attain that End Unless they proceed at least from True Knowledg which cannot be had by a mere Probability how high soever it be Whereas Material and Temporary Goods depend not on a constant course of Causes or Dispositions towards them knowable by us but very frequently if not equally on a Chanceable or Contingent cast of Things whence we use to say Fools have the best Fortune Hence the intending and directing part in such Actions depends on the Knowledg of some particulars but the Attainment is carry'd on by Material Means nay very frequently there is no knowledg at all requisit in any respect For Example He that by the death of a hundred Relations in a Plague-time should alone survive and so inherit their Estates would be really rich whither any interiour Act of his minde in the least contributed to it or not that is though he never desir'd aim'd at or even thought of it But if a Man in time of persecution and Martyrdom should say within himself I cannot believe there is a God or a Next World Yet I le venture to dye rather then deny them in hopes that if perhaps there be such a thing or state he will give me a far greater reward such a Man I dare affirm to be no nearer gaining Heaven by this Act no better principled than if he had never had any such Act at all in regard he wanted that First necessary disposition which St. Paul and Connaturality require Accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia Deus est Heb. 11. v. 6. 6. Again Faith is intended for a Spiritual Armour to rebeat all the assaults and temptations of our three Ghostly Enemies Original Corruption in us the Vanity of the World about us and the Cruelty of the Devil and Wicked men over us Hence the Advice of the Apostle cui resistite fortes in Fide hence his recommending to us above all things to take Scutum Fidei hence the Contempt of all Worldly Honours Pleasures and Riches in Gods choice Saints and their suff'ring Persecution gladly for Conscience sake hence lastly their embracing and ev'n courting Torments and Death it self with such Alacrity and Constancy But alas how unactive had their Charity and Zeal been how dull their desire to forego all present Goods ev'n life too among the rest if this wicked Doctrine had been in their hearts that perhaps all was a lye which they profest suff'red and dy'd for And how coldly and timorously would they have look'd Death in the face having perfect Certainty on one side that they were about to lose all the known Goods they possest for others unknown and uncertain Well may a Natural sincerity preserve diverse persons who are out of the Church morally honest and innocent but we must not hope for any eminent Sanctity or Heroick Act of Virtue from any Professors of such a Faith if they follow their Teachers maintaining there are no stronger Motives for the Truth of Christianity to comfort and establish the Souls of the Faithful And 't is to be feared that though their highly-conceited Probability or Moral Certainty as they call it be enough to Exclude Actual Doubt while Men are in a state of Security and all things go well with them Yet it will scarce be able to preserve them from doubting Actually when they are upon the point of foregoing all the Goods they at present enjoy and are so highly concern'd to be Certain of the Existence of those Future ones they hope for in lieu of them § 7. Moreover we are perfectly Certain by manifest Experience of the Existence of Temporal Goods viz. Honours Pleasures Riches c. or that such things are in the world whereas unless Faith be truly Certain that is Impossible to be false the Generality of Mankind cannot be perfectly assur'd ev'n of the Existence of Heaven or those Future Goods for which they are to relinquish all present ones Wherefore the Existence of the thing being the first and main Basis of all Humane Action and the Ground of all the other Motives 't is clear there 's a manifest difference between acting for Heaven and for Temporal Goods ev'n in this respect whatever Parallel may be pretended in some other Considerations Besides all acting ev'n for Temporal Goods were unjustifyable unless those Goods be held Attainable and de facto we are perfectly certain that Honours Pleasures Riches c. not only exist but are of such a nature also as they may be attained to due means us'd since we experience multitudes of men have and do daily arrive at them But ev'n though Heav'n be held to be yet it cannot be held to be attainable unless the Proposals of Faith be Certain since neither have those who are to come to Faith seen nor experienc'd any man get Heav'n nor discours'd with any whom they know to have come thence and seen it So that I fear were the Objection concerning the Sufficiency of Probable Motives to make us act for Inferiour or Humane Goods distinctly clear'd it would be