because he is infallible Infallibility then is the proper ground of Implicit Faith and accordingly the Church of Rome assuming to her self the Character of Infallible does upon that Supposition rightly require it I say upon that supposition for she is right enough in her Consequence supposing her Principle to be true But the truth of it is that is Most Extravagant and such as carries in it such matchless Arrogance and Presumption as befits only him who as God sitteth in the temple of God shewing himself that he is God For God only is Infallible and therefore he only has right to require Implicit Faith And to him indeed it is due from every one of his Creatures in the highest Measure imaginable as is also Implicit Obedience upon the same Ground Of both which we have a signal Example in Abraham who when he was call'd by God to go out into a place which he should after receive for an Inheritance is said by Faith to have Obey'd and to have gone out not knowing whither he went 26. But now what can be more dark and inevident than this Implicit Faith It s Formal Reason indeed is sufficiently clear and it resolves at last into a Ground highly Rational and so may be said in that respect to be the highest Reason For certainly nothing can be more Reasonable than to believe whatever God who is Infallible reveals There is therefore no Darkness on this Side Nay even the Light it self does not shine more Clear But as for the Matter of it if I may call it so where nothing distinctly is believ'd that is sure as dark and obscure as can well be conceiv'd so dark as even to be Invisible For a Man to believe at large without any restriction or limitation whatever God shall propose to him let it be what it will not Knowing what that is like Abraham's going not knowing whither he went is such a dark and obscure act of Faith as has nothing clear in it but the Humility and Devotion of him who so believes This is a Faith Worthy of God as well as peculiar to him and 't is the great inevidence and obscurity of it that makes it so For so far is the Matter of it from having any Evidence in it that it is not so much as Evident what the Matter of it is Here then is the very Blackness of Darkness and he that has this infolded Faith as every true Believer has and can thus trust God in the Dark where he sees nothing but only the general Reason of his so doing is not likely in any of the more explicit instances of it to plead the inevidence of the Article to excuse his Infidelity or to deny his Faith to an otherwise sufficiently clear Revelation merely because it is above his shallow Reason 27. Upon what has been hitherto discours'd it will not be difficult to give in few words a Satisfactory Resolution of a Celebrated Question which among the Schoolmen has made a great many and that is whether Faith belongs to the Vnderstanding or to the Will It is plain by the Measures already laid down that it belongs to the Latter For Faith as all acknowledge is an Assent and Assent is a Species of Judgement and Judgement as has been shewn already is an act of the Will not of the Understanding whose only Operation is Perception and consequently Faith is an act of the Will consenting to imbracing acquiescing and reposing it self in what the Understanding represents as proposed and reveal'd by God And indeed unless Judgment and consequently Faith did belong to the Will as their proper and immediate Principle 't is impossible to Conceive how a Man should be blame-worthy for any of his Opinions or how he should stand accountable either for Error on the one hand or for Infidelity and Heresy on the other For if Faith be an act of the Understanding then since the only Operation of the Understanding is Perception the greatest Fault of an Infidel or a Heretic will be Non-Perception which indeed is not Error but Ignorance whereas Infidelity and Heresie are always supposed to include Error and to be also the worst of Errors And this Non-perception is only a Negation and such as resolves into want of Parts which is not a Moral but a Natural defect whereas Infidelity and Heresie as indeed all that is Faulty are understood to be Privations and Defects of a Moral Nature But then to make them so they must be voluntary nothing being faulty but what is so that is again they must be Wilful that is they must be acts of the Will and Consequently Faith which is the Habit whereof those Sins are Privations must also belong to the same Principle or else in short there would be neither Vertue in having it nor Vice in being without it And accordingly our Saviour in upbraiding the Iews with Infidelity does all along not only by Confequence but directly and expresly Charge it upon their Wills Ye will not come to me that ye may have Life 28. And thus I have gone thorough what I intended and what indeed is of greatest Consideration upon this Subject of Faith In the account of which if I differ from any Authors of the better Character that have either professedly or occasionally written upon it particularly Baronius and Dr. Pearson 't is not that I love to lay aside great Authorities or affect to be by my self but because I follow the best Light of my Understanding write with Freedom and Ingenuity what I think and endeavour to represent things as they are without having regard to Authority any further than I think it joyn'd with Truth and Reason Which shall also be my Rule in what remains of this Treatise In the Mean time what has been hitherto discours'd concerning Reason and Faith may serve as a good Preparation in order to an Account of the Great Question Concerning the Belief of things above Reason But before we enter upon any thing of that Nature 't is fit the Distinction of Above Reason and Contrary to Reason be Consider'd and rightly Stated which is the task allotted for the next Chapter CHAP. III. The Distinction of things Contrary to Reason and above Reason Consider'd 1. THere are some Distinctions in the World that are without a Difference though Difference be the Ground of all Distinction and this by some is pretended to be of that Number who will have the Parts of it to be Coincident and that Contrary to Reason and above Reason signifie in reality alike and are but different Expressions for one and the same thing And though they may be reasonably suspected to do this to serve the interest of a Cause for whose advantage it would be to have this Distinction taken away yet they have the Confidence to Charge the same upon those that hold it pretending that it is only a dextrous Shift and Evasion invented by Subtile Men as an Expedient to relieve the Distress of
Perusal of the Candid and Considerate Reader and to the Blessing of God THE CONTENTS Chapter I. OF Reason Page 18. Chapter II. Of Faith p. 53. Chapter III. The Distinction of things Contrary to Reason and above Reason Consider'd p. 100. Chapter IV. That Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth p. 137. Chapter V. That therefore a things being Incomprehensible by Reason is of it self no Concluding Argument of its not being true p. 230. Chapter VI. That if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being True Human Reason would then be the Measure of Truth p. 243. Chapter VII That therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no just Objection against the Belief of it With an Account of the Cartesian Maxim that we are to Assent only to what is Clear and Evident p. 251. Chapter VIII Wherein is shewn what is the true Vse of Reason in Believing p. 282. Chapter IX An Application of the foregoing Considerations to the Mysteries of Christianity p. 294. Chapter X. The Conclusion of the Whole with an Address to the Socinians p. 307. Post-script p. 339. The Introduction 1. AMong the various Conjectures Men of a Prophetic Spirit have fall'n into Concerning the last events we have had this Opinion not long since advanc'd for one that as God formerly by rejecting the Iews made way for the Gentiles so in the latter days he will in like manner by rejecting the Gentiles make way for the Iews to enter into the Christian Church That the state of Christianity being become intirely Corrupt and all over Anti-christianiz'd the First of those Viols of the Divine Wrath that are to exterminate the Wicked and usher in the Terrours of the Great Day shall fall upon the Christian World that Christendom shall be utterly dissolv'd broken in pieces and destroy'd and that the Iews shall be replaced and reâ—establish'd upon its Ruins And to render it Worthy of so Sore a Calamity that the generality of its Professors shall not only greatly depart from the Primitive Power of the Evangelic Spirit by Apostatizing from the Purity and Perfection of both Christian Faith and Life which we have already seen come to pass but shall even lay down their Holy Profession renounce their very Faith and Religion and turn Infidels Upon the latter part of which Opinion those Words of our Saviour seem to cast a very suspicious Aspect VVhen the Son of Man cometh shall be find Faith upon the Earth As upon the Former do also those words of St. Paul Thou wilt say then The Branches were broken off that I might be graffed in VVell because of unbelief they were broken off and thou standest by Faith Be not high-minded but fear For if God spared not the Natural Branches take heed lest he also spare not thee Behold therefore the Goodness and Severity of God On them which fell Severity but towards thee Goodness if thou continue in his Goodness Otherwise thou also shalt be cut off that is as a dead wither'd and unfruitful Branch as were the Iews for the same Reason before and as our Saviour tells us every unfruitful Branch shall be 2. And truly if one were to judge of these Mens Opinion by the present face and state of things one would be inclined to think it true and that they had the right Key of Prophecy in their hands For sure by all Signs and Appearances the Course of the World seems to drive this way and if there be such a Fatal Revolution to come no doubt but that we are with large steps hastening to it For how are the Vitals of Religion continually struck at the Foundations of it unsettled and undermined its venerable Articles disputed and ridiculed and by what a slender thread does Christianity hang The great Complaint for a long while has been of the Decay of Christian Piety and the Universal Corruption of Manners But now our Religion is corrupted as well as our Manners and we every day make shipwrack of our Faith as well as of a good Conscience So that we have now fill'd our measure and are every way ripe for Destruction Some deny all Reveal'd Religion and consequently the Christian others allowing the Divinity of the Religion deny that of its Author together with the Doctrines of the Trinity Incarnation and Satisfaction others again owning his Divinity deny the necessity of Believing it others again granting that and the other Points deny the necessity of his Satisfaction which is not only resolv'd into mere Prudential Reasons as formerly instead of being grounded upon the Essential Order and Iustice of God but is brought down so low of late as to be made an Accommodation and Condescension to and a gracious Compliance with the common Weaknesses and Prejudices of Mankind Thus is the Christian Religion so mangled and dismember'd by some and so odly and insidiously represented by others that between them both the general Faith of the thing is indanger'd and a ready way prepared to Scepticism and Infidelity 3. Not that I think it ought to be any just matter of Scandal to any considering Christians or Prejudice to their Holy Religion to see so many Corruptions of it and Apostacies and Revoltings from it since this is no more than what the Holy Spirit of God has often forewarn'd us shall come to pass in the latter days wherein we are expresly told that perillous times shall come and that Men shall resist the Truth be proud and high-minded of corrupt minds and reprobate concerning the Faith And moreover that they shall privily bring in damnable Heresies even denying the Lord that bought them This therefore I say ought in reason to be no matter of scandal to any Christians And so neither ought the poor humble suffering condition of Jesus Christ to have been any to the Iews since this also was plainly foretold of the Messias and made a notable part of his Character And yet we find that the Cross of Christ was a stumbling-block to the Iews and so no doubt are the present sufferings I may say Crucifixion of his Religion to many Christians the generality of which measure the certainty of their Faith by the firmness and constancy of its Professors and are apt more to stagger and take offence at the untoward appearance of any Event than to be confirm'd in their belief from its agreement with Antient Prophecies 4. In the mean time what do those without think of us Particularly the Heathens among whom no doubt there are some that neither want Intelligence nor Curiosity to acquaint themselves with the present state of Christendom What a confirmation must it be to these Men in their Infidelity to see Christians grow weary of their own Religion and willing to part with those great and weighty Articles of it for which the holy Martyrs shed their Blood and which could not be extorted from them by all the might and power of their cruel Emperours Can it
be expected that these Men should embrace a Religion which they see thus continually deserted by its own Disciples Or rather instead of converting themselves to Christianity will they not look every day when the Christians shall come over to them For truly this seems to be the state of the Christian World at this time We are posting as fast as we can into Heathenism and stand even upon the brink of Infidelity The great Articles of our Religion are giving up every day and when Men have parted with these we are very much beholden to them if they retain any of the rest there being nothing in Christianity considerable enough when the great Mysteries of the Trinity Incarnation c. are taken away to make it appear an Institution worthy of God or to challenge the Assent of any thinking and consideringâ— Man But why do I talk of running into Heathenism I am afraid we are tending further For as from a Socinian 't is easie to commence a Deist so he that is once a Deist is in a hopeful way to be an Atheist whenever he please 5. I do not speak these things out of a Spirit of Peevishness and Dissatisfaction as some who being full of a Querulous Splenetick Humour and knowing not how better to dispose of it to their ease give it vent upon the Times of which they are always complaining right or wring No the deplorable and dangerous state of Christianity and the too visible growth of Socinianism and Deism among us extort these Reflections from me and have given me many a troublesome and uneasie Thought in my private Retirements For my Satisfaction under which my best Salvo has been to consider that God governs the World and that Jesus Christ who is the Head of his Church will preserve it from all the Powers of Earth and even from the Gates of Hell And that tho' now he seems to be asleep in this Sacred Vessel while the Tempest rages and the Waves beat against it and almost cover it yet 't is to be hoped he will awake and rebuke the Winds and the Sea and make all calm and quiet again However in the mean time 't is fit the Mariners should work and neglect the use of no means that are necessary to the safety of their Ship some by Writing others by private Discourse and all by Prayers and a good Life 6. But now whereas all Rational Method of Cure is founded upon the knowledge of the Cause of the Distemper he that would contribute any thing to the stopping this Contagion of Religious Scepticism that now reigns among us ought in the first place to consider the Reason of it what it is that makes Men so disposed to waver in their Religion and so ready to part with the great Articles and Mysteries of it Now to this purpose I call to mind a very considerable Observation of Descartes concerning Atheism which I take to be equally applicable to Infidelity particularly to this of the Mysteries of the Christian Faith The Observation is this That those things which are commonly alledged by Atheists to impugne the Existence of God do all turn upon this that either we attribute some Humane Affection to God or else arrogate so great force and penetration to our own minds as to go about to comprehend and determine what God can and ought to do So that if we would but carry about us this Thought that our Minds are to be consider'd as Finite but God as Incomprehensible and Infinite there would be no further difficulty in and of their Objections Thus that very Acute and Judicious Person concerning the Grounds of Atheism And in like manner I think it may be said of Infidelity as to the Mysteries of Christianity That the great Reason why so many that call themselves Christians do so obstinately cavil at them and dispute them is that either they think too meanly of God or too highly of themselves that either they ascribe something Humane to his Nature or something Divine to their own that either they set too narrow limits to the Divine Power and Greatness or carry out too far those of their own understandings in one word that either they Humaniâ—e God or Deify themselves and their own Rational Abilities 7. And they confess in effect as much themselves For the Reason that these Men commonly give out and pretend for their not allowing the Mysteries of the Christian Religion any room in their Creed is that they are above the reach of their Understandings They cannot comprehend them or conceive how they can be and therefore will not believe them having fix'd it as a Law in the general to believe nothing but what they can comprehend But now where does the Ground of this Consequence rest at last or upon what Principle does it ultimately depend How comes the Incomprehensibility of a Point of Faith to be a presumption against it why is its being above their Reason in Argument that it is not true Why I say but only because in the first place they attribute so much to their Reason at least by a Confuse Sentiment as to presume it to be the Measure and Standard of all Truth and that nothing that is True can really be above it Here I say the stress of the matter will rest at last For should the Argument of these Men be reduced to a Syllogistical Form it must necessarily proceed thus Whatever is above our Reason is not to be believ'd as true But the Reputed Mysteries of Christianity are above our Reason Therefore the Reputed Mysteries of Christianity are not to be believ'd as true Now the only contestable Proposition in this Syllogism is the Major which can be prov'd by no other Principle than this That our Reason is the Measure of all Truth and whose Proof must be in this Form Whatever is above the Measure of all Truth is not to be believ'd as true But our Reason is the Measure of all Truth Therefore whatever is above our Reason is not to be believ'd as true By this Analysis of their Argument into its Principle it is plain that this their Reason of disbelieving the Mysteries of the Christian Religion viz. Because they are above their Reason does at last resolve into this That their Reason is the Measure of all Truth and that they can comprehend all things For otherwise how should their not being able to comprehend a thing be an Argument that it is not true This I presume is a Principle our Adversaries would be loth to own and indeed with good Reason it being the most extravagantly absurd and self-arrowgating one that can possibly enter the Thought or proceed from the Mouth of a Man And accordinly I do not know any Socinian that had the immodesty in terms openly to assert it But this is what they must come to if they will speak out and what in the mean time they do vertually and implicitly say So then their procedure in short seems
