they had introduced into Christian Morality and having reduced them unto certain heads with a very neat and pure order which may be worthy to have the name of the particular Character of his Spirit But God permitted that when he had finished this so important Work he delivered it into the hands of a Doctor one of his Friends that he might communicate it unto others who were of known Learning and Zeal This Doctor acquitted himself faithfully in this Commission but those to whom he committed this Book that they might examine it being diverted therefrom by a multitude of affairs returned no answer unto him of a long time so that the Author continuing sick saw himself nigh unto death without knowing in a manner what was become of his Book and only understood that they judged it most worthy to be printed and that the Church might draw therefrom very great advantages if it pleased God to give it his blessing As therefore he proposed unto himself in this Work no other thing than to serve the Church this answer sufficed to banish out of his mind all the disquiet which he could have had thereabouts and he very easily and without farther trouble did wholly commit the care of it to Divine providence to which he had been always most submissive This submission notwithstanding hindred not but that some time before his death he recommended it unto another of his friends whom he knew to be very greatly concerned for every thing whereunto he had relation But this Friend being not able to address himself to any other save that Doctor who had not the Book any longer in his own hands and who could not himself learn thereof any news at all saw himself speedily after out of condition to serve both the Church and his Friend in such manner as he earnestly desired Some years past over in this uncertainty of what was become of this so precious a Work at which time God who had reserved unto himself the disposal thereof caused it to fall happily into the hands of a person who had no correspondence with its Author but seeing that it might be profitable to the Church thought himself obliged to contribute all his credit and power to its publication Here you have what was thought meet for the Readers to know concerning the History of this Book It were to be desired that we might speak here more openly concerning its Author but the Society of the Jesuits have accustomed themselves so to use those who endeavour to serve them by discovering unto them the excesses wherein they engage themselves and such is the implacable fury with which they pretend to have right according to their Maxims to persecute them as will not permit us to render unto his name the glory he hath therein deserved All that we can say therein to the end we may not leave those who come after us without knowing at least something of a person to whose zeal they will esteem themselves so much obliged is only this that he seemed to have been raised to combate and confound the Errours of these Fathers He had a mind facile clear and solid a sweetness and moderation in all respects charming an humility ingenuous beyond all that can be imagined stealing away the splendour of his other vertues from the eyes even of his most intimate Friends His education was admirable and contributed not a little to the beauty of his Spirit the purity of his Learning and the innocence of his Manners For he was born of a Father who had a care altogether peculiar to him to fortifie happily his Children against popular Errours to inspire into them the most pure Maxims of the Gospel and to enlarge their minds with the fairest speculations This so sage and so Christian conduct helped very much to augment the inclination which he had unto piety so that he had no sooner finished his course in Philosophy than he proceeded of himself to the study of Divinity to which he applyed himself with so great success that being received into the Colledge and Society of Sorbonne he performed all his acts with universal applause and thereupon received there the Doctors Cap. The only thing he had to combate with in this his laudable enterprise was the passionate affection which he had for the Mathematicks For as this Science is the most assured of all humane Sciences and almost the only one in which may be found any certainty capable to satisfie a Spirit which loves the truth the love which he had even to this truth it self wrought in him so violent an inclination to this Science that he could not withhold himself from applying and busying his thoughts therein for the inventing some or other new machine But at length the Holy Spirit which did conduct his Studies made him overcome in a little time the propension he had to these innocent inquiries and curiosities and he thought that it was not sufficient for a Divine to despise the divertisements of the world but that he ought also to deprive himself of those of his mind and he did only search after the truth where it was to be found that is to say in the Holy Scripture and in the Books of the holy Fathers So that we may well say of him what S. Gregory Nazianzene said in commendations of his Brother Caesarius who had greatly loved Astrology and the Mathematicks that he had the ingenuity to draw out of these sorts of Sciences all that was profitable therein learning thence to admire the invisible greatnesses of God which were resplendent in his works and knew to defend himself from that which was pernicious in them which is the adherence they have who apply themselves thereunto to their conjectures and to those truths which they pretend to discover therein This generous disengaging himself from all other things advantaged him not a little in the progress which he made in Ecclesiastical knowledge and in that part of Divinity which they call Scholastick which conducts Reason by the light of Faith and Tradition This his progress appeared more especially in the troubles which agitated the Faculty of Divinity of Paris in the year 1656. for he there defended the truth with so great moderation that he did not render it odious but on the contrary he did astonish and surprize his enemies The zeal he had for it was ardent but this ardour was tempered by his prudence and his knowledge was not less modest than his sweetness was couragious that there might be seen equally lightning in his discourse the regard which he had not to disoblige any person and the inflexible firmity which God had given him for the defence of his truth The wounds which that renowned Body received then in its Discipline entred very deep into his heart and the grief which he received therefrom increased by the consideration of the mischiefs which the Church was threatned with and which it resents unto this day began to alter his health
than his own Sect though it do not cease to appear unto him also credible But he answers in the second place that this opinion pleaseth him not at all and pretends that in this very case a Pagan is not bound at all to embrace the Faith a Caeterum hoc non placet it a generaliter dictum quippe dum Infidelis sibi persuasum habet suam sectam esse probabitem quamvis contraria sit probabilior tenetur utique in articulo mortis constitutus veram fidem quam probabiliorem judicat amplecti utpote in coarticulo constitutus in quo de extrema salute agitur ac proinde partem quam tutiorem probabiliorem judicat amplectitenetur At extra eum articulum non tenetur quod adhuc prudenter existimet se posse in sua secta perseverare Sanch. op mor. l. 2. c. 1. n. 6. p. 86. Because that when an Infidel is perswaded that his Sect is probable though the contrary which is the Christian Religion appear unto him more probable it is true that at the point of death when his Salvation is reduced to extremity and when by consequence he is obliged to follow that part which he judges to be more sure and more probable he is bound to embrace the true Faith which he believes to be more probable But out of this extremity he is not obliged because he judgeth prudently that he may persist in his idolatry In pursuance of this rule of probability that he acts prudently who follows a probable opinion I believe this Jesuit would not answer for the Salvation of a man who dyes in this estate since he must then believe that he may be saved without Faith and in Idolatry which is the greatest of crimes So that in saying he acts wisely in persisting in Idolatry he saith in effect that it is wisdom to walk in the darkness of death that it is prudence to destroy and precipitate himself into Hell in persuance of his rules of morality and grounding himself upon the principles of probability SECT II. That this Doctrine of Probability favours the Heretiques and nourisheth them in Heresie THe Doctrine of Probability is no lesse favourable to Heretiques then Infidels in that the ordinary arms whereof the Church makes use to defend it self against Heretiques and to assail them being Scripture Counsels Fathers and all that which we have received from the Ancients by Tradition the Jesuits and those who with them defend this Doctrine of Probability find not these evidences for their advantages and are so far from making use of them that they fear and fly from them all they can They cite in their Schools in their writings in a manner as often the Books of the Pagans as of the Scriptures they professe openly to preferre the new Authors above the Ancient they acknowledge not properly for Masters and Fathers any but those of their Society to the judgement and the censure of whom they submit frequently enough the judgements of the Saints which the Church hath always acknowledged for Masters and Fathers Divine or Ecclesiastick authority as well as Faith have scarce any credit in their Schools all as regulated and resolved by the authority of men and humane reason and in all contests and difficulties which they encounter if they cannot prevail by dispute they have recourse to those whom they regard as their Masters and Soveraign Judges in all sorts of matters They appeal to Suarez to Vasquez Molina Lessius and to others such like without making almost any mention of Jesus Christ the Apostles or the Ancient Fathers unless for form and without producing the definitions of the Councils or Traditions of the Church to determine the questions because they find them not conformable to their Spirit nor their designs some can make no use of them because they understand them not and even will not give themselves the trouble to study them and the others because they find not in them what is for their purpose Besides they wish they could content the whole World and answer all persons that consult them according to their humour and disposition Which obligeth them to look out for a Doctrine that is flexible and manageable and which may be accommodated to all occasions The maximes of Faith seem to them too fixed and the rules of the Church and the Gospel too firm and the opinions of the Holy Fathers too exact and too unmoveable For this cause they being not able to make use of them to establish the maximes of which they have need that they may make their designs to prosper and fearing on the other hand that they might be made use of against them to overturn their naughty maximes they find themselves as it were constrained by necessity to do all that they can directly or indirectly to corrupt them weaken them and to take away all credit from them In this they imitate and favour the hereticks of whom they have learned to reject the Holy Fathers especially in the difficulties which regard manners and the conduct of life and to despise Antiquity and Tradition through a blind love of their own novelties and proper imaginations and they are even in some sort more blameable then the Hereticks because they renounce the Father and the Tradition upon a pretence of holding to Scripture and these to follow their new Authors from whom they declare openly that we ought to take Law and rules for Christians Morals rather then from the Fathers of the Church Quae circa fidem emergunt dissicultates eae sunt ex veteribus hauriendae quae vero circa mores homini Christiano dignos à novitiis scriptcribus Colot l. 8 c. 16. p. 714. And indeed there hath never been any heresie which hath not had at the least some sort of probability because there hath yet never been any which hath not had some appearance of truth without which it could have found no followers the spirit of man not being capable to follow any thing but truth nor to be deceived but by the shaddow of it And it often happens that the greatest Heresies took for their foundation the greatest truths and have built on the strongest reasons Which shews clearly that if to follow a probable opinion be to act prudently and if an opinion be probable when it is grounded on the authority of some learned man or some likely reason as the Jesuits and those who hold their Doctrine of Probability tell us there is no heretick who may not maintain against them that he acts prudently whilest he lives in his heresie It is true that the Hereticks have misconceived the truths of which they would make use and especially those of the Scripture which they have corrupted in their sence and in their words that they might fit them to their thoughts and errours b Communis error ex probabili opinione ortus satu est ad gestorum per Sacerdotem vaâ—…em Sanch. op mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 35. p.