found not to mean that Probability of those Humane Good 's Existence or Attainableness suffices for example that there are Riches in common or that they may be gotten one way or other both which are presupposed to the Action as certainly known but it seems to mean only this that men ought to proceed to Action though there be but Moral Certainty or great Likelihood that those Goods are actually to be attain'd in this or that circumstance of Time or Place or by such or such means as by sending Ships to the Indies inventing Water-works Husbandry Souldiery and the like which assertion held within its bounds will break no squares seeing ev'n in the actual attainment of Heav'n by me or by this particular way or means when those means depend on material Circumstances there is found the same room for failure and contingency notwithstanding the Certainty of Heav'ns Existence and Attainableness in common secur'd to us perfectly by Faith For though Virtue practic'd is an Infallible Way to bring Souls to Bliss yet no man has Certainty that any Extrinsecal State he puts himself into or material means he uses will make him truly vertuous or finally get him the end he aims at but must content himself with Likelihoods or the seeming-betterness of his putting himself in that State or Circumstance or his using this or that means in the same manner as it happens when he acts for Temporary Goods and for the success leave it humbly in the hands of Divine Providence or miserentis Dei acknowledging with David that in manibus tuis Domine sortes meae and working out his Salvation with fear and trembling § 8. Besides to act Externally is in the power of the Will but to act Internally at least as is requisite for each Effect is not so For however the Will may set the Understanding to consider the Motive yet it must be the Truth of the Object 's Goodness
none had the least actual doubt or suspicion of doubt of it else surely they would never have staid in them inform us sufficiently to what a changeable tottering and ruinous condition Christian Faith would be reduc'd by these Principles and Parallels No fewer than three Houses fell in the compass of a short time and none had the least suspicion of doubt beforehand of such an Event therefore may an Atheist say Down falls Christian Faith too whose Foundation was by this Doctrin but Parallel for strength to the other or if it fall not in so long time it has only something better luck not better grounds than had the three Houses As for the objected Unsuitableness of such a Certainty as I require 't is reply'd that nothing is more natural for the Generality of Mankind than to be led by Authority nothing more penetrable by those of all sorts than the Infallibleness and Veracity of exceedingly vast and grave Authorities relating matter of Fact as we experience in their beleef that there was a Q. Elizabeth and such like to comprehend and assent immovably to which costs them not the least over straining as the Obiecter imagins Which being so I make account that God both in his power and wisdom could in his Goodness would render the Authority of his Church the Ground and Pillar of Truth as evident to all her Children both as to its Inerrableness and Veracity as the other nay incomparably more it being in every regard so requisit Objection VI. If the Motives to Faith must be Impossible to be False to us they would necessarily conclude the Truth of Faith wherefore they would of themselves oblige the Understanding to assent and so there would need no precedent pious affection of the Will which yet both Councils Fathers and Catholick Divines with one consent require Nay more were not such a pious affection put Acts of Faith would not be Free Answer If Experience teaches us that even assent to Humane Sciences though Evident from Intrinsecal reasons Comprehensible by our Understanding and purely Speculative is not to be acquir'd without an affection to see Truth as is evident from the carriage of meer Scepticks who having entertain'd a conceit of it's hopelesness come thence to want Love or Affection for it and so never come to see it how Conclusive soever the reasons be Much more by far must some good affection be pre-requisit to assent to Divine and Supernatural Truths which are Obscure in themselves as depending upon Authority Incomprehensible to our natural reason and Practical that is obligingly-Efficacious to break out into Christian Action or Love of Heaven above all sublunary things as True Faith must be The First obstacle of the three mention'd has this difficulty that the beams of Truth which come directly from the things themselves are generally apt to strike our Understanding more naturally penetrate it more deeply and to stick in it more immovably than those which are reflected to us from the Knowledg of another