instruct at least the Body in some measure and prevent their tasting Vice and consequently their becoming Slaves to it But that which is more especially observable is That Pains fill not the Capacities of the Mind as Pleasures do We easily cease to think of them when we no longer suffer them and are out of the danger and fear of them For then they importune not the Imagination they excite not the Passions nor provoke Concupiscence In fine they leave the Mind at liberty to think of what it pleases and thus we may discipline Children with them to keep them in their Duty or in the Appearance of it But though it be sometimes useful to affright and punish Children with sensible Corrections it ought not to be concluded that they should be allured by sensible Rewards There should no means be made use of that any whit forcibly affect the Senses but in a case of extreme necessity Now there can be none of bestowing Sensible Rewards upon them and representing these Rewards as the End of their Employment This on the contrary would be the means of vitiating their best Actions and inclining them rather to Sensuality than Vertue The Traces of Pleasures which they have once tasted remain strongly imprinted in their Imagination They continually quicken and awaken the Ideas of Sensible Goods they constantly excite importunate Desires which disturb the peace of the Mind Lastly They provoke Concupiscence on all occasions which is the Leaven that corrupts the whole mass But this is not the place of explaining these things according to their Desert The SECOND PART Concerning The IMAGINATION CHAP. I. I. Of the Imagination of Women II. Of the Imagination of Men. III. Of the Imagination of Old Men. WE have in the First Part in some measure explain'd the Physical Causes of the Disorders of Man's Imagination We shall endeavour in this to make some Application of these Causes to the more general Errors of Imagination and shall treat likewise of the Causes of these Errors which may be call'd Moral It may be understood from what has been said in the fore-going Chapter that the Delicacy of the Fibres of the Brain is one of the principal Causes that disables us from bringing an Application sufficient for the Discovery of Truths that lye any whit deep or conceal'd This Delicacy of the Fibres is more usually incident to Women and this is the Principle of their so exact acquaintance with all things that strike upon their Senses 'T is the Woman's Province to determine concerning the Fashions to judge of Language to distinguish the genteel Mein and the fine and courtly Behaviour They far out-do Men in the Science Skill and Dexterity about these things All that depends upon the Tast falls under their Jurisdiction but generally they are incapable of Penetrating into Truths that have any Difficulty in the Discovery All things of an abstracted Nature are Incomprehensible to them They cannot imploy their Imagination in disentangling compound and perplex'd Questions Their Consideration terminates on the surface and out-side of things and their Imagination has neither strength nor reach enough to pierce to the bottom of them and to make a Comparison of their parts without Distraction A Trifle or a Feather shall call them off the smallest out-cry dismay them and any little Motion gives them Imployment In short the Mode and not the Reality of things is enough to take up the whole Capacity of their Mind because the least Objects producing great Motions in the delicate Fibres of their Brain by a necessary consequence excite such lively and great Sensations in their Souls as wholly possess and take them up But though it be certain that this Delicacy of the Fibres of the Brain is the principal Cause of all these Effects yet it is not equally certain that it is universally to be found in all Women Or if it be to be found yet their Animal Spirits are sometimes so exactly proportion'd to the Fibres of their Brain that there are Women to be met with who have a greater solidity of Mind than some Men. 'T is in a certain Temperature of the Largeness and Agitation of the Animal Spirits and Conformity with the Fibres of the Brain that the strength of parts consists And Women have sometimes that just Temperature There are Women Strong and Constant and there are Men that are Weak and Fickle There are Women that are Learned Couragious and capable of every thing And on the contrary there are Men that are Soft Effeminate incapable of any Penetration or dispatch of any Business In fine when we attribute any Failures to a certain Sex Age or Condition they are only to be understood of the generality it being ever suppos'd there is no general Rule without Exception For it ought not to be imagin'd that all Men or all Women of the same Age Country or Family have their Brain of the same Constitution It is more pertinent to believe that as there are not two Faces in the World in every thing resembling one another so there are not two Imaginations exactly alike And that all Men Women and Children differ from one another only more or less in the Delicacy of the Fibres of their Brain For as we ought not too hastily to suppose an Essential Identity in those things between which we see no Difference so we ought not to make Essential Differences where we cannot find perfect Identity For these are the common Faults Men usually fall into That which may be said of the Fibres of the Brain is That in Children they are very soft and extreamly tender that with Age they harden and corroborate Yet notwithstanding the generality of Women and some Men have them extreamly delicate all their Lives To determine any thing farther we dare not But this is enough to be said of Women and Children That as they are not concern'd with searching after Truth and the Instruction of others so their Errors do not occasion much Prejudice since little credit is given to things by them advanc'd Let us speak of Men grown up of such as have their Mind in its Strength and Vigour such as may be thought capable of finding out Truth and teaching it to others The ordinary Season for the greatest Perfection of the Mind is from the Age of Thirty to that of Fifty Years The Fibres of the Brain in that Age have usually attain'd a tolerable consistence the Pleasures and Pains of the Senses make hardly any more Impression on them So that a Man has no more to do than to ward off violent Passions which rarely happen and from which a Man may screen himself if he diligently avoid all manner of occasion And thus the Soul meeting with no more Diversion from things sensible may with greater ease and leisure give her self to the Contemplation of Truth A Man in this capacity who had not his Mind fill'd with the Prejudices of Childhood who from his Youth upwards had
take up one part of their Mind and tinge and infect all the rest The Passions confound all the Idea's a thousand ways and make us generally discover in the Objects all that we have a mind to find in them Even the Passion that we have for Truth sometimes deceives us when it is too vehement But the Ambition to be thought Learned is the great Impediment to our becoming really so Nothing then is more rare and extraordinary than to find such Men as are capable of making new Systems and yet nothing is more common than to find such as have fram'd some System or other to their Humour We see few of those who study much reason upon common Notions there is ever some Irregularity in their Idea's which is an evident sign they have some particular System we are unaquainted with 'T is true all the Books they compose do not savour of it For when their Business is to write for the Publick Men are more cautious of what they say and a bare Attention is often enough to undeceive them Yet we see Books Publish'd from time to time which are a sufficient Proof of what I say And there are Persons who are proud to let the World know at the beginning of their Book that they are the Founders of some new System The number of the Inventors of new Systems is much increas'd by those who have been prepossess'd with any Author For it often falls out that having not met with Truth nor any solid foundation in their Opinions of the Authors they have read they first enter into a great Dislike and an high Contempt of all sorts of Books and thereupon fall to Imagining some probable Opinion which they hug and cherish and wherein they strengthen themselves in the manner I have explain'd But as soon as this Heat of Affection for any Opinion is boyl'd over and abated or the Design of Appearing in Publick has oblig'd them to examine it with a more exact and serious Attention they discover the Falsity of it and throw it up but with this Condition that they will never take up any other but utterly condemn all those who shall pretend to the Discovery of any Truth So that the last and most dangerous Error which Men of Study fall into is their Imagining there can be nothing known They have read many Books both Ancient and Modern and have miss'd of Truth in them They have had many fine Notions of their own which they have found to be false after a more strict and attentive Examination From whence they conclude that all Men are like themselves and that if those who fancy they have discover'd some Truths should seriously consider them they would be undeceiv'd as well as themselves And this is enough for them to condemn them without making any more particular Enquiry because if they did not condemn them it would be a kind of Confession that they were wiser than themselves a thing they cannot think very probable They look therefore upon those as Bigotted to their own Thoughts who give out any thing as certain and infallible Nor will they suffer a Man to talk of Sciences as of Evident Truths which cannot reasonably be doubted of but only as of Opinions of which it is good not to be ignorant Yet these Gentlemen would do well to consider that though they have read a great number of Books yet they have not read all or that they have not read them with all the Attention that was necessary to a perfect Understanding of them And that though they have had many fine Thoughts which they have found false in the Conclusion yet they have not had all that are possible and so 't is no improbable thing that others should have found better than themselves Nor is it necessary absolutely speaking that others should have greater Sense than they if that offends them for 't is enough to have had greater Fortune They need not be affronted to hear it said That others have Evident Knowledge of what they are Ignorant since we say at the same time that many Ages have been ignorant of the same Truths Not for want of excellent Wits but because these excellent Wits have not luckily fall'n upon them Let them not be angry therefore that a Man sees clearly and speaks as he sees but let them apply themselves to what is said to them if their Minds be still capable of Application after all their Excursions and then let them judge if they please But if they will not examine it let them hold their Tongue But I would have them reflect a little whether that Answer so readily made by them to most of the things demanded of them No body Vnderstands it No body knows how 't is done be not an injudicious Answer Since to answer so a Man must of necessity believe he knows all that all Men know or all that is possible to be known by them For had they not this Notion of themselves their Answer would be still more impertinent And why should they be so hard put to it to say they know nothing of them since in some particular junctures they acknowledge they know nothing at all And why must all Men be concluded Ignorant because they are inwardly convinc'd they are Ignorant themselves There are then three sorts of Persons that apply themselves to Study The first are such as are preposterously Bigotted to some Author or some insignificant or false Science The second are such as are prepossess'd and full with their own Fancies The last which usually proceed from the other two are such as Imagine they know all that is possible to be known and who fancying they know nothing with Certainty conclude universally that nothing can be Evidently known and regard all things that they hear as bear Opinions 'T is easie to be seen that all the Faults incident to these three sorts of Men depend on the Properties of the Imagination explain'd in the X. and XI Chapters and especially of the First That all this is owing to Prejudice which choaks up their Minds and makes them insensible to all other Objects but those they are prepossess'd with It may be said that their Prejudices do in their Minds what the Ministers of Princes do in respect of their Masters for as these Gentlemen permit as little as possible any others than those of their own Party and Interest or such as are unable to displace them from their Master's Favour to come to the speech of them so the Prejudices of the former suffer not their Minds to take a full View of the pure and unmix'd Idea's of Objects But they disguise them they cloath them with their own Liveries and thus all mask'd and discolour'd present them to the Mind So that 't is next to impossible it should discover and throw off its Errors CHAP. IX I. Of Effeminate Minds II. Of Superficial Minds III. Of Men of Authority IV. Of the Experimental Philosophers I Have if
a Man shall swear in Verba Magistri he shall speedily commence a Doctor Most Communities have a Ped and Learning peculiar to themselves which every private Person is oblig'd to stand and fall by What is true in one Society is false in another They sometimes take pride in maintaining the Doctrine of their Order against Reason and Experience and think they are oblig'd to warp and distort the Truth or make their Authors buckle that they may be consistent with it Which has occasion'd an infinite multitude of trifling Distinctions which are so many By-ways to lead infallibly to Errour If any Truth be now a-days discover'd Aristotle must have known it but if Aristotle be against it the Discovery is false Some make that Philosopher speak one way some another for all Pretenders to Learning teach him to speak in their own Dialect There is no Impertinence but he is introduc'd as uttering nor any New Discovery but is found enigmatically treasur'd up in some corner of his Books In a word he constantly contradicts himself if not in his Works at least in the Mouths of his Professors For though the Philosophers declare and indeed design to teach his Doctrine yet 't is an hard thing to find two to meet upon his Opinions because in effect his Books are so obscure and abound with so many loose indefinite and general Terms that even those Mens Notions may with some likelihood be ascrib'd to him that are the most opposite in the World He may be made to say any thing in some of his Works because he says just nothing whilst he makes much Noise as Children make the Bells â—ound what they have a mind to because they are very noisie but inarticulate 'T is true it seems reasonable to fix and determine the Mind of Man to particular Opinions to keep it from rambling and extravagance But why must it be done by Falshood and Errour Can Errour be thought capable of reuniting divided Minds If we consider how rare it is to find Men of Sense and Parts satisfy'd with reading Aristotle and persuaded they have acquir'd true Science though grown old in poring on his Books we shall evidently perceive that nothing but Truth and Evidence can quiet the Agitation of the Mind and that Disputes Aversions Errours and Heresies are kept up and fortify'd by the Corrupt Course and Method of Mens Study Truth consists in indivisibili is incapable of Variety and nothing else can reunite Mens Minds But Errour and Falshood can only divide and disturb them I make no question but there are such as honestly believe that he whom they style the Prince of Philosophers is guilty of no Errour and that his Works are the Magazines of true and sound Philosophy There are Men who imagine that in the space of two thousand Years the Time since he wrote no Man has been able to say he has made a Blot or been guilty of a Mistake and so making him infallible in a manner they can pin their Faith upon him and quote him as infallible But 't is not worth while to stand to answer such Gentlemen as these because their Ignorance must needs be exceeding gross and meriting more to be pitied than oppugn'd I desire only of them if they know that either Aristotle or any of his Followers have deduc'd any Truth from the Principles peculiar to him or if possibly themselves have done it that they would declare it explain it and prove it and I promise them never more to speak but to Aristotle's Praise and Commendation His Principles shall no longer be calumniated as useless since they have at last been serviceable to prove one Truth But we have no Reason to hope this For the Challenge has been long since offer'd and M. Des Cartes among the rest has done it in his Metaphysical Meditations almost Forty Years ago and oblig'd himself to demonstrate the Falshood of that pretended Truth And there is great Probability no Man will ever venture to attempt what M. Des Cartes's greatest Enemies and the most zealous Defenders of Aristotle's Philosophy never yet durst undertake I beg leave then after this to say That it is Blindness Slavishness of Spirit and Stupidity thus to betray Reason to the Authority of Aristotle Plato or whatever other Philosopher That 't is Loss of Time to read them out of no other Design than to remember their Opinions and 't is to waste that of others too to teach them in that manner And I may say with St. Augustin That a Man must be sottishly curious who sends his Son to the College to learn the Opinions of his Tutour That the Philosophers cannot instruct us by their Authority and to pretend to it is a piece of Injustice That 't is a kind of Madness and Impiety to take a solemn Oath of Allegiance to them And Lastly that 't is to detain Truth in an unjust Bondage from Interest and Partiality to oppose the New Opinions of Philosophy that may be true to keep up the credit of such as are known to be either false or useless CHAP. IV. A Continuation of the same Subject I. An Explication of the Second Rule concerning Curiosity II. An Explication of the Third THE Second Rule to be observ'd is That Novelty should never pass with us as a Reason to believe things to be true We have often said That a Man ought not to acquiesce in Errour and the seeming Goods which he enjoys That 't is just he should seek for the Evidence of Truth and the True Good which he does not possess and consequently have an Inclination for things that are New and Extraordinary Yet he is not for all that to cleave to them or to believe out of a Levity of Humour that Opinions are true because novel and that Goods are real because they have not been experienc'd Novelty should only put him upon examining New things carefully which he ought not to despise because he does not know them nor rashly to believe to contain what his Hopes and Wishes aim at But here follows a thing of common Observation When Men have examin'd Ancient and Receiv'd Opinions without perceiving the bright Light of Truth when they have tasted Common Goods without finding the solid Pleasure that should attend the Possession of Good and when their Desires and Longings are not abated by ordinary Goods and Opinions If then they hear of any thing new and unexperienc'd the Idea of Novelty gives them Grounds of hoping that this is the very thing they search for And because they commonly flatter themselves and willingly believe things are as they wish them to be their Hopes strengthen as fast as their Desires increase till at last they insensibly grow into imaginary Assurances Hereupon they so inseparably annex the Idea of Novelty to the Idea of Truth that the one is never excited without the other and that which is newest seems always truer and better than what is more ordinary and common Wherein
or would extend its Power over things where it has no Right or Jurisdiction The Second relating to Morality is this A Man ought never to fix his Love absolutely on any Good if he can without Remorse refuse to Love it From whence it follows That nothing but God ought to be Loved absolutely and independently For He alone it is that we cannot forbear Loving in that Nature without an inward Remorse that is without evident Conviction of doing Ill upon Supposition we have arriv'd to the Knowledge of Him through the means of Reason or of Faith But it must here be observ'd That when things which we perceive come recommended with strong Probability we are extreamly ready to Believe them We feel our selves in Pain when we will not suffer Persuasion to Break in upon us insomuch that were we not very cautious we should be in danger of Consenting to them consequently of being Deceiv'd for 't is a great Chance whether Truth be found entirely to agree with the Probability And for this Reason I have expresly put in the two Rules That nothing should be consented to without palpable Conviction that Evil use would be made of a Man's Liberty in not Consenting But though we find our selves most readily inclin'd to Consent to a Probability or a likelihood yet if we would be at the pains of making Reflexion whether we perceive our selves evidently oblig'd to consent to it we should doubtless find we were not For if this likelihood be founded upon the Impressions of our Senses a likelihood by the way that very ill deserves the Name a Man finds himself readily dispos'd to yield consent to it But no other Cause can be assign'd for this but some Passion or general Affection he has for that which affects or concerns the Senses as shall be sufficiently shewn in the following Discourse But if the likelihood proceeds from some Conformity with Truth as ordinarily Probable Notices are True taken in a certain Sense then if a Man examines his own Breast he will find himself inclin'd to do two things The one is to Believe and the other to make farther Inquiry still But he will never find himself so fully persuaded as to think he does evidently ill if he does not Consent at all Now these two Inclinations a Man has in respect of Things Probable are very Good For He may and ought to give his Consent to Things Probable or Verisimilar taken in a Sense which denotes the Image of Truth but he ought not however to yield an entire Consent as we have precaution'd in the Rule and he must examine all the latent sides and faces yet undiscover'd so as to enter fully into the Nature of the thing and to distinguish what is True from what is False and then to give an entire Consent if the Evidence oblige him to it He must then be well accustom'd to distinguish Truth from Probability by examining himself inwardly as I have been Explaining For 't is for want of this Care of Examining a Man's self in this Nature that he perceives himself Touch'd and Affected almost in the same manner by two different things For in fine 't is of the greatest Consequence to make a good use of this Liberty by perpetually bridling in our Consent and Affection to things till we find our selves as it were forc'd to let them go by the Commanding Voice of the Author of Nature which I call'd before the Reproaches of our Reason and the Remorse of our Consciences All the Duties of Spiritual Beings as well Angels as Men consist principally in the good use of this Liberty and we may say without any scruple That if they carefully Imploy their Liberty and not preposterously render themselves slaves to Lyes and Vanity they are in the ready way to the greatest Perfection they are naturally capable of Provided in the mean time their Vnderstanding stands not idle and that they are careful continually to excite it to new Discoveries and that they render themselves dispos'd for the Reception of greater Truths by perpetually Meditating on Subjects worthy of their Attention For that the Mind may advance to its Perfection it will not suffice a Man constantly to make use of its Liberty by Consenting to nothing at all like those Men who take Pride in knowing nothing in doubting and boggling at every thing in Nature Nor on the other hand must he Consent to all things like many Others who fear nothing so much as to be Ignorant of any thing and pretend to Universal Knowledge But he must make so good use of his Vnderstanding by continual Meditations as to find himself in a Capacity of being able to Consent to what it represents without Fear or Danger of being Deceiv'd CHAP. III. I. The Answers to some Objections II. Observations upon what has been said concerning the Necessity of Evidence 'T IS no hard thing to foresee that the Practice of the First Rule which I have been treating of in the foregoing Chapter will not go very well down with a great part of Mankind But especially with those Imaginary Philosophers who pretend to the Knowledge of every thing but really know nothing at all Who please themselves in talking Positively upon the most difficult Subjects and yet are certainly at the same time Ignorant of the more Ordinary and Easie. I question not but they would be ready to say with Aristotle That Absolute Certainty is no where to be sought for but in the Mathematicks That Physicks and Moral Philosophy are such Sciences as take up with meer Probability That Des-Cartes was very much out in his Design of handling Physicks like Geometry and that for that Reason he had no better Success That 't is not possible for Men to arrive to the Knowledge of Nature that her Secret Springs and Movements lie too deep to be pierc'd by an Humane Mind with a great deal more of such fine Things as these which they put off with Pomp and Ostentation and which they support with the Authority of a vast Flight of Authors whose Names they can repeat and out of which they can quote a Passage on Occasion and this is sufficient for them to plume themselves and look big upon I would heartily beg of these Gentlemen they would leave off talking of those things which they themselves acknowledge they do not Understand and would put a stop to the ridiculous Motives of their Vanity by ceasing to compose large Volumes on those Subjects which by their own Confession they Know nothing of But I would have those Men seriously examine whether one of these two Things is not absolutely Necessary either to fall into Error or never to give an entire Consent except to things entirely Evident Whether the Reason that Geometry is ever attended with Truth may not be ascrib'd to the Geometricians Observation of that Rule And whether the Errors some have fallen into touching the Quadrature of the Circle the Duplication of the Cube and
of the Vibrations which are excited by Objects in the Fibres of our Flesh It would be of very little use for her to know them nor could she from thence receive sufficient Light to judge whether the things about us were capable of Destroying or Maintaining the oeconomy of our Body But she feels her self touch'd with Sensations essentially different which shewing precisely the Qualities of Objects as they are related to her Body make her most exactly sensible in what capacity these Objects are in to hurt it We may farther consider That in case the Soul had no Perception but of that which happen'd in her Hand when it were burnt if she saw nothing there but the Motion and Separation of some Fibres she would not much concern her self about it Nay she might probably sometimes out of an Humour or a Frolick take some satisfaction in doing it like those Freakish kind of Men who divert themselves in their Passions or Debauches in breaking all things they light upon Or as a Prisoner would not be much concern'd to see the Walls batter'd down about him that confin'd him but rather would be glad of it upon the hopes of a Deliverance So if we had no other Perception than of the Separation of the Parts of our Body when we were burnt or hurt in any manner we should soon be perswaded that our Happiness was not confin'd to a Body which prevented our Injoying those things which ought to make us Happy and so should be glad of seeing it destroy'd Hence it is apparent that the Author of the Union of our Soul and Body hath with greatest Wisdom ordain'd That we should be sensible of Pain whenever any Change happen'd to our Body capable of incommoding it as when a Needle pierced the Flesh or the Fire separated some parts of it and that we should be sensible of a Titillation or an agreeable Heat when these Motions were moderate without perceiving the Truth of that which occur'd in our Body or the Motions of the Fibres we have been speaking of First because in the Sensation of Pleasure and Pain which are things far more different than in Degree we distinguish with greater Ease the Objects which occasion them Secondly because this way of Informing us whether the Uniting our selves with the Bodies that encompass us or the Separating from them be most convenient is the shortest and the speediest and takes up the capacity of the Mind the least which is only made for GOD himself Lastly because Pleasure and Pain are Modifications of our Soul which she feels with Relation to her Body and which more nearly affect her than would the Knowledge of the Motion of some Fibres belonging to it this obliges her to be more sollicitous about them And this is a Reason of the most strict Union betwixt the two Constituent Parts of Man From all which it is manifest that the Senses are given us for the Preservation of our Body only and not for the Discovery of the Truth What hath been said concerning Titillation and Pain ought universally to be understood of all other Sensations as we shall see hereafter I chose to begin with these two Sensations rather than others because they are more Strong and Lively and Proper to make my Meaning more Sensibly conceiv'd It is at present a very easie thing to shew That we fall into infinite Errors concerning Light and Colours and generally concerning all Sensible Qualities as Cold Heat Smells Tasts Sound Pain and Titillation and if I would stand to make a particular Enquiry into all those we fall into about all the Objects of our Senses whole Years would not suffice to make a Deduction of them because they are in a manner Infinite It will be sufficient therefore to speak of them in general In almost all Sensations there are four different things which Men confound with one another because they happen altogether and as it were in the same Instant And this is the Principle of all the Errors of our Senses The first is the Action of the Object that is in Heat for instance the Impulsion or Motion of the little parts of the Wood against the Fibres of the Hand The Second is the Passion of the Organ of Sense that is to say the Agitation of the Fibres of the Hand caused by that of the little Parts of Fire which Agitation is communicated to the Brain because otherwise the Soul would have no Sensation of it The Third is the Passion the Sensation or Perception of the Soul that is What every one Feels in himself when he is near the Fire The Fourth is the Judgment the Soul makes that what she feels is both in her Hand and in the Fire Now this Judgment is Natural or rather is only a Compound Sensation But this Sensation or this Natural Judgement is for the most part attended with another Free or Voluntary Judgement which is so customary for the Soul to make that she is almost incapable of preventing it Here then are four things of a very different Nature as may be seen which Men are not nice enough to distinguish but are apt to confound because of the strict Union of the Soul and Body which hinders them from making an exact distribution of the Properties of Matter and of the Mind 'T is notwithstanding easie to discover That of these four things which occur within us in the Sensation of an Object the two first belong to the Body and the two last appertain to the Soul only provided a Man has any whit meditated on the Nature of the Soul and Body as he ought to have done as I before suppos'd him But these things demand a particular Explication CHAP. XI I. The Error we fall into concerning the Action of Objects against the External Fibres of our Senses II. The Cause of this Error III. An Objection and Answer IN this and the three succeeding Chapters I shall treat of these four things above-mention'd which I said us'd to be confounded and taken for a simple Sensation and I shall only give a general Explication of the Errors we fall into because if I would descend to Particulars there would never be an end of them But I hope however to put the Mind of those who will seriously consider what I am about to say in a condition of discovering with a great deal of Ease all the Errors our Senses can make us Subject to But in order to this it is demanded That they would attentively Meditate as well upon the following Chapters as upon that they have last been Reading The first of the things we confound in each of our Sensations is the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Body It is certain a Man makes hardly any Difference betwixt the Sensation of the Soul and that Action of Objects which is so plain as not to need any farther Proof The generality of Men imagine that the Heat for instance which they Feel is in
zealous Patrons and Defenders of certain Novelties in Divinity which ought to be had in abhorrence For 't is not their Terms and Language we disapprove which as unknown as they were to Antiquity are Authoriz'd by Custom 'T is the Errors they diffuse and support by the help of this Equivocal and confus'd Dialect which we condemn In point of Divinity we ought to be fond of Antiquity because we ought to love the Truth which Truth is found in Antiquity And all Curiosity ought to cease when once we have taken hold of Truth But in point of Philosophy we ought on the contrary to love Novelty for the same Reason that we ought always to love the Truth that we ought to retrieve it and ought to have an Indefatigable Curiosity for it If Plato and Aristotle were believed Infallible a Man should perhaps apply himself to the understanding of them only But Reason opposes the Belief of it Reason on the contrary would have us judge them more ignorant than the New Philosophers since in the Age we live in the World is two thousand Years older and has learned greater Experience than it had in the days of Aristotle and Plato as we have already said And the New Philosophers may know all the Truths the Ancients have left us and find out and add a great many more to them Yet Reason will not have us believe these New Philosophers any more than the Old upon their bare Word It bids us on the contrary examine attentively their Thoughts and withhold our consent till there is no longer room for doubting without being ridiculously prepossess'd with the Opinion of their vast Knowledge or the other specious Qualities of their Mind CHAP. VII Of the Prepossession of Commentators THIS Prepossession is no where apparent in so strange and excessive a degree as in the Commentators on an Author because the Undertakers of this Task which seems too low and servile for a Man of Sense imagine their Authors merit the Praise and Admiration of all the World They look upon them as part of themselves and fancy they are Body and Soul to one another and upon this View Self-love admirably plays its part They artfully accumulate Encomiums on their Authors they shed Light and Radiations round them they load them with Glory as knowing they shall have it themselves by reflection and rebound This great and lofty Idea not only magnifies Aristotle and Plato in the Mind of many of the Readers but imprints a respect in them for all that have Commented upon them and some of of them had never Deified their Authors had they not fancy'd themselves incircl'd as it were in the Rays of the same Glory Yet I will not say that all Commentators are so liberal in their Panegyricks on their Authors out of hopes of a Return some of them would start at such an Apprehension if they would consider a little They are sincere and well-meaning in their Praises without any Politick design and without thinking what they do but Self-love thinks for them and without their being aware of it Men are insensible of the heat that is in their Heart though it gives Life and Motion to all the other parts of their Body They must touch and handle themselves to be convinc'd of it because this Heat is Natural The cause is the same in respect of Vanity which is so congenial to the Mind of Man that he is insensible of it and though 't is this as a Man may say that gives Life and Motion to the greatest part of his Thoughts and Designs yet it often does it in a manner imperceptible by him He must handle and feel and sound himself inwards to know that he is vain 'T is not sufficiently understood that 't is Vanity which is the First mover in the greatest part of Humane Actions and though Self-love knows this well enough it knows it only to disguise it from the rest of Man A Commentator then being some ways related and allied to his Author that he works upon Self-love never fails to discover in him notable Subjects for Praise and Incense with design to make them redound to the advantage of the Offerer And this is perform'd in so Artificial so Subtil and Delicate a manner as to be wholly Imperceptible But this is not the proper place of exposing all the Wiles of Self-love and Interest Nor is the Prejudicate Esteem Commentators have conceiv'd for their Authors and the Honour they do themselves in praising them the only Reason of Sacrificing to them Custom is another Motive and because they think the Practise necessary There are Men who have no great Esteem either for certain Sciences or Authors who notwithstanding fall zealously to writing Comments on them because either their Imployment Chance or perhaps a capricious Humour has engag'd them in the Attempt and these too think they are under an Obligation to be excessive in the Praises of the Sciences and Authors which they work on whe nat the same time the Authors are Silly and Impertinent and the Sciences Ignoble and Useless And indeed what can be more ridiculous than for a Man to undertake to Comment on an Author whom he thought Impertinent and to write Seriously on a Subject he believ'd to be Insignificant and Useless 'T is necessary therefore to the Preserving his Reputation to Praise both the Authors and Sciences though both one and the other are Contemptible and nothing worth and the fault of Undertaking an ill work must be mended with another Which is the Reason that when Learned Men Comment on different Authors they fall into Absurdities and Contradictions Upon this Account it is that almost all prefaces have as little of Truth in them as good Sense If a Man Comments upon Aristotle he is the Genius of Nature If a Man writes upon Plato 't is the Divine Plato They hardly ever Comment upon the works of Plain Men but 't is always of Men wholly Divine of Men who have been the Admiration of their Age and who have been bless'd by Providence with Light and Understanding above the rest of Mankind 'T is the same thing too with the matter they treat on 'T is always the finest the most exalted and most necessary of all other But that I may not be credited upon my bare word I will deliver here the way where in a Famous Commentator among the Learned treats the Author that he Comments on I mean Averroes who speaks of Aristotle He says in his Preface upon the Physicks of that Philosopher that he was the Inventor of Logick Moral Philosophy and Metaphysicks and that he has carried them to the top of their perfection Complevit says he quia nullus eorum qui secuti sunt eum usque ad hoc tempus quod est mille quingentorum annorum quidquam addidit nec invenies in ejus verbis errorem alicujus quantitatis talem esse virtutem in individuo uno miraculosum extraneum existit haec
necessary for them to know we allow them to omit them and likewise to despise them but 't is not fair to judge of them out of a fanciful dislike and ill-grounded suspicions For they ought to consider that the Serious Air and Gravity wherewith they speak the Authority they have obtain'd over the Minds of others and that customary way of confirming their Discourse with a Text of Scripture must unavoidably engage in Error their respectful Auditors who being incapable of Examining things to the bottom are caught with Modes and external Appearances When Error comes cloath'd in the Dress of Truth it frequently has more respect than Truth it self And this illegitimate Respect has very dangerous Consequences Pessima res est Errorum Apotheosis pro peste intellectûs habenda est si vanis accedat veneratio Thus when some Men out of a false Zeal or a Fondness for their own Thoughts bring the Holy Scripture to countenance or support false Principles of Physicks or other of like Nature they are often attended to as Oracles by the admiring Crowd who credit them upon their word because of the Reverence they ascribe to Divine Authority When at the same time some Men of a worse Complection have taken occasion hereby to contemn Religion So that by strangely perverting its Nature Holy Scripture has been the Cause of some Men's Errors and Truth has been the Motive and Original to other's Impiety We should then be cautious says the fore-cited Author of searching after Dead things among the Living and of presuming by our own Sagacity of Mind to discover in the Holy Scriptures what the Holy Spirit has not thought fit to declare in it Ex Divinorum Humanorum malesanâ admixtionâ— continues he non solum educitur Philosophia phantastica sed etiam Religio haeretica Itaque salutare admodum est si mente sobriâ fidei tantum dentur quae fidei sunt All Men who have any Authority over others ought never to determine till they have so much the more seriously consider'd as their Determinations are more obstinately adher'd to and Divines should be more especially regardful lest they give scandal and contempt to Religion through a false Zeal by an ambitious desire of their own Fame and of giving Vogue to their Opinions But it being not my Business to prescribe to them their Duty let them hearken to St. Thomas Aquinas their Master who being consulted by his General for his Opinion touching some Points answers him in these words of St. Austin Multùm autem nocet talia quae ad pietatis doctrinam non spectant vel asserere vel negare quasi pertinentia ad Sacram doctrinam Dicit enim Augustinus in 5. Confess Cùm audio Christianum aliquem fratrem ista quae Philosophi de coelo aut stellis de Solis Lunae motibus dixerâ—nt nescientem aliud pro alio sentienâ—em patienter intueor opinantem hominem nec illi obesse video cum de te Domine Creator omnium nostrûm non credat indigna si fortè situs habitus creaturae corporalis ignoret Obest autem si haec ad ipsam dâ—ctrinam pietatis pertinere arbitretur pertinacius affirmare audeat quod ignorat Quod autem obsit manifestat Augustinus in 1. super Genes Ad literam Turpe est inquit nimis perniciosum ac maximê cavendum ut Christianum de his rebus quasi secundum Christianas literas loquentem ita delirare quilibet infidelis audiat ut quemadmodum dicitur toto coelo errare conspiciens risum tenere vix possit Et non tamen molestum est quod errans homo videatur sed quod Authores nostri ab eis qui foris sunt talia sensisse creduntur cum magno eorum exitio de quorum salute satagimus tanquam indocti reprehenduntur atque respuuntur Vnde mihi videtur tutius esse ut hâ—â—c quae Philosophi communes senserunt nostrae fidei non repugnant neque esse sic asserenda ut dogmata fidei licet aliquandò sub nomine Philosophorum introducantur neque sic â—sse neganda tanquam fidei contraria ne sapientibus hujus mundi contemnendi doctrinam fidei occasio praebeatur 'T is a dangerous thing positively to determine concerning matters that are not of Faith as if they were St. Austin is our Author for it in the fifth Book of his Confessions When I see says he a Christian who is un-instructed in the Opinions of Philosophers about the Heavens the Stars and the Motion of the Sun and Moon and who mistakes one thing for another I I leave him to his Opinions and Uncertainties Nor do I see what injury it can do him provided he has right Notions of Thee our LORD and CREATOR to be ignorant of the Site and Position of Bodies and the different Regulations of Material Beings But he does himself wrong in that he fancies these things concern Religion and takes upon him obstinately to affirm what he does not understand The same Holy Man explains his Thoughts more clearly yet in his first Book of the literal Exposition of Genesis in these Words A Christian should be extreamly cautious of speaking of these things as if they were the Doctrine of the Sacred Writings since an Heathen who should hear him utter his Absurdities that had no appearance of Truth would Ridicule him for it Thus the Christian would be put in confusion and the Heathen but ill-edify'd Yet that which on these occasions is matter of greatest trouble is not that a Man is found in an Error but that the Heathens whom we labour to convert falsely and to their unavoidable destruction imagining that our Authors abound with these ridiculous Notions condemn them and spurn them as Ignorant and Unlearned which makes me think it much the safer way not to affirm as the Maxims of Faith the common receiv'd Opinions of Philosophers though not inconsistent with them though the Authority of Philosophers may sometimes be us'd to make way for their reception nor to reject their Opinions as contrary to Faith lest occasion be given to the Wise Men of the World to contemn the Sacred Truths of the Christian Religion The generality of Men are so careless or unreasonable as to make no distinction between the Word of GOD and that of Men when joyn'd together So that they fall into Error by approving them both alike or into Irreligion by the contempt of both indifferently 'T is easie to see what is the Cause of these last Errors and how they depend upon the Connection of Idea's explain'd in the XI Chapter and I need not stand more largely to explain them It seems seasonable to say something here of the Chymists and of all those in general that imploy their time in making Experiments These are the Men that are in Search after Truth Their Opinions are usually embrac'd without Scruple and Examination And thus their Errors are so much the more dangerous as
in difficult Questions that the Mind must survey at one sight a multiplicity of Relations that are between two things or more it is plain that if it has not consider'd these things very attentively or if it has but a confus'd Knowledge of them it can never have a distinct Perception of their Relation and consequently cannot make any solid Judgment of them One of the main Causes of our Mind 's wanting Application for Abstract Truths is our seeing them as at a Distance whilst other things are continually offering themselves to the Mind that are nearer at hand The great Attention of the Mind brings home as I may say the remote Idea's of the Objects we consider But it often falls out that when a Man is very intent on Metaphysical Speculation he is easily thrown off from them by some accidental Sensations breaking in upon the Soul which sit closer to it than those Idea's For there needs no more than a little Pleasure or Pain to do it The Reason whereof is that Pleasure and Pain and all Sensations in general are within the very Soul They modifie her and touch her more to the quick than the simple Idea's of Objects of Pure Intellection which though present to the Mind neither touch nor modifie it at all And thus the Mind on one hand being of a straitned and narrow reach and on the other unable to prevent feeling Pain and all its other Sensations has its Capacity fill'd up with them and so cannot at one and the same time be sensible of any thing and think freely of other Objects that are not sensible The Humming of a Fly or of any other little Animal supposing it communicated to the principal part of the Brain and perceiv'd by the Soul is capable do what we can of interrupting our Consideration of very Abstract and Sublime Truths because no Abstract Idea's modifie the Soul whereas all Sensations do From hence arises that Stupidity and Drousiness of the Mind in regard of the most Fundamental Truths of Christian Morality which Men know only in a Speculative and Fruitless manner without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST All the World knows there is a GOD and that this GOD is to be serv'd and worshipp'd But who is it that serves and worships him without the Divine Grace which alone gives us a relish of Delight and Pleasure in these Duties There are but very few that do not perceive the Emptiness and Inconstancy of Earthly Goods and that are not convinc'd with an Abstract though most certain and evident Conviction that they are indeserving of our Cares and Application But where are those who despise these Goods in their Practice and deny their Pains and Application to acquire them 'T is only they that perceive some Bitterness and Distaste in the Injoyment of them or that Grace has made sensible to Spiritual Goods by an inward Delectation affix'd to them by GOD 't is these only who vanquish the Impressions of Sense and the Strugglings of Concupiscence A View of the Mind alone can never make us resist them as we should do but besides that View there must be a certain Sensation of the Heart That Intellectual Light all alone is if you please the Sufficient Grace which makes only for our Condemnation which acquaints us with our own Weakness and of our Duty of flying by Prayer to Him who is our Strength But the Sensation of the Heart is a Lively and Operative Grace 'T is this which touches us inward which fills us and perswades the Heart and without it there is no body that considers with the Heart Nemo est qui recogitet corde All the most certain Truths of Morality lye conceal'd in the folds and doubles and secret corners of the Mind and as long as they continue there are barren and inactive since the Soul has no relish of them But the Pleasures of the Senses dwell nearer to the Soul and since she cannot be insensible to or out of love with her Pleasure 't is impossible to disengage her self from the Earth and to get rid of the Charms and Delusions of her Senses by her own Strength and Abilities I deny not however but the Righteous whose Heart has been already vigorously turn'd towards GOD by a preventing Delectation may without that particular Grace perform some Meritorious Actions and resist the Motions of Concupiscence There are those who are couragious and constant in the Law of GOD by the strength of their Faith by the care they have to deprive themselves of Sensible Goods and by the contempt and dislike of every thing that can give them any temptation There are such as act for the most part without the taste of Indeliberate or Preventing Pleasure That sole Joy they find in acting according to the Will of GOD is the only Pleasure they taste and that Pleasure suffices to make them persevere in their state and to confirm the Disposition of their Heart Those who are Novice Converts have generally need of an Indeliberate or Preventing Pleasure to disintangle them from Sensible Goods to which they are fastened by other Preventing and Indeliberate Pleasures Sorrow and Remorse of their Consciences are not sufficient for this purpose and as yet they taste no Joy But the Just can live by Faith and that in Indigence and 't is likewise in this Estate they merit most Forasmuch as Men being Reasonable Creatures GOD will be lov'd by them with a Love of Choice and not with a Love of Instinct or an Indeliberate Love like that wherewith we love Sensible things without knowing they be Good otherwise than from the Pleasure we receive in them Notwithstanding most Men having but little Faith and yet constant opportunities of tasting Pleasures cannot long preserve their Elective Love for GOD against their Natural Love for sensible Goods unless the Delectation of Grace support them against the Efforts of Pleasure For the Delectation of Grace produces preserves and augments Charity as Sensible Pleasures Cupidity It is apparent enough from what has been said that Men being never free from some Passion or some pleasant or troublesome Sensations have their Capacity and Extent of Mind much taken up and when they would imploy the remainder of its Capacity in examining any Truth they are frequently diverted by some new Sensations through the dislike they take to that Exercise and the Inconstancy of the Will which tosses and bandies the Mind from Object to Object without letting it stand still So that unless we have habituated our selves from our Youth to the conquering all these Oppositions as I have explain'd in the Second Part we find our selves at last incapable of piercing into any thing that 's somewhat difficult and demands something of Application Hence we are to conclude That all Sciences and especially such as include Questions very hard to be clear'd up and explain'd abound with an infinite number of Errors And that we ought to have in suspicion those bulky
for whatever affects us engages us because that Inclination dissipates the Sight of the Mind and fixes it conâ—inually on the confus'd Ideas of the Senses and the Imagination and inclines us to judge over-hastily of all things by the bare Relation which they have to us Truth never appears but when we see things as they are in themselves which we never do unless we see them in him who contains them in an intelligible manner When we perceive them within our selves we perceive them at a very lame and imperfect rate or rather we perceive our own Sensations and not the things we desire to perceive and which we falsly think we do To see things as they are in themselves requires much Application because at present we cannot unite to GOD without great Pain and Reluctancy But to see them in our selves requires no Application at all on our part since we are sensible of what touches us whether we will or no. We do not naturally find any Preventing Pleasure in our Union with GOD the pure Ideas of things do not touch and quicken us Therefore the Inclination we have for Pleasure is not a Means to apply and unite us to GOD but on the contrary slackens our Engagements to him and perpetually removes us farther from him carrying us continually to consider things by their Sensible Ideas because these false and impure Ideas are those that affect us Love of Pleasure then and the Actual Enjoyment of it which revives and corroborates this Love throw us continually off Truth to plunge us into Errour Those therefore who would draw near to Truth to be illuminated by its Light must begin by the Privation of Pleasure They must carefully shun whatever sensibly affects and agreeably shares the Mind For the Voice of Truth cannot be heard unless in the Silence of the Senses and the Passions An Aversion to the World and Contempt for all Sensible things being equally necessary to the Perfection of the Mind as to the Conversion of the Heart When our Pleasures are great and our Sensations lively we are incapable of the most simple Truths nor do we agree to common Notions unless of a sensible Make and Character When our Pleasures or other Sensations are moderate we may discover some plain and easie Truths But if it were possible to be absolutely delivered from Pleasures and Sensations we should be able easily to discover the most abstract and difficult Truths that are known For proportionably to our Removing from what is not GOD we approach to GOD himself we avoid Errour and discover Truth But ever since the Fall since the disorderly Love of Preventing Pleasure which domineers and triumphs the Mind is grown so weak that it can pierce into nothing and so materializ'd and dependent on its Senses that it cannot lay hold of things abstract and unaffecting With much ado it perceives common Notions and for want of Advertency frequently concludes them false or obscure It cannot distinguish the Truth of things from their Utility the Relation they have to one another from the Relation they have to it self and often takes those to be most true that are most useful agreeable and moving Finally this Inclination infects and muddies all our Perceptions of Objects and consequently all the Judgements that we make of them Here follows some Examples 'T is a common Notion that Vertue is preferable to Vice that 't is better to be Sober and Chast than Intemperate and Voluptuous But the Inclination for Pleasure so strangely confounds that Idea on certain Occasions that we have but a transient glimpse of it nor can draw those Consequences from it that are necessary to the Management of Life The Soul is violently bent upon the Pleasures she hopes for that she supposes them innocent and seeks only for the Means of enjoying them Every body well knows that 't is more eligible to be Just than Rich That Justice exalts a Man more than the Possession of the most magnificent Buildings which often serve more to manifest the Greatness of the Injustices and Crimes of the Possessor than his own Grandeur But the Pleasure that wretched Men receive in the vain Ostentation of their false Grandeur sufficiently fills up the narrow Capacity of their Mind to conceal and obscure so evident a Truth from them They absurdly imagine they are Great Men because they have Great Houses Special Algebra or Analyticks is certainly the finest I mean the most fruitful and most certain of all Sciences Without it the Mind has neither Penetration nor Extent and with it it is capable of knowing almost whatever is possible to be certainly and evidently known As imperfect as this Science has been it has made Famous all that have been skill'd in 't and knew how to employ it having by it discover'd Truths that seem'd incomprehensible to other Men. It is so well proportion'd to an Humane Mind that without dividing its Capacity with things useless to the Question it infallibly conducts it to its Point In a word it is an Universal Science and as it were the Key of all other Yet as valuable as it is in it self it has no Charms nor Lustre to captivate Men for this Reason only that it is not of a Sensible Nature It has been buried in Oblivion for many Ages and there are still very many that know not so much as the Name and scarce one in a thousand to be found that understands any thing of it The most Learned who have reviv'd it in our Days have not yet carried it very far nor handled it with that Order and Perspicuity it deserves Being Men no less than others they have grown at length disgusted with these pure Truths whilst unaccompanied with Sensible Pleasure and the Uneasiness of their Will debauch'd by Sin the Levity of their Mind which depends on the Motion and Circulation of the Blood have with-held them from feeding and growing upon those great those vast and second Truths which are the Immutable and Universal Rules of all transitory and particular Truths possible to be exactly known Metaphysick likewise is an Abstract Science which flatters not the Senses nor does the Soul receive any Pleasure in the Study of it and for the same Reason it is so miserably neglected that 't is usual to find Persons stupid enough confidently to deny Common Notions There are those who stick not to deny that we may or ought to affirm of a thing what is included in the clear and distinct Idea we have of it That Nothing has no Properties That a thing cannot be annihilated without a Miracle That a Body cannot move by any Force of its own That a Body in Motion cannot communicate to occurrent Bodies more Motion than it has it self and other things of the same kind They have never consider'd these Axioms with a View steady and distinct enough to see clearly the Truth of them and they have sometimes try'd Experiments which have abusively convinc'd them that
because they have been determin'd by the Will of God which is not subject to change as that a Bowl should move another on such an encounter 'T is easie to see he has not understood what he pretends to oppose He was not aware that the Conjuctive Particle and had sometimes the same purport as the Disjunctive or for if he had observ'd it he could with no good Grace have seriously wrangled upon the Ambiguity of a Particle He might have easily consider'd that Truths which are Necessary by their Nature as that Two times Two make Four need not the Will of God to make them such But be it granted that I had not sufficiently explain'd my self yet the place on which he criticises being but accessary to my Design it was not necessary to explain my self more at large Would a Man be at the pains of reading it he might see I needed only to say there were necessary Truths and that I was not oblig'd to examine the cause of their nececessity f For my part I know not what he drives at this is a very commodious way of criticising a Man has Reason whenever he desires it g He imposes on me three Falsities in six Lines I have never determin'd upon this Question neither in undue Circumstances nor with insufficient Proofs for I have not so much as spoken of it but if he has a mind to know my Thoughts of it I fear not to affirm that God cannot cause Contradictories to be true and false at the same time h He confounds Beings with Truths Man is capable of Reason and Sense A Globe may be divided into two Hemispheres A Man and a Globe are subject to change but these Truths are immutable l All this concerns not me but only shews the Fecundity of our Author m Consider if you please all these Flourishes endeavour to understand them and admire how the Imagination seduces Reason I think our Author may be said to resemble a Man who imagining he sees his Enemy at hand should presently charge against the Phantom should pierce it with his Sword should cut off its Head and then over-joy'd with so successful and easie a Conquest should triumphantly exclaim though my Pistols had miscarried my sword had run him through but though my Sword had missed him yet I had cut off his Head but lastly though his Head should have remained upon his Shoulders yet I found him so feeble and easily to be conquered that I had nothing to fear from him 'T is visible from all these Flourishes that our Author fancies he has severely handled me whilst yet I am as insensible of his Wounds as the Enemy the poor Man thought he had so cruelly Butcher'd n I ought in our Author's opinion to have begun with Theology to prove methodically there are necessary and contingent Truths but I do not believe that Conduct would have had the Approbation of many People and seeing it is an hard task to content the Criticks I cannot believe our Animadverter would have been well satisfied This third Head which I am going to comment on as on the preceding sufficiently shews us what he is o I know not whether what I say ought to be rank'd amongst Proverbs and Quibbles for that depends upon the Tast and I refer my self to those whom the Passion for criticising has not made over scrupulous and dainty They likewise may reflect whether this niceness suits well with the Author of this Discourse and whether he ought so much to pretend to an exquisite Tast. q Can he not see that these things are not of themselves Articles of Faith and that we may speak of the Goodness of God deprav'd Manners and corrupt Inclinations without having recourse to Faith p There 's a great difference between mingling and confounding I shall always distinguish things of Faith from those of Nature as I here say ought to be done But I never made a Resolution not to speak of God or Christian Morality in treating about the Search after Truth The Author seems not to understand me that he may play the Critick with less trouble r There are in these Animadversions some little Raileries which provoke to Pity but this might raise ones Indignation Let him know once for all that if I consented to the Publication of this Book 't was chiefly because it contains those things which he condemns as Enthusiasms s If he speaks of himself we ought to take his word for it t What he has said is true but what he goes to conclude from it is false it being Reason and not Faith which teaches us God is no Deceiver u He has here suppress'd two words which give all the force to my reasoning which runs thus If it must infallibly and necessarily have embrac'd every thing we shall see by and by what reason he had for this Retrenchment x Reason teaches us that God is no Deceiver and Faith supposes it which is quite contrary to what the Animadverter imagines y It cannot be doubted when we have Reasons for it but it is needless to stand to answer all these Questions z I do not conclude it with that Argument Mine is good and this good for nothing there is difference between INFALLIBLY and NECESSARILY forcing us to embrace Errour and not giving us the means to discover Truth Certainly these words Infallibly and Necessarily ought not to be suppress'd a He cannot shew a place in the whole Book he animadverts on where I suppose any Article of Faith as a Principle from whence to draw any Consequences Essential to the Search of Truth But he imagines if a Man speaks but of the Goodness of God deprav'd Manners and corrupt Inclinations he is treating of some Article of Faith b Methinks these two Conclusions have no other aim than to gain by surprise some little Applauses from such as give them gratis ADVERTISEMENT SInce the first Impression of this second part two Books have been publish'd relating to it The first entituled Animadversions upon the Animadversions on the Search after Truth wherein is discovered c. I am highly oblig'd to the Author of these Animadversions for the Honour he seems to do me by the Title of his Book but since this Title may make the World believe I had some hand in his Work I think my self oblig'd to say that though I am very well satisfied with his Person I am not extremely pleas'd with his Book Methinks that those who meddle in defending or opposing others ought to read their Works carefully so as to be throughly acquainted with their Opinions But the Search after Truth you 'll say merits not the Application of Men of Parts True it deserves not therefore that the Person spoken of who undoubtedly is a Man of great Sense and Worth should either impugn or defend it The Title of the second Book runs thus The Animadverter's Answer to the Preface of the second Volume of the Search after Truth wherein is examin'd c. I
corrupted his Mind he becomes if I may so speak bold and fierce against Truth Sometimes he rashly impungs it without knowing it at other times he consciously betrays it and relying upon his imaginary Learning is always ready to assert either the Affirmative or Negative according as he is possessed with a Spirit of Contradiction It goes quite otherwise with those that make no Ostentation of Learning they are not positive neither do they speak unless they have something to say and it even often happens that they remain silent when they should speak They have neither that Fame nor those outward Characters of Learning which spur Men on to speak without Knowledge and so may decently hold their Peace but the Pretenders are afraid to make a stop since they are sensible they shall be despis'd for their Silence even when they have nothing to say and that they are not always in danger of falling into Contempt though they speak but Impertinencies provided they utter them with a Scientifick Confidence What makes Men capable of thinking enables them to know the Truth but neither Honours Riches University-Degrees nor Chimerical Erudition makes them capable of thinking It 's their own Nature for they are made to think because they are created for the Truth Even bodily Health qualifies them not for thinking well but only is a less Hinderance than Sickness Our Body assists us in some manner in perceiving by Sense and imagining but not at all in conceiving For though without its Help we cannot attentively meditate nor oppose the continual Impression of the Senses and Passions which endeavour to perplex and obliterate our Ideas because in this present State we cannot overcome the Body but by the Body yet 't is plain that the Body cannot illuminate the Mind nor produce in it the Light of Understanding since every Idea that discovers the Truth proceeds from Truth it self All that the Soul receives from the Body relates only to it and when she follows those Glimpses she sees nothing but Phantasms and Dreams that is to say she sees not things as they are in themselves but only as they have relation to her Body As the Idea of our own Greatness or Littleness is a frequent occasion of Errour so likewise the Ideas of outward things that have refference to us make no less dangerous an Impression We have already observ'd that the Idea of Greatness is always attended with a great Motion of Spirits and a great Motion of the Spirits is ever accompanied with the Idea of Greatness and that on the contrary that of Littleness is always followed with a small Motion of Spirits which is in its turn accompanied with the Idea of Meanness From that Principle 't is easy to infer that such things as produce in us great Motions of Spirits must naturally appear greater stronger and more real and perfect than others for in the word Greatness I comprehend all those Qualifications and such like So that sensible Good must needs seem to us more considerable and solid than that which cannot be felt if we judge of it by the Motion of the Spirits and not by the pure Idea of Truth A great House a sumptuous Retinue a fine Furniture Offices Honour Riches will then appear to us to have more greatness and reality in them than Justice and other Vertues When we compare Vertue to Riches by the pure Eyes of the Mind we prefer Vertue but if we make use of our Corporeal Eyes and Imagination and judge of those things by the Motion of the Spirits which they raise in us we shall doubtless chuse Riches rather than Vertue 'T is from the same Principle that we imagine that spiritual and insensible things are almost nothing that the Ideas of our Mind are less noble than the Objects they represent that there is less reality and substance in the Air than in Metalls and in Water than in Ice that those vast Spaces that reach from the Earth to the Firmament are empty or that the Bodies that fill them have not so much reality and solidity as the Sun and Stars In short our reasoning upon that false Principle induces us into an infinite number of Errours concerning the Nature and Perfection of every thing A great Motion of Spirits and by consequence a strong Passion always attending the sensible Idea of Grandeur and a small Motion and consequently a weak Passion still accompanying the sensible Idea of Meanness we are very attentive to and bestow a great deal of our time on the study of such things as raise the sensible Idea of Grandeur whereas we neglect those which afford but the sensible Idea of Meanness Those great Bodies for instance which make their Circumvotions over our Heads have ever made a great Impression upon Men who at first ador'd them because of their Light and Brightness or sensible Idea of Grandeur some bolder Wits presum'd to examine their Motions so that the Stars have been in all Ages the Object either of the Study or of the Veneration of the greatest part of Mankind It may even be said that the fear of their Phantastick Influences which still fright Astrologers and weak Persons is a sort of Adoration paid by a Brain-sick Imagination to the Idea of Greatness that represents Celestial Bodies But the Body of Man on the contrary that is infinitely more admirable and deserves more our Application than whatever we can know of Saturn Jupiter and other Planets has remained a long time almost unknown The sensible Idea of dissected parts of Flesh having nothing great but being rather distastful and noisome it is but a few years since Men of Parts have looked upon Anatomy as a Science that deserved their study There have been Princes and Kings that boasted of being Astronomers the height and magnitude of the Stars seem'd to suit their Dignity and Grandeur but I know not of any that were ever ambitious of knowing Anatomy and skilfully dissecting a Heart or a Brain The same may be said of several other Sciences Rare and extraordinary things incite in Mens Minds greater and more sensible Motions than such as are seen every day we admire them and by a natural Consequence we fix on them an Idea of Greatness that is followed with Passions of Esteem and Reverence This perverts the Reason of several Persons who are so very respectful and curious of all the Remains of Antiquity and whatever comes from far or is rare and extraordinary that they are as Slaves to them because the Mind dares not sit and pronounce upon the Objects of its Veneration I grant Truth is in no great danger because some Men are taken up with the Medals Arms and Habits of the Ancients or with the Dress of the Chinese and Savages It is not altogether unserviceable to know the Map of Ancient Rome nor the ways from Tomquin to Nanquin though it be more useful to us to know those from London to Oxford or from Paris to St. Germain or Versailles
