoever else in this point may be known In like manner I say that if I knew the precise name of one worke of God I should know all the names of all the workes of God and whatsoever might be known And seeing the name of God is the precision of every name nameable it is apparant that in that name alone all and every thing may be knowne Orat. This thou hast after thy fashion palpably explained Phil. Thou hast laid down a strange way Idiot to accord all the Philosophers for when I seriously consider I cannot but agree with thee that their meaning was no otherwise then thou sayest by this which none of them all could deny that God is infinite in which onely saying are complicated all things that thou hast said wonderfull is this sufficience of all things knowable or that may be any wise delivered Descend more particularly to the treatise of the mind and say supposing that the calling of the mind mens be from the reason of measuring what wilt thou have the mind it self to be Id. Thou knowest how Divine simplicity complicates all things of this complicating simplicity the mind is the image it then thou shalt call this Divine infinite simplicity mind it shall be the samplar of our mind If thou call the Divine mind the universality of the truth of things thou shalt calours the universality of the likenesse of things that it may be the universality of notions The conception of the Divine mind is the production of things the conception of our mind the notion of things If the Divine mind be absolute entity then the conception thereof is the creation of beings and the conceptions of our mind the
it doe most liberally communicate it selfe to all things a being infinitely good yet can it be received in nothing as it is because in another thing it is otherwise received And being it cannot be received in any thing but after another manner it is yet received after the best manner that may be but unmultipliable infinity is better explicated in a various reception for great diversity doth better expresse unmultipliablenesse from whence it is that wisedome being in divers formes diversely received brings it to passe that every forme called to Identity is partaker of wisedome as well as it can that some things partake it in a certain spirit exceedingly distant from the first forme which scarce gives an elementall being others in a more formed spirit which gives a minerall being others in a yet more noble degree which gives a vegetable life others in a higher which gives a sensible life after that in such a one as gives an imaginative power then a rationall and lastly an intellectuall life and this is the highest degree that is the nearest image of wisedome And this onely is the degree that hath aptitude or fitnesse to lift it selfe up to the taste of wisedome because in those intellectuall natures the image of wisedome is the lively intellectuall life the power whereof is of it selfe to show or put forth a vitall motion which motion is by understanding to go forward to its proper object which is absolute truth that is eternall wisedome and that going foreward being to uunderstand is also to taste intellectaully for to apprehend by the understanding is by a certaine most welcome taste as well as it can to attains and reach to quiddity for as by the sensible taste which reacheth not the quiddity yet in outward things there is a certaine pleasant sweetnesse perceived by the sense which sweetnesse is from the quidditie So by the understanding there is tasted in the quidditie an intellectuall sweetnesse which is the image of the sweetnesse of the eternall wisedome which is the quidditie of quiddities and an unproportionable comparison of one sweetnesse to another Let these things that have beene said suffice for this short time that thou mayest know that wisedome is not in the art of oratory or in great volumes but in the separation from these sensible things and in the turning to the most simple and infinite forme and that thou mayest understand how to receive it in a Temple purg'd from all vice and by fervent love to cleave unto it untill thou mayest taste it and see how sweet that is which is all sweetnesse which being once tasted all things which now seeme great will grow vild and base unto thee and thou wilt be so humbled that no arrogance or any other vice will remaine in thee because with a most chaste and pure heart thou wilt inseparably adhere unto wisedome once tasted choosing rather to forsake this world and all things else that are not it then it and living with unspeakeable gladnesse thou wilt dye and after death eternally rest in it by a most amorous embracement which the ever blessed wisedome of God it selfe vouchsafe to grant both to thee and mee Amen The end of the first booke of the Idiot The second Booke of the Idiot Wherein the Speakers are The Author The Idiot The Oratour Author IT happened that the Romane Oratour after the words he had heard from the Idiot concerning wisedome was exceedingly stricken with admiration and went unto him whom when he had found lurking about the Temple of Eternity he thus spake unto him Orat. O man most desired and looked for help my weaknesse that I may with some ease feed upon those difficulties which transcend my mind and understanding otherwise it will little avail me to have heard from thee so many high Speculations Id. There is no difficultie more easie than to contemplate divine things where the