to be this They first set their Reason above all things and then will believe nothing that is above their Reason And if this be not in an unreasonable measure to exalt that Faculty to carry it beyond its due bounds nay to set it no bounds at all but strictly to make it Infinite and so to ascribe to it no less than a Divine Perfection I must profess my despair ever to know what is 8. To be the adequate Measure of all Truth so as to have no one Truth above the comprehension of it is as much as can be said of the Reason and Understanding of God himself His Infinite Understanding is indeed truly and necessarily so and whatever is above his Reason is for that very reason most certainly not true Because he essentially comprehending all that truly is it must necessarily follow that whatever he does not comprehend must be nothing But to say the same of the Reason of a Man or of the Intelligence of the most illuminated Angel would be to confound all distinction between Finite and Infinite God and Creature and to advance the most absurd and withal the most impious and blaspemous Proposition imaginable And yet this is the general Principle upon which the Body of Socinianism turns and by which it would be most directly and most compendiously confuted 9. I shall therefore take hold of it by this handle And since that which is a Principle one way as we argue forwards from the Cause to the Effect may be considered as a Consequence another way as we argue backwards from the Effect to the Cause and since there are these two general ways of Reasoning I shall therefore proceed both these wayes in the management of the present Argument which accordingly shall turn chiefly upon this double Hinge First I shall overturn their Principle I call it theirs because 't is what they must at last necessarily come to by shewing that Humane Reason is not the measure of Truth or that there may be some things True which are above the comprehension of Humane Reason and that therefore a things being above Reason is no concluding Argument of its not being True Secondly I shall argue ab Absurdo by shewing that if a things being above Reason were an Argument of its not being True then it will follow that Humane Reason is the Measure of all Truth which if I bring them to I shall think them reduced to a sufficient Absurdity These I intend as the two great Pillars of this Work which like the sides of an Arch will strengthen and bear up one another that which is liable to exception in the former part being made out in the latter and that which is liable to exception in the latter being made out in the former For if it be questioned in the First Part whether this be indeed their Principle That Humane Reason is the Measure of all Truth that will appear in the Second wherein it will be shewn to follow from their supposition And if it be question'd in the Second Part whether this their Principle be absurd and so whether they are reduced to an Absurdity that will appear in the First wherein this Principle is shewn to be False 10. And when by this Method I have shewn in general both a Priori and a Posteriori that a things being above Humane Reason is of it self no sufficient Argument of its not being true I shall then make application of all to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion which I shall shew may be true notwithstanding their being above Humane Reason and so that their being above it is no just ground to conclude them False and that therefore they ought to be believed notwithstanding their being above our Reason which in this case ought to be no prejudice to our Faith supposing them otherwise sufficiently revealed Which whether they are or no I shall not discuss my design at present not being to enter into the detail of the Controversie to prove the particular Mysteries of the Christian Faith such as the Trinity Incarnation or the like but only to lay a general ground and foundation for the belief of those Articles and to destroy that upon which the Body of Socinianism stands The Great and General Principle of which I take to be That nothing is to be believ'd as reveal'd by God that is above the comprehension of Humane Reason or That a Man is to believe nothing but what he can comprehend Which Principle I hope by the help of God with the utmost Evidence and Demonstration to overthrow And because in order to this I must first give a direct and profess'd Account of Reason and Faith besides what will be said Incidentally and Occasionally of them in the Course of the Treatise whose main design is so to adjust and accommodate the Natures and Properties of these two things together as to shew the Reasonableness of believing the Mysteries of the Christian Religion thereupon it is that I intitle the whole An Account of Reason and Faith in relation to the Mysteries of Christianity This is the Gross of what I design the Particulars of which will be more distinctly laid down and accounted for in the following Chapters CHAP. I. Of Reason 1. AMbiguity of Words being one great occasion of Confusion of Thoughts whoever will Discourse clearly and distinctly of any Subject must in the first place fix and settle the signification of his Terms in case they are Ambiguous that is if one and the same Term be applyed to different Ideas In this case Definition of the Name is to go before the Definition of the Thing between which two I conceive the difference to be this That in a Nominal Definition the word is only determin'd to such a certain Idea whereas in a Real one the Idea it self is opened and explained by some other Ideas that are supposed to be contain'd and involv'd in it Upon which account it is that Nominal Definitions are Arbitrary and therefore incontestable and therefore may be used as Principles in Discourse as they are in Geometry whereas Real Definitions are not Arbitrary but must be conform'd to the Nature of things and so are not to be taken for Principles whose Truth is to be supposed but for disputable Propositions whose Truth is to be proved 2. Reason therefore being an ambiguous word and of various acceptation before I proceed to give an account of the Nature of the thing it will be necessary that I define the Name which will also be the better defined if it be first distinguisht Now all Distinction being a sort of Division in which according to the Rules of Logick the Distribution ought to be into the most general and most immediate Members I shall accordingly distinguish of the several meanings of this word Reason by the same measure as I would divide any whole into its parts 3. I consider therefore that the most general distribution of Reason is into that of the Object and
distinct from the Soul or only the Soul it self acting after a certain manner this being almost as obscure as the other and I care not to employ either my own Thoughts or my Readers upon things whereof I have not any clear Conception All that I shall therefore further treat of concerning the Understanding for so I now call our Reason shall be with respect to its Operations by which the Nature of it is best known and whereof we are not only Conscious by way of Sentiment but have also or at least by self-reflexion may have some Notion and Conception by way of Idea 9. Now these are ordinarily supposed to be three Apprehension Iudgment and Discourse By Apprehension meaning the simple view or perception of a thing by Iudgment the joining or separating of Ideas by Affirmation or Negation by Discourse the collecting of one thing from another And upon this threefold ground our Systems of Logick have for a great while proceeded with great Agreement But as Authentick as Time and Consent have made this Division I cannot think it right when I compare it with what by self-reflexion I find to pass within my own Mind For supposing it were true as to the matter of it that is I mean that Judgment and Discourse did really belong to the Understanding which yet the Philosophers of the Carcesian way will by no means allow yet the Form of it must needs be very unartificial and inaccurate For Truth being the general Object of the Understanding and there being nothing in Truth but Ideas and the Relation that is between them 't is impossible there should be any more operations of the Understanding than Perception and Iudgment Perception as to the Ideas themselves and Judgment as to their Relation Which Judgment 't is true may be either Immediate or Mediate Immediate when the Relations of Ideas are judg'd of by the very Ideas themselves or Mediate when they are judg'd of by the help and means of some other Idea but then all this is but Judgment still though in two different ways the difference between them being the same as between judging of a thing under the Formality of a Proposition and judging of the same thing under the Formality of a Conclusion These indeed are different ways of judging but still they are both but Judgments and one as much as the other So that in reality that which these Men call Discourse is but a species of Iudgment and if for that reason they will consider it as distinct from Judgment and make it a third Operation they might as well have put in the other species too Judgment immediate and so made a fourth But then this is against the great Fundamental Law of Division which requires that one of the Members ought not to be so included in the other as that the other may be affirm'd of it Which is plainly the Case here this being such a kind of Division as if one should divide a Living Creature into a Plant an Animal and a Man and that because Discourse is as much a Species of Judgment as Man is of Animal And herein though the matter be so clear that I need it not yet I happen to have the Authority of a considerable Philosopher on my side Monsieur Derodon who in these few words expresses his Sense full and home to this purpose The third Operation of the Mind says he is commonly call'd Discourse but is properly the Iudgment of the Consequent as inferr'd from the Iudgment of the Antecedent 10. By this it is evident that supposing the matter of this Division never so true that is that Judgment and Discourse do appertain to the Understanding yet the Form of it is wrong Discourse which is here made a third member of the Division being contain'd under Judgment which is the second as the Species of it But neither is the matter of it true For Judgment and Discourse or to speak more accurately Iudgment whether immediate or mediate does indeed not belong to the Understanding but as will by and by appear to the Will There is but one general Operation that belongs to the Understanding and that is Perception For as I said before Truth being the general Object of the Understanding and there being nothing in Truth but Ideas and their Relations all that the Understanding can here have to do will be only to perceive these Ideas and the several Relations that are between them For when this is done then is a thing sufficiently understood to understand a thing being no more than to perceive its Ideas and how they stand related to one another Here is the whole compass and full extent of the Understanding and all that we can possibly conceive by it and he that perceives Ideas and their Relations understands as much of them as is to be understood Whereby it is evident that Perception is the only operation of the Understanding and that it can have no other 'T is true indeed there is variety in this Perception it being either Simple or Complex Simple of the Ideas themselves and Complex of their Relations which latter again is either Immediate or Mediate as was said before of Iudgment but still 't is all but Perception though differently modified which therefore I conclude to be the only Operation that properly belongs to the Understanding 11. But now if all that of right belongs to the Understanding be Perception then 't is most certain that Judgment cannot belong to the Understanding and that because Judgment is not Perception For we are said to judge as we perceive and some are so much in haste that they will judge before they perceive which plainly shews them to be two different things And that they are so this one Argument well considered is a Demonstration that Judgment is a Fallible thing that may be true or false as it happens whereas Perception is always true it being a Contradiction that it should be otherwise For what a Man does not truly perceive he does not perceive at all I conclude therefore that Judgment is not Perception and since Perception is as has been shewn the only operaâ—ion of the Understanding I conclude again that Judgment does not belong to the Understanding It must therefore belong to the Will which is the proper seat both of Judgment and of Errour too And it is nothing else but the Will 's consenting to and acquiescing in the Representations that are made by the Understanding Which agrees well with those weighty and very fruitful Maxims That the Will is the Subject and Principle of all Errour as well as Sin which indeed ought to be voluntary to make it culpable That 't is in our Power to avoid Errour by suspending our Judgment till the Evidence be clear though 't is not in our Power to avoid Ignorance or Non-Perception of many things by reason of the limitedness of our Faculties That the fault of those that err is that their Wills run
also a more dark side in which respect it comes short of it and must give it the Precedency And I think it may be very properly call'd a Dark side because it consists in Darkness and Obscurity and which is still so much the darker because 't is so peculiar to Faith and makes so great a part of its Character being the Main Difference that distinguishes it from Science or that Second Assent before spoken of For as to Firmness and Certainty therein they agree For Faith may be Firm because he that believes in God may be supposed not in the least to hesitate or doubt of the truth of what he reveals And 't is also certain because it relies upon the most certain Foundation the Testimony of God who is Infallible himself and cannot deceive And hitherto they run parallel one to the other But here begins both the difference and the disproportion that there is Clearness and Evidence on the side of Science and that Second Assent whereas there is none on the side of Faith which walks indeed upon firm Ground but altogether in the dark For he that Believes does not give his Assent because either by Sense or Reason he perceives the Object of his Faith to be thus or thus but merely because he has the Word and Authority of God for it Which though it be sufficient to found a Firm and Certain is yet however not enough to beget a Clear and Evident Assent So that the great and distinguishing Character of Science and the Second Assent is Light and Evidence and that of Faith inevidence and Obscurity which accordingly is commonly said to be an inevident Assent But how and in what sense it is so seems not commonly to be so well understood and for the Consequence of what depends upon the right stating of it deserves to be explain'd with all possible exactness 13. In order to which we are carefully to distinguish between the thing believ'd and the Reason or Motive that induces us to believe it even as in Knowledge we distinguish between the thing Known and the Argument or Medium by which it is Known the Scitum and the Formalis ratio Sciendi The thing Believ'd I would call the Matter or the Object of Faith and the Motive that induces me to believe it I would call the Formal Reason of Faith Aquinas I know calls them both Objects and then after distinguishes them by calling the Former the Material Object and the latter the Formal Object of Faith Accordingly he says that the Formal Object of Faith is the First Truth meaning as he afterward explains himself that Faith relies upon the Truth of God as its Medium or Argument Which Medium I chuse rather to call and I think more intelligibly the formal Reason than the formal Object of Faith Since the Term Object seems more properly to design the Matter of Faith or the thing Believ'd and is hardly applicable to the Motive or Reason of Believing However since we both mean one and the same thing there need be no debate upon the different manner of expressing it especially since if any one think his Term more intelligible and expressive of the Notion intended by it or has any reverence for it upon any other Consideration he is at liberty to substitute it in the room of the other 14. This necessary Distinction being premised 't is in the first place to be well heeded that when Faith is said to be an obscure and inevident Assent this Obscurity or inevidence is not to be applied to the formal Reason or Motive of Faith but only to the Matter or Object of it I say not to the formal Reason of it For as there may be in general a clear Reason why a Man should believe an Obscure thing so 't is most Certain that the formal Reason for which we assent to the things of Faith is very clear For this formal Reason is no other than the Authority of God Or rather since this includes the Truth of the Revealer as well as the Revelation it self for otherwise of what Authority would be the Revelation I would chuse to say that the Truth and Revelation of God do jointly make up the formal Reason of Divine Faith which accordingly proceeds upon this double Principle 1. That whatever God reveals is true 2. That this or that thing in particular is reveal'd by God For Faith has its Reasons as well as Science though of another Nature and its Reasons are these two as will more distinctly appear by disposing the Process of Faith into a Syllogistical Form which will be this Whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is Reveal'd by God Therefore this is true The Conclusion of this Syllogism contains both the Matter and the Act of Faith as it is an Assent to such a thing upon such a ground which is implied by the Illative Particle Therefore The two other Propositions contain the Ground it self or the formal Reason of Faith which you see consists of the double Principle before-mention'd Now 't is most apparent that these two Principles are both of them sufficiently clear or at least may be so 'T is clear in the first place that whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is either self-evident or may be proved from the Idea of God and so has either the Light of a Principle or of a Conclusion either an immediate or a Mediate Evidence And it may be also clear and to be sure is so whenever our Faith is well-grounded that such a thing in Particular is reveal'd by God And in both these respects it is true what is commonly said that Faith is the Highest Reason For you see it is perfectly reasonable in its Fund and Principle and does at last resolve as much as any Mathematical Conclusion into a rational ground of unquestionable Light and Evidence With this only difference that a Conclusion in Geometry is founded upon a Ground taken from within from the intrinsic Nature of the thing whereas our Conclusion of Faith proceeds upon a ground taken from without viz. from the Authority of God but such as however in Light and Evidence is no way inferiour to the other 15. This by the way may serve to shew the vanity and impertinence of those who when they are to prove that there is nothing in Christianity above Reason run out into a Popular Veâ—â— of Harangue about the Reasonables of the Christian Religion and its great Accommodation to Human Nature crying out with repeated importunity that Man is a Reasonable Creature Christianity a reasonable Service and Faith a Rational Act nay even the Highest Reason and the like As if we were for a Blind and unaccountable Faith and denied the use of Reason in Religion or that Faith was founded upon Reason Or as if because there is a Reason from without for Believing therefore the thing Believ'd might not from within and as to the inward Matter of it be above Reason so as