the Knowledge of Relations But Falsehood is not and the Knowledge of Falsehood or a false Knowledge is if it may be so said the Knowledge of what is not and what is not cannot be known but by Relation to what is So Errour cannot be understood but by comparing it to Truth There may be distinguished as many Species of Falsehood as of Truth and as there are Three sorts of Relations viz. of one Idea to another of an Object to its Idea or of an Idea to its Object and lastly of one Object to another So there are Three kinds of Truth and Falsehood namely betwixt Ideas betwixt Things and their Ideas and betwixt Things themselves It is true that 2 times 2 are 4 't is false that twice 2 are 5 That is a Truth and a Falsehood betwixt Ideas 'T is true that there is one Sun 't is false that there are two Here you have a Truth and a Falsehood betwixt Things and their Ideas 'T is true that the Earth is bigger than the Moon and 't is false that the Sun is smaller than the Earth There is a Truth and Falsehood betwixt Objects themselves Of those Three sorts of Truths such as are betwixt Ideas are Eternal and Immutable and upon that account are the Rule and Measure of all others because every Rule and Measure ought to be unchangeable And as Arithmetick Algebra and Geometry are general Sciences that rule and contain all the particular so they only consider those sorts of Truths All Truths or Relations betwixt Creatures or betwixt Ideas and created Things are obnoxious to those Changes whereof Creatures are susceptible Nothing but the Truth betwixt our Ideas and the Sovereign Being or betwixt Ideas themselves is Immutable because neither God nor the Ideas he contains are subject to Alteration And therefore 't is only that sort of Truths which are betwixt our Ideas that we try to discover by the Exercise of our Reason since we for the most part make use of our Senses to discover the others as we use our Eyes and Hands to ascertain us of the Existence of Things and to know the Relations of Equality or Inequality betwixt them There is nothing but Ideas of which the Mind can Infallibly know the Relations by it self and without the use of Senses But there are not only Relations betwixt our Ideas there are also Relations betwixt the Relations of our Ideas betwixt the Relations of those Relations betwixt the Collection of many Relations and so ad infinitum that is to say that there are Truths infinitely compounded and perplexed In Geometrical Stile we call a simple Truth or the Relation of one Idea to another as the Relation of 4 to 2 or to 2 times 2 a Geometrical Reason or only a Reason For the Excess and Defect of an Idea or to use the common Terms the Excess or Defect of a Magnitude is not properly a Reason nor equal Excesses and Defects equal Reasons When the Ideas or Magnitudes are equal there is a Reason of Equality and one of Inequality when they are unequal The Relation betwixt Relations of Magnitudes that is to say between Reasons is called Compounded Reason because 't is a compounded Relation as the Relation of 6 to 4 and 3 to 2. When the Compounding Reasons are equal the Compounded bears the Name of Proportion or Duplicate Reason The Relations of 8 to 4 and 6 to 3 are a Proportion because those two Relations are equal It must be observed That all the Relations or Reasons as well simple as compounded are true Magnitudes that very Name of Magnitude being a relative Term and necessarily importing a Relation For there is nothing Great by it self and without Relation to another besides the Infinite or Unite All entire Numbers are as true Relations as Fractions themselves or as Numbers compared with or divided by others though we do not consider this because entire Numbers may be express'd by one Arithmetical Figure So 4 for instance or 8 2 is as true a Relation as 2 4 or 2 8 though the Unite to which 4 relates be not expressed but understood 4 being equal to 4â—â— or 8 2 and therefore every Magnitude being a Relation or every Relation being a Magnitude it is plain that we can express all Magnitudes by Cyphers and represent them by Signs to the Imagination So that all Truths being but Relations to know all Truths exactly both simple and compounded it is sufficient to have an exact Knowledge of all sorts of Relations simple and compound We have already observed that there are two viz. Relations of Equality and Inequality It is plain that those of Equality are alike and that as soon as we know that a Thing is equal to another that is known we have an accurate Knowledge of its Relation But it goes not so with Inequality for because we know that a Tower is higher than a Fathom and lower than a thousand it follows not that we have a true Idea of its Heighth or of its Relation with a Fathom To compare things together or rather critically to measure the Relations of Inequality there is required a very exact Measure a simple and very intelligible Idea an universal Measure which may be adapâ—ed to all sorts of Subjects That Measure is Unity which serves to measure all Things and without which 't is impossible to have an accurate Knowledge of any But all Numbers being made up of Unites 't is evident that without the Ideas of Numbers and a Method of comparing and measuring those Ideas that is without Arithmetick 't is not possible to make any Progress in the Knowledge of Compound Truths And as Ideas and the Relations betwixt Ideas in short all sorts of Magnitudes can be greater or less than others so they cannoâ— be made equal but by more or less Unites join'd or repeated as often as 't is necessary So that it is only by the Addition and Subtraction of Unity or of the Parts of the Unity when 't is conceived as divided that we exactly measure all sorts of Magnitudes and discover all sorts of Truths Now Arithmetick and Algebra are of all Sciences those that afford us most Skill and Light to effect those Operations and to manage the Capacity of the Mind to the best Advantage since they endue it with all the Perfection and Extent that it is capable of and teach it to discover all the Truths that can be exactly known For ordinary Geometry does not so perfect the Mind as the Imagination and the Truths which that Science discovers are not always so evident as the Masters of it fansie For instance They suppose they have express'd the Value of some Magnitudes when they have proved them to be equal to some Lines that are the Subtendant of Right Angles whose Sides are perfectly known or to others that are determined by some one of the Conick Sections But their Mistake is visible for those Subtendants are unknown themselves We know more exactly the √
Learning or in the Study of all vain and useless Sciences which flatter the secret Pride of our Heart because this is what recommends us to the Admiration of the Vulgar I have shewn that the Inclination for Pleasures constantly throws off the View of the Mind from the Consideration of abstracted Truths which are the most simple and exuberant and permits it not to consider any thing with a competent Attention and Impartiality to judge well of it That Pleasures being the Modes of our Souls Existence they necessarily divide the Capacity of the Mind and that a Mind thus divided cannot fully comprehend a Subject of any great Extent Last of all I have made appear that the Relation and Natural Union we have to all those with whom we live and converse is the Occasion of many Errours we fall into and of our communicating them to others as others communicate to us the same they were engag'd in In the Fifth where I have endeavour'd to give some Idea of our Passions I have I think made it sufficiently evident that they were ordain'd to unite us to all things sensible and to give us as we are among them a due and necessary Disposition for their Preservation and our own That as our Senses unite us to our Body and expand our Soul into all the composing Parts of it so our Commotions carry us as it were out of our selves and diffuse us upon all things round about us That Lastly they incessantly represent things not as they are in themselves whereby we may form true Judgments but according to the Relation they have to us whereby to form Judgments useful to the Preservation of our Being and of those to whom we are either naturally or voluntarily united After having attempted the Discovery of Errours in their Causes and the Deliverance of the Mind from the Prejudices it is subject to I thought it was time at last to prepare it for the Search of Truth Wherefore in the Sixth Book I have explain'd the Means which I thought most natural for the increasing the Attention and enlarging the Capacity of the Mind by shewing the Use that might be made of its Senses its Passions and Imagination to the giving it all the Force and Penetration it is capable of After which I have establish'd certain Rules which must of necessity be observ'd for the Discovery of any Truth whatever I have explain'd them by many Examples that I might make them more sensible and have chosen those which I thought most useful or that included more fecund and general Truths that they might be read with greater Application and be made more sensible and familiar Possibly it may be acknowledg'd by this Essay of Method which I have given how necessary it is to reason only about clear and evident Ideas and in which we are inwardly convinc'd that all Nations do agree and never to proceed to Compound Things till having sufficiently examin'd the Simple whereon they depend And if it be consider'd that Aristotle and his Followers have not observ'd the Rules I have explain'd as we ought to be assur'd by the Reasons I have alledg'd and by the Correspondence that may be had with the most zealous Defenders of that Philosopher it may be we shall despise his Doctrine in spight of all the Impressions which persuade such as give way to be amuz'd by Words they do not understand But if we take notice of the manner of Monsieur des Cartes's Philosophizing we cannot doubt of the Solidity of his Philosophy For I have sufficiently shewn that he reasons but upon distinct and evident Ideas beginning with most Simple Things and afterwards passing on to the more Compound which depend on them Those who shall read the Works of that Learned Man will have plenary Conviction of what I say of him provided they read them with all the Application that is necessary to understand them And they will feel a secret Joy for being born in an Age and Country so fortunate as to free them from the Trouble of seeking a Master to teach them Truth among the past Ages of the Heathens and in the Extremities of the Earth among Barbarians and Strangers But as we ought not to be very sollicitous to know the Opinions of Men even though we were otherwise assur'd they had found out Truth so I should be very sorry if the Esteem I manifest for Monsieur des Cartes should prepossess any Man in his behalf and make him sit down satisfy'd with reading and retaining his Opinions without caring to be enlighten'd with the Light of Truth This would be preferring Man before GOD and consulting him in God's stead and acquiescing in the obscure Answers of a Philosopher which do not enlighten us to avoid the Trouble of Interrogating by our Meditation Him who answers and enlightens us both together 'T is a mean and unworthy thing to become the Partizan of any Sect and to look upon the Authors of it as infallible And thus Monsieur des Cartes chusing rather to make Men Disciples of Truth than Opinionated Followers of his Sentiments expressly forewarns them Not to take any thing he writes upon Trust and to embrace nothing but what the Force and Evidence of Reason should constrain them to believe He desires not like some Philosophers to be credited upon his Word He ever remembers that he is a Man and that disseminating his Light but by Reflexion he ought to direct the Minds of those who would be illuminated by him towards Him alone who can make them more perfect by the Gift of Understanding The principal Advantage that can be made of Application to Study is the rendring the Mind more accurate more illuminated more penetrating and fit for the Discovery of all the Truths we desire to know But such as read the Philosophers with Design of remembring their Opinions and factoring them to others approach not Him who is the Life and Nourishment of the Soul Their Mind grows blind and enervate by their Commerce with such as can neither strengthen nor enlighten them They are swell'd up with a spurious sort of Learning the Weight whereof overwhelms and the Glittering blinds them and fancying to themselves they are hugely learnâ—d when their Heads are cramm'd with the Opinions of the Antients they forget that they become their Disciples who St. Paul says became Fools by usurping the Name of Wise. Dicentes se esse Sapientes stulti facti sunt The Method I have given will if I mistake not be highly advantageous to those who desire to make use of their Reason or to receive of God the Answers he gives all those who can faithfully consult Him For I think I have said what is chiefly requir'd to corroborate and conduct the Attention of the Mind which is the natural Prayer we make to the true Master of all Men in order to be instructed But because this Natural Way of Searching out Truth is very painful and commonly impracticable except in
not fail of probable Reasons to confound the Soul with the Body Experience they 'll say teaches us That the Body is capable of Feeling Thinking and Reasoning 'T is the Body which is sensible of Pleasure and Pain 'T is the Brain which thinks and reasons The weight of the Body makes heavy the Mind Madness is a true distemper and those who have most Wisdom lose it when that part of the Brain where it resides is diseas'd The Essences of Beings are unknown to us and therefore Reason cannot discover of what they are susceptible So that reason refers us to Experience and Experience confounds the Soul with the Body and teaches us that this is capable of thinking Such would be their Reasons And in Truth those who assure us That the Essences of Being are unknown and make it Criminal for Philosophers to demonstrate Extension no Modification of Being but the very Essence of Matter would do well to consider the mischievous Consequences deducible from their Principles and not go to overthrow the only Demonstration we have for the Distinction between the Soul and Body For in fine the Distinction of these two Parts of our Selves prov'd by clear Ideas is the most Fruitful and necessary of all Truths in point of Philosophy and perhaps of Divinity and Christian Morality But this Distinction is likewise exactly demonstrated in many Places of the Search after Truth And I undertake to Monsieur de la Ville notwithstanding his Answer fraught with Ambiguities Figures and Contradictions or rather I undertake to the Libertines for as for him I believe him so setled in his Faith as not to want such sort of Proofs I undertake I say to the Libertines That they will never find any Sophism in my Demonstration That 't is impossible to conceive it clearly and distinctly without embracing it and that all the Proofs they offer to confound the Soul with the Body are drawn from Senses that they are obscure and confus'd and can never perswade such as Judge of things by clear and distinct Ideas From this Principal That the Essence of Body consists not in Extension and that the Essences of things are unknown I could still draw many other Consequences opposite to Faith But that is not necessary and I would rather if it were possible reconcile all false as well as true Philosophies with Religion However impious and Heretical would be the Consequences I could deduce from the Opinions of Philosophers I should think I wanted the Charity which I owe them if I endeavoured to make their Faith suspected So far am I from imitating the Conduct of Monsieur de la Ville who leaving a Principle demonstrated in all its Strength and receiv'd by all Ages lays out himself in drawing Heretical Consequences from it tho' of no use but to strengthen the Calvinists and encrease their Number and to disturb the Faith of the Orthodox I would on the contrary that no one should think on these Consequences or disown them as false and wrong-inferr'd from the Principal All Truths hang in a Chain together and no false Principle can be held but those who are any thing vers'd in the Art of Reasoning may infer from it abundance of Consequences repugnant to Religion So that if it were permitted to blacken the Faith of others upon Consequences drawn from Principles believ'd by them since there is no Man but Errs in something we might treat all the World as Heretical Wherefore the allowing Men to Dogmatize and to make others Faith suspected who are not of their Opinion would be opening a Gap to infinite Quarrels Schisms Disturbances and even Civil Wars and all Mankind is concern'd to look upon the Abettors of such a Conduct as Slanderers and Disturbers of the publick Peace For in short the different Parties in Religion which are almost always form'd from such like Consequences produce strange Events in a State which all Histories abound with But the Liberty to Philosophize or to reason upon Common Notions is not to be denied Men it being a Right which is as natural to them as to breath Divines ought to distinguish Theology from Philosophy Articles of our Faith from Opinions of Men. Truths which GOD imparts to all Christians by a visible Authority from those which he bestows on some particular Persons in Recompence of their Attention and Industry They should not confound things that depend on so different Principles No Question Humane Sciences ought to be made subservient to Religion but with a Spirit of Peace and Charity without condemning one another so long as we agree about Truths which the Church has determin'd For this is the way for Truth to shine out and all Sciences to be brought to greater and greater Perfection by the Addition of New Discoveries to the Ancient But the Imaginations of most Men cannot be reconcil'd to New Discoveries but even Novelty in Opinions never so advantageous to Religion frights them whilst they easily inure themselves to the falsest and obscurest Principles provided some Ancient has advanc'd them But when once these Principles are grown familiar they find them evident though never so obscure They believe them most useful though extremely dangerous And they are so well us'd to say and hear what they do not conceive and to slurr a real Difficulty by an imaginary Distinction that they are ever well satisfy'd with their false Idea's and can't endure to be talkt to in a clear and distinct Language like Men coming out of a dark Room they are fearful of the Light which strikes too violently on their Eyes and they imagine we go to blind them when we try to dissipate the involving Darkness Thus though I have shown by many Consequences that 't is dangerous for Example to maintain that Beasts have a Soul more noble than the Body yet since this Opinion is ancient and most Men are accustom'd to Believe it whilst the contrary bears the Character of Novelty Those who judge of the Harshness of Opinions rather by the Fear they produce in the Imagination than by the Evidence and Light they shed in the Mind will be sure to vote the Cartesians Opinion dangerous and will condemn these Philosophers as rash and presumptuous rather than those who make Beasts capable of Reasoning Let a Man but say in Company with an Air of Gravity or rather with a Look into which the Imagination scar'd with something extraordinary forms the Face Really the Cartesians are strange People They maintain That Beasts have no Soul I am afraid in a little time they will say as much of Man And this will be enough to perswade a great many that this is a dangerous Opinion No Reasons can prevent the Effect of this Discourse upon weak Imaginations and unless there happen to be some brisk Wit that with the gayety of Carriage shall re-embolden the Company from the Fear they had conceiv'd the Cartesians might tire themselves to Death before they could by their Reasonings obliterate
towards their Principle Because nothing but the Intuition of Eternal Wisdom which gives Being to Spirits can give them as we may say the Accomplishing Stroke and the utmost Perfection they are capable of When we see GOD as He is we shall be like Him says the Apostle St. John By that Intuition of Eternal Truth we shall be rais'd to that degree of Grandeur to which all Spiritual Creatures tend by the Necessity of their Nature But whilst we live on Earth the Weight of the Body drags down the Mind withdraws it continually from the Presence of GOD or that Internal Light which illuminates it makes perpetual Essays to fortifie its Union with Sensible Objects and compells it to represent things not as they are in themselves but according to the Relation they bear to the Preservation of Life The Body according to the Wise Man fills the Mind with such a multitude of Sensations that it becomes unable to discover the most obvious things the Sight of the Body dazles and dissipates that of the Mind so that the Eye of the Soul has great Difficulty distinctly to perceive any Truth whilst the Eye of the Body is imploy'd in the Discovery which evidences that all Truths are found out and all Sciences learn'd merely by the Attention of the Mind This being indeed its Return and Conversion unto GOD who is our only Tutour who only can instruct us with all Truth by the Manifestation of His own Substance as St. Austin speaks From all which it is manifest that 't is our Duty constantly to withstand the Opposition the Body makes against the Mind and to accustom our selves by degrees to disbelieve the Reports our Senses make concerning all circumambient Bodies which they always represent as worthy of our Application and Esteem because we must never make Sensible things the Object of our Thoughts or the Subject of our Employment 'T is one of the Truths which the Eternal Wisdom seems willing to teach us by His Incarnation For after having exalted a Sensible Body to the highest Dignity possible to be conceiv'd He gave us to understand by the Ignominy He reduc'd this same Body to that is by the Ignominy of the Noblest of all Sensible things what Contempt we ought to have for all Sensible Objects 'T is possibly for the same Reason that St. Paul said He knew not JESUS CHRIST after the Flesh. For 't is not the Flesh of CHRIST we must consider but the Spirit vail'd under the Flesh. Caro vas fuit quod habebat attende non quod erat says St. Austin Whatever is a Visible and Sensible Nature in our LORD merits not our Adoration but because of the Union with the WORD which can only be the Object of the Mind It is absolutely necessary for those who desire to become Wise and Happy to be wholly convinc'd and as it were pierc'd with what I have said 'T is not enough that they believe me on my Word or that they be contented by the glimpse of a transitory Light 't is necessary they should know it by a thousand Experiences and as many undeniable Demonstrations These are Things to be engraven indelibly on their Mind to be made present to their Thoughts in all their Studies and in all the Business and Employs of Life Such as will take the Pains to read the Work I here offer to the Publick with any Application of Thought will if I mistake not enter into such a Frame and Temper of Mind For we have several ways demonstrated that our Senses Imagination and Passions are absolutely useless to the Discovery of Truth and Happiness that on the contrary they dazle and seduce us on all occasions and in general that all the Notices the Mind receives through the Body or by Means of some Motions excited in the Body are all false and confus'd with reference to the Objects represented by them though they are extremely useful to the Preservation of the Body and the Goods that are related to it In this Work we encounter several Errours especially such as have been of longest Growth of universal Reception and have caus'd the greatest Disorder in the Mind and we shew that they almost all proceed from the Mind's Union with the Body We offer in diverse places to make the Mind sensible of its Slavery and Dependence on all Sensible things in order to awaken it from its Lethargy and to put it upon attempting its Deliverance Nor do we rest satisfy'd with a bare Exposition of our Ramblings but moreover explain the Nature of the Mind We don't for Instance insist upon a long Enumeration of all the particular Errours of our Senses and Imagination but chiefly dwell upon the Causes of these Errours And in the Explication of these Faculties and the General Errours we fall into we expose all at one View an infinite Number of particular Errours whereunto we are obnoxious So that the Subject of this Treatise is the Whole Mind of Man We consider it in it self with its Relation to the Body and with its Relation to GOD. We examine the Nature of all its Faculties we point out the Uses to be made of them for the avoiding Errour In fine we explain most of the things we thought necessary to our advancing in the Knowledge of MAN The finest the most delightful and most necessary Knowledge is undoubtedly that of Our Selves Of all Humane Sciences that concerning Man is the most worthy of Man and yet this is none of the most improv'd and most finish'd Science that we have The Vulgar part of Men neglect it wholly Among the Pretenders to Science there are very few which apply to it and much fewer whose Application is successful The generality even of those who go for Men of Parts have but a confus'd Perception of the Essential Difference between the Soul and Body St. Austin himself who has so admirably distinguish'd these two Beings confesses it was long before he could discover it And though it must be acknowledg'd he has better explain'd the Properties of the Soul and Body than all that went before him or have come after him to our present Age yet it were to be wish'd he had not attributed to the Bodies that are about us all the Sensible Qualities we perceive by means of them For in brief they are not clearly contain'd in the Idea which he had of Matter Insomuch that we may pretty confidently say The Difference between the Mind and Body till of late Years was never sufficiently and clearly known Some there are who fancy to themselves they very well know the Nature of the Mind Many others are persuaded 't is impossible to know any thing of it Lastly the greatest Number of all see not of what use that Knowledge could be and therefore despise it But all these so common Opinions are rather the Effects of the Imagination and Inclination of Men than the Consequences of a Clear and Distinct View of their Mind and
proceed from their feeling an Uneasiness and Regret to retire into themselves there to discover their Weaknesses and Infirmities and their being pleas'd with Curious Enquiries and gayer sort of Sciences Being always Abroad they are insensible of the Disorders that happen at Home within themselves They think all 's right because there 's a Stupor on their Soul and find fault with those who knowing their Distemper betake to Remedies saying they make themselves sick because they try for Cure But these Great Genius's who pierce into the most Mysterious Secrets of Nature who lift themselves in Opinion as high as Heaven and descend to the bottom of the Abyss ought to remember what they are These great Objects it may be do but dazle them The Mind must needs depart out of it self to compass so many things and this it can't do without scattering its Force Men came not into the World to be Astronomers or Chymists to spend their whole Life at the end of a Telescope or labouring at a Furnace to deduce trifling Consequences from their painful Observations Grant that an Astronomer made the first Discoveries of Continent and Sea and Mountains in the Moon that he first observ'd the Spots that circuit upon the Sun and that he had exactly calculated their Motions Suppose that a Chymist had found out at length the Secret of fixing Mercury or of making the Alkaest wherewith Van-helmont boasted to dissolve all Bodies What are they the wiser or happier for all this It perhaps has set them up in Reputation with the World but if they would reflect upon it they would find that Reputation did but increase their Bondage Astronomy Chymistry and most of the other Sciences may be look'd on as proper Divertisements for a Gentleman But Men should never be enamour'd with their Gayety not prefer them before the Science of Humane Nature For though the Imagination fixes a certain Idea of Greatness to Astronomy by reason of its considering Great and Glorious Objects and seated infinitely above all other things the Mind is not blindly to prostrate it self to that Idea but sit its Master and its Judge and strip it of that Sensible Pomp which amazes Reason The Mind must pronounce of all things according to its Internal Light without hearkening to the false and confus'd Verdict of its Senses and Imagination and whilst it examines all Humane Sciences by the Pure Light of Truth which enlightens it we doubt not to affirm it will disesteem most of them and set a greater Price on that which teaches us to know our selves than on all the other put together Therefore we choose rather to advise such as wish well to Truth to judge of the Subject of this Treatise by the Responses they shall receive from the Sovereign Instructor of all Men after having interrogated him by some Serious Reflexions than to forestall them with a long anticipating Discourse which perhaps they might look on as Common-place Matter or the Vain Ornaments of a Preface If they are persuaded this is a Subject worthy their Study and Application we desire them once more not to judge of the Things contain'd in it by the good or ill Manner they are express'd in but still to retire into themselves and there to hear the Decisions they are to follow and to judge by Being thus fully persuaded that Men cannot teach one another and that those who hear us learn not the Truths we speak to their Ears unless at the same time He who taught them us manifest them likewise to their Mind We think our selves farther oblig'd to advertise the Readers that would profit by this not to credit us on our Word out of any Inclination and Good-liking nor withstand our Sentiments out of Prejudice or Aversion For though we think nothing be therein advanc'd but what we learn'd at the Expence of Meditation we should however be very sorry that others should be contented with the Remembrance and Belief without the Knowledge of our Notions and fall into Errour for want of Understanding us or because we have Err'd before them That presumptuous Pride of some of the Learned who demand our Belief upon their Word seems intolerable They are angry with us for Interrogating GOD when once they have spoke to us because they Interrogate Him not themselves They grow warm upon every Opposition to their Opinions requiring an absolute Preference should be given to the Mists and Darkness of their Imagination before the Pure Light of Truth which illuminates the Mind We are Thanks to GOD very remote from this way of proceeding though it be often charg'd upon us We demand indeed a Resignation to Matters of Fact and the Experiments we produce because there are things not learn'd by the Applying the Mind to Sovereign and Universal Reason But as to Truths discoverable in the True Ideas of things which the Eternal Wisdom suggests to us in our most inward and secret Reason herein we expresly caution against resting upon what we have thought of them as judging it no small Crime thus to equalize our selves with GOD by usurping a Power over the Minds of Men. The chief Reason why we are so earnestly desirous that those who read this Work bring all possible Application along with them is that we are willing to be reprehended for the Faults we have been guilty of For we pretend not to be Infallible We have so strict an Union with and so strong a Dependence on our Body that we are justly apprehensive lest we have sometimes mistaken the confus'd Noise wherewith it fills the Imagination for the Pure Voice of Truth which speaks to the Understanding Were it GOD only who spoke and did we judge only according to what we heard we might perhaps say in the words of our LORD As I hear I judge and my Judgment is just But we have a Body that speaks lowder than GOD Himself but never speaks the Truth We have Self-love which corrupts the Words of GOD which are all Truth and we have Pride which emboldens us to judge without staying for the Words of Truth which ought to be the Rule of all our Judgments For the principal Cause of our Errours is that our Judgments reach farther than our Pure Intellectual Perceptions Wherefore I intreat those to whom GOD shall discover my Wandrings to put me in the Right Way that so this Treatise which I offer as an Essay whose Subject is well worthy the Application of Men may by degrees arrive to its Perfection This Undertaking was at first ettempted only with design of instructing my self But some Persons being of Opinion it might be of use if publish'd I the willinger submitted to their Reasons because one of the principal so well suited with the desire I had of advantaging my self The best means said they of being inform'd in any Matter is to communicate our Opinions about it to the Learned This quickens our own Attention as well as provokes theirs Sometimes they have
though our natural Inclinations are Voluntary yet they are not Free with that Freedom of Indifference I am speaking â—f which contains a Power of willing or not willing or rather of willing the contrary to what our natural Inclinations carry us For though it is Voluntarily and Freely that a Man loves Good in general since there is no Love but proceeds from the Will and 't is a contradiction for the Will to suffer violence or constraint However 't is impossible to Love it with that Freedom I have just explain'd since 't is not in the Power of the Will not to wish to be Happy But it must be observ'd that the Mind consider'd under so strong a bent towards Good in general cannot determine its Motion towards a particular Good unless the same Mind consider'd as susceptible of Idea's has knowledge of that particular Good I would say to make use of the ordinary terms that the Will is a blind Power that can make no advances to things but what are represented to it by the Vnderstanding so that the Will can not diversly determine its Propensity to Good or over-rule the direct Bent of his natural Inclinations but by commanding the Vnderstanding to represent it to some particular Object The power then that the Will has of determining its Inclinations necessarily contains an ability of applying the Uderstanding to the Objects which it likes That what I have said concerning the Will and Liberty may be better understood I will make it familiar by an Instance A Man represents to himself an Honour or Preferment under the Notion of a Good which he may hope for and immediately his Will wills this Good that is the Impression which is continually carrying the Soul towards Universal and undetermin'd Good inclines it towards this Honour But whereas this Honour is not the Universal Good nor is consider'd by a clear and distinct view of the Mind as Universal Good for the Mind can never see clearly That which is not the Impression we have towards Universal Good is not stopt by this particular Good The Mind has a tendency to go farther it is not necessarily and invincibly in Love with this Honour but is intirely at its Choice and Liberty in this respect Now its Liberty consists in this that being not fully convinc'd that this Honour comprehends all the Good it is capable of Loving it may suspend both its Judgment and its Love and thereupon as shall be shewn in the Third Book may through the Union it has with the Universal Being or that Being which contains all Good think of other things and consequently Love other Goods Finally it may compare all Goods together and love them according to that order in the Proportion they are lovely and refer them all to that one which contains all and which alone is fit to fix bounds to our Love as being the only one that is capable of filling all the Capacity we have of Loving Almost the same thing may be said of the Knowledge of Truth as of the Love of Good We Love the Knowledge of Truth as the Injoyment of Good through a natural Impression and that Impression is no more invincible than that which carries us towards Good that which makes it so is only Evidence or a perfect and intire Knowledge of the Object And we have equal Liberty in our false Judgments as in our inordinate Affections as shall be made to appear in the next Chapter CHAP. II. I. Of our Judgments and Reasonings II. That they depend upon the Will III. The Vse which should be made of its Liberty on their account IV. Two general Rules for the avoiding Error and Sin V. Some general Reflections upon those Rules IT might be readily inferr'd from what has been said in the precedent Chapter that the Understanding never judges since it goes no farther than Perception or that the Judgments and Reasonings which the Understanding makes are nothing but pure Perceptions That 't is the Will alone which really judges by acquiescing in and voluntarily resting upon what the Understanding represents And thus it is the Will alone which leads us into Error But this requires a larger Explication I say then there is no other difference on the part of the Understanding between a simple Perception a Judgment and a Reasoning than that the Understanding perceives a simple thing without relation to any thing whatsoever by a simple Perception that it perceives the Relations between two things or more in its Judgments And lastly that it perceives the Relations which are betwixt the Relations of things in its Reasonings wherefore all the Operations of the Understanding are nothing but pure Perceptions In Perceiving for Example twice 2 or 4 there is only a simple Perception In Judging that twice 2 are 4 or that twice 2 make not 5 the Understanding only perceives the Relation of Equality found between twice 2 and 4 or the Relation of Inequality between twice 2 and 5. Thus the Judgment in point of the Understanding is only the Preception of the Relation which is found between two things or more But Reasoning is the Perception not of the Relation which is found between two things or more for that would be a Judgment but of the Relation which is found between two or more Relations of two or more Things Thus when I infer that 4 being less than 6 twice 2 being equal to 4 are consequently less than 6 I not only Perceive the Relation of Inequality between 2 and 2 and 6 for that would be only a Judgment but the Relation of Inequality which is between the Relation of twice 2 and 4 and that Relation between 4 and 6 which is a Reasoning The Understanding then does only perceive and 't is the Will alone which judges and reasons by voluntary resting upon what the Understanding represents to it as has been already said Notwithstanding when things which come under our Consideration are palpably Evident our Consent seems to be no longer Voluntary whence we are ready to believe that 't is not our Will but our Vnderstanding that judges thereof But that we may be sensible of our Error we must know that the things we consider never appear with that Convincing Evidence till the Understanding has throughly examin'd all their Parts and Relations necessary to form a Judgment of them whereupon it happens that the Will which can will nothing without knowledge can act no longer on the Understanding that is cannot desire the Understanding to represent something new in its Object since it has already consider'd all the parts of it any ways relating to the question to be decided it is therefore oblig'd to rest upon what has been already represented and cease from its Agitation and Casting about 't is this Acquiescence of the Will which is properly a Judgment or Reasoning Thus because this Acquiescence or Judgment is not left Free when things strike us with that Evident Conviction we fansie
some other very difficult Problems have not proceeded from an heady and conceited rashness which has possess'd them with Likelihoods and made them pass for Truths Let them consider likewise on another hand whether the Cause of Error and Confusion's reigning so much in the Ordinary Philosophy may not be imputed to the Philosophers contenting themselves with Probability very easie and obvious to be met with and highly advantagious to their Vain Humour and their Interests Do not we almost every where find an infinite Diversity of Opinions upon the same Subjects and consequently infinite Errors Notwithstanding a prodigious number of Disciples give way to their own Seducements and submit themselves blind-fold to the Authority of these Philosophers without so much as Understanding what their Opinions are It is true there are some of them that after twenty or thirty Years time lost confess they have learnt nothing by their Reading but yet this their Confession is not so Ingenuous as it should be They think it requisite first to prove after their fashion that nothing can be known and after that they will make Confession of their Ignorance as Believing then they have the Privilege of doing it without being laught at for their Pains Yet were a Man dispos'd to entertain himself he would not want a proper Subject for his Laughter and Diversion should he handsomely Interrogate them concerning the Progress of their Learned Acquisitions and were they in Humour to declare in particular all the Fatigues they have undergone in the Study and Purchace of Nothing But though this their Learn'd and Profound Ignorance deserves to be well rally'd yet it seems not amiss to spare them at present and to commiserate those who have spent so many Years in Learning nothing but that false Proposition the irreconcileable Enemy to all Science and to all Truth That nothing can be known Since then the Rule I have establish'd is so necessary as has been seen in the Search after Truth let no Man Cavil at the proposing it And let not those who will not be at the pains of observing it themselves be forward to condemn so celebrated an Author as Des-Cartes for following it or according to their Notion for indeavouring so zealously to follow it They would not be so peremptory to condemn him did they know the Man on whom they pass so rash and unadvis'd a Sentence and did they not read his Works as they do Fables and Romances which they take up to entertain their idle Minutes but never to Study or be Instructed in Would they Meditate with that Author they might probably still find in themselves some Notions and Scatter'd Seeds of Truth which he teaches that would grow up and unfold themselves in spight of so disadvantagious a Load of mistaken Learning which oppresses them The Master that speaks and teaches us within challenges our Submission to him rather than to the Authority of the greatest Philosophers He takes pleasure in instructing us provided we apply our Minds to what he says 'T is by Meditation and a very exact Attention we Inquire of him and 't is by a certain internal Conviction and the secret Lashes and Reproaches felt upon our Non-submission that he answers us We ought in such wise to read the Works of Men as not to expect to receive Instruction from Men We must consult Him who Enlightens the World that with the Rest of the World he may Enlighten us And if he fails to Enlighten us after we have consulted him 't is doubtless because we have ill consulted him Whether then we read Aristotle or whether we read Des-Cartes we must not instantly believe either Aristotle or Des-Cartes But we should only Meditate as they have done or as they ought to have done with all the Earnestness and Attention we are capable of and thereupon Obey the Voice of our common Master and honestly yield up our Consent to that Internal Conviction and those Motions we find in us upon our Meditation This being done it may be allow'd a Man to pass a Judgment for or against an Author But he must first have digested the Principles of Des-Cartes and Aristotle's Philosophy before he can reject the one and approve the other before he can maintain concerning the Latter that no one Phaenomenon of Nature can ever be explain'd by the Principles peculiar to him as they have been of no use for this two thousand Years though his Philosophy hath been the Study of the most Ingenious Men in most parts of the World And on the contrary before he can boldly pronounce of the Other that he hath penetrated those recesses of Nature that lay deepest conceal'd from the Eyes of Men and hath open'd to them a most certain and infallâ—ble way of Discovering all the Truths 't is possible for a limited understanding to Comprehend But not to dwell upon the Notion we may conceive of these two Philosophers and of all others let us ever look upon them as Men And let not those of Aristotle's Party take it ill if after they have travell'd so many Ages in the Dark without finding themselves one step farther advanc'd than at their setting out there are some at last that have a Mind to see clearly what they do And if after the former have suffer'd themselves to be led like the blind there are those who remember they have Eyes with which they will attempt to conduct themselves Let us then be fully persuaded that this Rule viz. That an entire Consent should never be given but to things evidently perceiv'd is the most necessary of all others in the Search after Truth and let not our Mind embrace any thing as True which is not accompany'd with all the Evidence it demands 'T is requisite we should be persuaded of this to disburthen us of our Prejudices And 't is absolutely necessary we should entirely quit our Prejudices to enter into the Knowledge of Truth for as much as there is an absolute Necessity that our Mind be purify'd before it be inlightned Sapientia prima Stultitiâ caruisse But Before I conclude this Chapter 't is necessary to observe three Things The First is That I speak not here of things of Faith which have no Evidence attending them as have Natural Sciences The Reason of which seems to be this That we can have no Perception of Things but from the Idea's we have of them Now the Idea's we have are only given us by God according to our Exigencies and the need we have of them to conduct us in the Natural Order of Things according to which he has Created us So that the Mysteries of Faith being of a Supernatural Order we need not wonder if we want that Evidence since we want the Idea's of them because our Souls were Created by vertue of a General Decree through which we have all the Notions that are necessary for us but the Mysteries of Faith have receiv'd their Establishment only from an Order of Grace
which in our ordinary way of Conception is a Decree posteriour to this Order of Nature Mysteries then of Faith must be distinguish'd from things of Nature We ought equally to submit to Faith and to Evidence but in the concernments of Faith we must not look for Evidence as in those of Nature we ought not to take up with Faith That is with the Authority of Philosophers In a word to be a Believer 't is requir'd to Assent blindly but to be a Philosopher it is necessary to See plainly 'T is not however to be deny'd but there are some Truths besides those of Faith for which it would be unreasonable to demand indisputable Demonstrations as are those which relate to Matter of Fact in History and other things which have their dependence on the Will of Men. For there are two kinds of Truth the one Necessary the other Contingent I call Necessary Truths those which are immutable by their Nature and those which have been fix'd and determin'd by the Will of God which is not subject to Change All other sorts of Truth are Contingent Mathematicks Physicks Metaphysicks as also a great part of Morality contain Necessary Truths History Grammar Private Right or Customs and such other things as depend on the changeable Will of Man contain only Contingent Truths We demand therefore an exact Observation of the Rule we have been establishing in the Search of Necessary Truths the Knowledge of which may be call'd Science and we must be content with the greatest Probability in History which includes the Knowledge of things Contingent For under the general Name of History may be concluded the Knowledge of Languages Customs as also of the different Opinions of Philosophers when Men have only learnt them by Memory without having either Evidence or Certainty concerning them The Second thing to be Observ'd is that in Morality Politicks and Medicine and in all Practical Sciences we are obliged to be content with Probability Not Universally but upon occasion not because it satisfies the Mind but because the Instance is pressing And if a Man should always delay Acting till he had perfect Assurance of Success the Opportunity would be often lost But though it falls out that a Man must inevitably act yet he should in acting doubt of the Success of what he does And he should indeavour to make such Advances in Sciences as to be able on Emergencies to act with greater Certainty For this should be the constant end of all Mens Study and Employment who make any use of Thought The Third and last thing is this That we should not absolutely despise Probabilities since it often happens that many of them in Conjunction have as convincing a force as most evident Demonstrations Of which Nature there are infinite Examples to be found in Physicks and Morality So that 't is often expedient to amass together a sufficient number of them in subjects not otherwise Demonstrable in order to come to the Knowledge of Truth impossible to be found out any other way And now I must needs confess that the Law I impose is very Rigorous and Severe That there are abundance of Those who had rather renounce Reasoning at all than Reason on such Conditions That 't is impossible to run so fast with such retarding Circumspections However it must be granted me that a Man shall walk with greater Security in observing it and that hitherto those who have march'd so hastily have been oblig'd to return upon the same Ground Besides there are a great number of Men who will agree with me in this That since Monsieur Des-Cartes has discover'd more Truths in Thirty Years than all the Philosophers that preceded him meerly for his Submission to that Law if many others would study Philosophy as he has done we should in time be acquainted with the greatest part of those things which are necessary to make Life as happy as is possible upon an Earth which God has Curs'd CHAP. IV. I. Of the Occasional Causes of Error whereof there are Five Principal II. The general Design of the whole Work III. The particular Design of the First Book WE have seen from what has been said that a Man falls not into Error but for want of making a due use of his Liberty that 't is for want of curbing that eagerness of the Will and moderating its Passion for the bare appearances of Truth that he is deceiv'd And that Error consists only in the Consent of the Will which has a greater Latitude than the Perception of the Understanding since we should never err if we only simply judg'd according as we perceiv'd But though to speak properly there is no other cause of Error than the ill use of our Liberty it may notwithstanding be said we have several Faculties that are the Causes of our Errors not Real Causes but such as may be term'd Occasional All the ways of our Perceiving are so many occasions of Deceiving us For since our false Judgments include two things namely the Consent of the Will and the Perception of the Vnderstanding it is manifest that all the ways of our Perception may afford us some occasion or other of falling into Error forasmuch as they may incline us to rash and precipitate Consents But because it is necessary first to make the Soul sensible of her Weaknesses and Wandrings in order to possess Her with just Desires of a Deliverance from them and that she may with greater ease shake off her Prejudices We will endeavour to make an exact Division of her Manners of Perception which may serve as so many Heads to one or other of which may be referr'd as we proceed the different Errors whereunto we are obnoxious The Soul has three several ways of Perception By Pure Intellect by Imagination and by the Senses By Pure Intellect she perceives things Spiritual Universals Common Notions The Idea of Perfection that of a Being infinitely perfect and in general all her own thoughts when she knows them by a Reflexion made upon her self 'T is likewise by Pure Intellect she perceives Material things Extension with its Properties For 't is the pure Understanding only which is capable of Perceiving a Circle and a perfect Square a Figure of a thousand sides and such like things Such sort of Perceptions bear the name of Pure Intellections or Pure Perceptions since there is no necessity of the Mind 's forming Corporeal Images in the Brain to represent them by By Imagination the Soul only perceives things Material when being Absent she makes them present to her by forming the Images of them in the Brain This is the way whereby a Man Imagines all sorts of Figures a Circle a Triangle a Face an Horse Towns and Fields whether he has already seen them or not This sort of Perceptions we may call Imaginations because the Soul represents to her self these things by framing Images of them in the Brain And for as much as Spiritual things cannot be represented
is perpendicularly over our Heads and 't is upon that account her Diameter grows greater in her Ascent above the Horizon because then she 's approaching nearest us The reason then that we see her Greater when she rises is not the Refraction of her Rays meeting with the Vapours which proceed from the Earth since the Image which is at that time form'd from those Rays is lesser but 't is the Natural Judgment we make of her Remoteness occasion'd by her appearing beyond those Lands which we see at a vast Distance from us as has been before explain'd and I am amaz'd to find Philosophers asserting that the reason of this Appearance and Delusion of our Sences is harder to be discover'd than the greatest Aequations of Algebra This Medium whereby we judge of the Remoteness of any Object by knowing the Distance of the things betwixt us and it is often of considerable use when the other means I have spoke of are wholly insignificant for by this last Medium we can judge that certain objects are many Leagues distant which we cannot do by any of the other And yet if we strictly survey it it will be found in several things deficient For first we can only make use of it about things upon the Earth since it can be but very rarely and then very unprofitably imploy'd upon those in the Air or in the Heavens Secondly it cannot be made use of on the Earth but about things a few Leagues distant In the third place we ought to be certain that there are neither Mountains nor Valleys nor any thing of the like nature betwixt us and the Object that hinders us from applying the afore-said Medium Lastly I am perswaded there is no body but has made sufficient Tryals upon the Subject to be convinc'd that it is a thing extreamly difficult to judge with any certainty of the Remoteness of Objects by a sensible View of the things lying betwixt us and them and we perhaps have dwelt two long upon it These then are all the Means we have to judge of the Distance of Objects in which since we have found considerable Imperfections we cannot but conclude that the Judgments that are grounded upon them must needs be very Precarious and Uncertain Hence it is easy to manifest the truth of the Propositions I have advanc'd The Object C was suppos'd considerably remote from A Therefore in many Instances it may be advanc'd on towards D or may have approach'd towards B and no one can discover it because there is no infallible Means whereby to judge of its Distance Nay it may recede towards D when it is thought to approach towards B because the Image of the Object is sometimes augmented and inlarged upon the Retina whether it be because the Air betwixt the Object and the Eye occasions a greater Refraction at one time than at another whether it proceeds from some little Tremlings which happen in the Optick Nerve or lastly that the Impression which is caus'd by an unexact Union of the Rays upon the Retina is diffus'd and communicated to the parts which ought to receive no Agitation from it which may proceed from any different causes Thus the Image of the same Objects being larger on these occasions gives the Soul reason to believe the Object approaches nearer The like may be said of the other Propositions Before I conclude this Chapter I would have it observ'd That it is of great concern to us in order to the Preservation of our Life to have a nicer Knowledge of the Motion or Rest of Bodies in Proportion to their Nighness to us and that it is a thing useless and insignificant to know exactly the truth of these things when happening in places very remote For this evidently shews that what I have generally advanc'd concerning all the Sences how they never Discover things to us as they are absolutely and in their own Nature but only in Relation to the Preservation of our Body is found exactly True in this particular since we know the Motion or Rests of Objects proportionably better as they approach nearer to us and are incapable of judging of them by the Sences when they are so remote as to seem to have no Relation at all or very little to our Body as for instance when they are five or six hundred Paces distant if they be of a Moderate Bigness or even Nearer than this when they are Lesser or somewhat farther off when they are proportionably Greater CHAP. X. Of our Errors about sensible Qualities I. The Distinction of the Soul and Body II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses III. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately united IV. An Instance to explain the Effect which Objects have upon our Bodies V. What it is they produce in the Soul and the Reasons why the Soul perceives not the Motions of the Fibres of the Body VI. Four things which are generally confounded in every Sensation WE have seen in the fore-going Chapters that the Judgments we form upon the Testimony of our Eyes concerning Extension Figure and Motion are never exactly true And yet it must not be allow'd that they are altogether false they contain so much Truth at least as this amounts to that there are Extension Figures and Motions whatever they be which are extrinsical or without our selves I confess we often see things that have no Existence nor ever had and it ought not to be concluded that a thing is Actually without us from our Seeing it without us There is no necessary Connexion between the Presence of an Idea to the Mind of a Man and the Existence of the Thing represented by the Idea Which is manifest enough from the Consideration of what happens to Men in a Dream or a Delirium And yet we may safely affirm that ordinarily Extension Figures and Motions are without us when we see them so These things are not in the Imagination only but are Real And we are not deceiv'd in believing them to have a Real Existence and wholly independent on our Mind tho' it be a very hard thing to prove it It is certain then that the Judgments we form concerning the Extension the Figures and Motions of Bodies contain some Truth But 't is another case in point of those Judgments we make concerning Light Colours Tasts Smells and all other Sensible Qualities For Truth has nothing to do with them as shall be made manifest in the remainder of this First Book We make not here any Distinction between Light and Colours because we suppose them to have no great Difference and that they cannot be separately Explain'd We shall likewise be oblig'd to speak of other Sensible Qualities in general at the same time we shall treat of these Two in particular because they may be accounted for upon the same Principles The things which follow demand the greatest Attention imaginable as being of the highest Importance and very different as to their
enough to Punish and Reward us to make us sensible of Pleasure and of Pain Finally it is only in GOD and from GOD we ought to hope to receive the Pleasures towards which we have so strong so natural and so just an Inclination CHAP. XVIII I. That our Senses make us liable to Error even in things which are not sensible II. An Example taken from the Conversation of Men. III. That sensible Manners are not to be regarded WE have sufficiently explain'd the Errors of our Senses in respect of their Objects as of Light Colours and other Sensible Qualities Now let us see how they misguide us even in regard to those Objects which are not of their Jurisdiction by diverting us from an attentive Consideration of them and inclining us to judge of them from their Testimony and Report a thing that well deserves to be throughly explain'd Attention and Application of the Mind to the clear and distinct Idea's we have of Objects is the most necessary thing in the World to discover what truly they are For as it is impossible to see the Beauty and Excellency of any piece of Art without opening the Eyes and looking fixedly upon it So the Mind cannot evidently see the most part of things with the Relations they bare one to another unless it considers them with Attention But it is certain that nothing casts us off more from our Attention to clear and distinct Idea's than our own Senses and consequently nothing sets us so remote from Truth or so soon throws us into Error For our better conceiving these things 't is absolutely necessary to know That the three ways the Soul has of perceiving viz. by the Senses by the Imagination and by Intellect do not all equally affect her and consequently she does not fix an equal Attention on every thing she perceives by their means For she applies her self most to that which touches her nearest and she is careless enough of that which affects her but a little Now what she perceives by the Senses affects her much and takes up all her Application what she knows by her Imagination touches her less pathetically But that which the Vnderstanding represents to her I would say what she of her self perceives independently on the Senses and Imagination scarce quickens or awakens her at all No body doubts but that the least sensible Pain is more present to the Mind and makes it more attentive than the Meditation of a thing of far greater Importance The reason which may be given for this is That the Senses represent the Objects as present the Imagination represents them as absent Now the order of things requires that among many Goods or many Evils propos'd to the Soul those which are present should give her more concern or application than others which are absent because 't is necessary for the Soul suddenly to determine what ought to be done on this occasion And thus she is more intent to a simple prick of a Pin than to the most exalted Speculations And the Pleasures and Evils of this World make a greater Impression on her than the ineffable Pains and infinite Pleasures of Eternity The Senses then do extreamly warp and bend down the Soul to what they represent to her But whereas she is of a limited and finite Nature and so cannot conceive distinctly many things at once she cannot have a distinct Perception of what the Understanding represents to her at the same time her Senses offer any thing to her consideration She forsakes then the clear and distinct Idea's of the Understanding however proper to discover the truth of Things in their own Nature to apply her self intirely to the confus'd Idea's of the Senses which affect her tenderest part and give her not a representation of things as they are in their own Nature but only as they stand related to her Body If a Man to give an instance would explain any Truth he must necessarily make use of Speech and express his Notions and Internal Sensations by Motions and Manners sensible Now the Soul is incapable of perceiving many things distinctly at the same time so having always a great Attention to what comes in to her by way of the Senses she is scarce at leisure to consider the Reasons which she hears alledg'd But her greatest Application is confin'd to the sensible Pleasure she receives from the finely turn'd Periods the Conformity of the Gestures to the Words from the Genteel Mein of the Face from the Air and the Way and Manner of the Speaker Yet after she has heard she will needs judge because it is the Custom And thus her Judgments must be different according to the diversity of the Impressions she has receiv'd through the Senses If for example the Speaker has a voluble Tongue and easiness of Delivery if he observes the numerousness of Words and a delightful Cadence in his Periods if he has the Look of a Gentleman or of a Man of Parts if he be a Person of Quality or is attended with a great Retinue if he dictates with Authority or speakes in a grave decisive Manner if others listen to him with Silence and Respect if he has some Reputation in the World or is acquainted with the great Wits of the Age In fine if he has the happiness to please or to be esteem'd he will have Reason in every word that he advances and there shall be nothing even to his Band and Cuffs but shall prove something or other But if he be so unfortunate as to have the Qualities quite contrary to these let him demonstrate as long as he pleases he shall prove nothing Let him say the finest things in the World no Man shall ever regard them The Attention of the Auditors being imploy'd upon that only which strikes their Senses the Disgust they conceive at the sight of a Man so uncouth and ill-contriv'd will wholly take them up and hinder the Application they ought to allow to his Thoughts A dirty or a rumpled Band is enough to make the Wearer despis'd and all that comes from him and that way of talking like a Dotard or a meer Philosopher will make the most noble and exalted Truths which are above the reach of the generality of Mankind be look'd on as Ravings and Extravagances Such are the ordinary Judgments of Mankind Their Eyes and their Ears set up for Judges of Truth and not their Reason even in things that depend only on Reason because Men apply themselves meerly to the Sensible and Agreeable Manners of Men and seldom afford any Attention that is Resolute and Serious towards the Discovery of Truth Yet what greater Injustice is there than to judge of things by the Manner of them and to despise Truth because it comes not dress'd in those Ornaments that please us and indulge and flatter our Senses It should be reckon'd a Reproach to Philosophers and such as pretend to Sense to be more inquisitive after these agreeable out-side