If amongst many passages which I commonly produce on the same Subject there be some which appear not clear enough there may be found in others that which seems to be wanting in them But I have reason to believe that there is no cause to reproach me herein for I have taken a particular care not only to speak things so as I understood them but also to enter as far as I could into the very thoughts of the Fathers whom I have alledged knowing that it is never lawful to wound Justice or Charity under a pretence of combating Errour and defending Truth and that Errour it self may not be assailed nor Truth defended by lying and disguisement I am so far from desiring to augment this evil or to exaggerate these things that I oftentimes abstain from speaking as I could without departing from my design They that have any love or knowledge of the Truth will easily perceive this my moderation and they will oftentimes find nothing else to reprove me for in many important points but that I have not spoken enough therein and that I give over many times where they would cry out to me that I ought to go on and follow my Subject to the utmost If there be any who find herein expressions which seem to them to be too vehement and far removed from that sweetness and moderation which they love I beseech them not to judge according to their disposition but according to the things whereof I speak The passion or the praeoccupation they may be under either for the pernicious Maxims which I represent or for the Authors or for the Defenders of them may be capable to perswade them that I ought to have spoken of them with so much respect and moderation as belongs to the most serious and holy things But the reason and the nature even of the things themselves may easily undeceive them if they consider that expressions ought to correspond with their subjects and that it would introduce a disproportion to represent those things which are ridiculous and contemptible as seriously as if they were not and that this were to give too much advantage to presumption and insolence which speaks proudly to make Errour triumph over Truth and to give it in some sort the victory to treat it otherwise than with such force and vigour as is capable to repress and humble it So it is that Truth would be defended and hath it self declared that it will one day revenge it self on them that have assailed it with scorn and obstinacy not only bruising their heads but also insulting over them that they may be covered with confusion So that I have some cause to fear in this point on the behalf of Truth that I have been rather too reserved than too free And it seems that they who have any love for it may complain of me that I have not defended it with force and ardour enough in an encounter where it hath been assaulted by a very extraordinary Conspiracy of persons who for their own interest sufficiently well known have endeavoured to blot out of the memory of the Faithful and Books of the Church the most pure and safe Maxims concerning the Regulation and Conduct of Christian life and Manners And I may perhaps have some trouble to defend my self from this reproach and to hinder that it be not believed That I have not defended the Cause of the Church and of Truth with the zeal which they deserved but that I have already declared that I have not at all undertaken properly to defend it or refute those who have assailed and hurt it so cruelly but to make appear only the Errours and the pernicious Maxims by which they have overturned all Discipline and all the Rules of Manners and Christian life even the most holy and best established upon the Scriptures and Books of the Saints and also by their Examples Hereunto I have limited and obliged my self in this Work It may be God will raise up some other who shall go on where I leave and will undertake to refute fully the Errours which I have discovered and to establish by the Principles of Faith and Tradition the Truths which I have only noted in my passage The manner in which this first Book shall be received and the profit which will come thereon may procure a disposition to receive also yet better another of greater importance and be a motive to engage God to stir up some other person to labour therein We are all in his hands our travels and our thoughts whereof the first and principal ought to be never in any thing to have other than his designs He knows that which he hath given me in this Work is no other than to perform some Service to his Church and my Neighbour I beseech him to bless it with success leaving it to his Providence to dispose of it according as he shall please and I do for the present accept with all respect and submission whatsoever he shall ordain thereof The Necessity and Utility of this Work IF the pernicious Maxims of the Jesuits Morality should for the present be presented no otherwise than in an extract without adding any thing thereto but what is found in their Authors the World is at this day so indifferent in things which respect their Salvation and Religion there would be found very few persons who would be touched therewith or who would take any pains to consider them But it is come to pass by the particular order of Divine Providence that he who hath enterprised to discover them some years ago hath exprest them in a manner so taking that hath attracted the whole World unto him to read them by the grace of his style and thereupon hath made them easily to appear odious and insupportable by their proper excesses and extravagancies This so happy beginning had hath success much more happy for mens minds being touched with a desire to know particularly things so important and so prejudicial to their Consciences and Salvation my Masters the Parochial Rectors of Rouen and Paris have in pursuit thereof published with a zeal worthy of their Charge many learned Writings which have given to all the World enough of instruction and light to conceive the distance and horrour they ought to keep towards that wicked Doctrine and the danger whereinto they put them who follow these Guides who pursue or practise them But as their design was only to make a speedy order against an evil which then did but begin to appear they believed that it was sufficient to advise their people thereof in general terms in notifying unto them some of the more pernicious propositions without extending them further to discover their principles consequences and unhappy effects as it had been easie for them to do and they thought that to strangle them in their birth it would have been sufficient only to expose them to the view of the whole World being in themselves so odious and monstrous
them or if they quit them being forced thereunto by the publick Complaints and Censures it is only in appearance and for a time and they afterwards resume their very same opinions and maintain and publish them as before as one may see in the Books of the English Jesuits of Sanctarel of Bauny of Celot and of Posa and of divers others who having been censured by the Church they have disavowed and suppressed them for a season but have shortly after produced them with the same opinions which had been condemned in them and with the approbation of the Superiors of their Company They have also established upon the same foundation the insupportable confidence which they have had unto this present to handle the Cases of Conscience and to govern Souls not only in an imperious manner but in a kind of Tyranny and to pass over all the primitive and true Laws of Christian Morality and Discipline that they may regulate all things according to their own proper reason and sense and sometimes against their own proper thoughts by their will only regarding nothing but their own interest and the satisfaction of the world whom they endeavour to please by conducting them rather according to their desires than according to the Rules of Truth and for their Salvation It is by this confidence joyned to so great complacency that they labour to introduce themselves in the world more than all others who hold their Maxims and endeavour to get credit with all persons great and small who finding their Divinity favourable to their interest and their passions do easily follow their advice and their conduct And so they easily diffuse every where the venom of their pernicious Doctrine which brings loosness and corruption into all sorts of conditions as we shall make it evidently appear at the end of this Extract These reasons have obliged me to take the Jesuits Morals for my Subject in this Book rather than those of others who are in the same opinions considering that they are the first Masters of this new Science that they surpass others in number of Writers as well as they believe themselves to surpass them in knowledge that they are the Inventors of many Opinions and those the most pernicious that they are all of a piece and agree together to sustain them that they are most obstinate in defending them even then when they are condemned that they are most advenurous and most insinuating to diffuse them unto the world and most complacent to cause them to be received So that I believe I shall combate all the corruption which Novelty hath introduced into Christian Morality by fastning upon the Divinity of the Jesuits since it is all inclosed therein as in the fountain from whence it diffuseth it self into the Spirits of other new Casuists who imitate them and into the consciences of the people of the world who follow them because of the facility of their conduct who permit them every thing that they will and sometimes more than they durst hope for The Order of the Matters of this Book I Distribute all this Book into three Books In the first I will handle the Principles of Sin to make appear that the Jesuits do establish and nourish them In the second I will speak of the Remedies of Sin to shew that they abolish or alter them In the third I will examine the particular Duties of every Profession and the Sins which they do ordinarily commit to shew that they excuse and favour these last and dispense with the first by abolishing and obscuring them in such manner that they appear not at all The first Book shall have two Parts The first shall be of the Interior Principles of Sin and the other of the Exterior I will divide every Part into so many Chapters as there are Principles of Sin which I shall take notice of And when the abundance of matter or the diversity of questions shall require it I shall divide also the Chapters into Articles the Articles into Points and the Points into Paragraphs I shall keep the same order in the other Books THE CONTENTS THE FIRST BOOK Of the Internal and External Principles of Sin The First Part. Of the Internal Principles of Sin CHapter I. Of Lust in General Pag. 1 Article I. Of Hatred That the Divinity of the Jesuits maintains aversions against our Neighbour that it allows us to wish and do him hurt and even to kill him though it be for temporal concerns and also when we are assured that by killing him we damn him Bauny Escobar Emanuel Sa Molina Amicus Lessius Pag. 2 Article II. Of Pride That the Jesuits cherish pride and vain-glory in all sorts of persons even in the most holy actions and that according to their Divinity it is almost impossible to sin mortally by pride or vain-glory Filliutius Escobar Sa Sanchez Pag. 7 Article III. Of fleshly Pleasure and Uncleanness Pag. 11. I. Point Of dishonest Discourses Looks and Touches Filliutius Escobar ib. II. Point Of the Servants and Mediators of unchast Commerce as are they who bear Messages or Letters and make appointments with Whores and who lodge or protect them Sanchez Hurtado Molina Escobar Pag. 15 III. Point Of dishonest thoughts and desires of Fornication Adultery and other such like sins and of the pleasure that may be taken therein Sa Sanchez Filliutius Layman Azor. Pag. 22 Article IV. Of Gluttony The Opinions of the Jesuits concerning the excess of Eating and Drinking and the bad effects which arise therefrom Escobar Sa Azor Sanchez Pag. 26 The Sum Of the foregoing Article Pag. 30 Article V. Of Covetousness I. Point That the Jesuits authorize all sorts of ways to get wealth and dispense with restitution of what is procured by the most unjust and infamous ways Escobar Filliutius Lessius Layman Sanchez Pag. 31 II. Point Divers motives and particular expedients to dispense with restitution though a man be obliged thereto Escobar Lessius Pag. 35 Article VI. Of Unfaithfulness Pag. 38 I. Point Of divers sorts of Vnfaithfulness and of Deceit which may be committed in things by altering them selling them by false weights and measures and taking those which are anothers without his privity Escobar Lessius Amicus Filliutius Tambourin Sa Dicastillus Pag. 39 II. Point Of Infidelity in Promises and Oaths Pag. 46 Section I. Several ways of mocking God and Men without punishment and without sin according to the Jesuits in promising that which they never intend to do and not doing that which they have promised although they are obliged thereto by Vow and by Oath Filliutius Sanchez Tambourin Sa Escobar ibid. Section II. The contrivance of the Jesuits to elude Vows made unto God Promises and Oaths made to a Confessor and to lye and deceive even in Confession Escobar Sa Sanchez Filliutius Pag. 52 III. Point Of Unfaithfulness in Conversation and common Discourse Pag. 54 Section I. An expedient which the Jesuits give for to deceive the World and to
in these dishonest looks leaves every one to his own judgement and to his own conscience to do that which he pleaseth qua in re o uisque satisfaciat suae conscientiae in the same manner Escobar leaves every one to his liberty in particular to follow his own sense in a matter so dangerous and to rule himself by his complexion and age consulatur cujusque complexio aetas There is nothing that carries men more strongly to impâ—rity then Stage-plays and particularly those which represent dishonest things For in other sensual objects and divertisements there are but one or two senses commonly that are satisfied but in Stage-plays all the senses in a manner are affected are almost all engaged in impurity by sensible images and representations which hath obliged the Saints to condemn them so often and to turn men away from them as one of the most dreadful inventions of the Devil and most capable to destroy souls For this cause Escobar speaks according to the truth where he saith a Râ—praesentantes comedias res turpes conti nentes vel eo modo ut ad venerem excitent ut plurimum mortaliter peccant Escobar tr 1 Exam. 8 c. 1. n. 3. p. 138. They who act Comedies wherein dishonest things are contained or represented in such manner as ordinarily to excite impurity sin mortally But if the Comedians finde this proposition at first sight to be rigorous I am assured that they will receive it without much trouble when they shall understand that which follows For after he had condemned of mortal sin those who act Comedies he adds that b Porro audientes obserentiam ob abquem bonum sinem non peccant ob curiositatem aut levitatem venialiter delinquunt Ibid. p. 3. p. 13â—9 those that go thither to learn something or for any other good end sin not at all and if they go thither of curiosity or lightness they sin onely venially These Stage-players will easily satisfie themselves by this last proposition seeing it destroys the former and shews clear enough that their Profession is in effect good ar at least indifferent for there is no appearance that one can be a partaker in an other mans sin or be present voluntarily without cause by lightnesse or onely to please his curiosity at a wicked action and an exercise which of it self is a mortal sin and draws on to sin being St. Paul doth testifie that not onely they who do evil are worthy of death but they also who consent thereto that is to say those who approve it by their actions by their words by their presence and even by their silence So that if they who act Stage-plays sin mortally as Escobar saith in his first proposition it follows according to St. Paul that those who go to bear them expressely upon lightness and curiosity make themselves partakers of their sin And if on the contrary they who go to them sin not at all or sin venially as the same Escobar saith though they go thither through lightness and more curiosity it will follow that they who act the Comedies do not sin at all neither or sin but venially contrary to what Escobar affirms in his first proposition and against the judgement of all the Saints Filliutius in the place which I have cited speaks of Stage-playes almost like Escobar c Si ob solam curiosiatem audiantur vel delectationem representationis non rerum representatarum