not to be comprehended or accounted for by it But this will cross my way again in another place and therefore I shall not anticipate here what further Considerations I may have occasion to bestow upon it there 16. To return therefore I say that this Obscurity and inevidence that is in Faith and upon whose account it is commonly said to be an inevident Assent does not belong to its formal Reason which you see may be clear enough as clear as any Principle of Natural Science but only to the Matter or Object of it That is in other words the inevidence does not lie in the Reason of Believing but in the Nature of the thing Believ'd Not that the matter of Faith again is wholy and all over without Evidence for then there would be no reason to believe it but only that it has no evidence from within and from the Nature of the thing it self as was remarqu'd before Not that this again is so to be understood neither as if the Proposition to be believ'd were not so much as simply intelligible as to the very litteral sense and direct signification of its Terms No we are no more to believe we Know not what than to believe we Know not why and whatever Darkness there may be in Faith it is still so much a Luminous Assent and an Act of Reason as to require that we understand the simple Meaning of the Proposition we are to believe as well as the Grounds of Credibility upon which it Challenges our Assent For the general Object of Faith is Truth and Truth is the relation of Connexion between Ideas I say Ideas for Truth does not lie in Sounds or Words but in Things Therefore to believe such a Thing to be True is the same as to believe that there is a Connexion between such Ideas But then a Man must know what those Ideas are or else how can he believe they are connected Therefore he must understand something more than the Terms themselves he must also have the Ideas of those Terms which is the same as to under stand the Meaning and Signification of them And indeed he that has no Idea or Conception of what he believes believes he knows not what and he that believes he knows not what cannot be properly said to believe any thing In all Faith therefore the Proposition Must be simply intelligible and though the Truth of it be to be Believ'd yet the Meaning of it must be understood 17. For we are again Carefully to distinguish between the Meaning of a Proposition and the Truth of a Proposition The meaning of a Proposition is only the Determination of the Ideas that are signified by such Terms the Truth of it is the Union or Connexion that is between those Ideas Now though a Man does not see the Connexion that is between the Ideas of that Proposition he is said to Believe yet he must in some measure perceive the Ideas themselves because in believing the Proposition he is supposed to believe that such Ideas are so related and Connected together When therefore 't is said that the Matter of Faith is inevident as to the intrinsic Nature of the thing the inevidence must not be thought to lie in the Ideas whereof the Proposition to be Believ'd Consists but in the Connexion of those Ideas that is not in the Meaning of the Proposition but in the Truth of it which is properly the Object of Faith as the Ideas themselves are of Perception Which again by the way may serve to discover another Instance of Impertinency in the Reasoning of those who when they are Maintaining that there can be no Article of Faith above Reason divert into pompous Flourishes and Declamations about the Intelligibility of the Objects of Faith and the utter impossibility of Believing what is not intelligible As if we denied the simple intelligibility of the Proposition or would have Men believe they know not what which certainly would be a strange degree of Implicit Faith and more Nonsensical than that of the Collier or as if that Proposition which is clear enough as to its simple Meaning might not be inevident and so above Reason as to its Truth or in other words as if Clearness of Ideas might not consist with Obscurity of their Connexion 18. But then it must be observ'd again that when we say that the Inevidence that is in the Matter of Faith respects the Truth of the Proposition not the Meaning of it or the Connexion of the Ideas and not the very Ideas themselves this is not so to be understood neither as if the Matter of Faith even thus consider'd were Absolutely and in its self necessarily inevident and such as could not possibly be known without altering its Nature and ceasing to be any longer the Object of Faith I know the contrary Supposition has prevail'd in some Schools where it passes almost for Principle and Maxim that Knowledge and Faith are mutually Exclusive of each other that the same thing cannot be at once the Object of both and that therefore if a thing be believ'd it cannot be known and if known that it cannot be believ'd St. Austin was of this Opinion and has in many places declared his mind to this purpose particularly in his XL Treatise of his Exposition upon St. Iohn's Gospel And his Authority has recommended it as it did most other things to several of the Schoolmen particularly Aquinas whence it has been transmitted down among many Modern Writers of the Systematical way both Philosophers and Divines But we must follow Reason before Authority and whoever can be prevail'd with to lay the latter quite aside and to use the other as he ought will I believe clearly perceive that nothing hinders but that the same Proposition may be at once the Object of both Faith and Science or that the Same thing may be at the same time both Known and Believ'd provided it be by different Mediums according to the diversity of the respective Acts. 19. For not to enter into the wrangle and Dust of the Schools upon this Occasion it may be sufficient to consider that there is no manner of Opposition between Faith and Knowledge or the Most evident Assent as to the Essence of the Proposition that being not supposed to be denied in the one which is Affirm'd in the other or the contrary but only as to the Medium of the Act. And that 't is not the Absolute Nature of the thing Believ'd but the Quality of the Motive that specifies Faith and distinguishes it from other Assents So that 't is no matter what the Absolute Nature of the thing be in it self whether it be evident or not evident Knowable or not Knowable provided it be assented to upon the proper Medium and Motive of Faith that is upon Authority without any respect had to the Natural evidence of the thing though otherwise never so evident in its own Absolute Nature so as to be the Object of Science
and so much Contested whether true or no can never be made too Clear and sometimes a different though not better Representation of a thing may contribute to its further Illustration every Reader having his particular Point of View so as that the very â—ame Notion or Truth that does not Meet with him in one Posture may shine full in his Face and strike him with success in another I shall therefore under the Shelter of Mr. Boyle's Authority and by the advantage of his Light venture to set down my own Thoughts concerning this weighty Point applying my self chiefly to that part of it wherein I think the other Account Most defective 14. And first though it should be true that to be above Reason is to be Incomprehensible and to be Contrary to Reason is to appear repugnant to some Principle or Conclusion of Right Reason yet I do not think this of it self sufficient either to Clear or to Justifie the Distinction since it may be both again demanded what it is to be incomprehensible and what repugnant and again disputed whether incomprehensible and repugnant be not the same as well as whether that which is above Reason be not also Contrary to it And then we are but where we were before This Account of the Matter is then too Gross and General to be rested in and we must be therefore more minute and particular in our Explanation of it if we would be more Clear 15. However since Generals are to go before and do also prepare the way for Particulars I shall first propose the general Idea of things above Reason and contrary to Reason and then particularize upon that Idea by opening and unfolding more distinctly and explicitly what is contain'd in it and by so comparing and collating together the two parts of the Notion as to shew the real Difference that is between them So that I shall make but one work of the Explanatory and Iustificatory parts supposing that there needs no more to the Justification of the Distinction than only to have the Members of it well explain'd For if the Idea of Above Reason be distinct from the Idea of Contrary to Reason as the Explanation of them will shew that it is then the Distinction proceeds upon a real Difference is grounded upon the Nature of things and has all that is necessary to a true and good Distinction 16. By things above Reason then as the Expression is used in this Distinction I conceive to be Meant Not such as Reason of it self cannot Discover but such as when proposed it cannot Comprehend And by things Contrary to Reason I conceive such as it can and does actually comprehend and that to be absolutely Impossible Or in other words a thing is then above Reason when we do not comprehend how it can be and then Contrary to Reason when we do positively comprehend that it cannot be Thus in the General 17. But to be a little more Particular we are to Consider upon the first Part that when we speak of things above Reason the word Reason here as was shewn in the first Chapter signifies the same as Vnderstanding and there being but one only Operation of that namely Perception by Comprehend here must be meant the same as by Perceive So that when we say of things above Reason that they are such as Reason cannot Comprehend 't is the same as to say they are such as the Understanding cannot Perceive But then when we say Cannot Perceive 't is to be carefully noted that this is not to be understood of the literal and Grammatical Meaning of the Proposition as if the thing said to be Above Reason were perfectly unintelligible but only of the Truth of it as was observ'd before concerning Faith And then again when we say that Above Reason is when we do not Comprehend or Perceive the Truth of a thing this must not be meant of not Comprehending the Truth in its whole Latitude and Extent so that as many Truths should be said to be above Reason as we cannot thus thorougly comprehend and pursue throughout all their Consequences and Relations to other Truths for then almost every thing would be Above Reason but only of not comprehending the Union or Connexion of those immediate Ideas of which the Proposition supposed to be above Reason consists And which is therefore said to be above Reason not because the simple and direct Meaning of its Terms is unintelligible or because the Truth of it is not comprehensible in its remotest and utmost Extent but purely because the Connexion of its Ideas or the manner of it is not discernible and that partly for want of sufficient clearness of the Ideas themselves so as to be able to perceive their Union Intuitively and partly for want of a due and proper Medium whereby to compare them so as to discern their Union in the way of Science and Demonstration 18. 'T is also to be Observ'd upon the Second part of the Explanation that I chuse rather to say that things contrary to Reason are such as we Perceive to be Impossible than such as appear contrary to some Principle or some Conclusion of Right Reason This being the more General and Absolute Idea whereof the two other are but Instances and Specifications For then is a thing said to be Impossible when its Ideas cannot stand together or be united Which may be either because of the immediate Opposition and Inconsistency of the Ideas themselves with themselâ—â—s so as Mutually to Exclude each other as in a Contradiction or because of their inconsistency with some other Truth with which it cannot Comport Or in other words either because one of the Ideas cannot consist with the other by reason of the immediate opposition that is between them or because the Union of both is inconsistent with some Truth or other which therefore will not suffer them to be United Which Truth will be indeed either a Principle or a Conclusion of right Reason And then we are said to Perceive a thing to be Impossible when we perceive that its Ideas cannot stand together and that either immediately by the very inconsistency of the Ideas themselves or mediately by the Repugnance that they carry to some other Truth whether Principle or Conclusion Which Repugnance I take to consist in this that the supposed Principle or Conclusion cannot stand with the Union of such Ideas and that therefore if such a Principle or such a Conclusion be true as is supposed then such Ideas are not United and indeed are as uncapable of Union that is as impossible as if there were an immediate inconsistency between the Ideas themselves So that for a thing to be Contrary to Reason is in short for the Understanding to perceive the Absolute impossibility of it or that its Ideas cannot stand together which it does either Immediately by perceiving the direct inconsistency of those Ideas or Mediately by perceiving their inconsistency with some evident and incontestable Truth
to be true this plainly demonstrates the thing in Question if there can be yet any Question about it most evidently shewing that what is Above Reason is not as such Contrary to Reason it being impossible that what is Contrary to Reason should be true whatever is Contrary to Reason being also as Contrary to Truth I might also further alledge that to be Above Reason does equally abstract from True and False which Contrary to Reason does not and that not only because as I observed before it determines nothing concerning its Object but also because 't is a thing not of an Absolute but of a Relative Importance as being an extrinsecal Denomination taken not from the Nature of the Object as it is in it self but only as it is to us and in relation to our not only Finite but very Limited Capacities For to be Above Reason is not to be Above Reason in general or all Reason so as to be absolutely incomprehensible but only Human Reason But then that which is Above the Reason of a Man may not be Above the Reason of an Angel as indeed what is Above the Reason of one Man may not transcend that of another and what is above the Reason of an Angel may yet be perfectly comprehended by God the Supream and Soveraign Reason So that to be Above Reason here is of a respective signification such as does not express the quality of the Object as it is in its own Nature but only as it is in reference to such a particular Faculty whereas to be Contrary to Reason is not a Relative but an Absolute thing and whatever is Contrary to Reason is Contrary to all Reason and so consequently to Truth I say I might further insist on these and some other Considerations but being partly prevented here by Mr. Boyle whose Account I would have used to supply the defects of Mine as Mine is intended to supply some of his and having so abundantly clear'd the difference of these things already I shall not so far distrust either the Strength of the Argument or that of my Reader 's Understanding as to prosecute this Matter any further than only to shape an Answer out of what has been laid down to an Objection which I meet with in a Modern Writer against Monsieur Iurieu and which to do it the utmost Justice I will set down in his own words 24. I have Consider'd says he the Distinction which they use between being Contrary to Reason and being above Reason 'T is agreed that 't is not possible to believe what is Contrary to Reason But 't is said that we can well believe what is above Reason This Distinction seems to me of no use or else I do not comprehend it For if by being above Reason it be meant that we do not comprehend a Truth in its whole Extent though what we conceive of it be clear and certain I own that in this sense one ought to believe what is above Reason But if by being above Reason be meant a Doctrine wherein we see nothing Clear a Doctrine which our Reason loses the sight of on all its sides I mean that all the Propositions which may be extracted from it appear incomprehensible such a one as this for example that the three Divine Persons make but one God c. It seems that to be above Reason in this sense is the same as to be intirely inaccessible to Reason which differs nothing but in words from being Contrary to Reason 25. I suppose whoever has duely consider'd and well comprehended the Tenour of the foregoing Discourse can neither be insensible of the Deficiency of this Allegation nor be long at a loss what Answer to return to it But to spare my Reader this Trouble My Reply is that this Author's Argument proceeds upon a wrong Supposition He supposes here that to be Above Reason must be either the Not Comprehending a thing in its whole Latitude and extent or the Comprehending Nothing at all of it Whereas I have shewn before that 't is neither of them That we do not mean by Above Reason what is all over unintelligible even as to the very Meaning of the Proposition nor what is not to be Comprehended in its utmost extent but only what is incomprehensible to us as to the Truth of the thing or the Manner of it 'T is true indeed if the Proposition were perfectly unintelligible so that as he says we could see nothing clear in it even as to the very Sense and Meaning of it we could no more believe it than what is Contrary to Reason though even then it would not as this Author confusely enough pretends be the same with it because what is Contrary to Reason is supposed to be well understood But 't is much otherwise if it be incomprehensible only as to the Truth or Manner of the thing This as I shall shew hereafter may very well be Beleiv'd though what is Contrary to Reason cannot and what is utterly unintelligible cannot And I have sufficiently shewn already that what is thus only inaccessible to Reason differs a little more than in words from being contrary to it 26. And now if Humane Nature were not a very unaccountable thing I should stand greatly amazed at either the Natural or wilful Blindness of those who are for confounding things so vastly different as the parts of this Distinction of things above Reason and contrary to it most apparently are There are indeed some things which we are ordinarily taught to distinguish and yet when strictly examin'd and compared will be found to have no real ground of Distinction in them And 't is every whit as great and almost as Common a Fault to distinguish things that do not differ as to confound those that do And there are also other things of such near Resemblance and Cognation to each other that there needs a great deal of Art Subtlety and nice Inspection to discern their Difference So Fine and Minute and almost imperceptible are the Lines that terminate their Natures and divide them from one another But the Ideas of these things are as different as those of a Man and a Tree a Triangle and a Square so that a Man must wink hard not to perceive it or be very insincere not to acknowledge it And I cannot imagine why those especially who are known to serve themselves upon occasion of Distinctions which have no other Foundation than the mere Will and Pleasure unless you will say Interest of those that use them should yet reject such a Solid and well-grounded as well as well Authorized one as this but only because it is not for their turn and if admitted would like a Bomb thrown into their Garrison blow up and lay wast their Main Strength and force them to desert and give up a Cause which they are now especially most Zealously Fond of and seem resolv'd even against Reason to Maintain 27. For I must further remarquâ— and 't is an