are us'd to no other Preception than that of their Senses believe the Sun to abound with Light but those who can be Sensible and Reasonable at the same time are of another opinion provided they have as good a Faculty of Reasoning as they have of Sensation I am very well perswaded that even those who pay the greatest Deference to the testimony of their Senses would close with our Opinion had they well consider'd the things that we have said But they are too much in love with the Delusion of their Senses they have obey'd their Prejudices too long and their Soul is too unthoughtful or forgetful to acknowledge or remember that all the Perfections she imagines she sees in Bodies belong only to her self But it is not to this sort of Men we address our selves we are very little concern'd for their Approbation and Esteem They refuse to hearken to us and consequently are incompetent Judges we are satisfy'd in defending Truth and having the Approbation of those who seriously labour to rid themselves of the Errors of their Senses and to employ the Light of their Understanding We only require of them that they would seriously Meditate on these Thoughts with the greatest Attention they can and then let them judge of them Let them condemn them or acquit them we submit them to their Judgment since by their Meditation they have obtain'd a Supreme Power and Jurisdiction over them which without Injustice cannot be contested with them CHAP. XX. The Conclusion of the First Book I. That our Senses are given us only for the Preservation of our Body II. That we ought to doubt of the Reports they make III. That 't is no little thing to doubt as we ought to do I HAVE if I am not mistaken made a sufficient Discovery of the General Errors into which our Senses lead us whether in regard to their own Objects or in respect of Things which can only be perceiv'd by the Understanding And I am of an Opinion that we fall into no Error by their Conduct the cause whereof may not be discover'd by the things that have been said in case a Man will bestow a little Meditation upon them We have hitherto seen that our Senses are most faithful and exact in instructing us in the Relations which all the Bodies which surround us have with our own but are incapable of teaching us what these Bodies are in their own Nature that to make the best use of them they must only be imploy'd to the Preservation of our Health and Life and that they can't be sufficiently despis'd when they pretend to raise themselves to a Sovereignty above the Understanding This is the Principal Thing I would gladly have well remembred in all this First Book viz. Let a Man throughly consider that our Senses were only given us for the Preservation of our Body let him fortifie himself in this Notion and in order to free himself from the Ignorance he is under let him seek out other Succors and Assistances than those his Senses furnish him withall But supposing there be some such Men to be found as doubtless there be but too many of them who will not be perswaded of these last Propositions by what we have hitherto said we demand of them still much less than this we only desire of them to enter into some Distrust of their Senses and if they cannot entirely reject their Testimonies as false and treacherous let them only seriously doubt lest these Reports should not be absolutely true And certainly in my Opinion enough hath been said to cast at least some Scruple in the Mind of Reasonable Men and consequently to excite them to the Employing their Liberty otherwise than they have hitherto done for if they could once begin to doubt that the Reports of their Senses were not true they might with greater Ease with-hold their Consent and so prevent their falling into those Errors into which they have hitherto fallen especially if they could remember that Rule we have given at the Beginning of this Discourse That we ought not to give an entire Consent except to Things that appear entirely evident and to which we could not forbear consenting without being certainly convinc'd we should make an ill usâ— of our Liberty in not consenting For what remains let not a Man imagine he has made but an inconsiderable Progress if he has only learn'd to Doubt To know how to Doubt with Judgment and Reason is not so small a thing as is suppos'd For we must needs say there is a great deal of difference betwixt Doubting and Doubting Some Doubt out of a Rash Passion and a Brutish Resolution others out of Blindness and Malice out of Humour and Fancy and because they will do so But there are others likewise that Doubt out of Prudence and Caution out of Wisdom and Penetration of Mind The Academicks and Atheists Doubt after the former manner but true Philosophers Doubt in the latter The first Doubt is a Doubt of Darkness which never conducts us towards the Light but sets us at a greater Distance from it The second Doubt proceeds from Light and is assistant in some measure to the production of it in its turn Those who only Doubt in the former manner know not what it is to Doubt with Understanding They Laugh at Monsieur Des Cartes's teaching us to Doubt in the first of his Metaphysical Meditations because it seems to them that it is no other than a Fantastick Doubting That it can only be said in general that our Nature is Infirm that our Mind is full of Blindness that we ought to be very careful to rid our selves of our Prejudices and some such things as these They suppose that this is enough to prevent being seduc'd by their Senses and not to be deceiv'd at all But it is not enough to complain that the Mind is weak we must make her sensible of her Weaknesses It is not enough to say She is subject unto Error we must discover to her wherein her Errors consist to which I think we have given an Introduction in this first Book by accounting for the Nature and Errors of our Senses and we will still pursue the same Design in explaining the Nature and Errors of our Imagination in the Second F. MALEBRANCHE'S TREATISE CONCERNING The Search after TRUTH BOOK the SECOND Concerning The IMAGINATION THE FIRST PART CHAP. I. I. A General Idea of the Imagination II. That it includes two Faculties an Active and a Passive III. A General Cause of the Changes which happen in the Imagination of Men and the Foundation of the Second Book IN the foregoing Book I have treated concerning the Senses I have endeavour'd to Explain their Nature and precisely to determine the Use that ought to be made of them I have discover'd the Principal and most General Errors wherein they ingage us and have attempted such a Limitation of their Power as to put Man in a capacity of Hoping
It daily happens that an unexpected Event that has any thing terrible in its circumstances deprives of their Senses Men of a Mature Age whose Brain is not so susceptible of new Impressions who are experienc'd in the World who can make a Defence or at least are capable of taking up some Resolution Children at their first Arrival in the World suffer something from every Object that strikes upon their Senses wherewith they are not yet acquainted All the Animals they see are Creatures of a new Species on their Regard since nothing of what they see at present was ever seen by them before They are destitute of Strength and void of Experience the Fibres of their Brain are of a most fine and flexible temper How then is it possible their Imagination should continue whole when expos'd to the Impressions of so many different Objects 'T is true the Mothers have somewhat pre-accustomed their Children to the Impressions of Objects by having already imprinted them in the Fibres of their Brain before they left the Womb and this is the reason they receive much less damage when they behold with their own Eyes what they in some manner have perceived already with their Mother's 'T is farther true that these adulterate Traces and wounds their Imagination receives upon the sight of so many Objects to them frightful and terrible close up and heal again in time for as much as being unnatural the whole Body is against them and all the parts conspire to their Destruction as has been seen in the preceding Chapter And this is the cause that all Men in general are not Fools from their Cradles But this hinders not but that there may be ever some Traces so strong and deep impress'd as can never be effac'd but will remain as long as Life it self If Men would make serious Reflections upon what happens in their own Breast and contemplate their own Thoughts they would not want an Experimental Proof of what I have said They would generally discover in themselves some secret Inclinations and Aversions which are not in others whereof there seems no other Reason to be given than these Traces of our Infancy For since the causes of these Inclinations and Aversions are peculiar to us they have no foundation in the Nature of Men and since they are unknown to us they must needs have acted on us at a time when our Memory was not yet capable of registring the circumstances of things which might have assisted us in calling them again to Mind and that time could be only that of our tenderest Age. Monsieur Des-Cartes has acquainted us in one of his Epistles that he had always a particular fancy for all Squint-ey'd People and having diligently search'd into the Cause of it at length understood this Defect was incident to a young Maid he lov'd when he was a Child the Affection he retained for her diffusing it self to all others that any way resembled her But 't is not these little irregularities of our Inclinations which subject us most to Error 'T is our having universally or almost universally our Mind adulterate in something or other and our being generally subject to some kind of Folly though perhaps we are not aware of it Let a Man but examine carefully the Temper of those People he converses with and he will easily be perswaded into this Opinion and though himself be an Original for others to Copy after and be look'd upon as such yet he will find all others to be Originals too and all the difference to consist in the Degree of more or less Now one of the Causes of the different Characters of Mens Minds is doubtless the difference of Impressions received by them in their Mother's Womb as has been manifested touching peculiar and unusual Inclinations because these being Species of Folly that are settled and permanent for the most part they cannot have their Dependence on the Constitution of the Animal Spirits which is of a flux and alterable Nature And consequently they must needs proceed from the Base and Spurious Impressions made in the Fibres of the Brain at such time as our Memory was incapable of preserving the Remembrance of them that is in the beginning of our Lives Here then is one of the commonest Causes of the Errors of Mankind I mean that Subversion of their Brain caused by the Impression of External Objects in making their Entrance into the World and this Cause does not so suddenly cease as may be possibly imagined The ordinary Commerce Children are oblig'd to have with their Nurses or even with their Mothers that frequently have had no Education puts the last hand and gives the finishing stroke to the corruption of their Mind These silly Women entertain them with nothing but Fooleries with ridiculous Tales and frightful Stories Their whole Discourse to them is about things sensible and they deliver it in a way most proper to confirm them in the false Judgments of their Senses In a word they sow in their Minds the Seeds of all the Follies and Weaknesses themselves are subject to as of their extravagant Fears and Apprehensions their ridiculous Superstitions and other the like Feeblesses of Mind Which is the Reason that not being accustomed to search for Truth nor to taste and relish it they at last become incapable of discerning it and of making any use of their Reason Hence they become timerous and low-spirited which Temper for a long time sticks by them For there are many to be seen who when fifteen or twenty Years old retain the Character and Spirit of their Nurse 'T is true Children seem not to be greatly qualified for the Contemplation of Truth and for abstract and sublime Sciences because the Fibres of their Brain being extreamly fine are most easily agitated by Objects even the most weak and least sensible that can be and their Soul necessarily admitting Sensations proportioned to the Agitation of these Fibres leaves Metaphysical Nations and pure Intellection to apply her self wholly to her Sensations And thus Children seem improper for and incapable of an attentive Application to the pure Idea's of Truth being so frequently and so easily drawn off by the confus'd Idea's of their Senses Yet in Answer to this it may be said First that 't is easier for a Child of seven Years old to be freed from the Errors his Senses lead him to than for a Man at sixty who all his Life long has been mis-guided by the prejudices of Childhood Secondly that a Child though incapable of the clear and distinct Idea's of Truth is at least capable of being admonish'd that his Senses deceive him upon all occasions and if he cannot be taught the Truth he should not however be encouraged and fortified in his Errors Lastly the youngest Children though never so taken up with Pleasant and Painful Sensations yet learn in little time what Persons more advanc'd in Years cannot in much longer as the Knowledge of the Order and Relations
obtain'd a Facility for Meditation who would only take up with the clear and distinct Notions of Intellect and industriously reject all the confus'd Idea's of Sense and who had both Time and Inclination for Study would doubtless very rarely fall into Error But such a Man as this is not the subject of our Discourse 't is Men of the vulgar stamp who usually have nothing of this in them I say then that the Solidity and Consistence accruing with Age to the Fibres of Men's Brains gives the Solidity and Consistence to their Errors if I may so speak 'T is the Seal that seals up their Prejudices and all their false Opinions and locks them from the Attempts and Force of Reason In fine by how much this Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain is advantagious to well Educated Persons by so much it is prejudicial to the greatest part of Mankind because it confirms each of them in the Notions they have taken up But Men are not only confirmed and strengthened in their Errors when they have attained to the Age of Forty or Fifty Years They are still more liable to fall into new ones every day for believing themselves competent Judges of every thing as indeed they ought to be they peremptorily determine yet only consult their Prejudices to give a decision For Men reason only upon things with relation to the Idea's they are most familiar with and accustomed to When a Chymist would reason about any Physical Body immediately his three Principles are present to his Mind A Peripatetick has recourse forthwith in his Thoughts to his four Elements and the four Primitive Qualities And another Philosopher drives every thing up to other Principles And so there can nothing enter into the Mind of a Man but is instantly tinged with the Error he is subject to and augments their number This Consistence of the Brain has besides a very mischievous Effect especially on more Aged sort of People which is to incapacitate them for Thought and Meditation They are unable to fasten their Attention upon any thing they have a Mind to know and so are incapable of reaching to Truths that are any thing obscure or intricate They are utterly insensible to the most reasonable Opinions when founded upon Principles that to them seem Novel though as to those other concerns that Age has given them Experience in they are very understanding Men. But all that I here affirm is only to be understood of those who have spent their younger days without the due Use and Improvement of their Mind and applying it as they should do To illustrate these things 't is necessary to know that not any thing whatever can be learned without Advertency and Attention and that 't is impossible we should be attentive to any thing unless we Imagine it and frame a lively Representation of it in our Brain But to the end we may Imagine any Objects 't is necessary we should inflect some part of our Brain or impress some other kind of Motion in it that we may frame the Traces whereunto are consociated the Ideas that represent these Objects to us So that if the Fibres of our Brain were any whit hardned they would be capable of no other Inflection or Motions than those they were formerly us'd to And thus the Soul could form no Imagination of nor consequently be attentive to what she pleases but only to such things as are customary and familiar to her Hence we ought to conclude that 't is of very great Advantage to use a Man's self to Meditate upon all sorts of Subjects in order to acquire an Habitual Facility of Thinking on what he will For as we acquire a great Readiness at moving our Fingers all manner of ways and with a prodigious Nimbleness by the frequent Use we make of them in playing on a Musical Instrument so the parts of our Brain the Motion whereof is necessary to the Imagining what we please attain by Use a certain Facility of Plying and Inflecting themselves which makes us imagine the things we have a Mind to with a great deal of Ease Readiness and Distinction Now the best means of procuring this Disposition which causeth the Principal Difference between a Man of Parts and another is to accustom a Man's self from his Youth to the Disquisition of the Truth of things very abstract and difficult Because in that Age the Fibres of the Brain are pliable and flexible all manner of ways I suppose not however that this Facility can be acquir'd by those we call Men of Books and Learning who only apply themselves to Reading without Meditation and without searching out the Resolution of Questions themselves before they Read them in Authors 'T is palpable enough that hereby they only acquire a Facility of Remembring what they have read 'T is daily observ'd that Men of much Reading are unable to bring Advertency of Attention to things that are new to them and unheard of and that the Vanity of their Learning inclining them to form a Judgment of them before they conceive them makes them fall into gross Errors to which other Men are not obnoxious But though the want of Advertency is the main Cause of their Errors there is one still that is peculiar to them which is that finding ever in their Memory abundance of confus'd Notions they presently select some one of them and consider it as the subject of the Question And because the things a Man speaks are not conformable to it they ridiculously conclude he is in an Error Should you endeavour to represent to them that they are deceiv'd themselves and that they understand not so much as the state of the Question they fall into a Passion and not being able to conceive what is said to them they persist to embrace that false Notion their Memory has suggested But should the falsity of it be made too manifestly apparent they substitute a second and a third in its room which they defend sometimes against all appearances of Truth and even against their own Conscience as having but little Respect or Love for Truth but a great deal of Shame and Confusion in acknowledging there are things another knows better than themselves All that has been said concerning Men of forty or fifty Years old ought with greater allowance to be understood of Aged Men because the Fibres of their Brain being still more inflexible and wanting Animal Spirits to imprint new Traces in it their Imagination is altogether faint and languid And whereas generally the Fibres of their Brain are loaded with abundance of superfluous Humours they lose by degrees the Memory of things past and return to the weaknesses usually incident to Childhood Thus in this Decrepid Age they have the Defects which depend on the Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain which are found both in Children and in grown Men. Though it may be said they have more Prudence than either of them because they are less subject
expected that all the Accidents which befal those that have been sick of the Scurvy must befal him too The same Medicines therefore are prescrib'd him and 't is matter of amazement to find they have not the same Effect as they have been known to have had in others An Author applies himself to one kind of Study The Traces of the Subject he 's imploy'd about are so deeply imprinted and make such lively Radiations through the Brain as to confound and efface sometimes the Traces of things of a quite different kind There has been a Man for instance that has wrote many bulky Volumes on the Cross this made him discover a Cross in every thing he look'd upon and 't is with Reason that Father Morinus handsomly rallies him for thinking a Medal represented a Cross though it represented quite another thing 'T was by such another unlucky turn of Imagination Gilbertus and many others after having studied the Load-stone and admir'd its properties must needs reduce to these Magnetick Qualities abundance of Natural Effects that had no Relation to them in the World The Instances I have here alledg'd suffice to prove that the great facility of the Imagination's representing Objects that are familiar to it and the difficulty it finds in Imagining those that are Novel is the Reason of Mens forming almost ever such Idea's as may be styl'd mix'd and impure and of the Mind 's judging of things only with Relation to it self and its former Thoughts And thus the different Passions of Men their Inclinations Conditions Imployments Qualities Studies finally all their different Ways and Scopes of Life putting very considerable Differences in their Idea's occasion them to fall into innumerable Errors which we shall explain in the following Discourse Which was the reason of My Lord Bacon's speaking this most judicious Sentence Omnes perceptiones tam sensûs quam mentis sunt ex analogiâ hominis non ex analogiâ universi Estque Intellectus humanus instar speculi inaequalis ad radios rerum qui suam Naturam naturae rerum immiscet eamque distorquet inficit CHAP. III. Of the Mutual Connection between the Idea's and the Traces of the Brain and of the Mutual Connection there is between Traces and Traces Idea's and Idea's AMONG the whole Mass of Material Beings there is nothing more worthy of the Contemplation of Men than the Contexture of their own Body and the Correspondence found between the Parts that compose it And among all things Spiritual there is nothing the Knowledge whereof is more necessary than that of their Soul and of all the Relations she is indispensably under to GOD and Naturally to the Body 'T is not enough to have a confus'd Knowledge or Sensation that the Traces of the Brain are mutually connected to each other and that they are pursued by the Motion of the Animal Spirits that the Traces when excited in the Brain excite the Idea's in the Understanding and that the Motions that arise in the Animal Spirits raise the Passions in the Will We ought as far as is possible to have a distinct Knowledge of the Cause of all these different Connections but especially of the Effects they are capable of producing We ought to know the Cause thereof in as much as it is necessary to know our Guide and Conductor who alone is capable of acting in us and of rendring us happy or miserable and we ought to know the Effect of them it being necessary to know our selves as much as possible and other Men with whom we are oblig'd to live So should we know the means both of conducting our selves to and preserving our selves in the most happy and perfect state we are capable of attaining by the order of Nature and the Precepts of the Gospel and so should we be able to frame our Lives sociably with Men by exactly knowing the means of making use of them in our Exigencies and assisting them in their Miseries I pretend not to Explain in this Chapter a Subject so vast and Comprehensive nor have I that Opinion of my self as to think I should throughly do it in this whole Work There are many things I am still ignorant of and despair of ever knowing well and there are others which I presume I know but am unable to explicate For there is no mind so little and so narrow but may by Meditation discover more Truths than can be deduc'd at length by the most Eloquent Man in the World We are not to imagine with a great part of the Philosophers that the Mind becomes Body when united to the Body and that the Body becomes Mind when united to the Mind The Soul is not expanded through all the parts of the Body in order to give Life and Motion to it as the Imagination represents nor does the Body become capable of Sensation by its Union with the Mind as our treacherous and abusive Senses would seem to perswade us Either Substance preserves its own particular Being and as the Soul is incapable of Extension and Motions so the Body is incapable of Thought and Inclinations All the Affinity that we know between the Body and Mind consists in the Natural and Mutual correspondence of the Thoughts of the Soul with the Traces of the Brain and of the Emotions of the Soul with the Motions of the Animal Spirits When the Soul receives some new Idea's some new Traces are imprinted on the Brain and when Objects produce new Traces the Soul receives new Idea's Which is not said as if the Soul consider'd these Traces since she has no knowledge of them or as if these Traces included these Idea's since there is no Analogy betwixt them or lastly as if she receiv'd her Idea's from these Traces for 't is inconceivable as shall be explain'd hereafter how the Mind should receive any thing from the Body and become more enlightned than she is by turning towards it as the Philosophers pretend who would have the Souls Perception of all things to be caus'd Per conversionem ad phantasmata by the Conversion to the Phantasms or Traces of the Brain Thus when the Soul wills the moving of her Arm the Arm is mov'd though she not so much as knows what ought to be done to the moving it and when the Animal Spirits are agitated the Soul finds a Commotion in her self though she is ignorant whether there be any such thing as Animal Spirits in her Body When I come to treat of the Passions I shall speak of the Connection there is between the Traces of the Brain and the Motions of the Spirits and of that which is between the Idea's and the Emotions of the Soul for all the Passions have their Dependance thereon I am to Discourse at present only of the Connection between Traces and Idea's and the Connection Traces have with one another There are three very considerable Causes of the Connection of Idea's with the Traces of the Brain The first and most general
instance who enter upon the Study of Algebra or Analyticks are incapable of taking Algebraick Demonstrations without a great deal of pains and when they have once master'd them they retain them but a short time because Squares for example Parallelograms Cubes Solids and the like being exprest by aa ab a 3 abc c. the Traces whereof have no Natural Connection with their Idea's the Mind finds no hold to fasten the Idea's to and to examine the Relations of them by But those who begin to Study Common Geography most clearly and readily conceive the little Demonstrations that are explain'd to them provided they distinctly understand the Terms made use of Because the Idea's of a Square a Circle or the like are Naturally Connected with the Traces of the figures they see describ'd before their Eyes And it often happens that the meer shewing of the figure used in the Demonstration makes them sooner comprehend it than the Discourses made to explain it Because words being Connected to Idea's by an arbitrary institution only excite not these Idea's readily and distinctly enough to make us easily understand their Relations For 't is chiefly upon that account there is so much difficulty found in learning the Sciences By the way it may be discover'd from what I have been saying that those Writers who coin abundance of new Words and Figures to explain their Notions by spend much pains to very little purpose They think to make themselves intelligible when indeed they take the way of becoming incomprehensible We define say they all our Terms and all our Characters and others ought to agree to them It is true others agree to them with their Will but their Nature is repugnant They cannot fasten their Idea's to these Novel Terms because to that is required custom and long practice The Authors perhaps have attain'd that custom but the Readers have not And when a Man endeavours to instruct the Mind 't is necessary he first know it since he ought to conform to Nature and offer her nothing provoking or offensive Yet we ought not to condemn the Industry and Care Mathematicians take in defining their Terms for Definition is evidently necessary to take away Equivocation But the ordinary and receiv'd Terms ought to be imploy'd as far as possibly they can or such whose common signification is not very remote from that which they pretend to introduce which is a thing not constantly observ'd among the Mathematicians Nor do we pretend by what has been said to condemn Algebra especially such as Mr. Des-Cartes has restor'd and left it to us For though the Novelty of some Expressions in that Science give the Mind some trouble at first yet there is so little variety and confusion in these Expressions and the Assistances the Mind receives from them so much out-weigh the Difficulty found in them that I am of Opinion 't is impossible for a Man to invent a way of Reasoning and Expressing his Reasonings more suited or better accomodated to the Nature of the Mind or that can carry it farther in the Discovery of unknown Truths The Expressions of that Science do not distract the Capacity of the Mind they burden not the Memory they contract and abridge in a wonderful manner all our Idea's and our Reasonings and even render them in some measure sensible by Practice In fine their usefulness is much greater than the Natural Expressions of the delineated Figures of Triangles Squares and others of like Nature which are inserviceable to the Disquisition and Unfolding of Truths any whit intricate and obscure But so much for the Connection of Idea's with the Traces of the Brain 'T is seasonable to say something of the Connection of Traces with one another and consequently of the Connection between the Idea's corresponding to these Traces This Connection consists in this that the Traces of the Brain are so firmly connected to one another as 't is impossible to excite them again without the whole retinue which were imprinted at the same time If a Man for instance happens to be in some publick Solemnity in case he observes all the Circumstances and all the Principle Persons that assisted at the time the place the day and all other Particularities the remembrance only of the Place or some other less observable Circumstance of the Ceremony will be sufficient to bring the Representation of all the other to his Mind 'T is upon this account that when we can't recollect the Principal Name of a thing we sufficiently specifie it by making use of a Name which signifies some Circumstance of that thing as not being able to call to Mind the proper Name of a Church we can make use of another Name signifying a thing that has some Relation to it We can say 'T is that Church where there was such a Throng where Mr. such a one Preach'd where we went on Sunday And thus not having the proper Name of a Person ready at hand or when it is more convenient to denote him in another manner we can do it by saying He whose Face was disfigured by the Small-pox the Portly and well-made Gentleman the little crooked Man according as we stand affected towards him though to express a Man in terms of contempt is neither a sign of good Nature nor good Manners Now the mutual Connection of these Traces and consequently of their Idea's one with another is not only the foundation of all the Figures of Rhetorick but also of infinite other things of greatest concernment in Morality and Politicks and in all Sciences in general which are any ways related to Man and consequently of many things we shall treat of in the sequel of our Discourse The cause of the Connection of many Traces together is the Identity of time wherein they were imprinted on the Brain For 't is enough for many Traces to have been produc'd at the same time to cause that they should never afterwards be excited but in company of one another because the Animal Spirits finding the Channel of these Co-temporary Traces gaping and half open continue their courses in them by reason of their meeting with a more free passage through them than through the other parts of the Brain This is the cause of Memory and the Corporeal Habits which are common to us with Beasts The Connections of the Traces are not always conjoyn'd with the Emotions of the Spirits because all the things we see do not always appear either Good or Evil These Connections too may change or break because being not of perpetual necessity for the preservation of Life there is no need they should always be the same But there are certain Traces in our Brain which have a Natural Connection with one another as also with certain Commotions of the Spirits that being necessary to the Preservation of Life And this Connection can't be broken at least not easily because 't is convenient it should always be the same For instance the trace of a
great Precipice which a Man sees under him and from which there is danger of falling or the Traces of some bulky Body imminent over his Head and ready to fall and crush him is naturally Connected with that which represents Death and with a Commotion of the Spirits which disposes him to flight or the desire of flying it This Connection admits no alteration because 't is necessary it should always be the same and it consists in a disposition of the Fibres of the Brain which we bring with us into the World All the Connections which are not Natural may and ought to break because the different Circumstances of times and places ought to change to the end they may be useful to the Preservation of Life 'T is convenient the Partridge for instance should fly the Sports-man with his Gun at the season and the places of his pursuing the Game But there 's no necessity it should fly him in other places or at other times Thus 't is necessary all Animals for their Preservation should have certain Connections of Traces easily made and easily broken and that they should have others very difficult to be sever'd and lastly others incapable of Dissolution 'T is of very great use to make diligent enquiry into the different Effects these different Connections are able to produce For there are Effects which as they are very numerous so they are no less important to the Knowledge of Man and all things relating to him We shall see hereafter that these things are the principal Causes of our Errors But 't is time to return to the Subject we have promis'd to Discourse on and to explain the different Changes which happen to the Imagination of Men by reason of their different ways and purposes of Life CHAP. IV. I. That Men of Learning are the most subject to Error II. The Causes why Men had rather be guided by Authority than make use of their own Reason THE Differences observable in Men as to their Ways and Purposes of Life are almost infinite Their different Conditions different Employments different Posts and Offices and different Communities are innumerable These Differences are the Reason of Men's acting upon quite different Designs and Reasoning upon different Principles Even in the same Community wherein there should be but one Character of Mind and all the same Designs you shall rarely meet with several Persons whose Aims and Views are not different Their various Employments and their many Adhesions necessarily diversifie the Method and Manner they would take to accomplish those various things wherein they agree Whereby 't is manifest that it would be an impossible Undertaking to go about to explain in particular the Moral Causes of Error nor would it turn to any great Account should we do it in this place I design therefore only to speak of those Ways of Living that lead us into great multitudes of Errors and Errors of most dangerous Importance When these shall be explain'd we shall have open'd the way for the Mind to proceed farther and every one may discover at a single View and with the greatest ease imaginable the most hidden Causes of many particular Errors the Explication whereof would cost a world of Pains and Trouble When once the Mind sees clearly it delights to run to Truth and it runs to it with an inexpressible swiftness The Imployment that seems most necessary to be treated of at present by Reason of its producing most considerable Changes in the Imagination of Men and its conducting them into Errors most is that of Men of Books and Learning who make greater use of their Memory than Thought For Experience has ever manifested that those who have applied themselves the most fervently to the Reading of Books and to the Search of Truth are the Men that have led us into a very great part of our Errors 'T is much the same with those that Study as with those that Travel When a Traveller has unfortunately mistaken his way the farther he goes at the greater distance he is from his Journey 's end and he stâ—ll deviates so much more as he is industrious and in haste to arrive at the place design'd So the vehement pursuits Men make after Truth cause them to betake themselves to the Reading of Books wherein they think to find it or put them upon framing some Phantastical System of the things they desire to know wherewith when their Heads are full and heated they try by some fruitless Sallies and Attempts of Thought to recommend them to the taste of others with hopes to receive the Honours that are usually pay'd to the first Founders of Systems These two Imperfections are now to be consider'd 'T is not easie to be understood how it comes to pass that Men of Wit and Parts choose rather to trust to the Conduct of other Men's Understanding in the Search of Truth than to their own which GOD has given them There is doubtless infinitely more Pleasure as well as Honour to be conducted by a Man 's own Eyes than those of others And a Man who has good Eyes in his Head will never think of shutting them or plucking them out under the hopes of having a Guide And yet the use of the Understanding is to the use of the Eyes as the Understanding is to the Eyes and as the Understanding is infinitely superiour to the Eyes so the use of the Understanding is accompany'd with more solid Satisfactions and gives another sort of Content than Light and Colours give the Sight Notwithstanding Men employ their Eyes in Guiding and Conducting themselves but rarely make use of their Reason in Discovery of Truth But there are many Causes which contribute to this overthrow of Reason First Men's Natural Carelessness and Oscitation that will not let them be at the Pains of Thinking Secondly Their Incapacity to Meditate which they have contracted for want of applying themselves to it from their Youth as has been explain'd in the Ninth Chapter Thirdly The inconcernedness and little Love they have for Abstract Truths which are the Foundation of all that can be known in this World The Fourth Reason is the Satisfaction which accrues from the knowledge of Probabilities which are very agreeable and extreamly moving as being founded upon sensible Notions The Fifth Cause is that ridiculous Vanity which makes us affect the seeming Learned For those go by the Name of Learned who have read most Books The Knowledge of Opinions is of greater use in Conversation and serves better to catch the Admiration of the Vulgar than the Knowledge of True Philosophy which is learned by Meditation In the sixth place we may reckon that unreasonable Fancy which supposes the Ancients were more enlightned than we can be and that there is nothing left for us but what they have succeeded in The Seventh is a Disingenuous Respect mix'd with an absurd Curiosity which makes Men admire things that are most Remote and Ancient such as are far fetch'd or
dispositio cùm in uno homine reperitur dignus est esse Divinus magìs quam humanus And in other places he still bestows more pompous and magnificent praises on him As Lib. 1. de Generatione Animalium Laudemus Deum qui separavit hunc virum ab aliis in perfectione appropriavitque ei ultimam dignitatem humanam quam non omnis homo potest in quacunque aetate attingere The same he says of him Lib. 1. Dest Disp. 3. Aristotelis doctrina est SVMMA VERITAS quoniam ejus intellectus fuit finis humani intellectûs quare bené dicitur de illo quód ipse fuit creatus datus nobis Divinâ providentiâ ut non ignoremus possâ—bilia sciri Must not a Man be mad in good earnest that will talk at this rate And must not his Bigottry for this Author be degenerated into Extravagance and Folly Aristotle 's Doctrine is the SOVEREIGN TRUTH 'T is impossible for any man to equal him or come near him in Science This is the Man that was sent us from Heaven to teach us all that is possible to be known This is he upon whom all the wise Men are form'd and they are so much more learn'd as they better understand him As he says in another place Aristoteles fuit Princeps per quem perficiuntur omnes Sapientes qui fuerunt post eum licèt differant inter se in intelligendo verba ejus in eo quod sequitur ex eis And yet the Works of this Commentator have been dispersed over all Europe and into Countries farther remote They have been translated out of Arabick into Hebrew out of Hebrew into Latin and it may be into many other Languages Which Manifestly shews what Esteem the Learned have had for them So that a more sensible instance than this cannot be given of the Prepossession of Men of Study For it evidently shews that they are not only Opinionated with an Author themselves but also communicate their Bigottry to others proportionably to the Esteem the World conceives of them And thus these false Praises Commentators load him with are often the cause that Men of no very brightned Parts who betake themselves to the Reading of them are prepossessed and thereby led into infinite Error See here another instance A Man renowned among the Learned who Founded the Geometry and Astronomy Lectures in the Vniversity of Oxford begins a Book which he wrote upon the Eight first Propositions of Euclid with these Words Consilium meum est Auditores si vires valetudo suffecerint explicare Definitiones Petitiones communes Sententias octo priores Propositiones primi libri Elementorum caetera post me venientibus relinquere And he concludes with these words Exolvi per Dei gratiam Domini Auditores promissum liberavi fidem meam explicavi pro modulo meo Definitiones Petitiones communes Sententias octo priores Propositiones Elementorum Euclidis Hîc annis fessus cyclos artemque repono Succedent in hoc munus alii fortasse magis vegeto corpore vivido ingenio c. A Man of a competent Sense would not require more than an hour's time to learn of himself or with the help of the meanest Geometrician the Definitions Postulates Axioms and the Eight first Propositions of Euclid they have very little need of any Explication and yet here is an Author that talks of his Enterprize as of some very difficult and mighty Undertaking He is apprehensive least his strenth should fail him Si vires valetudo suffecerint He leaves the Prosecution of them to his Successors Caetera post me venientibus relinquere He thanks GOD for having through his particular Mercy accomplish'd and made good what he promis'd Exolvi per Dei gratiam promissum liberavi fidem meam Explicavi pro modulo meo What the Quadrature of the Circle the Duplication of the Cube This Great Man has explain'd pro modulo suo the Definitions Postulates Axioms and the Eight first Propositions of the first Book of Euclid ' s Elementâ— Possibly amongst those who shall succeed him there may some be found of a stronger and healthier Constitution than himself to carry on so great a Work Succedent in hoc munus alii FORTASSE magis vegeto corpore vivido ingenio But as for his part he has done enough to sit down and rest Hêc annis fessus cyclos artémque reponit Euclid never thought of being so obscure or of saying such extraordinary things when he compos'd his Elements as should necessarily demand a Book of near three hundred pages to explain his Definitions Axioms Postulates and Eight first Propositions But this Learned Englishman knew how to enhance the Science of Euclid and if Age would have permitted him and he had but continued in the same Vigour we should at present have had a dozen or fifteen mighty Volumes upon Euclid's Elements only which doubtless would have been very beneficial to Novice Pretenders to Geometry and had made much for the Honour of Euclid See what whimsical designs a falsly term'd Learning can put Men upon This Gentleman was vers'd in the Greek Tongue for we are oblig'd to him for a Greek Edition of St. Chrysostom's Works He possibly had read the Ancient Geometricians He could give an Historical Account of their Propositions no less than their Descent and Genealogy He had all the respect for Antiquity that ought to be had for Truth and what is it such a Disposition of Mind produces A Commentary upon the Definitions of Terms the Demands Axioms and the Eight first Propositions of Euclid much harder to be understood and remembred I do not say than the Propositions he commented on but than all that ever Euclid wrote on Geometry There are many Men that out of Vanity talk in Greek and even sometimes in a strange Language they don't themselves understand For Dictionaries no less than Indices and Common Places are very great helps to some sorts of Authors But there are very few of Prudence enough to keep in their Greek upon a Subject where it is needless and impertinent to make use of it And this makes me believe it was Prepossession and an inordinate Esteem for Euclid that form'd in our Author's Imagination the first Design of his Book If this Gentleman had made as much use of his Reason as his Memory in a Matter where Reason should have only been imploy'd or if he had had as great a Respect and Love for Truth as Veneration for the Author he went to expound there is great Probability that having mispent so much time upon so frivolous a Subject he would have acknowledg'd Euclid's Definitions of a Plane Angle and Parallel Lines to be Vicious and Defective and inexpressive of the Nature of them and that the Second Proposition is impertinent since the Proof of it depends upon the Third Postulate which is harder to be granted than that Second Proposition since in granting that Third Postulate which
is That we may describe from any Point a Circle at what interval we please we not only grant that a Line may be drawn from a Point equal to another Line which Euclid effects in that Proposition after a very round-about manner But we allow that from any Point may be drawn an infinite number of Lines of what length we please But the Design of most Commentators is not to Illuminate their Authors and to find out Truth 't is to make Ostentation of their Learning and implicitly to defend the Authors which they Comment on even to their Vices 'T is not so much to make themselves or their Authors understood they talk as to make him admir'd and themselves together with him If the Gentleman before-mention'd had not stuff'd his Book with Sentences of Greek with a great many Names of unheard of Authors and such other useless Observations for the understanding Common Notions Verbal Definitions and Geometrical Postulates who would have read his Book who would have admir'd him or who would have conferr'd on its Author the Honorary Title of Learned or of a Man of Sense I presume it can't be doubted after what I have said but the Indiscrete Reading of Books often prepossesses the Mind But as soon as Prepossession enters in that which we call Common Sense is banish'd out of it 'T is incapable of Judging soberly of any thing any way relative to the Subject of its Prepossession It stains and tinctures with it every Thought nay it cannot apply it self to Subjects quite remote from those it is prejudic'd for Thus a Man opinionated with Aristotle can relish nothing but Aristotle He must judge of every thing with relation to Aristotle What does not accord with that Philosopher seems false he has constantly some Saying of Aristotle in his Mouth he is citing him upon all occasions and all sorts of Subjects both to prove things so obscure as no Man can comprehend and to prove things so self-evident as Children cannot doubt of because Aristotle is to him what Reason and Evidence are to others So if a Man be possess'd with the conceit of Euclid and Geometry he will be for reducing every thing you shall say to him to the Lines and Propositions of his darling Author and shall talk nothing but with reference to his Science The whole would not be bigger than its part but because Eulid has said it nor will he be asham'd to quote him for the Proof of it as I have sometimes observ'd But this is still more customary with those who are devoted to other Authors than those of Geometry in whose Books nothing is more frequent than Greek Hebrew Arabick Citations to prove things as evident as the Sun at Mid-day All this is occasion'd by Reason that the Traces imprinted on the Fibres of the Brain by the Objects of their Prepossession are so deep as always to remain gaping and half open And the Animal Spirits continually passing through them preserve them so without permitting them to close again So that the Soul having always of necessity the Thoughts that are connected with these Traces becomes as it were enslav'd to them and she is ever troubled and disquieted even when knowing she is wrong she is willing to be Righted Thus she is in constant danger of falling into a great number of Errors unless she stands always upon her guard with an inviolable Resolution of observing the Rule given in the beginning of this Work that is of Denying an entire Consent except to things entirely evident I pass over the evil Choice that is generally made of the kind of Study Men apply themselves to as properly belonging to Moral Philosophy to treat of though it may likewise be reduc'd here to what has been said of Prepossession For when a Man is fallen beyond retrival into the Reading of the Rabbins and Books of all sorts of most unknown and consequently most useless Languages and spends his whole Life therein he does it doubtless out of Prepossession and the Imaginary hopes of becoming Learned though it is impossible by that Method to acquire any true Sience But because this Application to unprofitable Studies does not so much subject us to Error as waste our Time to possess us with a foolish Vanity I shall not speak here of those who fondly think of becoming Learned in all these sorts of sordid and unprofitable Sciences the number whereof is very great and the Study usually too passionate and earnest CHAP. VIII I. Of the Inventors of new Systems II. The last Error of Men of Learning WE have been manifesting the state of the Imagination of Men of Books and Study who resign up all to the Authority of some certain particular Authors There are others still very opposite to these who have no respect at all for Authors let their Esteem be what it will among the Learned If they esteem'd them formerly they are now of a contrary Mind and set themselves up for Authors They love to be thought Inventors of some new Opinions thereby to procure Reputation in the World and are well satisfy'd that by saying something that was never said before they shall not fail to have their Admirers This sort of People are generally of a strong Imagination the Fibres of their Brain are in such a disposition as to preserve for a long time the Traces of what has been imprinted on them Thus when once they have imagin'd a System that has in it any thing of probability 't is impossible to beat them out of it Whatever any way makes for its confirmation is most heartily embrac'd and retain'd And on the contrary all the Objections that are made to it are over-look'd at least are eluded by some frivolous Distinction They are inwardly pleas'd with the sight of their own Workmanship and of the Esteem they hope will redound to them from it They only apply themselves to consider the Image of Truth deduc'd from their probable Opinions They fix this Image stedfastly before their Eyes but never behold with a steddy View the other sides of their Sentiments which would betray their Falshood There must go great Qualifications to capacitate a Man to be the Inventor of any true System For 't is not enough to have a quickness of Parts there must besides be a certain Capaciousness of Thoughts and Reach of Mind which can at one View take in a clear prospect of a great many things Little and narrow Minds with all their Vivacity and Delicacy are too short-sighted to survey all that is necessary to be seen for the establishing a System They are check'd and even stop'd with some little Difficulties that discourage them or with some glimmering Lights which dazzle and carry them away their Sight is too narrow to survey at once the whole body of a capacious Subject But however Capacious and Penetrating the Mind is unless it be withal exempt from Passion and Prejudice there is no Good to be hoped from it Prejudices
I mistake not said enough to discover in general what are the Faults of Imagination and the Errors whereunto Men of Books and Study are most obnoxious Now whereas there are few besides who trouble their heads with Searching after Truth and the rest of the World take up with their Opinion it seems we might put an end here to this Second Part. However 't is not amiss to add something concerning the Errors of other Men as being no unuseful thing to take notice of them Whatever flatters the Senses extreamly affect us and whatever affects us makes us mind it in proportion to its affecting us Thus those who resign themselves up to all sorts of most Sensible and Pleasing Diversions are incapable of Penetrating into Truths ever so little abstruse and difficult because the Capacity of the Mind which is not infinite is fill'd up with their Pleasures or at least is very much divided by them The generality of Great Men of Courtiers of Rich and Young and of those we call the fine Wits giving themselves to perpetual Diversions and studying only the Art of Pleasing by all that gratifie the Concupiscence and the Senses by degrees obtain such a Niceness in these things or such a Softness that it may be often said they are rather the Effeminate than the fine Wits which they would fain be thought There is a great deal of difference betwixt a true Fineness and Softness of Mind Though these two things are ordinarily confounded The Fine or the Curious Wits are those whose Reason descend to the least Differences of things Who fore-see Effects which depend on hidden un-usual and invisible Causes In brief they are those who dive farthest into the Subjects they consider But the soft Minds have only a counterfeit Delicacy and Niceness They are neither Lively nor Piercing They cannot see the Effects of even the most gross and palpable Causes In short they are unable to comprehend or penetrate any thing but are wonderfully nice as to Modes and Fashions An ungentile Word a Rustick Accent or a little Grimace shall provoke them infinitely more than a confus'd mass of lame and inconcluding Reasons They cannot discover the Defect of an Argument but can critically discern a false Step or an incompos'd Gesture In a word they have a perfect Understanding of Sensible things as having made continual use of their Senses but have no true Knowledge of things depending on Reason because they have scarce ever imploy'd their own Yet these are the Men that flourish most in the Esteem of the World and who most easily advance to the Reputation of the Fine Wits For when a Man talks with a free and easie Air when his Expressions are pure and well chosen when he serves himself with Figures that please the Senses and excite the Passions in an imperceptible manner though what he says be nothing but Impertinence and Folly though there be nothing good or true in his Discourse yet he shall be voted by the common Opinion the Fine the Curious the Acute Wit 'T is not perceiv'd that this is only a Soft and Effeminate Mind that glitters with false Lights but never shines out with a genuine Brightness that only perswades because we have Eyes and not because we have Reason For what remains I do not deny but that all Men have a Tincture of this Infirmity we have now remark'd in some part of them There is no Man whose Mind is not touch'd with the Impressions of his Senses and Passions and consequently who has not some Adherences to Sensible Manners All Men differ in this but in degree of more or less But the Reason of charging this Fault upon some particular Men is because there are those who acknowledge it to be a Fault and labour to correct it Whereas the Men we have been speaking of look upon it as a very advantagious Quality They are so far from owning this false Delicacy as the Effect of an Effeminate Softness and the Original of infinite Distempers to the Mind as to imagine it the Product and Sign of the Beauty and Excellency of their Genius To these may be added a vast number of Superficial Minds who never go to the bottom of things and have but a confus'd Perception of the Differences between them but they are not in the Fault as are those before-mention'd for 't is not their Divertisements that straiten their Souls and make them little-minded but they are naturally so This Littleness of Mind proceeds not from the Nature of the Soul as may perhaps be imagin'd 'T is effected sometimes by the paucity or dulness of the Animal Spirits sometimes by an immoderate plenty of the Blood and Spirits by the inflexibility of the Fibres of the Brain or by some other Cause not necessary to be known There are then two sorts of Minds The one easily observes the differences of things and this is the solid Mind The other imagines and supposes a resemblance between them which is the superficial Character The first has a Brain fitly dispos'd for the Reception of the clear and distinct Traces of the Objects it considers and because 't is very attentive to the Idea's of these Traces it sees the Objects at hand and surveys every part of them But the Superficial Mind receives only the faint and confus'd Traces thereof and that by the by very remotely and obscurely insomuch that they appear alike as the Faces of those we behold at too great a distance because the Mind ever supposes Similitude and Equality where 't is not oblig'd to acknowledge Difference and Inequality for the Reasons I shall give in the Third Book In this Class may be reckon'd all your Publick Haranguers and great Talkers and many of those who have a great Facility at delivering themselves though they speak but seldom For 't is extreamly rare for Men of serious Meditation to be able to express themselves clearly upon the things they have thought They generally hesitate when they come to Discourse about them as being scrupulous and fearful of using such Terms as may excite a false Idea in the Hearers Being asham'd to talk purely for Talking sake as is the way with a great many who talk peremptorily on all adventures They are at a loss at finding words expressive of their un-obvious and not common Thoughts Though I have the greatest Deference and Esteem imaginable for Pious Men Divines and Aged Persons and in general for all those who have deservedly a great Sway and Authority over others yet I think my self oblig'd to say thus much of them That it is usual for them to think themselves infallible because the World hears them with Respect that they exercise their Mind but little in discovering Speculative Truths that they are too liberal in condemning whatever their Pleasure and Humour suggests before they have attentively consider'd it Not that they are to be blam'd for not applying themselves to the Study of many Sciences not very
aut simulachra conflant nihil divinitati nocetur ita quicquid fit in sapientem protervê petulanter superbè frustrà tentatur Cap. 4. Inter fragorem templorum super Deos suos cadentium uni homini pax fuit Cap. 5. Non est ut dicas ita ut soles hunc sapientem nostrum nusquam inveniri Non fingimus istud humani ingenii vanum decus nec ingentem imaginem rei falsae concipimus sed quaelem confirmamus exhibuimus exhibebimus Ceterùm hic ipse M. Cato vereor ne suprà nostrum exemplar sit Cap. 7. Videor mihi intueri animum tuum incensum effervescentem paras acclamare Haec sunt quae auctoritatem praeceptis vestris detrahant Magna promittitis quae ne optari quidem nedum credi possunt And lower Ita sublato altè supercilio in eadem quae caeteri descenditis mutatis rerum nominibus tale itaque aliquid in hoc esse suspicor quod prima specie pulchrum atque magnificum est nec injuriam nec contumeliam accepturum esse sapientem And lower Ego vero sapientem non imaginario honore verborum exornare constitui sed eo loco ponere quo nulla perveniat injuria Battering Rams and other Engines of Wars will shake the Walls and Towers of the strongest Garrisons and in time level them with the Earth But what Machines are found sufficient to shake the impregnable Mind of his Wise-man Compare not with him the Wall of Babylon forc'd by Alexander nor those of Carthage and Numantia that one General overturn'd Nor lastly the Capitol and the Citadel which carry the marks of the prevailing Enemy Arrows shot against the Sun are spent in vain Sacriledges committed in the overthrow of Temples and the Shrines of the Gods melted down touch not the Divinity yet the Gods may be overwhelm'd in the ruines of their own Temples But his Wise-man shall never be oppress'd or rather he may be oppress'd but 't is impossible he should be hurt But think not says Seneca that the Wise-man I am picturing is no where to be found 'T is no vain Fiction of ours ridiculously to exalt the Mind of Man 'T is not a Stalking Idea without Realty and Truth no the Original Cato transcends perhaps the Picture that I make of him But methinks continues he I perceive your Mind begins to kindle and grow hot and you are ready to cry out That 't is the way to make our selves contemptible to promise things above the reach of Faith or Hope and that the Stoicks only change the Names of things to speak the same Truths in a more lofty and supercilious strain But see how you are mistaken For 't is not our Design to dignifie the Wise-man with the imaginary Honour of great and pompous Words but to set him in a place inaccessible to Injuries and Affronts See here now Seneca's weak Reason is hurried away with an impetuous Imagination But is it possible for Men under a continual sense of their Miseries and Infirmities to fall into such presumptuous and arrogant Notions Can a reasonable Man be perswaded that Pain cannot touch or hurt him Or could this All-wise this Self-sufficient Cato suffer without Disquiet at least some Molestation I don't say the heinous Insults and Abuses of an enraged Rabble Dragging Stripping Beating him but the Stinging of a silly Fly What can be imagin'd more weak against so strong and convincing Proofs of our own Experience as this pretty Arguing of Seneca which yet is one of his best Arguments Validius debet esse quod laedit eo quod laeditur non est autem fortior nequitia virtute non potest ergo laedi Sapiens Injuria in bonos non tentatur nisi à malis bonis inter se pax est Quod si laedi nisi infirmior non potest malus autem bono infirmior est nec injuria bonis nisi à dispari verenda est injuria in Sapientem virum non cadit Cap. 7. That which hurts says he must be stronger than that which is hurt But Vice is not stronger than Vertue therefore the Wise-man cannot be hurt To this we need only answer Either that all Men are Sinners and consequently worthy of the Misery they suffer as Religion assures us or that if Vice be not stronger than Vertue yet the Vicious may sometimes be more prevalent than the Vertuous as Experience manifests Epicurus was in the right in saying that Injuries were supportable by a Wise-man but Seneca certainly in the wrong to affirm The Wise-man could not be injur'd The Vertue of the Stoicks could never render them impregnable since 't is not inconsistent with true Vertue for a Man to be Miserable and pitiable at the time of his suffering some Evil St. Paul and the Primitive Christians had doubtless more Vertue than Cato and all the Stoicks and yet they confess'd they were Miserable through the Pains they endur'd though they were Happy through the Prospect of an Eternal Retribution Si tantum in hâc vitâ sperantes sumus miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus says St. Paul As 't is GOD alone who through his Grace can give us a real and a solid Vertue so 't is from Him only we can receive the Fruition of a solid and real Happiness which yet he neither promises nor gives us in this Life but in the other it must be expected from his Justice as the Recompense of the Miseries we have undergone for the Love of him in this We are not as yet in possession of that Peace and Repose which nothing can disturb even the Grace of our LORD makes us not so Invincible but it commonly leaves us to the Sense and Feeling of our own Imbecility both to certifie us there is nothing in the World but is capable of hurting us and to teach us to suffer with a modest Patience and an humble Resignation all the Injuries we receive and not with a fastuous and haughty Patience like the Constancy of Proud Presumptuous Cato When Cato was struck on the Face he was not troubl'd at it nor would he revenge or pardon the Affront but Dogmatically deny'd that he had receiv'd any He would be thought infinitely above those that struck him So that his Patience was Pride and Arrogance and affronting and abusing those that injur'd him This Patience of his being a manifest sign that he look'd upon his Enemies as Beasts with whom 't was below him to be angry And this Contempt of his Enemies and great Esteem of himself is what Seneca calls the greatness of Courage Majori animo says he speaking of an Abuse Cato had receiv'd non agnovit quam ignovisset How extravagant it is to confound Magnanimity with Pride and separating Patience from Humility to joyn it with an unsufferable Arrogance And yet how feelingly does such Extravagance flatter the Vanity of Man who is never willing to stoop and abase himself And how dangerous is it for Christians especially to
Sensibility of Men the Corruption of the Senses and the Passions dispose them to the desire of being struck with it and provokes them to strike others with it also I am then of Opinion that there is no Author more fit than Seneca to exemplifie that contagious Communication of a great many Men who go by the Name of the Fine and Bold Wits and to shew how these strong and vigorous Imaginations domineer over the Weak and Unenlightened Minds not by the force and evidence of their Reasons which are the Productions of the Mind but by the Turn and lively way of Expression which depend on the Strength of Imagination I know well enough that this Author's Reputation is considerable in the World and ' will be look'd upon as a rash attempt to have treated him as a very Imaginative and Injudicious Author But 't was chiefly upon the Account of his Esteem I have said so much of him here not out of any Envy or ill Humour but because the Estimation he is in will more sensibly touch the Mind of the Reader and more closely apply it to the Consideration of the Errors I have attack'd For we should as far as possible bring the most Eminent Instances when the things we say are important it being sometimes an Honouring a Book to Critizice upon it But yet I am not the only Man that finds fault with the Writings of Seneca for not to mention some Famous Men of our own Age 't is near six hundred Years ago that a most Judicious Author observ'd there was little Exactness in his Philosophy little Judgment and Justice in his Elocution and his Reputation was rather the result of the Heat and indiscreet Inclination of Youth than the Consent of Learned and Judicious Men. Publickly to engage the grossest and most palpable Errors is labour lost there being no contagion in them 'T would be ridiculous to advertise Men that Hypocondriack People are deceiv'd 't is visible to all the World But if those very Men they have the greatest Opinion of should chance to be mistaken 't is a piece of service to admonish them lest they should imitate them in their Errors Now 't is plain that the Spirit of Seneca is a Spirit of Pride and Vanity And whereas Pride according to the Scripture is the Origine of Sin Initium Peccati Superbia The Spirit of Seneca cannot be the Spirit of the Gospel nor his Morals be allied to the Morals of our SAVIOVR the only true and solid Morals True 't is that all the Notions of Seneca are not false nor dangerous And he may be read with profit by such as have an exactness of Thought and are acquainted with the Foundation of Christian Morality Good use has been made of him by Great Men and I have no intent of blaming those who to accommodate themselves to the Weakness of others that had an excessive Esteem for him have drawn Arguments from his Works whereby to defend the Morality of our LORD and oppugn the Enemies of the Gospel with their own Weapons The Alcoran has many good things in it and some true Prophecies are to be found in the Centuries of Nostradamus The Alcoran is made use of to oppose the Religion of Mahomet and Nostradamus's Prophecies may be of use to convince some Fantastick and Visionary People But what is good in the Alcoran can't make it a good Book nor can some true Explications in Nostradamus's Centuries make him ever pass for a Prophet neither can it be said that all who make use of these Authors approve them or have for them any real Esteem A Man ought not to go about to overthrow what I have said about Seneca by alledging abundance of Quotations out of him which contain in them nothing but solid Truths and consonant to the Gospel For I grant many such are met with in that Author and so there are in the Alcoran and other mischievous Books Nor would he be less to blame who should overwhelm me with the Authority of those great Numbers who have made use of Seneca since use may be made of what we think an impertinent Book provided those we speak to judge otherwise of it than our selves But to ruine intirely the Wisdom of the Stoicks we need only know one thing which is sufficiently prov'd by Experience and by what we have already said which is that we are link'd and fasten'd to our Body our Relations our Friends our Prince and our Country by such ties as we neither can break nor could for shame endeavour it Our Soul is united to our Body and by our Body to all things Visible by so potent an Hand that 't is impossible by our own force to loosen the Connection 'T is impossible our Body should be prick'd but we must be prick'd and hurt our selves because the state of Life we are in most necessarily requires this Correspondence between us and the Body which we have In like manner 't is impossible to hear our selves reproach'd and despis'd but we must feel some discontent thereupon because GOD having made us for sociable converse with other Men has given us an Inclination for every thing capable to bind and cement us together which Inclination we have not strength enough of our selves to overcome 'T is Extravagance to say that Pain does not hurt us and that words of Contumely and Contempt are not at all offensive to us as being above such things as these There is no getting above Nature without being assisted by Grace nor was there ever any Stoick who despis'd Glory and the Esteem of Men through the meer Strength of his Mind Men may indeed get the mastery of their Passions by contrary Passions They may vanquish their Fear or their Pain by Vain Glory I mean only that they may abstain from Flying or Complaining when seeing themselves in the midst of a multitude the desire of Glory supports them and stops those motions in their Bodies which put them upon Flight In this manner they may conquer them but this is no Conquest or Deliverance from their slavery 't is possibly to change their Master for some time or rather to put on a longer and an heavier chain 'T is to grow wise happy and free only in appearance but in reality to suffer an hard and cruel bondage The natural union a Man has still with his Body may be resisted by that union he has with Men because Nature may be resisted by the strength of Nature GOD may be resisted by the forces He himself supplies us with but GOD cannot be resisted by the strength of a Man 's own mind Nature can't be perfectly vanquish'd but by Grace because GOD cannot if I may be allow'd so to speak be overcome but by the special auxiliaries of GOD himself And thus that so much celebrated and vaunted Division of all things in such as depend not on us and such as we ought not to depend on is a Division that seems agreeable to Reason