such as are Points of Faith besides the new difficulty of seeing the Veracity of the Attester which how evident soever it be yet it puts the Understanding to double pains whereas Evidence had from the Thing is but a single labour and so less confounding and distracting the thought The Second Obstacle Incomprehensibleness is apt to stupify the Understanding and retard Assent nay even to deter it from considering them as Truths The Atheistical temper of the world which could not subsist were Metaphysicks duly advanc'd sufficiently informs us how difficult it is for men to apply and fix their thoughts upon those considerabilities in things and those natures which are abstracted from matter the reason whereof is because it being natural that our Fancy be in act while our Understanding is so and there being not Proper Phantasms the onely agreeable ones to material men who are not strong enough to guide their Judgments purely by Principles and Connexions of Terms which sute to such abstracted Conceptions but Metaphorical ones onely which the Understanding must in rigour deny to be right ones even while by necessity 't is forc't to make use of them Hence the life of a Christian as such being to serve God in Spirit and Truth and so the Objects and Principles of his new Life for the most part and principally Spiritual ones it comes to pass that for this very regard alone there will need a great love of Truth and Spiritual Goods to make the Understanding appliable to them or even admit a consideration of them I was told by a worthy Friend of mine that discoursing with an acute man but a great hater of Metaphysicks and mentioning a Spirit he in a disgust broke out into these words Let us talk of what we know By which expression 't is manifest that he mistook the Question An est for Quid est But what makes for my purpose is that the unknowableness of the Essence or nature of a Spirit to us in this State obstructed even his desire to consider whether there were any such thing or no consequently that there needs a contrary desire or affection to know Spiritual things to make us willing even to entertain a thought of their being much more to conceit it But incomparably more needful is such an Affection when to the Spirituality of those points there shall be added an Incomprehensibleness nay if onely those points be consider'd an Incredibleness when no Parallel can be found in Nature nor scarce any similitude weakly to shadow out the thing and it's possibility nay when some of those points directly thwart the course of natural Causes whence all our other Knowledges have their Stability Then I say if ever there is requisit an Affection for the Nobleness and Excellency of those high Spiritual Objects to make us willing to hearken to any Authority proposing them how evident soever the Motives be for the Credibleness of that Authority The third Obstacle follows taken from the End for which Faith is essentially ordain'd that is from what it essentially is viz. a mover of the Will to Virtue and Goodness or a Practical Principle Now nothing is more evident than this Truth that by-affections and contrary inclinations are apt to hinder the understanding from assenting or even attending candidly and calmly to these Reasons how clear soever they be which make against any beloved Interest whence there needs a contrary affection to these other to remove the mists those passions had rais'd and purge the Eye of the Mind that so it may become capable of discerning what it could not before though in it self most visible How much more not only requisite but even necessary must some pious affection be to permit the mind freely to embrace the doctrin of Christian Faith containing Principles which enjoyn a disregard and posthabition of all that is sweet to Flesh and Blood nay even of Livelihood and Life it self 'T is most manifest then that a Plous
is a crooked path and a False Light leading it into Errour What therefore they are to do in the circumstances they have brought themselves into is to show that they destroy not the Truth of Faith that is the Nature of Faith it self and the Nature of the Way to that Truth or the Rule of Faith by putting them both possible to be False I saw they did and therefore was oblig'd to begin my discourse higher and to Settle the Existence of Faith by removing the possibâ—lâ—ty of it's Falshood that so it might be shown able to bear the having a Rule which while it was in the tottering and uncertain condition to which Mr. T. and Mr. St. had reduc't it that is in a Possibility of being all a Ly and indeed is an Actuality of being as to us not-Truth but at most a great Likelihood it was utterly incapable of Since therefore in the right method of discoursing An est ought to antecede Quid ests they have lost their right to be discours't