the importunity of the Men I argue with Which indeed is the present Case since as was intimated in the Beginning the Sentiment of these Men concerning the disbelief of things above Reason resolves at last into this Principle that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth Which therefore both for their Satisfaction and Refutation must be shewn to be False 4. Now when I say that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth my meaning is that it is not that Common Standard whereby Truth in the General is to be Measured so that of every thing it may be safely Concluded that it is either true or not true according as it accords with this Measure as 't is comprehensible or not Comprehensible by Human Reason 'T is true indeed there is a certain Sense in which Human Reason sometimes is and may be truely said to be the Measure of Truth in as much as whatever the Understanding does clearly and distinctly Perceive may be concluded as most certainly true it being impossible that a thing should be otherwise than as we clearly perceive it to be without supposing our Perceptive Faculties to be in themselves Naturally False and without supposing it also necessary that we should fall into Errour even in the right use of these Faculties it being impossible to conceive a More right use of them than to Assent only to what we clearly Perceive which are not only in themselves manifest Absurdities but such also as would necessarily infer the Authour of our Natures to be also the Authour of our Errours and Deceptions It must therefore be admitted by all what the Philosophers of the Cartesian way so earnestly stand and Contend for that Clearness of Perception is the great Rule and Criterion of Truth so far that whatever we do clearly and distinctly perceive to be true is really in it self True But then this is only to be a Partial and inadequate Rule and in some certain limited respect only not absolutely and in general For though I grant that whatever we clearly perceive is true yet I deny that it follows likewise Backwards that whatever is true we do also clearly Perceive and so consequently that whatever we do not clearly Perceive is therefore not True By which it is plain that this Cartesian Maxim must be very much abused to prove that Human Reason is the Common and General Measure of Truth and I dare say the Great Authors of it never intended it to that purpose 5. Reason or Understanding in general may be safely said and must necessarily be allow'd to be the Measure of Truth For Truth in general carries a necessary Relation to understanding in general as fully adequate and commensurate to it So that all Truth is simply and absolutely intelligible the greatest and sublimest Truths as much as the least and meanest those which the Angels study and desire to look into as much as those which employ the narrow Thoughts of the poorest Rustic The Former are in themselves as intelligible as the latter and if not actually so well understood 't is not because of any incapacity in the Objects but by reason of the Disproportion of the Faculties that are Conversant about them But this disproportion must not be Universal nor extend throughout the whole Order of Being For what is intelligible must be so to some Understanding since what no Understanding can Comprehend is the same as not to be intelligible and consequently there must be an Understanding that Comprehends all that is truly intelligible that is all Truth And accordingly it may be truly said of this All-Comprehensive Understanding that it is the Measure of Truth so that whatever this perfect Understanding does not understand is not intelligible and if not intelligible then also not True Besides that it might be further Consider'd were this a proper place for so Abstract and Metaphysical a Speculation that Truth it Self as to the real Nature and Essence of it is one and the same with the Divine Ideas as they are related to one another and does therefore exist Originally and intirely in the Mind of God who is Substantial Truth and accordingly does Comprehend all Truth and so consequently is the Measure of it And because this All-comprehensive Understanding is contain'd within the Extent of Reason or Understanding in General therefore it may be truly said also of Reason or Understanding in General that it is the Measure of Truth it being most certain that what is above all Reason or what no Reason whatsoever can Comprehend is as much above Truth too and cannot possibly be true 6. But though it be thus necessary to allow this of Reason in General the same cannot be allow'd of Human Reason For whatever is the Measure of Truth must be fully adequate and Commensurate to Truth That 's Certain And therefore if Human Reason be the Measure of Truth it must have the same compass and extent with Truth and possess it whole and intire if not Essentially and Substantially as God does yet at least Noetically and by way of Theory so as to be able thoroughly to Perceive and Comprehend all Truth But now that this Qualification cannot possibly agree to Human Reason though it be somewhat unreasonable that I should be put to prove such a Proposition as this I hope fully to demonstrate upon a Double Consideration one taken from the Nature of Human Reason and the other from the Nature of Truth 7. And first to begin with Truth This as the Most thinking and Metaphysical Persons Conceive of it is supposed to consist in the Relations of equality or inequality or Agreement or Disagreement Now we are to Consider that these Relations may be of Three Sorts either such as are between Created Beings or such as are between Intelligible Ideas or such as are between Created Beings and their Ideas And we are also to Consider that there are two General Sorts of Truths extremely different one from another and therefore carefully to be distinguish'd Those that regard only the Abstract Natures of things and their immutable Essences independently on their actual Existence And others again that do regard things that do actually Exist The former of these Constitute that Order of Truths which we call Necessary the latter that which we call Contingent And this double order of Truths results from that threefold Relation before-mention'd From the first and third Relations arise Contingent Truths which are nothing else but the Relations of agreement of disagreement that are either between Created Beings themselves or between Created Beings and their Ideas And these I call Contingent Truths in opposition to those that are Necessary and Eternal partly because these Relations could not begin to exist before those Beings were produced it being impossible that there should be Relations between things that are not and partly because these Relations might not have existed because those Beings might not have been produced And as Contingent Truths arise from the first and third
so from the second and middle Relations result those Truths which are Necessary Eternal and Immutable and which I understand to be nothing else but the Relations of Agreement or Disagreement that are between Ideas 8. I go here upon the common and allow'd Distinction between Necessary and Contingent Truths and upon the as much allow'd Supposition that there is such an Order of Truths as are Necessary and Eternal which therefore I take for granted as a Principle not to decline the trouble of proving it but because it is a Confess'd as well as Evident thing and I care not for proving any more evident things than I needs must And that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are in this precisely distinguish'd from those that are Contingent that they are the Relations that are between Ideas I think is plain from the very Notion and Nature of them because they are supposed to be such Truths as regard the Abstract Natures and Essences of things as they are in Idea and not as they have an actual Existence in rerum Naturâ since then they would not be necessary but Contingent Truths which would be contrary to the Supposition And Because these Necessary Truths are the most considerable and principal sort of Truths as being the Ground and Foundation of all Science and the true and proper Objects of our Theory and Contemplation and because for the same Reason whenever we speak of Truth Absolutely and in General we are presumed to mean necessary and immutable Truth hence it is that Truth is commonly said by Metaphysical Writers to consist in the Relations that are between Ideas though indeed this be strictly true only of Necessary Truth But it is sufficient to the present purpose that it is true of this And so much I suppose will readily be granted me at least that the general Nature and Reason of Necessary and Eternal Truths consists in the Relations that are between Ideas 9. I further add that these Ideas must be the same with the Divine Ideas 'T is true indeed that exactly speaking all Ideas are Divine Ideas even those which we use to call our own it being most Certain as might easily and with the greatest Evidence be shewn that the immediate Objects of our Understandings are no other than the Ideas of the Divine Intellect in which we see and contemplate all things But not to enter into this sublime Speculation at present it will be sufficient to consider that unless the Ideas whose Relations Constitute those Truths which are Necessary and Eternal be the Divine Ideas it will be impossible that Necessary and Eternal Truths should be what we suppose they are that is Necessary and Eternal For Necessary and Eternal Truths must be Necessary and Eternal Relations and it being impossible that Relations should be more Necessary or Eternal than the Subjects from which they result unless these Ideas the Subjects of these Relations be Necessary and Eternal how can their Relations be so 'T is plain therefore that these Ideas must be Necessary and Eternal But now I pray what Ideas are so but the Divine What is there in the whole Compass of Being that is Necessary Eternal and Immutable but God and his Divine Perfections As therefore we say that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are Relations between Ideas and not such as are between either Created Entities themselves or between them and their Ideas because then they would be of the Order of Contingent not of Necessary Truths For the same reason we must say that they are the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas those only being sufficiently steddy and Permanent Subjects to sustain such Stable and Immutable Relations And indeed were it not for those Representative Perfections of the Divine Nature which we call Ideas there would be no Necessary and Eternal Essences to support these Necessary and Eternal Relations and then there could be no such Relations and if no such Relations then there could be no Necessary Truths and is no Necessary Truths then no Science Which by the way would most Convineingly prove to any Capable and Attentive Understanding the absolute Necessity and Certainty of a God as the most inmost Ground and Central Support of the whole Intellectual World 10. Well then it can no longer be doubted but that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas But now as these Ideas are Infinite as being the Essential Perfections of God and really identify'd with his Divine Nature and Substance so it must necessarily follow that the Relations that result from them and subsist between them must also be Infinite And then since these Truths do essentially Consist in and in their Reason and Formality are no other than these Ideal Relations it no less evidently follows that Truth also must be Infinite too 11. Which also will be necessary to Conclude upon another Account For I confider again that since Relations do not in reality differ as distinct Entities from their Subjects and Terms as the Relations of two Circles supposed to be equal to each other do not really differ from the Circles themselves so related these Ideal Relations must in the reality of the thing be one and the same with the Divine Ideas themselves and consequently with the Divine Nature with which these Ideas are identified And accordingly Truth which is the same with these Ideal Relations must also as to the real Essence and Substance of it be one and the same with the Divine Nature 12. And that indeed it is so may be further and somewhat more directly demonstrated thus That God is the Cause of whatever is besides himself or that whatever is is either God or the Effect of God is a clear and acknowledg'd Principle Necessary Truth then is either God or the Effect of God But it is not the Effect of God and therefore it can be no other than God himself Now that it is not the Effect of God the many gross Absurdities which that supposition draws after it I think will oblige him that Considers them to acknowledge For First if Necessary Truth be the effect of God either it would not be necessary which is against the Supposition or if it be then as being a necessary Effect it must have a necessary Cause that is a Cause necessarily determin'd to act and so God would be a necessary Agent even ad extra He would also be an unintelligent Agent The Consequence is not to be avoided For if Truth be the effect of God then antecedently to the effecting of it there was no Truth and consequently no Knowledge because there could be nothing known and so God in the production of Truth if indeed he did produce it must be supposed to act altogether in the dark and without any Intelligence Again if Truth be the Effect of God then the Perfection of the Divine Understanding must be supposed to depend upon something that is not God nay upon something created
by God whereas God is the true perfective Object of all his Creatures and is himself completely Happy in the sole Contemplation of himself ' Tâ—will follow again that God has constituted an Order of Realities which he has not â—ower to abolish that he has made some things which he cannot unmake again And lastly to add no more If Truth be the Effect of God then it cannot be God because God cannot produce what is Himself and if it be not God then by the Supposition there will be something Necessary Immutable Eternal and Independent c. that is not God Which last Consequence as it contradicts the Common and Natural Sentiment of Mankind so it struck so hard against a certain very Thoughtful and Metaphysical Head that he could not forbear urging this as One Argument against the very Being of Necessary Truth because then as he pretends there would be something Necessary besides God not considering that this Necessary Truth is really one and the same with the Divine Substance Which one Consideration puts by the whole force of his Argument against the Being of Necessary Truth though however it be sufficiently conclusive of the Point we now contend for that this Truth is not the Effect of God For if it were then his Allegation would take place that is there would indeed be something Necessary besides God which though it does not follow from the Supposition of the Being of Necessary Truth is yet plainly inseparable from the other Supposition that of its being the Effect of God For then the very next Consequence is that there would be something Necessary besides God which no Religious nor indeed Rational Ear can bear 'T is plain therefore that Truth is not the Effect of God and since it is not it remains by vertue of the premised Disjunction that it can be no other than the very Substance and Essence of the Deity 13. And to this purpose I further consider That the whole Perfection of the Mind does consist in its union with God who is her only true Good This seems to me a Proposition of a very shining Evidence For the good of the Mind must of necessity be something Spiritual otherwise it would be of a Nature inferiour to herself and so not capable of being her Perfection But neither is that enough Whatever is the good of the Mind must not be only of a like Nature with the Mind that is of a Spiritual but of a superiour Nature too It must be something above the Mind that can be its Perfection and that can act upon it and inlighten it and affect it with pleasing Sensations otherwise how can it be able to add any thing to its better Being or Perfection And in order to all this it must also be intimately present to it and united with it otherwise how can it so act upon it But now God is the only Spiritual Being whom we can possibly conceive thus qualified to be the good or perfective Object of our Minds Whence it follows that he only is so and that we cannot become either more Perfect or more Happy in any Kind or Degree but by our Union with and Possession of God And hence it further follows that Truth could not be any Perfection of our Understandings if it were not the same with the Divine Essence since that is our only perfective and beatifying Object and that therefore since it really is perfective of our Understandings and that in the very highest measure the Understanding being then most Perfect when it has the clearest and the largest view of Truth it can be no other than the very Essence of that Infinite Mind who is the only true Good and Objective Perfection of all Spirits 14. 'T is true indeed Des Cartes makes all Truth even that which is Eternal to have been positively instituted and establish'd by God to depend upon him as the Summus Legislator to be the effect of his Will and Pleasure and by Consequence to be Absolutely and Originally Arbitrary and Contingent So that according to him 2 and 2 might not have been 4 or 3 Angles of a Triangle might not have been equal to 2 Right ones if God had pleas'd so to Order it But this Notion of this Great Man does so rudely Shock the Natural Sense of Mankind that it cannot find Admission even where the rest of his Philosophy does but is generally exploded notwithstanding the eminency of its Author and that even by one of his greatest Admirers and as I think by far the Most Considerable of his Disciples And truly I think this Opinion is treated no worse than it deserves since besides the Absurdities already Mention'd it shakes the Foundations of Science yea and of Morality too by supposing the Natures not only of Metaphysical and Mathematical Truth but even of Moral Good and Evil to be of a Positive and Arbitrary and Consequently of a Contingent Ordination It is therefore deservedly as well as generally rejected but then let those that reject it have a Care that they fall not into a worse Absurdity As they would not suppose Truth to be of a Positive and Alterable Nature and that the Relations of Ideas might have been otherwise than they are so let them have a Care how they make any thing Necessary and Immutable that is Not God Let them be Consistent with themselves and as they justly reject the Opinion that makes Truth the Effect of God's Free and Arbitrarious Constitution and consequently of a Mutable and Variable Nature so let them own and Confess as they are Obliged to do that it is no other than God himself For there is no other way of avoiding Des Cartes's Absurdity For if Truth be not God then 't is the Effect of God and if the Effect of God then since the Constitutions of God are Free and Arbitrary the Natures and Relations of things might have been quite otherwise than they are the whole Science of Geometry might be transposed a Circle might have the Properties of a Square and a Square the Properties of a Circle 2 and 2 might not have been 4 or what else you will instance in And so in Morality too which is of far worse Consequence there might have been the like transposition what is Vertue might have been Vice and what is Vice might have been Vertue These are the Natural Consequences of Truth 's being the Effect of Divine Constitution and they are intolerable ones too and therefore the Principle from which they flow is by the general Current of Writers well denied But then unless they proceed and acknowledge Truth to be one with the Divine Essence they cannot help relapsing into the same or worse Absurdities For whoever says that Truth is not God must say that it is the Effect of God and whoever says that must either say that 't is Arbitrary and Contingent or if he says it is Necessary and Immutable he must allow of something Necessary and Immutable
that is not God But now it being most Evident that there is nothing Necessary that is not God if Truth be not God then 't is plain that it cannot be Necessary which presently runs us into the Cartesian Absurdity of the Arbitrary Position of Truth or if it be Necessary then 't is as plain that it must be God The short is Truth is either God or the Effect of God If it be not God then 't is the Effect of God as Des Cartes says But if not the Effect of God as the Consequent Absurdities from that Principle demonstrate and as is generally granted then 't is God himself as we say It must be one or the other there is no Medium To say that Truth is God or to say that 't is the Effect of God are each of them Consistent Propositions though from the gross Absurdities of the Latter the Former only appears to be the right but to deny that 't is the effect of God and yet not to say that it is God that is to affirm that 't is neither the Effect of God nor yet God is all over unmaintainable and inconsistent If it be not the Effect of God as is both generally and justly acknowledg'd then it must of Necessity be God since whatever is is either God or the Effect of God 15. And indeed if Truth be not God how comes it to be Cloath'd with the Glorious Ensigns of his Majesty to wear the Characters of his Divinity and to have so many of his peculiar and incommunicable Attributes How comes it to be Necessary Immutable Eternal Self-existent Increated Immense Omni-present and Independent and that not only upon the Conceptions of any Minds whether Human or Angelical but even all things whatsoever which might never have been made or might now be annihilated without any Prejudice to the being of Truth which does not respect the natural and actual Existencies but only the Abstract Essences of things For were there no such thing as any real Circle or Triangle in Nature it would still be never the less true that their Abstract Essences would be determinate and invariable and that such and such distinct Properties would belong to them Which by the way plainly Convinces that Truth is none of the Effects Works or Creatures of God since it did exist before them does not now depend on them and would remain the self-same Immutable thing without them But then I demand whence has it this Self-subsistence and Independency of Being Whence again has it its fix'd and unalterable Nature such as we can neither add any thing to nor diminish ought from How is it that it is Present in all Places and to all Minds so as to be Contemplated by them all at the same time and after the same Manner How comes it to pass that we cannot so much as dis-imagine it or by way of Fiction and Supposition remove it out of Being but it still returns upon us with a strong and invincible Spring since even the very Supposition that there is no Truth carries a Formal Proposition in it whose Ideas have a certain Habitude to each other and so Contradicts it self Besides how comes it to be a Perfection of the Divine Understanding Is any thing a Perfection to God but himself How comes it also to be the Rule and Measure of his Will which can be determin'd by nothing but what is just Reasonable and True Can any thing be a Rule to God that is not himself Does he Consult or Follow any thing but what is One with his own Divine Nature and Essence And yet God consults and follows Truth and cannot act but according