Selected quad for the lemma: truth_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
truth_n	church_n	ground_n	live_a	1,680	5	9.4884	5	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A29193	Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last animadversions in the case concerning liberty and universal necessity wherein all his exceptions about that controversie are fully satisfied.	Bramhall, John, 1594-1663.	1657 (1657)	Wing B4214; ESTC R34272	289,829	584

But he who calleth him perfection it self acknowledgeth that all the perfection of the Creatures is by participation of his infinite perfection Such errours as these formerly recited do deserve another manner of refutation and when he is in his lucide intervalles he himself acknowledgeth what I say to be true That God is incomprehensible and immaterial And he himself proveth so much from this very attribute of God that he is infinite Ci. c. 15. s. 14. Figure is not attributed to God for every figure is finite Neither can he be comprehended by us for whatsoever we conceive is finite nor hath he parts which are attributed only to finite things nor is be more than one there can be but one infinite Whereas I called hell the true Tophet he telleth us gravely That Tophet was a place not far from the walls of Hierusalem and consequently on the earth Adding after his boasting manner That he cannot imagine what I will say to this in my answer to his Leviathan unlesse I say that by the true Tophet in this place is meant a not true Tophet Whosoever answereth his Leviathan will be more troubled with his extravagancies than with his arguments Doth he not know that almost all things happened to them as figures There may be a true mystical Tophet as well as a literal And there is a true mystical Gehenna or Vally of Hinnon as well as a literal He that should say that Christ is the true Paschal Lamb or the Church the true Hierusalem or John Baptist the true Elias may well justifie it without saying That by the true Paschal Lamb is meant no true Paschal Lamb or by the true Hierusalem no true Hierusalem or by the true Elias no true Elias VVhat poor stuff is this And so he concludeth his Animadversion with a rapping Paradox indeed True religion consisteth in obedience to Christs Lieutenants and in giving God such honour both in Attributes and actions as they in their several Lieutenancies shall ordain That Soveraign Princes are Gods Lieutenants upon earth no man doubteth but how come they to be Christs Lieutenants with him who teacheth expressely that the kingdom of Christ is not to begin till the general Resurrection His errours come so thick that it is difficult to take notice of them all yet if he had resolved to maintain his Paradox it had been ingenuously done to take notice of my reasons against it in this place First what if the Soveraign Magistrate shall be no Christian himself Is an Heathen or Mahumetan Prince the Lieutenant of Christ or a fit infallible Judge of the controversies of Christian Religion Are all his Christian subjects obliged to sacrifice to idols or blaspheme Christ upon his command Certainly he giveth the same latitude of power and right to Heathen and Mahumetan Princes that he doth to Christian. There is the same submition to both I authorise and give up my right of governing my self to this man whom he maketh to be a mortal God To him alone he ascribeth the right to allow and disallow of all doctrines all formes of worship all miracles all revelations And most plainly in the 42. and 43. Chapters of his Leviathan where he teacheth obedience to infidel Princes in all things even to the denial of Christ to be necessary by the Law of God and nature My second reason in this place was this What if the Magistrate shall command contrary to the Law of God must we obey him rather than God He confesseth That Christ ought to be obeyed rather than his Lieutenant upon earth This is a plain concession rather than an answer But he further addeth That the question is not who is to be obeyed but what be his commands Most vainly For if true Religion do consist in obedience to the commands of the Soveraign Prince then to be truly religiou●… it is not needful to inquire further than what he commandeth Frustra fit per plura quod fier●… potest per pauciora Either he must make the Soveraign Prince to be infallible in all his commands concerning Religion which we see by experience to be false and he himself confesseth that they may command their subjects to deny Christ or else the authority of the Soveraign Prince doth justifie to his subjects whatsoever he commands and then they may obey Christs Lieutenant as safely without danger of punishment as himself My third reason was this If true Religion do consist in obedience to the commands of the Soveraign Prince then the Soveraigne Prince is the ground and pillar of truth not the Church But the Church is the ground and pillar of truth not the Soveraign Prince These things write I unto thee c. that thou mayest know how thou oughest to behave thy self in the house of God which is the Church of the living God the power and ground of truth What the Church signifieth in this place may be demonstratively collected both from the words themselves wherein he calleth it the house of God which appellation cannot be applied to a single Soveraign much lesse to a Heathen Prince as their Soveraign then was And likewise by the things written which were directions for the ordering of Ecclesiastical persons The last Argument used by me in this place was ad hominem Why then is T. H. of a different mind from his Soveraign and from the laws of the Land concerning the Attributes of God and the religious worship which is to be given to him The Canons and Constitutions and Articles of the Church of England and their Discipline and form of Divine Worship were all confirmed by Royal authority And yet Mr. Hobbes made no scruple to assume to himself that which he denieth to all other subjects the knowledge of good and evil or of true and false religion And a judgement of what is consonant to the Law of Nature and Scripture different from the commands of his Soveraign and the judgement of all his fellow Subjects as appeareth by his book De cive printed in the year 1642. Neither can he pretend that he was then a local Subject to another Prince for he differed more from him in Religion than from his own natural Soveraign This Paradox hath been confuted before and some of those grosse absurdities which flow from it represented to the Reader to all which he may adde these folowing reasons First true Religion cannot consist in any thing which is sinful But obedience to Soveraign Princes may be sinful This is proved by the example of Jeroboam who established idolatry in his kingdom And the Text saith this thing became a sin It may be he will say this idolatrous worship was a sin in Jeroboam not in the people who obeyed him But the Text taketh away this evasion branding him ordinarily with this mark of infamy Jeroboam the son of Nebat who made Israel to sin Secondly true Religion cannot consist in obedience to contradictory commands But the commands of