with about the Quid est of the Rule of Faith or what is that Rule till they can justify themselves not to have destroy'd the very An est or Existence of Rule and Faith both with which Mr. T. is now challeng'd from his own words and Mr. St. from his abetting him and espousing his Patronage Both Nature therefore and Art excuse me from replying to Mr T. and Mr. St. where the just Laws of severe and rigorous Reason exactly obseru'd and so 't is onely a voluntary Courtesy not an obligatory duty to afford them or any other Writers thus Principled any Answer at all or to admit them to a dispute about this Point What is the Rule of Faith Lastly hence is inferr'd that a Conclusive Method or short way of ending all Controversies between the Catho lik Church and all her relinquishers is settled by this Doctrin For if right Faith must be Impossible to be False to us or to the Generality of Christians that is if the Motives to embrace Christianity must be thus firm then 't is Evident that that Party whose Writers renounce the having any such Motives in case those writers speak the sense of that Party is not rightly Christian or truly Faithfull but a distinct Sect from the body of right Christians or it being most unjust that the discourses of private Speculaters should be pinn'd upon the whole party if they write things deniable by that party in case any such Party should think fit to disclaim such Writers as private discoursers and their Tenet of Christian Faith's not being Absolutely Certain which they are at liberty to do and set some other writers to maintain the opposit Thesis it will quickly be seen whether they are able to bring Infallible Grounds of Faith I mean any Authority conveying Christ's Faith down to us infallibly which they must bring if they will prove Faith Impossible to be False distinct from what the Catholik Church holds to and which themselves renounc't when they forsook her Communion But that there are any such Grounds as these that is Grounds Inerrably bringing down the Knowledg of Christs Faith to us that is a Rule of Faith Impossible to be False to us I could never yet discern by the carriage writings or Discourse of any Party that dissented from the Catholick Church to be their Tenet If then it be a most Certain Truth that Faith must be Impossible to be false as I hope I have abundantly concluded 't is also most Certain that those who deny they have such a Faith do by that very denyal confess they have no True Faith nor are truly Faithfull nor of the True Catholick Church Postscript THus Reader thou seest I still endeavour candidly to put Controversy home as far as my discourse can carry it and that I have resum'd here all the scatter'd ends of voluminous disputes into one point By which means the sincere Protestant and all others out of the Church may see at a short view what they are to do If they look into their own breasts as they are Professors of Christianity they will find it writ there in Capitals That CHRISTIAN FAITH CANNOT BE AN ILLUSION ' OR FALSHOOD Also that Faith is to be held by them True and that they ought to suffer all Persecutions and Death it self for the professing it to be such This found and duly reflected on the next thing to be done is that they press their Learned men by whom they are led to shew them by such Grounds as their separation from the Catholick Church permits them to hold that is by their Grounds that Christian Faith is Impossible to be False If they can as hitherto they have told us they cannot then their Adherents may in reason hope well of their own condition till they see those attempts evidently shown invalid But if they profess still they cannot and that Faith needs no such Certainty then not onely the natural dictamen of Christianity in their own breasts ought to make them distrust the Principles of their Party found to be so destructive to Christian Faith but also I shall hope there are some Proofs in this foregoing Treatise which they will judg require an Answer I expect my Answerer will sow together many thin Rhetorical fig-leaves to cover the Deformity of that abominable Thesis that Faith may be False which to propose undisguiz'd were too openly shameful But I hope thou wilt be able to discern their sense through their Rhetorick and heedfully to mark with a stedfast Eye that in how quaint and elegant phrases soever they cloak their Tenet yet the genuin downright and natural sense of the position they go about to defend will still be this The mysteries of Christian Faith may all be so many Lies for any thing any man living absolutely knows and the whole Body of Christian Doctrine a Bundle of Falshoods I expect also many plausible Instances and pretended Parallels of the sufficiencie of inferiour degrees of Certitude for such and such particular ends But what thou art to