alioquin non sit probabile pericu'um lapsus in mortale non excedit veniale Filliutiu mor. tom 2. Tr. 30. v. 10. n. 212. If one goes thither saith he only for curiositie or for the pleasure he takes in beholding good Actors and not of the things which they represent this is but a venial sinne provided that he come not thereby in apparent danger of falling into mortal sin And to shew that he esteems this venial sin to be a very small one and that commonly there is even none at all in attending on these filthy and dishonest Stage-playes he permits this to the Ecclesiastiques d Non etiam Clerici peccant sublato scandalo quod sere non intercedit ex Sanchez quia srequentissime intersunt Ibid. The Ecclesiastiques themselves saith he sin not in going to a Stage-play provided that it be without scandal which hardly happens at all saith Sanchez because they go thither very frequently He saith that Ecclesiastiques sin not in going to Stage-playes provided they can go thither without scandal and at the same time he declares that there is no scandal therein because they go thither very frequently It is true and we see it too well at this day that the greatest crimes cause no horror nor offend the world but only when they are not common as soon as they become so they cease to cause horror and daunt no more the spirits of men and often times they passe even for innocent actions For what concerns dishonest touches Escobar saith generally that they are permitted betwixt persons espoused and relates this as the opinion of Sanchez and many others e Sanchez alu multi affirmant licere si absit pollutionis consensus in rem illicitam periculum Escobar tr 1. Exam. 8. n. 74. d. 149. sect 3. Sanchâ—… saith he and many others assure us that they are permitted provided that no danger of falling into pollution come thereby nor of giving consent unto any unlawfull thing He also makes Sanchez speak more boldly in this point citing him again the second time f Sanchez citatus ait licere oscula tactuâ— externos etiam si secutura pollutio praevideatur dummodo adsit justa causa sponso scilicet ad vitandum inurbanitatis seu austeritatis not am Ibid. n. 74. Sanchez whom I have already cited saith that kisses and touches of the body are permitted to persons betrothed though they foresee that pollution will follow thereon provided the man be moved to it by some just reason as namely that he may not appear to be of an ill humour or too austere It is better according to Sanchez and Escobar to give a mans self up to impurity and unnatural excesse than to passe for an uncivil person before men or women Filliutius reports it as an opinion of the same Sanchez g Non esse mortale nec saepe veniale exosculari molles infamium carnes Filliutius moral tom 2. tract 30. c. 9 n. 171. p. 321. that it is no mortal fin nor commonly a venial one to kisse the tender and delicate flesh of children h Etiamsi fiant ob solam delectationem naturaliter consequentem crunt ad summum peccata venialia Ibid. n. 176. And speaking of touches and kisses which are given for pleasure only he saith that they can be but venial sins and besides he testifies that he could hardly condemn them of venial sin Erunt ad summum peccata venialia And a little after having made this question i
motive whatsoever it be swear that he hath not done a thing which notwithstanding he hath done indeed It is not sufficient for him to lye formally he will also joyn perjury to lying in saying that one may swear that he hath not done that which he hath done and he would cover this lye and this perjury by the thought of a man onely in what estate and in what circumstances soever he be alone or in company speaking for recreation or for other motive whatsoever it be pretending that he may swear that he hath not done which he hath done without fear of taking a false oath provided b Intelligendo intra se aliud revera fecit that he intend onely in his mind some other thing that he had not done See here Sanchez first method which serves for nothing but to learn to lye purely simply and without equivocation by using words that are not equivocal in themselves at all and which cannot signify that which one saith nor that which is in ones mind at all as he affirms himself So that such words are contrary to the thoughts which he hath and he saith really other things then he thinketh which is to lye formally and simply The second method is no better then the former for he saith one may c Vel intelligendo aliam diem ab ea aqua fecit understand or supply out of ones mind that he hath not done the thing on an other day then that on which he did it or else that he hath not done it in an other place an other time or an other company or with other circumstances of which he gives him choice leaving him entire liberty to make use of which he pleases to deceive without scruple For his words are clear and general d Vel intelligendo aliud quodvis additum verum quodcunque illuct sit Or intending saith he some quite other thing and quite other circumstance which he pleases to add which is true of what sort soever it be And with these precautions if you will believe him e Revera non mentitur nec perjurus est he lyes not at all in effect and is not perjured imagining and pretending to make us believe that he hath spoken no false thing and that he hath spoken the very truth though he say not that which is demanded of him nor that which the words he uttereth signifie of themselves but an other truth altogether different sed aliam veritatem disparatam This is a true way to be able to justifie all manner of lyes and perjuries the greatest lyar and the greatest impostor may make use hereof to justify and to maintain himself in these crimes in saying that his meaning was other than his saying and that so f Revera non mentitur nec perjurus est sed tantum non dicit unam veritatem determinatam qaam auditores concipiunt ac verbo illo significant sed aliam veritatem disparatam He is really neither lyar nor perjured but onely did not speak precisely a truth which they understood who did hear him and which his words signified but another truth which had no thing ommon therewith But that for this they had no cause to complain of what he said to them and answered in this manner they having no right to question him For he presupposeth as a general maxime g Quia alteri respondere non obligatus nec obligatur respondere ad ejus mentem that when one is not obliged to answer a person neither is he obliged to answer according to his thoughts Which he supports by a maxime of Logick which saith h A quo enim removetur genus omnis quoque species removetur That when the general kind of any thing is removed the special sorts are also removed This reasoning he saith he learned from Navarre who saith that when one is not obliged to answer a person he may answer him in what manner he pleases he is not obliged to give him an honest civil true sincere faithful one but that he may make one in all points contrary for that we may make him none if we please There is none that sees not clearly what follows from this that incivil conversation especially amongst equals where one hath no authority over others nor right to question them nor to oblige them to answer to that which is proposed or demanded of them every one may say what he will and understand what he will by his words without apprehending that he lies and believing that he speaks the truth because he represents it in his minde though he hide it or expresse even the contrary in his words But there is great difference betwixt conceiving or thinking the truth and speaking or signifying it to others Those who will follow this Jesuit shall have the truth in their thoughts but not in their words they conceive it well but they do not speak it at all and in this they are lyars and perjured notwithstanding all their intentions and secret thoughts for to lye is no other thing then to speak otherwise then a man thinks and to say one thing having another in his thoughts Filliutius seems at first sight not to agree with Sanchez in this point a Quinto quaeritur quale peccatum sit uti amphibologia absque rationabili causa Filliutius qq mor. tom 2. tract 25. c. 11. n. 330. p. 204. It is demanded saith he what sin it is to make use of equivocations without any reafonable cause His first answer is b Respondeo dico primo probabile esse quod sit mendacium atque adeo perjurium si confirmetur juramento It is probable that it is a lye and by confequence perjury when it is confirmed with an oath But a little after his inclination which he hath for looseness and to flatter the lust and corruptions of men make him say c Dico 2. probabilius videri non esse mendacium nec perjurium Ibid. That it seemeth more probable that in rigour it is no lye nor any perjury His principal reason is d Quia qui sic loquitur jurat non habet intentionem dicendi falsum vel jurandi salsitatem ut supponimus Ibid. because that he who talks and swears after this manner hath no intention as is presupposed to speak nor to swear false though he indeed both speak and swear so He pretends then as Sanchez that the inward will of man alone can change the signification of words and give to them such as he pleases It is true that Sanchez gives not this power to the intention alone without joyning some mental restriction untoâ—t by which he forms in his mind a true sense in saying in himself that he will neither lye nor forswear Filliutius notwithstanding fails not to approve these restrictions and mental additions of Sanchez e Et quod profertur in rigore habet aliquem sensum verum quem talis intendit
Sa to affirm c Fabellam recitare ut auditores excitentur ad pie audiendum non est peccatum Sa verh Praedicare num 5. p. 378. that it was no sin to make fabulous relations in Sermons to stir up the auditors attention and devotion He speaks also more clearly in another place where he saith d Mentiri in concione in pertinentibus ad doctrinam quidam aiunt esse mortale alii non semper quod intellige si sit materia levis Sa verb. Mendacium num 2. pag. 494. that there are some who hold that it is always mortal sin to tell a lye in Preaching on any Doctrinal point but others deny it And he relates the opinion of these latter adding onely that it must be understood onely when the matter is sleight If to lye in the chair in points of Doctrine according to this Jesuit be but a venial sin he without doubt would make no great matter of lyes which a Preacher should speak in other matters and it may be he might give them in this the same liberty that he gives them to tell tales generally and without exception He condemns them not more rigorously who tell lyes in confession e Mentiri in consessions de peccatis venialibus out de aliis confessis mortalibus veniale solum peccatum est etiamsi illa antea apud se proposuisset vere confiteri Sa verb. Confessio n. 12. p. 88. It is but a venial sin saith he to lye unto a Confessor in confessing venial or mortal sins formerly confessed though after resolution to confesse them truly Escobar saith the same and adds some thing f Mendacium de peccaâ—o veniali veniale est nisi illud veniale esset totalis confessionis materia quia tunc daretur absolutio fine materia Sacramentum nullum esset Suarez tom 4. n. 3. par disp 22. sect 10. n. 6. Alii negant quia omne mendacium de veniali est res levis Escob tr 7. ex 4. n. 107. p. 816. Suarez holds saith he that to lye in confessing a venial sin is but a venial sin provided that this venial sin be not all the matter of the confession for in this case the absolution will have no subject and the Sacrament will be nul Others hold the contrary for that a lye which consists in a sleight and venial matter is always sleight A lyetold in confession and which makes the Sacrament null in the judgement of this Jesuit and of those whose judgement he reports seems to him a very sleight thing to furnish matter for a mortal sin though it destroy a Sacrament and turn it into an action profane and sacrilegious It is easie to see if this be to honour the Truth and the Sacrament of penance which by a particular reason may be called the Sacrament of Truth because there a man acknowledgeth that which he is truly confessing himself a sinner before God and confessing his sins before a Priest who holds the place of God nevertheless this Divinity teaches that it is no great matter to lye in this Sacrament and that fault committed herein ought to be considered according to the matter of the sin rather then by the holinesse of the Sacrament in such manner that if the matter about which the lye is told be not an important thing in it self the sin is but sleight though thereby the Sacrament be profaned made nul and sacrilegious This Jesuit commits yet a greater extravagance against the truth when he saith that it may be opposed with a resolution altogether formal that is to say by pure malice though it be acknowledged in the heart without becoming guilty of any great fault g Impugnaeâ—e perspicuam veritatem animo impugnandt contradicendi est peccatum grave aut leve juxta materiae gravitatem aut levitatem Escobar tract 2. exam 2. cap. 1. num 14. pag. 292 To conflict with the truth saith he which is evident with a formal design to oppose and contradict it is great or little according as the truth in hand is of great or little consequence He considers not the greatness of the Majesty of God who is encountred in the Truth and who is Truth it self neither doth he any more consider the wicked disposition of him who impugnes the truth by an aversion or contempt which he hath towards it opposing it by a formal design to resist and destroy it though he know it evidently animo impugnandi contradicendi perspicuam veritatem If when the King speaks any of his Officers should rise up and contradict him publickly in a thing which he knew himself to be just and true being induced to this excesse onely by insolence and to oppose himself against the King and to contradict him without cause it is certain he would be treated as in guilty of high treason and his action would passe in the judgement of all the world for an unsufferable outrage and contempt of Royal Majesty though the subject upon which he thus opposed the King were not of great importance And yet Escobar would that it should be accompted but a sleight fault to deal thus with God and his Truth One passage alone of Sanchez which I will rehearse here may suffice to prove that which I have said that in things purely spiritual the Jesuits find scarcely any sufficent matter for mortal sin h Res quantumvis sacras principal ter ob vanam gloriam officere ut Sacramenta omnia ministrare vel recipere sacram celebrare non excedit culpam venialem Sanchez op mor. l. 1. c. 3. n. 1. p. 9. Et si debitus ordo pervertatur ea tamen perversio non tanti est ut adea gravis injuria rebus spiritualibus inseratur ut poena aeterna digna sit Ibid. To perform of vanity saith he the most sacred actions as to administer the Sacraments or to receive them or to celebrate the most Holy Masse for vain glory can be but a venial sin though vain glory be proposed as the principal end He acknowledges that there is disorder in this action but he pretends that it is of small consequence and that the injury that is done to God and things Spiritual and Divine in making them subservient to vain glory is not a thing so considerable as to merit the disfavour of God and that it conserve for a matter to mortal sin and a cause of eternal damnation It is not an easie thing to judge what reason he may have thus to diminish this sin if he acknowledge that there may possibly be great ones in Spiritual matters For indeed it will be a hard thing to find greater then this considered by the light of Faith then to say Masse for vanity as the principal end thereof this is properly to sacrifice to vanity or to the Devil who is the god of vanity the body of Jesus Christ which is horrible onely to think And if the sacrifice of the Masse may be