to its Immutable Laws and Measures It is not therefore really distinguish'd from him but Coeternal and Consubstantial with him and so in Consulting Truth he Consults his own Essence even the Divine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Eternal and Increated Wisdom the true intelligible Light in whom are all the Ideas and Essences of things the Fulness of Being and Truth who in the Beginning was with God and was God who is Eternally Contemplated by him with Infinite Joy and Complacency and who said of himself Incarnate I am the Way the Truth and the Life I would fain know how all these incommunicable Attributes of God should agree to Truth if it be any thing less than a Divine Nature Particularly I demand whence has it that unshakeable Firmness and Stability that invincible Permanency and Stedâ—astness that Necessity of Existence that utter repugnance to Not Being but only because it is really Coessential and Consubstantial with him whose Name is Iehovah and who is Being it self to whom it is Essential to Exist or rather whose very Essence is Existence 16. But now from this Coessentiality and Consubstantiality of Truth with the Divine Nature a Noble and Sublime Theory but which I do but lightly touch over having not room here to pursue it at large it evidently and necessarily follows again that Truth is Infinite There cannot be a more immediate nor a more necessary nor a more inseparable Connexion between any two things than between this Consequence and that Principle And indeed if Truth were not Infinite how can the Knowledge of God be so Not sure as Concretely and Objectively Consider'd for that manifestly implies the Infinity of its Object And what is the Object of the Divine or of any other Understanding but Truth And should Knowledge here be taken for the Power or Faculty of Knowing to what purpose is an Infinite Power of Knowing unless there be an Infinite to be Known And would not such a Power be uneasie and afflictive as well as useless to him that had it unless the Object be supposed to carry due Proportion to it For if it be so uneasie a Reflexion to some of us to have such short and narrow Faculties when the Compass of Truth has so large and spatious an extent to be able to know so little when there is so much to be known how much more troublesom and painful would it be to the Supreme Intelligence to have an Infinite Understanding when all that is intelligible is but Finite Would not that Infinity of his Capacity serve to vex and disquiet him more than the Narrowness of ours does us the difference being as much as between having a great Stomach and but little Meat and a little Stomach when there is a great deal of Meat whereof which is the greatest Punishment is Obvious to imagine And we may judge of this in some measure by our selves We have in us a Capacity boundless and unlimited For tho' our Understandings be Finite our Wills know no Measure and are in a manner Infinite As God has made us capable of enjoying an Infinite Good so Nothing less than that can satisfie our Desires For we desire Good as Good and consequently all possible Good Now we find this to be a great Pain to us at present to desire an Infinite Good
In the mean while though man knows not how many Orders of Intelligent Creatures there are above him yet 't is with great Reason and Consent presumed that there are none below him so that he is placed even by his own Confession in the lowest Form of the Intellectual Order And why then may not his Understanding as much as he values himself upon it be of so Shallow a Depth and so low a Size that even Finite Objects may be disproportionate to him Especially since we find him so often puzzl'd and gravell'd in Natural things as also in those Ideal Truths that have relation to the Natural and Ectypal World such as Philosophical and Mathematical Problems Or if the Reason of any Creature could be the Measure of Truth why should he be that Creature who is seated in the very Confines of the Material and Immaterial World and is as it were the Common-Point where Matter ends and Spirit begins who brings up the rear of the Intellectual kind and is both the youngest and the least indow'd among the Sons of God 31. These Considerations sufficiently shew that there is no Necessity nor so much as Probability that Human Reason should be the Measure of Truth even upon the Supposition of its being Finite Which indeed is enough of it self to carry the Point Contended for as far as the Design of the present Argument is Concern'd For if it be not necessary that Human Reason should be the Measure of Truth then it is Possible that it may not be and if it is Possible that it may not then we can be never Sure that it is and if we cannot be Sure that it is then we cannot Use it as a Measure which as I have remarqu'd already and for the Moment of it do here reinculcate makes it the same to all intents and purposes as if it were not such at all But yet to carry our Plea a little highter I further Contend that as the foregoing Considerations suffice to shew that Human Reason may not so there is One behind that very positively Demonstrates that it Cannot be the Measure of Truth even tho' we should allow it to be of a Finite and bounded Nature as well as our own understandings 32. As there are many things whereof our Ideas are very Confuse and Obscure so 't is most 〈◊〉 that there are some things 〈◊〉 we have no Ideas at all it 〈◊〉 not pleas'd the Eternal and 〈◊〉 Intelligence to Exhibit that in Himself which is Representative of those things to our Understandings But now besides the Difficultys and disadvantages we shall always ly under in the Comprehension of things from the Confuseness and Obscurity of our Ideas which of it Self will many times render those things and also whatever nearly relates to those things incomprehensible by us and besides that our not having any Ideas of Certain things is an invincible Bar to all Knowledge and Comprehension of those things unless we could be supposed to be able to see without Light 't is also further Considerable that possibly the Knowledge of that Truth which we set our Selves to Comprehend and whereof we have the Ideas may depend upon the truth of another thing whereof we have no Idea If it should be so tho Truth in general be never so Finite or the Particular Truth we would Contemplate be never so Finite 't is plain we shall be no more able to Comprehend it than if it were Infinite Now I say that 't is not only Possible that this may be the Case which yet of it Self as I have again and again Noted is sufficient to debar us from using our Reason as the Measure of Truth but there are also some Instances wherein it appears actually to be so We know well enough what we mean by Liberty and Contingency and are withal well assured that we are Free Agents We have also a Sufficient Notion of Prescience and are also no less assured of the Reality of it And because both these are true and there can be no real repugnance between one Truth and another we are also by Consequence assured that there is a good Harmony and Agreement between them and that they are Consistent with each other But now how to adjust their apparent Opposition or reconcile those Instances of seeming Contradiction and inconsistency wherewith they press us this we neither Know nor are able with all our Meditation to Comprehend and that because we have not an Idea of the Human Soul without which there is no possibility of Comprehending how its Free Workings may be the Objects of Prescience tho our Ideas of Prescience and Liberty were never so Clear Or if this Instance shall not be thought so proper because the Men with whom our present Concern lies are pleas'd to disown the Doctrine of Prescience let me desire them to Consider whether there be not many other Difficulties concerning Human Liberty besides that taken from Prescience which they are no more able to get over then they are that And that for the very same Reason even because they ahve not an Idea of the Soul upon the Knowledge of which the Solution of those as well as some other Difficulties in Morality does Necessarily depend Or if they please let them take an Instance of a Physical Nature We know well enough what it is to be in a Place and we know also as well what it is to be Coextended to a Place But now how Being in a Place may be without Coextension to a Place this is what we cannot Comprehend tho as to the thing it Self upon other Considerations constrain'd to grant it and that because we are ignorant of the general Nature of Spirit upon the clear Conception of which the Comprehension of the other does so depend that it cannot be had without it And indeed we may concluded in general that when ever we have clear Ideas of things and yet are not able to Comprehend the Truth of them 't is because the Knowledge of those things depends upon the Truth of something else whereof we have either no Idea or not such as is sufficiently Clear Which must be the true Reason of the hitherto presumed impossibility of finding out the exact Proportion between a Circle and a Square Why Circle and Square are very Intelligible things and how come we then not to be able to determin the precise and just Proportion that is between them It cannot be from any Obscurity in the things themselves much less from our want of having Ideas of them for we have as clear and exact Ideas of these Figures as we can have of any thing in the World It must be therefore because the Knowledge of their Proportion depends upon the Knowledge of some other thing whereof the Idea fails us which till we are posses'd of we shall in vain endeavour to discover the other Whereby it plainly appears that we are not only uncapable of Comprehending those Truths that relate to things whereof we
have no Ideas but that even where we have Ideas and those very Clear ones too we may be as far from Comprehending a Truth as if we had none merely upon the account of the Dependence which that Truth has upon some other thing whereof we have not at least a just Idea Which single Consideration is enough for ever to spoil Human Reason for setting up for the Measure of Truth even upon the Supposition of its being Finit So very False is that arrogant Assertion of a Modern Philosopher Quaecunque existunt humanae Menti pervestigabilia praeterquam Inâ—initum Whatever is may be thoroughly Comprehended by the Mind of Man except Infinite And again Vnum duntaxat est quod omnem mentis nostrae vim longissime excedit ipsâque suâ Naturâ ut in se est ab eâ Cognosci nequit Inâ—initum puta There is but one only thing that far exceeds the Force and reach of our Mind and that cannot of its own very Nature be known by it as it is in it self namely Infinite What but One thing excepted from the Verge and placed beyond the reach of Human Knowledge 'T is well that One thing is a pretty large one but sure the Authour was ignorant of something else that is Himself or else he could never have advanc'd such a Crude and ill-consider'd a Proposition 33. And thus I have shewn at large in a rational way by arguing a Priori and from the Nature of things that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth and that even upon the most Liberal Supposition of its being Finite And if it be not so supposing Truth to be Finite much less is it supposing it what it has been prov'd to be of an Infinite Nature If upon the Former Supposition it exceeds the Proportion of our Reason certainly upon the latter there will be no Proportion between them But whether our Reason bears no Proportion to Truth or whether it be only Disproportionate to it either way it follows that it cannot be the Measure of it which I cannot but now look upon as a Proposition sufficiently demonstrated And in all this I contend for no more than what is implied in that Common and universally approv'd Maxim even among those of the Rational way that we ought not to deny what is Evident for the sake of what is Obscure or depart from a Truth which we see a Necessity to admit because of some Difficulties attending it which we cannot solve which they say is an Argument only of our Ignorance and not of the Falshood of the thing This indeed is a true Rule and such as must be allow'd to hold good in all our Reasonings let the Matter of them be what it will Only I wish that the Implication of the Rule were as much minded as the Rule it self is generally receiv'd For it plainly implies that there are some things which though plain and certain as to their Existence are yet incomprehensible and inexplicable as to their Manner But then as the Incomprehensibility of the Manner should not make us reject the Truth of the thing when otherwise Evident so neither should the Evidence we have of the Truth of the thing make us disown the Incomprehensibility of the Manner since it is so far from being against the Nature of Truth that it should be incomprehensible that you see we have discover'd even from the Contemplation of its Nature that there are incomprehensible Truths Of which I might now subjoyn some particular Examples but that I should fall very deep into a Common Place being herein prevented by many other Writers particularly by the admirable one of L' Art de Penser to the First Chapter of whose Fourth Book I refer my Reader where he shews by several and some of them uncommon Instances that there are things which the Mind of Man is not capable of Comprehending After which he Concludes with a very grave and useful Reflection which for the great advantage and Pertinency of it to the present Affair though I refer my Reader to the rest of the Chapter I shall here set down The Proâ—it says he that one may draw from these Speculations is not barely to acquire the knowledge of them which of it self is barren enough but it is to learn to know the Bounds of our understanding and to force it to confess that there are things which it cannot Comprehend And therefore it is good to fatigue the mind with these kind of Subtilties the better to tame its Presumption and abate its confidence and daringness in opposing its Feeble Lights against the Mysteries of Religion under the Pretence that it cannot comprehend them For since all the Force of Human Vnderstanding is constrain'd to yield to the least Atom of Matter and to own that it sees Clearly that it is infinitely divisible without being able to Comprehend how this may be Is it not apparently to transgress against Reason to refuse to believe the wonderful effects of the Divine Onnipotence Merely for this Reason that our Vnderstanding cannot Comprehend them Yes without doubt it is as will better appear in the sequel of this Discourse In the mean while before I take leave of the Subject of this Chapter I have a double Remarque to make upon it 34. The First is that since Truth in its full extent is Incomprehensible we should not vainly go about to Comprehend it but be contented to be ignorant in many things And since there are some special Truths in particular that are incomprehensible we should not apply our Thoughts to the Comprehension of all things at a Venture as some who are for understanding every thing but sit down first and Consider whether they are proportionate to our Capacities or No and as far as we can learn to distinguish what Truths may and what may not be Comprehended by us that so we may not lose that Time and Pains in the Contemplation of them which might be profitably imploy'd in the Consideration of other things better suted to our Capacity As a great many do who busie themselves all their Lives long about such things which if they should study to Eternity they would not Comprehend and that indeed because they require an Infinite Capacity to Comprehend them Whereas the shortest Compendium of Study and the best way to abridge the Sciences is to study only what we can Master and what is within the Sphere of our Faculties and never so much as to apply our selves to what we can never Comprehend 35. The other Remarque is that the Conclusion prov'd in this Chapter does very much Fortifie and Confirm that which was undertaken to be made out in the last Concerning the Distinction of Things Above and Things Contrary to Reason For if there are Truths which we cannot Comprehend then it seems what is above our Comprehension may yet be True and if True then to be sure not Contrary to Reason since whatever is Contrary to Reason is no less
Contrary to Truth which though sometimes above Reason is yet never Contrary to it CHAP. V. That therefore a things being Incomprehensible by Reason is of it self no Concluding Argument of its not being True 1. AS there is nothing in Man that deserves his Consideration so Much and Few things without him that deserve it More than that part of him wherein he resembles his Maker so there is Nothing more worthy of his Consideration in that part or that is at least more necessary to be Consider'd by him than the Defects of it without a due regard to which it would not be very safe for him to dwell much upon the Consideration of the other as being apt to seduce him into â— ride and Vanity to blow him up with Self-Conceit and so by an imaginary Greatness to spoil and corrupt that which is Genuine and Natural 2. Now the Defects of our Intellectual part Consider'd in their general Heads are I suppose Sin Ignorance and Errour And though Sin in it self must be allow'd to be of a worse Nature and Consequence than either Ignorance or Errour however some may fancy it a greater Reproach to 'em to have their Intellectuals question'd than their Morals and so upon that score may require more of our Consideration yet upon another account the Defects of the Understanding seem to need it more than those of the Will since we are not only apt to be more proud of our Intellectuals than of our Morals but also to Conceit our selves more Free and Secure from Errour than we are from Sin though Sin in the very Nature and Principle of it implies and supposes Errour 3. Pride the presumed Sin of the Angels is also the most Natural and Hereditary one of Man his dominant and most cleaving Corruption the Vice as I may call it of his Planet and Complexion And that which we are most apt to be proud of is our Vnderstandings the only Faculty in us whose limits we forget In other things we are Sensible not only of the general Bounds of our Nature but also of the particular narrowness of them and accordingly do not attempt any thing very much beyond our Measure but contain our Selves pretty reasonably within Our Line at least are not such Fools as to apply our Strength to Move the Earth out of its place or to set our Mouths to drink up the Sea or to try with our Eyes to look into the Regions beyond the Stars But there is hardly any Distance but to which we fancy our Intellectual Sight will reach scarce any Object too bright too large or too far remov'd for it Strange that when we Consider that in us which makes us Men we should forget that we are so And yet thus it is when we look upon our Understandings 't is with such a Magnifying Glass that it appears in a manner boundless and unlimited to us and we are dazzled with our own Light 4. Not that it is to be presumed that there are any who upon a deliberate Consideration of the Matter have this Form'd and express Thought that their Understandings are Infinite Human Nature seems hardly capable of such Excess But only as the Psalmist says in another Case of some Worldly Men that their Inward Thought is that their houses shall continue for ever Not meaning that any could be so grossely absurd as positively and explicitly to Conceive that their Houses any more than their own Bodies should last always and never decay but only that they had such a kind of a wandring and Confuse Imagination secretly lurking in their Minds and loosely hovering about them so in like manner there are a sort of People who are Parturient and teeming with a kind of Confuse and unform'd Imagination tho' perhaps they never bring it to an express and distinct Thought that their Understandings have no bounds or limits belonging to them tho' they cannot deny but that they have if directly put to the Question 5. Accordingly you shall find those whose Conduct betrays this inward Sentiment who venture at all in their Studies stick at nothing but will undertake to give a Reason for every thing and positively decide whatever Comes in their way without Suspense or Reserve imagining confusely at least they have a Comprehension of all things and that there is nothing too hard or knotty for them nothing but what they either actually do or are capable of Comprehending if they once set themselves to it And from hence they roundly Conclude that whatever they are not able to Comprehend is not true and accordingly deny their Belief to whatever transcends their Comprehension 6. Now I confess there is no fault to be found with the Consequence of these Men nor with their Practice as it relates to that Consequence which are both as far as I can see exceeding right if their Principle be once admitted For if indeed it be really so that Human Reason is adequate and Commensurate to Truth so that there is no Truth but what it is able to Comprehend then it will certainly follow that whatever it cannot Comprehend is not True and there will need no other nor better Argument of the falshood of any thing than the Incomprehensibility of it For their Reasoning resolves into this Form Whatever is true we can Comprehend This we do not Comprehend Therefore this is not true Or thus If whatever is true we can Comprehend then what we cannot Comprehend is not true But whatever is true we can Comprehend Ergo c. Where 't is plain that if the Major of the First or the Minor of the Second Syllogisin wherein the Principle of these Men is Contain'd be allow'd there will be no avoiding the Conclusions of them So that if we admit that Human Reason is Comprehensive of all Truth we are not Consistent with our Selves if we do not also grant that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is a just Warrant to Conclude it not True 7. But then on the other side if this Mighty Principle upon which such a Weight is laid and such great things built be false if Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth as I think is with great Evidence Demonstrated in the last Chapter then is not the Consequence as good this way that therefore a thing 's being Incomprehensible by Reason is no Concluding Argument of it 's not being True For how are we inconsistent with our Selves if granting Human Reason to be Commensurate to Truth we deny that the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be True but only because in denying that we Contradict our Principle or which is all one Suppose the Contradictory Proposition to it to be true viz. that Human Reason is not Commensurate to Truth But now if in saying that the Incomprehensibility of a thing does not argue it not to be true we in the Consequence of what we affirm Suppose that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth then 't is as plain that the