but is not consistent with this disorder'd state Sin has reduc'd us to We are united to all the Creatures by the Order of GOD but we absolutely depend on them by the Disorders of Sin So that being incapable of Happiness when in Pain or Disturbance we ought not to hope for Happiness in this Life by imagining we have no Dependence upon those things to which we are naturally slaves There is no possibility of being happy except by a lively Faith and a solid Hope which gives us a fore-tast of the Enjoyment of future Goods nor of living up to the Rules of Vertue and overcoming Nature unless supported by the Grace merited for us by Our LORD and SAVIOVR JESVS CHRIST CHAP. V. Of Montagne's Book MONTAGNE's Essays may serve as another instance to prove the Influence some Imaginations have over others For that Author has such a sort of a Fine and Debonaire way and gives such a Lively and Natural Turn to his Thought as 't is almost impossible to read him without being prejudic'd in his behalf that his affected Negligence admirably becomes him and indears him to most Men without making him contemptible and his Arrogancy is that of a Gentleman if we may say so that makes him respected and not disliked That Air of Gentility and Gallantry sustain'd by some stock of Learning works so prodigiously on the Mind that a Man often admires him and still yields to his Decisions without daring to enquire into them and sometimes without understanding them 'T is not by the strength of his Reasons he perswades for Reasons are seldom alledg'd for what he advances at least such as have any force and solidity in them And indeed he neither has any Principles whereon to bottom his Reasonings nor any Method to make Deductions from his Principles A Touch of History is no Argument nor a little Story a Demonstration A couple of Verses of Horace or an Apophthegm of Cleomenes or Caesar are not fit to perswade Reasonable Men And yet these Essays are nothing but a Contexture of scraps of History little Relations good Words Distichs and Apophthegms Montagne should not be look'd upon in his Essays as a Man that argues but as one that writes for his Diversion whose drift is the Pleasure and not the Instruction of his Reader And if those that read him were only diverted by him it must be own'd that Montagne could not do them so much harm But 't is next to impossible to forbear loving that which pleases and not to desire those Dishes that are agreeable to the Palate Nor can the Mind long be pleas'd with the reading of an Author but it will take in its Sentiments or at least receive some Tincture from them which mingling with its Idea's makes them confus'd and obscure But 't is not only dangerous to read Montagne for Diversion by reason that the Pleasure a Man takes in him insensibly engages him in his Opinions but also because his Pleasure is more criminal than is imagin'd For 't is certain that this Pleasure arises chiefly from Concupiscence and that it only feeds and strengthens the Passions this Author's way of Writing being only so taking because 't is sensible and moving and that it rouses our Passions in an imperceptible manner It would not be time mispent to prove this in particular and in general that we are pleas'd with all the divers Styles of Men meerly on the account of the secret Corruption of our Morals but this is not the proper place for it and besides it would carry us too far from our purpose However if we but reflect on the Connection of our Idea's and Passions I formerly spoke of as also upon what passes within our selves at the time of our Reading some well wrote piece we may in some measure discover that if we love the Sublime Style the noble and free Air of some Authors 't is because of our Vanity and our Passion for Greatness and Independency And that the relish we find in that delicacy of Effeminate Discourses is deriv'd from no other Fountain than a secret Inclination for Softness and Pleasure In a word 't is Sensibility and not Reason a certain Skill and Faculty for what affects the Senses and not for Truth that makes some Authors charm and ravish us even whether we will or no. But to return to Montagne The Reasons why his greatest Admirers so much cry him up to me seems to be that they thought him a Judicious Author and far from the imputation of Pedantry as also one who was throughly acquainted with the nature and weaknesses of the Mind If I should shew then that Montagne with all his Gallantry was as much a Pedant as many others and that he had a very imperfect Knowledge of the Mind I shall make it appear that those who most admire him were not perswaded by the Evidence of his Reasons but were only brought over by the Force of his Imagination The word Pedant is very Equivocal but Use if I mistake not and even Reason will have it signifie those who to make ostentation of their false Science quote all sorts of Authors right or wrong talk meerly for talking sake and to be admir'd by the Ignorant and without any Judgment or Discretion amass together Apophthegms and Passages of History to prove or at least pretend to prove things that cannot be made out by any thing but Reason Pedant is oppos'd to Rational and that which makes Pedants so odious to Men of Sense is their being Irrational for sensible Men naturally loving to Reason can't endure the Conversation of those who reason not at all Pedants are unable to reason because their Mind is little or else is taken up with False Learning and they are unwilling to reason as knowing they are esteem'd and admir'd by some sort of People more for their citing some passage of an Unknown or Ancient Author than pretending to Argument and Reasoning And thus their Vanity acquiescing in the prospect of the respect that 's paid to them fixes them to the study of uncommon and out of the way Sciences that attract the Admiration of the Vulgar Pedants therefore are vain and arrogant of great Memory and little Judgments successful and powerful in Citations misfortunate and weak in Reasons Of a vigorous and capacious Imagination but desultory and disorderly and unable to keep to any Accuracy and Exactness Having thus clear'd the Notion of the word Pedant it will be no hard matter to prove Montagne as much a Pedant as most others in this signification of it which seems most agreeable to Reason and Custom For I speak not here of the Pedant of the Long Robe it being not a Paedagogue's Gown that only makes a Pedant Montagne who had such an aversion to Pedantry possibly never wore a Gown but nevertheless could not divest himself of all his Imperfections He has labour'd much for a Gentleman-like way but has taken no great pains for exactness of Thoughts or
Countries it being the most difficult thing to remember Names and if I should live long I am perswaded I should forget my own That a plain Gentleman who could retain by Heart and word for word and with Assurance long-winded Discourses should have such a multitude of Servants that he could not remember their Names That a Man who was Born and Bred in the midst of Fields and Tillage who kept Business and Farms in his Hands and who says To be regardless of what lies at our Feet of what we have in our Hands and of what most nearly concerns the necessities and use of Life is a thing utterly inconsistent with his Maxim should forget the French Names of his Domesticks Could he be ignorant as he says of the most part of our Coins in use the difference of one Grain from another either in the Earth or Granary unless it were the most manifest of the grossest Principles of Agriculture which there 's hardly a Child but knows what use Leaven is of in making Bread and why Wine must stand sometime in the Fat before it ferments and yet has his Mind stor'd with the Names of the Ancient Philosophers and their Principles with the Idea's of Plato Epicurus's Atoms the Plenum and Vacuum of Leucippus and Democritus the Water of Thales Anaximander's Infinity of Nature Diogenes's Air the Numbers and Symmetry of Pythagoras the Infinite of Parmenides the Vnity of Musaeus the Water and Fire of Apollodorus the Similar Parts of Anaxagoras the Discord and Friendship of Empedocles the Fire of Heraclitus c. A Man that in three or four Pages of his Book quotes more than fifty different Authors with their Opinions Who has fill'd his Book with various Historical Passages and many confus'd Apophthegms who in point of Books says History and Poesy were his Excellency Who contradicts himself every moment and in the same Chapter and even in the speaking of things he pretends to be best acquainted with I mean the Qualities of his Mind should this Man boast that his Judgment is better than his Memory We will confess that Montagne was Excellent at Forgetfulness since Montagne assure us of it and would have us think so nor is this altogether contrary to Truth But let us not believe him on his word or for the Praises that he gives himself that he was a Man of great Sense and of extraordinary Sagacity of Mind For this might engage us in Error and give too much Countenance to those false and dangerous Opinions he puts off with a presumptuous and dogmatical Arrogance which only confounds and blinds the feebler sorts of Minds The other Encomium they bestow on Montagne is that he was perfectly acquainted with the Mind of Man that he survey'd it to the bottom its Nature and its Properties that he knew the strong and weak sides of it and in a word all that could be known of it Let us see if he deserve these Praises and whence it comes to pass Men are so liberal on his behalf Those who have read Montagne know well enough that he would fain pass for a Pyrrhonist and that he takes Pride in doubting of all things The perswasion of Certainty in any thing says he is a certain testimony of Folly and extream incertainty and there is not a foolisher and less Philosophical sort of Men than the Philodox of Plato On the contrary he extolls the Pyrrhonists at that excessive rate in the same Chapter that 't is not to be doubted but he was of the same Sect. 'T was necessary in the time he liv'd to doubt of every thing to pass for a Man of Parts and a Gentleman and the Quality of a Bold Wit which he pretended to engag'd him farther in these Opinions Now 't is but supposing him an Academick to be able at one stroke to manifest him the most ignorant of all Men not only in what relates to the Nature of the Mind but in every thing else For since there is an Essential difference between Knowing and Doubting if the Academicks say what they think when they assure us They know nothing we may conclude they are the most Ignorant Persons in the World But they are not only the most Ignorant of all others but also the most Vnreasonable Defenders of their Opinions For they not only reject what is most certain and universally receiv'd to be thought the Bold Wits but by the same strength of Imagination love to talk in a Decisive Magisterial strain about the most uncertain and improbable things in Nature Montagne affords us a manifest Instance of this Distemper of Mind And we must necessarily say he was not only ignorant of the Nature of an Humane Mind but was in the grossest Errors upon that Subject supposing he had said what he thought of it as he ought to have done For what can we say of a Man that confounds the Mind with Matter that reports the most extravagant Opinions of the Philosophers about the Nature of the Soul without despising them and in a way that gives us to understand he lik'd those best that were most opposite to Reason Who saw no necessity of the Immortality of our Souls who thinks it indiscoverable by Humane Reason and who looks upon the Arguments that are given for it as Dreams which the desire of it breeds in us Somnia non docentis sed optantis Who finds fault with Men for separating from the Crowd of other Creatures and distinguishing themselves from Beasts which he calls our Fellow Brethren and Companions who believes they converse with and understand each other and ridicule us as we discourse and understand one another and laugh at them who makes a greater difference betwixt Man and Man than betwixt a Man and a Beast Who attributes even to Spiders Deliberation Thought and Conclusion And who after having maintain'd that the Disposition of the Humane Body had no advantage over that of Beasts readily embraces this Opinion That 't is not by our Reason our Discourse our Soul we have the Ascendant over Beasts but on the account of our Beauty the fineness of our Complection and the excellent Disposition of our Members in comparison of which we ought to give up our Intelligence Prudence and the rest as trivial Accomplishments c. Can any one say that a Man who concludes with such the most extravagant Opinions as that 'T is not by the Deductions of Reason but our Arrogance and Obstinacy that we give our selves the Preeminence above other Animals had a very exact Knowledge of the Mind of Man Or can he think to convince others herein But we should do all Men Justice and impartially declare what was the Character of Montange's Mind He had indeed but little Memory and still less Judgment But these two Qualities put together make not that accomplish'd thing which generally goes by the Name of Fineness and Beauty of Wit or Parts 'T is the Beauty the Vivacitys and the Extent of
has pretended not to be ignorant of that adventitious Whiteness in the Hairs of Old Men and has given several Reasons for it in several places of his Books But being the Genius of Nature he has not stopt there but penetrated much farther He has moreover discover'd that the Cause which turn'd Old Men's Hairs white was the self-same with that which made some Men and some Horses have one Eye Blue and the other of another Colour These are his Words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This is very surprizing but there is nothing un-intelligible to this Great Man who gives Reasons for such a vast number of things in almost all parts of his Physics as the most enlightned Men of this Age believe impenetrable which must needs give good grounds for an Author 's saying He was given us by GOD that we might be ignorant of nothing possible to be known Aristotelis est SVMMAVERITAS quoniam ejus Intellectus fuit finis humani intellectûs Quare bene dicitur de illo quod ipse fuit creatus datus nobis divinâ Providentiâ ut non ignoremus possibilia sciri Averroês ought too to have said That Aristotle was given us by Divine Providence for the understanding what was impossible to be understood For certainly that Philosopher teaches us not only the things that may be known but since we must believe him on his word his Doctrine being the Soveraign Truth SVMMAVERITAS he teaches us likewise those things which 't is impossible to know Undoubtedly a Man must have a strong Faith thus to believe Aristotle when he only gives us Logical Reasons and explains the Effects of Nature by the confus'd Notions of the Senses especially when he positively determines upon Questions which we cannot see possible for Men ever to resolve Yet Aristotle takes particular care of admonishing us to believe him on his word it being an uncontroverted Axiom with this Author That a Disciple is to believe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 True sometimes Disciples are oblig'd to believe their Masters But their Faith should reach no farther than to Experiments and matters of Fact For would they become true Philosophers they ought to examine their Master's Reasons and never receive them till they had discover'd their Evidence by their own But to become a Peripatetic Philosopher there is no more requisite than to believe and to remember The same Disposition of Mind going to the reading that Philosophy as to the reading of an History For should a Man take the freedom of using his Mind and his Reason he must not expect to grow any considerable Philosopher 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the Reason why Aristotle and a great many other Philosophers have pretended to know what can never be known is their not well distinguishing the difference betwixt knowing and knowing betwixt having a Certain and Evident Knowledge and only a Probable and Obscure And the Reason of their not having observ'd that Distinction is their being taken up always with subjects of a greater Reach and Comprehension than their own Mind so that they have usually seen only some parts thereof without being able to take them all in together which suffices to the Discovery of many Probabilities but not for the evident Discovery of Truth Besides which Vanity being the Motive to their seeking Science and Probabilities making more for their Esteem among Men than Truth it self as being more proportion'd to the ordinary stature and ability of the Mind they neglected to search for the necessary means of augmenting its Capacity and giving it a greater Growth and Comprehension for which reason they have not been able to go to the bottom of Truths that lay any thing deep and conceal'd The Geometricians only have well discover'd the narrow Capacity of the Mind at least have taken such a Method in their Studies as shews they have a perfect Knowledge of it especially those who use Algebra and Analytics which Vieta and Des-Cartes have re-establish'd and perfected in this Age. Which is herein apparent that these Men never attempted the Resolution of Difficulties very Compound till after having most clearly known the more Simple which they depend on they never fix'd to the consideration of Crooked Lines as of Conick Sections till they we perfect Masters of common Geometry But what is peculiar to the Analysts is that seeing their Mind incapable of Attention to many Figures at once and unable to imagine Solids of more than three Dimensions though there were frequent necessity of conceiving such as had more they made use of common Letters that are very familiar to us to express and abridge their Idea's And thus the Mind being not confounded or taken up with the Representation it would be oblig'd to make of a great many Figures and an infinite number of Lines can survey at a single view what otherwise was impossible to be seen Forasmuch as the Mind can launch out farther and penetrate into a great many more things when its Capacity is manag'd to the best advantage So that all the Skill and Artifice there is in making the Mind deeper-sighted and more comprehensive consists as shall be explain'd in another place in a dexterous management of its Strength and Capacity and in not laying it out impertinently on things not necessary to the discovery of the Truth it is in search of Which is a thing well worthy to be observ'd For this one thing makes it evident that the ordinary Logicks are more proper to straiten the Capacity of the Mind than enlarge it it being visible that by imploying the Rules they give in the finding out any Truth the Capacity of the Mind must be taken up with them and so it must have the less Liberty for attending to and comprehending the whole extent of the subject it examines 'T is manifest enough then from what hath been said that most Men have made but little Reflection on the Nature of the Mind when they would imploy it in The Search of Truth that they have not been throughly convinc'd of its little Extent and the necessity there is of Husbanding it well and increasing it and that this is one of the most considerable Causes of their Errors and of their so ill success in their Studies This is not said with Presumption that there were ever any who knew not their Mind was limited and straitned in its Capacity and Comprehension This doubtless has been known and is still confess'd by all the World But the generality know it only confusedly and confess it no farther than Teeth-outwards For the conduct they take in their Studies gives the Lye to their Confession since they act as if they truly believ'd their Mind was Infinite and are desirous of diving into things which depend on a great many Causes whereof they commonly know not any one There is still another Failing very customary with Studious Men and that is their applying to too many Sciences at once so that if they study
we not only can see from one end of the same Point abundance of most large and even immense Objects There is moreover not any Point in all these great Spaces of the World from whence we cannot discover an almost inexhaustible number of Objects and even Objects as big as the Sun the Moon and Heavens There is not then any Point in the great Circumference of the World wherein the Species of all these things ought not to center which is contradictory to all appearance of Truth The second Reason is taken from the Change these Species undergo It is certain the nearer an Object is the greater the Species ought to be since we see the Object greater Now we cannot see what 't is that can lessen this Species and what become of the Parts that compos'd it when it was greater But that which is still more difficult to conceive according to their Notion is how in beholding an Object with Magnifying-glasses or a Microscope the Species grows on a suddain five or six hundred times bigger than it was before for 't is still harder to be seen from what adventitious Parts it can increase so mightily in an instant The third Reason is that in looking on a perfect Cube all the Species of its faces are unequal and yet we fail not to see all its faces equally square And so in beholding in a Picture Ovals and Parallelograms which can only send forth Species of a similar Figure we see notwithstanding Circles and Squares For this makes it manifestly clear that there is no necessity the Object we behold should produce Species like it self in order to our seeing it Lastly it is not conceivable how it is possible for a Body that is not sensibly exhausted to send constantly Species from out of it self on every side how it can continually fill with them so very capacious Spaces all round about and that with an incomprehensible swiftness For an Object that lay hid in the very instant of its Discovery may be seen many millions of Leagues on all sides And what seems much stranger yet is that the Bodies which have a great deal of Action as the Air and some others have not force enough to extrude from them their representative Images which the grossest and least active Bodies can do as Earth Stones and almost all hard Bodies But I shall not spend more time in producing all the Reasons that oppugn this Opinion because that would be an endless work the least Essay of Thought furnishing out an inexhaustible number of them These we have already urg'd are enough and even more than were necessary after what has been said relating to this Subject in the first Book whâ—n we explain'd the Errors of the Senses But there being such a multitude of Philosophers devoted to this Opinion I thought it necessary to say something of it to put them upon reflecting on their own Thoughts CHAP. III. That the Soul has no Power to produce Idea's The Cause of the Error Men are guilty of upon this Subject THE second Opinion is theirs who believe that our Souls have the Power of producing the Idea's of the things they would contemplate and that they are mov'd to the producing them by the impressions Objects make upon the Body though these impressions are not Images representative of the Objects they are caused by They pretend it is in this that Man is made after the Image of GOD and participates of his Power That as GOD has created all things out of nothing and can annihilate them again and thence create others wholly new so Man has the Power of Creating and Annihilating the Idea's of all things as he pleases But there 's very good reason to suspect all these Opinions that elevate Man so high as being Notions which commonly derive from his vain and haughty Heart and which the Father of Lights never vouchsafed to give him This Participation of the Power of GOD which Men boast of having whereby to represent Objects and to do many other particular Actions is a Participation which seems to draw in something of Independency as 't is ordinarily explain'd But 't is likewise a Chimerical Participation which Men's Ignorance and Vanity have caus'd them to imagine For they are under a greater Dependance on the Goodness and Mercy of GOD than they suppose But this is not the place to give an Explication of these things Let us only try to make it visible that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of the things they perceive No Man can doubt but that Idea's are real Beings seeing they have real Properties that they differ one from another and that they represent quite different things Nor can it reasonably be doubted but they are of a Spiritual Nature and very different from the Bodies represented by them All which seems strong enough to raise a doubt whether the Idea's by means whereof we perceive Bodies are not of a nobler extract than the Bodies themselves And in earnest the Intelligible World ought to be perfecter than the Material and Terrestrial as we shall see in the process of our Discourse and then in affirming that Men are impower'd to frame all Idea's as they please we incur the danger of maintaining that Men have power of making Beings more noble and more perfect than the World which GOD has created But this reflection never enters our Heads by reason of our imagining an Idea to be nothing because not obvious to the Senses or if we look upon it as a Being 't is a Being so slender and contemptible that we fancy it annihilated as soon as absent from the Mind But though it should be true that Idea's were only little pitiful despicable Beings they are however Beings and Beings Spiritual And Men having not the Power of Creating have not consequently the Power of Producing them For the Production of Idea's in the manner they explain it is a true Creation and though they endeavour to palliate and soften the Presumption and Harshness of this Opinion in saying that the Production of Idea's supposes something antecedent and Creation supposes nothing yet they bring no Reason to solve the Knot of the difficulty For it ought well to be heeded That there is no greater difficulty in producing Something out of Nothing than in producing it by presupposing another thing out of which it could not be made and which could contribute nothing to its Production There is no greater difficulty for instance in the Creation of an Angel than in the Production of an Angel from a Stone Because a Stone being a Being of a quite opposite kind cannot be any ways serviceable to the Production of an Angel But it may contribute to the Production of Bread of Gold c. because Stone Gold and Bread are only the same Extension of a diverse Configuration and all these are Material things Nay it is even harder to produce an Angel out of a Stone than to produce it out
to have any other Principal End of his Actions than Himself This is a common Notion with all Men capable of any Reflection and Holy Scripture will not suffer us to doubt that GOD has created all things for Himself It is necessary then not only that our Natural Love I mean the Motion he produces in our Mind should tend towards him but also that the Knowledge and the Light he gives it should discover something to us which is in Him For all that comes from GOD can have no other End but GOD. If GOD has made a Mind and given it the Sun for its Idea or for the immediate Object of its Knowledge GOD we should think had made that Mind and the Idea of that Mind for the Sun and not for Himself GOD cannot therefore make a Mind for the Knowledge of his Works were it not that this Mind should in some sort see GOD in contemplating his Works So that it may be said that unless we saw GOD in some manner we should see nothing at all just as we should love nothing at all except we lov'd GOD that is except GOD continually impress'd on us the love of Good in general For that Love being our Will we are unable to love any thing or will any thing without Him since we cannot love particular Goods but by determining towards these Goods the motion of Love that GOD gives us for Himself Thus as we love not any thing but by means of that necessary Love we have for GOD so we know nothing but through that necessary Knowledge we have of Him all the particular Idea's which we have of the Creatures being only the Restrictions of the Idea of the Creator as all the Motions of the Will towards the Creatures are only Determinations of the Motion towards the Creator I suppose there is no Theologist but will agree with me in this that the Impious love GOD with this Natural Love I speak of And St. Augustin and some other of the Fathers maintain'd it as a thing undoubted that the Wicked see in GOD the Rules of Morals and eternal Truths So that the Opinion I am explaining ought not to trouble any body Ab illa incommutabili luce Veritatis etiam impius dum ab ea avertitur quodammodo tangitur Hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant aeternitatem multa rectè reprehendunt rectéque laudant in hominum moribus Quibus ea tandem regulis judicant nisi in quibus vident quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat etiamsi nec ipsi eodem modo vivant Vbi autem eas vident Neque enim in sua natura Nam cum proculdubio mente ista videantur eorumque mentes constet esse mutabiles has verò regulas immutabiles videat quisquis in eis hoc videre potuerit ..... Vbinam ergo sunt istae regulae scriptae nisi in libro lucis illius quae veritas dicitur unde lex omnis justa describitur ...... in qua videt quid operandum sit etiam qui operatur injustitiam ipse est qui ab ea luce avertitur à qua tamen tangitur There are in St. Augustin infinite passages of the like Nature whereby he proves that we see GOD even in this Life through the Knowledge we have of eternal Truths Truth is uncreated immutable immense eternal and above all things It is true independently and by it self and is beholden to nothing else for its Perfection It renders the Creatures more perfect and all Spirits are naturally solicitous to know it nothing can have all these Perfections except GOD therefore Truth is GOD. We see immutable and eternal Truths therefore we see GOD. These are the Reasons of St. Augustin My own are somewhat different and I would not unjustly usurp the Authority of so Great a Man to countenance my Opinion 'T is my thoughts then that Truths even those which are eternal as That twice two are four are not so much as absolute Beings so far am I from believing them to be GOD. For 't is manifest that this Truth consists only in the Relation of Equality which is between twice two and four We do not say then with St. Augustin That we see GOD in seeing eternal Truths but in seeing the Idea's of these Truths for Idea's are real but the Equality between Idea's which is the Truth has nothing real in it When for instance we say the Cloth we measure is three Ells long The Cloth and the Ells are real but the Equality between the three Ells and the Cloth is no real Being but only a Relation intervening between them In saying Twice two are four the Idea's of the Numbers are real but the Equality between them is only a Relation And thus according to our own Opinion we see GOD in seeing eternal Truths not that these Truths are GOD but because the Idea's on which these Truths depend exist in GOD and perhaps too St. Augustin understood it so We are perswaded also that we know changeable and corruptible Truths in GOD though St. Augustin speaks only of the immutable and incorruptible since there is no need of subjecting GOD to any imperfection on this account nothing being more requir'd than that GOD gives us a Manifestation of what He has in Himself which relates to these things But when I say that we see in GOD material and sensible Things special Notice should be taken that I don't say We have the Sensations of them in GOD but only that they proceed from GOD who acts upon us For GOD perfectly knows sensible things but not by any Sensation In perceiving any thing of a sensible Nature two things occur in our Perception Sensation and Pure Idea The Sensation is a Modification of our Soul and 't is GOD who causes it in us which he is able to cause though He has it not Himself because he sees in the Idea he has of our Soul that it is capable of it As to the Idea which is found joyn'd to the Sensation that is in GOD and we see it because he is pleas'd to discover it to us And GOD joyns the Sensation to the Idea when the Objects are present to the intent we may believe them so and may enter into the Sentiments and Passions that we ought to have with relation to them We believe lastly that all Spirits see the eternal Laws no less than other things in GOD but with some difference They know the Divine Order and the Eternal Truths and even the Beings GOD has made according to this Order and these Truths through the Union they necessarily have with the WORD or the WISDOM of GOD who enlightens them as we have before explain'd But 't is through the impression they without intermission receive from the Will of GOD which carries them towards Him and strives as I may so say to conform their Will entirely like His own that they know this Order to be a Law I mean that they know the Eternal Laws
enough from hence that their Argumentations upon Natural things are founded merely on Logical Notions such as Act Power and an infinite number of Imaginary Entities which they take no care to distinguish from such as are Real These Gentlemen therefore finding it wonderful easie to see after their manner what they have a Mind to see imagine they have better Eyes than other Men and that they perceive distinctly Extension supposes something else and that 't is only a Property of Matter which Matter may be divested of as of the rest Yet if you make a Demand of them that they would please to explain that thing which they pretend to perceive in Matter besides Extension they offer to do it several ways every of which makes it apparent that they have no other Idea of it than that of Being or of Substance in general This is extreamly evident if we take notice That this their Idea includes no particular Attributes which agree to Matter For whilst we take Extension from Matter we rob it of all the Attributes and Properties which we distinctly conceive do belong to it and though we leave that imaginary thing which they suppose the Essence of it it being manifest that neither Earth nor Heaven nor any thing we see in Nature could be made of it Whereas on the contrary if we take away what they fancy the Essence of Matter provided we leave Extension and we leave all the Attributes and Properties we distinctly conceive included in the Idea of Matter For it is certain that out of Extension all alone might be fram'd an Heaven an Earth and all the Visible World and infinite others So this Something which they suppose over and above Extension having no Attributes distinctly to be conceiv'd belonging to it and clearly included in the Idea we have of it can have nothing real in it if we will credit our Reason nor can be of any use in explaining Natural Effects And that which is said of its being the Subject and Principle of Extension is said gratis and without any distinct Conception in them that say it that is they have no other than a General and Logical Idea of it as of Subject and Principle In so much that we may further imagine a new Subject and a new Principle of this Subject of Extension and so in infinitum the Mind having the Power of representing the General Idea's of Subject and Principle as long as it pleases 'T is true there is a great probability that Men had not so puzzl'd and obscur'd the Idea that they have of Matter had they not some Reasons for it and that there are many who maintain contrary Conclusions to these of ours upon Theological Principles Doubtless Extension is not the Essence of Matter if that be contrary to our Faith And we willingly acknowledge it We are thank GOD very well perswaded of the Feebleness and Limitedness of an Humane Mind We know it is of too little Extent to measure an Infinite Power that GOD can do infinitely more than we can conceive that he communicates only those Idea's which represent to us the things that arrive by the order of Nature and hides the rest from us Wherefore we are always ready to submit our Reason unto Faith but there is need of better proofs than are generally urg'd to ruin the Reasons we have establish'd Because the manner of explaining the Mysteries of Faith are not of Faith and we believe these Mysteries without conceiving how the manner of them can be distinctly explaind We believe for instance the Mystery of the TRINITY though the Humane Mind is unable to conceive it and yet we cease not to believe that the things that differ not in any third differ not in themselves though this Proposition seems to overthrow it For we are convinc'd that Reason is not to be made use of except in Subjects proportion'd to its Capacity and that we ought not to look steadfastly on our Mysteries for fear of being dazel'd by them according that Admonition of the Holy Spirit Qui scrutator est Majestatis opprimetur à gloriâ However if we thought it convenient for the satisfaction of some Men's Minds to explain how our Notion upon this matter may be reconcil'd with what we are taught by Faith concerning Transubstantiation we probably could do it in a way very distinct and perspicuous and could no ways offend against the Decisions of the Church But we think this Explication may be dispens'd with especially in this Work For it ought to be observ'd That the Holy Fathers have almost always look'd upon it as an incomprehensible Mystery and that they never play'd the Philosophers to explain it but contented themselves for the most part with unexact Comparisons fitter to make known the Doctrine than to give a Satisfactory Explication to the Mind Therefore Tradition is for such as Philosophize not on this Mystery and who sumit their Reason to the Rule of Faith without distracting their Brain to no purpose about most abstruse and difficult Questions We should be to blame should we require the Philosophers to give us clear and easie Explications of the manner of our LORD's Body being in the Eucharist for this would be to demand of them novelties in Divinity And in case the Philosophers should make an impudent Answer to the Demand they must be necessarily obnoxious either to the having their Philosophy or Divinity condemn'd For if their Explications were obscure they would give reason to despise the Principles of their Philosophy if their Answer were easie and apparent we should have reason to be apprehensive of Novelty in their Divinity Since then Novelty in point of Divinity bears the Impress and Character of Error and the World has a right and priviledge of despising Opinions merely on the Account of their being Novel and having no foundation in Tradition we ought not to undertake to give easie and intelligible Explications of those things which the Fathers and Councels have not perfectly explain'd and 't is sufficient to hold the Doctrine of Transubstantiation without offering to make out the manner of it For otherwise we might sow the seeds for fresh Disputes and Quarrels whereof there are too many already and the Enemies of the Truth would not fail to use them to malicious purpose and for the oppressing of their Adversaries Disputes in point of Theological Explications seem to be the most useless and most dangerous of any and they are with greater reason to be fear'd for that even Religious Persons often fancy they have a right of breaking their Charity with such as break with their Opinions We have but too common Experience of this Practice and the cause of it lies not very deep Wherefore 't is always the best and surest way not to be eager to speak of things whereof we have no Evidence and which others are not dispos'd to conceive Nor ought obscure and uncertain Explications of Mysteries of Faith which we are under no
Consequences to settle the General Rules of our Behaviour though few there are that do it whilst daily Disputes arise about Questions of Morality which are the immediate and necessary Results of so self-evident a Principle as this before us The Geometricians are continually making new Discoveries in their Science and if they do not much advance it 't is because they have already drawn from their Principles the most useful and necessary consequences But the greatest part of Mankind seem incapable of concluding any thing from the First Principle of Morals All their Ideas vanish and dissipate when their Will inclines them barely to consider it Because they will not as they ought and they will not as they ought because they cannot taste it or that having tasted it are presently distasted For 't is an Abstract Metaphysical and purely Intellectual Principle and not attainable by Sense or Imagination And therefore seems to Carnal Eyes or Minds that see no farther than their Eyes to have no solidity Nothing appears in this Principle likely to settle and compose the restless agitation of their Will and thereupon to stop the View of their Mind and fix it attentively on considering it What hope then is there they should see it well comprehend it right and draw those direct Inferences from it which they ought Those who should have but an imperfect apprehension of this Geometrical Proposition That the sides of Similar Triangles are proportional could certainly be no great Geometricians But if besides that confus'd and imperfect Perception of that Fundamental Proposition of Geometry they had some Interest why the sides of Similar Triangles should not be proportional and if False Geometry were as suitable to their perverse Inclinations as False Morals we should see as absurd Paralogisms in Geometry as Morality because their Errours would be pleasant to them and Truth would only trouble perplex and confound them Hence we need not wonder at the Blindness of Men in former Ages who liv'd whilst Idolatry flourish'd in the World or of such as live at present unenlightned with the Sun-shine of the Gospel It was needful for Eternal Wisdom to cloath it self with Sensibility to instruct Men that enquire only of their Senses Four thousand Years together Truth was manifested by speaking to their Mind but not entring into themselves they did not hear it 't was requisite therefore it should speak unto their Ears The Light which enlightens all Men shin'd upon their Darkness without dispersing it and they could not behold it Intelligible Light must veil it self and become Visible The Word must be made Flesh and hidden and inaccessible Wisdom must instruct Men in a Carnal manner Carnaliter says St. Bernard The Generality of Men and especially the Poor who are the worthiest Object of their Creator's Mercy and Providence those who are oblig'd to labor for their Living are extremely ignorant and stupid They hear only because they have Ears and see only because they have Eyes But are incapable of retiring into themselves by any Effort of Reason there to examine Truth in the silence of their Senses and their Passions Truth they cannot apply to because they cannot relish it and commonly that application enters not their Heads because they cannot think of applying themselves to unaffecting Objects Their desultory and restless Will continually casts the View of their Mind upon all sensible Objects the Variety of which is pleasant and diverting For the Multiplicity and Diversity of Sensible Goods serve to conâ—eal their Vanity and to keep up our Hopes of finding among them the True Good which we desire Thus though the Counsels which JESUS CHRIST in quality of Man of the Way and of Author of our Faith gives us in the Gospel are much more proportion'd to the weakness of our Mind than those which the same CHRIST as He is Eternal Wisdom Internal Truth Intellectual Light inspires into our most inward Reason and though He renders these His Counsels delectable by His Grace sensible by His Example and convincing by His Miracles yet Men are so stupid and inconsiderate even as to things of greatest importance to be known that they scarce ever think of them as behooves them Not many perceive the Excellency of the Gospel nor the Soundness and Necessity of the Precepts of our LORD few there are that meditate on them so as to nourish and strengthen the Soul by them The continual tossing and agitation of the Will which looks for the Enjoyment of Good permitting not those Truths to be insisted on which seem to deprive the Soul of it Here follows another proof of what I am asserting Doubtless it much concerns and lies upon the Wicked to know whether their Soul is Mortal as they suppose it or Immortal as Faith and Reason assure as being a thing of geatest moment and importance to them since the Question lays their Eternity at stake and the quiet of their Mind depends on the resolve Whence comes it that they are ignorant or doubtful in the matter but from their want of serious Attention and the Restlesness and Corruptness of their Will not suffering the Mind to take a steady View of the Reasons which contradict the Opinion they wish to be true For in brief is it so difficult to discover the difference between the Body and Soul betwixt a Thinking and an Extended thing Must a Man bring so great an Attention to perceive that a Thought is neither Round nor Square that Extention is capable only of different Figures and Motions but not of Thought and Reasoning and so that what Thinks and what 's Extended are two Beings altogether opposite And yet this is all that 's requisite to demonstrate the Immortality of the Soul and that she is not perishable though the Body should be annihilated True it is when a Substance perishes that the Modes or Manners of its Existence perish with it as were a piece of Wax annihilated it is certain the Figures of that Wax would be annihilated also because the Roundness for instance of the Wax is really nothing but the Wax it self existing in such a manner and so cannot subsist without the Wax whose Mode it is But though God should destroy all the Wax in the World it would not follow from thence that any other Substance or Modes of Substance should be annihilated All Stones for example might subsist together with their Modes Because Stones are Substances or Beings and not Modes of Being of the Wax So though God should annihilate the half of a Body it would not follow that the other half was annihilated The latter half is united to the other but is not one with it And therefore one half being annihilated it might be reasonably inferr'd that the other half was no longer related to it but not that it did it self exist no longer for being a different Being it could not be reduc'd to nothing by the annihilation of the other Thence 't is manifest that Thought
as long as we see and feel it 'T is certain that if the Mind could easily keep up to clear and distinct Ideas without being as it were supported by some Sensation and without having its Attention perpetually disturb'd by the Restlesness of the Will we should find no great difficulties in infinite Natural Questions but in a short time should get rid of our Ignorance and Errours about them which we now look upon as inexplicable For instance 't is an indisputable Truth to every Man that makes use of his Reason that Creation and Annihilation exceed the ordinary force of Nature Should we now stick to the consideration of that pure Notion of the Mind and Reason we should not so readily admit the Creation and Annihilation of such innumerable multitudes of New Beings as of Substantial Forms Real Qualities and Faculties and the like We should look for the reason of Natural Effects in the distinct Ideas of Extension Figure and Motion and this is not so difficult as is imagin'd For all Nature hangs in a continued chain and the parts of it mutually prove each other The Effects of Fire as those of Cannons and Mines are very wonderful and their Cause as secret and conceal'd Nevertheless if Men instead of adhering to the Impressions of their Senses and false and delusive Experiments should insist on that sole Notion of Pure Intellect That 't is impossible for a Body gently mov'd to produce a Violent Motion in another since it cannot communicate more moving Force than it has it self it would be easie from that single Notion to conclude there is some subtile and invisible Matter that it is violently agitated and universally diffus'd among all Bodies and several things of like kind which might serve to explain the Nature of Fire and to discover other yet more intricate and hidden Truths For seeing so great Motions produc'd in a Cannon or a Mine and all the visible surrounding Bodies in too little Commotion to effect them we are infallibly assur'd there are other invisible and insensible Bodies which have at least so much Motion as the Cannon Bullet but being extremely fine and subtile may when alone pass freely and without bursting any thing through the Pores of the Cannon before it is fir'd that is as may be seen explain'd at large in Mr. des Cartes before they have surrounded the hard and gross parts of the Saltpeter which the Powder is compos'd of But when the Fire is kindled that is when these most subtile and agitated particles have encompassed the gross and solid parts of the Saltpeter and so have communicated their most forcible and violent Motion to them all must necessarily burst because the the Pores of the Cannon which gave a free passage on all sides to the subtile parts we speak of when alone are not large enough to receive the gross parts of the Saltpeter and others that make the Powder when agitated by the subtile particles that environ them For as the Water of a River shakes not the Bridge it runs under because of the minuteness of its parts So this most fine and subtile Matter continually passes through the pores of all Bodies without causing any sensible alteration But as again that River is able to overturn a Bridge when bearing down its Stream huge massy pieces of Ice or other more solid Bodies it dashes them against it with the same Force that it self is mov'd by so the subtile Matter is capable of those astonishing Effects observable in Cannons and Mines when having communicated to the parts of the Powder swimming in the midst of it an infinitely more violent and rapid Motion than that of Rivers and Torrents these same parts of the Gunpowder cannot freely pass through the Pores of the including Bodies because of their too great bulk and therefore open themselves a way by violently breaking what withstands them But 't is not very easie to imagine these so subtile and refin'd Bodies and they are look'd upon as Chimeras because they cannot be seen Contemplatio fere desinit cum aspectu says My Lord Bacon And indeed the greatest part of Philosophers had rather invent some New Entity than be silent about things they do not understand If it be objected to their false and inconceivable Suppositions that Fire must necessarily be compos'd of parts rapidly mov'd because of those violent Motions it produces whilst nothing can communicate what it has not which surely is a most clear and solid Objection they will be sure to confound all by some childish and imaginary Distinction such as Causes univocal and equivocal that they may seem to say something when indeed they say nothing at all For in fine 't is a receiv'd Maxim with all considering Men That there can be no equivocal Cause in Nature and Ignorance has only invented them Those then who are desirous of knowing Nature should take care to fix more to clear and distinct Notions They should a little check and resist that Levity and Inconstancy of their Will if they would penetrate to the bottom of things for their Minds will ever be feeble superficial and desultory whilst their Wills remain roving fickle and inconstant It must be confess'd that 't is a painful and tiresome thing and full of constraint to become attentive and go to the bottom of the things we have a mind to know But nothing can be had without pains Mean time 't is a reproach to Men of Sense and Philosophers who are oblig'd by all manner of reasons to the Search and Defence of Truth to talk they know not what and to be satisfied with what they do not understand CHAP. III. I. Curiosity is natural and necessary II. Three Rules to moderate it III. An Explication of the first of these Rules AS long as Men shall have an Inclination for a Good that exceeds their Strength and they shall not enjoy it they will ever have a secret Inclination for whatever carries the Character of New and Extraordinary They will constantly be persuing after things which they have not yet consider'd with hopes of finding what they seek for and whereas their Minds can never be fully satisfied without the Intuition of him for whom they are created so they will always be restless and tossing about till He appears to them in His Glory This Disposition of Minds is doubtless very consonant to their Condition it being infinitely better restlesly to search after Truth and Happiness which they do not possess than to fix on a false and ill-grounded security by taking up with Falshood and Seeming Goods the ordinary Desserts they feed on Men ought not to be insensible to Truth and Hapiness and what is New and Extraordinary ought to quicken them For there is a Curiosity which we may permit them or rather which we ought to recommend to them So then common and ordinary things containing not the true Good and the Ancient Opinions of Philosophers being most uncertain it is reasonable we should
be Curious for New Discoveries and always unquiet in the Enjoyment of ordinary Goods Should a Geometrician go to give us New Propositions contrary to Euclide's and pretend to prove that Science full of Errours as Hobbs has essay'd in a Book he wrote against the Pride of the Giometricians I confess we should be to blame to be pleas'd with such sorts of Novelties since Truth being found we ought to be constant in embracing it our Curiosity being given us only to excite us to the Discovery And therefore 't is no common fault with Geometricians to have a Curiosity for new Opinions in their Science They would quickly be disgusted with a Book whose Propositions contradicted those of Euclid for that being infallibly assur'd of the truth of his Propositions by incontestable Demonstrations their Curiosity must cease on that respect An infallible sign that our Inclination for Novelty proceeds only from our want of Evidence as to the Truth of things we desire naturally to know and our not possessing the Infinite Goods which we naturally long to enjoy 'T is then just and equitable that men should be excited by Novelty and fond of persuing it But however there are Exceptions to be made and some Rules to be observ'd which may easily be deduc'd from our Assertion viz. That the Inclination for Novelty is only given us to discover Truth and our real Goods These Rules are three in number the first of which is That Men must not love Novelty in matters of Faith which are not under the Jurisdiction of Reason The second That Novelty is no reason to induce us to believe things to be true or good that is we must not judge any Opinion true because t is Novel nor any Good capable of contenting us because 't is new and extraordinary and we have never yet enjoy'd it The third That when we are moreover assur'd that some Truths lie so deep that 't is Morally impossible to discover them and that some Goods are so little and slender that they can never satisfie us the Novelty ought not to raise our Curiosity nor must we give way to be seduc'd by false Hopes But we will explain these Rules more at large and shew that the want of observing them engages us in a vast number of Errours We commonly meet with Men of two quite opposite humours some that will always blindly and implicitly believe others that will ever plainly and evidently perceive The former having scarce ever made use of their Reason indifferently believe whatever they hear the latter resolving always to exercise their Mind even in matters that are infinitely above it equally despise all sorts of Authorities Those are commonly of a stupid or weak capacity as Children and Women these are Haughty and Libertine Wits as Hereticks and Philosophers We very rarely meet with Men exactly poiz'd in the midst of these two Extremes who seek not for Evidence in matters of Faith by a vain and fruitless Agitation of Mind or that sometimes believe not without Evidence false Opinions about Natural things by an indiscreet Deference and servile Submission of Spirit If they be Men of Religion and defer greatly to the Authority of the Church their Faith extends sometimes if I may be allow'd to say so to Opinions purely Philosophical and they pay them the same respect as the Truths of the Gospel whilst their illegitimate Zeal too readily prompts them to censure and condemn all of a different Sentiment and Persuasion Hence they entertain injurious suspicions against Persons that make New Discoveries and 't is sufficient to pass for a Libertine with them to deny Substantial Forms that the Creatures feel Pleasure and Pain and other Philosophical Opinions which they believe true without any evident Reason only because they imagine some necessary Dependencies between these Opinions and matters of Faith But if Men are more bold and daring the Spirit of Pride carries them to despise the Authority of the Church and they are hardly brought to submit to it They delight in harsh and presumptuous Opinions and love to be thought Bold Wits and upon that prospect talk of Divine things irreverently and with a sort of domineering Arrogance dâ—spising as too credulous such as speak modestly of some receiv'd Opinions Lastly they are extremely dispos'd to doubt of every thing and are quite opposite to those who too easily submit to the Authority of Men. 'T is manifest that these two Extremes have nothing laudable and that those that require not Evidence in Natural Questions are no less culpable than others who demand it in the Mysteries of Faith But yet the former who hazard the being mistaken in Philosophical Questions by too easie a Belief are doubtless more excusable than the latter who run in danger of Heresie by a presumptuous doubting For 't is less perillous to fall into infinite Errours of Philosophy for want of examining them than into one Heresie for want of an humble Submission to the Authority of the Church The Mind reposes it self upon finding Evidence but 't is toss'd and disturb'd when it finds none because Evidence is the Character of Truth And therefore the Errour of Libertines and Hereticks proceeds from their Doubting that Truth is to be met with in the Decisions of the Church because they see it not with Evidence and hoping at the same time that the Points of Faith may be evidently known Now their passion for Novelty is corrupt and disorder'd because having already the Truth in the Faith of the Church they ought no longer to seek for it besides that the Truths we are taught by Faith being infinitely above our Reason they could not be discover'd supposing according to their false Notion that the Church was guilty of Errour But as many Err by refusing to submit to the Authority of the Church so there are no fewer that deceive themselves by submitting to the Authority of Men. The Authority of the Church must always be yielded to because it can never err but we must never blindfoldly resign to the Authority of Men because they are always liable to mistake The Doctrines of the Church infinitely transcend the powers of Reason but the Doctrines of Men are subject to it So that if it be an intolerable Vanity and Presumption to follow the Guidance of our Mind in seeking for Truth in matters of Faith without Respect to the Authority of the Church it is likewise a sordid Levity and a despicable Meanness of Spirit blindly to believe upon the Authority of Men in Subjects depending on Reason Notwithstanding which it may be said that most of those who bear the Name of Learned in the World have purchas'd their Reputation merely by getting by rote the Opinions of Aristotle Plato Epicurus and some other Philosophers and by blindfoldly embracing and wilfully maintaining their Opinions An Acquaintance with the Sentiments of some Philosophers is enough to entitle to Degrees and exteriour Badges of Learning in the Universities And provided
understand but rather Superstition and Hypocrisie The Superstitious out of a slavish Fear and a dejection and timerousness of Spirit start and boggle at a lively and penetrating Wit Explain to them for instance the natural Reasons of Thunder and its Effects and you shall be a reputed Atheist But Hypocrites by a diabolical Malignity transform themselves into Angels of Light for they employ the appearances of Truths of universally sacred and rever'd Authority to withstand from out of partial Interests such Truths as are rarely known and of little Reputation Thus they oppugn Truth by her own Image and whilst they ridicule in their Heart what is reverenc'd by the World they establish their Reputation so much more deep and impregnable in the Minds of Men as the Truth they have abus'd is more sacred and inviolable Such Persons are the strongest powerfullest and most formidable Enemies of the Truth They are not indeed very common but there need be but few to do a world of mischief The Shew of Truth and Vertue frequently do more Evil than Truth and Vertue themselves do Good For one subtile Hypocrite is enough to overthrow what cost a great many truly wise and vertuous much labour and pains to build Monsieur Des Cartes for instance has demonstratively prov'd the Existence of a GOD the Immortality of our Souls and a great many other both Metaphysical and Physical Questions and our Age is under infinite Obligations to him for the Truths he has discover'd to us Notwithstanding there starts up an inconsiderable Person and takes upon him being an hot and vehement Declamer and in Esteem with the People for the Zeal he manifested for their Religion to compose Books full of Calumnies against him and accuse him of the vilest Crimes Des Cartes was a Catholick and was Tutor'd in his Studies by the Jesuits whom he frequently mention'd with an honourable respect This was enough with that malicious Spirit to persuade a People opposite to our Religion and easie to be provok'd upon Matters so nice as those of Religion are that he was an Emissary of the Jesuits and had dangerous Designs because the least shadow of Truth in Points of Faith has more influence on Men's Minds than real and effective Truths in Matters of Physicks or Metaphysicks for which they have little or no regard Des Cartes wrote of the Existence of a GOD and this was sufficient for this Slanderer to exercise his false Zeal and to oppress all the Truths that made for his Enemy's Defence He accus'd him of Atheism and of cunningly and clandestinely teaching it like that infamous Atheist Vanino burn'd at Toulouse who to cover his Malice and Impiety wrote for the Existence of a GOD. For one of the Reasons he alledges for his Enemy's being an Atheist was that he wrote against the Atheists as did Vanino for a cloak to his Villany So easie is it for a Man to overwhelm Truth when supported with the shews of it and when once he has obtain'd an Authority over weaker Minds Truth loves Gentleness and Peace and though she be very strong yet she sometimes yields to the Pride and Arrogance of Falshood and a Lye dress'd up and arm'd in her own Appearances She knows that Errour cannot finally prevail against her and if it be her Fate sometimes to live proscrib'd and in obscurity 't is only to wait more favourable opportunities of manifesting her self for she generally at last breaks out in greater Strength and Brightness even in the very place of her Oppression 'T is no wonder to hear an Enemy of Des Cartes a Man of a different Religion and ambitious to raise himself upon the Ruins of Men above him an injudicious Haranguer in a word a Voetius to talk contemptuously of what he neither does nor will understand But 't is to be admir'd that such as are neither Enemies to Des Cartes nor his Religion should be possess'd with an Aversion and Contempt of him on the account of the Reproaches they have read in Books compos'd by the Enemy both to his Person and his Church That Heretick's Book intitled Desperata Causa Papatus is a sufficient Proof of his Impudence Ignorance Outrage and desire of seeming Zealous thereby to purchase a Reputation amongst his Flock which shews that he 's not a Man to be trusted on his Word For as we are not to believe all the fabulous Stories he has heap'd together in his Book against our Religion so we are not to believe on the strength of his Affirmation those bitter and hainously injurious Accusations he has forg'd against his Enemy 'T is not then the part of a Rational Man to enter into a Persuasion that M. Des Cartes was a dangerous Person because they have perchance read it in some Book or heard it said by others whose Piety is awful and respected for Mens bare words are not to be credited when they accuse others of the highest Crimes nor is the Zeal and Gravity it is spoken in sufficient Inducement to persuade us of the Truth of it For in short 't is possible for Folly and Falshood to be set off in the same manner as better things especially when the Speaker is won over to the Belief of them out of Simplicity and Weakness 'T is easie to be inform'd of the Truth or Falshood of the Indictment drawn up against M. Des Cartes his Writings being easie to come by and not difficult to be understood by an Attentive Person Let a Man therefore read his Books that better Evidence may be had against him than a bare Hear-say and after he has well read them and digested them it may be hop'd the Plea of Atheism will be thrown out and on the contrary all due Respect and Deference paid to a Man who in a most simple and evident manner has demonstrated not only the Existence of a GOD and the Immortality of the Soul but a great number of other Truths that till his time were never thought on CHAP. VII Of the Desire of Science and of the Judgments of the falsly Learned THE Mind of Man is doubtless of a little Reach and Capacity and yet he longs to know every thing All Humane Sciences are unable to satisfie his Desires though he has not room to comprehend any one in particular He is constantly disquieted and impatient for Knowledge either because he hopes to find what he seeks for as we have said in the foregoing Chapters or because he is persuaded that his Soul is agrandiz'd by the vain possession of some extraordinary Knowledge The irregular Desire of Happiness and Greatness puts him upon the Study of all Sciences hoping to find Happiness in moral and looking for that false Greatness in speculative Knowledge Whence comes it that there are Men who spend their Life in Reading the Rabbins and such like Books written in foreign obscure and corrupt Languages by injudicious and sensless Authors but from a Persuasion that the Knowledge of the
Oriental Tongues gives them a wonderful Lift and Exaltation above others that know nothing of them and what can bear up their Courage under so ungrateful unpleasant painful and useless a Study but the hope of Eminency and the prospect of some vain Greatness And indeed they are look'd upon as extraordinary Men they are complemented upon their profound Learning they are more awfully listned to than others and though we may for the most part pronounce them the most injudicious of all if it were only for wasting their Life on so insignificant a Business which can neither make them wiser nor happier yet they are suppos'd to have greater Sense and Judgment than others Because they are more knowing in the Derivation of Words we think them more learn'd in the Nature of Things 'T is for the same Reason that Astronomers employ their Time and Fortune to get an accurate Knowledge of what 's not only useless but impossible to be known They would find in the Courses of the Planets such an exact Regularity as does not belong to them and erect Astronomical Schemes to foretel Effects the Causes whereof they do not know They have fram'd a Selenography or Geography of the Moon as if Men design'd to travel thither and have already shar'd that World amongst the most famous Astronomers few of them but are awarded some Province in this Country as a Recompence for their Labours And I question whether they think it not a piece of Honour to have been in the good Graces of him who so magnificently distributed these Kingdoms What makes Rational Men so hot in the Study of this Science whilst at the same time they are grosly ignorant as to most useful Truths but that there seems to be something great in the Knowledge of Heavenly Transactions The Knowledge of the least thing happening in the Upper World seems more Noble Sublime and befitting the Greatness of their Mind than the Knowledge of things vile abject and corruptible as they think Sublunary Bodies The Excellency of a Science derives from the Excellency of its Object This is a notable Principle The Knowledge of the Motion of Inchangeable and Incorruptible Bodies is therefore most noble and elevated of all other and as such seems worthy of the Greatness and Excellency of their Mind Thus it is Men suffer themselves to be dazled with a false Idea of Greatness which flatters and excites them The Imagination struck falls down before the Phantom which it reverences to the blinding Reason that should judge of it and turning it upside down Men seem to be in a Dream when they judge of the Objects of their Passions to have their Eyes seal'd up and to be destitute of common Sense For what is there of so great Importance in the Knowledge of the Motions of the Planets Don't we know enough already to regulate our Months and Years Why so much ado to know whether Saturn is incircled with a Ring or a great multitude of Little Moons and why must we make Parties hereupon What Reason is there for a Man to boast himself upon the Prediction of the Greatness of an Eclipse when possibly the Success was owing only to a luckier Guess There are Men appointed and encourag'd by the Royal Order to observe the Stars let us sit down content with their Observations This Employment they follow with Reason because they engage in it by Duty It is their proper Business and therefore their Labours are successful as grounded upon Art and carried on with all imaginable Accuracy and Application and they want nothing to promote their Endeavours Thus we ought to be fully satisfy'd as to a Maâ—ter that concerns us so little whilst they communicate to us their Discoveries 'T is requisite that many Persons study Anatomy since its Knowledge is exceeding useful that Knowledge being most to be desir'd which has most Use and Advantage Whatever contributes any thing to our Happiness or rather to the easing our Infirmities and mitigating our Miseries may and must be studied But to be prying whole Nights at the end of a Telescope to discover in the Heavens some Spot or new Planet or other to ruin a Man's Health and Happiness to neglect all his Business that he may pay constant Visits to the Stars and measure their Magnitudes and Situations is in my mind entirely to forget both what a Man is at present and what he shall be hereafter But you 'll say perhaps that this manifests the Greatness of him who made these mighty Objects To which I say That the least Fly shews forth the Power and Wisdom of GOD to those who attentively consider it without prejudice to its Littleness more than all that the Astronomers know concerning the Heavens Yet Men are not made to consider Flies and we think their pains but ill employ'd who have studied to inform us how the several Lice of every respective Animal are made and how different Worms are transform'd into Flies and Butter-flies They may if they please for their diversion when they have nothing else to do busie themselves about these things but they ought not to spend their whole time upon them unless they are become insensible to their miseries But it lies upon them to be incessantly endeavouring to know GOD and themselves to labour seriously to get rid of their Errours and Prejudices of their Passions and Inclinations to Sin to be importunate in the search of Truths most needful for them for at last those shall be found to be most judicious who are most careful in the Enquiry after the solidest Truths The principal Cause which engages Men in these false Studies is their having conjoin'd the Idea of Learned to these vain and unfruitful Sciences instead of annexing it to the solid and necessary When once a Man has the Thoughts of growing Learned in his Head and the Spirit of Polimathy begins to work he is little concern'd to know what Sciences are most necessary either to guide him by the Rules of Vertue or to perfect his Reason he only fixes his Eye on such as go for the Learned in the World and observes what they have in them that makes them so considerable All the most solid and necessary Sciences being of common and easie access can neither make their Possessors admir'd nor respected for common things however fine and admirable in themselves are carelesly and supinely regarded which makes the Pretenders to Learning dwell but little on Sciences necessary to the Conduct of Life and the Perfection of the Mind For these raise not in them that Idea of the Sciences which they had form'd as not being those they admir'd in others and which they would have others to admire in them The Gospel and Morality are Sciences too common and ordinary for them they love to be skill'd in the Criticisms of some words to be met with in the Ancient Philosophers or Greek Poets The Tongues as Arabick and Rabbinage and all except their genuine native