delight coincides with the difficultie But tell me what is it thou desirest Orat. That thou wouldest tell me how seeing God is greater than can be conceived I ought to frame my conception of him Id. As thou wouldst do of conception Orat. Explain thy self Id. Thou hast heard how in every conception he that is unconceivable is conceived there comes therefore a conception from a conception to him that is unconceivable Orat. How shall I then make a more precise conception Id. Conceive precision for God is absolute precison it self Orat. What is then to be done by me when I purpose to frame a right a conception of God Id. Turn thy self unto rectitude or rightnesse Orat. And when I labour to frame a true conception of God what must I then do Id. Then bend thy mind upon Truth it self Orat. What if I mean to make a just conception Id. Turn thy self to justice Orat. And when I seek to make a good conception what must I then do Id. Lift up the eyes of thy mind unto Goodnesse Orat. I wonder whither it it that thou sendest me in all these cases Id. See how easie the difficultie is in divine things that it always offers it self to the seeker in the same manner that it is sought for Orat. Without doubt there is nothing more wonderfull Id. Every question concerning God presupposeth the thing questioned and that must be answered which in every question concerning God the question presupposeth for God although he be unsignifiable is signified in every signification of terms Orat. Declare thy self more at large I pray thee for I am so transported with wonders that I can scarce hear what thou sayest Id. Doth not the question whether a thing be or no presupprose the Entitie Orat. Yes Id. Therefore when it is demanded of thee whether God be or whether there be a God answer that which is presupposed namely that he is because that is the Entitie presupposed in the question So if any man shall ask thee what is God considering that this question presupposeth a quidditie to be thou shalt answer that God is absolute quiddity it self And so of all things Nor need there be any hesitation or doubt in this for God is the absolute presupposition it self of all things which after what manner soever are presupposed as in every effect the cause is presupposed See therefore Oratour how easie Theologicall difficulty is Orat. Certainly this is a very grrat and yet a stupendious facility Id. Nay I say unto thee that God is infinite facility it self and it doth not agree to God that he should be infinite difficulty for it must needs be as thou shalt hear anon of crooked and straight that difficulty passe into facility if it ought to agree to the infinite God Orat. If that which in every question is presupposed be in divine matters an answer unto the question then of God there can be no proper question because the answer coincides with it Id. It is a very good inference and add unto it that God being infinite straightnesse and absolute necessity a
doubtfull question reacheth not him but all doubt is in him certainty whence we also infer that any answer unto any question concerning God is not a proper and precise answer for precision is not more than one and infinite which is God for every answer partakes of the absolute answer which is infinitely precise But what I said unto thee how that in Theological questions the presupposed is the answer must be understood in the same manner that the question is made and so taking it this is sufficiencie because whereas in God neither the question nor the answer to the question can reach precision therefore after the manner wherein the question approacheth to precision in the same manner the answer presupposeth And this is our sufficiencie which we have of God knowing that precision inattingible cannot by us be reached but after some manner that partakes the manner of absolute precision Among the which being divers and manifold that partake the onely manner of precision the foresaid manner comes nearest unto absolute facility and is our sufficiency because we cannot reach any other which is easier and truer Orat. Who would not be amazed at the hearing of these things For whereas God is absolute incomprehensibility thou sayest that comprehension comes so much the nearer unto him by how much the manner thereof doth more partake of facility Id. He that doth with me behold how absolute facility coincides with absolute incomprehensibility cannot choose but say as I do Whereupon I do constantly affirm that by how much the universal manner to all questions formable of God shall be more easie by so much more true and more convenient it is as position or affirmation agrees to God Orat. Make this somewhat more plain Id. That is as we admit some things may be spoken of God affirmatively for in that Divinity which denies all things of God we must speak otherwise because there the truer answer is to every question a negation yet by that means or manner we are not led to the knowledge what God is but what God is not There is moreover a consideration of God as neither position nor ablation that is neither affirmation nor negation agrees unto him but as he is above all position and ablation and then the answer is to deny affirmation negation and copulation As in case it should be demanded Whether God be according to the way of position it must be answered out of that which is presupposed to wit that he is and that the very absolute presupposed Entity