Supposition of Reason's not being the Measure of Truth will also Oblige us to say that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of it 's not being True Whereby it is plain that the Consequence is every whit as good thus Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument that it is not True as thus Human Reason is the Measure of Truth therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument that it is not True The only Reason why he that denies this latter Consequence upon the Supposition or Concession of this latter Principle is inconsistent with himself being this because in denying the latter Consequence he Supposes the Former Principle which Principle therefore must as much inter the Consequence that Supposed it viz. That a things being Incomprehensible by Reason is no Warrant to Conclude that it is not true 8. And because this Principle that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth has been already proved at large I look upon the grounds of this Consequence as already laid and therefore to shew the Connexion that is between the one and the other besides what I have even now said to that purpose need only add this further Remarque That since Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth or since there are Incomprehensible Truths then it seems the Incomprehensibility of a thing and the Truth of a thing may Consist together or in other words the same thing may be at once True and Incomprehensible But now there cannot be in the whole Compass of Reasoning a more certain or more evident Maxim than this That that which is when a thing is or would be supposing it were is no Argument that it is not As for Instance Suppose it should be Objected against the Copernican Hypothesis of the Motion of the Earth that it is repugnant to Sense since we see the Sun and the Stars Rise and Set and Move round about us It is thought a sufficient Answer to this to say That supposing the Earth and not the Sun did really Move these Appearances would yet be the same as they are now since Sailing as we do between the Sun and the Stars as a late Writer expresses it not the Ship in which we are but the Bodies which surround us would seem to Move And 't is most Certain that if supposing the Earth did really Move the Motion would yet seem to be in the Sun and Stars then the seeming Motion of those Bodies is no Argument that the Earth does not Move 9. Why just so it is in the present Case when 't is Objected against the Truth of a thing that 't is Incomprehensible by Human Reason 't is a sufficient Answer to say that this argues nothing since if the thing were true it might yet be Incomprehensible And 't is most certain that if supposing a thing to be True it might yet be Incomprehensible then the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no good Objection against the Truth of it And therefore since we have proved that there are Incomprehensible Truths and Consequently that the Truth of a thing and the Incomprehensibility of the same thing may Consist together we may now with all Rational assurance Conclude that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument that it is not True any more than the seeming Motion of the Sun is an Argument against the real one of the Earth since the Former would be even Supposing the Truth of the Latter And both by Vertue of this most Evident and incontestable Principle That what may Consist with the Truth of any thing can be no good Argument that it is not True 10. And indeed when it shall be Consider'd how many things surpass our Conception when we are Children which yet we are able well to Comprehend when we are Men how many things again are beyond the Ken of Ignorant and Illiterate Men which yet are very Intelligible and Shine forth with full Light to the Men of Art and Learning and how many things again even among the Learned are now discover'd and well understood by the help of Algebra which were Mysteries to former Ages and are still beyond even the Imagination of those who have not that Noble and Wonderful Key of Knowledge When again it shall be further Consider'd how many of those things which we cannot even with the Assistance of that Commanding Key unlock in this state of Mortality we may yet have a clear view of in that of Separation when deliver'd from the Burthen of our Flesh and that many of those things which are too high for us then may yet be of a level with the Understanding of Angels and that what is above their Capacity may yet be most clearly and distinctly perceiv'd by the Infinitely penetrating and All-Comprehensive Intellect of God I say he that shall but seriously enter into this single Reflection must needs discover himself much wanting in that Stock of Sense and Reason he pretends to if he still continue to Measure the Possibilities of things by their Proportionableness to his Understanding or Conclude any thing False or Impossible when he has no better Reason for it but only because he cannot Comprehend it CHAP. VI. That if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true Human Reason would then be the Measure of Truth 1. AS there is Nothing more Common than for people to hold Certain Principles that have an inseparable Connexion with very bad Consequences and yet not professedly to hold those Consequences because either they do not attend to them or are not sensible that they do indeed follow from such Principles whereof we have two very pregnant Instances in the Maintainers of the Predestinarian and Soliâ—idian Systemes so on the other hand and for the same Reason there are those who take up and with great Fixedness adhere to certain Consequences without Professedly holding those Principles from which they truly flow and to which if traced to the Head they will infallibly lead them 2. Of this we have a very particular Instance where I confess one would not expect to find it in those of the Socinian Perswasion The Reason these Men of Reason give why they will not believe the Mysteries of the Christian Faith is because they are above their Reason they cannot Comprehend them Whereby they plainly imply that they will believe Nothing but what they can Comprehend or that Nothing is to be believ'd that is Incomprehensible which is also a common Maxim among them who accordingly make Above Reason and Contrary to Reason to be one and the same thing And whereas 't is only the untruth of a thing that can make it unfit to be the Object of Faith in saying they will not believe what they cannot Comprehend they do as good as say that what they cannot Comprehend is not True and so that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is a just warrant to conclude it
False And all this they own and expresly declare if not in these very terms yet at least in such as are equivalent to them as is too Notorious and well known to need any Citations for the proof of it But now though they do thus professâ—dly own that the Incomprehensibility of a thing by Reason is an Argument of its not being true yet that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth or that all Truth is Comprehensible by it are as I take it Propositions which they do not openly and professedly avow For as I noted in the Introduction 't is such an Odious and Arrogant Assertion that they cannot with any Face of Modesty or common Decency make a plain and direct Profession of it though at the same time 't is most Certain that this is the true Principle of that Consequence which they do professedly hold viz. that the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be true and that this Consequence does as necessarily lead back to that Principle 3. For as if Human Reason be the Measure of Truth it follows in the descendintg line as a direct Consequence that the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be true so it follows as well Backwards per viam ascensûs that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be True then Human Reason is the Measure of Truth Since if it were not the Incomprehensibility of a thing as is shewn in the Preceding Chapter would then not argue it not to be True If therefore it does 't is plain that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth Which Principle whoever disowns ought also to renounce the other Proposition viz. That the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument of its untruth which if yet he will imbrace notwithstanding 't is plain he holds the Consequence without its Principle and has indeed no Reason for what he Affirms 4. For as he who granting Human Reason to be the Measure of Truth denies yet that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument of its not being true is therefore inconsistent with himself because in so doing he supposes the Contradictory to what he had before granted viz. that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth So he that Affirms that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument of its not being True and yet denies that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth is also as inconsistent with himself because in so doing the supposes the Contradictory to his own Assertion and does in effect say that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not an Argument of its not being True as most Certainly it would not be in case Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth as the foregoing Chapter has sufficiently shewn The short is if the Not being of A proves that C is not then the being of C proves that A is since if it were not according to the First Supposition C could not be And so here if Reason's not being the Measure of Truth proves that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not an Argument of its not being True then if the Incomprehensibility of a thing be an Argument of it 's not being True 't is plain that Reason is the Measure of Truth since if it were not then according to the first Supposition the Incomprehensibility of a thing would not be an Argument of its not being True 5. For how I pray comes the Incomprehensibility of a thing to conclude the untruth of it I cannot Comprehend such a thing therefore it is not True where 's the Consequence By what Logic does this Latter Proposition follow from the Former why we have here the Minor Proposition and the Conclusion and to make a Complete Argument of it we must add another thus If it were true I should Comprehend it but I do not Comprehend it therefore it is not true Whereby it appears to the eye that my not being able to Comprehend a thing is no otherwise an Argument of the â—â—â—â—truth of it than as it is first preâ—â—pposed that if it were true I should 〈◊〉 â—ble to Comprehend it Which again resolving into this Absolute â—â—â—â—osition that I am able to Comprehend all Truth it plainly follows that if my inability to Comprehend a thing be an Argument that it is not true then I am able to Comprehend all Truth and that my Reason is the Measure and Final Standard of it 6. I Conclude therefore that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of it 's not being true then Human Reason will be the Measure of Truth and that they that hold the Former ought also if they will be Consistent with themselves to admit the Latter But because this is a False Principle that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth therefore I Conclude again that the Consequence that Resolves into this Principle is also False since we may as well Conclude a Consequence to be False because it leads back to a False Principle as a Principle to be False because it is productive of a bad Consequence Which still further Confirms and Establishes the Conclusion of the last Chapter viz. That the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of its untruth which you see is now proved both Backwards and Forwards and so made impregnable on all sides We have proved it Forwards by shewing the Falseness of that Principle that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth and by thence arguing the said Conclusion and we have also proved it Backwards by shewing that the Contrary Supposition Resolves into that False and already Confused Principle And I do not see how any Conclusion can be better proved CHAP. VII That therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no just Objection against the Belief of it With an Account of the Cartesian Maxim that we are to Assent only to what is Clear and Evident 1. T Is a Wonderful thing to Consider the Caprice of Human Nature by what unaccountable Springs it's Movements are ordered and how odly and unsteddily Men act and manage themselves even in the same Circumstances and in Relation to the same Objects Sometimes the Obscurity and Mysteriousness of a thing shall be a Motive of Credibility and recommend it the rather to their Belief Thus you shall have a great many reject that Philosophy as idle and Chimerical which undertakes to explain the Effects of Nature by insensible Particles their different Bigness Figure Contexture Local Motion Rest c. Merely because this is a plain Simple and Intelligible Account such as they can easily and well Conceive The very easiness and clearness wherewith they Conceive these Principles is Made an Objection against them though indeed it be a good Presumption for them and for that very Reason they will not believe them to be the true Principles of Nature whose Effects they fancy must be Resovled into Causes more hidden and Abstruse And accordingly they find in themselves a greater inclination to lend attention to
those that shall undertake the Solution of them by the real Chimeras of Substantial Forms Qualities Sympathys Antipathys c. or that shall go to account for them by the yet more Obscure Principles of the Chymists striking and filling their Ears with those great but empty Sounds Archeus Seminal Spirit Astral Beings Gas Blas c. which they receive with great satisfaction not for their Scientific Light for they are dark as may be mere Philosophic Cant but only because they are Mysterious and Abstruse and therefore they fancy there must be somewhat more than Ordinary in them tho they know not nor it may be never Consider'd what And herein as in some other Instances Men love Darkness better than Light 2. But then at another time you shall have them inquiring after Truth as Diogenes did after an Honest Man with a Candle in their hands and not caring to go a step any further than they can see their way Now upon a sudden they are all for Clear and distinct Ideas Full and adequate Perceptions Demonstrative Proofs and Arguments and nothing will serve or Content them but Light and Evidence and they will believe nothing but what they can Comprehend Strange diversity of Conduct Who would think two such vastly distant extreams should meet together I will not say in the same Man but in the same Human Nature and that the very same Creature and such a One as Stiles it self Rational too should proceed by such uncertain Measures and act so inconsistently with it Self sometimes embracing a thing for the sake of it's Obscurity and sometimes again in another Fit making that alone an Invincible Objection against the Belief of it 3. But it is plain by the foregoing Measures that it is not For since Truth is the general Object of Faith 't is evident that nothing can argue a thing to be absolutely incredible or not reasonable to be beleiv'd but that which at the same time argues it not to be True For if true then 't is still within the Compass of the general Object of Faith But now we have shewn already that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of it 's not being true whence it clearly and closely follows that 't is no Argument neither against it's Credibility And if so then we may believe it Notwithstanding it's Incomprehensibility because we may believe whatever is not Absolutely incredible So that there is no Necessity that we should discard every thing we cannot Conceive as unworthy of a Rational Belief or that what is Above our Reason should be therefore above our Faith too 4. It is true indeed that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is in it Self no proper and direct Argument why it should be believ'd and he would be thought to give but an ordinary account of his Faith who being askâ—d why he believ'd such an Incomprehensible thing should answer because it is Incomprehensible which at best could pass only for a Religious Flourish much such another as Credo quia impossibile And that because the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not directly and per se a Criterion of Truth whether it may be per Accidens may be Consider'd afterwards whose Natural and genuin Character is not Obsecurity but Light and Evidence Not that nothing is True but what has this Character for we have already shewn the Contrary in proving Incomprehensible Truths but that as whatever we clearly perceive is True so our Clear perceiving of a thing is the only sign from the Intrinsic Nature of the thing it Self of the Truth of it Incomprehensibility therefore is none but as such abstracts from true and not true and is equally Common to both But now that which may Consist with a thing supposing it false can no more prove it True than that which may Consist with a thing supposing it True can prove it false according to the Tenour of the Fifth Chapter The Incomprehensibility therefore of a thing is no proper Argument of the Truth of it and Consequently no Reason of it Self why it should be believ'd and that because it abstracts as such from True and False and is too Common to Both to prove either 5. And because it is so it is also further granted that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not only in it Self no proper Reason why it should be believ'd but has also so far the Nature of a Disswasive from believing as to be a Caution against a too hasty Belief till there appear some other Motive from without either from Reason or Authority that shall determin the Assent In the mean while it advises to Suspend For the Incomprehensibility of a thing being as such No Reason why a Man should believe it 't is plain that if he did believe it Consider'd only as in that State he would believe it without Reason That therefore is a Reason why he should suspend a Negation of Reason being enough to with-hold ones Assent though to give it one had need have a positive Reason When therefore a thing appears Incomprehensible that indeed is sufficient Reason to suspend our Belief till some prevailing Consideration from without shall over-rule that Suspension by requiring our Assent But when it does so then the Incomprehensibility ought to be No Argument to the Contrary and it would be every whit as absurd to reject a thing now because of its Incomprehensibility as to believe it before for that Reason And that because as the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no reason for Believing it so it is no Absolute Reason against it 6. If it were so it would be in Natural things the objects of Human and Philosophic Science such as belong properly and immediately to the Province and Jurisdiction of Reason Here if any where the Incomprehensibility of a thing would forbid all Assent to it And so it is supposed to do by some who though far from denying the Belief of Incomprehensible things in Religion will yet tell you that in Physical Contemplations Clearness and Evidence is to lead the way and we are to proceed with our Light before us assenting to nothing but what we well Comprehend In Matters of Faith indeed they will allow that Reason is to be submitted to Revelation and that we are to believe many things which pass our Comprehension but in Matters of pure Reason they will have us go no further than Reason can carry us Which indeed is right enough it their Meaning be that we are to Assent to Nothing but what upon the whole Matter all things Consider'd from without as well as from within we have reason to believe true and that we are never to proceed to judge or determin without some Evidence or other but then this will equally hold in Matters of Faith too which is too rational an Assent to be given at a Venture and we know not why and whose Formal Reason as has been already discours'd is always Clear But if their Meaning be that in Matters