sapiant quia minores vocantur Lactant. lib. 2 divin instit c. 8. These deprive themselves of wisdom who suffer themselves to be led by others like Beasts receiving without discerning all that which the ancients have invented That Which deceives them is the name of Ancestors Imagining that they cannot be Wiser then they because they come after them and because these are called neoteriques And in the same place l Deus dedit omnibus pro virili portionem sapientiae nec quia nos illi temporibus sapientia quoque antecesserunt Quia si omnibus aequaliter datur occupari ab antecedentibus non potest Ibid. God hath given wisdom to every man according to his capacity and those who precede us in time do not therefore exceed us in wisdom For being it is given indifferently to all men they who came first cannot by their possession eject others from it He considered not when he alledged these passages that what these Authors say is for reproof of those who suffer themselves to be carried with humane customs and traditions to the prejudice of manifest truth or who are too credulous and timorous in the inquiry after natural things which depend on reason and that they speak not of matters of Faith and Religion such as those are which he handles in his Book But if he have perceived this truth he abuses the authority of these great personages applying it against their sence and using it without reason to justifie a thing quite remote from their thoughts and contrary to their judgements and from that of all antiquity which were easie to be made appear if it were not a thing too remote from my subject He alledges also these words which he attributes to the Council of Constantinople m Beatus qui prosert verbum inauditum id est novum Syn. Const art 1. Happy is that man who produces an unheard word that is a now one Finally he cites those words of the holy Scripture n Omnis scriba doctus similis est patrifamilias qui profert de thesauro suo nova vettra Matth. 13. ver 53. every learned Doctor is like unto a Father of a Family who brings out of his treasure things new and old I passe by this last passage of the Gospel of Saint Matthew which he abuseth manifestly against the sence of the Son of God and that of all interpreters But I cannot passe over the remarkable falsity and visible corruption of the pretended words of the Council of Constantinople For the true words of the Council are Beatus qui profert verbum in auditum obedientium Blessed is he who utters a word into obedient ears From which he first cuts off the word obedientium obedient Afterwards he joins two words into one and instead of in auditum in to the hearing which were the Councils words he makes it say inauditum unheard In the third place adding corruption of sence unto falsification of words he saith that this word inauditum signifies new But there is no cause to marvel that the desire of novelty leads to falsity and consequently to errours and heresies Azor and after him Filliutius who doth nothing in effect but follow him speak also very advantagiously for novelty saying generally that the Apostolical Traditions are of humane right and that by consequence they may be changed o Ex quo officitur ut traditiones divinae ad â—us divinum specteat ac proinde sunt immutabiles Apostolicae vero ad jus humanum propterea Ecclesiae authoritate mut abiles Azor Instit mor. l. 8. c. 4. q. 4. pag. 743. Filliutius tom 2. tr 22. c. 1. n. 11. p. 65. Divine Traditions saith Azor appertain to Divine right and by consequence they are immutable but the Traditions of the Apostles are humane Laws and for that cause the Churoh may change them He expounds a little above what he means by Divine and Apostolical Traditions in these terms p Divinae traditiones sunt quaâ— ab ipsius Christi ore Apostoli acceperunt vel quas Spiritu Sancto dictante vel gubernante vel Christo Domino imperante promulgarunt Apostolicae sunt qu as ipsi Apostoli tanquam Ecclesiae Praelati Doctores magistri recto es instituerunt Azor. Ibid. Divine Traditions are those which the Apostles have learned from the mouth of Jesus Christ or which the Holy Ghost hath dictated and they have written by his Command or by that of Jesus Christ The Traditions of the Apostles are those which the Apostles have instituted in the quality of Prelats Doctors Tutors and Governours of the Church In such manner that according to them the Traditions of the Apostles are no other then the Inventions of the Apostles which they ordained of themselves and of their own proper motion without having learned them of Jesus Christ or the Holy Spirit This is no more then his words clearly signifie and the division he makes suffers not any other sence to be given them since he opposes those Traditions which the Apostles have instituted of themselves quas ipsi Apostoli instituerunt to those which they have received from the mouth of Jesus Christ and from those which the Holy Ghost taught them and which he established by their Ministry quas ab ipsius Christi ore Apostoli receperunt vel quas Spiritu Sancto dictante jubente vel Christo Domino imperante promulgarunt He makes then of these two sorts of Traditions as it were two opposite members dividing Traditions into Divine and Humane or Apostolical He calls the first Divine because they draw their original from God and his Spirit who hath instituted them the Apostles having onely published them by his motion and order he affirms that the other are humane and of humane right ad jus humanum spectant because according to him they proceed from an humane spirit and not from Gods and that the Apostles who were men instituted them and are become their Fathers and Authors If it be true as he faith that the Apostles have made these rules in the Church whether concerning faith or manners and that they have not received them from Jesus Christ nor the Holy Ghost he hath reason to say that the constitutions and traditions which he terms Apostolical are onely of humane right because they take their original and their authority from the spirit of man and which by consequence may be changed by men and it may follow also from the same principle that they are subject unto errour the spirit of a man how holy soever it be may always deceive him when he is the Author and original of his thoughts and actions It will follow thence also that the Apostles have governed the Church as Princes and Politicians govern their estates and their common wealths by their wit and reason It would follow likewise that the Church is not governed by the Spirit of Jesus Christ being they who first governed it and
of Superiours will depend on the will and the fancy of their inferiours He holds not onely that the priviledge of probability may dispense with an inferiour for the obedience which he owes to his Superiour but also to elevate him above his Superiour and to oblige the Superiour to obey his subject He demands n Tenetur poenitentis opiuionem probabilem confessarius sequi relicta sua probabiliori Tenetur quia poenitens habet jus ad absolutionem opinioni probabili nitens In prooem exam 3. cap. 6. num 27. dag 25. whether a Confessor is obliged to follow the probable opinion of his penitent and to quit his own which is more probable His answer is that he is obliged thereto because the penitent grounding himself upon a probable opinion hath a right unto absolution So absolution and pardon of sins is no longer a grace and favour unto the sinner according to Escobar but a right and this right is not founded on the Word of God but upon the word of man and upon a probable opinion and even upon the word of a single man who may be the Author thereof and stand single in this opinion according to the Jesuits But as a probable opinion gives right unto a penitent to demand absolution so it might seem that a probable opinion should give a right to a Consessor to refuse it if he judged it neither to be his duty nor to be in his power to give it him But Escobar maintains that he is obliged to give it him renouncing his own right as well as his opinion to submit it to that of his penitent o Quod si Confessario falsa videatur opinio pâ—nitent is debet se accommodare si à probat is autoribus probabilis reputetur Ibid. n. 27. p. 29. and if it happen that the opinion of the penitent appear not onely not probable to the Confessor but that he also believes it assuredly false Escobar wills not to refuse to comply with the will of his penitent and that if the penitent will not submit nor abate any thing of his pretended right the Confessor must accord to what he demands For if he pretend to use rigour and to passe sentence upon this difference these new Doctors who have established themselves judges in the Church and of the Church it self and of the Holy Fathers will almost all with one voice condemn him to give him absolution and in case he fail therein p Vasquez 1.2 tom 1. disp 92. a. 7. n. 4. addit Confessarium non proprium negantem absolutionem secundum opinionem probabilem solum venialiter delinquere At credidero mortaliter pecoare si de mortalibus facta confessio Ibid. n. 27. Vasquez will declare he sinneth mortally if he be an ordinary Confessor as are the Parish Priests or venially if he be a delegate as are the Monks And Escobar with others having no regard at all to this distinction will condemn absolutely them both of mortal sins SECT III. The opinion of Sanchez concerning the probability of opinions WE might produce upon this subject almost as many Authors as there are of the Society because they have in a manner all written of it and they are all agreed in the principal questions so important is this point in their Diviuity of which we may say that it is as it were the foundation and that there upon their Doctrine and their conduct is built But there is none that hath more enlarged and cleared this matter nor by consequence who hath more discovered the spirit of the Society then Sanchez For this purpose I thought meet to give him a title apart Amongst many maximes which he establisheth as fundamentals in this matter this is a principal one a Opinio probabilis est quae rationi alicujus momenti inniâ—tur ita tamen ut pro opposita parte nihil convincens sit Sanch. op mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 6. p. 28. An opinion is probable when it is founded on some considerable reason provided there be nothing to convince the contrary opinion From whence he draws this consequence with Val. b Tunc manere apud aliquem intra opinionis certitudinem quidpiam quando sibi persuadet rationem illius solvi posse aut ab ipsomet aut ab aliis A man may hold an opinion probable when he is perswaded that he himself or some other can answer the reasons used for ground thereof And when he is perswaded that neither he nor any other can answer the reasons he hath against an opinion c Licet quis rationem peculiarem habeat contra oppositam sententiam quam ipse solvere nequit sibi solvi non posse videctur non ideo censere debet opposiram aliorum opinionem improbabilem esse ut eam sequi nequeat He ought not to believe for all that if it be held by others that it is not probable so that he may not follow it himself Of which he renders this reason which breathes nothing but modesty and humility d Quiae solo suo jubicio non debet aliorum sententiam improbabilem judicare Ibid. Because he ought not judge of himself alone that the opinion of others is not probable And to make all men resolve to pass by all sorts of difficulties and reasons how strong and insoluble soever they appear he saith that it e Vel eo maxime quod sibi persuadere debeat quotidie contingere subito inveniri solutionem rationum quas quis insolubiles putabat aut ab aliu facile solvi Ibid. happens dayly that new answers are found to reasons which were believed to be invincible And so although one single person or many cannot answer the convincing reasons which are given for an opinion yet they ought perswade themselves that others may do it and that so the contrary opinion ceases not to be probable and by consequence may be followed in conscience So that according to this Author it is lawful to put in practice an opinion which we believe false and pernicious thinking that this own judgement made thereon may possibly be false so there will be nothing which can be capable to retain these libertine spirits nor to hinder them from despising all sorts of reasons and lights how clear and strong indeed soever they be and that by their own judgement and after that from doing what they please They may extend this liberty much more easily to the most certain truths of Religion which have not always convincing reasons for them because they subsist only by authority and faith and if they had a libertine f Sibi persuadeat rationem illius solvi posse ab ipsomet aut ab aliis Supra might easily perswade himswade himself that either he or some other might answer them And if he should not happen on any person who were able to do it he might always imagine that it was not impossible to meet some one hereafter since that as
65. A man relying on an opinion sweet and indulgent but probable disobeys his Superior in a thing in which it is probable that he is not obliged to obey but it is more probable that he is obliged The Superior following the opinion which is more safe judges that he ought to obey and therefore that he hath sinned It is enquired whether he may act against him and punish him as disobedient See here the question proposed according to the rules of Probability The Superior hath reason to command it the Inferior hath reason not to obey both founded on Probability The person of the Superior is more considerable and his pretension more just besides it is more probable Let us see notwithstanding what will be the judgement of the Doctors of this Science r Respondeo Petrum non peccasse Addo posse Praelatum subscribere alterutri opinioni ac propterea censere Petrum habuisse obligatâ—onem obediendi Sed illam invincibiliter ignorasse ductum opinione probabili nihilominus temere judicat Praelatus eum peccasse quia improbabile est eum peccarc qui sequitur opinionem probabilem ut num 59 ostendi Cum ergo improbabile sit Petrum peccasse injustus erit Antistes si contra illum procedat quia ubi non est culpa nec medicina est opus nec poena Ibid. I answer saith Caramouel that the Inferior sins not and I say further that the Superior may follow which of the two probable opinions he pleaseth and by consequence judge that the other is obliged to obey him but he having followed a probable opinion is innocently ignorant of this obligation But the Superior shall be rash if he judges that he sins because it is not probable that he sins who follows a probable opinion and so it being probable that this private man hath not sinned the Superior shall be unjust if he treat him as guilty for where there is no fault there is no need of remedy nor punishment There is no person who seeth not that this answer overturneth in a manner all the Authority of Superiors of what condition or order soever they be since the reasoning of this Author is general and comprehends them all For through the extreme licence which they have at this day introduced to make almost every thing probable and to found this probability upon any likely reason or upon the advice of one single man as do the Jesuits it will hardly happen at all that a Superior can make any command in which some probability occurres not which may take away his power of causing himself to be obeyed and to punish the rebellious who pretend to be innocent and more just and reasonable than himself If this Superior be condemned of rashness and injustice in following the more probable opinion he shall be by much stronger reason if he follows the less probable So that whatsoever he doth and on what side soever he turneth in any difference which he shall have with his Subjects he cannot avoid condemnation if he be judged at the Tribunal and according to the Laws of Probability and it seems that as this Doctrine was not invented but to favour looseness and disorder and vice in all sorts of professions it hath also for its principal scope to fight against and to destroy as much as is possible the persons that are established by God to hold the Word in duty and all things in order This is evident that the Doctors themselves of this new Science are constrained to confess that if the principles of their Probability be held to we must speak no more of Scripture nor of Superiors and that they do only delude their Inferiors having no authority or power at all Caramouel considering this principle of the Jesuits Divinity of which we shall speak hereafter to wit that the Church hath not power to condemn inward actions affirms that it follows thence not only that the Ecclesiastick doth not ill who sayes not his Breviary at all provided he conceal this but also that there is no more Authority in the Church which appears so horrible to himself that he cryes out with astonishment Å¿ Bone Deus si haec opinio semet admitteretur actum esset de tota aut fere Superiorum authoritate subditi obedirent ad ocâ—los privatim omnia mandata Ecclesiastica aut Secularia tâ—merarent Nemo peccaret si secreto comederet carnes die Veneris nemo qui diebus jejunii tertio vel quarto nemo qui secreto omitteret Officium divinum Caram Theol. fund p. 205. Good God if this opinion have success there will be an end of almost all authority of Superiors the Inferiors will only obey them when they look on them and in secret they will violate all sorts of Commandments Secular or Ecclesiastick none shall sin in eating Flesh on Fridays nor in eating three or four times a day on Fasting-dayes nor in dispensing with themselves secretly for Divine Service He acknowledges all these things he confesses that they are unsupportable excesses but he confesses that they are true consequences of the Jesuits Probability t Nimia omnia improbabilia tamen legitime illata ex doctrina probabili These excesses are very great and incredible but yet they are the legitimate consequences of the Doctrine of Probability He himself makes no difficulty to testifie openly that he sees well that this Doctrine tends to the withdrawing of all sorts of Subjects and Inferiors from the obedience of their Superiors and u Ut video ex hac doctrina oriri in nostris scholis possit Independentium illa haeresis quae ab annis pauculis inficit Angliam Ibid. to introduce every where the heresie of the Independents which of late years hath infected England To all this he answers but one word and as it were on the by at the end of his discourse x Quaerenda igitur est ratio probabiliore certier quae hanc doctrinam perniciosam debellet Ergo Theologe Lector me adjuva ergo vel mihi oslende cur antecedens non sit probabile aut cur consequens sit probabile aut tandem ostende errorem in argumentation is nostrae forma quoniam doctior esse desidero nec â—pâ—os Magistros lavenio Ibid. We must therefore search out some reason which is more certain than the more probable to convict and overturn this pernicious Doctrine Assist me saith he Reader if thou be'st a Divine and shew me why the antecedent is not probable or how the conclusion can be so or at least shew me some fault in this reasoning for I desire to be instructed and I find no Master capable to instruct me He avows the mischief of this Doctrine which he himself terms pernicious and also that he knows no remedy for it at all That is that it is wholly inevitable Whence it is easie to conclude that by the very rules of Logick unto which he addicts himself as the principal