management of Life that 's too trite and vulgar it not being their purpose to be useful to others or themselves but only to be reputed Learned They either alledge no Reasons of things which they advance or if they do they are so mysterious and incomprehensible as neither themselves nor any body else can evidently conceive Clear Reasons they have none but if they had they would not use them because they surprize not the Mind are thought too simple and common and suited to the Abilities of all Mankind They rather bring Authorities to prove or with pretence to prove their Notions for the Authorities employ'd seldom prove any thing by the Sense they contain but only by being Greek and Arabick But perhaps it will be pertinent to speak something of their Quotations which will acquaint us in part with the disposition of their Mind It is methinks manifest that nothing but a falsly-term'd Learning and a Spirit of Polimathy could bring these Citations into fashion as they have formerly been and are still at this day with some of the Learned For 't is usual with some Authors to be perpetually quoting long Sentences without any Reason for it whether because the things they advance are too clear to be doubted of or that they are too intricate and obscure to be made out by the Authority of their Authors since they could know nothing of them or lastly because the Citations inserted are inserviceable to adorn and beautifie their Discourse 'T is repugnant to common Sense to bring a Greek Passage to prove the Air transparent because 't is evident to all the World to employ the Authority of Aristotle to persuade us that Intelligences move the Heavens because we are certain Aristotle could not know it and lastly to mingle strange Languages Arabian and Persian Proverbs with French English or Latin Books written for every body forasmuch as these Citations cannot be ornamental at least are such fantastical Ornaments as disgust most Persons and can satisfie but very few Nevertheless the greatest part of those who would fain be thought Learned are so extreamly pleas'd with this kind of Giâ—â—rish that they blush not to quote in strange Tongues which they do not understand and tug might and main to draw into their Books an Arabick Passage which they cannot so much as read Thus they puzzle themselves strangely to effect a thing repugnant to good Sense but that sacrifices to their Vanity and makes them esteem'd by Soâ—s One very considerable Fault is still behind which is that they are but in little care to seem to have read with Choice and Judgment all they desire being to be reckon'd great Readers especially of obscure Books that they may seem more Learned of Books that are scarce and dear that they may be thought to have every thing of wicked and impious Books which honest Men are afraid to read with much the same Spirit as some boast to have acted Crimes which others dare not Hence they rather cite very Dear very Rare very Ancient and Obscure Books than other more Common and Intelligible Astrological Cabalistical and Magical Books than such as are good and wholesome as if they did not see that Reading being a kind of Conversing they should rather desire to seem industriously to have sought the Acquaintance of Good and Intelligible than Wicked and Obscure Authors For as no Man in his Senses would chuse out for ordinary Converse People that want an Interpreter when the same things that are to be learn'd of them might be known another way so 't is ridiculous to read Books not to be understood without a Dictionary when the same things may be had in those that are more intelligible And as it is a sign of a deprav'd Nature to affect the Company and Conversation of the Impious so 't is the Criterion of a corrupt Heart to delight in reading Wicked Books But 't is an extravagant Pride for a Man to pretend to have read those which he has not which yet is a thing of very common occurrence For we find Men of Thirty Years standing quote more ill Books in their Works than they could have read in many Ages whilst they would have others believe they have very exactly read them But most of the Books of some of these Learned Gentlemen owe their Birth to the kind Dictionary and all their Reading may be reduc'd to the Indexes of the Books they quote and some Common Places heap'd together from out of different Authors I venture not to enter into the Particulars of these things nor to give Instances to prove them for fear of provoking Persons so fierce and cholerick as these Learned Pretenders as not caring to be revil'd in Greek and Arabick Besides that 't is needless more sensibly to evince what I have said by particular Allegations the Mind of Man being ready enough to tax the Management of others and make particular Application of this Discourse In the mean time let them hug themselves and feed upon this vain Fantom of Greatness and give one another the Applauses which we deny them For we have been perhaps already too troublesome by molesting them in their so seemingly sweet and grateful Enjoyments CHAP. IX How the Inclination for Honours and Riches conduces to Errour HOnours and Riches no less than Vertue and Science which we have already spoke of are principal Acquirements to give us the Ascendant over other Men. For there seems to accrue to our Being a Growth and Enlargement and kind of Independency from the Possession of these Advantages So that the Love we have for our selves naturally streaming out to Honours and Riches every body may be said to have some sort of Inclination for them We will explain in brief how these Inclinations obviate the Discovery of Truth and engage us in Falshood and Errour It has been shewn in several places that much Time and Labour Assiduity and Contention of Mind must go to the clearing up Compound Truths surrounded with Difficulties and depending on many Principles Whence it is easie to conclude that Men of publick Characters of great Employments who have large Estates to look after and great Affairs to manage and whose Hearts are fix'd upon Riches and Honours are not the fittest Enquirers after Truth and that they commonly err in point of all things difficultly known whenever they pretend to judge of them And that because First They have little time to lay out in the Search of Truth Secondly They take but little Pleasure in this Search Thirdly They are very incapable of Attention because the Capacity of their Mind is divided by the multitude of the Ideas of the things they wish for which take up their Thoughts whether they will or no. In the fourth place They fancy they know every thing and can hardly be induc'd to believe their Inferiours have more Reason than themselves some Matters of Fact they may vouchsafe to learn of them but are above being taught by them solid and
Fears and Disquiet and instead of examining the Will of GOD in Holy Writ and referring to Men of untainted Imagination they constantly intend an Imaginary Law which the disorderly motions of Fear have engraven in their Brain And though they be inwardly convinc'd of their Infirmity and that GOD requires not certain Duties they prescribe themselves as being inconsistent with his Service yet they cannot forbear preferring their Imagination to their Understanding and submitting rather to some confus'd and terrifying Sensations that throw them into Errour than to the Evidence of Reason which brings them back to a good Assurance and reduces them into the right way of Salvation There is commonly a good stock of Vertue and Charity in Persons tormented with Scruples but not so much in People devoted to certain Superstitions and whose principal Employment is some Jewish and Pharisaick Practices GOD requires to be worship'd in Spirit and in Truth He is not satisfy'd with our making Faces and paying external Ceremonies with our bending the Knee before him and praising him with a Lip-offering when our Heart is far from him If Men are content with these exteriour Marks of Respect 't is because they cannot fathom the depth of the Heart for even they would be worship'd in Spirit and in Truth GOD demands our Mind and our Heart which as he has created so he preserves only for himself But many there are who to their own misfortune deny him those things which he has all manner of Right and Claim to They harbour Idols in their Hearts which they adore with a spiritual and true Worship and to which they sacrifice themselves and all they have But because the true GOD threatens in the Recesses of their Conscience to punish their excessive Ingratitude with an Eternity of Torments and yet they cannot think of quitting their belov'd Idolatry they therefore bethink themselves of an external Performance of some good Works They betake themselves to Fasting to Almsgiving and Saying of Prayers as they see others do and continue some time in such like Exercises but whereas they are painful to those that have not Charity they commonly forsake them to substitute some little Practicks and easie Devotions in their room which striking in with Self-love necessarily but insensibly subvert the whole System of Morals which our LORD has left us They are faithful fervent and zealous Defenders of those Humane Traditions which Un-enlightned Persons make them believe most useful and the frightful Idea of Eternity daily represents as absolutely necessary to their Salvation It fares not so with the Righteous They hear no less than the Wicked the Menaces of their GOD but the confus'd Noise of their Passions does not deafen them to his Counsels The false Glarings of Humane Traditions do not dazle them so far as to make them insensible to the Light of Truth They place their Confidence in the Promises of CHRIST and follow his Precepts as knowing that the Promises of Men are as vain as their Counsels However it may be said that the Dread which the Idea of Eternity breeds in their Minds sometimes effects so great a Commotion in their Imagination that they dare not absolutely condemn these Humane Traditions and that sometimes they approve them by their Example because they have A shew of Wisdom in Will-worship and Humility like those Pharisaick Traditions mention'd by St. Paul But that which more especially deserves to be consider'd in this place and which does not so much relate to Moral as Intellectual Disorder is that the fore-mention'd Fear stretches the Faith as well as Zeal of those it infects to things false or unworthy the Holiness of our Religion There are many who believe and that with a stiff and obstinate Faith That the Earth rests immovably in the Centre of the World That Brutes are sensible of Real Pain That Sensible Qualities are strew'd and diffus'd over Objects That there are Forms or Real Accidents distinguish'd from Matter and a world of the like false or uncertain Opinions because they conceit it would be repugnant to their Faith to deny them They are frighted with the Expressions of the Holy Scripture which speaks to our Capacity and consequently makes use of the receiv'd manners of Speech without design of making us Philosophers They believe not only what the Spirit of GOD means to teach them but likewise all the Opinions of the Jews They can't see for example that Joshua speaks before his Souldiers as even Copernicus Galilaeus and Des Cartes would speak to the Vulgar part of Men and that though he had been of the Opinion of these Philosophers he would not have commanded the Earth to stand still since he could not have manifested to his Army in words which they did not understand the Miracle GOD shew'd for his People Don't those who believe the Sun immoveable say to their Servants to their Friends or to those who are of their Opinion that The Sun Rises and Sets Do they affect to speak differently from others whenever their chief Design is not to Philosophize Was Joshua so admirably vers'd in Astronomy Or if he was did his Souldiers understand it But were he and his Souldiers Astronomers could we think they would be playing the Philosophers when their Thoughts were intent on Fighting Joshua therefore must have spoke as he did though both he and his Souldiers were of the same Opinion that the best Astronomers hold now-a-days And yet the Words of that great General Sun stand thou still upon Gibeon and what is said afterwards that the Sun stood still according to his Command persuade a great many that the Opinion of the Earth's Motion is not only dangerous but also absolutely Heretical and unwarrantable They have heard that some Devout Men whom we are to treat with much Deference and Respect have censur'd and condemn'd it and have some confus'd Notion of what happen'd to a Famous Astronomer of our own Age upon that occasion All which seems sufficient to make them obstinately believe that Faith is concern'd in that Opinion A certain confus'd Sensation rais'd and encourag'd by a Motion of Fear which yet they are scarce aware of throws them into Suspicions of those who follow Reason in things of Reason's Jurisdiction Hence they regard them as Hereticks they hear them but with Impatience and Regret of Mind and these their secret Apprehensions breed in them as great a Reverence and Submission to these Opinions and several others purely Philosophical as to Truths that are Objects of Faith CHAP. XIII I. Of the Third Natural Inclination viz. The Friendship we have for other Men. II. It makes us approve the Thoughts of our Friends and deceive them by undue Praises OF all our Inclinations taken in the general and in the Sense explain'd in the first Chapter there remains now to be spoken to only that which we have for those we live with and for all the Objects round about us of which I shall say but little
Simple or Compound But I have not oblig'd my self to account for all the different Motions whereof the Mind is capable I am willing to have it known that my principal Design in all the foregoing Treatise concerning the Search after Truth was to make Men sensible how weak and ignorant they are and how subject to Errour and Sin I have said it and I say it again perhaps it will be remembred I had never design'd a Thorough particular Explication of the Nature of the Mind but I have been oblig'd to say something of it to lay open its Errours in their Principle to unfold them methodically in a Word to make my self intelligible If I have transgress'd the Bounds I had prescrib'd my self â—t was because I had methought new things to say which seem'd of moment and which I believ'd might be read with Pleasure Perhaps I was mistaken but that Presumption was necessary â—o encourage me to write them For who would say any thing if he did not hope to be attended to I have said it 's true several things which seem to have less Analogy with the present Subject than would be the particular Treatment of the Motions of the Soul and I acknowledge it But 't is not my Intention to put my self under any Constraint when I propose to my self a Method I lay down a Rule to go by but I presume it may be permitted me to turn aside as I walk when any thing falls in my way to be consider'd I presume too I have the Liberty of diverting to a Resting Place provided I lose not Sight of the Road I am to pursue Such as will not ease themselves with me may go on if they please 't is but turning to a new Page But if they take it amiss I would let them know that there are many who find that the Resting Places I have made choice of make their Journey easier and more pleasant The End of the First Volume PREFACE to the Second Volume Which may serve as an Answer to the ANIMADVERSIONS on the First SOme time since was publish'd a Book entituled Animadversions upon the Search after Truth wherein at the same time are examin'd part of M. des Cartes 's Principles being a Letter by an Academick in Paris c. 'T is said this Book attacks me and truly not without Reason for the Title shews it and the Author manifests it was his Design which gives me a Right and imposes on me a sort of Obligation of speaking my Thoughts of it For besides that I ought to disabuse some people who delight in these petty Quarrels and immediately determine on the side of the Criticks that gratifie their Passion I think my self bound to give some Answer to the Aggressor that I may not be thought to be â—ilent out of Insolence or Impotence The Animadverter may pardon me if he pleases if I sometimes seem to give him Provocation I should be very sorry so much as to design it But I cannot defend my self without wounding him nor repell the Blows he makes at me without making him feel and others know his Weakness and Imbecillity Self-defence is a natural Obligation but the Defence of Truth is absolutely indispensible See here in short his Design He supposes the Book he animadverts on is a Method for laying the Foundations of the Sciences He reduces this Method to fourteen Heads and shews that they are either Suppositions without Proof or Assertioâ—s without Foundation and consequently that the Substance of the Book is intirely useless to the Enquiry after Truth though there are here and there some Observations in it that place it in the rank of Works which have gain'd the Estimation of our Age. I answer in General that the Author of the Animadversions has not understood or has dissembled the Understanding the Design of the Book he impungs it being plain that the principal Design of it is to discover the Errours we are subject to 'T is true it treats of the Nature of the Senses Imagination and Intellect but 't is manifest and I precaution in several places that this is only to discover these Errours in their Causes This being the Method I always endeavour to observe as believing it most advantageous to the enlightning the Mind The Title of the first Page of the Book he opposes wherein are to be seen in Capitals CONCERNING THE ERROURS OF THâ— SENSES the very Table of the same Book or rather the Place where I make the Division of the whole Work might have taught him my Design if he had desir'd to know it where he might have read these words which methinks are clear enough And so all the Errours of Men and the Causes of them may be reduc'd to five Heads and we shall treat of them according to that order First We shall speak of the Errours of the SENSES Secondly Of the Errours of IMAGINATION Thirdly Of the Errours of the PURE INTELLECT Fourthly Of the Errours of our INCLINATIONS And fifthly Of the Errours of the PASSIONS And thus having made an Essâ—y to rid the Soul of the Errours which she is subject to WE SHALL Lastly LAY DOWN A GENERAL METHOD TO CONDUCT HER IN THE SEARCH OF TRUTH 'T is plain enough from this Division that the first Volume which is the subject of our Aâ—thor's Animadversions treats only of the Senses Imagination and Intellect and that the Method which he supposes I have given ought to be the Subject of the Second Volume Nevertheless as he is pleased to make me undertake a Design I do not execute that he may have the more to Charge upon my Conduct so he goes to prove it was my Design to lay down a Method in that Book I do him no Injury says he in looking on his Book as a Method to lay the Foundations of the Sciences For besides that the Title expresses so much he declares himself upon the Point in the following manner Let us examaine the Causes and Nature of our Errours and since the Method of examining things by considering them in their Birth and Origin is the most regular and perspicuous and serves better than others to give us a thorough knowledge of them let us try to put it here in practice I do a Man no Injury when I say he designs to draw an Hercules but if I shew that instead of an Hercules he takes a Polyphemus or Thersites I make him ridiculous Should I say with many others that the Animadverter is a Cartesian or that he designed by his Animadversions on my Book to defend the Doctrine of Des Cartes I should not wrong him but if at the same time I should shew that he opposes me without understanding me I should possibly offend him 'T is then injuring a Man to charge upon him Designs which he never had to render him ridiculous But a Man must be wretchedly in the wrong who imposes them on such as have like me in several places explain'd themselves clearly upon
the Subject But the Title of my Book evidences as much for 't is concerning the Search after Truth I answer That to search out Truth two things are requisite first to be delivered from the Prejudices of Childhood or vulgar Errours Secondly to have a good Method The Title of the Book is comprehensive of these two parts I have given the first in the former Volume but the Animadverter will needs have it that I have given the second which surely is unreasonable He ought rather to correct the Title by the Book if the Title displeased him than to go about to ruine a whole Book for the Title 's sake But continues our Aurhor I declare my self upon the Point in this manner Let us examine the Causes and Nature of our Errours and since the Method of examining things by considering them in their Birth and Origin is the most regular and perspicuous and serves better than others to give us a thorough knowledge of them let us try to put it here in practice I have been shewing that I have declar'd distinctly enough in the Division I have made of my work that I gave not my Method in the first Volume this cannot be doubted But let us see whether this passage was enough to make him think I have given a Method I say Let us examine the Causes and Nature of our Errours My Design therefore according to this Passage is to examine the Causes and Naâ—ure of our Errours That 's plain I continue And since the Method of examining things by considering thâ—m in their Birth and Origin is more regular and perspicuous than others let us try to put it in practice My Design therefore is to examine the Causes and Nature of our Errours methodically can any one from hence believe I have given a Method If so we may believe there is no Author but has given a Method since there is none but has the same Design as my self to write methodically I might even say that the Animadverter has design'd to give a Method and impugn him by his own Weapons but that he had rather be thought to have written without any These are the Proofs imployed by him to demonstrate I have given a Method The fourteen Heads of this Imaginary Method are in the places whence they are taken either incidental Propositions or Answers to Objections or Opinions he ascribes to me for want of Understanding what he engages or lastly Examples which of themselves neither are nor can be Heads of a Method Here follows the first of these Heads I begin thus The Mind or Soul of Man being neither material nor extended is undoubtedly a simple Substance indivisible and without any Composition of Parts notwithstanding it has been the custom to distingish in it two Faculties namely the Understanding and the Will which it is necessary in the first place to explain for it seems c. And in order to render the abstract Ideas of these two words sensible I explain them not as our Author misrepresents me with Relation to the Essence of Matter which he supposes unknown but by Relation to the Properties which all the World acknowledge are in Matter i. e. the capacity of being mov'd and of receiving different external Figures and internal Configurations The Animadverter supposing as has been said that the Book he impugns is a Method begins thus The first thing to be observ'd when a Man pretends to the search of Truth is not to suppose he has already found it though he be in perfect possession of it c. And lower Which thing the Author seems not to have sufficiently consider'd for at his very first setting out he engages in the supposition of a thing the Knowledge whereof is the principal motive to his Enquiry after Truth and which he ought not to determine before he had exhausted the greatest Questions in Philosophy Thus it is he enters on his matter in his first Chapter The Mind of Man being neither material nor extended c. 'T is easie to see this Supposition is not indifferent c. I answer first that it was not my Design to give a Method in the Book he impugns but only to prepare the Mind by delivering it from Prejudices Secondly that though it had been my Design I might have suppos'd some Truths which are commonly acknowledg'd as that the Soul is not material especialy if I employ them not as a Foundation to build some System on I answer in the third place that the Proposition he will have to be an Head of my Method is an incidental Proposition The bare construction of the words is a sufficient indication the process of the Discourse an undeniable proof and all that I say in this place might subsist though the Soul were material 'T is not the part of a good Critick to take an incidental Proposition for a Fundamental and an Head of a Method Nor is this to prove I have suppos'd to have found the Truth I am in quest of since the thing I suppose or rather which I do not examine is not of any use to me When it was necessary to the sequel of Discourse to know that the Soul was a kind of Being distinct from Matter I have prov'd it or referr'd to those that have But why will he oblige me to prove a thing in this place which would be useless to the following Discourse and I should have been sorry to have prov'd here Whether the Soul be material or not it is always true that it has been the custom to distinguish two Faculties in it the Understanding and Will These two words are in use and I may employ them they are perhaps obscure and I ought to define them and because their Ideas are abstract I may make them sensible This is what I have done and I cannot yet see what any one can blame in it At my very first setting out he says I engage in the supposition of a thing the knowledge whereof is the principal motive to my Enquiry after Truth and which I ought not to determine before having exhausted the greatest Questions in Philosophy All this Discourse is false I engage not in a Supposition for incidental Propositions come not into account The principal motive to my Enquiry after Truth is not to know whether the Soul be Material or Immaterial and so far is this Question from being insoluble till having drain'd the greatest Questions of Philosophy that its Resolution depends on no other This Question is not complex'd and the bare Comparison of Ideas which answer to the terms is sufficient to resolve it as I shall shew in the sixth Book though this is not discoverable by those who make more use of their Imagination than their Reason There is no necessity of explaining this more at present we need but know that this Supposition is an incidental Proposition from which I draw no Conseqence and which I should have been to blame to prove and
yet if we will credit the Animadverter What is worst of all is that this sole Anticipation is enough to ruine all the hopes the Search after Truth might have rais'd in us In the four or five first Pages which our Animadverter spends in refuting the first pretended Head of the Imaginary Method many things would deserve our consideration if we thought our selves obliged to let the World know all his Faults for he imposes on me here as in other places without any Proof Opinions and Designs which never entred my Head and he does it with a confidence which is capable of surprising all those who believe others on their Words I am willing to think he is too honest and sincere a Man to prevaricate and to be prodigal of that Respect which is due to the Publick but if so there is Levity or Temerity in his enterprise he should not have undertaken to oppose what he did not understand Yet I cannot chuse but relate how he finishes his first Attack we shall know what we are to think of the rest by the Beginning and End I said that the Soul being a Simple and Indivisible Substance has no parts however it had been the custom to distinguish in it two Faculties the Understanding and Will c. This has given occasion to the Animadverter to accuse me of Contradiction and after having prov'd after his manner by many Interrogations and Rhetorical Figures extremely convincing he concludes with these words which represent his whole figurative Reasoning in short and for that Reason he has put it in Italick Which is the same thing says he as if I should say THE SOUL IS WITHOUT ANY COMPOSITION OF PARTS BUT YET I AM GOING TO EXPLAIN HOW SHE CONTAINS THEM You see Sir continues he that this Supposition serves only to throw us immediately into obscurity besides that it is contrary on other grounds to the success of this Method But who ever took Faculties for Parts Certainly the Passion for Criticising must be very blind to put into the Mouth of a Man of Parts so extraordinary Comparisons and to make him believe the World must be content with them But let us examine his second Head of my pretended Method and see how he impugns it After having shewn that to the avoiding Errour we must only give our consent to things appearing in such Light and Evidence as make it impossible for us to withhold it without clearly Understanding the secret Reproaches of our Reason I adjoyn 'T is not however to be denied but there are some Truths besides those of Faith for which it would be unreasonable to demand indisputable Demonstrations as are those which relate to matter of Fact in History and other things which have their dependence on the Will of Men for there are two kinds of Truth the one necessary the other contingent And because these two words Necessary and Contingent are not it may be clear enough I explain them thus I call necessary Truths those which are immutable by their Nature and those which have been fix'd and determin'd by the Will of God which is not subject to change All other sorts of Truth are contingent And lower We demand therefore an exact observation of the Rule we have been establishing in the Search of necessary Truths the knowledge of which may be call'd Science and we must be content with the greatest probability in History which includes the knowledge of things contingent For under c. I wish it might be examin'd first whether the things I have been saying are clear or obscure Whether it may not be suppos'd there are necessary Truths as that 2 times 2 are 4 and contingent Truths as that Mr. shall say such a thing at such an hour especially when we have no design of establishing any System upon this Supposition Whether there be any thing more certain than this Supposition whereby it may be proved Lastly whether a Man can reasonably persuade himself that I lay down for one of the Heads of my Method or a Supposition essential to any System a Proposition which begins with FOR. This being suppos'd I come now to produce the Reasonings of our Animadverter against what I have said of contingent and necessary Truths I shall only place in the Margin some Notes or Answers I shall think necessary this being the shortest and easiest way for me since it is an harder thing than is imagined to answer clearly such as are unintelligible and inconsequent Reasoners For we must at least put their Objections in some form to solve them which cannot be always done either because they will not bear it or because we do not understand them For my own part I am very glad it cannot be imagined I use the Animadversions as the Animadverter has us'd the Search or that from different Passages of this Book I compose an incomprehensible peice of Nonsense ANIMADVERSIONS The Second Supposition concerning Necessary Truths Page 9. ANIMADVERSIONS THE Second thing supposed by the Author is that there are two sorts of Truths Necessary and Contingent I know not for what reason he looks upon what he here asserts as a undeniable and why he does not think of proving it For this is one of the most considerable Questions that has employed the Learned especially the Ancients insomuch that the first Philosophers were b all except Parmenides of a contrary opinion to that he maintains in this place Yet Parmenides acknowledged but one necessary Truth whereas he supposes a very great number Protagoras believ'd there was no Truth on the part of things so far was he from owning any necessary and that Man was the Measure and Rule of all that could come in Question that there was nothing but mere Appearances and no Realities and consequently there were no Truths to seek or Errours to avoid all being equally true or rather equally false The Pyrronists have still maintained there was nothing certain or truly determined or that if there were yet we could not know it The new Philosophers grant that individuals are no wise immutable but are subject to continual Vicissitudes which being so what becomes of necessary Truths I speak not of those which are found in the Mathematicks that ought to make a Question c apart but of those he supposes in Physicks Medicine and Morality though I still except those which regard the Essence or Existence of a God Where then could he place them except in the d Species and Essences of the same Individuals which are subject to change And if these Essences or Species are nothing but Ideas as may be suspected if their immutability be only in appearance should not we in following that supposition engage in an Errour which would absolutely exclude us from the knowledge of the true state of things But let us see what the Author calls necessary Truths for at least he explains what he means by these words I call necessary Truths those which are immutable by their Nature
and those which have been fixed and determined by the Will of God which is not subject to change To say that these Truths are immutable by their Nature what is it more than to say they are immutable because immutable unless this signifies they are essentially so without any external assistance But if these Truths were necessary in this manner how were they determin'd by the Will of God since God being free as the Author will not deny he might if he had pleas'd have not determin'd them to be immutable e And if so they are immutable only by Grace because God will'd it so and determin'd them to that state of immutability This being so how come they to be immutable by their Nature since it was possible for them to be liable to change But if it were not possible for them to be subject to change how could they be determin'd by God to be immutable and how could he have fix'd them by the operation of his Will The Author may explain himself upon this Point if he think convenient mean time it is no little concern to know whether God can change the Essences of things and make two Contradictories true at the same time for as a celebrated Divine of our Age has said upon the same words that are now under examination Is God the Author of the Truth of his own Existence Or ought we to affirm that we can form a right-lined Triangle whose three Angles shall be greater than two Rights or that shall have one Side longer than the other two In a word if it be possible for Contradictories to be true and false at the same time what will become of humane Reasoning And what shall we say to those Theological Conclusions which assure us that God is not Corporeal that he is not subject to Change that he has always been f c. g Might we not say in following this Hypothesis that its possible for him to have been eternally and not to have been eternally that he is liable and not liable to change I mean not to pronounce upon so difficult a Question but I may affirm the Author had no right to do it especially in the Circumstances he has done it and without alleadging sufficient Proofs Yet methinks I perceive a shew of Reasoning in these words and by the Will of God which is not subject to change He seems to consider the Will of God as the Cause of the Necessity of these Truths But if so he proves too much in the place where we complain he proves nothing at all for if what God wills be immutable because his Will is not subject to change it follows that whatever he wills must have an equal immutability since it is the same Will which is the Cause of it Mean while it is certain he wills things which are subject to change when he determines the Existence or Non-existence of Creatures in the Vicissitude of times h Thus though God should have fix'd these Truths but for some Ages his Will thereby would be no less immutable than for his producing daily all those admirable changes which make the Beauty of the Universe But the Author will say God wills that these Truths should be immutable for ever But how could he know this had he any particular Revelation yet he speaks as possitively as if he was very certain It may be he bottoms upon this that if these Truths seem immutable to us whilst they are subject to change we should err in pretending to Science l But if it were so all that could thence be concluded is that the first Philosophers the Academicks and Pyrronists have better Philosophiz'd than the Peripateticks Cartesians and other Dogmatists and I do not believe the Author would establish his Philosophy upon such a Sophism unless there were necessary Truths we could have no true Science therefore there are necessary Truths m But though we might suppose there were necessary Truths in Physick Medicine c. and might determine about this Question without being utterly excluded from the knowledge of Truth Though these Truths were necessary by their Nature and their immutability by some new Mystery was still an effect of the free determination of the Will of God Though the necessity of these Truths proceeded from the immutability of this Will whilst yet it is the Cause of all the Changes happening in the Universe Though we should be moreover assur'd that God had resolv'd to preserve these Truths in an entire immutability We must still suppose in order to enter into his Opinion the knowledge of the Existence of God and of his Will of his Liberty and of his Power n Which obliges me to make some Reflexions upon what he has borrowed from Faith to add to Reasons Philosophical which is what we may look upon as his third Supposition After having prov'd that we must yield only to Evidence except in matters of Faith which are not submitted to the disquisition of Reason I conclude with these words Mysteries then of Faith must be distinguished from things of Nature we ought equally to submit to Faith and to Evidence but in the concernments of Faith we must not look for Evidence as in those of Nature we ought not to take up with Faith that is with the Authority of Philosophers In a word to be a Believer 't is required to assent blindly but to be a Philosopher it is necessary to see plainly Mysteries of Faith must be distinguished from things of Nature Thus judiciously speaks the Author and concludes with these words which might even pass for o a Proverb To be a Believer 't is requir'd to assent blindly but to be a Philosopher 't is necessary to see plainly Mean while I wonder he observes not in his Book the Resolution he made of not p mingling the concerns of Religion with the decisions of Philosophy for it 's too visible that one half of his Book is nothing but Reflexions upon original Sin deprav'd Manners and corrupt Inclinations which Christian Morality is to correct q I blame not his Piety in this nor believe it a thing unbecoming a Christian to labour upon these Subjects But that ought to be reserv'd for Sermons r Or if he had design'd to take the occasion of insinuating these Morals as knowing that the true way of moving the Heart pathetically is to do it by discovering to the Mind the Truths that are of nearest concernment to it he might have satisfied that laudable desire but should have contriv'd for that purpose particular Chapters which he has done too in some places But once more a very little thing will serve to confound the Light we begin to receive in the Search after Truth s We cannot at the same time satisfie both Reason and Faith since Reason obliges us to open our Eyes and Faith commands us to shut them t And yet I find he has so interwoven his principal Propositions with the Credenda of Religion that he seems to talk
no Pain in discharging his Duty But God is withdrawn from us since the Fall of Adam he is no more our Good by Nature but only by Grace we feel now no Delight and Satisfaction in the Love of him and he rather thrusts us from than draws us to him If we follow him he gives us a Rebuff if we run after him he strikes us and if we be obstinate in our Persuit he continues to handle us more severely by inflicting very lively and sensible Pains upon us And when being weary of walking through the rough and stony Ways of Vertue without being supported by the Repast of Good or strengthned by any Nourishment we come to feed upon sensible Things he fastens us to them by the relish of Pleasure as though he would reward us for turning back from him to run after counterfeit Goods In short since Men have sinn'd it seems God is not pleas'd that they should love him think upon him or esteem him their only and sovereign Good It is only by the delectable Grace of Christ our Mediator that we sensibly perceive that God is our proper Good For Pleasure being the sensible Mark of Good we then perceive God to be our Good when the Grace of our Redeemer makes us love him with Pleasure Thus the Soul not knowing her own Good either by a clear View or by Sensation without the Grace of Jesus Christ she takes the Good of the Body for her own she loves it and closes to it with a stricter Adhesion by her Will than ever she did by the first Institution of Nature For Corporeal Good being now the only one left that is sensible must needs operate upon Man with more Violence strike his Bâ—ain livelier and consequently be felt and imagined by the Soul in a more sensible manner And the Animal Spirits receiving a more vehement Agitation the Will by consequence must love it with a greater Ardency and Pleasure The Soul might before Sin blot out of her Brain the too lively Image of Corporeal Good and dissipate the sensible Pleasure this Image was attended with The Body being subject to the Mind the Soul might on a sudden stop the quavering Concussion of the Fibres of the Brain and the Commotion of the Spirits by the meer Consideration of her Duty But she lost that Power by Sin Those Traces of the Imagination and those Motions of the Spirits depend no more upon her whence it necessarily follows that the Pleasure which by the Institution of Nature is conjoin'd to those Motions and Traces must usurp the whole Possession of the Heart Man cannot long resist that Pleasure by his own Strength 't is Grace that must obtain a perfect Victory Reason alone can never doe it None but God as the Author of Grace can overcome himself as the Author of Nature or rather exorate himself as the Revenger of Adam's Rebellion The Stoicks who had but a confused Knowledge of the Disorders of Original Sin could not answer the Epicures Their Felicity was but Ideal since there is no Happiness without Pleasure and no Pleasure to be sensibly perceiv'd by them in Vertuous Actions They might feel indeed some Joy in following the Rules of their phantastick Vertue because Joy is a natural Consequence of the Consciousness our Soul has of being in the most convenient State That Spiritual Joy might bear up their Spirits for a while but was not strong enough to withstand Pain and overcome Pleasure Secret Pride and not Joy made them keep their Countenance for when no body was present all their Wisdom and Strength vanished just as Kings of the Stage lose all their Grandeur in a Moment It is not so with those Christians that exactly follow the Rules of the Gospel Their Joy is solid because they certainly know that they are in the most convenient State Their Joy is great because the Good they possess through Faith and Hope is Infinite for the Hope of a great Good is always attended with a great Joy and that Joy is so much livelier as the Hope is stronger because a strong Hope representing the Good as present necessarily produces Joy as also that sensible Pleasure which ever attends the Presence of Good Their Joy is not restless and uneasie because grounded on the Promises of God confirm'd by the Blood of his Son and cherished by that inward Peace and unutterable Sweetness of Charity which the Holy Ghost sheds into their Hearts Nothing can separate them from their true Good which they relish and take Complacency in by the Delectation of Grace The Pleasures of Corporeal Good are not so great as those they feel in the Love of God They love Contempt and Pain They feed upon Disgraces and the Pleasure they find in their Sufferings or rather the Pleasure they find in God for whom they despise all the rest to unite themselves to him is so ravishing and transporting as to make them speak a new Language and even boast as the Apostles did of their Miseries and Abuses when they departed from the presence of the Council rejoicing that they were counted worthy to suffer shame for the Name of JESUS Such is the Disposition of Mind in true Christians when they are most basely affronted for the Defence of Truth CHRIST being come to restore the Order which Sin had overthrown and that Order requiring that the greatest Goods be accompanied with the most solid Pleasures it is plain that things ought to be in the manner we have said But we may farther confirm and strengthen Reason by Experience for 't is known that as soon as any Person has formed but the bare Resolution to despise all for God he is commonly affected with a Pleasure or internal Joy that makes him as sensibly and lively perceive that God is his Good as he knew it evidently before The true Christians assure us every Day that the Joy they feel in an unmixt loving and serving God is inexpressible and 't is but reasonable to believe the Relation they make of what happens within them On the contrary the Impious are perpetually vexed with horrible Disquietudes and those that are shar'd betwixt God and the World partake of the Joys of the Just and of the Vexations of the Impious They complain of their Miseries and 't is reasonable to believe that their Complaints are not groundless God strikes Men to the Quick and through the very Heart when they love any thing besides him and 't is this Stroke that causes a real Misery He pours an exceeding Joy into their Minds when all their Adherencies are to him only and that Joy is the Spring of true Felicity The Abundance of Riches and Elevation to Honours being without us cannot cure us of the Wound God makes and Poverty and Contempt that are likewise without us cannot hurt us under the Almighty's Protection By what we have said 't is plain That the Objects of the Passions are not our Good that we must not follow their
affords us the Enjoyment of him as far as we are capable of it in this Life whereas the Blindness of the Mind and the Depravation of the Heart make our Imperfection and are the Results of the Union of our Soul and Body as I have proved in several Places shewing that we never know the Truth nor love the real Good when we follow the Impressions of our Senses Imaginations and Passions All this is evident and yet Men who all passionately desire the Perfection of their Being care but little to increase the Union which they have with God nay they are continually at work to strengthen and enlarge that which they have with sensible things The Cause of that surprizing Disorder cannot be too much explain'd The Possession of Good must naturally produce two Effects in the Possessour at once must render him more perfect and more happy however it does not always fall out so 'T is impossible indeed that the Mind should actually enjoy a Good without being actually more perfect but it may happen that it actually enjoys it without being actually happier Those that know Truth best and love most the most lovely Goods are always actually more perfect than those that live in blind Ignorance and disorderly Practice but they are not always actually happier It is even so with Evil it ought at once to make both imperfect and unhappy but though it always makes Men more imperfect yet it does not always make them more unhappy or at least makes them not unhappy proportionably to its making them imperfect Vertue is often bitter and distastful whereas Vice is sweet and pleasant so that it is especially by Faith and Hope that pious Men are truly happy whilst the wicked have the actual Enjoyments of Pleasures and Delights It ought not to be so indeed but however it is so Sin has brought forth that Disorder as I said in the foregoing Chapter and that Disorder is the principal Cause not only of the Corruption of our Morals but also of the Ignorance and Darkness of our Mind By that Disorder it is that our Imagination persuades it self that Bodies may be the Good of the Mind For Pleasure as I have often said is the sensible Character or Mark of Good But now of all the Pleasures we enjoy upon Earth the most sensible are those which we imagine to receive by the Body We judge though too inconsiderately without doubt that Bodies can be and are effectually our Good And 't is so hard to oppose the Instinct of Nature and to withstand the Arguments of the Senses that the design of it does not so much as come into our Mind We think not on the Disorders introduc'd by Sin We consider not that Bodies can act upon the Mind but as occasional Causes that the Mind cannot immediately or by it self enjoy any Corporeal thing and that all the ways it has of uniting to an Object are by its Knowledge and Love that God only is superiour to it can reward or punish it by Sensations of Pleasure or Pain that can enlighten and move it in a word act upon it Those Truths though most evident to attentive Minds are not however so powerful to convince us as is the deceiving Experience of a sensible Impression When we consider something as part of our selves or look on our selves as a part of that thing we judge it our Good to be united to it we love it and this love is so much the greater as the thing whereunto we think our selves united seems to be a more considerable part of the whole we make up together with it Now there are two sorts of Proofs which persuade us that a thing is part of our self viz. the Instinct of Sensation and the Evidence of Reason By the Instinct of Sensation I am persuaded that my Soul is united to my Body or that my Body makes part of my Being but I have no full Evidence of it since I know it not by the light of Reason but by the Pain or Pleasure I feel at the presence and impression of Objects My Hand is prick'd I suffer Pain thence I conclude that my Hand makes part of my self my Cloaths are rent and I endure nothing therefore I say my Cloaths are not my self my Hair is cut without Pain but cannot be pluck'd up without smart that puzzles the Philosopher and he knows not what to determine In the mean while this perplexity shows that even the wisest rather judge by the instinct of Sensation than by the light of Reason that such or such things belong or belong not to themselves For should they determine them by Evidence and the light of Reason they would quickly know that the Mind and the Body are two sorts of Beings altogether opposite that the Mind cannot be united to the Body by it self and that the Soul is wounded when the Body is struck only because of her Union with God 'T is then only by the Instinct of the Sensation that we look on our Body and all the sensible things to which we are united as part of our selves that is as belonging to that which thinks and feels in us For what is not cannot be known by evident Reason since Evidence discovers Truth alone But on the contrary 't is by the light of Reason that we know the Relation we have with Intellectual things We discover by a clear View of the Mind that we are united to God in a more strict and essential manner than to our Body that without him we are nothing and neither can doe nor know neither will nor be sensible of any thing that he is our All or if we may so speak that we make up a whole with him of which we are but an infinitely small part The light of Reason discovers us a thousand Motives to love God only and to dispise Bodies as unworthy of our Love But we are not naturally sensible of our Union to God nor persuaded that he is our All by the Instinct of sense 't is only the Grace of our Lord which produces in some Men that spiritual sense to help them to overcome the contrary Sensations by which they are united to their Body For God as the Author of Nature inclines Minds to the love of him by a Knowledge of Illumination and not of Instinct and in all probability 't is but since the Fall that God as the Author of Grace has superadded Instinct to Illumination because our light is at present so mightily impair'd as to be incapable of bringing us to God being besides continually weakn'd by contrary pleasure or instinct and rendred ineffectual We therefore discover by the light of the Mind that we are united to God and to the intellectual World which he contains and are convinced by Sensation that we are united to our Body and by it to the material and sensible World God has Created But as our Sensations are more lively moving frequent and lasting than our Illuminations so 't
is not strange that our Sensations should agitate us and quicken our love for sensible things whereas our Light dissipates and vanishes without producing any zeal and ardency for Truth 'T is true that several Men are persuaded that God is their real Good love him as their All and earnestly desire to strengthen and increase their Union with him But few evidently know that by meditating on the Truth we unite our selves to God as far as natural strength can attain that it is a sort of Enjoyment of him to contemplate the true Ideas of things and that that abstracted view of some general and immutable Truths on which all the particulars depend are flights of a Mind that sequesters it self from the Body to unite it self to God Metaphysicks speculative Mathematicks and all those universal Sciences which regulate and contain the particular as the Universal Being comprehends all particular Beings seem to be Chimerical to most Men as well to the pious as to those that do not love God So that I dare hardly make bold to say that the study of those Sciences is the most pure and perfect Application to God that the Mind may be naturally capable of and that it is by the sight of the Intellectual World which is their Object that God has produced and still knows this sensible World from which Bodies receive their Life as Spirits live from the other Those that purely follow the Impressions of their Senses and motions of their Passions are not capable of relishing the Truth because it flatters them not And even the Vertuous who constantly oppose their Passions when they proffer them false Goods do not always resist them when they conceal from them the Truth and make it despicable because one may be pious without being a Man of parts To please God we need not exactly know that our Senses Imagination and Passions always represent things otherwise than they are since it appears not that our Lord and his Apostles ever intended to undeceive us of several Errours upon this matter which Descartes has discover'd to us There is a great difference betwixt Faith and Understanding the Gospel and Philosophy the greatest Clowns are capable of Faith but few can attain to the pure Knowledge of Evident Truth Faith represents to vulgar Men God as the Creator of Heaven and Earth which is a sufficient motive of Love and Duty towards him whereas Reason knowing that God was God before he was Creator not only considers him in his Works but also endeavours to contemplate him in himself or in that immense Idea of the infinitely perfect Being which is included in him The Son of God who is the Wisdom of his Father or the Eternal Truth made himself Man and became sensible that he might be known by Men of Flesh and Blood by gross material Men that he might instruct them by that which was the Cause of their Blindness and draw them to the love of him and disengage them from sensible goods by the same things that had enslav'd them for having to doe with Fools he thought fit to take upon him a sort of Folly whereby to make them wise So that the most pious Men and truest Believers have not always the greatest Understanding They may know God by Faith and love him by the help of his Grace without understanding that he is their All in the sense Philosophers understand him and without thinking that the abstracted Knowledge of Truth is a sort of a Union with him We ought not therefore to be surprized if so few Persons labour to strengthen their natural Union with God by the Knowledge of Truth since to this there is required a continual opposition of the Impressions of the Senses and Passions in a very different way from that which is usual with the Vertuous who are not always persuaded that the Senses and Passions abuse them in the manner that has been explain'd in the foregoing Books The Sensations and Thoughts in which the Body has a share are the sole and immediate Cause of the Passions as proceeding from the Concussion of the Fibres of the Brain raising some particular Commotion in the Animal Spirits And therefore Sensations are the only sensible proofs of our dependence on some things which they excite us to love but we feel not our Natural Union with God when we know the Truth and do not so much as think upon him because he is and operates in us so privately and insensibly as to be imperceptible to our selves And this is the Reason that our natural Union with God raises not our Love for him But it goes quite otherwise with our Union to sensible things All our Sensations prove it and Bodies appear before our Eyes when they act in us Their Action is visible and manifest Our Body is even more present to us than our Mind and we consider the former as the best part of our Selves So that our Union to our Body and by it to sensible Objects excites in us a violent Love which increases that Union and makes us depend on things that are infinitely below us CHAP. VI. Of the more general Errours of the Passions with some particular Instances 'T IS the part of Moral Philosophy to discover the particular Errours concerning Good in which our Passions engage us to oppose irregular affections to restore the Integrity of the Heart and to rule the Course of our Life But here we chiefly aim at giving Rules to the Mind and finding out the Causes of our Errours in reference to Truth so that we shall not proceed farther in those Matters that relate to the Love of true Good We are tending to the Instruction of the Mind and only take the Heart in the way in as much as the Heart is its Master We search into Truth it self without a special Respect to our selves and we consider its Relation with us only because that Relation is the Spring of Self-love's disguising and concealing it from us for we judge of all things by our Passions whence it is that we mistake in all things the Judgments of Passions never agreeing with the Judgments of Truth 'T is what we learn in these excellent Words of St. Bernard Neither Love nor Hatred know how to make a Judgment according to Truth Will you hear a true Judgment As I hear I judge says our Lord he says not as I hate as I love or as I fear Here you have a Judgment of Hatred We have a Law say the Jews and by that Law he ought to die Here a Judgment of Fear If we let him alone say the Pharisees the Romans shall come and take away our Place and Nation Here another of Love as that of David speaking of his Parricide Son Spare the young Man Absalom Our Love Hatred and Fear cause us to make false Judgments only Nothing but the pure Light of Truth can illuminate our Mind nothing but the distinct Voice of our common Master can cause us to make
a poor weak and languishing Wretch who though he have the same Spirit and Principles yet because he is Master of Nothing imagines he is almost Nothing himself However our Retinue is not our self and so far is the plenty of the Blood and Animal Spirits the vigour and impetuousness of the Imagination from leading us to the Truth that on the contrary nothing carries us so far from it whereas 't is the Dull if I may so call them that is the cool and sedate Minds that are the fittest for the Discovery of solid and hidden Truths Their Passions being silent and quiet they may listen in the Recess of their Reason to the Truth that teaches them but most unhappily they mind not its Words because it speaks low without a forcible sound and that nothing wakens them but a mighty Noise Nothing convinces them but what glitters to appearance and is judg'd great and magnificent by the Senses they love to be dazled with Brightness and rather chuse to hear those Philosophers who tell them their Stories and Dreams and assert as the false Prophets of former times that the Truth has spoken to them though it has not than to listen to Truth it self For they have already suffer'd four thousand Years and that without opposition humane Pride to entertain them with Lies which they reverence and keep to as to Holy and Divine Traditions It seems the God of Truth is wholly gone from them they think on him and consult him no more they meditate no more and cover their neglect and laziness with the delusive pretences of a sacred Humility 'T is true that we cannot of our selves discover the Truth but we can doe it at all times with the assistance of him that enlightens us and can never doe it with that of all the Men in the World Those that know it best cannot shew it to us unless we ask it of him to whom they have made their Application and unless he be pleased to answer our Questions that is our Attention as he has done theirs We are not therefore to believe because Men say this or that for every Man is a Liar but because he that cannot deceive speaks to us and we must perpetually interrogate him for the solution of our Difficuties We ought not to trust to them that speak only to the Ears instruct but the Body or at the utmost move but the Imagination But we ought attentively to listen unto and faithfully believe him who speaks to the Mind informs the Reason and piercing into the most abstruse Recesses of the inward Man is able to enlighten and strengthen him against the outward and sensible Man that continually labours to seduce and corrupt him I often repeat these things because I believe them most worthy of a serious Consideration God alone is to be honour'd because he only can endue us with Knowledge as 't is he alone that can fill us with Pleasure There is sometimes in the animal Spirits and the rest of the Body a Disposition that provokes to Hunting Dancing Running and other Corporeal Exercises wherein the Force and Activity of the Body are most conspicuous Which Disposition is very ordinary to young Men especially before their Body be in a State of Consistency Children cannot stay in one place and will always be moving if they follow their humour For whereas all their Muscles are not yet strengthened nor perfectly finisht therefore God who as the Author of Nature regulates the Pleasures of the Soul with reference to the Good of the Body causes them to be delighted with such Exercises as may invigorate it Thus whilst the Flesh and Fibres of their Nerves are yet soft the Channels through which the animal Spirits must necessarily flow to produce all sorts of Motion are wore and kept open Humours have no time to settle and all Obstructions and Causes of Corruption are removed The confused Sensation that young Men have of that Disposition of their Body makes them pleased with the thoughts of their Strength and Dexterity They admire themselves when they know how to measure their Motions and to make extraordinary ones and are ambitious of being in the presence of Spectators and Admirers Thus they strengthen by degrees their Inclination to Corporeal Exercises which is one of the principal Causes of Ignorance and Brutishness For besides the time that is by that meanes lavisht away the little use they make of their Understanding causes the chief part of the Brain in whose tractableness the force and quickness of the Mind especially consists to become altogether inflexible and the animal Spirits through disuse are difficultly dispers'd in the Brain in a manner requisite to think of what they please This incapacitates most part of the Nobility and Gentry especially such as follow the War to apply themselves to any thing They answer with a Word and a Blow as the Proverb says for if you speak any thing that they don't willingly hear instead of thinking upon a suitable Reply their Animal Spirits insensibly flow into the Muscles that raise the Arm and make them answer without Consideration with a Blow or a Threatning Gesture because their Spirits agitated by the Words they hear are conveyed to such Places as are most open through Habit and Exercise The sense of their Corporeal Strength confirms them in those insulting Manners and the submissive Aspect of their Hearers puffs 'em up with such an absurd Confidence as makes them believe they have said very fine things when they have but haughtily and brutishly uttered Impertinencies being flater'd by the Fear and Caution of the Standers by It is not possible to have applied our selves to any Study or to make actual profession of any Science to be either Author or Doctor without being conscious of it But that very Consciousness naturally produces in some Men such a vast Number of Imperfections that it would be better with them if they wanted those Honourable Qualities As they look upon them as their most considerable Perfections so they are extreamly pleased with that Contemplation they set them before the Eyes of others with all the possible Dexterity and conceive they have thereby right to judge of every thing without Examination If any be so couragious as to contradict them they at first endeavour skillfully and with a sweet and obliging Countenance to insinuate what they are and what right they have to determine of such Matters And if any still presume to oppose them and that they be at a loss for an Answer they do not stick openly to declare what they think of themselves and of their Adversaries Every inward Sense of any Qualification we enjoy naturally swells up the Courage A Trooper well mounted and accoutred who neither wants Blood nor Spirits is ready to undertake any thing that Disposition inspiring him with an undaunted Boldness So it goes with a Man of Letters when he fansies himself to be Learned and that the Haughtiness of his Heart has