consider is whether those Ends be Parallel or equal to that highest End and Concern of Christian Faith These things I expect but I expect not that so much as one Principle that will be found to deserve that name will ever be thought prudent to be produc't to justify a Tenet every way so Irrational and unprincipled or rather destroying the Certainty and consequently the Essence and Nature of the Best Body of Principles that either Nature or the Author of Nature and Grace himself ever instill'd into Mankind Lastly I beseech thee to obtain for me if thou canst that if any think fit to reply to this Treatise they would be perswaded to set aside all WITTY PREVARICATION and ELEGANT DROLLERY the two chief and in a manner onely Sticklers in the pretended Answer to Sure-Footing and beginning with First Principles to draw thence Immediate Consequences as I have constantly endeavour'd in this Discourse By
came afterwards through consideration of the Thing or Object to judg it True it became determin'd and how but by a Notion the most determinative of any other viz. that of being or is wherfore since to put in her at the same time a Judgment of its possibility to be False puts her to be indetermin'd and this in order to the same This Position puts the Soul to be at once determinate and indeterminate as to the same which states are as vastly distant as actual Being and not-actual Being can remove them Nay this monstrous Thesis makes the Soul Indeterminate to either side that is to Truth as well as to Falshood even after it had suppos'd her determin'd to Truth For to judg a Point possible to be False puts the Judgment Potential or Indetermin'd as to the Falshood of it and False signifying not-true possible to be False must signifie possible to be not True and so include Potentiality or Indetermination to Truth also in regard were it actually True it could not be Possible to be not True or not it self The Soul must then be Indeterminate to either that is neither judg it true nor false even after she was supposed to judg it true in case she can then judg it possible to be false and consequently this Position of Faith's possibility to be false cannot without highest contradâ—ction stand with a hearty conceit that Faith is True To think to escape the force of this Argument by alleadging the respect to different Motives or that the Understanding was not perfectly but partly determin'd is in our case frivolous For I ask was it determin'd enough by any Intellectual or Rational Motives to judg the thing is if not what made it judg so when those Motives could not Is it not evident it must be some weakness or some blind motive in the Will not Light of Understanding But if it were determin'd enough to judg the thing is or is true 't is also enough for my Argument and Purpose § 8. Especially the force of this Argument will be better penetrated when it shall be well consider'd in what Truth and Falshood formally consist and that taken rightly they are certain Affections or Dispositions of our Understanding For that is not to be called True by me which is not True to me not is any thing True to me but when 't is seen by me to be so in the Object and to be thus seen by me is the Object to inform and actuate my Understanding Power as 't is Judicative whence that Power as 't is thus actuated gains a Conformity to the thing it self in which consists the precise nature of Truth However then Truth come from the Object which is the ground or cause of it yet 't is formally no where but in the Understanding or Judgment as appears evidently from this that Truth is found in Propositions now Propositions are not in the thing formally though when true they are deriv'd hence but in the mind only and significatively in words Truth then is that whereby I am true or veracious when I say interiourly the Thing is or is thus and thus wherefore the Truth of any Point is not had till this Actuation or Determination of my Power by the Object which as it's Formal Cause makes this Conformity to it be put And this put to think that at the same time or at once the mind can be unactuated undetermin'd potential or disconformable to it is too gross a conceit to enter into the head of any man endued with the common Light of Reason Whoever then affirm's Faith or those Propositions which express Faith possible to be false he is convinc't by the clearest Light of Reason in case the desperation of maintaining the Truth of Faith for want of grounds drives him not to say any thing but that he speaks candidly what he thinks not to judg or say from his heart His Faith is indeed True having never experienc't in his Soul for want of Principles to put it there that the Object or Ground of his Faith hath wrought in it that Conformity to the thing in which Truth consists and consequently that when he professes Points of Faith to be Truths he either by a fortunate piece of folly understands not what he sayes or collogues and dissembles with God and the world for honour or some other Interest § 9. 