as himself that accused the Church of England of●… Arminianisme for holding those truths which they ever professed before Arminius was born If Arminius were alive Mr. Hobbes out of conscience ought to ask him forgivenesse Let him speak for himself De libero hominis arbitrio ita sentio c In statu vero lapsus c This is my sentence of free will That man fallen can neither think nor will nor do that which is truly good of himself and from himself But that it is needfull that he be regenerated and renewed in his understanding will affections and all his powers from God in Christ by the Holy Ghost to understand esteem consider will and do aright that which is truely good It was not the speculative doctrine of Arminius but the seditious tenets of Mr. Hobbes and such like which opened a large window to our troubles How is it possible to pack up more errours together in so narrow a compasse If I were worthy to advise Mr. Hobbes he should neve●… have more to do with these old Philosophe●… except it were to weed them for some obs●…lete opinions Chrysippus used to say He sometimes wanted opinions but never wanted arguments but to stand upon his own bottom and make himself both Party Jurer and Judge in his own cause Concerning the stating of the question THe righ stating of the question is commonly the mid way to the determination of the difference and he himself confesseth that I have done that more than once saving that he thinketh I have done it over cautiously with as much caution as I would draw up a lease Abundant caution was never thought hurtfull until now Doth not the truth require as much regard as a lease On the other side I accuse him to have stated it too carelessely loosly and confusedly He saith He understands not these words the contversion of a sinner concerns not the question I do really believe him But in concluding That whatsoever he doth not understand is unintelligible he doth but abuse himself and his readers Let him study better what is the different power of the will in naturall or civill actions which is the subject of our discourse and morall or supernaturall acts which concernes not this question and the necessi●…y of adding these words will clearly appear to him Such another pitifull piece is his other exception against these words without their own concurrence which he saith are unsignificant unlesse I mean that the events themselves should concur to their own production Either these words were unsignificant or he was blind or worse than blind when he transcribed them My words were these Whether all Agents and all Events be predetermined He fraudulently leaves out these words all Agents and makes me to state the question thus Whether all Events be predetermined without their own concurrence Whereas those words without their own concurrence had no reference at all to all Events but to all Agents which words he hath omitted The state of the question being agreed upon it were vanity and meer beating of the air in me to weary my self and the reader with the serious examination of all his extravagant and impertinent fancies As this Whether there be a morall efficacy which is not naturall which is so far from being the question between us that no man makes any question of it except one who hath got a blow upon his head with a mill-saile Naturall causes produce their effects by a true reall influence which implies an absolute determination to one as a father begets a son or fire produceth fire Morall causes have no naturall influence into the effect but move or induce some other cause without themselves to produce it As when a Preacher perswadeth his hearers to give almes here is no absolute necessitation of his hearers nor any thing that is opposite to true liberty Such another question is that which followes Whether the object of the sight be the cause of seeing meaning if he mean aright the subjective cause Or how the understanding doth propose the object to the will which though it be blind as Philosophers agree yet not so blind as he that will not see but is ready to follow the good advice of the intellect I may not desert that which is generally approved to satisfie the phantastick humour of a single conceited person No man would take exceptions at these phrases the will willeth the understanding understandeth the former term expressing the faculty the later the elicite act but one who is resolved to pick quarrels with the whole World To permit a thing willingly to be done by another that is evil not for the evils sake which is permitted but for that goods sake which is to be drawn out of it is not to will it positively nor to determine it to evil by a natural influence which whosoever do maintaine do undeniably make God the authour of sin Between positive willing and nilling there is a meane of abnegation that is not to will That the will doth determine it self is a truth not to be doubted of what different degrees of aide or assistance the will doth stand in need of in different Acts natural moral supernatural where a general assistance is sufficent and where a special assistance is necessary is altogether impertinent to this present controversie or to the right stating of this question In the last place he repeateth his old distinction between a mans freedom to do those things which are in his power if he will and the freedom to will what he will which he illustrateth for similitudes prove nothing by a comparison drawn from the natural appetite to the rational appetite Will is appetite but it is one question Whether he be free to eate that hath an appetite And another question whether he be free to have an appetite In the former he saith He agreeth with me That a man is free to do what he will In the later he saith He dissents from me That a man is not free to will And as if he had uttered some profound mystery he addeth in a triumphing manner That if I have not been able to distinguish between th●…se two questions I have not done well to meddle with either And if I have understood them to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if he will is to deale uningenuously and fraudulently with my readers Yet let us have good words Homini homino quid praestat What difference is there between man and man That so many wits before Mr. Hobbes in all Ages should beate their brains about this question all their lives long and never meet with this distinction which strikes the question dead What should hinder him from crying out 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have found it I have found it But stay a little the second thoughts are wiser and the more I look upon this distinction the lesse I like it It seemeth like the