In short we cannot find fault with those that will enquire into the History of the Wars betwixt the Greeks and Persians betwixt the Tartars and Chinese let them have for Thucydides Xenophon or any other whatsoever as much Inclinations as they please But we cannot suffer that Admiration of Antiquity should lord it over Reason that it should be forbidden to make use of our Understanding in examining the Opinions of the Ancients and that the Discovery and Demonstration of their Errours should pass for a rash and presumptuous Attempt Truth is of all Times and Ages If Aristotle did discover it it may still be found out his Opinions are to be proved by strong Reasons for if they were solid in his time they will be so in ours 'T is to deceive our selves to pretend to demonstrate natural Truths by humane Authorities It may perhaps be proved that Aristotle has had such and such Thoughts upon such and such Subjects but 't is a very slender improvement of Reason to read Aristotle or any other Author with great Diligence and Trouble that we may historically learn his Opinions and teach them to others We cannot without Indignation look on some Universities that were established for the Enquiry and Defence of Truth and are now turned into particular Sects and boast of studying and maintaining the Opinions of some Men. We are ready to fall into Passion at the reading of those Philosophers and Physicians who store their Books with so many Quotations that one would rather take them for Commentaries of the Civil and Cannon Law than for Tracts of Natural Philosophy and Physick For who can suffer that Reason and Experience should be deserted and the Fancies of Plato Aristotle Epiâ—urus or any other Philosopher blindly followed Such strange methods would perhaps strike us dumb with Amazement though we were not hurt by them I mean though these Gentlemen did not impung the Truth which alone we think our selves obliged to espouse But their admiring the Dreams of the Ancients inspires them with a blind Zeal against Truths newly discovered they cry them down without knowing them they oppose them without understanding them and by the strength of their Imagination infuse their Sentiments into the Minds and Hearts of their Auditors and Admirers As they judge of those new Discoveries by the Esteem they have for their Authors and that their Contemporaries which they have seen and convers'd with have not that big and extraordinary Appearance which the Imagination attributes to Ancient Authors so they have no Consideration for the Modern For the Idea of the Men of our Age raises nothing but Contempt because it is not attended with violent and surprizing Motions Limners and Statuaries never represent Ancient Philosophers as other Men but give them a big Head and a broad and high Fore-head and a long and venerable Beard That 's a good Argument to prove that the Vulgar Sort has some such Idea of them for Painters picture things as they represent them to themselves and follow the Natural Motions of the Imagination and so for the most part we look on the Ancients as Uncommon Men. Whereas Imagination representing Men of our Age like to those with whom we daily converce and producing no extraordinary Motion in the Spirits raises nothing in the Soul but Contempt and Indifferency towards them I have seen Des-Crates said one of those learned Admirers of Antiquity I have known him and conversed with him several times he was an honest Man and no Fool but had nothing extraordinary He had form'd a contemptible Idea of the Cartesian Philosophy because he had conversed with the Author some minutes and had not observed in him those great and extraordinary Looks that oversway the Imagination If he were puzzled with some Arguments of that Philosopher he proudly said meaning it a sufficient Answer That he had known him formerly I could wish those Gentlemen might see Aristotle otherwise than in Picture and converse an hour with him provided he should speak French or English and not Greek and not make himself known before they had declar'd their Opinion of him Such things as bear the Character of Novelty whether they be new in themselves or appear in a new Order or Situation agitate us very much striking the Brain in places that are most sensible because least exposed to the Course of the Spirits Such things as bear a sensible Mark of Greatness do also strangely move us because they stir up a great Motion of the Spirits But such as at once come attended with Characters of Novelty and Greatness do not simply move us they overthrow ravish stupifie us by their violent Commotions For Instance Those who speak nothing but Paradoxes attract the Admiration of weak Minds because what they say has the Character of Novelty those that speak by Sentences and use high and lofty Flights inspire Veneration because they seem to say something great But those that joyn Loftiness to Novelty and Greatness to Rarity never fail of ravishing and stupifying the Vulgar Sort though they should speak but Impertinences for that pompous and stately Nonsence insani fulgores those false Declamatory Glitterings for the most part dazle the Eyes of infirm Minds and make such a lively and surprizing Impression upon their Imagination that they know not where they are that they venerate the Power that blinds 'em and cast 'em down and admire as shining Truths confused and unexpressible Sensations CHAP. VIII A Continuation of the same Subject What good Vse can be made of Admiration and other Passions ALL Passions have two very considerable Effects for they apply the Mind and win the Heart by the former they may by a due use be made serviceable to the Knowledge of Truth because Application produces that light by which it is discovered but the latter Effect is always disadvantageous because Passions cannot win the Heart but by corrupting the Reason and representing things not as they are in themselves or according to Truth but as they are related to us Admiration is of all Passions that which least affects the Heart because 't is the Sight of things consider'd as Good or Evil that agitates us and that the Consideration of their Greatness or Smallness without any other Relation to us makes but little Impression upon us so that the Admiration that attends the Knowledge of the Greatness or Littleness of new things we consider corrupts the Reason much less than any other Passion and can even be of great use for the Knowledge of Truth provided we be very careful to hinder its being followed by other Passions as it happens for the most part In Admiration the Animal Spirits are strongly driven to those places of the Brain that represent the new Object as it is in it self which print thereon Traces of it distinct and deep enough to be long continued and consequently afford to the Mind a clear Idea and easie to be remembred and therefore it cannot be denied but
when it thinks upon nothing Should that Idea vanish my Mind it seems should vanish with it or at least become smaller and narrower if it should fix upon a less considerable Idea so that the preservation of that great Idea being the preservation of my own Greatness and the perfection of my Being I am in the right to admire nay others ought to admire me for it should they give me my due For I am really something great by the Relation I have to great things and I enjoy them in some manner by my Admiration and that Foretast which a sort of Hope affords me Other Men would be Happy as well as I am my self if knowing my Greatness they should fix themselves upon the Cause that produces it but they are blind and insensible to great and fine things and know not how to raise and make themselves considerable It may be said That the Mind naturally and without Reflection argues in some such manner when it it suffers it self to be led away by the abusive Meteors of the Passions Those Reasonings have some Likelihood though their Weakness be sufficiently visible however that Probability or rather the confused Sense of the Probobility that attends natural and inconsiderate Arguments is so prevalent that they never fail of seducing us when we stand not upon our guard For Instance When Poetry History Chymistry or any other Humane Science has struck the Imagination of a young Man with some Motions of Admiration if he do not carefully watch the Attempt these Motions make upon his Mind if he examine not to the bottom the Use of those Sciences if he compare not the Trouble of learning them with the Benefits that may accrue to him in short if he be not as nice in his Judgment as he ought to be he runs the hazard of being seduced by his Admiration shewing him only the fairest Part of those Sciences and 't is even to be feared lest they should so far corrupt his Heart as that he should never awake out of his Dream even when he comes to know it to be but a Dream because it is not possible to blot out of the Brain deep Tracks engraven and widened by a long-continued Admiration And therefore we ought to take diligent care to keep our Imagination untainted that is to say to hinder the formation of dangerous Traces that corrupt the Heart and Mind I shall here set down a very useful Way to prevent not only the Excess of Admiration but also of all other Passions in general When the Motion of the Animal Spirits is so violent as to imprint on the Brain deep Traces that corrupt the Imagination it is always attended with some Commotion of the Soul And as the Soul cannot be moved without being conscious of it she is thereby sufficiently warn'd to stand upon her guard and to examine whether it be for her good to suffer those Traces to be enlarged and finished But at the time of the Commotion the Mind is not so free as rightly to judge of the Usefulness of those Traces because the same Commotion deceives and inclines it to indulge them We must therefore endeavour to stop that Commotion or to turn to some other Place the Current of the Spirits that cause it and in the mean while 't is absolutely necessary to suspend our Judgment But we ought not to imagine that the Soul always can by her bare Will stop the Course of the Spirits that hinder her from making use of her Reason her ordinary Power being not sufficient to quell Motions not raised by her so that she must dexterously endeavour to deceive an Enemy that attacks her unawares As the Motions of the Spirits stir up respective Thoughts in the Soul so our Thoughts excite such and such Motions in the Brain so that to stop a rising Motion of the Spirits a bare Will is not sufficient but Stratagem must be us'd and we must skilfully represent to our selves such Things as are contrary to those that stir up and indulge that Motion whence a Revulsion will arise But if we would only determine another way the Motion of the Spirits already risen we must not think of contrary but only different Things from those that have produced it which will certainly make a Diversion But because the Diversion and Revulsion are great or little as the new Thoughts are accompanied with a greater or less Motion of the Spirits we must carefully observe what sort of Thoughts agitate us most that we may in urging Occasions represent them to our seducing Imagination and use our selves so much to that sort of Resistance that no surprizing Motion may affect our Soul If we take care firmly to unite the Idea of Eternity or some other solid Thought to those violent and extraordinary Motions they will never be stirr'd up for the future without raising that Idea and furnishing us with Weapons to resist them This appears from Experience and from the Reason mention'd in the Chapter Of the Connection of Ideas so that we must not imagine it absolutely impossible by a dexterous Managery to conquer our Passions when we are stedfastly resolv'd upon it However by that Resistance we ought not to pretend to Impeccability nor to the avoiding of all Errours whatsoever First Because 't is very difficult to acquire and preserve such a Habit as that our extraordinary Motions shall raise in us Ideas fit to oppose them Secondly Though we should have gotten that Habit those Motions of the Spirits will directly excite the Ideas to be impugned and but indirectly supply us with the necessary Weapons to assault them So that the Evil Ideas being still the principal will be stronger than the Good that are but accessary and the latter ever stand in need of the Help of the Will Thirdly Those Motions of the Spirits may be so violent as to take up the whole Capacity of the Soul so that there will remain no room if I may so speak for the reception of the accessary Idea that is proper to make a Revulsion in the Spirits or not at least for such a Reception as may incite us to an attentive Contemplation of it Lastly There are so many particular Circumstances that can make that Remedy useless that though it ought not to be neglected yet we must not relie too much upon it We must have a perpetual Recourse to Prayer that we may receive from Heaven necessary Helps in the time of Temptation and in the mean while endeavour to present to the Mind some Truths so solid and prevalent as that they may overcome the most violent Passions For I must needs add by the way That several pious Persons often return into the same Faults because they fill their Mind with a great many Truths that are more glittering than solid and fitter to weaken and dissolve than to fortifie it against Temptations whereas others that are not endued with so much Knowledge faithfully stick to their Duty because of some
great and solid Truth which they have rendred familiar and which bears 'em up and strengthens them in all Occasions CHAP. IX Of Love and Aversion and their principal Species LOve and Hatred are the Passions that immediately succeed Admiration for we dwell not long upon the Consideration of an Object without discovering the Relations it hath to us or to something we love The Object we love and to which consequently we are united by that Passion being for the most part present as well as that which we actually admire our Mind quickly and without any considerable Reflection makes the necessary Comparisons to find out the Relations they have to each other and to us or else is naturally aware of them by a preventing Sense of Pleasure and Pain Then it is that the Motion of Love we have for our selves and for the beloved Object extends to that which is admired if the Relation it has immediately to us or to something united to us appear advantageous either by Knowledge or Sensation Now that new Motion of the Soul or rather that Motion of the Soul newly determin'd join'd to that of the Animal Spirits and followed with the Sensation that attends the new Disposition that the same new Motion of the Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion we call here Love But when we feel by any Pain or discover by a clear and evident Knowledge that the Union or Relation of the admired Object would prove disserviceable to us or to something united to us then the Motion of the Love we have for our selves or for the Thing united to us terminates in us or cleaves to the united Object without following the View of the Mind or being carried to the admired Thing But as the Motion towards Good in general which the Author of Nature continually imprints on the Soul carries her to whatever is known and felt because what is either intelligible or sensible is Good in it self so it may be said that the Resistance of the Soul against that natural Motion which attracts it is a kind of voluntary Motion which terminates in Nothingness Now that voluntary Motion of the Soul being join'd to that of the Spirits and Blood and followed by the Sensation that attends the new Disposition which that Motion of the Spirits produces in the Brain is the Passion we call here Aversion or Hatred That Passion is altogether contrary to Love and yet 't is never without Love It is altogether contrary to it because Aversion separates and Love unites the former has most commonly Nothingness for its Object and the latter has always a Being The former resists the natural Motion and makes it of no effect whereas the latter yields to it and makes it victorious However Aversion is never separated from Love because Evil the Object of the former is the Privation of Good so that to fly from Evil is to fly from the Privation of Good that is to say to tend to Good And therefore the Aversion of the Privation of Good is the Love of Good But if Evil be taken for Pain the Aversion of Pain is not the Aversion of the Privation of Pleasure because Pain is as real a Sensation as Pleasure and therefore is not the Privation of it But the Aversion of Pain being the Aversion of some internal Misery we should not be affected with that Passion should we not love our selves Lastly If Evil be taken for what causes Pain in us or for whatever deprives us of Good then Aversion depends on Self-love or on the Love of something to which we desire to be united So that Love and Aversion are two Mother-Passions opposite to each other but Love is the First the Chief and the most Universal As at that great Distance and Estrangement we are from God since the Fall we look upon our Being as the Chief Part of the Things to which we are united so it may be said in some sense that our Motion of Love for any thing whatsoever is an Effect of Self-love We love Honours because they raise us our Riches because they maintain and preserve us our Relations Prince and Country because we are concern'd in their Preservation Our Motion of Self-love reaches to all the Things that relate to us and to which we are united because 't is that Motion which unites us to them and spreads our Being if I may so speak on those that surround us proportionably as we discover by Reason or by Sensation that it is our Interest to be united to them And therefore we ought not to think that since the Fall Self-Love is only the Cause and Rule of all other Affections but that most part of other Affections are Species of Self-love For when we say that a Man loves any new Object we must not suppose that a new Motion of Love is produc'd in him but rather that knowing that Object to have some Relation or Union with him he loves himself in that Object and that with a Motion of Love coeval to himself For indeed without Grace there is nothing but Self-love in the Heart of Man The Love of Truth of Justice of God himself and every other Love that is in us by the first Institution of Nature have ever since the Fall been a Sacrifice to Self-love There is no doubt however but the most wicked and barbarous Men Idolaters and Atheists themselves are united to God by a natural Love of which consequently Self-love is not the Cause for they are united to him by their Love to Truth Justice and Vertue they praise and esteem good Men and do not love them because they are Men but because they see in them such Qualities as they cannot forbear to love because they cannot forbear to admire and judge them amiable And therefore we love something besides our selves but Self-love over-rules all the rest and Men forsake Truth and Justice for the smallest Concerns For when by their natural Force they venture their Goods and Lives to defend oppress'd Innocence or on any other Occasion their greatest Spur is mere Vanity and the hopes of getting a Name by the seeming Possession of a Vertue which is reverenc'd by all the World They love Truth and Justice when on their side but never against themselves because without Grace they cannot obtain the least Victory over Self-love There are many other sorts of natural Love We naturally love our Prince Country Relations those that have any Conformity of Humour Designs and Employments with us But all those sorts of Love are very weak as well as the Love of Truth and Justice and Self-love being the most violent of all conquers them so easily as to find no other Resistance but what it creates against it self Bodies that strike against others lose their Motion proportionably as they communicate it to the stricken and after having moved many other Bodies may at last entirely lose their own Motion It is not so with Self-love It determines every
a great Number but also differ by the different Perceptions and Judgments that cause or accompany them Those different Judgments of the Soul concerning Good or Evil produce different Motions in the Animal Spirits to dispose the Body in relation to the Object and consequently cause in the Soul Sensations that are not altogether like Whence it proceeds that some Passions are observ'd to differ from each other though their Commotions be not different In the mean while the Commotion of the Soul being the chief Thing observable in every Passion 't is better to refer them to the Three original Passions in which those Commotions are very different than to treat confusedly and disorderly of them in reference to the different Perceptions we may have of the Good and Evil that raises them For we may have so many different Perceptions of Objects in reference to Time to our selves to what belongs to us to the Persons or Things to which we are united either by Nature or Choice that it is wholly impossible to make an accurate Enumeration of them When the Soul perceives any Good which she cannot enjoy it may perhaps be said that she hopes for it though she desires it not However 't is plain that this her Hope is not a Passion but a simple Judgment And therefore 't is the Commotion that attends the Idea of any Good of which we take the Enjoyment to be possible that adopts Hope into a true Passion It is the same when Hope grows into Security For the latter is a Passion only because of the Commotion of Joy that mixes with that of Desire since the Judgment of the Soul that considers any Good as certain is a Passion but as much as it is a foregoing Taste of the Good that affects us Last of all When Hope diminishes and is succeeded by Despair 't is visible again that the latter is a Passion but because of the Commotion of Sorrow that mixes with that of Desire for the Judgment of the Soul that considers any Good as unattainable would not be a Passion should we not be actuated by that Judgment But because the Soul never looks upon Good or Evil without any Commotion and even without any Alteration in the Body we often give the Name of Passion to the Judgment that produces it confounding together whatever happens both to the Soul and Body at the sight of any Good or Evil For the Words Hope Fear Boldness Shame Impudence Anger Pity Derision Grief and the Names of all other Passions in common use are short Expressions made up of several Terms by which can be explain'd in particular whatever Passions contain We understand by the Word Passion the View of the Relation any thing has to us the Commotion and Sensation of the Soul the Concussion of the Brain and the Motion of the Spirits a new Commotion and Sensation of the Soul and lastly a Sensation of Pleasure that always attends the Passions and makes them grateful All these we commonly understand by the Name of Passions but sometimes it only signifies either the Judgment that raises it or only the Commotion of the Soul or the bare Motion of the Spirits and Blood or lastly something else that accompanies the Commotion of the Soul It is very useful for the Knowledge of Truth to abridge Ideas and Expressions but that often causes some considerable Errour especially when those Ideas are abridg'd by popular Use For we ought never to abridge them but when we have made them very clear and distinct by a great Application of Mind and not as 't is ordinarily done as to Passions and sensible Things when we have made them familiar to us by their Sensations and the mere Action of the Imagination which easily imposes on the Mind There is a great difference betwixt the pure Ideas of the Mind and the Sensations or Commotions of the Soul Pure Ideas are clear and distinct but 't is a hard Task to make them familiar whereas Sensations and Commotions are intimate with us but can never plainly and distinctly be known Numbers Extension and their Properties may be clearly known but unless we make them sensible by some expressive Characters 't is very difficult to represent them to our Mind because whatever is abstracted moves us not On the contrary the Commotions and Sensations of the Soul may easily be represented to the Mind though the Knowledge we have of them be but confused and imperfect for all the Words that raise them lively strike the Soul and make it attentive Thence it proceeds that we often imagine we rightly understand some Discourses that are altogether incomprehensible and that reading some Descriptions of the Sensations and Passions of the Soul we persuade our selves that we perfectly comprehend them because they strongly move us and that all the Words that reverberate upon our Eyes agitate our Soul The hearing of the very Names of Shame Despair Impudence c. straightway excite in our Mind a confused Idea and obscure Sensation that powerfully influences us and because this Sensation is very familiar to us and presents it self without any Trouble or Endeavour of the Mind we fancy it to be clear and distinct These Words however are the Names of compounded Passions and by consequence abridg'd Expressions which popular Use has made up of many confused and obscure Ideas Seeing we are oblig'd to employ such Terms as common Use has approv'd of the Reader should not be surpriz'd to meet with Obscurity and sometimes with a sort of Contradiction in our Words And if it were but consider'd that the Sensations and Commotions of the Soul that answer to the Terms us'd in such Discourses are not wholly the same in all Men because of their different Dispositions of Mind they would not so easily condemn us when they could not enter into our Opinions This I say not so much to prevent Objections against my self as that we may understand the Nature of the Passions and what we are to think of Books treating of such Matters After so many Cautions I shall not stick to say that all the Passions may be referr'd to the three Primitive namely Desire Joy and Sorrow and that it is specially by the different Judgments the Soul makes of Goods and Evils that such as relate to the same Primitive Passion differ from each other For Instance I may say that Hope Fear and Irresolution that is the Mean betwixt them both are Species of Desire That Boldness Courage and Emulation c. have a greater Relation to Hope than to all others and that Timidity Cowardise Jealousie c. are Species of Fear I may say that Alacrity and Glory Kindness and Gratefulness are Species of Joy caused by the Sight of the Good that we know to be in us or in those to whom we are united as Derision or Jeering is a sort of Joy commonly arising at the Sight of the Evil that befalls those from whom we are separated Lastly That Distaste
Tediousness Regret Pity Indignation are so many kinds of Sorrow caused by the Consideration of something displeasing But besides those Passions and several others I pass by which particularly relate to some of the Primitive Passions there are yet many others whose Commotion is almost equally compounded either of Desire and Joy as Impudence Anger and Revenge or of Desire and Sorrow as Shame Regret and Vexation or of all Three together when Motives of Joy and Sorrow meet And though these last Passions have no particular Names that I know of they are however the most common because in this Life we scarce ever enjoy any Good without a Mixture of Evil nor suffer any Evil without Hopes of being freed of it and enjoying Good And though Joy be altogether contrary to Sorrow yet it allows of its Company and even admits it an equal Sharer in the Capacity of the Soul as Volent when the Sight of Good and Evil divide its Capacity as Intelligent All the Passions therefore are Species of Desire Joy and Sorrow and the chief difference betwixt those of the same sort must be taken from the different Perceptions or Judgments that cause or accompany them So that to become learned in the Nature of Passions and to make of them the most accurate Enumeration possible it is requisite to enquire into the different Judgments that may be made of Good and Evil. But as we especially intend to find out the Cause of our Errours we need not so much to insist upon the Judgments that precede or cause the Passions as upon those that follow them and which the Soul makes of Things when she is agitated by some Passion because those last Judgments are the most liable to Errour Such Judgments as precede and cause the Passions are almost ever false in something because they are for the most part grounded upon such Perceptions of the Soul as consider Objects in relation to her and not as they are in themselves But the Judgments that follow the Passions are false all manner of ways because such Judgments being only made by the Passions are only grounded upon the Perceptions the Soul has of Objects as relating to her or rather to her own Commotion In the Judgments that precede the Passions Truth and Falshood are join'd together but when the Soul is agitated and judges by every Inspiration of the Passion Truth vanishes and Falshood remains to be the Principle of so many more false Conclusions as the Passion is greater All Passions justifie themselves continually offering to the Soul the moving Object in the fittest way for preserving and increasing her Commotion The Judgment or the Perception that causes it gets still new Forces from the Increase of the Passion and the Passion likewise augments proportionably as the Judgment that produces it in its turn is strengthen'd Thus false Judgments and Passions join in Confederacy for their mutual Preservation And should the Heart never cease sending up Spirits for keeping open the Tracks of the Brain and supplying the Expences which that violent Sensation or Commotion make of the same Spirits Passions would perpetually increase and never allow us to be sensible of our Errours But as all our Passions depend on the Fermentation and Circulation of the Blood and that the Heart can never furnish as many Spirits as are necessary for their Preservation they must needs expire when the Spirits diminish and the Blood grows cool again Though it be an easie matter to discover the ordinary Judgments of Passions yet 't is not a thing to be neglected there being few Subjects that deserve more the Application of an Enquirer after Truth who endeavours to free himself from the Dominion of the Body and will judge of every thing by true Ideas We may instruct our selves in this Matter two ways either by pure Reason or by our inward Consciousness when we are agitated by some Passion For Instance Experience teaches us That we are apt to judge of those we love not to their Disadvantage and to spit all the Venom of our Hatred at the Object of our Passion We also know by Reason that as we cannot hate but what is Evil so 't is necessary for the preservation of Hatred that the Mind should represent to it self the worst part of its Object For 't is sufficient to suppose that all Passions justifie themselves and give such a Disposition first to the Imagination then to the Mind as is fit to preserve their own Commotion directly to conclude what are the Judgments which all the Passions cause us to make Those that are endued with a strong and lively Imagination that are extremely sensible and much subject to the Motions of Passions may perfectly inform themselves of those things by their own inward sense and it often comes to pass that they speak of them in a more pleasing and instructing manner than others whose Reason over-tops their Imagination yet it follows not that those that discover best the Springs of Self-love that penetrate farthest into Man's Heart and more sensibly discover its Recesses are always the greatest Understandings This only proves that they are livelier quicker of Imagination and sometimes more malicious than others But those that without consulting their inward Sense make use only of their Reason to enquire into the Nature and Effects of Passions though they be not always so quick-sighted as others are always more rational and less obnoxious to Errour because they judge of things as they are in themselves They see very near what Men posseâ—t with Passions can doe as they suppose them more or less agitated but do not rashly judge of the Actions of others by what they would doe themselves in such Occasions for they well know that Men are not equally sensible to the same things nor alike susceptible of involuntary Commotions and therefore 't is not by consulting our Sensations which the Passions create in us but by listening to Reason that we must treat of the Judgments that accompany them lest we should draw our own Picture instead of discovering the Nature of Passions in general CHAP. XI That all the Passions justifie themselves What Judgments they cause us to make in their Vindication WE need no long deduction of Arguments to demonstrate That all Passions justifie themselves That Principle is sufficiently evident both by our internal Consciousness of our selves and the Behaviour of those we see agitated by them and therefore we need only barely propound it to consider it as we should do The Mind is such a Slave to the Imagination that it always obeys when the Imagination is over-heated and dares not answer when the same is incensed because it meets with Abuses when it resists and is always rewarded with some Pleasure when it humours that imperious Faculty Even those whose unruly Imagination persuades them they are transmuted into Beasts find out Reasons to prove they must live as Beasts do walk Four-footed eat Grass and imitate every Action that is purely
they may not overcome and so will quickly feed themselves with a borrowed Taste of the Good they hope to enjoy and will pass such Judgments as are fit to justifie their Hope and Joy But those that want agitated Spirits as Old Men and those that are of a Phlegmatick and Melancholy Temper being inclined to Fear and Sorrow because their Soul is conscious of her own Weakness and destitute of Spirits to perform her Orders will make quite contrary Judgments imagine insuperable Difficulties to justifie their Fear and give up themselves to Envy Sorrow Despair and other sorts of Aversion of which weak Persons are most susceptible CHAP. XII That such Passions as have Evil for their Object are the most Dangerous and Vnjust And that those that have the least Mixture of Knowledge are the most lively and sensible OF all the Passions the several sorts of Aversions make their Judgments the most remote from Reason and the most dangerous there being no Passion which corrupts and bribes Reason so much in its behalf as Hatred and Fear Hatred chiefly in the Cholerick or in those whose Spirits are in a perpetual agitation and Fear in the Melancholy or those whose gross and heavy Spirits are neither easily moved nor soon quieted But when â—atred and Fear conspire together to bribe Reason which is very frequently done then there are no Judgments so unjust and capricious but they will pass and defend them with an insuperable Obstinacy The Reason of this is That as in this Life Evil strikes the Soul more to the quick than Good so the Sense of Pain is livelier than that of Pleasure Injuries and Scandals more sensibly affect us than Commendations and Applause and though there are Men indifferent as to the enjoying some Pleasures and receiving certain Honours yet there is scarce one that can bear Pain and Contempt without Uneasiness And therefore Hatred Fear and other sorts of Aversion that have Evil for their Object are most violent Passions which shake the Mind with such unexpected Commotions as discompose and stupifie it and quickly pierce into the bottom of the Heart dethrone Reason and pass upon all sorts of Subjects erroneous and unjust Sentences to favour their tyrannical Madness Of all Passions they are the most cruel and distrustful contrary to Charity and Civil Society and at the same time the most ridiculous and extravagant since they give such impertinent and frantick Judgments as excite the Laughter and Indignation of all other Men. Those Passions inspired the Pharisees with these absurd Discourses What are we doing This Man works many Miracles If we let him alone all Men will believe in him and the Romans will come and destroy both our City and Nation They agreed that our Saviour had wrought many Miracles for the Resurrection of Lazarus was undeniable But what were the Judgments of their Passions To murther both JESUS and Lazarus whom he had raised from the Dead Why JESUS Because say they if we let him alone all Men will believe in him and the Romans shall come and extirpate our Nation And why Lazarus Because that by reason of him many of the Jews went away and believed on Jesus Oh Judgments equally Cruel and Irrational Cruel through Hatred and Irrational through Fear The Romans shall come and destroy our City and Nation The same Passions moved a great Assembly consisting of Annas the High-Priest Caiaphas John Alexander and as many as were of the Kindred of the High-Priest to speak thus What shall we doe with these Men For that indeed a notable Miracle hath been done by them is manifest to all them that dwell in Jerusalem and we cannot deny it But lest it should spread farther let us threaten to punish them severely if they preach the Name of JESUS any more All those great Men agitated by their Passions and blinded by their false Zeal pass Judgment both impertinent and unjust They dare not punish the Apostles because of the People and that the Man who had been miraculously cured was above Forty Years of Age and present in the Assembly but threaten them lest they should â—each in the Name of Jesus supposing they ought to condemn the Doctrine because they put the Author to death You intend say they to bring this Man's Blood upon us When false Zeal unites it self to Hatred it shelters it from the Reproofs of Reason and justifies it so well that we scruple not to be led by its Motions When Ignorance and Weakness accompany Fear they extend it to innumerable Subjects and drive on its Commotions to that heighth that the least Suspicion disturbs and frightens Reason False Zealots imagine they serve God when they obey their Passions They blindly follow the secret Motions of their Hatred as Inspirations from internal Truth and insisting with great satisfaction on the Proofs of Sense that justifie that Excess their Errours become confirmed with an unconquerable Stubbornness As to ignorant and weak Persons they create to themselves Matter of ridiculous and fantastick Fears like Children that walk in the dark without a Guide and Light fansie frightful Bugbears are distur'd and cry out as though they were undone Knowledge retrieves them if they be ignorant but if they be weak their Imagination continues crazed and the least thing that relates to that frightful Object renews the Tracks and opens the Current of the Spirits which cause the Symptoms of their Fear So that it is altogether impossible to cure or pacifie them for ever But when false Zeal meets with Hatred and Fear in a weak Mind it incessantly produces such unjust and violent Judgments as cannot be thought upon without Horrour To change a Mind possest with those Passions requires a greater Miracle than that which converted St. Paul and his Cure would be absolutely impossible could we seâ— Bounds to the Power and Mercy of God Those that walk in the Dark rejoyce at the sight of Light but this Man cannot suffer it because it wounds him by opposing his Passion His Fear is in some sort voluntary as being produced by his Hatred and therefore he loves to feel its Commotions because we love to be agitated even with the Passions that have Evil for their Object when the Evil is only imaginary or rather when we know as in Tragedies that the Evil cannot hurt us The Phantasms which those that walk in the Dark frame in their Imaginations vanish at the Approach of Light but the idle Dreams of this sort of Men will not disappear at the Light of Truth which instead of dissipating the Darkness of their Mind incenses their Imagination so that the frustrated Light recoils because they are wholly taken up with the Objects of their Passion and it seems those Apparitions have a real Body since they reflect some weak Rays of the Light that falls upon them But though we should suppose in those Men a sufficient Teachableness and Attention to listen to and comprehend the Reasons that
As to be a good Mathematician 't is not sufficient to learn by Heart all the Demonstrations of Euclid Pappus Archimedes Apollonius and others that have written of Geometry so to be a Learned Philosopher 't is not enough to have read Plato Aristotle Des Cartes and perfectly to know their Sentiments upon Philosophical Questions For the Knowledge of all the Opinions and Judgments of other Men either Philosophers or Geometricians is rather a History than a Science the true Science that perfects as far as possible the Mind consisting in a certain Ability of solidly judging of all things proportion'd to its Reach But not to lose time nor prepossess the Reader with precipitate Judgments let us begin to treat of such an important Matter First of all we ought to remember the Rule that has been established and proved at the beginning of the First Book because 't is the Foundation and Principle of whatever we shall say hereafter And therefore I repeat it We must never give a full Consent but to those Propositions that appear so evidently true that they cannot be denied it without feeling an inward Pain and the secret Reproaches of our Reason that is to say without clearly knowing we should make a wrong Use of our Liberty by with-holding our Consent For as many times as we yield to Probabilities we certainly venture to be mistaken and 't is but by good Chance or a lucky Hit if we be not really deceived So that the confused Sight of a great number of Probabilities upon different Subjects makes not our Reason more perfect nothing but the clear View of the Truth being able to afford it any real Perfection and Satisfaction Thence 't is easie to conclude That since according to our first Rule nothing but Evidence can assure us that we are not deceived we ought to take a special care to preserve that Evidence in all our Perceptions that we may pass a sound Judgment upon all the Things to which our Reason can attain and discover as many Truths as we are capable of The Things that can produce and preserve that Evidence are of two sorts some are within us and in some manner depending on us others are out of our Jurisdiction For as to see distinctly visible Objects 't is required to have a good Sight and to fix it steadfastly upon them which two Things are in us or in some manner depending on us So 't is requisite to have a sound Understanding and a strong Application in order to pierce into the bottom of intelligible Truths which two Things are in us or in some sort in our power But as the Eyes stand in need of Light to see which Light depends upon foreign Causes so the Mind needs Ideas to conceive which as it has been proved elsewhere have no Dependency upon us but are furnished to us by a foreign Cause So that should the Ideas of Things supersede being present to our Minds as often as we desire to see them should he that enlightens the World conceal them from us it would not be more possible for us to redress it or to know any thing than it is to see visible Objects when the Light is gone But we have no reason to fear it For the Presence of Ideas being natural to our Minds and depending on the general Will of God which is constant and immutable they can never disappear nor fail us in the Discovery of such Things as are attainable by Natural Reason For the Sun that enlightens the Minds is not like that which illuminates Bodies it is never eclipsed nor goes ever down but penetrates every thing without dividing its Light The Ideas of all Things being then continually present to us even when we do not attentively consider them all that we need doe to make all our Perceptions evident is only to look for such Means as can increase the Attention and Extent of the Mind as nothing else is required on our side to distinguish visible and present Objects but to have good Eyes and to fix them thereupon However because the Objects we consider have more Relations than we can discover at once by a simple Essay of Thought we still need some Rules skilfully to unfold the Difficulties by which Succours the Mind being grown more attentive and extended may with a full Evidence discover all the Relations of the Thing examined We shall divide this Sixth Book into Two Parts We shall treat in the First of those Supplies that may afford the Mind more Attention and Extent and in the Second we shall prescribe those Rules that it must follow in the Inquiry after Truth to pass sound and undeceivable Judgments CHAP. II. That Attention is necessary to preserve Evidence in our Knowledge That the Modifications of the Soul make her attentive but share and take up too much her Capacity of Perceiving WE have shewn at the Beginning of this Work that the Understanding does nothing but perceive and that as to its Concern there is no difference betwixt bare Perceptions Judgments and Reasonings unless it be that the second and third are Perceptions more composed than the first because they not only represent many Things but also the Relations they have together For naked Perceptions represent only Things to the Mind whereas Judgments represent the Relations that are betwixt Things and Reasonings the Relations that are betwixt the Relations of Things provided they be simple Reasonings for if they were Complex they would represent Relations of Relations or compound Relations which are between the Relation of Things and so ad infinitum For proportionably as Relations multiply so the Reasonings that represent them to the Mind become more composed However Judgments and simple Reasonings as well as those that are composed are but as to the Understanding bare Perceptions since it does no more than simply perceive as has been already observed Whence it appears that the Understanding never falls into Errour since there is none in Perceptions and that Errour it self is not of an intelligible nature For as we have already said many times it consists in a too hasty Consent of the Will which suffers it self to be dazzled by some false Glimpse and instead of keeping its Liberty as long as possible negligently relies upon the Appearance of Truth Notwithstanding as it commonly happens that the Understanding has but confused and imperfect Perceptions of Things so 't is really a Cause of our Errours though only occasional For as the Corporeal Sight leads us into Mistake when it represents outward Objects confusedly and imperfectly confusedly when they are at too great a distance or for want of Light and imperfectly when it only shews such Faces of them as look towards us So the Understanding often having but a confused and imperfect Conception of Things because they are not sufficiently present to it and that it discovers not all their Parts causes the Will that too easily yields to those obscure and imperfect Conceptions to fall into
many Errours We must then look out for Means that may hinder our Perceptions from being confused and imperfect And because as every one knows nothing can make them more clear and distinct than Attention we must find out Means to become more and more attentive Thus we may hope to keep to Evidence in our Reasonings and even to survey all at once the necessary Connexion betwixt all the Parts of our longest Inferences To find out those Means 't is necessary to persuade our selves of what has been said elsewhere That the Mind gives not an equal Attention to all the Things it perceives For it applies it self infinitely more to such as affect modifie and penetrate it than to those which though they be present yet do not concern or belong to it In short 't is more taken up with its own Modifications than with the bare Ideas of Objects which Ideas are Things different from it self Thence it comes that we consider but with tediousness dislike and remissness the abstracted Ideas of the pure Understanding that we apply our selves much more to Things that we imagine especially when our Imagination is strong and the Tracks of our Brain very deep And lastly that we are wholly taken up with sensible Qualities and even so that we can afford no Attention to the pure Ideas of the Mind when we feel something very pleasant or painful For Pain Pleasure and other Sensations being Modes of the Souls Existence 't is impossible we should exist without perceiving them and having the Capacity of the Mind taken up since our Sensations are nothing but Perceptions But 't is not so with the pure Ideas of the Mind since they may be intimately united to it without its taking the least notice of them For though God is most intimately united with us and comprehends the Ideas of whatever we see yet those Ideas though never so present and as I may say in the middle of our selves are concealed from us when the Motions of the Spirits do not raise their Traces or when our Will applies not the Mind to consider them that is to say when it performs not those Acts to which the Author of Nature has joined the Representation of those Ideas This is the Foundation of whatever we shall say concerning the Means that can improve our Attention which Means will be drawn from the very Nature of the Mind so that 't is to be hoped that they will not prove fruitless and chimerical as many others that are more puzling than serviceable And though they should not be as useful as we could wish yet the Time that shall be bestowed upon their Reading will not be entirely lost since this will afford us a fuller Knowledge of the Nature of the Mind The Modifications of the Soul have Three Causes the Senses the Imaginations and the Passions For every one experimentally knows that Pain and Pleasure and all other strong Sensations lively Imaginations and vehement Passions take up the Mind so much as to make it incapable of Attention at the time they too vigorously affect it because they fill as I may say its whole Capacity or Faculty of Perceiving And even when those Modifications are moderate they still divide its Capacity in some sort so that it cannot give up it self wholly to the Consideration of abstracted Truths Thence we must draw this important Conclusion That those that will earnestly apply themselves to search after Truth must carefully and as far as possible avoid all the Sensations that are too lively as a great Noise a bright Light Pleasure Pain c. That they must incessantly watch over the Purity of their Imagination lest deep Traces should be imprinted on their Brain which would continually disturb and as it were dissolve the Mind and that they must above all stop the Motions of the Passions which make so powerful an Impression on the Body and Soul that it is for the most part impossible the Mind should think upon any thing else For though the pure Ideas of Truth are always present yet they cannot be attended to while the whole Reach and Compass of our Thoughts are charg'd with these penetrating Modifications However as it is not possible that the Soul should be free of Passion Sensation or any other particular Modification we must make a Vertue of Necessity and endeavour to draw from those very Modifications such Succours as can make us more attentive But the Use of them requires great Skill and Circumspection if we desire to make an Advantage of them and we must carefully examine how far we have occasion for them that we may use them only when the necessity of being attentive compels us to it CHAP. III. Of the Vse that can be made of the Passions and Senses to preserve the Attention of the Mind THE Passions that may successfully incite us to the Enquiry after Truth are those that afford Strength and Courage to overcome the trouble of rendring our selves attentive There are some good and others bad the Good are such as the Desire of finding out the Truth of getting so much Light as to conduct our selves and be useful to our Neighbours and the like the Bad or Dangerous are the Desire of getting Fame of making Establishments of rising above our Fellows and others yet more corrupted of which we need not speak In our present unhappy State it often happens that the least rational Passions are the most inciting to the Enquiry after Truth and are more pleasant Consolations in all the Troubles we are at to discover it than such as are juster and more reasonable For Instance Vanity moves us much more than the Love of Truth and we see every day such Persons as are extraordinarily given to study as long as they find Men before whom they can boast of their Learning whereas they entirely forsake it when they meet with no body more to listen to them The confused Prospect of the Glory that surrounds them when they vend their Opinions bears up their Courage in the most fruitless and tedious Studies But if either by Chance or the Necessity of their Affairs they come to be taken off from that little Flock of Applauders their Heat presently cools the most solid Studies are no longer alluring Distaste Tediousness and Moroâ—eness overtake them and make them forsake all Vanity did triumph over their natural Laziness but now Laziness triumphs over the Love of Truth for Vanity may sometimes resist Laziness but Laziness commonly proves too strong and powerful for the Love of Truth However as the Passion for Glory may be referr'd to a good End as to the Glory of God the publick Use the Preservation of our good Name some Persons may perhaps be allow'd in some cerâ—ain Cases to make use of that Passion as a powerful Help to make the Mind more attentive But Care must be taken to use it only when the reasonable Passions whereof mention has been made are not sufficient and that our Duty
engages us to apply our selves to Subjects that are very disgusting First because that Passion is very dangerous to the Conscience Secondly because it insensibly draws us into ill Studies that have more Lustre than Use or Truth in them and Lastly because it is very difficult to moderate it and that we often become its Fool and Property and instead of enlightning the Mind we only strengthen the Concupiscence of Pride which both corrupts our Moral Powers and darkens our Understanding with an undissolvable Obscurity For it must be consider'd how That Passion insensibly increases settles and fortifies it self in the Heart of Man and when it is too violent instead of helping the Mind in the Search of Truth it strangely blinds it and even persuades it that Things are just as it desires they should be Sure it is there would not be so many false Inventions nor imaginary Discoveries were not Men's Heads giddy'd by the ardent Desire of appearing Inventors For the firm and obstinate Persuasion wherein several Persons have been to have found for Instance the Perpetual Motion the Quadrature of the Circle the Duplication of the Cube by ordinary Geometry in all likelihood proceeded from an extraordinary Desire of seeming to have perform'd what others have vainly attempted And therefore 't is fitter to excite in us such Passions as are so much more useful to our searching out of Truth as they are more strong and wherein the Excess is not to be fear'd Such are the Desires of making a good Use of our Mind of freeing our selves from Prejudices and Errours of getting a sufficient Light to behave our selves in our Condition and such others as neither engage us into fruitless Studies nor carry us on to rash and inconsiderate Judgments When we have begun to taste the pleasure of making use of our Mind to be sensible of the Profit that arises from it have freed our selves of violent Passions and have disrelish'd sensible Pleasures which always prove the Masters of or rather the Tyrants over Reason in those that indiscreetly give up themselves to them we need not other Passions but such as we have spoken of to become attentive upon the Subjects on which we desire to meditate But most Men are not in that Condition they have neither Taste nor Understanding nor Curiosity for any thing but what affects the Senses their Imagination is corrupted by an almost infinite Number of deep Traces which raise none but false Ideas and as they depend upon all the Objects that resort to the Senses and Imagination so they always judge by the Impression they receive from them that is with reference to themselves Pride Debauchery the various Engagements the restless Desires of Advancement which are so common amongst the Men of the World darken the Sight of Truth and stifle in them the Sense of Piety because they separate them from God who alone is able to enlighten as he alone is able to govern us For we cannot increase our Union with sensible Things without diminishing that which we have with intellectual Truth since we cannot be at the same time strictly united with Things so different and opposite Those whose Imagination is pure and chaste that is whose Brain is not fill'd up with deep Traces that fasten them to visible Things may easily unite themselves to God listen attentively to the Truth that speaks to them and even forbear the Use of the most just and rational Passions But as to those that live amongst the Great who depend upon too many things and whose Imagination is soil'd by the false and obscure Ideas of sensible Objects they cannot apply themselves to the Truth unless they be born up by some Passion strong enough to countervail the Weight of the Body that carries them down and to imprint Traces on their Brain that may make a Revulsion upon the Animal Spirits However as every Passion can only by it self perplex our Ideas they ought to use that Help but so far as Necessity requires and all Men ought to study themselves that they may proportionate their Passions to their Weakness It is no hard matter to find a Method of raising in us such Passions as we desire since the Knowledge we have given in the foregoing Books of the Union betwixt Soul and Body has sufficiently open'd the way to it In a word no more is requir'd than to think attentively upon those Objects that by the Institution of Nature are able to raise the Passions Thus we may almost at any time excite in our Hearts whatever Passion we have occasion for but because we can easier excite them at any time than suppress them or remedy the Disorders they cause in the Imagination we must be very sober and cautious in employing them Above all we must take care not to judge of Things by Passion but only by the clear Sight of the Truth which is almost impossible when the Passions are somewhat lively they ought only to raise our Attention but they never fail of stirring up their proper Ideas and violently driving the Will to judge of Things by those Ideas that affect it rather than by the pure and abstracted Ideas of Truth that make no Impression upon it So that we often make Judgments which last no longer than the Passion because they are not produced by the clear Sight of the immutable Truth but by the Circulation of the Blood True it is that Men are wonderfully obstinate in some Errours which they maintain as long as they live but then those Errours have other Causes than the Passions or at least depend on such as are permanent and lasting proceeding from the Constitution of the Body from Interest or from some other durable Cause For Instance Interest being a Motive of a continual standing produces a Passion that never dies and the Judgments that arise from it are very long liv'd But all the other Sentiments of Men which depend upon particular Passions are as inconstant as the Fermentation of their Humours They say one while this another while that and yet what they say is commonly conformable to what they think And as they run from one counterfeit Good to another by the Motion of their Passion and are disgusted at it when that Motion ceases so they run from one false System into another and ardently assert a false Opinion when Passion makes it probable which the Passion ebbing they afterwards forsake By their Passions they taste of every Good without finding any really so and by the same Passions see all Truths without discovering any thing absolutely true though in the time of their Passion what they taste seems to them the Sovereign God and what they see an undeniable Truth The Senses are the second Spring whence we can draw Succours to make the Mind attentive Sensations are the very Modifications of the Soul and differ from the pure Ideas of the Mind the former raising a much stronger Attention than the latter So that 't is plain that
to supply the want of Application to insensible Truths it may be fit to express them in a sensible and moving manner 'T is for that Reason that Geometricians express by sensible Lines the Proportions that are betwixt several Magnitudes for by drawing Lines upon Paper they draw as I may say answerable Ideas upon their Mind and make them more familiar by Seeing them at the same time that they Conceive them Thus several very difficult Things may be taught to Children though they be not susceptible of abstracted Truths by reason of the Nicety of the Fibres of their Brain Their Eyes see nothing but Colours Pictures Images but their Mind considers the Ideas that answer those sensible Objects But we must take a special Care not to over-shadow the Objects which we will consider or represent to others with so much Sensibility that the Mind should be more taken up with it than with the Truth it self which is a most considerable and common Fault for we meet every day with Men that apply themselves only to what moves the Senses and express themselves in such a sensible manner that Truth is as stifled under a vain and pompous Apparel of their false Eloquence so that their Hearers being more affected with the Measure of their Periods and the Motions of their Figures than by the Reasons they alledge give way to be persuaded without so much as knowing what causes their Persuasion or what they are persuaded of And therefore we must so carefully moderate the Sensibility of our Expressions as only just to make the Mind attentive There is nothing more beautiful than Truth neither can we pretend to make it handsomer by daubing it with sensible Colours that have no Solidity in them and are pleasing but a short time We might perhaps make it more fine and delicate but should enerve and emasculate it So that we ought not to set it off with so much Lustre and Brightness that the Mind be more taken up with the Ornaments than with the Body it self this being to deal with it as some Persons do with themselves when loaded with such abundance of Gold and precious Stones they appear the least considerable part of the whole which they make up with their Clothes We must dress the Truth as are those Magistrates of Venice who are oblig'd to wear a plain Gown and a Cap to distinguish them from the Commonalty that Men may look on their Faces with Reverence and Attention without admiring their Apparel Lastly We must take care not to surcharge it with too great a Retinue of delightful Things that dissipate the Mind and obstruct its View lest we should give to any thing else the Honours due to it As it often happens to Princes who cannot be distinguish'd amongst the great Number of their Courtiers and Attendants who assume to themselves that Air of Greatness and Majestical Countenance which only becomes the Sovereigns themselves But to give a more considerable Instance I say that Truth must be proposed to others as it manifests it self The Sight of Men since the Fall of their Fore-fathers is too weak to look on Truth it self and therefore Sovereign Truth has made it self sensible by coming invested with our Humanity that it might attract our Thoughts enlighten our Mind and appear lovely to our Eyes So we may according to that Pattern adorn with something sensible the Truths we endeavour to understand our selves and to teach others that we may fix the Mind upon them which loves what is sensible and is not easily delighted by Things that flatter not the Senses The Eternal Wisdom has made it self sensible but not glittering and pompous becoming sensible not to fasten us to what is sensible but to raise us to what is intellectual and to condemn and sacrifice Sensibility in his own Person So we must make use in the Knowledge of Truth of something sensible but not too splendid that cannot indear too much the sensible Object but only keep open the Eye of our Mind in the Contemplation of mere intellectual Truths Such Sensibility should be employ'd as we may dissipate annihilate and willingly sacrifice upon the Sight of the Truth to which it has conducted us The Eternal Wisdom has offer'd it self to us from without in a sensible manner not to keep us abroad but that we may retire within our selves and that the Inner Man might intellectually consider it So we must in our Search of Truth make use of something sensible which may not keep us abroad gazing on its Lustre but make us enter into our selves and strengthen our Attention and Union to the Eternal Truth which only is able to rule the Mind and enlighten it upon any Subject whatsoever CHAP. IV. Of the Vse of Imagination to make the Mind attentive and especially of the Vsefulness of Geometry WE had need be very circumspect and cautious in the Choice and Use of those Helps that we may draw from our Senses and Passions to become attentive to the Truth because our Senses and Passions too vividly affect us and so much fill up the Capacity of the Mind that it often sees nothing but its own Sensations when it proposes to discover Things in their own Nature But as to those Succours which our Imagination may afford us they make the Mind attentive without fruitlesly dividing its Capacity and wonderfully help us to a clear and distinct Perception of Objects so that they are for the most part very useful as will be made plain by some Instances We know that a Body is moved by two or several different Causes towards two or several different Places whereunto it is equally or unequally driven by these Forces that the Force of the Motion perpetually increases or decreases according to some known Proportion We are asked what way that Body goes in what place it shall be at such or such a Moment with what degree of Celerity it shall be endued when 't is come to such a place and other like Questions 2. But if the Force that moves it towards B be equal to that which moves it towards C then divide the Lines AB and AC into the parts 1 2 3 4. I II III IV equally distant from A If the Force that moves it towards B be double of that which moves it towards C take in the Line AB Parts that are double of those that you cut in AC If that Force be subduple take them subduple if it be thrice greater or lesser cut them likewise thrice greater or lesser and so proportionably The Divisions of those Lines will represent to the Imagination the different Degrees of those moving Forces and withal the Space that they shall cause the Body to run over First That Line AXYE expresses the true Degrees of the compound Motion For we sensibly perceive that if each of the Forces which produce it can promote the Body a Foot in a Minute its composed Motion will be of two Foot in a Minute if both
we conceive it right the Soul cannot think more at one time than another whether it be then that she perceives many Objects or is taken up with one or even when she is said to think upon nothing But the Reason why we imagine that we think more at one time than another is that we do not sufficiently distinguish betwixt confused and distinct Perceptions More Thought is doubtless required or the Capacity of Thinking must be more fill'd distinctly to perceive several Objects than one alone but we need not more Thought to perceive many Things confusedly than one alone distinctly Thus the Degrees or Quantity of Thought is equal in the Soul when she considers many Things and when she considers only one For when she is taken up with one Thing she has always a clearer Idea of it than when she applies her self to many For 't is fit to be observed That a simple Perception sometimes contains as much Thought or fills as much the Thinking Capacity of the Mind as a Judgment and even a composed Reasoning since Experience teaches us that the simple but lively clear and evident Perception of one Thing engages our Application and possesses us as much as a composed Reasoning or the obâ—cure and confused Perception of several Relations betwixt many Things For as there is as much or more Sensation in the sensible Sight of an Object which I hold near my Eyes and curiously examine than in the Sight of a spacious Field on which I cast a negligent and careless Eye because the nearness of the Sensation of the Object near my Eyes makes up for the Extent of that confused Sensation of those many Things which I slightly and unattentively look upon in a Field So the spiritual Sight the Mind hath of an Object is often so lively and distinct that it contains as much and more Thought than the View of the Relations betwixt many Things True it is that at some certain times it seems to us as though we thought but upon one Thing which yet we can hardly comprehend whereas at other times we comprehend that Thing and several others with great easiness Thence we imagine that the Soul has more Extent and a larger Capacity of Thinking at one time than at another But our Mistake is visible for the Reason why at some certain times we can scarce conceive the easiest Things proceeds not from the Capacity of the Soul 's being straitned or impair'd but from its being fill'd with some lively Sensation of Pain or Pleasure or with a great number of weak and dark Sensations that cause a sort of Giddiness which is commonly nothing else but the confused Sensation of a great number of Things A Piece of Wax is susceptible of a very distinct Figure but cannot admit two without a Mixture of both since it cannot be perfectly round and square at the same time and if one should pretend to give it a Million of Figures none of them would be distinct And in that Case supposing that Piece of Wax capable of knowing its own Figures yet it could not tell which it is that terminates it on all sides the number would be so great It is even so with our Soul when a very great number of Modifications take up her Capacity she can perceive none distinctly because she has not a separate Sensation of them and so thinks she is sensible of nothing She cannot say that she feels Pain Pleasure Light Sound Savour 't is none of those Qualities and yet 't is them all together she is sensible of And though we should suppose that the Soul is not subject to the confused and unruly Motion of the Animal Spirits and so free from the Contagion of her Body as to have her Thoughts altogether independent on what happens in it yet it might fall out that we should easier understand some Things at one time than at another without any Enlargement or Diminution in the Capacity of our Soul for then we might think upon particular Objects or of Being indefinite and in general The general Idea of Infinite is inseparable from the Mind and wholly takes up its Capacity whenever it thinks upon no particular Thing For when we say that we think on nothing it signifies not that we think not upon that general Idea but only that our Thoughts are not applied to any particular Object And certainly if that Idea did not fill our Mind we could not think as we do upon all sorts of Things since we cannot think upon Objects of which we have no Knowledge And if that Idea were not more present to the Mind when we suppose we think upon nothing than when we are busie about some particular Object we could as easily think upon whatever we please when we are mightily taken up with some particular Truth as when we are not attentive unto any thing Which is repugnant to Experience For to instance when we are strongly engag'd in meditating on some Geometrical Proposition we find not so much easiness to think upon other Things as when we are diverted by no particular Thought And therefore we think more on the General and Infinite Being when we think less on the Particular and Finite and we think always as much at one time as at another We cannot then improve the Extent and Capacity of the Mind by swelling it up as I may say and giving it more Reality than it has received from Nature But only by a skilful and dexterous managing thereof which is done to the best advantage by Arithmetick and Algebra For those Sciences afford Means of abridging Ideas so methodically and reducing them into such an Order as that the Mind with its little Extent is capable with their Assistance of discovering very composed Truths and such as appear at first sight incomprehensible But we must draw these Things from their Principle that we may explain them with more clearness and certainty Truth is nothing else but a real Relation either of Equality or Inequality Whereas Falsehood is but the Negation of Truth or a false and fantastick Relation Truth is that which is and Falsehood is not or if you will is that which is not We never mistake when we see Relations that are since we cannot be deceived when we see the Truth But we always mistake when we judge that we see some Relations that are not in being for then we see a Falsehood we see what is not or rather we see not at all Whoever sees a Relation of Equality betwixt two times Two and Four sees a Truth because there is such a Relation as he sees and whoever sees a Relation of Inequality betwixt twice Two and Five sees a Truth because he sees a Relation that really is But whoever judges that he sees a Relation of Equality betwixt two times Two and Five mistakes because he sees or rather supposes he sees a Relation of Equality where there is none Truths are but Relations and the Knowledge of Truths is