'T is hence farther demonstrated that the Position we impugn destroys the Notion of Metaphysical Unity consisting in an Indivision or Indistinction of any Notion Nature or Thing in it self and a Division or Distinction of it from all other For according to this Tenet Truth or the Conformity of our Understanding to the Object put by our joynt supposition that the Proposition of Faith is true may possibly be Disconformity or Falshood and this Determinate State Indeterminate which makes the mind as having in it One Notion that is indeed that One Notion capable to admit into its bowels Another not only disparate but Opposit that is One possible to be not One but Another § 10. The same is demonstrated concerning Metaphysical Verity For this Position makes the self-same mental Proposition or Disposition of the Understanding we call Truth possible to be Falshood that is Possible not to be the same with it self which subverts all Metaphysical Verity that is the Foundation or ground of all Formal Verity or Truth in the World § 11. The same injury demonstratively accrues to Metaphysical Bonity or Goodness For it makes that Conformity of the mind to the thing which is Truth and so the Good or Perfection of the Understanding to be at once possible to be Falshood that is possible to be not good but harmful and destructive to it § 12. I make no question but my Adversaries will think to elude the force of these three last Demonstrations and perhaps of some others by alleadging that they deny absolutely Truth can possibly be Falshood and that they mean only that though the Points of Faith appear now upon considerable Motives to be True yet those Motives secure it not from being absolutely False but not so that they can really be both And I grant this would be a good Answer in case they did not affirm Points of Faith to be really True upon which Supposition taken from the common Language and Sentiments of all that profess Christianity even theirs too as Christians I proceed but only profest they were Likely to be True for then it would be so far from following that Truth could be Falshood or that the same Points could be both true and not true at once that in that case it would follow they ought to affirm they were neither True nor False since likely to be True and True indeed are no more the same than a Statue which is like a man is the same with a man But if all Christians be bound to profess and themselves actually do so that their Faith is indeed
none but onely an Affection or determination of a Thing both known by plain Nature whatever som Schoolmen speculate For these put meer Experience teaches us that that thing which is call'd Pillar is the same thing which is call'd Round or which is all one that in this Proposition The Pillar is round the two extream notions are indeed that is with a Conformity to the Thing identifi'd or that that Proposition is True But to return home to our purpose 'T is clear that Pillar and Roundness Existing by the same existence or in the same Thing are found in the thing after it's manner and in my Judgment or Soul as apt to judg after it 's that is judgingly But Truth hath nothing to do with either of these manners of Being as was discourst formerly in the parallel case of Notions but purely and adequately consists in the Unity or Community of Form which my Judgment has with the Thing by having which in her the Soul gains a Conformity to it In this Common Form consider'd as in the Thing consists it's Metaphysical Verity or it 's Being what it is and this Verity consider'd as apt to stamp or imprint it self on my Iudging Power is call'd Objective Truth as receiv'd in me and fashioning or conforming my said Power to the Thing as in it self and so making my Judgment True 't is call'd Formal Truth This declar'd I deny that I any where confound Objective Truth with Formal or what 's in the Thing with what 's in me as in me for that were to identifie those two most vastly and most evidently different States A Supineness too gross for any attentive Discourser to fall into I conceive then what the Objecter would alledge is that I confound those Truths spoken of with Truth to us or quoad nos as the Schools speak For though what 's Truth to us must needs be Truth in it self and in us in regard we cannot know that to be which is not yet what 's Truth in it self or Truth in us is not therefore Truth to us in regard one may upon probable nay improbable or even False Grounds light upon a right judgment in which case his mind as judging is conformable to the thing or True yet still that thing is not true to him in regard he hath no reason