Bat according to the way of ablation or negation it must be answered that he is not when by that way none of all those things that may be spoken can agree to him that is unspeakable But by the way which is above all position and ablation it must be answered that he is neither to wit absolute Entity nor that he is not nor both together namely that he is and is not but that he is above all And now I think thou understandest what I mean Orat. I understand now that thou wouldest say that in words using divinity where we admit speeches of God and the power of language is not utterly excluded there thou hast brought the sufficiency of difficult things into the facility of the manner of forming truer Propositions concerning God Id. Thou hast well apprehended it for if I would lay open unto thee the conception which I have of God my speech if it must stand thee in stead must needs be such as hath significative words that so in the power of the word which is alike known unto us both I may lead thee to that which is sought and that which is now sought is God And therefore this is Sermocinal or word-using Divinity whereby I endeavour by the power of language to lead thee to God the easiest and truest way that I can Orat. Let us now I pray thee return to those things that were formerly premised by thee and explain thou them in order In the first place thou saidest that the conception of conception seeing God is the conception of conception is the conception of God Now is it not the mind which conceiveth Id. Without the mind there is no conception Orat. Seeing then to conceive belongs to the mind certainly to conceive an absolute conception is nothing else but to conceive the Art of the absolute mind Id. Go on for thou art in the way Orat. But the art of the absolute mind is no other thing then the form of all things formable So I see how the conception of conception is nothing else but the conception of the Idea of divine Art If I say the truth tell me so Id. Thou speakest exceeding well for absolute conception can be nothing else but the Ideal form of all things which can be conceived which is the equality of all things formable Orat. This conception as I think is called the word of God or the reason 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Id. Howsoever it be called by learned men in that conception are all things As we say that those things which without reason foregoing come not into being are formerly in reason and all things which we conceive to be have a reason of their being that they may be after the manner in which they are and no otherwise Therefore he that looks with a profound mind into the simplicity of absolute reason which by way of priortity complicates all things in it self he makes a conception of conception by it self or absolute conception and this was the first thing that I premised Orat. Enough of this now go on to shew how the conception of absolute precision it a more precise conception of God Id. I am not now at leisure to repeat the same thing in every particular neither do I see it to be so seasonable for thee considering that by one the way is opened for thee to all But take it notwithstanding very briefly Precision straightnesse truth justice goodnesse of which thou hast heard are the same thing Yet do not beleeve that I mean as all divinity is circular one of the attributes verified of another as we say that from the necessity of Gods infinite simplicity the greatnesse of God is his power and back again his power is his greatnesse and so of all those things that are by us attributed to the essence of God But these things of which I now speak we find by experience do coincide in our ordinary talk For when we hear any body expresse a thing as it is indeed presently one sayes that the expresser did it precisely another rightly another truly another justly another well And thus we find it true in our dayly speech Neither doth he who said he did it precisely and rightly mean any other thing then he that said he expressed it truly justly and well And this thou grantest in thy self to be true when thou markest how he that said neither more nor lesse than he ought to have said hath
likenesse of beings for those things that agree to the Divine mind as to infinite truth agree to our mind as the nearest image of truth If all things be in the Divine mind as in their precise and proper truth all things are in our mind as in the image or similitude of their proper truth to wit notionally for knowledge is by likenesse All things are in God but there the samplars of things all things are in our mind but here the similitudes of things As God is the absalute entity which is the complication of all things that are so our mind is the image of that infinite entity which is the complication of all images no otherwise then the first picture of an unknown King is the samplar of all other copies that are painted according to it for the knowledge or face of God descends not but in the mentall nature whereof truth is the object and further it descendeth not but by the mind so that the mind is the image of God and the samplar of all the images of God after it self Therefore look how much all things after the simple mind do partake of the mind so much do they also partake of Gods image so that the mind of it self is the image of God and all things after the mind no wayes but by the mind CHAP. IV. How our mind is not the