rule of Truth the Doctrine from whence issues by infallible consequence so great errours is truly pernicious and entirely false because it is indubitable in Logick that from a true conclusion nothing but truth can follow and likewise that that from whence false and pernicious conclusions may be drawn must needs be false and pernicious it self without troubling ones self to seek other reasons to prove it this same being evident and certain by the light of Nature only and by the acknowledgement of them who are the Authors and Defenders of this Doctrine We need no other proofs to make appear that this Doctrine introduceth Independency and the ruine of all sorts of Authority since the principal Defenders of it acknowledge it and by the same reason it is entirely opposed to the spirit and conduct of Faith and leads to Irreligion For the true Faith and true Religion being nothing but Obedience and being given us of God to captivate our understanding to revealed Truths the one and the other keeps our spirit under a perpetual dependance and voluntary submission unto the Word and Will of God But the Jesuits Doctrine of Probability gives the spirit of man a Soveraign liberty which submits it self to nothing and reserves alwayes to it self a power not only to condemn and approve what it pleases but also to condemn that which it approves and to approve what it condemns passing from one to another and even from the more probable to the less probable without fearing to engage it self at all in the least sin and pretending alwayes to walk in an assured way and more then probable in the midst of Probabilities which environ us on every side since they have made probable almost all the rules of life and humane converse and have even elevated mens spirits above all these Probabilities to a Soveraign Independance Caramouel expresses this in this manner y Fidei Orthodoxae dogmatibus demonstrationibus ac principiis per se notiâ— subest ingenium probabilibus sententiis superest Caram Theol. fund p. 138. The wit of man is subject to the Doctrines of Orthodox Faith and the evident principles of natural reason which it cannot resist but it is above all probable opinions So that to reduce the substance of this Article into a few words the Doctrine of the Jesuits Probability withdraws the Spirit from all sorts of obedience from that which is due to Superiors by giving it power to resist them upon the least appearance of reason from that which is due unto God himself by permitting to dispense with a great part of his Commandments and from that which is due to the Church teaching to deride its Laws and clude its Ordinances from that which is due to reason by giving liberty to follow that which is less probable if it please better and be more conformable to our interests and also attributing unto it an Empire greater than that of God himself who can never depart from that which is most just and most reasonable and giving it an incomparable power and Independance in the Kingdom of Probabilities SECT V. That an opinion probable being once received all the Prelates of the Church and all the men in the World cannot hinder that it should be probable and safe in conscience according to the Jesuits THere is nothing more easie than to introduce into the Schools a new opinion and to make it probable according to the Jesuits and their followers because they hold that it needs only one reason by which it may be maintained or one Author that approves it There is also nothing more easie than to cause it to be received in the World because they believe that the most pleasant which are those that all enquire after are the best and most safe Finally there is nothing more easie than to uphold and bring it in credit it s own pleasantness and the approbation that some give it being sufficient to acquire unto it new Partizans and new Defenders who will publish it and induce it unto practice and so it will have for it the approbation of Divines the example of private persons and plausible reasons which are all foundations of Probability And being once established in this manner it will as it were be impossible to destroy and discredit it and consequently there will be no means to hinder the World from following it or the Authors who have undertaken its defence to teach and publish it For 1. It is well known what trouble it is to undo things that are passed into custom and evil things rather than good and amongst evil things those which are most pleasing and favourable to the corrupt inclinations of nature give most trouble in rooting them out and we hardly ever obtain our design therein 2. When a custom which hath taken birth from an evil maxim is also propped up by apparent reasons and the authority of those that have reputation of being vertuous and learned the evil becomes as it were incurable and without remedy And this is that which we have seen to happen to the most part of the new and pernicious opinions under which the Church groans at this day whilst it endures them 3. The Authors of these opinions make use of no other armes commonly to defend them nor admit of others to oppose them than reason they submit all to dispute they examine all by the rules of Logick by Syllogismes and Subtilties So that he who is most proper to catch at niceties and contest about them carries it commonly though his cause be the weaker and less reasonable 4. It is clear that there is scarcely any that will give way to another in wit and reason especially in the heat of a dispute but the opinions which carry men on to looseness and vice have yet more advantage in this kind of combat which is made by reason and disputation that they are there as it were invincible because of the force which the natural corruption of our spirits give them It were easie to produce many proofs hereof if one of the newest and withall of the most eager defenders of Probability did not testifie it openly by his words a Qui rem dicit esse illicitam ad multa tenetur Primo enim debet ostendere rationes quae malitiam probant esse demonstrativas nempe tales quibus dari responsio probabilis noâ— possit 2. Debet etiam ostendere rationes quae bonitatem probant ne quidem probabilem esse ostendet si omnibus ad unam dederit solutionem quae evidenter sit vera 3. Etiam debebit ostendere partem illam quae bonitatem astruit non haâ—ere sufficientes authoritates ut dicâ—tur probabilis Haec omnia tria simul ostendere debet casurus causa etsi duâ— ex illis ostâ—ndat modo unum non ostendat Caram Theol. fund p. 138. He that saith that an action is evil and unlawfull is obliged unto many things 1. To make appear that the reasons which prove
the malice of the action be demonstrative that is that they be such as whereto no probable answer can be given 2. And in the second place he ought also shew that the reasons which prove this same action to be good and lawfull be not so much as probable which cannot be done but by giving to every one in particular a solution which is indubitable and evident 3. In the third place he is also obliged to make appear that the opinion which maintains that this action is good hath not sufficient authority to be held probable He is obliged to prove these three things together and if he fails but in one though he prove the other two he will lose his cause There needs nothing more to make invincible all sorts of wicked opinions and which lead men unto looseness and vice it being certain that it is impossible to convince them by the rules and conditions which this Disciple of the â—efuits prescribes For there being no reasons so evident which the wit of man can not obscure and entangle by his passion and artifices it is clear that if evil mexionâ— must be judged by reason and dispute none will ever be convict because the animosity of men may alwayes maintain them by contrary reasons And if we cannot be assured of any truth unless we can entirely salve all the difficulties which occurre therein as this same Author pretends it will follow that there shall never be any thing assured in Morality nor in Doctrine nor in Faith nor in Nature since it is manifest that the greatest and most indubitable Truths are subject to innumerable difficulties which the most learned and the most ingenious know not oftentimes how to explicate And so every thing shall be uncertain and probable There shall be no difference betwixt good and bid Doctrine and it shall be lawfull for all men to follow what they please in every kind of matter which is the proper scope of these Doctors of Probabilities The evil Doctrine shall have even all sorts of advantage above the good because according to this Casuist he that maintains it needs prove nothing of that he saith nor answer to any thing that can be said against him but by Probabilities And on the contrary he that speaks for truth and who condemns errour looseness and vice is obliged to prove all that he saith by demonstrations and to answer and refute all that which his adversary can say with reasons so clear and cogent that he cannot reply any thing that hath so much as an appearance of truth And when he hath entirely disarmed him and destroyed all his reasons making him see clearly that they are of no value and that they are not so much as probable only he hath yet gained nothing at all For if you believe this Casuist he must besides this take from him all his Authority of every sort and reduce him to that pass that he may be able to find none sufficient to support his opinion and render it probable which is in a manner impossible because it suffices as to this to have one single Casuist that teaches it and though none have yet ever taught it he that invents and first maintains it may make it probable if he be accounted a man of learning and piety and there are none but such amongst the Masters of this Science So his opinion shall be alwayes probable and though false and pernicious it shall be shot-free under probability 5. This is one rule of these great Doctors that b Benigniores eisi aliquando sint minus probabilts per accidens sunt sempâ—r utiliores securiorâ—s Caram Theol. fued p. 134. the opinion more sweet is alwayes better and more safe though it be less probable By this rule the opinions which favour looseness and corrupt inclinations will be more safe and their probability alwayes invincible For if the reasons which are applyed against them be more forcible and pressing they will thereby become indeed less probable but they will not thereby become less pleasing and consequently they will become alwayes better and more sure according to the maxims of this marvellous Science 6. But if you oppose against them the authority of the Saints and Antient Fathers they will say that their opinions are very probable but those of the Casuists of these times are no less probable that the Moderns carry it even above the Antients c Quod ownia quae pulcbie cogitarunt jâ—m sunt à junioribus summo sludio ingenio elimata Ibid. p. 22. Quae circa sidem emergunt difficultates eae sunt à veteribus hauriendae quae vero circa mores homine Christiano dignos à novitiis scriptoribus Celor l. 8. c. 16. p. 714. because their best thoughts are cleared up and perfected by those that followed them But though the opinion of the Antients be more probable that of the Moderns being more pleasant they conclude by their principles that it is better and more safe They maintain also that when the question is about Faith we may well have recourse unto the Antients and hold that which they have believed and taught in their Writings but in matter of manners and the conduct of life we must take our rules from the new Casuists 7. One of the most certain wayes to know that an opinion is bad are the bad consequences and pernicious effects which naturally follow thereupon but this is not capable to stay the defenders of the Jesuits probability They acknowledge the dangerous consequences and pernicious effects which issue infallibly from many Novel opinions which they teach and they for bear not to maintain them at all and protest that they will maintain them alwayes because they seem probable and no person can condemn them d Multa inoonvenientia suboriuntur ex restrictionibus mentalibus multae â—x occultis compensationibus multa ex licentia occidendi injustum Judicem aut teslem quam nonnulli concedunt multa ex illa opinione quae docer de occultis non judicare Reelesiam multa ex aliis Quibus tamen non obstantibus inconvenientibus illae sentensiae in terminis quibus bodie traduntur in Scholis sunt ut minimum probabilissimae à nemine damnari pessunt Caram Theol. fund p. 549. Hereupon follow many inconveniences saith Caramouel which arise from these mental restrictions secret compensations the liberty which some give to kill an unjust Judge or Witness the opinion which holds that the Church cannot judge of secret things and other like opinions and yet all these inconveniences hinder not but that these opinions so as they are taught at this day in the Schools are at the least very probable and cannot be condemned by any 8. If it be represented unto them that a good part of these Novel opinions are contrary to the Laws of the Church and some of them to the Civil Laws also they pretend that because they be Novel they are exempt from the censure