of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what has an internal Evidence and what in its self and by its own Lights is Comprehensible by us as they seem to mean or else their distinction of the Case of Reason and the Case of Revelation is here impertinent then I conceive that they set too narrow limits to our Assent in Matters of Reason when they allow it to be given only to things which in this sense are Evident to us For 't is plain that there are many things in Nature which we fee are True and must be True and so not only may but cannot help Assenting to them though at the same time we are not able to Comprehend how they are or can possibly be 7. Not that our Assent is then Blind and wholly without Evidence for then we might as well Assent to the contrary as to what we do and would do better not to Assent at all but only that it has none from within and from the intrinsic Nature of the Object but only from some External Consideration much after the same manner as it is in â—atch In both which there may be a Clear Reason why we should Assent to an Obscure thing But then as the internal Obscurity does not destroy the External Evidence so neither does the External Evidence strike any Light into the internal Obscurity or in other words as the Reason for Assenting is never the less Clear because the Matter assented to is Obscure so neither is the Matter assented to ever the less Obscure because the Reason for assenâ—ing to it is Clear And yet notwithstanding this internal Obscurity of the Matter we assent to it because of the prevailing Light of the External Evidence And this we do not only in Matters of Faith according to the Restriction of some but in the things of Nature and Reason too where we are oftentimes forced by the pressing urgency of certain External and Collateral Considerations to assent to things internally obscure and whose very possibility we cannot Comprehend as is plain in the great Question of the Divisibility of Quantity and other Instances whereof every Thinking Man's Obseâ—â—ation cannot but have already furnish'd him with variety The Incomprehensibility then of a thing is non just Objection against our Assent to it even in Matters of a Rational Nature much less then is it in Matters of Faith For if not in Matters that belong to the Court of Reason and where she sits as Judge then much less in things that are not of her proper Jurisdiction and if notwithstanding the internal inevidence of an Object we think fit to assent to it upon Rational Considerations much more may we and ought we upon the Authority of the Infallible God 8. Indeed if whatsoever is Above our Reason were also as some pretend as Contrary to it and there were nothing true but what was also Comprehensible and so the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then I conâ—ess we could not as Rational Creatures assent to an incomprehensible Proposition upon any Consideration whatsoever No not even that of Divine Authority 'T is true indeed there could then be no such Authority for Incomprehensible things But if there were 't is impossible we should regard it because we could not have greater assurance either of the Existence or of the Truth of it than we have already upon this Supposition that the things reveal'd are not true But now if this Supposition be no more than a Supposition if to be above Reason does not involve any Contrariety to it if there are incomprehensible Truths and Consequently the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument oâ— it s not being true all which has been already proved then 't is plain that what is an incomprehensible may yet be a Believable Object because within the Possibility of Truth and then to render it actually believ'd there needs only some External Evidence either from Reason or Authority For what should hinder our Assent to an Incomprehensible thing when we have plain Evidence from without for it and its own internal Obscurity is no Argument against it 'T is plain therefore that we ought to give our Assent And since we do so oftentimes upon a Ground of Reason much more ought we upon that more Firm and Immoveable ground of Revelation The short is whatever is no Objection against the Truth of a thing is none against the Credibility of it since Truth is the General Object of Faith unless you will say that a thing is unfit to be believ'd upon any other account besides want of Truth and therefore since we have already shewn that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Truth of it it visibly follows that it is no Argument against the Belief of it neither Therefore an Incomprehensible thing may be believ'd and accordingly he that refuses to believe any thing is bound to give a better Reason for it than because it is Incomprehensible 9. If it be said that this is reason enough because Faith is a Rational Act and therefore what is above the Comprehension of Reason is as much above a Rational Belief to this besides what I have already remarqu'd upon this Occasion in the Chapter of Faith I here further reply that it is true indeed and on both sides agreed that Faith is a Rational Act but in what Sense is the Question There are two very different Senses according to which it may be said to be so either in regard of the Clearness of its Formal Reason or in regard of the Clearness of its Object Either because it is founded upon an External Evidence or Argument for believing or because it proceeds upon an Internal Evidence that appears in the very Nature of the thing Believ'd Iâ— Faith be said to be a Rational Act in the latter Sense the Assertion is then False for so that â—s in respect of the Object we have shâ—wn it to be an inevident Assent But i◠〈◊〉 be said to be a Rational Act in the former Sense then indeed it is true but nothing to the purpose since nothing hinders but that this External Evidence may well consist with an Internal Inevidence or in other words that the Clearness of the Reason for Believing may stand with the Obscurity of the Object Believ'd And therefore though Faith be a Rational Act yet it does not hence â—ollow that what is Above Reason is also above Faith and cannot rationally be believ'd because the Act of Faith is said to be Rational Not in respect of the Evidence of the Object but only that of its Formal Reason or Motive And therefore though there be no Evidence in the Object yet it is not thereby render'd uncapable of being the Matter of Faith because the Evidence which Faith as a Rational Act supposes is wholly of another kind There seems indeed a kind of opposition as to the Sound between Faith's being an Act of Reason
Incomprehensible But if by Evidence here be Meant Evidence at large abstracting from Internal or External and the Sense be that we are to assent to nothing but what has some Evidence or other either Internal or External or what is some way or other evident to us and what we see plainly to be true by a Light shining from within or from without in short what we have one way or other sufficient ground or Reason to assent to then the Maxim is undoubtedly true and will hold Universally not only in Matters of Reason but also in Matters of Faith too which as was shewn in the Chapter of Faith is the Conclusion of a Syllogism and so a Rational Act and proceedt upon as Much though not the Same kind of Evidence as any other Conclusion does And that even in the Belief of Incomprehensible things which it would be absurd nay impossible to believe if there were no Reason to believe things above Reason According to a saying as I take it of St. Austin in one of his Letters to this purpose That we could not bring our selves to believe what is Above our Reason if Reason it self did not perswade us that there are things which we should do well to believe although we are not capable of Comprehending them So then in â—hort if this Maxim that we are to assent to nothing but what is Evident be understood of Internal Evidence then 't is False not only in Matters of Faith but also in Matters of Reason wherein things intrinsecally inevident are assented to But if it be understood of Evidence at large then â—tis true not only in Matters of Reason but also in Matters of Faith which as has been often noted is reasonable in its Fund and Principle and whose Evidence must be Clear though its Object may be Obscure 14. In this large therefore and indefinite Sense of the Word Evidence the Maxim is to be understood We are to assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident that is we ought to make use of our liberty of Suspension so far as not to give our Assent to any thing but what all things Consider'd and upon the whole appears Evident to us what by some Light or other we see and plainly perceive to be true and what in one word we find sufficient Reason either from within or from without to Assent to According to that well known Sentence wherewith Des Cartes Concludes his wonderful System Nihilque ab ullo Credi velim nisi quod ipsi Evidens invicta ratio persuadebit I would have nothing believ'd by any one but what by evident and irresistible reason he shall be Convinc'd of And certainly he would be very unreasonable that should desire more For to assent without Evidence of one sort or other that the thing assented to is true is to assent without a why or wherefore and to assent so is to assent without Reason which again is to assent not as a Rational Creature and as Man ought not so to be sure God cannot require such an Assent To assent therefore to nothing but what upon some Consideration or other is Clear and Evident to us and what we have good reason to imbrace as true is certainly a Maxim of unquestionable Truth and of universal Extent that holds in all Matters whatsoever whether of Reason or of Faith in the former of which an Assent without Evidence would be the Act and in the latter the Sacrifice of a Fool. 15. And that this is the true Sense wherein Des Cartes intended his Maxim as well as the true Sense of the Maxim it self is plain from the Occasion of it which as all know who are not utter Strangers to or very Negligent Readers of his Books was the bringing in and obtruding so many things in the Vulgar Philosophy whereof the Introducers of them had such Confuse Notions and of whose reality and Existence they had no Firm and Solid Reasons to assure them such as Substantial Forms really inhering Accidents and Qualities and the like which served rather to darken than clear up the Science of Nature and were the Occasions of a thousand Errours in the Superstructures that were rais'd upon those Imaginary and Chimerical Principles In Opposition to and as a Remedy for which he lays down this Fundamental Maxim to be Carefully observ'd by all the Disciples of Truth in their whole Intellectual Progress never to assent to any thing but what is Clear and Evident that is to nothing but of Whose Truth and Reality they are fully assured and have sufficient Reason to assent to This is the true Sense of the Maxim this is the Sense of its Author and in this Sense it is undeniably true And that without any prejudice to our present Conclusion with which as thus explain'd it is very Consistent For 't is now very easie to discern that we may believe an Incomprehensible thing and yet at the same time according to this Cartesian Maxim assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident because the Evidence of Faith is External and that there may be an External Evidence to assent to a thing Internally Inevident is no Contradiction 16. Which by the way may serve to discover as well the Injustice as the Impertinence 1. Of those who make use of this Maxim as an Objection against the Belief of things above Reason 2. Of those who take occasion from hence to traduce the Cartesian Philosophy as favourable to and looking with a very propitious Aspect upon Socinianiâ—â— and indeed as little better than an Introduction to it only because it talks so much of clear and distinct Ideas and Conceptions and of assenting to nothing but what is Clear and Evident But Most of all 3dly Of those who proceed even to traduce the Author himself as a secret Friend to the Cause and no better than a Socinian in Disguise It would have been indeed a Considerable Glory and Advantage to that or any other Interest to have had so great a Master of Reason a Friend to it But he Certainly was not if with his Words he has transmitted to us his real Thoughts which would be great uncharity to question and with a witness to Assent to what is not Evident 17. He was indeed a great Master in the Rational way but no Magnifier or Exalter of Human Reason So far from that that he seems to have had the most inward and feeling Sense of its Infirmities and Defects and the best to have understood what a poor little thing 't is to be a Man of any one in the World As may be abundantly Collected from several passages in his Writings besides that the whole vein of them runs that way particularly those two final Sentences wherewith he shuts up his Principles and his Metaphysics At Nihilominus memor meaetenuitatis nihil affirmo c. and Naturae nostrae infirmitas est agnoscenda Which plainly shew what a low debasing Sense he had both of Himself and of
much Heathenized Religion of some Christians may also very deservedly retire behind the Curtain and decline coming to the Light for fear the Absurdities and Monstrous Inconsistencies of it should be laid open But certainly there is not any thing neither Doctrine nor Precept in that true Religion that is reveal'd by God in Evangelical Christianity that need fly the Light of Reason or refuse to be tried by it Christian Religion is all over a Reasonable Service and the Author of it is too reasonable a Master to impose any other or to require as his Vicar does that Men should follow him blindfold and pull out their eyes to become his Disciples No he that Miraculously gave Sight to so many has no need of nor pleasure in the Blind nor has his Divine Religion any occasion for such Judges or Professors For it is the Religion of the Eternal and uncreated Wisdom the Divine Word the true Light of the World and the Universal Reason of all Spirits and 't is impossible that he should reveal any thing that Contradicts the Measures of sound Discourse or the immutable Laws of Truth as indeed it is that any Divine Revelation should be truly Opposite to Right Reason hower it may sometimes be Above it or that any thing should be Theologically true which is Philosophically False as some with great profoundness are pleas'd to distinguish For the Light of Reason is as truly from God as the Light of Revelation is and therefore though the latter of these Lights may exceed and out-shine the former it can never be Contrary to it God as the Soveraign Truth cannot reveal any thing against Reason and as the Soveraign Goodness he cannot require us to believe any such thing Nay to descend some degrees below this he cannot require us to believe not only what is against Reason but even what is without it For to believe any thing without Reason is an unreasonable Act and 't is impossible that God should ever require an unreasonable act especially from a Reasonable Creature 5. We therefore not only acknowledge the use of Reason in Religion but also that 't is in Religion that 't is chiefly to be used so far are we from denying the Use of it there And it is a little unfairly done of our Adversaries so much to insinuate the Contrary as they do For I cannot take it for less than such an Insinuation when they are arguing with us against the Belief of the Christian Mysteries to run out as they usually do into Harangues and Flourishes whereof by the way I know none more guilty than the Author of Christianity not Mysterious about the Reasonableness of the Christian Religion and the Rational Nature of Faith what a Reasonable Act the One is and what a Reasonable Service the Other is c. as if we were against the Use of Reason in Religion or were for a Blind Groundless and Unaccountable Faith or if because we hold the Belief of things above Reason therefore we are for having no Reason for our Belief This I say is an unfair Insinuation and such as argues some want either of Judgment or Sincerity I don't know which in those that suggest it For they seem plainly by running so much upon this Vein to imply as if it were part of the Question between us whether there be any Use of Reason in Religion or whether Faith is to be Founded upon Reason or No. But Now this is no part of the Controversie that lies between us we acknowledge the Use of Reason in Religion as well as they and are as little for a Senseless and Irrational Faith as they can be This therefore being Common to us both is no part of the Question and they do ill to insinuate that it is by so many Popular Declamatory Strains upon the Reasonableness of Religion and in particular of Faith whereas they do or should know that the thing in Question between us is not whether there be any Use of Reason to be made in Believing but only what it is or wherein the true Use of it does Consist 6. Now this we may determine in a few words having already laid the grounds of it For since the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument against the Truth of it nor Consequently against the Belief of it as is shewn in the three foregoing Chapters it is plain that the proper Office and Business of a Believers Reason is to Examin and Inquire Not whether the thing proposed be Comprehensible or not but only whether it be Reveal'd by God or No since if it be the Incomprehensibleness of it will be no Objection against it That therefore ought to be no part of its Questistion or Deliberation because indeed it is not to the purpose to Consider whether such a thing be when if it were it would be no just Objection The only Considerable thing then here is whether such a Proposition be indeed from God and has him for its Author or no. And here Reason is to clear her Eyes put the Matter in the best Light call in all the Assistance that may be had both from the Heart and the Head and determine of the thing with all the Judgement and all the Sincerity that she can But as to the Comprehensibility or Incomprehensibility of the Article this is quite besides the Question and ought therefore to be no part of her scruting or debate since if it were never so much above her Comprehension it would be never the less proper Object for her Belief 7. The Sum is the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Belief of it therefore in the believing of a thing the proper work of my Reason is not to Consider whether it be incomprehensible But when a thing is proposed to me as from God all that my Reason has to do in this Case is Seriously Soberly Diligently Impartially and I add Humbly to Examine whether it comes with the true Credentials of his Authority and has him for its real Author or no. This is all that Reason has to do in this Matter and when she has done this she is to rise from the Seat of Judgement and resign it to Faith which either gives or refuses her Assent Not as the thing proposed is Comprehensible or not Comprehensible but as 't is either Revealâ—d or not Reveal'd CHAP. IX An Application of the foregoing Considerations to the Mysteries of Christianity 1. HAving thus raised the Shell of our Building to its due â—itch we have now only to Roof it by making a Short Application of the Principles laid down and setâ—led in the Former Chapters to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion against the Truth and Belief of which it plainly appears from the Preceding Considerations that there lies now no Reasonable Objection For if Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth and if therefore the Incomprehensibility of a â—hing to Human Reason be no Argument of its 〈◊〉 being True