able to conclude it such or to make him see it to be true Truth then to us is the same with our Sight of it that is with Certainty or Determination of our Understanding by force of Intellectual Motives and this indeed I often seem to confound with Truth in the two former Acceptions but I therefore seem to do it because I am loath to transcribe and apply so often my Postulata and suppose my Judicious Reader bears them in mind Which if he pleases to understand as subjoyn'd to those Discourses it will follow that what is so in the thing it self or perhaps in us if it be so severely obligatory to be thus constantly profest and held so and consequently by my later Postulatum necessary to be known to be so all my mistaken proofs will be brought to conclude it True to us that is Certain You will say why is it not enough for God to provide that our Acts of Faith be indeed True in us since so they would perfect our Understandings by conforming them to the thing and guide us right but they must also be True to us or be known to be True I answer for two Reasons One because God's Government of Mankind would by this means be preternatural obliging him to hold profess and dye for professing the Truth of those Points which he knows not to be such The other Reason is because every Act of Faith as exercis'd would perpetually involve an Errour in case the Motives to those Assents were not conclusive of the Truth of those Points For however one may light by hap-hazard or through weakness on a Truth from an Inclusive Motive yet since 't is impossible a rational Creature should assent but upon some Motive good or bad hence every Assent practically implies 'T is true for this reason Wherefore if the Reason grounding such Assents be unapt to conclude the Truth of the thing that Judgment necessarily involves a Falshood or Errour however it be otherwise conformable to the thing abstractedly consider'd Truths then being bastard illegitimate and monstrous both the Intellectualness and Supernaturalness of that Virtue call'd Faith make it scorn to own such defective Prâ—ductions Objection III. The Meanings of Words are indeed to be taken from the Vulgar but the Truth of Propositions is to be taken onely from the Judgments of Learned Men though then that be indeed the meaning of the word Faith which the Generality of Christians mean by it yet the Truth of this Proposition Faith is possible to be False must be judg'd of by the Sentiments of the most Learned Divines the Generality at least the Best of which and Catholicks amongst the rest grant the Grounds of Faith as to our Knowledg and consequently Faith it self to be Possible to be False Answer That Maxim is to be understood of those Propositions which require some Speculation to infer them in which case also even the Unlearned are not bound to Assent upon the Authority of Learned men taken precisely as men of Skill because generally 't is Practically-self-evident to them that such Speculative men differ oft times in their Sentiments and they are unfurnisht of due means to discern which is in the right yet if they are to act in such affairs they are bound in Prudence to proceed upon the Judgments of that part which is generally reputed most and ablest and then their proceedure is laudable because they do the best secundum ultimum potentiae or that lies in the power Whence Learned men who have ability to judg of the Reasons those Speculaters give behave themselves imprudently and blameably if they even proceed to outward action meerly upon their Judgments without examining the Reasons they alleadge in case they have leasure and opportunity to do so But now the Maxim holds not all for those Propositions in which 't is either self-evident or evident to common and uncultivated Reason that the Predicate is to be connected with the Subject as 't is for example in this Man is a rational Creature or this which is palpably consequent from the former Man is capable of gaining Knowledg for in such as these the natural Sentiments of the Vulgar are full as Certain as those of Speculaters perhaps Certainer And with the same Evidence the Predicate Possible to be False must necessarily be seen to be connected with Faith by all those who esteem themselves oblig'd by Gods Command to profess and dye for the Truth of those Points they believe Besides they hold that Faith makes them know God and his Will that their Assent of Faith is to be Immoveable or adher'd to all their lives that is such as cannot be