rules of Penance but after they have acknowledged them in general they overturn and violate them in their conduct they even condemn those that would observe them and establish others quite contrary without fear of falling not only into manifest contradictions but also into a visible contempt of those Truths which they have acknowledged and of rendring themselves by this carringe unexcusable before God and men So F. Bauny saith in the 46. ch of his Summe p. 717. That notwithstanding great and frequent relapses a sinner who resorts to the feet of a Priest to put an end to his sins past dignus est absolutione toties quoties deserves to have his pardon quandocunque nulla notetur emendatio when he is not observed to have amended his life at all Never troubling himself to agree this with the rule which he established before Non datur venia nisi correcto No pardon without amendment For he consents not only that a man deserves pardon for his sin and that absolution is to be given him though he be not amended quandocunque nulla notetur emendatio but he pretends also that it ought to be given him as often as he demands it in this estate toties quoties though it be believed that he will not correct himself in the time to come though he promise it Because as he saith such resolutions are presumed to come no farther than from the teeth outwards And in the 40. ch 650. p. he saith That if any one of ignorance and simplicity have accused himself of his faults only in gross without determining any one in particular it will not be needfull to draw out of his mouth the repetition of such faults As if he had a design to recant what he had said above That a Confessor who holds the place of a Judge in this Sacrament as the Council speaks in the 14. sess and 19. chap. cannot pass sentence but of what he hath an entire and full cognisance In the 5. ch 68. p. It sufficeth not saith he to discharge our duty to say to a Confessor that we have stoln in notable quanity sufficient to offend mortally if we do not rate and specifie the sum because he ought to know the condition of his penitent which cannot easily be done unless he unfold unto him the value of his theft And yet in the 39. ch 616. p. he is not afraid to maintain the contrary in these terms It is not necessary in Confession to relate the said circumstance the quantity of the theft as whether one stole five or fifty Crowns It will suffice in rigour to say to his Confessor that in matter of stealth he hath sinned mortally taking from another the summe which maketh and constituteth that sin In the 3. ch 46. p. he saith That he who receiveth the Supper or hears a Sermon without applying his heart thereto ought not to be esteemed an Hugenot But in the 20. ch 336. p. he saith That he who without intention of idolizing it doth bend his knee before an Idol shall yet be held for an Idolater As if to receive the Supper amongst Hugenots were not as well an action of an Hugenot as to kneel before an Idol is an action of an Idolater In the same 20. ch p. 332. he speaks thus Since true devotion is inward and not in the demeanour or without and in the countenance and other exteriour gestures and that this pretended devotion destitute of that which is within is but a vizor and idol of devotion the case is resolved that in voluntary distraction and wandring of the mind in praying by obligation as do Priests Deacons and Subdeacons and Beneficiaries there is sin and so they be obliged to begin the Office again which they have said with so much indevotion For the will of the Church is that by this action which it commands them they should praise and pray to their Creator And can they do that having nothing less whilst they pray than God before their eyes They ought then for to satisfie their duty begin their Office again and if they fail to do it they ought to make restitution to the Church wherein their Benefice is or to the poor the benefit they have received according to the rate of their omissions And on the contrary he saith That the Church seemeth to him in the precept of reciting the Hours to exact of the Priests and those who are obliged thereto only to honour and praise God chaunting Psalms and singing though with voluntary distraction wherein they continue provided that they sing tunably and with reverence Of which he renders this reason in the same place For the outward action by which we attend on God is of the kind and appertains unto the vertue of Religion Therefore as they who without intention of Idolatry bow their knee before an Idol are notwithstanding guilty of Idolatry so we must believe that they pray who recite the Office though without intention but not without that decency and outward composure which such an action requires And a few lines after he reasons thus and draws this practique conclusion It follows that the Confessor cannot blame the penitent of a mortal fault for applying his mind to frivolous things whilst that his tongue sounded in the Church with others the praises of God if outwardly he did nothing that was incompatible with this attention 2. He shall not oblige him to repetition of any thing he had said because pronouncing it in such manner he hath accomplished the precept neither is he for all that obliged to make restitution of the fruits received from his Benefice if it be so that he have any And yet he hath not only said the contrary before but he returns again to it in the 13. ch 163. p. The said Beneficiaries shall be obliged to make restitution of the fruits they have received of their Benefices when they say their Hours but imperfectly with voluntary distrâ—…tions which endure the whole Office or the greater part thereof Of which he renderâ— this reason Because not to rehearse his Hours at all and to do it indecently without respect attention and reverence is all one before God because he is equally contemned and dishonoured in both It would be hard to find in two Authors who had different designs to contradict and refute one another opinions so opposite and contradictions so visible For these oppose one another in their principles in their conclusions and in their reasons which serve for proofs saying quite contrary things drawing quite contrary conclusions and propping them with reasons quite contrary as is visible in the passage I now rehearsed which need not be any further cleared And that which is yet more astonishing is that they make these so strange changes almost in a moment and they may be met with sometimes in the same page and sometimes within two or three lines as may appear in some of the places which I have cited But I cannot pass by one
assumpta admittere sicut non solum potest assumere naturam omni sensu externo privatam sed etiam talem sensuum privationem in assumpta jam natura admittere Ibid. n. 130. That there is nothing this way that can hinder the Word from taking the nature of a fool or after he hath taken our nature to suffer it to fall into folly as he cannot only take a nature deprived of all outward senses but also suffer it to fall into this privation after he hath assumed it He is not content only to say that the eternal Word might suffer under folly but he saith also that he might have assumed it voluntarily as he assumed humane nature That is that this proposition the impiety and blasphemy whereof is horrible only to be thought might have been true God is a fool and that with a voluntary folly which is accounted the worst of all He ought to have considered that folly is a disorder of the body and the Soul and of the highest part of the Soul which is Reason and that all disorder is inconsistent with the Wisdom of God as well as sin is inconsistent with it because it is a voluntary disorder and a true folly according to Scripture and if the reason of Jesus Christ had been disorderly it is manifest that his Will might have been so too and that as his Will could not be so by sin which is the folly of the Will neither could his reason be so by folly which is as we may say the sin of the Understanding as some Philosophers esteem Errour is yet a greater evil than folly because folly takes away reason but errour is the cause it is ill used Now it were better to be wholly deprived of any thing then to abuse it as it were better not to have wit then to abuse it in deceiving not to have strength then to abuse it in committing violences and murthers and yet Amicus forbears not to maintain with others that Jesus Christ was capable of erring and that he might erre in deed For the explication of this opinion he distinguisheth two sorts of errours whereof one respects the things we are obliged to know and which he calls Error pravae dispositionis because it includes a wicked disposition from whence it proceeds as from its cause the other respects such things as we are not obliged to know which consists in a simple privation of knowledge error simplicis negationis He saith 2 De secunda non est dubium quin potuerit esse in Christo Nam sicut potuit Verbum assumere naturam irrationalem incapacem omnis scientiae ita rationalem omni scientia spoliatam tam actuali quam habituali Amicus tom 6. disp 24. sect 4 n. 114. p. 359. of this second sort of error that there is no doubt but it might be in Jesus Christ For as the Word might have taken the nature of a beast incapable of all sort of rational wisdom and knowledge so it might in like manner have taken a reasonable nature destitute of all wisdom and knowledge as well actual as habitual He is not content only to maintain a proposition so strange and impious but he would also have it pass as undubitable as if it were not lawful only to doubt of it non est dubium But behold his blindness we need only consider what he saith of the other species of errour which consists in being ignorant of that which is our duty or to have an apprehension of it contrary unto truth He dares not absolutely affirm that this sort of errour might have been in Jesus Christ he contents himself to relate the opinion of Vasquez and some others 3 Tantum de prima est controversia Prima sententia affirmans potuisse de potentia absoluta talem errorem esse in Christo est Vasquez disput 60. c. Ibid. Who hold saith he that this sort of errour might have been absolutely in Jesus Christ and this opinion is that of Vasquez Certainly he doth great wrong to doubt of this sort of errour after he had said that we may not doubt of the other For if it be certain as he pretends that the eternal Word might have taken a reasonable nature destitute of all kind of knowledge and wisdom actual and habitual it follows manifestly that he might have taken it destitute of all that knowledge of things which every reasonable nature is obliged to know as of the knowledge of God and of the first principles of Reason since this sort of errour is necessarily contained in the other Which follows also clearly from the other opinion of the same Jesuit that Jesus Christ might have taken on him the nature of a fool For folly is not only an ignorance of principal duties but of all truths also according to the very definition of the Philosophers who say that it is a general blindness of mind in all things mentis ad omnia caecitas So that if Jesus Christ might have been a fool in humane nature he might have been generally ignorant of all the duties of humane and reasonable Nature and of all the principles of Reason And Amicus shews himself as weak a Logician as Christian in doubting of this last Article after he had said that we might not doubt of that general Maxime whereunto it is inseparably and visibly annexed One of the Reasons of the Jesuits who teach that Jesus Christ was capable of that errour which hath respect unto his duty which they call an Errour of a depraved disposition error pravae dispositionis and which is not only a simple ignorance and simple privation of light but an opposition to the truth and an apprehension contrary to its Rules and Laws is That Jesus Christ might according to them have taken the nature of an Ass as they express it in these very words 1 Foruit Verbum assumere stoliditatem naturae asininae ergo errorem naturae humanae Amicus ib. n. 116. The Word might have taken upon him the sottish and blackish disposition of the nature of an Ass and by consequent he might have taken the errour of humane nature Which can serve for no other thing then to make this opinion more incredible whether we regard the impiety of these strange words Potuit Verbum assumere stoliditatem naturae asininae or we regard the consequence which is ridiculous Ergo errorem naturae humanae For the blockish disposition of an Ass is not an ignorance of his duty because it hinders not an Ass to know and perceive all that which he ought to know and perceive according to his nature and much less is it an apprehension opposed unto truth which the nature of an Ass is uncapable to know And so though it were true that Jesus Christ might have been united to the nature of an Ass it would not have followed that he might have been united to a reasonable nature ingaged in errour and in errour contrary
being not willing to receive it sin by contempt And he answers in one word No. Which is so much more considerable because a little after he saith of this Sacrament after the opinion of one of his Brethren that where 2 Asserit praepesitus caeteris paribus majoâ—em gratiaâ—n per illam conferri quam per Baptismum quodvis allud Saâ— a nentum excepto Ordine Ib. n. 24. the disposition is equal it confers more Grace then Baptism or any other Sacrament except that of Orders So that according to the principles of the Jesuits we may without any considerable neglect indifferency or contempt resuse all the Graces that are contained in all the Sacraments of the faithful when God offers them by his extraordinary mercy and we may receive them without any inconvenience fince they will that we may refuse in that manner the Grace of Confirmation which they hold to be greater then that of all the Sacraments There are two occasions upon which the Sacrament of Confirmation seems to be most necessary that of persecution and peril of death and that of receiving holy Orders Escobar speaking of the first saith 3 Puto esse allquando per accidens peccatum veniale temeritatis sine confirmaâ—ione facile suscipienda periculis mortis tradi Ibid. n. 23. p. 796. I think that it may happen sometimes by accident that a man may sin Venially through rashness in exposing himself unto mortal danger without receiving Confirmation when it may easily be had He will not that we are obliged to receive Confirmation even then when we are exposed to danger of death during persecution and being in danger to lose the Faith through Torments though we might easily recieve it and so fortifie our selves by the incomparable Grace of this Sacrament But he cannot hinder truth from speaking by his mouth against himself For being constrained to avow that there is at least Venial sin in refusing or neglecting to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation in this extremity he is obliged by the same means to confess that this sin is greater since it is a constant maxim with him and his Fraternity that we ought to judge of the greatness of an obligation and sin by that of their matter And so Confirmation and the Grace of Confirmation being so great that according to him it surpasseth that of all the Sacraments of the Faithful and the necessity of receiving it in the case he proposeth being so great that therein salvation and peril of renouncing the Faith are concerned if we be not fortified with the Grace of this Sacrament it must follow of necessity that the sin which we commit in voluntarily neglecting and rejecting it will be great or none at all And Mascarenhas makes use of this very reason to prove that there is neither any necessity nor precept which obligeth us to receive Confirmation 1 Confirmatur qu a cum haec res in se fir gravis si de illa dâ—retur aliquod praeceptum obligans sub mortall sed non obligas its sicut dictum est supra ergo signum est de hoc nullum dari praeceptum Mascarenhas tract 1. de â—acram in genere disp 4. cap. 5. pag. 47. This matter saith he being of great importance if there were any Commandment for it it would oblige under mortal sin and there being no such obligation as we have said before there is then no precept in this point And consequently it is no sin at all not to receive this Sacrament It must be observed here that the Jesuits have acknowledged at first a precept for receiving Confirmation and have contented themselves to confine and restrain it to the first ages of the Church in which persecutions were frequent pretending that it is expired in these our times Afterwards they have said that if this precept did yet oblige at present it was not with so great rigour as that it should be any great sin to go against it and that the Fathers and Councils that had ordained the Faithful to receive this Sacrament had ordained it only by way of Counsel and not of Precept 3. From thence they have inferred that it can be at most but a Venial sin to omit Confirmation and neglect the Precept of receiving it 4. They also at length wipe out even that Venial sin that they may entirely abolish the Commandment for this Sacrament and perhaps the Sacrament if self if they could so much passion and injustice do they express in fighting against it It is by this way and by these degrees that they have introduced many Novelties Errors and loose Principles both into the manners and doctrine of the Church which they maintain publickly at this day as Truths and Rules of Christian Piety As for the other case in which it seems that we are yet more obliged to receive Confirmation to wit before we present our selves to take Orders Escobar demands 2 Num Ordinibus necessario praemittenda Confirmatio Escobar Ibid. n. 25 p. 796. If it be necessary to take Confirmation before Orders He saith at first that there are some who hold it a crime to fail herein but he afterwards expresses his own opinion in these terms 3 Asserue rim receptionem prius Tonsurae absque praevia Confirmatione non excedere culpam venislem levem Ordinum verò minorum veniale commissum gravius Ibid. I am not afraid to say that to receive the rasure without having before-hand received Confirmation is but a Venial sin a very slight one and that it is a greater but yet still a simple Venial one thus to receive the lesser Orders He puts the same question again a little after in a Chapter which hath for its Title 4 Praxis circa materiam de Sacrameneo Ordinis ex Societatis Jesus Doctoribus Ibid. p. 888. The practice in the matter of the Sacrament of Orders drawn out of the Doctors of the Society of Jesus in which he demands 5 An Ordinandus debeat prius Sacramentum Confirmationis accipere Ibid. n. 32. whether he who is to be ordained ought first to receive the Sacrament of Confirmation He acknowledges that Tolet judges that they who do otherwise sin mortally and are irregular because of the express command of the Council of Trent which is conceived in these terms 6 Prima Tonsura non initientur qui Sacramentum Confirmationis non susceperunt Concil Trident. sess 22. cap. 4. That those who have not received the Sacrament of Confirmation be not received unto the rasure which hinders not Escobar from declaring that 7 Alii negant adeo strictis verbis uti Concilium Tridentinum sed solum consulere Episcopis ut non confirmatos non promoveant others say that the words of the Council are not to be taken rigorously but that it only counsels Bishops not to promote unto Orders those who have not been Confirmed Whence he concludes with them who hold this opinion 8