nor Consequently against its being Believ'd and if the only Use and Imployment of Reason in Believing be to Consider not the Internal Evidence of the thing whether the Article be Comprehensible or no but whether it be truly reveal'd by God I say if these things are so as we have abundantly prov'd them to be then from these Premises the Clear and undeniable Consequence is that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just reason why they should not be Believ'd and so thaâ— we may Believe them though we should suppose them what yet some deny to be Incomprehensible 2. Nay so far is the Incomprehensible Sublimity of these Mysteries from being a sufficient Objection against the Belief of them that Accidentally and indirectly it may be improved into a Considerable Argument for them and such as may serve to recommend them to our Faith inasmuch as it is a very strong Presumption that they are of no Human Origin but have God for their Authour it being reasonable to suppose that what does so very much transcend the Capacity of Man to Comprehend does no less exceed his Ability to invent And accordingly the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries for which some will have them to be false is made use of by a very Rational Authour as an Argument of their Truth And it may be worth while to let the Reader see how he Manages it in relation to One of the Most Sublime of them The more Obscure are our Mysteries Strange Paradox the more Credible they now appear to me Yes I find even in the Obscurity of our Mysteries receiv'd as they are by so many different Nations an invincible Proof of their Truth How for instance shall we accord the Vnity with the Trinity the Society of three different Persons in the perfect Simplicity of the Divine Nature This without doubt is Incomprehensiblâ— but not Incredible It is indeed above us but let us Consider a little and we shall believe it at least if we wâ—ll be of the same Religion with the Apostles For supposing they had not known this ineffable Mystery or that they had not taught it to their Successours I maintain that it is not Possible that a Sentiment so extraordinary should find in the Minds of Men such an Vniversal Belief as is given to it in the whole Church and among so many different Nations The More this Adorable Mystery appears Monstrous suffer the Expression of the Enemies of our Faith the More it Shocks Human Reason the More the Imagination Mutinies against it the more Obscure Incomprehensibâ—â— and Impenetrable it is the less Credible is it that it should Naturally insiâ—â—ate it self into the Minds and 〈◊〉 of all Christians of so many and so distant Countries Never do the same Errours spread universally especially such sort of Errours which so strangely offend the Imagination which have nothing sensible in them and which seem to Contradict the most Simple and Common Notions If Iesus â—hrist did not Watch over his Church the Number of the 〈…〉 would quickly exceed that of 〈◊〉 â—â—â—hodox Christians For 〈…〉 in the Sentimen◠〈…〉 that does not 〈…〉 the Mind And 〈…〉 that 〈…〉 to our Vnderstandings may establish themselves in time But that a Truth so Sublime so far removed from Sense so Cross to Human Reason so Contrary in short to all Nature as is this great Mystery of our Faith that a Truth I say of this Character should spread it self Vniversally and Triumph over all Nations where the Apostles had Preach'd the Gospel supposing that these First Preachers of our Faith had neither known any thing nor â—aid any thing of this Mystery this Certainly is what cannot be Conceiv'd by any one that has never so little knowledge of Human Nature That there should be Heretics that should oppose a Doctrine so Sublime is nothing strange nor am I surprized at it On the Contrary I should be very much if never any body had opposed it This Truth wanted but little of being quite oppress'd 'T is very possible For 't will be always reckon'd a Commendable Vndertaking to attaque that which seems to Clash with Reason But that at length the Mystery of the Trinity should prevail and should establish it self Vniversally wherever the Religion of Iesus Christ was receiv'd without its being known and taught by the Apostles without an Authority and a Force Divine there needs methinks but an Ordinary Measure of good Sense to acknowledge that nothing in the World is less Probable For it is not in the least likely that a Doctrine so Divine so above Reason so remov'd from whatever may strike the Imagination and the Senses should Naturally Come into the Thought of Man 3. You see here how this Excellent Person strikes Light out of Darkness by improving even the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries into an Argument for the Truth and Credibility of them and so turning the Artillery of our Adversaries against themselves This indeed is a bold Atchievement anâ— as Fortunate a one too for I think there is a great deal of Force and Weight in his Reasoning But I need not push the Matter so far nor follow so home into the Enemies Camp as to plant their own Cannon against them 'T is sufficient to the design of the present undertaking and as much as I am led to by the Principles before Establish'd to Conclude that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no Argument against them This therefore I insist upon and if my Reason mightily deceive me not dare ingage finally to stand to For if as it has been shewn the Incomprehensibility of a thing in general be no Conclusive Argument against either the Truth or the Credibility of it then since Negative Propositions do separate the Attribut from the Subject according to all the Extent which the Subject has in the Proposition what Consequence can be more Clear than that the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries is no Argument against the Belief of them I Conclude therefore that it is None and that they ought never the less to be believ'd for their being Incomprehensible supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd 4. Whether they are so or no is besides my Undertaking at present to examin nor need I ingage my Pen in this Question since the Affirmative side of it is so Obvious to every Eye that can but read the Bible and has been withal so abundantly and convincingly made good by those abler hands which have gone into the Detail of the Controversie and undertaken the particular defence of the Christian Mysteries This part of the Argument therefore being so well discharged already I shall Concern my self no further with it than only in Consequence and Pursuance of the Former Principles to bestow upon it this one single Necessary Remarque viz. That as the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just Objection against the Belief of them supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd so neither is it a just Objection
against their being so Reveal'd supposing the plain obvious and literal Construction of the Words does naturally and directly lead to such a Sense And that it does so is not I think offer'd to be denied and the thing it self is plain enough to extort an acknowledgement but then 't is pretended that there is a Necessity of having recourse to a different Construction and to understand the words in another Sense because of the unconceivableness and incomprehensibleness of that which their proper and Grammatical Scheme does Exhibit But by the Tenour of this whole Discourse it evidently appears that there is no such Necessity since to admit an incomprehensible Sense has nothing absurd or inconvenient in it and that because the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of the Untruth of it From whence it plainly follows that 't is no more an Objection against its being Reveal'd than 't is an Objection against the Belief of it supposing it were Reveal'd there being nothing but the untruth of a thing that can be a reasonable Obstruction against either 5. We are therefore to take the Words of Scripture according to their proper and most Natural Sense and not seek out for Forc'd and Strain'd Interpretations upon the account of the Incomprehensibility of that which is apparently Genuin and Natural And if the Revelation be otherwise plain and such as we would accept of in another Case and about matters which we can well Comprehend we ought not to think it the less so because the Sense of it so understood is such as we cannot reconcile to our Apprehensions and Conceptions of things For notwithstanding that it may be true since by this time we may be sufficiently satisfied that there are many Incomprehensible Truths The Incomprehensibility of a thing is therefore no Argument against its being Reveal'd any more than 't is against the Belief of it supposing it were Which opens an immediate Entrance to the Christians Mysteries which I doubt not would be thought sufficiently Reveal'd were it not for the incomprehensibility of them the only Objection that can be pretended against their Revelation 6. I have hitherto argued upon the Supposition that the Mysteries of Christianity those Doctrines I mean that are so call'd are above Reason and such as do transcend our Comprehension and have shewn that even upon that Supposition there is no reasonable Objection against the Belief of them that they are never the less Believable for their being Incomprehensible But what if I should recall this Concession and put our Adversaries to the proof that they are indeed above Human Reason and Comprehension They cannot be ignorant that there are those that Contend they are not and with great shew of reason offer to prove it by endeavouring to render a Conceivable and Intelligible Account of them If these Men should be in the right which I do not think necessary at present to inquire into it would be a further Advantage to our Cause and such as though I do not now insist upon it I need not lose the Benefit of But if it should prove that they are not in the right the Cause of our Christian Mysteries is not much Concern'd in the loss of that Pillar but can support it self well enough without it as having another that is sufficient to bear its weight since though we should suppose these Sacred Doctrines to be never so Incomprehensible to our Reason it does by no Consequence follow as from the Argument of this whole Discourse is apparent that therefore they may not be due Objects of our Faith 7. Should any one now be so fond of Objection as to draw one against the Mysteries of Christianity from the use of the Word Mystery in Scripture which knows no other Mysteries but such as before the Revelation of them were undiscover'd not Considering whether they were in themselves Conceivable or no I must tell him that I do not know that ever I met in any Controversie with a less pertinent Objection as much as it is made of by a late Bold Writer who heaps together a great many Texts to shew the signification of the Word Mystery in the New Testament that it signifies not things in themselves inconceivable but only such as were not known before they were Reveal'd Well be it so as this Gentleman pretends though I believe upon Examination it would appear otherwise yet what is this to the purpose For do we Dispute about Names or Things The Question is not whether the Scripture expresses inconceivable things by the Name of Mysteries but whether there be not things in Scripture above our Conception call them by what Name you will and if there be whether their being so above our Conception be an Argument why they should not be Believ'd Now to these inconceivable things it has been the Common Use of Church-Writers to apply the Name of Mysteries which if the thing be granted he must be a great Lover of Cavil and Wrangle that will Contend about it But the Learned Bishop of Worcester has already prevented me in the Consideration of this Objection for which reason together with the Frivolousness of it I shall pursue it no further CHAP. X. The Conclusion of the whole with an Address to the Socinians 1. AND thus I have led my Reader through a long Course of Various Reasoning and perhaps as far as he is willing to follow me though I hope his Journey has not been without some Pleasure that may deceive and some Profit that may in part reward the Labour of it I have shewn him what Reason is and what Faith is that so he may see from the Absolute Natures of each what Habitude and Relation they have to one another and how the Darkness and Obscurity of the Latter may Consist with the Light and Evidence of the Former I have also Consider'd the Distinction of things Above Reason and things Contrary to Reason and shewn it to be real and well-grounded and to have all that is requisite to a good Distinction And for the further Confirmation of it I have also shewn that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth From which Great Principle which I was the more willing to discourse at large and thoroughly to settle and establish because of its Moment and Consequence to the Concern in hand I have deduced that weighty Inference that therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument of its not being true which Consequence for the greater Security of it because it is so Considerable in the present Controversie I have also proved Backwards by shewing that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then Human Reason contrary to what was before demonstrated would be the Measure of Truth Whence I infer again ex Absurdo that therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of its not being true From this last Consequence I infer another of no less Moment and
or other whether Principle or Conclusion For the way and method is the same in knowing a thing to be False or impossible as in knowing it to be True and accordingly as the Process of the Understanding is either Immediate or Mediate in the latter so is it also in the Former But though there are these different ways of perceiving the impossiblity of a thing 't is in the General Perception of its Impossibility and not in the several ways of it that its contrariety to Reason must be made Formally to consist Even as it was shewn before of Knowledge which is made to consist in the Perception of the Relation of Ideas and not in this or that determinate manner of perceiving it which indeed serve afterwards to distinguish Knowledge into its kinds as suppose Intuitive and Demonstrative but do not enter into its First and General Idea For which Consideration I think the Perception of a things impossibility does better express its Contrariety to Reason than the Repugnance it appears to have to some Principle or Conclusion of it that being only as I said before an instance and specification and but one single one too of its Impossibility 19. So Now we are arrived to a Clear and Distinct Conception of things Above Reason and things Contrary to Reason A thing is then above Reason when we do not Perceive or Comprehend how it can be And then Contrary to Reason when we do Perceive that it Cannot be or is Impossible As to give a plain and sensible Instance of each of these That the sides of an Hyperbola should be always approaching to each other and yet never meet though continued to infinity is a Proposition of unquestion'd Certainty in Geometry and yet such as passes the Reason of a Man to Comprehend how it can be and therefore may properly be said to be one of those things that are above Reason But now that a Triangle should have Parallel Sides is not only above Reason but directly Contrary to it For here the Understanding is not only at a loss to Comprehend how it may be but does positively and evidently perceive that it cannot be it being utterly impossible that a Figure of Three Lines should have its sides Parallel to each other 20. Now though by this Explanation of things above Reason and contrary to Reason the Difference between them is already obvious even to the eye and stares a Man in the very Face like things of great inequality whose Disproportion appears at View without Measuring them yet for further Satisfaction 's sake and to make the matter as plain as any thing in Nature to all but those who either have not or will not use their Understandings let us a little Compare these Ideas together thereby the better to illustrate their Difference 21. It is most Evident that the Idea of things above Reason and the Idea of things contrary to Reason are two really distinct Ideas and that One is Not the Other This immediately appears from the very direct View of the Ideas themselves For what can be More plain than that Not to Comprehend how a thing may be and to Comprehend that it cannot be are two different things And what better way have we to know the Distinction of things but only that the Idea of one is not the Idea of another But then besides the Ideas of these things are not only Formally different from each other but have also different Properties and Characters belonging to them and such too as are exclusive of each other and which therefore do manifestly shew the Ideas to which they belong to be distinct For for a thing to be above Reason implies only a Negation the Not Comprehending how a thing can be but for a thing to be Contrary to Reason implies the Position of an Intellectual act the Comprehending that it cannot be Again in things above Reason the Proposition is supposed not to be understood whereas in things Contrary to Reason it is supposed to be well understood and that to be false and impossible Again in things above Reason the Mind determines nothing concerning the Object proposed whether it be true or whether it be false whether it be Possible or whether it be Impossible All that she determines is concerning her own Act that she does not Comprehend how it can be But whether it be or not that she does not affirm but holds herself in a perfect Suspence But now in things Contrary to Reason the Mind is every whit as positive and decisive and does determine as boldly and freely as in those things that are most according to it Whereby it plainly appears that to be Contrary to Reason is something more than to be above it and that the Mind proceeds a great deal further in the former than in the latter the Language of the Soul in things above Reason being only How can these things be But in things Contrary to Reason she is Positive and Dogmatical roundly pronouncing This cannot be So that unless there be no difference between a Negation and a Positive Act between the Ignorance or Non-Perception of a thing and the knowing it to be False between Suspension and a peremptory Determination between a greater and a less 't is most undeniably evident that the Parts of this Distinction are not only really but widely different and that to be above Reason is one thing and to be contrary to Reason is another 22. If it be pretended as some perhaps may be likely to Object that to be Contrary to Reason implies a Negation as well as to be above Reason because it is there supposed to be Comprehended that the thing is False and cannot be and that therefore they agree in one of the Main instances of their Difference to this the Answer is Clear and Full. I grant there is a Negation in one as well as the other but then I distinguish of Negation There is a Negation of the Act and a Negation of the Object Contrary to Reason does indeed imply a Negation of the Object that is it implies a Separation and dis-union of certain Ideas as inconsistent and incompatible one with another But it does not imply a Negation of the Act but the quite Contrary because the understanding is here supposed positively to comprehend the thing and withal the Impossibility of it which is not done in things Above Reason wherein the Negation is that of the Act. So that this first and great difference between them stands firm and good 23. And now having thus far justified the reality of this distinction of things Above Reason and Contrary to Reason both by the Explanation and Collation of the Parts of it which thereby appear to consist of Ideas as different as can well be conceiv'd I might further proceed to do the same by producing some Instances of things confessedly Above Reason that are also notwithstanding as confessedly True For if any one thing that is Above Reason be yet found