explication but a certaine image of the eternall complication how those things that are after the mind are not such an image How the mind is without notions and yet hath a conere ate judgement and why the body it necessary for it Phil. Hou seemest out of the great fulnesse of thy mind as though thou meantest that as the infinite minde is the absolute formative power so the finite minde is the conformative or configurative power Id. I doe indeed for that which is to be said cannot conveniently be expressed therefore is the multiplication of speech very profitable Now marke further than an image is one thing and an explication another for equality is the image of unitie for from unitie once ariseth equalitie Therefore is equality the image of unitie yet is not equality but plurality the explication of unitie therefore is equally the image of the explication of of unity not the explication So doe I meane that the minde is the most simple image of the divine minde amongst all the images of divine complication And so is the minde the first image of that divine complication which by his simplicity and power complicateth all images of complication For as God is the complication of complications so the minde which is the image of God is the image of the complication of complications and after the images are the plurality of things which explicate the divine complication As number explicates unity motion rests time eternity composition simplicity time the present greatness a point motion a moment inequality equality diversity identity and so of the rest From hence gather the admirable power of our minde for in the vertue thereof is complicated the assimulative power of the complication of a point by which it finds in it self a power wherein it assimulates it selfe to every greatnesse So also because of the assimulative power of the complication of unity it hath power to assimulate it selfe to every multitude And so by the assimulative power of the complication of now or the present it hath power assimulate it selfe to all time and so by the assimulative power of th complication of rests to all motion and of simplicity to every composition and of identity to all diversity and of equality to all inaquality and of conjunctionto every dis-junction And by the image of the absolute complication which is the infinite minde it hath power by which it can assimulate it selfe to every explication and many such things thou seest of thy selfe may be said which our mind hath because it is a certaine image of the infinite simplicity which complicateth all things Phil. It seemeth then that onely the mind is the image of God Id. So it is properly because all things that are after or beneath the mind are not the image of God but only ly so far forth as the mind shineth or appeareth in them as it more shineth in perfect living wights then in imperfect ones and more insensible things then in vegetables and more in vegetables then in minerals so that creatures that want the mind are rather explications then images of the Divine simplicity although according to the shining or appearing of the mentall image in explication they do diversly partake of the image Phil. Aristotle said there was no notion concreate or made together with the minder or soul because he likened it to a smooth and shaven table but Plato saith there were notions concreated with it yet that for the moles and weights of the body the soul forgot them what do'st thou thinke to be the truh Id. Undoubtedly our mind was by God put into this body to the profit and advantage thereof and therefore it must needs have from God all that without which it could not acquire that profit and advantage it is not therefore credible that there were notions concreated with the soul which it lost in the body but because it hath need of a body that the concreated power may proceed unto act As the visive power of the soul cannot see actually except it be stirred up by the object and that cannot be but by the representing of multiplied specis by then esn of the organ and so it hath need of the eye Even so the power of the mind which is the comprehensive and nationall power cannot porceed to its opperations except it be stirred up by sensible things which it cannot be but by the mediation of sensible phantasmis Therefore it hath need of an organicall body and such an one without which it could not be stired up In this therefore Aristotle seems to have thought aright that there are no notions of the soul concreated from the beginning which it lost by being incorporated But because it cannot profit if it want all udgement as a deaf man can never profit to become a lutenist because he hath in himself no judgement of harmony by which he may discerne whether he do profit therefore our soul hath a concreated judgement without which it could not profit This judging power is naturally concreated with the mind by which of it self it judgeth whether discourses be weak strong or concluding Which power if Plato called a concreated notion he was not out of the way at all Phil. How clear is thy delivery which every man that hears is forced to assent unto These things must be diligently marked for we plainly find a spirit in our mind speaking and judging this good that just the other true and reprehending us if we decline from the just which speech and judgement it learned not and therefore it is connate or concreate Id. By this we