contradict and clude this last and dreadful sentence than by correcting his errour to submit himself thereunto for he is not ashamed to say that the reason which Jesus Christ alledges and whereupon he grounds his judgment is not true and takes not place in the matter wherein he alledges it that is to say in the last Judgment It is not to purpose 1 Nec refert quod Dominus Matth. 25. formam judicii describens meminerit potius operum misericordiae quam aliorum Id enim fecit ut homines praesertim plebeios qui ad majora spiritualia parum sunt comparati in hec vita ad ea excitaret haec autem ratio cessat in extremo judicio quia tunc homines non erunt amplius ad optra misericordiae exciâ—tandi Lessim de perfect divin lib. 13. tract 22. pag. 142. saith he to alledge that our Lord in the 25. of S. Matthew representing unto us the form of the last Judgment speaks of the works of mercy rather than others For he doth it only to stir up men and especially the common people who are not capable of comprehending spiritual things to exercise these works in this life Now this reason cannot take place at the last Judgment because then there will be no need to excite men unto works of mercy I will not stay here to examine this excess which will appear strange enough of it self to them who are not void of the common resentments of Christianity because it will be more proper to do it elsewhere We will only observe in this place that one Jesuit hath undertaken to fight and destroy Gods first Commandment and another his last Judgment They who can have the patience to behold a multitude of Expositions of Scripture Councils and Holy Fathers false extravagant unheard of and many times impious need only read Poza's Book which he entituled Elucidarium Deiparae A Volume as big as his would be needful to represent all his excesses I have related some of them in the Chapter of Novelty and elsewhere which I repeat not here to avoid tediousness Father Adam hath surpassed all his Brethren in the same excess For he destroys not only the letter and the sense of Scripture he fights with the Authors themselves whom God hath made use of to impart them to us He decrys them and deprives them of all that authority and credit which is due unto sacred Writers and who were no other than the hand and tongue of the Holy Ghost by attributing unto them weaknesses and extravagancies and affirming by an horrible impiety that following their own imaginations and passions they are sometimes transported beyond truth and have written things otherwise than they were and that they did neither conceive nor believe them themselves in their consciences It will not easily be imagined that this conceit could ever come into the mind of a Monk I will not say but of a Christian who had not entirely renounced the Faith and Church if this Father had not written it in manifest terms and more forcibly than I can represent it in a Book whereto he gives this Title Calvin defeated by himself In the third Part of this Book Chap. 7. he saith That it is not only in criminal matters that zeal and hate inflame a Soul and transport it unto excest and violence but that the Saints themselves acknowledge that they are not exempt from this infirmity And flagrant passions sometimes push them on to actions so strange and ways of expressing themselves so far removed from truth that those who have written their lives have called them holy extravagancies innocent errours and Hyperboles more elevated than their apprehensions and which expressed more than they intended to say He adds also in the same Chapter and in the progress of the same discourse That this infirmity is not so criminal but that God did tolerate it in the person of those Authors whom he inspired and whom we call Canonical whom he left to the sway of their own judgments and the temper of their own spirits He compares the Saints and Fathers of the Church to persons full of passions and violence he excepts not the Canonical Authors themselves and he makes them all subject to the same infirmities and the Canonical Authors also to the greater and more inexcusable For if they be vicious in others they are yet more in these in whom the least faults and the least removes from the truth which in ordinary persons were but marks of infirmity would be as notorious and criminal as the greatest because they would be imputed unto God whose words the Canonical Authors have only rehearsed and it is as unworthy of God contrary to his nature and power to depart a little as much from the truth It is therefore manifest that what this Jesuit saith tends directly to destroy all Holy Scripture Faith and Religion For if the Canonical Writers could exceed and depart a little from the truth in one single point they were subject to do it in all the rest So their discourse is not of divine Authority neither are their Books the Books or Word of God because God is always equally infallible and can never go beyond or depart from the truth in the least whether he speaks himself or by the mouth of his Prophets CHAPTER II. Of the Commandments of God ARTICLE I. Of the first Commandment which is that of Love and Charity THis first Commandment of Love contains in it and requires of us three things to wit that we love God above all Creatures our selves for God and our neighbour as our selves These three coming from one and the same trunk and root shall make three Articles of this Chapter and I will handle all three severally that I may more distinctly represent the Jesuits opinions upon every obligation of the first Commandment and to make it evidently appear that they destroy it in every part I. POINT Of the Command to love God I will relate nothing here save only from Father Anthony Sirmond because he seems particularly to have undertaken to destroy this Precept and because he hath said upon this Subject alone all that may be found in the worst Books of his Fraternity 1. That he abolishes the Command of loving God and reduces it to a simple counsel 2. That according to him the Scripture hardly speaks at all of divine Love and Charity and that our Lord hath very little recommended it 3. That he declares that the love of God may very well consist and agree with the love of our selves 4. And that it is nothing else but self-love SECTION I. That there is no Command to love God according to the Maxims of the Jesuits Divinity OUr Lord speaking of the double Commandment of Love saith That all the Law and the Prophets do depend thereon In his duobus mandatis universa lex pendet Prophetae Matth. 22. He saith not that the command to love God doth depend on and is
also upon some bad occasion as to affirm by oath that one hath committed murder or adultery is but a venial sin 1 Qula licet juramentum hoc adjungatur narrationi peccati mortalis ut juro me commisisse tale homicidium vel fornicationem tamen non fit cum complacentia in illo ex necessitate sed tantum fic sine causa leviter quare non excedet culpam venialem Ibid. n. 336. pag. 205. For though we make use of this oath in the relation we make of a mortal sin as when we say I swear that I have committed this murder or this fornication yet this may be done without any complacency in this crime and only out of levity and without cause Wherefore it is but a venial sin He adds that though a man who swears thus should take pleasure in the crime he relates and should scandalize and defame another person in his relation this oath according to Suarez would not be mortal which he also believes as probable with him For after he hath said that the more rational Casuists hold that 2 Si quis narret peccatum mortale infamando proximum ut adulterium cum muliere honesta vel complacendo in illo tunc juramentum additum videtur mortale Ibid. num 337. if any one reporting a mortal sin wrong the honour and reputation of his neighbour as by saying that he hath committed adultery with an honest woman or if he take pleasure therein if he swear to affirm that which he saith it is a mortal sin he opposeth unto theirs the opinion of Suarez as probable 3 Attamen Suarez loco citato n. 8. defendit à mortali si tantum habeatur ratio juramenti quia non cadit supra illam materiam quatenus mala sed tantum quatenus vera Quare nec erit peccatum saltem mortale quod est satis probabile Ibid. For all that Suarez saith he in the place now quoted n. 8. maintains that it is no mortal sin if it be considered only as an oath because this oath regards not the matter of this discourse as bad but only as true And by consequence there is none at the least no mortal sin therein which is probable enough And because this reason of Suarez is metaphysical enough Filliutius relates another or rather expounds the same in another manner and makes it more intelligible 4 Quia ejusmodi defectus nec est contra finem juramenti Potest enim confirmari per illud veritas nec facit Deum testem mendacii sed ad summum rei malae indecentis ut diximus At id per se non est injuria gravis Ibid. num 336. Because this defect saith he speaking of the injury done unto God by the man who takes him for a witness of the adultery he hath committed is not contrary to the end of an oath For it may serve to confirm the truth and he takes not God for a witness of a false but at the most of a wicked and dishonest thing as we have said and this in it self is no great injury against God By this reckoning we may say that a child should do his father no great wrong nor a servant his Master nor wife her husband to produce and take him for witness of her debauches provided they were true unless we will say that the honour of God is less considerable than that of men or that God ought to be insensible of all injuries and indignities committed against him Sanchez discharges of sin at least mortal all those who swear of custom 5 Qualiscunque illa fit nondum sit reâ—ractata Atque ita ut sint peccata lethalia requirit talem advertentiam qualis est necessaria in homine non sic ad jurandum assueto Sanch. op moral lib. 3. cap. 5. num 28. pag. 21. of what sort soever it be saith he though they have not yet recanted it If they in swearing have not so much presence of mind as to perceive what they say and do and what evil they cause as the most prudent have who have not this evil habit so their vice and wicked custom of swearing shall not hurt them but on the contrary upon this occasion it shall be favourable unto them For if they had it not they would perceive what they did in swearing and would make themselves Criminals But because the evil custom of swearing which they have contracted and wherein they persist still voluntarily blinds and hinders them from perceiving the crime they commit it secures them from it according to this Doctor By this reason if a man being in a dangerous way should pull out his own eyes and then fall into a precipice he might be excused by this that he could not see when he fell By all this which hath been said unto this present it is clear that the Jesuits excuse them who swear and forswear through an evil habit who swear rashly and without reason vainly and without necessity in wicked and scandalous matters which tend to the dishonour of our neighbour by defaming him and of God by taking him for witness of crimes and debauches of which in swearing they boast themselves So that there remains nothing in this matter but swearing and forswearing with full knowledge and black malice to be a crime and which properly retains the name of an oath and perjury in the Schools of these Fathers Escabar puts this Question 1 Lictuâ—e inducere aliquem ad jurandum falsum quod tamen ipse juraturus ex ignorantia verum putat Escobar tr 1. exam 3. cap. 7. num 31. p. 74. Is it lawful to suborn any person to swear a false thing which he notwithstanding ignorantly believes to be true And after he had said that Azor is not of this opinion because it is not lawful to cause that evil to be done by another which we cannot do our selves he adds 2 Affiâ—n ac autem Petrus Hartado But this is the opinion of P. Hurtado He might also have joyned Sanchez to him who holds the same opinion 3 Si absque inductione aliqua mea ille se effâ—…at ad jurandum quod bona fide putat esse verum etian si ego falsum norim conducat ad probandum quod scio verum esse ne jure meo defrauder licebit utique acceptare Sanch. op moral lib. 3. cap. 8. num 10. pag 35. If some one present himself to me saith he without my sollicitation to swear that which he in simplicity believes to be true though I know well that it is false if notwithstanding it serve to prove some other thing which I know to be true and conduces to hinder that I be not deprived of my right it is lawful for me to take his offer The reason of Escobar is 4 Quia proximus tunc non inducitus ad effâ—ctum formaliter malum cum jurando non delinquat Ibid. Escobar Because in