their attempting or neglecting to do this and onely by that Test it will be seen whether my Evictions stand or fall whereas from flashy wit so little is gain'd that even what 's solid suffers disgrace by such a managery And I here very penitently beg pardon of my Readers that I have sometimes heretofore spent my precious time and less-fruitful labour which might have been better employd in pursuing that way of Folly For such my more deliberate Thoughts now discover it however the reputed profoundness but indeed real shallowness of my Adversaries made it at that season seem most convenient FINIS Corrections of the Press PAge 6. line 5. built upon p. 14. l. 13. the Ten et p. 25. l. 10. Acts. as p. 33. l 5. not be is p. 43. l. 9 is deniable p. 89. l 25. Objects on p. 112. l. ult 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 121. l. 2. 't is neither Affirmation nor l. 9 usually p. 126. l. 26. Such Truths p. 128. l. 9. their power l. 18. at all p. 130. l. 25. of the Schools p. 134. l. 26. find p. 139. l. 18. being to l. 21. both at p. 149. Objection VIII p. 161. l. 13. parologysm l 21 nut at p. 164 l. 1. Objection IX l. 5. to have p. 171. l. 22. onely-true Postulata The Thesis demonstrated from the nature of Evidence From the nature of the Subject in Faith-Propositions From the nature of the Copula From the nature of the Predicatâ— in most of those Propositions From the nature of Distinction as apply'd to the Predicate From the impossibility of distinguishing the subjects of Faith-propositions From the nature of Truth consisting in an Indivisible From the nature of Connexion From the nature of Opinion The Origin and Natures of Suspence and Assent The Point evinc't from the natures of Suspence and Assent From the nature of Holding From the nature of Knowing From the nature of Certainty in many regards From the Impossibility that what may be false can have any Principles From the Identity of Certainty with Infallibility From the contrary opinion's unavoidably subjecting Faith to Chance and Contingency From the Incompossibility of Truth with Falsehood From the nature of Disputation and the Impossibility otherwise to evince the Truth of faith The main Thesis demonstrated from the want of Potentiality in the Subject From the otherwise necessity of putting a consistency of Truth with Falshood From the otherwise necessity of putting Contradictories to be true From the otherwise necessity of putting it possible the minde should be at once conformable and disconformable to the thing From the Impossibility of different Respects here so to avoid a Contradiction From the nature of the Soul From the necessity of putting the Soul at once determin'd and indetermin'd in order to the same Point From the Formal Natures of Tâ—uth and Falshood From the notion of Metaphysical Unity From the notion of Metaphysical Verity From the notion of Metaphysical Bonity or Goodness From the contrary Thesis being destructive to the Fiâ—st Principle in all Metaphysicks From the Impossibility of a sufficient Motive to judg a thing True with a Motive to judg it possible to be False From the nature of the First Cause or the Deity From the nature of the proper Agent in instructing Mankind From the nature of the Persons instructed From Faith's being a Virtue From Faith's being an Intellectu al Virtue From Faith's being a Supernatural Virtue From the firmness Supernatural Faith ought to hâ—vâ—â—bove Natural Another Proof from the same head From the requisiteness that Christian Action should proceed from the Acters in the perfectest manner That otherwise Christian Religion would be more defective in point of Principles than any other Art or Science From Faith's being the Knowledg of our last End and of the way to it From the Certainty the Heathens had of the Principles of their imperfect Morality From mans last End being only attainable by Intellectual means From Virtue 's being the connatural Effect of Truth and Vice of Falsehood From the otherwise Inability of Faiâ—h to resist overcome Temptations From the otherwise Uncertainty of the Existence of Spiritual Goods or the Attainableness of them in the next life From the otherwise preternaturaliâ—y in producing a due love of Heaven From the Incredibleness of the Mysteries nor superable by any Motive possible to be False From the otherwise greater plausibility of Objections against Faith From Faith's being a Knowledg of God of his Will From Faith's being plac'd beyond Contingencie From the manner in which Christians express themselves when they profess their Faith From this that otherwise it were lawful to lay a wager Christian Faith is a Ly. From the Carriage of the Martyrs if suppos'd Honest Prudent From the Blasphemousnes of the Equivalencies to this Proposition Faith is Possible to be False From the Practice of Learnedst Christians in captivating their understandings to Faith From the Duty incumbent on the maintainers of the impugn'd Tenet to remain Seekers all their lives From the inefficaciousness it brings to Christian Preaching and Exhortation From the Churches constant Practice of Obliging to Belief * Rule of Faith * Infer 4 * Infer 2.