there is any Thing useful and which may be certainly and exactly known but it may be found out by an Arithmetical and Algebraical Method So that those two Sciences are the Foundation of all others and help us to the true Means to acquire all those that are accurate because the Capacity of the Mind cannot be better managed than it is by Arithmetick and especially by Algebra THE SECOND PART OF THE SIXTH BOOK Concerning METHOD CHAP. I. Of the Rules that are to be observed in the Search after Truth HAving explain'd the means how to improve the Attention and Extension of the Mind by which alone it may acquire a greater perfection that is become more enlightned sagacious and piercing it is time to set down those Rules the Observation whereof is absolutely necessary to resolve any Question whatsoever I shall insist long upon it and endeavour to explain them by several Instances that their necessity may be better known and the Mind accustomed to make use of them it being not so difficult or necessary to know them theoretically as to put them in Practice Let none expect here very extraordinary surprizing and abstruse things For on the contrary that those Rules may be good they must be very simple natural and few very plain and intelligible and depending on each other in short such as may lead our Mind and rule our Attention without distracting either For Experience shews that the Logick of Aristotle is of no great use because it takes up the Mind too much and disturbs the Attention it ought to give to the Subjects of its Enquiry Let then those Lovers of Mysteries and rare Inventions lay aside for a while that capricious humour and consider as attentively as they can whether the Rules we shall prescribe are sufficient to preserve Evidence in the Preceptions of the Mind and to discover the most hidden Truths Unless they suffer themselves to be unjustly prejudiced against those Rules by the simplicity and easiness of the same I hope that the great use which may be made of them as we shall shew hereafter will convince them that the most clear and simple Principles are the most pregnant and fecund and that rare and difficult things are not always so useful as our fruitless Curiosity endeavours to persuade us The Principle of all those Rules is that we must always preserve Evidence in our Reasonings to discover Truth without Fear and danger of being mistaken From that Principle follows this general Rule that respects the Subject of our Studies We ought only to Reason upon such things whereof we have clear and distinct Ideas and by a necessary consequence we must still begin with the most simple and easie Subjects and insist long upon them before we undertake the Enquiry into such as are more composed and difficult The Rules that concern the Method to be taken in resolving Questions depend likewise on the same Principle and the first of those Rules is that we must very distinctly conceive the State of the Question proposed to be resolv'd that is have Ideas of the Terms so distinct as that we may compare them together and discover the Relations which we look for When those Relations cannot be found out by an immediate comparison of their Ideas then the second Rule is that we must try by an Essay of Thought to discover one or several intermediate Ideas that may be a means or common measure to discover the Relations that are betwixt those things A special care is to be taken that those Ideas be the more clear and distinct as the Relations we endeavour to discover are more nicely exact and numerous When the Questions are very difficult and require a long Examination the third Rule is that we must carefully take off from the Subject to be consider'd all things whose Examination is not needful to the Discovery of the Truth we are in quest of For the Capacity of the Mind must not be vainly shar'd and divided but its strength must only be employed in such things as may enlighten it so that all those things which are to be laid aside are such as concern not the Question and which when taken off leave it whole and entire When the Question is thus brought within the least compass the fourth Rule is to divide the Subject of our Meditations into Parts and consider them one after the other in a natural order beginning with the most simple or those that contain the least number of Relations and never medling with the more composed before the most simple are distinctly known and become familiar When they are become familiar by Meditation the fifth Rule is to abridge Ideas and dispose them in the Imagination or write them upon Paper that they may no longer clog and fill up the Capacity of the Mind Though that Rule be always useful yet 't is not of absolute necessity unless it be in very intricate Questions that require a great extent of Mind for the Mind is only enlarg'd by the abridgment of Ideas But the use of that Rule and the following is best known by Algebra The Ideas of all the things that necessarily require Examination being clear familiar abridg'd and disposed and ranged in good order in the Imagination or written upon Paper the sixth Rule is to compare them all by the Rules of Complications one with the other alternately either by the View of the Mind alone or by the Motion of the Imagination attended with the View of the Mind or by the Calculation of the Pen joined to the attention of the Mind and Imagination If amongst all the Relations that result from those Comparisons you find not that which you enquire after then take off again all the Relations that are not subservient to resolve the Question make the others familiar abridge them posture and dispose them in the Imagination or write them upon Paper compare them together by the Rules of Complications and then see whether the composed Relation that is look'd for is one of the composed Relations that result from those new Comparisons If none of those new discover'd Relations contain the Solution of the Question then take off again those that are useless make the other familiar c. That is doe the same over and over and continuing thus you shall discover the Truth or Relation you enquire after how composed soever it may be provided you can extend the Capacity of your Mind to it by abridging your Ideas and still in all your Operations having before your Eyes the Scope you aim at For 't is the continual and steady view of the Question which must regulate all the advances of the Mind since we should always know whither we are going We must above all take care not to satisfie our selves with some glimpse or likelyhood but begin anew so often the Comparisons that are conducible to discover the Truths enquired after as that we may not withold our Assent to it without feeling the secret Lashes
and Reproofs of our internal Master that Answers our Questions that is the Application of our Mind and the Desires of our Heart Then will that Truth serve as an infallible Principle to proceed in the Acquisition of Sciences All the Rules we have given are not necessary in all sorts of Questions for the first Rule is sufficient in those that are easie and we need but in some others the first and second In short since we must make use of those Rules 'till we have discover'd the Truth we seek for it follows that the more difficult the Questions are the greater must the number of those Rules be which we must put in practice Those Rules are not very numerous but very natural as depending upon each other and may be made so familiar as to fall of themselves into the Mind as often as shall be requisite In short they can rule the Attention of the Mind without dividing it which is in great part what we could desire but they look so inconsiderable in themselves that to make them more recommendable it is necessary to shew that the Philosophers are fallen into a great many Errours and Extravagancies by not observing so much as the two first which are the chief and easiest of all whereas Des Cartes by their use has discover'd all those great and fruitful Truths which are to be learn'd in his Works CHAP. II. Of the general Rule that concerns the Subject of our Studies That School-Philosophers observe it not which is the Cause of several Errours in their Physicks THE first of these Rules and which respects the Subject of our Studies teaches that we must not argue except from clear Ideas whence it follows that to study methodically we must begin with things most simple and easie to be understood and insist long upon them before we undertake to enquire after the more composed and difficult Every one will easily grant the necessity of that general Rule plainly seeing that he walks in the dark who reasons upon obscure Ideas and uncertain Principles But 't will be matter of surprize to hear us affirm that it is hardly ever observed and that the greatest part of those Sciences which still at this day flush the Pride of some false Pretenders to Science are only grounded upon such Ideas as are either too confused or too general to be conducible to the finding out of Truth Aristotle who so justly deserves the Quality of Prince of such Philosophers as being the Father of that Philosophy which they so studiously cultivate reasons very seldom upon other Ideas than such as are confused and sensible and upon others that are general undetermin'd and representing nothing particular to the Mind For the ordinary Expressions of that Philosopher are so perplexed as to represent only to the Senses and Imagination the confused Sentiments we have of sensible things or to make his Disciples speak in such a rambling and indeterminate manner as not to understand themselves Most of his Works but especially his Eight Books of Physicks on which are as many different Commentators as there are Professors of Philosophy are a mere Logical Tattle where he talks much and says nothing Not that his Stile is too copious and diffused but because he has a particular Talent at being succinct and saying nothing but Words In his other Works he makes not such frequent use of his loose and general Terms but those he employs raise only the confused Ideas of the Senses by which Ideas he pretends in his Problems and elsewhere to resolve in two Words an infinite Number of Questions of which it may be demonstrated that they are altogether insoluble But that my Meaning may be better understood what I have proved in other Places must here be remembred viz. That all the Terms that excite nothing but sensible Ideas are equivocal nay and what 's to be well observ'd Equivocal from Errour and Ignorance which must needs cause an infinite number of Delusions The Word Ram is equivocal signifying an Animal that ruminates and a Constellation into which the Sun enters at Spring but that seldom causes any Mistake For he must be an Astrologer with a Witness who should imagine any Relation betwixt those two Things and believe for instance that we are subject at that time to vomit up the Medicines that we take because the Ram is a ruminating Beast But as to the Terms of sensible Ideas but few acknowledge them for Equivocal Aristotle and the Ancient Philosophers did not so much as dream on 't which will be agreed to by any one that has read any of their Books and distinctly knows the Cause why those Words are liable to Equivocation For nothing is more evident than that the Philosophers Opinion as to that Matter was quite contrary to the Truth For instance When they say that Fire is hot Grass green Sugar sweet they understand just as Children and the vulgar of Men that Fire contains in it what they feel when they warm themselves that Grass has painted upon it the Colours they see that Sugar is endued with that Sweetness they taste when they eat it and so as to all other visible and sensible Qualities which cannot be denied by those that have read their Writings They talk of sensible Qualities as of Sensations they take Heat for Motion And thus by the Equivocation of Terms they confound the Modes of Existence peculiar to Bodies with the Modifications of the Soul 'T is no longer since than Des Cartes's time that to those confused and indeterminate Questions Whether Fire is hot Grass green and Sugar sweet c. we use to answer by distinguishing the Equivocation of sensible Terms that express them If by Heat Colour and Savour you understand such and such Dispositions of Parts or Motion of insensible Particles then Fire is hot Grass green and Sugar sweet But if by Heat and other Qualities you understand what I feel when near the Fire what I see when I see Grass c. Fire is not hot nor Grass green c. For the Heat I feel and the Colours I see are only in the Soul as has been proved in the First Book But as Men commonly suppose that what they feel is the same with that which is in the Object so they believe they are in the right when they judge of the Qualities of Objects by their own Sensations And thus they hardly say two Words without speaking a Falsehood and never say any thing upon that Matter but what is obscure and confused and that for the several following Reasons First Because all Men have not the same Sensations of the same Objects nor even the same Man in different Times or when different Parts of his Body are affected by them What is sweet to one is bitter to another what is hot to one is cold to another what seems hot to a Man when he is cold feels cold to himself when he is hot or when other Parts of his Body are affected
false Supposition of the Philosophers which we are here endeavouring to destroy that the surrounding Bodies are the true Causes of our Pain and Pleasure Reason seems to justifie a Religion like the Pagan Idolatry and approve the universal Depravation of Morals Reason I grant teaches not to adore Onions and Leeks for instance as the Sovereign Divinity because they can never make us altogether happy when we have them or unhappy when we want them neither did the Heathens worship them with an equal Homage as their great Jupiter whom they fansied to be the God of Gods or as the Sun whom our Senses represent as the universal Cause that gives Life and Motion to all things and which we can hardly forbear to look on as the Sovereign Divinity if we suppose as the Pagan Philosophers that he Comprehends in his Being the true Causes of what he seems to produce as well upon our Soul and Body as upon all the Beings that surround us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Worship to Leeks and Onions they deserve at least some particular Adoration I mean they may be thought upon and loved in some manner if it be true that they can in some sort make us happy and may be honour'd proportionably to the good they doe us Surely Men that listen to the Reports of Sense think Pulse capable of doing them good otherwise the Israelites would not have bewailed the loss of them in the Wilderness or look'd on themselves as unhappy for being deprived thereof had they not fansied to themselves some great Happiness in the Enjoyment of them See what an Abyss of Corruption Reason plunges us into when it goes hand in hand with the Principles of Pagan Philosophy and follows the footsteps of the Senses But that the Falshood of that wretched Phylosophy and the Certainty of our Principles and Distinctness of our Ideas may not be longer doubted it will be necessary plainly to establish the Truths that contradict the Errours of the Ancient Philosophers or to prove in few words that there is but one true Cause since there is but one true God that the Nature and Force of every thing is nothing but the Will of God that all Natural things are not real but only occasional Causes and some other Truths depending on them It is evident that all Bodies great and little have no force to move themselves a Mountain a House a Stone a Grain of Sand the minutest and bulkiest Bodies imaginable are alike as to that We have but two sorts of Ideas viz. of Spirits and Bodies and as we ought not to speak what we conceive not so we must only argue from those two Ideas Since therefore our Idea of Bodies convinces us that they cannot move themselves we must conclude that they are moved by Spirits But considering our Idea of finite Spirits we see no necessary Connexion betwixt their Will and the Motion of any Body whatsoever on the contrary we perceive that there is not nor can be any Whence we must infer if we will follow Light and Reason That as no Body can move it self so no Created Spirit can be the true and principal Cause of its Motion But when we think on the Idea of God or of a Being infinitely perfect and consequently Almighty we are aware that there is such a Connexion betwixt his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that it is impossible to conceive he should will that a Body be moved and it should not be moved And therefore if we would speak according to our Conceptions and not according to our Sensations we must say that nothing but his Will can move Bodies The moving force of Bodies is not then in themselves this force being nothing but the Will of God Bodies then have no proper Action and when a moving Ball meets with another and moves it the former communicates nothing of its own to the latter as not having in it self the Impression it communicates though the former be the Natural Cause of the latter's Motion and therefore a natural Cause is not a true and real Cause but only an occasional which in such or such a Case determines the Author of Nature to act in such or such a manner 'T is certain that all things are produced by the Motion of visible or invisible Bodies for Experience teaches us that those Bodies whose parts are in greater Motion are always the most active and those that Cause the greatest Alterations in the World so that all the Forces of Nature are but the Will of God who Created the World because he will'd it who spake and it was done who moves all things and produces all the Effects we see because he has established some Laws by which Bodies Communicate their Motion to each other when they meet together and because those Laws are efficacious they and not the Bodies act There is then no Force Power nor true Cause in all the Material and sensible World Nor need we admit any Forms Faculties or real Qualities to produce Effects which the Bodies bring not forth or to divide with God his own Essential Force and Power As Bodies cannot be the true Causes of any thing so likewise the most Noble Spirits are subject to the same impotency on that respect They cannot know any thing unless God enlightens them nor have the Sensation of any thing unless he modifies them nor will unless he moves them towards himself They may indeed determine the Impression God has given them to himself towards other Objects but I doubt whether it can be call'd a Power For if to be able to sin is a Power it is such a one as the Almighty wants saith St. Austin somewhere If Men had of themselves the Power of loving Good it might be said that they have some Power but they cannot so much as love but because God Wills it and that his Will is Efficacious They love because God continually drives them towards Good in general that is towards himself for whom alone they are Created and preserved God moves them and not themselves towards Good in general and they only follow that Impression by a free Choice according to the Law of God or determine it towards false and seeming Goods according to the Law of the Flesh But they cannot determine it but by the sight of Good For being able to doe nothing without an Impression from above they are incapable of loving any thing but Good But though it should be supposed which is true in one sense that Spirits have in themselves the Power of knowing Truths and loving Good should their Thoughts and Will produce nothing outwardly it might still be said that they were impotent and unoperative Now it seems undeniable that the Will of Spirits is not able to move the smallest Body in the World it being evident there is no necessary Connexion betwixt the Will we may have of moving our Arm for instance and the Motion of the same Arm. It moves
Men pay their Worship to the Sun and is still the universal Cause of the Disorders of their Mind and the Corruption of their Heart Why say they by their Actions and sometimes by their Words should we not love Bodies since they are able to afford us Pleasure And why are the Israelites blam'd for lamenting the Loss of the Garlick and Onions of Egypt since the Privation of those things which enjoyed afforded them some Happiness made them in some sort unhappy But the Philosophy that is mis-call'd New and represented as a Bugbear to frighten weak Minds that is despised and condemned without hearing that New Philsosophy I say since it must have that name destroys all the Pretences of the Libertines by the establishing its very first Principle that perfectly agrees with the first Principle of the Christian Religion namely That we must love and fear none but God since none but He alone can make us happy As Religion declares that there is but one true God so this Philosophy shews that there is but one true Cause As Religion teaches that all the Heathen Divinities are but dead Metals and immovable Stone so this Philosophy discovers that all the second Causes or Divinities of the Philosophers are but unactive Matter and ineffective Wills As Religion commands not to bow to those Gods that are not Gods so this Philosophy teaches not to prostrate our Minds and Imagination before the phantastick Grandeur and Power of pretended Causes which are not Causes which we ought neither to love nor to fear nor be taken up with but think upon God alone see and adore love and fear him in all things But that 's not the Inclination of some Philosophers they will neither see God nor think upon him for ever since the Fall there is a secret Opposition betwixt God and Man They delight in Gods of their own Invention in loving and fearing the Contrivances of their Heart as the Heathens did the Works of their Hands They are like those Children who tremble at the sight of their Play-Fellows after they have dawb'd and blacken'd them Or if they desire a more noble Comparison though perhaps not so just they resemble those famous Romans who reverenced the Fictions of their Mind and foolishly adored their Emperours after they themselves had let loose the Eagle at their Canonization CHAP. IV. An Explication of the Second Part of the General Rule That the Philosophers observe it not but that Des Cartes has exactly followed it WE have been shewing to what Errours Men are liable when they reason upon the false and confused Ideas of the Senses and their rambling and undetermin'd Notions of Logick whence it appears that to keep to Evidence in our Perceptions 't is absolutely necessary exactly to observe that Rule we have prescrib'd and to examine which are the clear and distinct Ideas of things that we may only argue by deduction from them In that same general Rule concerning the Subject of our Studies there is yet a remarkable Circumstance namely That we must still begin with the most simple and easie things and insist long upon them before we undertake the Enquiry after the more composed and difficult For if to preserve Evidence in all our Perceptions we must only reason upon distinct Ideas 't is plain that we must never meddle with the Enquiry of compound things before the simple on which they depend have been carefully examin'd and made familiar to us by a nice Scrutiny since the Ideas of compound things neither are nor can be clear as long as the most simple of which they are composed are but confusedly and imperfectly known We know things imperfectly when we are not sure to have considered all their Parts and we know them confusedly when they are not familiar enough to the Mind though we may be certain of having consider'd all their Parts When we know them but imperfectly our Argumentations are only probable when we perceive them confusedly there is neither Order not Light in our Inferences and often we know not where we are or whither we are going But when we know them both imperfectly and confusedly which is the commonest of all we know not so much as what we would look for much less by what Means we are to find it So that it is altogether necessary to keep strictly to that Order in our Studies Of still beginning by the most simple Things examining all their Parts and being well acquainted with them before we meddle with the more composed that depend on the former But that Rule agrees not with the Inclination of Man who naturally despises whatever appears easie his Mind being made for an unlimited Object and almost incomprehensible cannto make a long Stay on the Consideration of those simple Ideas which want the Character of Infinite for which he is created On the contrary and for the same Reason he has much Veneration and an eager Passion for great obscure and mysterious Things and such as participate of Infinity Not that he loves Darkness but that he hopes to find in those deep Recesses a Good and Truth capable of satisfying his Desires Vanity likewise gives a great Commotion to the Spirits stirring them to what is great and extraordinary and encouraging them with a foolish Hope of hitting right Experience teaches that the most accurate Knowledge of ordinary Things gives no great Name in the World whereas to be acquainted with uncommon Things though never so confusedly and imperfectly always procures the Esteem and Reverence of those who willingly conceive a great Idea of whatever is out of their depth of Understanding And that Experience determines all those who are more sensible to Vanity than to Truth which certainly make up the greatest Number to a blind-fold Search of a specious though chimerical Knowledge of what is great rare and unintelligible How many are there that reject the Cartesian Philosophy for that ridiculous Reason That its Principles are too simple and easie There are in this Philosophy no obscure and mysterious Terms Women and Persons unskill'd in Greek and Latin are capable of learning it It must then be say they something very inconsiderable and unworthy the Application of great Genius's They imagine that Principles so clear and simple are not fruitful enough to explain the Effects of Nature which they supposed to be dark intricate and confused They see not presently the Use of those Principles that are too simple and easie to stop their Attention long enough to make them understand their Use and Extent They rather chuse to explain Effects whose Causes are unknown to them by unconceivable Principles than by such as are both simple and intelligible For the Principles these Philosophers are wont to explain obscure Things by are not only obscure themselves but utterly incomprehensible Those that pretend to explain Things extremely intricate by Principles clear and generally receiv'd may easily be refuted if they succeed not since to know whether what they say
publick Fame for we ought not to trouble our selves with enquiring into the true Genealogy of Things for which we have no great Esteem CHAP. VI. General and necessary Directions to proceed orderly in the Search after Truth and in the Choice of Sciences LEST it should be said that we have only been destroying the Reasonings of others but establish nothing certain and undeniable of our own it will be convenient to propose in few words what Order we ought to observe in our Studies for the avoiding Errour and I design withal to shew some Truths and Sciences that are very necessary as bearing such a Character of Evidence as that we cannot withold our Consent without feeling the secret Upbraidings of our Reason I shall not explain at large those Truths and Sciences that 's already done and I intend not to reprint the Works of others but only to refer to them and to shew what Order we must keep in our Studies to preserve Evidence in all our perceptions The first Knowledge of all is that of the Existence of our Soul all our Thoughts are so many undeniable Demonstrations of it for nothing is more evident than that whatever actually thinks is actually something But though it be easie to know the Existence of our Soul yet her Essence and Nature are not so easily discovered If we desire to know what she is we must take care above all not to confound her with the things to which she is united If we doubt will argue we must only believe that the Soul is something that doubts wills argues and nothing more as long as we have not felt in her other Properties for we know our Soul only by the inward Sensation we have of her We must not mistake her for our Body for Blood for Animal Spirits for Fire and many other things for which Philosophers have mistaken her We must believe of the Soul no more than we are forced to believe of her by a full conviction of our inward Sense for otherwise we shall be deceiv'd Thus we shall know by a simple view or by internal Sensation whatever may be known of the Soul without being obliged to long reasonings that might lead us into Errour For when we reason Memory operates and whereever Memory operates there may be Errour supposing our Knowledge should depend on some wicked Spirits that should take delight in deceiving us Though I should suppose for instance a God who took delight in thus abusing me yet I am persuaded that I could not be deceived in a Knowledge of simple Perception as is that by which I know that I am that I think or that 2 and 2 are 4. For I am conscious to my self that in this extravagant Supposition such a deluding Spirit though never so potent could not make me doubt that I am or that 2 times 2 are 4 because I perceive those things with a simple view or Perception and without the use of Memory But when I reason as I see not evidently the Principles of my Reasonings but only remember that I have evidently seen them If that seducing God should join that Remembrance to false Principles as he might do if he pleas'd I should conclude nothing but what was false Just like those that make long Calculations fancying they remember that they have plainly seen that 9 times 9 are 72 or that 21 is a primitive Number or some other Errour of that Nature draw false Inferences from thence And therefore 't is necessary to know God and to be assured that he is no Deceiver if we desire to be fully convinced that the most certain Sciences as Arithmetick and Geometry are true Sciences for without that their Evidence is not full and we can still with-hold our Consent And 't is likewise necessary to know by a simple View and not by Reasoning that God is no Deceiver since reasoning may still be false in the supposition of a deluding God All the ordinary Proofs of the Existence and Perfections of God drawn from the Existence and Perfections of his Creatures are methinks liable to this Defect that they convince not the Mind with a simple Perception All those Arguments are Reasonings convincing in themselves but because they are Reasonings they are not demonstrative in supposing a wicked and deceitfull Genius They sufficiently shew that there is a Power superiour to us which is granted even by that foolish Supposition but they do not fully persuade us that there is a God or a Being infinitely perfect so that the Conclusion of those Arguments is more evident than the Principle T is more evident that there is a Power superiour to us than that there is a World since no Supposition can obviate our demonstrating that superiour Power whereas in supposing an evil and deceitfull Spirit 't is impossible to prove the Existence of the World because it may still be conceived that this wicked Genius gives us the Sense of things that are not in being as Sleep and some Distempers make us perceive things that never were and even feel an actual pain in imaginary Members such as we have lost or that we never had But the Arguments of the Existence and Perfections of God drawn from our Idea of infinite are Prooâ—s of simple sight We see there is a God as soon as we perceive infinite because necessary Existence is included in the Idea of infinite and that nothing but infinite can furnish to us the Idea of an infinite Being We likewise see that God is no Deceiver because knowing that he is infinitely perfect and that infinite cannot want any Perfection we plainly perceive that he will not seduce us and even that he cannot because he can but what he wills and what he is able to will And therefore there is a God a true God and a God that never deceives us though he does not always enlighten us and that we are obnoxious to Mistakes when we want his Light Attentive Minds perceive all those Truths by a simple intuitive Perception though we seem to make Arguments that we may demonstrate them to others so that they may be supposed as unquestionable Principles of our Reasonings for having known that God delights not in deceiving us nothing hinders but we may proceed to Reason 'T is also plain that the certainty of Faith depends on that Principle That there is a God uncapable of Deceipt For the Existence of God and the Infallibility of his Divine Authority are rather a natural Knowledge and common Notions as to Minds capable of serious Attention than Articles of Faith though to have a Mind susceptible of a sufficient Attention rightly to conceive those Truths and willingly to apply our selves to the understanding them be a particular Gift of God From that Principle That God is no Deceiver we might likewise infer that we have a real Body to which we are united in a particular manner and that we are surrounded with several others For we are inwardly convinced of their
Existence by the continual Sensations which God produces in us and which we cannot correct by Reason without offending Faith though we can correct by Reason the Sensations that represent them as endu'd with some Qualities and Perfections that are not in them So that we ought not to believe that they are such as we see or imagine them but only that they exist and that they are such as we conceive them by Reason But that we may proceed orderly we must not yet examine whether we have a Body whether there are others about us or whether we have only bare Sensations of Things which exist not Those Questions include too great Difficulties and are not perhaps so necessary as may be imagin'd to perfect our Mind and to have an accurate Knowledge of Natural and Moral Philosophy and some other Sciences We have within us the Ideas of Numbers and Extension whose Existence is undeniable and their Nature immutable and which would eternally supply us with Objects to think on if we desire to know all their Relations It is necessary to begin to make use of our Minds upon those Ideas for some Reasons which it will not be amiss to explain whereof the principal are Three The First is That those Ideas are the most clear and evident of all For if to avoid Errour we must still keep to Evidence in our Reasonings 't is plain that we must rather argue from the Ideas of Numbers and Extension than from the confus'd or compos'd Ideas of Physicks Morals Mechanicks Chymistry and other Sciences Secondly Those Ideas are the most distinct and exact of all especially those of Numbers So that the Habit which proceeds from the Exercise of Arithmetick and Geometry of not being content till we precisely know the Relations of Things endues the Mind with such an Exactness of Thought as is not to be found in those that are satisfied with the Probabilities so obvious to be met with in other Sciences The Third and chief Reason is That those Ideas are the immutable Rules and common Measure of all the Objects of our Knowledge For those that perfectly know the Relations of Numbers and Figures or rather the Art of making such Comparisons as are requisite to know them have a kind of Universal Knowledge and a very sure Means evidently and certainly to discover whatever goes not beyond the ordinary Limits of the Mind But those that are not skilful in this Art cannot with Certainty discover such Truths as are somewhat intricate though they have very clear Ideas of Things and endeavour to know their Compound Relations These or the like Reasons mov'd some of the Antients to apply their Youth to the Study of Arithmetick Algebra and Geometry Undoubtedly they well knew that Arithmetick and Algebra endue the Mind with such an Insight and Penetration as was not to be gotten by other Studies and that Geometry manages the Imagination so well as that it is not easily puzzl'd or confounded for that Faculty of the Soul so necessary to Sciences acquires by the Use of Geometry such an universal Nicety as promotes and preserves the clear View of the Mind even in the most intricate Difficulties And therefore he that desires always to preserve Evidence in his Perceptions and discover naked Truâ—hs without Mixture of Darkness and Errour must begin with the Study of Arithmetick Algebra and Geometry after he has obtain'd some Knowledge at least of himself and the Sovereign Being As for Books that make the Way to those Sciences easie I may refer to the Meditations of des Cartes as to the Knowledge of God and our selves to the Elements of Mathematicks newly printed as to Arithmetick and Algebra to the New Elements of Geometry printed in 1667 or to the Elements of Father Taquet Jesuit printed at Antwerp in 1665 as to ordinary Geometry and as to Conick Sections and the Solution of Geometrical Problemes to the Treatises of Monsieur de la Hire intituled Of Conick Sections Of Geometrical Places and Of the Construction of Equations to which may be added the Geometry of des Cartes I would not have advis'd to the Elements of Mathematicks as to Arithmetick and Algebra if I knew any Author who had clearly demonstrated those Sciences but Truth obliges me to a thing for which I may be blam'd by some People for Algebra and Analyticks being altogether requisite for the Discovery of compos'd Truths I must needs shew my Esteem for a Book which carries those Sciences very far and which in the Opinion of many Learned explains them more clearly than they had been hitherto By the careful Study of those general Sciences we shall evidently know a great Number of Truths very serviceable in all accurate and particular Sciences We may afterwards study Natural and Moral Philosophy as being very useful though noâ— very fit to make the Mind nice and quick-sighted And if we desire to preserve Evidence in all our Perceptions we must take a special Care not to be opinionated of any Principle that is not evident and to which the Chinese for instance would not be suppos'd to dissent after having throughly weigh'd and consider'd it And therefore we must only admit in Physicks those Notions which are common to all Men such as Axioms of Geometry and the clear Ideas of Extension Figure Motion Rest and others of that nature if there be any Perhaps it will be said that Extension is not the Essence of Matter But what is that to the purpose 'T is sufficient that the World which we conceive to consist of Extension appears like to that we see though it be not made of such a Matter which is good for nothing and altogether unknown whilst so much Noise is made about it It is not absolutely necessary to examine whether there are actually External Beings corresponding to those Ideas for we argue not from those Beings but from their Ideas We must only take care that our Reasonings which we make upon the Properties of Things agree with our inward Consciousness that is that our Thoughts perfectly agree with Experience because in Physicks we endeavour to discover the Order and Connexion of Effects with their Causes either in Bodies if they exist or in the Sense we have of them if they are not in being I say not however that we can doubt whether Bodies are actually existing when we consider that God is not a Deceiver and that the Order he has constituted in our Sentiments of Things both as to natural Occurrences and such as are wrought to create our Belief of what Reason is at a Loss to comprehend is very regular But I observe this because 't is not necessary to insist at first very long upon a thing which no body doubts of and is not extremely conducible to the Knowledge of Physicks consider'd as a true Science Neither must we puzzle our Heads with enquiring whether there are in the Bodies about us some other Qualities besides those of which we have clear
Ideas for we must only reason upon our Ideas and if there be any thing of which we have no clear distinct and particular Idea we shall never know it nor argue from it with any Certainty Whereas perhaps by reasoning upon our Ideas we may follow Nature and perhaps discover that she is not so hidden as is commonly imagin'd As those who have not study'd the Properties of Numbers often imagine that it is not possible to resolve some Problemes which are however simple and easie so those that have not meditated upon the Properties of Extension Figures and Motions are very apt to believe and even to assert that most part of the Physical Questions are inexplicable But we must not be deterr'd by the Opinion of those who have examin'd nothing or nothing at least with due Application For though few Truths concerning Natural Things have been fully demonstrated yet 't is certain that there are some that are general which cannot be doubted of though it be very possible not to think upon them to know nothing of them and to deny them If we meditate orderly and with due Time and all necessary Application we shall discover several of those certain Truths I speak of But for more Conveniency it will be requisite carefully to read des Cartes's Principles of Philosophy without approving of any thing he says till the Strength and Plainness of his Reasons shall suffer us to doubt no longer As Moral Philosophy is the most necessary of all Sciences so it must be study'd with the greatest Application it being very dangerous to follow in this the Opinions of Men. But to the avoiding Errour and keeping to Evidence in our Perceptions we must only meditate upon such Principles as are confess'd by all those whose Hearts are not corrupted by Debauchery and their Minds blinded with Pride For there is no Moral Principle undeniable to Minds of Flesh and Blood who aspire to the Quality of Bold Wits Such People conceive not the most simple Truths or if they do they constantly deny them through a Spirit of Contradiction and to keep up the Reputation of great Wits Some of the most general Principles of Morality are That God having made all things for himself has made our Understanding to know and our Will to love him That being so just and powerful as he is we cannot be happy but by obeying his Commands nor be unhappy in following them That our Nature is corrupted our Mind depending on our Body our Reason on our Senses and our Will on our Passions That we are uncapable of performing what we plainly see to be our Duty and that we have need of a Redeemer There are yet many other Moral Principles as That Retirement and Penitency are necessary to diminish our Union with sensible Objects and to increase that which we have with intelligible Goods true Goods and the Goods of the Mind That we cannot enjoy vehement Pleasures without becoming Slaves to them That nothing must be undertaken by Passion That we must not long for Settlements in this Life c. But because these last Principles depend on the former and on the Knowledge of Man it behoves us not to take them at first for granted If we orderly meditate upon those Principles with as much Care and Application as so great a Subject deserves and admit no Conclusion for true but such as follows from those Principles we shall compose a very certain System of Morals and perfectly agreeable with that of the Gospel though not so large and compleat I grant that in Moral Reasonings it is not so easie to preserve Evidence and Exactness as in some other Sciences and that the Knowledge of Man being absolutely necessary to those that will proceed far many Learners make no considerable Progresses therein They will not consult themselves to be sensible of the Weakness of their Nature They are soon weary of interrogating the Master who inwardly teaches them his Will that is the Immutable and Eternal Laws and the true Principles of Morality They cannot listen with Pleasure to him that speaks not to their Senses who answers not according to their Desires and flatters not their secret Pride They have no Veneration for such Words the Lustre of which dazles not their Imagination which are lowly pronounc'd and never distinctly heard but when the Creatures are silent But they consult with Pleasure and Reverence Aristotle Seneca or some new Philosophers who seduce them by the Obscurity of their Words by the Elegancy of their Expressions or the Probability of their Reasons Since the Fall of our first Parents we esteem nothing but what refers to the Preservation of the Body and the Conveniencies of Life and as we discover that sort of Good by means of the Senses so we endeavour to use them on all Occasions The Eternal Wisdom which is our true Life and the only Light that can illuminate us often shines but upon the Blind and speaks but to the Deaf when it speaks within the Recesses of our Soul because we are for the most part exercis'd abroad And as we are continually putting Questions to the Creatures to learn any News from them of the Good we are in search of it was requisite as I have said elsewhere that this Wisdom should offer it self to our Senses yet without going out of our selves that we might learn by sensible Words and convincing Examples the way to eternal Happiness God perpetually imprints on us a natural Love for him that we may always love him yet by that same Motion of Love we incessantly recede from him running with all the strength he gives us to the sinsible Good which he forbids us to love and therefore as he desires we should love him so he must make himself sensible and offer himself before us to stop by the delectation of his Grace all our restless Agitations and begin our Cure by Sensations or Satisfactions like to the preventing Pleasures that had been the Original of our Disease For these reasons I pretend not that Men may easily discover by the strength of their Mind all the Rules of Morality necessary to Salvation and much less that they should be able to act according to their Light for their Heart is still more corrupted than their Mind I only say that if they admit nothing but evident Principles and argue consequently from them they shall discover the same Truths that are taught us in the Gospel because it is the same Wisdom which speaks immediately and by it self to those that discover the Truth in evident Reasonings and which speaks in the Holy Scriptures to those that understand them in their right sense We must therefore study Morality in the Gospel to spare our selves the trouble of Meditation and to learn with certainty the Laws and Rules of our Life and Manners As to those who are not satisfied with a bare Certainty because it only convinces the Mind without enlightening it they must meditate upon those Laws and
a Muscle it must needs swell up and produce in that part a Convulsive Motion If that Motion may easily be resisted 't is a sign that the Nerves are not yet obstructed by any Humour since we may empty the Muscle of the Spirits that have enter'd into it and determine them to swell up the opposite Muscle But if we cannot do it we must conclude that pungent and piercing Humours have some part at least in that Motion Even it may often happen that those Humours are the only Cause of Convulsions since they may determine the Course of the Spirits to some certain Muscles by opening some Passages that convey them and shutting others Besides that they may contract the Tendons and Fibres by penetrating their Pores When a very ponderous Weight hangs at the end of a Rope it may considerably be rais'd by only wetting that Cord because the Particles of Water penetrating as so many little Wedges betwixt the Threads of the Rope shorten it by dilating it So the piercing and pungent Humours insinuating into the Pores of the Nerves contract them stretch the Parts to which they are tied and produce in the Body Convulsive Motions that are extremely slow violent and painful and and often leave the Part sadly distorted for a long time As to the Convulsive Motions that are very swift they are caus'd by the Spirits but it is not necessary that those Spirits should receive any Fermentation 't is enough that the Conduits through which they pass be more open at one side than at the other When all the Parts of the Body are in their natural Situation the Animal Spirits diffuse themselves equally and readily through them according to the Necessities of the Machine and faithfully perform the Orders of the Will But when Humours disturb the Disposition of the Brain alter or variously move the Apertures of the Nerves or penetrate into the Muscles they agitate their Springs and the Spirits diffusing into those Parts after a new and unusual manner produce extraordinary Motions without the Consent of the Will However we may often by a strong Resistance hinder some of those Motions and insensibly diminish the Traces that produce them even when the Habit is wholly form'd Those that look carefully to themselves find little Difficulty in preventing Grimaces unbecoming Gestures and a sourish Countenance though their Body have a Disposition to them and may even conquer them when strengthen'd by Habit but with a great deal more Difficulty for such Dispositions should always be oppos'd in their Birth and before the Spirits have traced out a Way not easie to be stopp'd up The Cause of those Motions is often in the agitated Muscle and proceeds from some pungent Humour or fermenting Spirits but we must judge that it is in the Brain especially when the Convulsions agitate not one or two parts of the Body but most or all and withall in several Diseases which alter the natural Constitution of the Blood and Spirits 'T is true that one Nerve often having different Branches which disperse through Parts of the Body very remote as into the Face and Bowels it sometimes happens that a Convulsion the Cause of which lies in a Part to which some one of those Branches resorts may have Communication with those to which other Branches reach without proceeding from the Brain and without a Corruption of the Spirits But when the Convulsive Motions are common to most Parts of the Body we must needs say either that the Spirits ferment in a very extraordinary manner or that the Order and Disposition of the Parts of the Brain is disturb'd or that it proceeds from both Causes together I shall not insist any longer upon this Question because it grows so compound and depending on so many things when we enter into Particulars that it cannot easily be made serviceable to a clear Explication of the Rules we have given There is no Science which may supply us with more Examples to shew the Usefulness of those Rules than Geometry and especially Algebra since these two Sciences make a perpetual Use of them Geometry plainly discovers the Necessity always to begin with the most simple Things and which include the least Number of Relations It always examines those Relations by Measures that are clearly known it takes off whatever is unserviceable to discover them it divides into Parts Compound Questions disposes those Parts and examines them in order In short The only Fault to be found in this Science is as I have observ'd elsewhere that it affords no convenient Means to abridge Ideas and discover'd Relations So that though it regulates the Imagination and makes the Mind exact yet it increases not its Extent very much neither does it give a Capacity to discover very compound Truths But Algebra continually teaching to abridge and in the shortest Way imaginable Ideas and their Relations extremely improves the Capacity of the Mind for nothing so compound can be conceâ—v'd in the Relations of Magnitudes but the Mind may discover it in time by the Means it affords when we know the Way that ought to be taken The fifth Rule and the following which speak of the Method of abridging Ideas concern only that Science for none else has a convenient Way of abridging them so that I shall not insist upon their Explication Those who have a great Inclination for Mathematicks and desire to give their Mind all the Force and Extent it is capable of and to put themselves into a State of discovering without a Tutor an infinite Number of new Truths will perceive if they earnestly apply themselves to Algebra that the Usefulness of that Science as to the Enquiry after Truth proceeds from its observing the Rules we have prescrib'd But I must advertise that by Algebra I especially understand that which des Cartes and some others have made use of Before the Conclusion of this Book I shall set down an Example somewhat at large to shew the Usefulness of the whole Treatise I shall represent by it the Advances of a Man who in the Discussion of an important Question endeavours to free himself from Prejudices I shall at first make him fall into some Faults that they may excite the Remembrance of what has been said elsewhere But at last his Attention leading him to the Truth enquir'd after I induce him speaking positively and as one who pretends to have solv'd the Question he examin'd CHAP. IX The last Instance to shew the Vsefulness of this Treatise wherein the Cause of the Vnion of Parts in Bodies and withall the Rules of the Communication of Motion are examin'd BOdies are united together three different Ways by Continuity Contiguity and in a third manner that has no particular Name because it seldom happens I shall call it by the general Term of Union By Continuity or by the Causes of it I understand somewhat or other which causes the Parts of a Body to hold so strongly together that we must use violence
which two Principles of Errour I remember to have been often seduc'd For to return to the Difficulty in hand 't is not possible to conceive how those little Fetters should be indivisible by their own Essence and Nature nor consequently how they should be inflexible since on the contrary I conceive them most divisible nay necessarily divisible by their own Essence and Nature For the Part A is most certainly a Substance as well as B and consequently 't is plain that A may exist without B since Substances may exist without one another otherwise they would be no Substances It cannot be said that A is no Substance for 't is plain that that is not a bare Mode whereas every Being is either a Substance or the Mode of a Substance And therefore since A is not a Mode it is a Substance and may exist without B and much more the Part A exists separately from B so that this Fetter is divisible into A and B. Moreover if this Fetter were indivisible or crooked by its own Nature and Essence there would happen a thing quite contrary to what we see by Experience for not one Body could be broken Let us suppose as before a Piece of Iron composed of many Fetters perplexed within one another and A a B b to be two of them I say it will not be possible to disintangle them and consequently to break the Iron For to break it the Fetters that make it up must be bent which however are supposed inflexible by their own Nature and Essence If they be not supposed inflexible but only indivisible by their own Nature the Supposition would be unserviceable for solving the Question For then the Difficulty will be Why those little Fetters obey not the Force that is used to bend a Bar of Iron Neither must they be supposed indivisible if they be not supposed inflexible For if the Parts of those Fetters could change their situation in reference to one another 't is visible that they might be separated since there is no Reason why if one part may be somewhat removed from the other it could not be entirely removed And therefore whether these little Fetters are supposed indivisible or inflexible the Question cannot be solved by that means for if they be only supposed indivisible a Piece of Iron must be broken without trouble and if they be supposed inflexible it will be impossible to break it since the little Fetters that make up the Iron being intricated within one another it will be impossible to disintangle them Let us therefore solve the Difficulty by clear and undeniable Principles and find the Reason why that little Band has two Parts A B so firmly united to one another 'T is needful I perceive to divide the Subject of my Meditation into Parts that I may examine it the more exactly and with less Intention of Thought since I could not at first at a single view and with the whole Attention I am capable of discover what I enquired after This I might have done at the beginning for when the Subjects of our Meditation are somewhat abstruse 't is always the best way to consider them by parts and not fruitlessly weary our selves with the vain Hopes of meeting happily with the Truth What I enquire after is The Cause of the strict Union betwixt the minute Parts that make up the little Fetter A B. Now I conceive only distinctly three Things that can be the Cause sought for viz. The very Parts of that little Fetter or the Will of the Author of Nature or lastly invisible Bodies surrounding such little Bands I might yet alledge as the Cause of these things the Form of Bodies the Qualities of Hardness or some occult Quality the Sympathy betwixt Parts of the same Species c. but since I have no distinct Idea of those fine things I neither must nor can ground my Reasonings thereupon so that if I find not the Cause I search after in those things of which I have distinct Ideas I will not fruitlessly trouble my self with the Contemplation of such rambling and general Notions of Logick and shall forbear speaking of what I understand not But let us examine the first of these things that may be the Cause why the Parts of that small Band are so firmly joined viz. the very Parts of which it is made up When I only consider the Parts of which hard Bodies are composed I am inclined to believe That no Cement which unites the Parts of that Fetter can be imagin'd besides themselves and their own Rest for of what Nature could it be It cannot be a thing subsisting of it self since all those minute Parts being Substances for what Reason should they be united by other Substances but themselves Neither can it be a Quality different from Rest because there is no Quality more contrary to Motion that may separate those Parts but their own Rest but besides Substances and their Qualities we know not any other sorts of things 'T is true that the Parts of hard Bodies remain united as long as they are in Rest one by another and that when they are once in Rest they remain of themselves in the same state as long as they can but this is not what I enquire after and I know not how too I came to mistake the Subject I endeavour here to discover why the Parts of hard Bodies have so great a strength to remain in Rest one by another that they withstand the Force that is used to move them I might however answer my self that every Body has truly Force of continuing fix'd in its present state and that this Force is equal whether in Motion or Rest But that the Reason why the parts of hard Bodies remain in Rest by one another and that we can difficultly move and separate them is our not imploying sufficient Motion to overpower the Rest. This is probable but I am seeking Certainty if it be to be found and not bare Probability And how can I know with Certainty and Evidence that each Body has this Force to continue in the state it 's in and that this Force is equal both as to Motion and Rest since Matter on the contrary seems indifferently passive to either and altogether destitute of Force Let us have recourse then with M. des Cartes to the Will of the Creatour which is it may be that Force which Bodies seem to have in themselves which is the second thing above mention'd suppos'd capable of preserving the Parts of this little Fetter we speak of so closely link'd to one another Certainly 't is possible that God may will every Body should remain in its present state and that his Will should be the Force which unites their Parts to one another as I otherwise know his Will to be the Moving Force which puts Bodies in Motion For since Matter is incapable of moving it self I have Reason methinks to conclude it is a Spirit and even the Author
two parts as close as they are yet the Air cannot get in and therefore 't is that which compresses and constringes the two parts together and makes them so difficult to be disunited unless we glide them over one another For all this it is manifest that the Continuity Contiguity and Union of two Marbles would be one and the same thing in a vacuum for neither have we different Ideas of them so that it would be to talk without understanding our selves to make them differ absolutely and without any regard to the surrounding Bodies I now come to make some Reflexions upon M. Des Cartes's Opinion and the Original of his Errour I call his Opinion an Errour because I can find no sincere way of defending what he has said upon the Rules of Motion and the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies towards the end of the second Part of his Principles in several places and that he seems to have evidently prov'd the Truth of the contrary Opinion This great Man most distinctly conceiving that Matter could not naturally move it self but that the moving Force of all Bodies was nothing but the general Will of the Author of Nature and that therefore the Communications of their Motion upon their mutual Collision must come from the same Will yielded to be carry'd away with this Notion That the Rules of the different Communication of Motions must be fetch'd from the Proportion found between the different Magnitudes of Colliding Bodies it being impossible to penetrate into the Designs and Will of God And whereas he concluded that every thing had the Force to persevere in its present State whether it were in Motion or Rest because God whose Will constituted this Force acts always in the same manner he inferr'd that Rest had an equal Force with Motion Thus he measur'd the Effects of the Power of Rest by the Greatness of the Body it resided in as well as those of Motion And hence he gave the Rules of the Communication of Motion which are seen in his Principles and the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies which I have endeavour'd to refute 'T is a hard matter not to submit to the Opinion of Monsieur des Cartes when we contemplate it on the same side For once more since the Communication of Motions proceeds only from the Will of the Author of Nature and that we see all Bodies continue in the State they have once been put in whether it be Motion or Rest it seems that we ought to seek for the Rules of the different Communications of Motion upon the Concourse of Bodies not in the Will of God which is unknown to us but in the Proportion that is found between the Magnitudes of these same Bodies I do not therefore admire that Monsieur des Cartes should light upon this Notion but I only wonder he did not correct it when having push'd on his Discoveries he found out the Existence and some Effects of the subtile Matter which surrounds all Bodies I am surpriz'd to find him in the 132d Article of the Fourth Part attribute the Elastick Force of certain Bodies to the subtile Matter and yet not ascribe to it their Hardness and the Resistance they make to our Endeavours to bend and break them but only to the Rest of their Parts For I think it evident that the Cause of the Elasticity and Stiffness of some Bodies is the same with that which impowers them to resist the Violence that is us'd to break them For indeed the Force which is employ'd in breaking a piece of Steel has but an insensible Difference from that which is us'd to bend it I mean not to multiply Reasons here which one might give for the proving these things nor to answer some Difficulties possible to be urg'd about Bodies which are not sensibly springing and yet are difficultly bent For all these Difficulties vanish if we consider that the subtile Matter cannot easily make new Tracks in Bodies which break in bending as in Glass and temper'd Steel which it can easier do in such Bodies as are compos'd of branchy Parts and that are not brittle as in Gold and Lead And Lastly that there is no hard Body but has some kind of Elaterium 'T is a hard matter to persuade one's self that Monsieur des Cartes did positively believe the Cause of Hardness to be different from that which makes the Elasticity and what looks most likely is that he made not sufficient Reflexion on that matter When a Man has for a long time meditated on any Subject and is well satisfied about that of his present Enquiry he commonly thinks no farther on it he believes that the Conceptions he had of it are undeniable Truths and that it is needless to examine them any more But a Man has so many Things in him which disrelish his Application provoke him to precipitate Judgments and subject him to Errour that though his Mind remains apparently satisfied yet it is not always well instructed in the Truth Monsieur des Cartes was a Man like us No greater Solidity Accuracy Extent and Penetration of Thought is any where to be met with than in his Works I confess but yet he was not infallible Therefore 't is very probable he remain'd so settl'd in his Opinion from his not sufficiently reflecting that he asserted something in the Consequence of his Principles contrary to it He grounded it on very specious and probable Reasons but such notwithstanding as being not capable of themselves to force his Consent he might still have suspended his Judgment and consequently as a Philosopher he ought to have done it It was not enough to examine in a hard Body what was in it that might make it so but he ought likewise to have thought on the invisible Bodies which might give it Hardness as he did at the End of his Philosophical Principles when he ascrib'd to them the Cause of their Elasticity He ought to have made an exact Division and comprehensive of whatever might contribute to the Hardness of Bodies It was not enough to have sought the Causes of it in the Will of God he ought also to have thought on the subtile Matter which surrounds these Bodies For though the Existence of that violently agitated Matter was not yet proved in the place of his Principles where he speaks of Hardness it was not however rejected he ought therefore to have suspended his Judgment and have well remember'd that what he had written concerning the Cause of Hardness and of the Rules of Motion was fit to be revis'd which I believe was neglected by him or at least he has not sufficiently consider'd the true Reason of a thing very easie to be discover'd and which yet is of greatest Consequence in Natural Philosophy I thus explain my self Monsieur des Cartes well knew that to the Support of his System the Truth of which he could not reasonably suspect it was absolutely necessary that great Bodies should always communicate some
any convincing Proof deny Spiritual Habits whom it may be good to satisfie if possible Lastly If respect be had to natural Equity which forbids us to condemn the secret Purposes and Intentions after all this I say what I offer may possibly appear improbable But yet I can't see why it should be taken ill that I endeavour to content even the most querelous Minds touching their Difficulties about Original Sin THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE Third CHAPTER of the Third PART of the Second BOOK Wherein I speak of the power of Imagination of some Authors and particularly of Tertullian AS I am well satisfy'd that the most general and fruitful Principle of Errors in the Scicences and especially in Morals is the Impression made by lively Imaginations on the Mind of Men who are manag'd more by Mechanism than by Reason so I thought it lay upon me to set this truth to open view by all the ways that might awaken them from their slumber on its account And because Examples strike deepest especially when the Instance is somewhat great and uncommon I thought that the celebrated Names of Tertullian Seneca and Montague were the most proper to raise their Attention and give them a sensible conviction of the contagious Empire of the Imagination over Reason For if Words all-dead and unanimated by the look and sensible behaviour of these famous Authors have still more Force than the Reason of a great many others if the Turn of Expression that gives but a faint Idâ—a of the sensible action which the Imagination lively diffuses over the Face and the rest of the Body of those who are pierc'd with what they say is able to Agitate Penetrate and Convince a great many certainly it must be granted that nothing is more dangerous than a respectful Attention to Men of a strong and lively Imagination For their Air and Way is a natural Language so powerful and convincing and they know how to Image things so passionately to the Life that they seldom fail of raising the Senses and â—assions against Reason and pouring as I may say Conviction and Certitude into their Spectators I easily foresaw in alledging these great Examples that it was impracticable to cure those who were amaz'd and thunder-struck with the reading of these three fam'd Authors For a little knowledge of the nature of Man will suffice to teach us that the wounds of the Brain are harder to be heal'd than those of the other parts of the Body and that 't is easier to close up a sore not expos'd to fresh insult from without than to make a perfect cure of an inveterate Prejudice that justifies it self each minute by very-probable-Reasons 'T is extreamly difficult to close up exactly the Traces of the Brain because expos'd to the course of the Spirits and liable to be constantly renew'd by infinite other Traces which may be call'd accessory These sorts of Wounds cannot ordinarily be cur'd or made up till the Brain receives others more deep which opposing them cause a violent and continual Revulsion in the Spirits For we ought not to reckon a Prejudice quite cur'd when we fancy it is because we are not actually affected with it then only the cure is perfected when the Trace is quite shut up and not when the Spirits desist from their wanted course for some particular Reason I knew then well enough that such as had been prostrated and over-whelm'd by the Force and Motions of Tertullian ravish'd and dazl'd by the loftiness and beauties of Seneca charm'd and corrupted by the gentile easie and natural Turns of Montague would not change their Opinion by reading a few Pages of my Book I judg'd on the contrary I should incur their displeasure by trying to dissolve the inchantment which so held them But as I hop'd these Examples would be useful to my design for the fore-mention'd Reasons I thought I was to be more regardful of the Profit of many who were Free from Prepossession than of the Spleen of some particulars that I concluded would censure the liberty I had taken I consider'd there were very few so strongly prevented with esteem for these Authors but it was hop'd might return to sound sence again I concluded lastly that there being hardly one it may be prepossess'd with all Three together because of the diverse Characters of their Imagination the most Opinionated might find I was in the right in a good many things I know what Respect I ought to have for the Works of Tertullian as well on account of the Subjects that he treats of as of the Approbation they have receiv'd from several Persons who ought to be able to judge of them And I have sufficiently manifested that Temper of Mind by what I have said of him and by the Quality of the Book de Pallio of which alone I have spoke with so much freedom though there were others it may be fitter for my purpose But after all I don't think that Time ought to change and amplifie the Ideas of things that all Antiquities are venerable and that illegitimate Reasons and extravagant ways are worthy of Respect because they were a long time in the World before us I can't think that affected Obscurities ought to be venerated like Sacred Mysteries Sallies of Imagination to go for shining Lights of Knowledge and African Heats which work in a Mind naturally full of Fire to be look'd on as Motions of a Prophetick Spirit which can divulge nothing but sublime Truths I am certain that even those who defer most to Tertullian's Works will agree with me in all this and that they are too equitable to justifie the Disorders of Imagination against Reason But it may be they are a-kin to those Judicious Persons who though they infinitely love Truth yet they are not insensible to outside Manners For I have oftentime observ'd some of them so enchanted with certain strong lively great and pompous Expressions of Tertullian that having prov'd to them that Author was none of the most Judicious and Reasonable they would think it enough to convince and surprize me only to repeat them I own that Tertullian has Expressions extreamly strong and bold which produce most lively and animated Images in the Mind and upon that score I justly bring him for an Example of the Power which strong Imaginations have to move and convince by Impression Thus those who urge to me these Objections confirm my Opinion by opposing it Their Prepossession and Esteem for Tertullian justifies my Conduct the frequent Citations and the big Words which they alledge prove what I say For they use not in Discourse to produce entire Reasonings but often quote strong and lively Expressions in order to dazzle perturbate and convince by the sensible Impression There is no Reason I think to imagine that I set up for a Censor of so many great Men who cite Tertullian constantly in the Pulpit and elsewhere They have their Reasons for it into which I neither do nor ought to