without making use of a Perjurer this is to give great liberty or rather a great and dangerous temptation to all Agents Proctors and Sollicitors of Affairs The other Example is of a man who hath need of a Knight of the Post to reform a Contract and make it valid 8 Insuper potest deservire hoc juramentum confirmando contractui qui alià s infirmus erit Ibid. Moreover saith Sanchez this oath may be made use of to fortifie and make valid a Contract which without it would be null This is to make good penny-worths of conscience and our neighbours Souls to abandon it in this manner and to help him even to cast himself into perdition and the power of the Devil to secure a debt or to avoid the reproach or suspicion of being negligent in the conduct of an affair Escobar puts also this Question about an Oath 9 Num liceat per faisos Deos ad jurandum inducere Determinate inducere mortale crimen est petere vero juramentum ab eo qui per falsos Deos est juraurus per se malum non est Escob tr 1. exam 3. num 57. pag. 79. Whether it be lawful to induce one to swear by false gods The Answer is 10 That to engage him expresly thereto is a mortal sin but to demand an oath of him who will swear by false gods is no evil thing in it self He holds then that it is no evil in it self to take such an oath of an Infidel but it would be to demand it that it may be demanded but not expresly that we may sollicite an Infidel and engage him to swear provided we tell him not in express terms that he shall swear by his false gods though we be assured that he will not swear otherwise not acknowledging the true God Who sees not that this is to deride God and men to treat of matters of Religion and Salvation in a manner so unhandsom and gross that common sense only is sufficient to perceive the excess and baseness of it Escobar cites Filliutius upon this Point and he saith in effect the same thing with him and in the same terms 1 Petere juramentum ab co quem constat esse juraturum per falses Deos non est per se malum Filliutius tom 2. mor. qq tr 21. cap. 11. num 339. pag. 265. To demand saith he an oath of him who wâ—…are assured will swear by his false god is not a thing evil in it self This is also the Judgment of Sanchez who with his Brethren acknowledging that it is to contribute to an action of Idolatry or at the least to give occasion of it also with them that it may not be done without some reason for it But instead of what the others say generally that we ought to be engaged thereto by some necessity or utility he saith more that it cannot be so little as not be sufficient thereunto 2 Vel modica utilitas satis est ad excusandum ab hoc praecepto vitandae hujus occasionis Sanch. ut supra num 23. pag. 37. The least benefit or interest sufficeth saith he to dispense with the Precept which obliges us to avoid this occasion And it is in a manner upon this reason that he gives a solution to another difficulty which he propounds a little after 3 Secunda difficultas est quale peccatum fit exigere hoc juramentum ad Infideli parato ad jurandum per falsos Deos quando defuit necessitas aut utilitas excusans Ibid. num 22. Quam difficultatem in terminis non enodant Authores Quia generale charitatis preximl ac correctionis fraternae praeceptum obligat quemlibet sub mortâ—li ad vitandum lethale alterius peccatum quando commode absque suo damno id potest What sin is it to require an oath of an Infidel who is ready to swear by false gods without necessity or utility which might serve for excuse He answers 1. That none have declared nor explicated this Question in the terms he hath proposed it And after he acknowledges that some condemn this action of mortal sin because it is entirely against the Charity which we owe to our Neighbour which obliges us to hinder and much more not to tempt him to offend God mortally at least when we can do it conveniently and without any loss This so weighty a consideration startles him a little but it is not capable to make him to quit his opinion and yield unto the truth 4 Quamvis autem hoc probabilius esse credam quia ratio adducta fortiter urget at probabile est culpam solum venialem admitti Though I believe saith he that this opinion is more probable because the reason of these Authors which I now related is very urgent it is very probable that it is but a venial sin His reason is that since there needs so small a matter to be able without sin to prevail against the Precept forbidding us to demand an oath of an Infidel this is a sign that this Command is not so rigorous as to oblige under mortal sin though we should violate it expresly and without any particular reason 5 Quia ut vidimus n. 2. seq vel modica utilitas satis est ad excusandum ab hoc praecepto vitandae hujus occasionis at à praeceptis sub mortali obligantibus non tam levis causa excusare solet Ibid. Because saith he the least consideration of benefit sufficeth to exempt us from the Precept which obligeth to avoid this occasion and it is not ordinary for so slight an occasion to dispense with Commands which oblige under mortal sin This manner of arguing is very ordinary with the Jesuits to establish one Errour by another and to make use of one disorder which they have already introduced to make way for a second by drawing consequences from the one to the other Because they give liberty without sin to demand an oath of an Idolater when we have any small pretext for it they infer from thence that when we demand it without any reason it cannot be any great evil Thus it is that they take from themselves authority to dispense with the Commandments of God and abolish them as they please and that they make use of their own dispensations to give them liberty to violate them freely or at least without any great sin ARTICLE III. Of the Commandment of God HONOUR THY FATHER AND THY MOTHER THis Commandment obligeth Children to their Fathers and Mothers in four principal things as the Catechism of the Council of Trent observes to love reverence obedience and assistance These are also the four Duties in which the Jesuits undertake to dispense with them 1. For what concerns love Dieastilius saith 1 Defiderare filium v. g. parentis mortem aut de illa gaudere ob haereditatem eldem provenientem non ita certum est esse licitum quamvis de
to deprive me of my honour before a Prince Judge or Persons of great quality by accusing me of feigned crimes and I have no other way to divert this loss of reputation but by killing you secretly And a little after he adds alledging Bannez for it * Idem dicendum si crimen est verum si tamen est occultum * Pâ—obari potest 1. quia si baculo vel alapa impacta velis meum honorem famam violare possum armis prohibere ergo etiam si id nitar lingua Nam parum videtur referre quo instrumento quis nitatur inferre injuriam si aeque efficaciter nocebit Ibid. num 81. 2. Quia contumeliae possunt armis impodiri ergo detractiones 3. Periculum samae aequiparatur periculo vitae at qui ob periculum vitae evadendum licitum est occidere ergo c. Quia honor merito apud homines pluris aestimatur quam damnum multarum pecuniarum ergo si potest occidere ne damnum pecuniarum accipiat potest etiam ne ignominiam cogatur sustinere Ibid. num 77. The same is to be said where the crime is true so it be hid and secret And that he may establish this so strange Doctrine of which there is none who may not see how dangerous and fatal the consequences are he brings three instances which are so many reasons whereof he makes use to prove it * Idem dicendum si crimen est verum si tamen est occultum * Pâ—obari potest 1. quia si baculo vel alapa impacta velis meum honorem famam violare possum armis prohibere ergo etiam si id nitar lingua Nam parum videtur referre quo instrumento quis nitatur inferre injuriam si aeque efficaciter nocebit Ibid. num 81. 2. Quia contumeliae possunt armis impodiri ergo detractiones 3. Periculum samae aequiparatur periculo vitae at qui ob periculum vitae evadendum licitum est occidere ergo c. Quia honor merito apud homines pluris aestimatur quam damnum multarum pecuniarum ergo si potest occidere ne damnum pecuniarum accipiat potest etiam ne ignominiam cogatur sustinere Ibid. num 77. This may be proved saith he first because if one attempt to damnifie me in my honour and reputation by smiting me with a cudgel or giving me a box on the ear I may betake me to my arms to keep him off and by consequence I have the very same right if he endeavour to do me the same wrong by reproaching me for it is of small consideration what means are made use of to do me an injury if I be hurt as much the one way as the other In the second place Recourse may be had to arms to hinder an affront and so likewise by consequence to silence reproaches In the third place The danger of losing honour is equal to that of lâ—sing life But it is lawful to kill to avoid the peril of losing life and by consequence also for avoiding the danger of losing honour * Idem dicendum si crimen est verum si tamen est occultum * Pâ—obari potest 1. quia si baculo vel alapa impacta velis meum honorem famam violare possum armis prohibere ergo etiam si id nitar lingua Nam parum videtur referre quo instrumento quis nitatur inferre injuriam si aeque efficaciter nocebit Ibid. num 81. 2. Quia contumeliae possunt armis impodiri ergo detractiones 3. Periculum samae aequiparatur periculo vitae at qui ob periculum vitae evadendum licitum est occidere ergo c. Quia honor merito apud homines pluris aestimatur quam damnum multarum pecuniarum ergo si potest occidere ne damnum pecuniarum accipiat potest etiam ne ignominiam cogatur sustinere Ibid. num 77. Because as he saith a little before men by good reason esteem their honour more than wealth and money and by consequence as he will say hereafter if one may kill for fear of losing his money he may also for fear of taking an affront I have no design for the present to consider or examine this whole discourse nor all these reasons which contain almost as many excesses as words I shall content my self to say in general of him and those who imitate him in this kind of reasoning in matters of Christian Morality that the farther they advance the farther they stray and are removed from the truth and fall continually from one errour into another and the latter are usually the greater their conclusions are worse than the Maxims from whence they draw them and the reasons which they produce to prove the one and the other are also oftentimes of yet more dangerous consequence than all their propositions The same Lâ—ssius after the three reasons which we have now related gives thereupon also a fourth which comprehends all the rest which alone may serve as a general Maxime to resolve a multitude of cases in this matter but which may also be both the cause and justification of all sorts of Murders 1 Quia jus defenfionis videtur se extendere ad omne id quod necessarium ut te ab omni injuria serves immunem Ibid. num 81. Because the right of self-defence saith he seems to give liberty to employ all the means which are necessary to secure ones self fromall sorts of injuries He seems to have taken this Maxime as good store of others from Molina who expounds it also more clearly 2 Fas est quacunque via ratione quibuscunque armis id totum efficere quod ad tuâ—m defenâ—…onem suâ—rit necessarium Molina de just jure tom 4. tract 3. disp 2. num 5. pag. 1757. It is lawful saith he to employ all sorts of means and to make use of all sorts of ways and of all sorts of arms to do that which is necessary for self-defence The Proposition of the one and the other is universal in all these points They give no boundaries to mens passions suspicions jealousies and pretences whereof they may make use to cover and justifie their interests and vain-glory If we believe these Jesuits all men have right to make use of all sorts of expedients to maintain their reputation true or false against all sorts of people who offend against it in any manner whatsoever or who hurt their interest and pretensions He may kill his adversary himself or employ other persons whom he shall judge more proper to kill him by open force or surprize All this is lawful for every private man according to these Doctors Jus defensionis videtur se extendere ad omne id quod est necessarium c. They hold also that we may use this right not only in important occasions but even in the least also to repel or repair a petty as well as a grand injury to have
him believe their innocence And in case they meet not with a prudent Confessor who understands well these shifts and deceits and fall into the hands of one who seems to them too exact and would oblige them to restore what they have privily taken away he holds that they are excused from giving credit unto him and though the Church it self should interpose and employ its Authority and press them by vertue of a Monitory to come unto Confession and Restitution they would not be obliged to obey it Because in this occurrent saith he neither the wife nor the children aforesaid ought or can be forced by the Confessor to reveal the things they so purloyn'd though the Creditors should obtain Mandates and Letters monitory from the Bishop From the same Principle he affirms in the same Chapter pag. 200. That a person who is indebted for very great and notable sums may to the prejudice of his Creditors give away part of his goods so that he to whom the gift is made shall not be obliged to restore any part thereof to his Creditors if he be not constrained by Law See how he concludes after he had proposed contrary opinions upon this point I say then that he who hath received by Deed of Gift any moveable or immoveable of a man in great debt is not obliged to quit it in favour of the Creditors of such a Debtor before the Law constrain him In the following Page he propounds another Case upon the same Subject and he resolves it after such a manner as authorizes and maintains not only injury but revenge also and murder Some one saith he entreats a Souldier to smite and beat his neighbour or to burn the Farm of a man who hath offended him It is demanded whether the Souldier failing the other who prayed him to do all these outrages ought to repair out of his own Estate the damage which proceeded thence Upon which he makes a Relation of some Authors who hold the affirmative and without quoting any one for the contrary opinion he broaches it as from himself and saith for refuting the first My opinion is not as theirs For no man is obliged to restore if he have not violated Justice Doth he so who submits himself to anothers pleasure when he only entreats of him a favour This goodly reasoning may serve to justifie from doing wrong not only all men who employ their friends or other persons to do mischief making use of them as their hands and instruments and so doing the very same action and injury with them whether they commit theft or murder or other violences but it may also justifie all persons who induce and sollicite others unto wickedness and the Devil himself when he tempts men and causes them to sin because temptation and sollicitations unto evil force not the will and are only inducements and prayers as it were which depend absolutely on them who are tempted and sollicited to do evil which many do also refuse and reject Behold whereunto the Maxims of this Casuist are reduced They teach to steal with subtilty and confidence without being obliged unto restitution to speak against ones conscience without lying to forswear without treachery to make a mock of Justice without being deficient in the respect due thereto to contemn the Authority of the Church without disobedience and finally to defraud Creditors ruine Commerce destroy publick Faith and make havock of our neighbours goods without injustice ARTICLE VII THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESSE BEaring false witness is a sin so odious and contrary to the Law of Nature that the most corrupted persons and who boast of all other sins cannot endure to be accused of this nor even of a simple lye God hath always forbidden it whether before a Judge or in private but the Jesuits favour it at any time and the sins which depend on it to wit slander and detraction Dicastillus demands 1 An teneatur quis retractare suum falsum dictum quando ex co inferenda est alteri mors seu mutilatio etiamsi testi se retractantâ— fidem resultet simile damnum Exi stimo si non peccaverit mortaliter dicendo illam falsitatem non teneri cum tanto suo incommedo cognita veritate dictum retractare Legatur Tolet. lib. 5. cap. 59. Less dub 7. Reginald sect 2. num 45. Dicastill lib. 2. tract 2. disp 8. dub 7. num 92. Whether he be obliged to retract who hath affirmed some falsity which will cost the loss of life or member to another when the witness by his retractation will himself incur the same penalty He answers That he believes that if the false witness have not sinned mortally by bearing this false testimony he is not obliged after that he understands the truth to retract what he hath said so exposing himself to so great evils That is to say it is lawful to kill an innocent after we have slandered him rather than put our selves into any danger by retracting since it is not so much the offences or the Hangmen as the witnesses that put him to death who is condemned upon their depositions That we may have a clearer Exposition of this Question this Jesuit sends us his to Treatise of Restitution where he saith 1 Ad nibil tenetur is qui falâ—um testimonium dixit ex ignorantia vel inadvertentia etlaâ—si ex â—llo tesâ—imonio contingaâ— aliquem damnari Less cap. 3. dub 7. Haec sententia in praxi tuta est sed prior magis videtur consona rationi Dicastill lib. 2. tract 2. disp 3. dub 2. num 57. That the opinion which holds that a person who hath born false witness through ignorance or inadvertence without sinning mortally is obliged to nothing though this false testimony do occasion the condemnation of a man is safe in practice though the opinion seem to him more agreeable unto reason For he regards no more to follow the light of natural reason and equity than the Rules of Faith but only his own sense and the Authority of such as he is in resolving difficulties which refer to Manners and Religion And this is one of the most goodly and commodious Principles of the Jesuits Divinity that we are not obliged to restitution when we have not sinned mortally in wronging our neighbour For if this Principle be sure they who find a great sum of money or take it by ignorance and heedlesness are not obliged to restore it because they have not sinned mortally in taking of it We may see the consequence of this in the Chapter of Restitution But if you joyn hereto the conditions the Jesuits require to make an action a mortal sin false witnesses will thereby receive great comfort and encouragement boldly to act and acquit themselves in this duty The same Author is not less favourable to him who suffers himself to be corrupted by money not to bear false witness but not to testifie the truth He approves Azors observation who saith