we value our selves above others that do not and sometimes look upon them as Ignorant The Pains we have taken to master him interess us in his Defence For by venerating this Author and procuring the Veneration of others we justifie our own studies and as we find pleasure in justifying our selves so we must not fail to praise and defend him with Earnestness and Zeal and by lively and sensible ways These Reasons and some others of less force are sufficient I think to let us know that the obscurity of Tertullian is no disadvantage to him in the Opinion of some Persons and that likely they would have less admir'd him if the Truths which are scatter'd over his Works were reduc'd to their more simple and clear Ideas Mathematical Truths and Relations are always Sum'd up in their Exponents that is in the most simple terms that express them and are disengag'd from all perplexing and obscuring Dependencies For Geometricians love naked Truth and desire not to convince by Impression but by Light and Evidence But what would become of most of Tertullian's Thoughts were they reduc'd to their Exponents by the Rules of Logical Geometricians and should we see them strip'd of all that sensible Pomp which dazles Reason Yet if we would judge solidly of this Author 's Reasonings we ought to make the Experiment However I do not pretend that Tertullian ought to have written with Geometrical Plainness Figures which express our sentiments and motions with respect to the Truths we expose to others are absolutely necessary and I think that more especially in discourse of Religion and Morality we ought to Employ those Ornaments which procure all the reverence that is due to Truth and those Motions which actuate the Soul and incline her to vertuous Actions But we are not to dress up and adorn a Phantasm without substance and reality nor excite Motions when there 's no occasion and if we will vigorously impress on our Hearers Conviction and Certitude 't is necessary that the Conviction should relate to something true and solid We must neither convince nor be convinced without knowing evidently distinctly precisely why we do the one or suffer the other We ought to know both what we say and what we think and only to Love Truth and Knowledge without putting out the Eyes of others after we have made blind our selves THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE Nature of IDEAS Wherein I explain how we see all things in God both Truths and Laws Eternal I Hoped that what I had said upon the nature of Ideas was sufficient to have shown that God only enlightens our understanding But I have found by Experience that there are Persons incapable of a competent Attention to conceive the Reasons I have given of this Principle Abstracted reasons are incomprehensible to the greatest part of Men but that which is sensible awakens them and fixes and keeps open the Eye of their Mind They cannot consider nor consequently comprehend what comes not under the Senses nor Imagination Which thing I have often said nor can I too often repeat 'T is plain that Bodies are not visible of themselves that they cannot act upon our mind nor represent themselves to it This has no need of proof but is discover'd by a bare perception and is infinitely more certain than that Bodies communicate their Motion when they meet But it is not certain save with those who silence their Senses to listen to their Reason Therefore all Mankind believe that Bodies impel each other because the Senses tell them so but they do not believe that Bodies are of themselves absolutely invisible and incapable of acting on the Mind because the Senses do not tell them this but seem to say the contrary Nevertheless there are some whose reason is so steadfast and resolv'd as to rise up to the most abstract Truths They contemplate them with attention and couragiously resist the Impression of their Senses and Imagination But the Body insensibly weighing down the Mind they relapse these Ideas vanish and whilst the Imagination stirs up more sensible and lively the former are beheld as Apparitions that only cause mistrust and fear of delusion We are easily apt to distrust those Persons or things we are not familiar with and which have not afforded us any sensible pleasure For 't is Pleasure that wins the Heart and Familiarity that cures our Trouble and disquiet of Mind Wherefore those who are not us'd to Metaphysical and abstract Truths are very prone to believe we purpose to seduce them when we only labour to instruct them They look with a suspicious Eye and a kind of dread upon Ideas which have nothing charming and sensible and the Love they bear to their own Repose and Felicity speedily rids them of so vexatious a Contemplation which seems incapable of contenting them If the Question before us were not of the greatest Importance the Reasons I have given and some others not necessary to be produc'd would oblige me to say no more of it for I foresee that whatever I can say upon this subject will never enter the Heads of some People But this Principle That there is none but God who enlightens us and that this illumination is effected by the manifestation of an immutable and necessary Reason or Wisdom seems to me so conformable to Religion that I think my self indispensably oblig'd to Explain it and maintain it to the utmost of my Power I had rather be call'd a Visionist Enthusiast and all the fine Names that the Imagination which in little Souls is always Sarcastical uses to oppose to reasons it cannot comprehend or defend it self against than to grant that Bodies are capable of instructing me that I am my own Master Reason and Light and that to be thoroughly inform'd in all things I need only consult my self or other Men who perhaps may fill my Ears with a loud noise but certainly cannot infuse Light and Knowledge into my Mind Here then are some farther Reasons for the Opinion I have establish'd in the Chapter belonging to this Illustration No body will deny that Man is capable of knowing Truth and the least intelligent Philosophers acknowledge that he partakes of a certain Reason which they don't determine And therefore they define him animal Rationis particeps For there is no body but knows at least confusedly that the essential difference of Man consists in his necessary union with Universal Reason though it be not commonly known who it is that includes this Reason and little Care is taken to discover it I see for Example that two times two are four and that a Friend is preferable to a Dog and I am certain there is no Man in the World but sees this as well as I. Now I discover not these truths in the Mind of others no more than others do in mine Therefore there is necessarily an Vniversal Reason which enligntens me and all intelligent Beings For if the Reason I consult were not the same as that
as it is more united to Universal Reason and less sensible to the impression of the Senses and Passions In a word as it is more reasonable But 't is requisite that I explain as clearly as possibly I can the sense I have about Natural or Divine Order and Law For the difficulty that is found to embrace my Opinion proceeds it may be from the want of a distinct conception of my meaning 'T is certain that God comprehends in himself after an intelligible manner the Perfections of all the Beings he has created or can create and that by these intelligible Perfections he knows the Essence of all things as by his own Wills he knows their Existence Which perfections are likewise the immediate Object of the Mind of Man for the Reasons I have given Therefore the intelligible Ideas or the Perfections which are in God which represent to us what is external to him are absolutely necessary and immutable But Truths are nothing but relations of Equality or Inequality that are found between these Intelligible Beings since it is only true that 2 times 2 are 4 or that 2 times 2 are not 5 because there is a Relation of Equality between 2 times 2 and 4 and of Inequality between 2 times 2 and 5. Therefore Truths are as immutable and necessary as Ideas It has ever been a truth that 2 times 2 are 4 and 't is impossible it should ever be false which is visible without any Necessity that God as supream Legislator should have establish'd these Truths so as is said by M. des Cartes in his Answer to the six Objections We easily comprehend then what is Truth but Men find some difficulty to conceive what is this immutable and necessary Order what is this Natural and Divine Law which God necessarily wills and which the Righteous likewise will For a Man's Righteousness consists in his Loving Order and in his conforming his Will in all things to it as that which makes a Sinner in his disliking Order in some things and willing that it should conform to his Desires Yet methinks these things are not so mysterious as is imagin'd and I am perswaded all the difficulty that is found in them proceeds from the trouble the mind is at to aspire to abstract and Metaphysical Thoughts Here then is in part what are my Thoughts of Order 'T is evident that the perfections which are in God representative of created or possible Beings are not all Equal That those for Example which represent Bodies are less noble than others that represent Spirits and that even in those which represent only Bodies or Spirits there are degrees of perfection greater and lesser ad infinitum This is clearly and easily conceiv'd though it be hard to reconcile the simplicity of the Divine Essence with that variety of Intelligible Ideas included in his Wisdom For 't is evident that if all the Ideas of God were equal he could see no difference between his Works since he cannot see his Creatures save in that which is in himself representing them And if the Idea of a Watch which shows the Hour with all the different Motions of the Planets were no perfecter than that of another which only points to the hour or than that of a Circle and a Square a Watch would be no perfecter than a Circle For we can judge of the Perfection of Works only by the Perfection of the Ideas we have of them and if there was no more understanding or sign of Wisdom in a Watch than a Circle it would be as easie to conceive the most complicated Machines as a Square or a Circle If then it be true that God is the Vniversal Being who includes in Himself all Beings in an intelligible manner and that all these intelligible Beings which have in God a necessary Existence are not equally perfect 't is evident there will be between them an Immutable and Necessary Order and that as there are Eternal and necessary Truths because there are Relations of Magnitude between intelligible Beings there must likewise be an immutable and necessary Order by reason of the Relations of Perfection that are between these Beings 'T is therefore an Immutable Order that Spirits should be nobler than Bodies as it is a necessary Truth that 2 times 2 should be 4 or that 2 times 2 should not be 5. But hitherto immutable Order seems rather a Speculative Truth than a necessary Law For if Order be consider'd but as we have just now done we see for Example that it is True that Minds are more noble than Bodies but we do not see that this Truth is at the same time an Order which has the force of a Law and that there is an Obligation of preferring Minds before Bodies It must then be consider'd that God loves himself by a necessary Love and therefore has a greater degree of love for that which in him represents or includes a greater degree of perfection than for that which includes a less So that if we will suppose an Intelligible Mind to be a thousand times perfecter than an Intelligible Body the love wherewith God loves Himself must necessarily be a thousand times greater for the former than for the latter For the Love of God is necessarily proportion'd to the Order which is between the intelligible Beings that he includes Insomuch that the Order which is purely Speculative has the force of a Law in respect of God himself supposing as is certain that God loves himself Necessarily And God cannot love Intelligible Bodies more than Intelligible Minds though he may love created Bodies better than created Minds as I shall show by and by Now that immutable Order which has the force of a Law in regard of God himself has visibly the force of a Law in reference to us For this Order we know and our natural love comports with it when we retire into our selves and our Senses and Passions leave us to our Liberty In a word when our Self-love does not corrupt our Natural Being we are made for God and that 't is impossible for us to be quite separate from him we discern in him this Order and we are naturally invited to love it For 't is His Light which enlightens us and his Love which animates us though our Senses and Passions obscure this Light and determine against Order the Impression we receive to love according to it But in spite of Concupiscence which conceals this Order and hinders us from following it it is still an essential and indispensable Law to us and not only to us but to all created Intilligences and even to the Damn'd For I do not believe they are so utterly estrang'd from God as not to have a faint Idea of Order as not to find still some beauty in it and even to be ready to conform to it in some particular Instances which are not prejudicial to Self-Love Corruption of Heart consists in Opposition to Order Therefore Malice or Corruption of
the conduiâ—s of the Nerves are widened and the Fibres recumbent after a particular manner the Spirits may easily insinuate themselves But what is it we can conceive capable of augmenting the Soul's Facility to act or think For my part I own I cannot comprehend it And in vain should I interrogate my self what these dispositions are For I could give my self no answer nor light upon the matter though I have a most lively sense of that easiness with which some Thoughts arise in me And if I had no particular Reasons to induce me to believe that I really have such Dispositions though I know them not in me I should judge there neither was spiritual Habit nor Memory in my Soul But in short seeing there is doubt and scruple about it we have an infallible Symptom that Men are not so enlightned as is pretended For Doubt can never be reconcil'd to Evidence and clear Ideas 'T is certain that a Man of the greatest Understanding cannot evidently know whether he deserves Hatred or Love as speaks the Wiseman My own consciousness of my self cannot satisfy me herein St. Paul says indeed his Conscience reproach'd him with nothing yet for all that he does not affirm he is justified On the contrary he asserts he is not thereby justified and that he dares not judge himself since he that judges is the Lord. But having a clear Idea of Order if we had another as clear of the Soul from the inward feeling of our selves we should evidently know whether she was conformable to Order We should know whether we were Righteous or not and we could exactly discover all our interiour Dispositions to Good and Evil whenever we were conscious of them But if we could know our selves just as we are we should not be so subject to Presumption And there is great likelihood that St. Peter would not have said to his Master whom he was not long after to deny Why cannot I follow thee now I will lay down my life for thy sake Animam meam pro te ponam For being inwardly conscious of his own Strength and good Will he might have seen with Evidence whether he had Resolution and Courage to conquer Death or rather the insults of a silly Maid and two or three Servants If the nature of the Soul be more known than any other If the Idea we have of her be as clear as that we have of the Body I ask only how it comes to pass that there are so many who confound her with it Is it possible to confound two clear Ideas intirely different Let us do justice to all Mankind Those who dissent from our Opinion are as rational as our selves they have the same Ideas of things and are partakers in the same Reason Why then do they confound what we distinguish Do they use on other occasions to confound things whereof they have clear Ideas Do they ever confound two different numbers or take a Square for a Circle And yet the Soul differs more from the Body than one of these Figures from the other For they are two substances which are in nothing alike and are confounded notwithstanding Which must therefore proceed from some difficulty there is to discover their difference from it s not being observable by a simple perception and from the Impossibility of concluding that one is not the other without Argument and Reasoning It must come from hence viz. That the Idea of Extension must be cautiously consulted and Extension discover'd to be no Mode of Existence of a Body but the Body it self as being represented a subsisting Thing and as the Principle and Foundation of whatever we conceive clearly in Bodies And that so the Modes of which Body is capable having no Proportion of sensible Qualities the subject of these Qualities or rather the Being of which they are Modes must needs be different from Body For such like argumentation is requisite to prevent our confounding the Soul with the Body But if we had a clear Idea of the Soul as we have of Body certainly we need not take these round-about ways to distinguish her from it Since it would be discoverable by a simple view and with as great ease as we see a Circle is not a Square I insist not longer upon proving that we know not the Soul nor her Modifications by clear Ideas Survey our selves on what side soever we will this sufficiently appears And I had not added this to what I have said in the Search after Truth if some Cartesians had not found fault with it If this will not satisfy them I shall expect they will make me sensible of this clear Idea which I am not able to find in my self do whatever I can to discover it THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE Eighth CHAPTER of the Second PART of the Third BOOK Of loose and general terms which signify nothing How they are distinguish'd from others IN order to comprehend what I have said in some Places how that they give not the reasons of things who explain them by Logical Terms and General Ideas we need but consider that whatever exists is reduc'd to Being or Modes of Being whatever Term signifies neither of these signifies nothing and every Term that signifies not one or other of them distinctly and in particular signifies nothing distinct This to me seems most clear and evident but what is evident in it self is not so to all the World Words are the current Coin wherewith Men pay themselves and others All Terms that are inoffensive to the Ear have free Passport amongst them And Truth comes so rarely into the Commerce of the World that those who speak it or hear it have commonly no regard for it The gift of Speech is the greatest of Talents the language of Imagination is the surest of means and a Memory charg'd with incomprehensible Terms will always make a splendid appearance whatever the Cartesians may say of it When Men shall have no addiction but to Truth they will be Cautious of what they say they will carefully examine their own meaning rejecting with scorn senseless and insignificant Terms and closely adhering to clear Ideas But when will the time come that Men shall love Truth only We may say when they shall depend no longer on their Body when they shall have no necessary relation to sensible Objects when they shall not any more corrupt one another but faithfully consult their Master who instructs them in the recesses of their Reason But this will never happen whilst we live on Earth However all Men are not equally indifferent for Truth If there are some who speak without Reflection and hear without distinction and have no attention but to what affects them there are others who industriously labour to inform themselves and to convince others of the Truth And to these chiefly I address my self for at their Instance I entred on making these Remarks I say then that whatever is whether it actually exists or not and consequently
special a regard as to give it all things necessary to its preservation and likewise a Seed for perpetuating it's kind This proves second causes no more than the Plurality of Causes of contrary Principles of Good and Evil which the Manichees imagin'd to account for these effects But 't is a certain Sign of the Grandeur Wisdom and Magnificence of God For God does no works unbecoming an infinite Wisdom and he does them with that profusion as is a manifest proof of his Power and Greatness Whatever is destroy'd is repair'd again by the same Law that destroy'd it So great is the Wisdom Power and Fecundity of that Law God prevents not the destruction of Beings by any new Will not only because the first suffices to restore them but especially because his Wills are of much greater value than the Reparation of these Beings They are far more valuable than all that they produce And God had never made this World since not worthy of the Action by which it was produc'd unless he had other prospects than are known by the Philosophers and knew how to honour himself in JESUS CHRIST with an honour which the Creatures are not capable of giving him When a House falls and crushes an Honest Man to death a greater Evil happens than when one Beast devours another or when a Body is forc'd to rebound by the shock it receives from the Encounter of another But God does not multiply his Wills to redress either the true or apparent Disorders which are the necessary Consequences of natural Laws God ought not to correct nor change these Laws though they sometimes produce Monsters He is not to confound the Order and simplicity of his Ways He must neglect mean and little things I would say he must not have particular Wills to produce effects which are not equivalent to or worthy of the Action of the Producer God works not Miracles save when Order which he constantly follows requires it which Order requires that he should act by the most simple ways and make no exceptions to his general Wills but when 't is absolutely necessary to his designs or on particular occasions which we are absolutely ignorant of Though we are all united to Order or the Wisdom of God yet we know not all the Rules of it We see in it what we ought to do but we cannot discover in it what God ought to Will nor is it our business to be very sollicitous to know it A great instance of what I have said we have in the Damnation of an infinite number of Persons whom God suffer'd to perish in times of Ignorance and Error God is infinitely Good He loves all his Works He wills that all Men should be sav'd and come to the Knowledge of the Truth for he has made them to injoy him And yet the greatest number are Damn'd They live and die in blindness and will remain in it to all Eternity Comes not this from his acting by the simplest means and his following Order We have shown that according to Order God ought not to prevent by Indeliberate Pleasures the will of the first Man whose Fall has disorder'd Nature It was requisite that all Men should descend from one not only because that is the most simple way but for several too Theological and abstract Reasons to be here explain'd In fine we ought to believe this conformable to the Order which God follows and to the Wisdom he always consults in the intention and execution of his designs The first Man's Sin has produc'd infinite Evils I confess but certainly Order requir'd that God should permit it and that he should instate Man in a peccable condition God minded to repair his laps'd Work seldom gives Victorious Graces that prevail over the malice of the greatest Sinners Sometimes he gives Graces useless to the conversion of the Receiver though he foresees their inutility and sometimes sheds them in great Plenty yet with little effect Commonly he acts as it were by degrees giving Men secret inspirations of Self-denial and Repentance as formerly he gave them Counsels in his Gospel Thus he prepares them for the grace of Conversion and last of all bestows it Why all these round-about Methods and ways indirect Would it not have been enough for him to have positively Will'd the Conversion of a Sinner to have effected it in an efficacious and irresistible manner But is not it visible that this proceeds from his acting by the simplest Methods and Orders willing it though we do not always see it For God must necessarily follow Order and Wisdom in his actings though these are Unfathomable Abysses to the Mind of Man There are certain most simple Laws in the Order of Grace by which God for the most part acts For this Order has its Rules as well as that of Nature though we know them not as we see those of the Communications of Motions Only let us follow the Counsels which are given us in the Gospel by him who perfectly knows the Laws of Grace This I say to pacify the unjust Complaints of Sinners who despise the Counsels of JESUS CHRIST and charge their Malignity and disorders upon God They would have God show Miracles in their behalf and dispense with the general Laws of Grace They lead their Life in Pleasures they seek out for Honours and daily renew those wounds which sensible Objects have given their Brain and add more to them and after this expect God should cure them by a Miracle Not unlike wounded Men who in the excess of their Pain tear their Cloaths renovate their Wounds and when in the sight of approaching Death complain of the cruelty of their Surgeons They would have God to save them because say they God is Good Wise Powerful and needs but determine it to make us happy Why did he make us to damn and destroy us They ought to know that God Wills they should be sav'd and to that intent has done all that could be done by Order and Wisdom which he consults We cannot believe that he deserts us whilst he gives us his own Son to be our Mediator and Sacrifice Yes God is willing that all Mankind should be sav'd but by ways that we ought to study with care and follow with caution and weariness God is not to consult our Passions in the Execution of his designs He can have no regard but to his Eternal Wisdom nor follow any other rule than the Divine Order which Order will have us imitate JESUS CHRIST and obey his Counsels for our Sanctification and Salvation But if God has not predestin'd all Men to be conformable to the Image of his Son who is the Model and Exemplar of the Elect 'T is because herein God acts by the most simple means with reference to his designs which all make for his Glory 'T is because God is an universal Cause which ought not to act like particular Causes which have particular Volitions for all they do 'T
Idolaters for I cannot refrain from believing that all Honour and Love that have not God for their End are Species of Idolatry Soli Deo honor gloria THE ILLUSTRATION UPON WHAT I have said in the Fourth Chapter of the Second Part concerning Method and elsewhere That God Acts always with Order and by the simplest ways 'T IS thought by some Persons to be too rash and venturous conjecturing and abusing loose and General Terms To say that God always Acts with Order and by ways that are most simple and easie for the Execution of his designs Wherefore it will not be an useless undertaking to prove and explain this Truth since 't is of the greatest consequence not only to the knowledge of Nature but much more for the knowledge of Religion and Morality By the Word God we understand an infinitely perfect Being whose Wisdom and Knowledge have no bounds and who consequently knows all the means by which he can execute his Designs Which suppos'd I say that God Acts always by the shortest means and by the simplest ways To make my meaning better understood I take a sensible Example I suppose that God Wills the Body A should strike the Body B. Since God knows all He perfectly knows that A may tend to strike against B by innumerable crooked Lines and by but one right Now God Wills only the impulsion of B by A and we suppose that he only Wills the Translation of A to B to effect this impulsion A then must be convey'd to B by the shortest way that is by a right Line For if the Body A were convey'd to B by a crooked Line that would show either that the conveyer knew no other way or that he purpos'd not only the Collision of these Bodies but also the means of making it otherwise than by Relation to it which is against the Supposition There is required so much more Action to convey a Body from A to B by a curv'd than by a right Line as the curv'd is longer than the right If therefore God translated A to B by a curv'd Line double to the interjacent right half of the Action of God would be intirely useless and so half his Action would be produc'd without design and end as well as without effect therefore Again Action in God is Will therefore more Will is requir'd in God to cause A to be circulary than directly translated But we suppose that God had no Will in respect of the Motion of A but as it relates to the Collision therefore there is not Will enough in God to move A by a crooked Line and consequently 't is a Contradiction for A to be so mov'd Thus it is a Contradiction that God should not Act by the most simple ways unless we suppose that God in the choice of means he imploys for the executing his designs has something else in view than these designs which is a Contradiction in our Supposition When I say there is more Will in God to translate a Body from A to B by a crooked Line than by a strait it is not to be thence concluded against the simplicity of God's Essence and Action For it must be acknowledged That it is not comprehensible how either the simplicity of an Infinite Being includes all the different perfections of Finite Beings or how his Will continuing ever the same and always conformable to Order varies with reference to the different Beings it produces and preserves I speak but according to our way of conceiving things Now methinks I have a most clear Conception That when God Wills and Creates for Example one cubical foot of Matter He Wills another thing than when He Creates two For nothing is plainer than that God could not Create two different things nor know whether he Created one or two Cube-feet of Matter or whether he convey'd a Body circularly or directly if there were not in His Wills some difference in regard to Matter and its Motion since God sees no otherwise than in Himself and in his own Wills all the differences of His Creatures Now whatever that Action is in God which relates to the different Beings produc'd or preserv'd by Him I call the Differences or Augmentations and Diminutions of Will in God And in this way of conceiving things I say that God cannot employ more Will than is necessary to the executing his Designs and therefore Acts always by the simplest ways with reference to them However I deny not but it 's possible for God to have a great number of ways equally simple for the producing the same effects or that He may produce them by different means But this I say that He always brings them to pass by the ways that are most simple provided they be all of the same kind it being a Contradiction that an Infinitely Wise Being should have useless or disorderly Wills Now if we bring home this Principle to Morality we shall see that those ensure their Salvation who so prepare themselves for Grace by Self-denial and Repentance and an exact Obedience to the Precepts of our LORD as that God Acting by the simplest ways that is in giving them but little additional Grace may Operate much in them For though God would have all Men saved yet he shall save none but those that can be sav'd by the most simple means which have reference to his great design of Sanctifying through JESUS CHRIST a determinate number of Elect unto his Glory and he will multiply the Children of Eve till that number be fulfill'd For God's design of Sanctifying us by the simplest ways made it necessary for him after the Sin to multiply the Children of Men that he might fill up the number of the Elect since there are a great many Persons who Damn themselves by with-drawing from the Order of God But whereas God does not Work like a Particular Cause we ought not to imagine that He has like us particular Volitions for every thing He produces For if it were so it seems evident to me That the Generation of Monsters would be impossible and it would never happen that one of God's Works should destroy another And since God cannot have contrary Wills we must have had recourse with the Manichees to a Principle of Evil to freeze for Example the Fruits which God made to grow Which being so there is methinks a necessity to conclude the establishment of some General Laws by which God Predestines and Sanctifies his Elect in JESUS CHRIST which Laws are what we call the Order of Grace as God's General Wills whereby he produces and preserves all things in the World are the Order of Nature I know not but I may be mistaken yet I doubt not but from this Principle might be directly drawn a great many Consequences which might resove those difficulties that have been the Controverted Subjects of several Years But I do not think my self oblig'd to deduce them let every one do it according to his Light and
us good but as capable to enjoy together with us the true Good These Truths seem evident to me but Men strangely obscure them by supposing that the surrounding Bodies can Act on us as True Causes Indeed most Christian Philosophers acknowledge That the Creatures can do nothing unless God concur to their Action and that so sensible Objects being unable to Act on us without the Efficacy of the First Cause must not be lov'd or fear'd by us but God only on whom they depend Which Explication makes it manifest That they condemn the consequences which I have now deduc'd from the Principle they receive But if in imitation of Monsieur de la Ville's Conduct I should say 't was a slight and subterfuge of the Philosophers to Cloak their Impiety if I should urge them with the Crime of supporting Aristotle's Opinions and the prejudices of Sense at the expence of their Religion if piercing too into the inmost recesses of their Heart I should impute to them the secret desire of debauching Men's Morals by the defence of a Principle which serves to justifie all sorts of disorders and which by the consequences I have drawn from it overthrows the first Principle of Christian Morality Should I be thought in my Senses whilst I went to condemn most Men as impious upon the strength of the inferences I had deduc'd from their Premises Monsieur de la Ville will no doubt pretend that my Consequences are not rightly inferr'd but I pretend the same of his and to ruine them all I need but explicate some Equivocal Terms which I shall sometime do if I find it necessary But how will Monsieur de la Ville justifie the common Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes and by what sort of concourse will he ascribe to God all that is due to Him Will he make it clearly appear that one individual Action is all of God and all of the Creature Will he demonstrate that the Power of the Creature is not useless though without its Efficacy the sole Action of God would produce the same effect Will he prove that Minds neither ought to Love nor Fear Bodies though the latter have a true Power of Acting on the former and will he make multitudes of Converts hereupon among those whose Mind and Heart are taken up with sensible Objects from a confus'd Judgment they make that these Objects are capable of making them Happy or Miserable Let him confess then That if we might treat as Hereticks and profane Persons all that hold Principles from which Heretical and Impious Consequences may be drawn no Man what ever could secure his Faith from being suspected ARGUMENT III. The Consequence of the Principle propos'd by Monsieur de la Ville as a Point of Faith viz. That the Essence of Body consists not in Extension This negative Principle overthrows the only demonstrative and direct Proof we have of the Soul 's being a distinct Substance from the Body and consequently of her Immortality When this truth is receiv'd which I presume with many other Persons to have demonstrated which Monsieur de la Ville impugns as contrary to the decisions of the Church viz. That the Essence of matter consists in Extension in Length Breadth and Thickness It is easie to comprehend that the Soul or that which is capable of Thought is a distinct substance from the Body For it 's manifest that Extension whatever Division and Motion be conceiv'd in it can never arrive to Reason Will or Sense Wherefore that thinking thing which is in us is necessarily a substance distinct from our Body Intellectual Notices Volitions and Actual Sensations are Actually Modes of some substances Existence But all the Divisions incidental to Extension can produce nothing but Figures Nor all its various Motions any thing but Relations of Distance Therefore Extension is not capable of other Modifications Therefore our Thought Desire Sensations of Pleasure and Pain are Modes of a Substances Existence which is not a Body Therefore the Soul is distinct from the Body which being conceded we thus demonstrate her Immortality No substance can be Annihilated by the Ordinary strength of Nature For as nature cannot produce something out of nothing So she cannot reduce something into nothing Modifications of Beings may be Annihilated Rotundity of a Body may be destroy'd for that which is round may become square But this roundness is not a Being a Thing a Substance but only a Relation of Equality of distance between the terminating parts of the Body and that which is in the Center Which relation changing the Roundness is destroy'd but the substance cannot be reduc'd to nothing Now for the foremention'd Reasons the Soul is not a Mode of a Body's Existing Therefore she is immortal and though the Body be dissolv'd into a Thousand parts of a different Nature and the structure of its Organs broke to pieces since the Soul consists not in that structure nor in any other Modification of matter 't is evident that the dissolution and even the Annihilation of the substance of an humane Body were that Annihilation true could not Annihilate the substance of our Soul Let us add to this another proof of the immortality of the Soul grounded upon the same Principle Though the Body cannot be reduc'd to nothing because it is a substance it may notwithstanding die and all its parts may be dissolv'd Because Extension is divisible But the Soul being a substance distinct from Extension cannot be divided For we cannot divide a Thought a Desire a Sensation of Pain or Pleasure as we may divide a square into two or four Triangles Therefore the substance of the Soul is indissoluble incorruptible and consequently immortal because unextended But if Monsieur de la Ville supposes that the Essence of Body consists in something besides Extension how will he convince the Libertines that she is neither material nor mortal They will maintain that something wherein the Essence of Body consists is capable of thinking and that the substance which thinks is the same with that which is extended If Monsieur de la Ville denies it they 'll show that he does it without Reason since according to his Principle Body being something else than Extension he has no distinct Idea of what that can be and consequently cannot tell but that unknown thing may be capable of Thought Does he think to convince them by saying as he does in his Book that the Essence of Body is to have Parts without Extension Certainly they will not take his Word for it for finding it as hard to conceive parts without Extension as indivisible Atoms or Circles without two Semi-circles they must have more deference for him than he has for God himself For Monsieur de la Ville in the last part of his Book pretends that God himself cannot oblige us to belive contradictory things such as are the Parts of a Body without any Actual extension But the Libertines on their part would
the Character that had been given of their Persons And yet 't is but placing the definition instead of the thing defin'd to shew the extravagance of this Discourse For if a Man should say seriously the Cartesians are strange sort of Men they affirm That Beasts have neither Thought nor Sense I fear in a short time they will say as much of us Certainly we should conclude this Man's apprehensions but ill-grounded But the generality of Men are unable to extricate the least Ambiguity especially when their Imagination is frighted with the Notion of Novelty which some represent to them as dangerous Besides that the Air and exteriour Manners easily persuade but Truth is not discover'd without some application of Thought whereof the greatest part of Mankind is incapable Certainly Men that have most Light and Understanding whose Opinions are implicitely embrac'd by the Vulgar ought not to be so easie to condemn their Brethren at least before they have examin'd their Sentiments with a serious Attention nor ought they to possess their respectful Hearers with disadvantageous Notions of their Neighbour this being contrary to the Rules of Charity and Justice But the Cartesians you 'll say admit Principles which have mischievous Consequences and I grant it since you 'll have it so But they disown these Consequences They it may be are so gross and stupid as not to see these Consequences are included in their Principles They think they can separate one from the other and do not suppose other Philosophers are to be believ'd upon their bare Word They break not their Charity with those who hold Principles which they think big with impious Consequences and as contrary to Religion as sound Sense For it may be concluded from the dangerous Consequences I have drawn from those very Principles which flush the Peripateticks even to the triumphing over their Adversaries How many and how much worse than these I might infer if I should give my self liberty to choose out of the Body of their Philosophy that which was most exceptionable But whatever the advantage is in Theological Disputes as well as in Field-Battles to be the Aggressors I had rather defend my self weakly than conquer and triumph by assaulting For in short I do not conceive how Men delight in making Hereticks and prophane Persons of those who submit to allâ—the decisions of the Church upon Consequences which they disavow The Victory methinks is very fatal which spills but the Blood of our own Country-Men Nevertheless I do not believe I have advanc'd in the Search after Truth any Principle of Philosophy productive of dangerous Consequences on the contrary I have left M. des Cartes in some places and Aristotle almost in all because I could not reconcile the Former with Truth nor the Latter with Truth or Religion this I leave to Men of more Wit and Invention than my self I said that the Essence of Matter consisted in Extension because I thought I had evidently demonstrated it and thereby given clear and uncontroverted proofs of the Immortality of the Soul and her distinction from the Body A Truth which is essential to Religion and which the Philosophers are oblig'd by the last Lateran Council to prove But I never thought this Principle so fecund with Truths advantageous to Religion was contrary to the Council of Trent Monsieur de la Ville ought not to affirm it for that will do but mischief This is the Conduct of the Protestants in Holland Vitichius Poiret and several others I say not this to make his Faith suspected but I am under strong apprehensions least his Conduct may give them occasion to affirm That we own in France a Man cannot be a Catholick without believing that the parts of a Body may be without any Actual Extension since a Book Dedicated to the Bishops publish'd with all the Ceremonies with Approbation and Privilege treats the Cartesians as Hereticks on that particular I fear least by his probabilities he may shake the Faith of several Persons who know not precisely what is necessary to make an Article of Faith But I am still more apprehensive least the Libertines should strengthen themselves in their Opinions That the Soul is Corporeal and consequently Mortal That a thinking Substance is the same with an extended One because Extension with them and Monsieur de la Ville being but the Mode of a Being whose Essence is unknown to us we have no Argument from Reason that this Being is not capable of Thinking and we have many Arguments from Sense which though never so false are yet convincing and even Demonstrative with those who will not be at the pains of Reasoning And upon these grounds I think I am oblig'd to affirm with all the confidence afforded me by the view of the Truth I have Demonstrated That Extension is not a Mode of Being but a Being a Thing a Substance in a Word Matter or Body and that many Answers are to be seen in the Search after Truth to those proofs of Sense by which the Libertines confound the two Substances that Man 's compos'd of I maintain farther That Monsieur de la Ville has not shown that Opinion of the Essence of Matter to be contray to Transubstantiation that he has propos'd only those Answers which are easie to be resolv'd That we may more easily triumph over his Adversaries That he has not impugned mine and probably not so much as known them and that in the Humour I see him I think not my self obliged to acquaint him with them Lastly That he has added to the Council of Trent more Articles of Faith or Explications than any private Person has Right to give after express Prohibitions contain'd in the Bull which confirms the said Council As to what regards my own Particular I desire the Reader not to believe Monsieur de la Ville upon his Word but to examine with Caution and Distrust even those Matters of Fact which he vouches with the greatest Confidence He boasts himself upon his Sincerity and Ingenuousness and I am far from disputing him those Qualities which are indispensable to every honest Man but I cannot help saying in the Defence of Truth and my own Justification that he has often forgotten himself in his Book of which here follows a sufficient Proof In the Frontispiece of his Work he has inserted an Advertisement which has a Look of Integrity for 't is compos'd only to make a kind of Reparation These are his Words He says He met with a Copy of the Search after Truth of the Strasbourgh-Edition in the Year 1677. which obliges him to signifie to his dear Reader that I have in the Impression retracted and Errour which I had advanc'd in the First But it is so true that I am either little skill'd in Divinity or very daring that I could not recant that Errour without advancing Two others His whole Advertisement is only to make me a charitable Reparation However it is false
be enquir'd why GOD who so loves the Glory he receives in the Establishment of His Church had not begun it many Ages before Thus it suffices to say That an Eternity ought to forego the Incarnation of the WORD to manifest why this Great Mystery was accomplish'd neither sooner nor later GOD then must have created the Universe for the Church and the Church for JESUS CHRIST and JESUS CHRIST that He might find in Him a Sacrifice and High-Priest worthy of the Divine Majesty We shall not doubt of this Order of the Designs of GOD if it be observ'd that He can have no other End of his Actions than Himself And if it be conceiv'd that Eternity does not belong to Creatures we shall acknowledge they were produc'd when 't was requisite they should be Which Truths suppos'd let us try to discover something in the Method GOD takes for the Execution of His Grand Design VII Were I not persuaded that all Men are no farther Reasonable than enlightned by Eternal Wisdom it would no doubt be great Temerity to speak of the Designs of GOD and offer to discover any of His Ways in the Production of His Work But whereas it is certain that the word Eternal is the Universal Reason of Minds and that by the Light which he continually sheds in us we may have some Communication with GOD I ought not to be blam'd for consulting that Light which though Consubstantial with GOD Himself fails not to answer those who know how to enquire of it by a serious Attention VIII However I confess that Faith teaches a great many Truths not discoverable by the natural Union of the Mind with Reason Eternal Truth answers not to all we ask since we ask sometimes more than we can receive But this must not serve for a Pretence to justifie our Laziness and Inapplication IX Vulgar Heads are soon wearied with the Natural Prayer the Mind by its Attention ought to make to inward Truth in order to receive Light and Understanding from it and thus fatigu'd by that painful Exercise they talk of it in a contemptuous manner They dishearten one another and cover their Weakness and Ignorance under the delusive Appearances of a counterfeit Humility X. But their Example is not to infuse into us that agreeable Vertue which cherishes Carelessness and Negligence in the Mind and comforts it under its Ignorance of most necessary Truths We must pray constantly to Him who enlightens all Men That he will bestow His Light upon us recompence our Faith with the Gift of Understanding and especially to prevent us from mistaking Probability and confus'd Sensations which precipitate proud Minds into Darkness and Errour for the Evidence which accompanies His Resolves XI When we design to speak of GOD with any exactness we must not consult our selves nor the vulgar part of Men but elevate our Thoughts above all Creatures and with great Reverence and Attention consult the vast and immense Idea of a Being infinitely perfect which representing the true GOD very different from what the Vulgar fancy Him to themselves we are not to treat of Him in popular Language Every Body is allow'd to say with the Scripture that GOD Repented Him that He created Man that He was Angry with his People that he deliver'd Israel from Captivity by the Strength of His Arm. But these or the like Expressions are not permitted Divines when they should speak accurately and justly Therefore 't is not to be wondred if in the Sequel of Discourse my Expression shall be found uncommon It ought rather to be carefully observ'd whether they be clear and perfectly adapted to the Idea which all Men have of an Infinitely Perfect Being XII This Idea of a Being infinitely perfect includes two Attributes absolutely necessary to the Creation of the World an unlimited Wisdom and an irresistible Power The Wisdom of GOD affords infinite Ideas of different Works and all possible Ways for the executing His Designs and His Power renders Him so absolutely Master of all things and so independent of all Assistances whatever that He need but Will to execute what he Wills For we must above all take notice that GOD needs no Instruments to work with that His Wills are necessarily efficacious in a Word that as His Wisdom is His own Understanding His Power is no other than His Will Among these innumerable Ways whereby GOD might have executed His Design let us see which was preferable to all other and let us begin with the Creation of this Visible World from which and in which He forms the Invisible which is the Eternal Object of His Love XIII An excellent Artist ought to proportion his Action to his Work he does not that by Ways compound which may be perform'd by more simple he acts not without End and never makes insignificant Essays Whence we are to conclude that GOD discovering in the infinite Treasures of His Wisdom an Infinity of possible Worlds as necessary Consequences of the Laws of Motion which he could establish was determin'd to the Creation of that which might be produc'd and preserv'd by the simplest Laws or which should be the perfectest that could be considering the simplicity of the Ways necessary to its Production and Preservation XIV GOD might doubtless have made a perfecter World than that we inhabit He might for Instance have caus'd the Rain which fecundates the Earth to have fallen more regularly on Plow'd Lands than in the Sea where it is not necessary But in order to this He must have chang'd the Simplicity of His Ways and have multiplied the Laws of the Communications of Motions by which our World subsists and so there would not have been that Proportion between the Action of GOD and His Work which is necessary to determine an infinitely wise Being to act or at least there would not have been the same Proportion between the Action of GOD and this so perfect World as there is between the Laws of Nature and the World we inhabit For our World imagine it as imperfect as you will is sounded on so Simple and Natural Laws of Motion as make it perfectly worthy of the infinite Wisdom of its Author And indeed I am of Opinion that the Laws of Motion necessary to the Production and Preservation of the Earth and all the Stars in the Heavens are reduc'd to these Two First That mov'd Bodies tend to continue their Motion in a right line Secondly That when two Bodies meet their Motion is distributed to each in proportion to their Magnitude so that after the Collision they ought to move with equal degrees of Celerity These two Laws are the Cause of all those Motions which produce that variety of Forms which we admire in Nature XVI 'T is own'd notwithstanding that the second is â—ever manifestly observable in the Experiments that can be made upon the Subject but that comes from our seeing only what happens in visible Bodies and our not thinking on the invisible that surround
Glory Sin which introduc'd into the World the Miseries of Life and Death which follows it were necessary that Men after their Trial upon Earth might be legitimately crown'd with that Glory the Variety and Order whereof shall make the Beauty of the future World XXXIII 'T is true that Concupiscence which we feel in us is not necessary to our Meriting For Jesus Christ whose Merits are infinite was not subject to it But though He absolutely controll'd it He was willing to admit in Himself the most vexatious Motions and Sensations that He might merit all the Glory that was prepar'd for Him Of all Sensations that which is most repugnant to a Soul willing and deserving to be happy is Pain wbich yet He was willing to suffer in the most excessive degree Pleasure makes actually Happy the Person that actually enjoys it which yet he willingly deny'd Himself Thus he has offer'd like us innumerable Sacrifices through a Body which he took like ours But these Sacrifices were of a different kind from those of the greatest Saints because he voluntarily rais'd in Himself all those painful Sensations which in the rest of Men are the necessary Consequences of Sin which being thus perfectly voluntary were therefore more pure and meritorious XXXIV If I had a clear Idea of the Blessed Spirits who are not embody'd I perhaps could clearly resolve a Difficulty that arises from their Consideration For it may be objected either that there is very little Variety in the Merits or Rewards of Angels or that it was to ill purpose for God to unite Bodies to Spirits which are whilst united so dependant on them I confess I do not see any great Diversity in the Rewards answering the Merits of purely intelligible Substances especially if they have merited their Recompence by one sole Act of Love For being not united to a Body which might be an Occasion to God's giving them by most Simple and General Laws a Train of different Thoughts and Sensations I see no Variety in their Combats or Victories But possibly another Order has been establish'd which is unknown to me and therefore I ought not to speak of it And 't is sufficient that I have establish'd a Principle from whence may be concluded that God ought to create Bodies and unite Minds to them that by the most simple Laws of Union of these two Substances He might give us in a general constant and uniform manner that great Variety of Sensations and Motions which is the Principle of the Diversity of our Merits and Rewards XXXV Lastly 't was requisite that God alone should have all the Glory of the Beauty and Perfection of the future World This Work which infinitely excels all others ought to be a Work of pure Mercy It was not for Creatures to glory in having any other part in it than that the Grace of Jesus Christ had given them In a word 't was fit that God should suffer all Men to be involv'd in Sin that He might shew them Mercy in Jesus Christ. XXXVI Thus the first Man being impower'd by the Strength of His Charity to persevere in Original Righteousness God ought not to have fix'd him to his Duty by preventing Pleasures for having no Concupiscence to conquer God ought not to prevent his Free Will by the Delectation of His Grace In short having all in general that was necessary to his meriting his Reward God who works nothing in vain ought to leave him to himself though He foresaw His Fall since He design'd to raise him up in Jesus Christ put Free Will to confusion and manifest the Greatness of His Mercy Let us now endeavour to discover the Ways whereby God executes His Eternal Purpose of the Sanctification of His Church XXXVII Though God in the Establishment of the future World acts in Ways very different from those by which He preserves the present yet it ought not to be imagin'd that difference is so great as to take from the Laws of Grace the Character of the Cause that made them As it is the same God who is the Author both of the Order of Grace and Nature these two Orders must agree in all those included Symptoms which discover the Wisdom and Power of their â—ounder Therefore since God is a General Cause whose Wisdom has no Bounds He must needs for the Reasons before given act as such in the Order of Grace as well as in that of Nature and His own Glory being His End in the Construction of His Church He must establish most Simple and General Laws and which have the greatest Proportion of Wisdom and Fertility with their design'd Effect XXXVIII The more wise an Agent is the more comprehensive are his Wills A very limited Understanding is constantly taking fresh Designs and in the Execution of any one of them employs more Means than are useful In a word a straitned Capacity does not sufficiently compare the Means with the End the Force and the Action with the Effect to be produc'd by them On the contrary a Mind of great Reach and Penetration collates and weighs all things forms not Designs except upon the Knowledge of the Means to dispatch them and when it has observ'd in these Means a certain Proportion of Wisdom with their Effects he puts them in practice The more simple are the Machines and more different their Effects the more Marks they bear of an intelligent Workman and more worthy they are to be esteem'd The great Number of Laws in a State are commonly a Proof of the want of Insight and Extent of Thought in their â—ounders it being rather the Experience of their Exigency than a wise Fore-sight that establish'd them God therefore whose Wisdom is infinite ought to employ the simplest and most comprehensive Means in the Formation of a future World as well as in the Preservation of the present He ought not to multiply His Wills which are the executive Laws of His Designs save when Necessity obliges Him to it but must act by General Wills and so settle a Constant and Regular Order by which He foresees through the infinite Comprehension of His Wisdom that a Work so admirable as His must needs be form'd Let us see the Consequences of this Principle and the Application we may make of it in the Explication of those Difficulties which seem very puzzling and perplex'd XXXIX Holy Writ on one hand teaches us that God wills all Men should be sav'd and come to the Knowledge of the Truth and on the other that He does whatever He wills and yet Faith is not given to all Men and the Number of those that perish is greater than that of the Predestinate How can this be reconcil'd with His Power XL. God foresaw from all Eternity Original Sin and the Infinite Number of those whom Sin should cast into Hell and nevertheless created the First Man in a State from whence He knew He must fall and likewise has appointed such Relations betwixt this Man and his
them Amongst which he considers his Church Jesus Christ who is the Head of it and all the Persons which in consequence of some General Laws establish'd ought to compose it In brief upon Consideration of Jesus Christ and all his Members he constitutes Laws for his own Glory Which being so is it not evident that Jesus Christ who is the Principle of all the Glory redounding to God from his Work is the first of the Predestinate and that all the Elect are likewise truly lov'd and predestined gratis in Jesus Christ because they may honour God in his Son That lastly they are all under infinite Obligations to God who without regard to their Merit has settled the General Laws of Grace which ought to sanctifie them and conduct them to the Glory they shall eternally possess LV. You 'll say perhaps that these Laws are so simple and exuberant that God must prefer them to all other and that since he only loves his own Glory his Son ought to become incarnate and so has done nothing purely for his Elect. I confess God has done nothing purely for his Elect For St. Paul teaches us that he has made his Elect for Jesus Christ and Jesus Christ for himself If God cannot be rendred amiable to Men unless we make him act purely for them or not in the wisest manner I had rather be silent Reason teaches me that we render God amiable by shewing him to be infinitely perfect and by representing him so full of Love for his Creatures as not to produce any one with Design of making him miserable For if all are not so happy as to enjoy his Presence 't is because Order requiring that so great a Good should be merited all do not deserve it for the Reasons I have given Surely this is to make God lovely to represent him such as even the Reprobate cannot choose but adore his Conduct and repent them of their Negligence LVI Yet for their Satisfaction who will have God to predestine every of his Elect by a particular Will it may be said with a Salvo to the foregoing Hypothesis That God before he created Souls to unite them to Bodies foresaw all that could befall them by the General Laws of Nature and Grace and all that they should do in all possible Circumstances Therefore being able to create as is suppos'd the Soul of Paul or of Peter and to unite it to a Body which he foresaw should be that of a Predestinate Person he resolved from all Eternity to create the Soul of Paul by a Benevolent Will had for him and to predestine him by this Choice to Life Eternal whereas he creates the Soul of Peter not for any Benevolent Will had to him but by a kind of Necessity by Reason of the Laws of Union which he has most wisely establish'd betwixt Souls and Bodies by which he is oblig'd as soon as Bodies are form'd to unite Souls to them which would have been advantageous to all if Man had not sinned But the Body of Peter being begotten of an Heathen Father or of one that is careless of his Children's Education or Lastly Peter being engag'd by the Fortune of his Birth Places Times Employments which induce him to Evil will infallibly be one of the Reprobate Yet Peter shall be useful to the Designs of God For though he himself shall not enter into the Number of the Predestinate yet he shall by some of his Posterity He shall be subservient to the Beauty and Grandeur of the Church of Jesus Christ by the infinite Relations he shall have to the Elect. Furthermore he shall not be miserable but in proportion to the wrong use he has made of his Liberty since God punishes with Pain only voluntary Disorders This is what may be offer'd for the Satisfaction of some Persons Inclination though I cannot clearly see how it can be altogether rely'd on LVII Such as ascribe to God particular Designs and Wills for all the particular Effects produc'd in Consequence of General Laws commonly employ the Authority of Scripture to justifie their Opinion But being the Scripture is made for all the World for the Simple as well as the Intelligent it abounds with Anthropologies It not only ascribes to God a Body a Throne a Chariot and Equipage Passions of Joy Sorrow Wrath Repentance and other Motions of the Soul but also attributes to him the customary Ways of humane Actings that it may speak to the Simple in a more sensible manner If Jesus Christ became Man 't was in part to satisfie the Inclination of Men who love what is like them and are studious of what affects them 'T was by this real and true kind of Anthropology to persuade Men of those Truths they were incapable to comprehend any other way Thus St. Paul to accommodate himself to the World speaks of the Sanctification and Predestination of the Saints as if God continually work'd in them by particular Wills and even Jesus Christ speaks of his Father as if he took care by such like Wills to adorn the Lilies and to preserve every Hair of the Head of his Disciples Because in truth the Goodness of God to his Creatures being extreme these Expressions afford a great Idea of it and recommend God to the Affections of the grossest Souls and such as are most infected with Self-love Yet as by the Idea we have of God and by the Passages of Scripture conformable to that Idea we correct the Sense of other Texts which attribute to God Members and Passions like ours so when we would speak with Exactness of the manner of God's acting in the Order of Grace or Nature we ought to explain those Passages which make him act as a Man or a particular Cause by the Idea we have of his Wisdom and Goodness and other Scripture Passages comporting with that Idea For in fine if we may say or rather if we are oblig'd to say from the Idea we have of God that he causes not every drop of Rain to fall by particular Wills though the natural Sense of some Scripture Passages authorises that Opinion there is the same Necessity to think notwithstanding some Authorities of the Scripture that God gives not by particular Wills to some Sinners all those good Motions which are useless to them and which would be useful to several others For otherwise I see not how 't is possible to reconcile the Holy Scripture either with Reason or it self as I think I have prov'd If I thought what I have said insufficient to convince attentive Persons that God acts not by particular Wills like particular Causes and finite Understandings I would proceed to shew that there were very few Truths that would admit of greater Probation on Supposition that God governs the World and that the Nature of the Heathen Philosophers is nothing For indeed every thing in Nature proves this Opinion except Miracles which yet would not be Miracles or different from those we call Natural Effects if it
the Grace of the Creator XXXVI In the establish'd Order of Nature I can see but two Occasional Causes which shed Light on Minds and so determine the General Laws of the Grace of the Creator one which is in us and depends in some measure on us the other which is found in the Relation we have with surrounding Objects The former is nothing but the diverse Motions of our Will the second is the Occurrence of sensible Objects which act on our Mind in consequence of the Laws of Union of our Soul with our Body XXXVII We are taught by our own inward Consciousness That the Love of Light produces it and that Attention of Mind is a Natural Prayer by which we obtain Instruction of God for all the Enquirers of Truth who apply themselves to Truth discover it in proportion to their Application And if our Prayer were not interrupted nor our Attention disturb'd if we had any Idea of what we ask and should ask it with a competent Perseverance we should not fail to obtain whilst we were capable of receiving it But our Prayers are continually interrupted unless Self-interess'd our Senses and Imagination muddy and confound all our Ideas And â—hough the Truth we consult answers our Enquiries the confus'd Noise of our Passions deafens us to its Answers or makes us speedily forget them XXXVIII If it be consider'd that Man before the Fall was animated with Charity and possess'd with all that was requisite to his Perseverance in Innocence and that by his Perseverance and Application he ought to merit his Reward 't will easily be conceiv'd that the several Desires of his Will were establish'd the Occasional Causes of the Light receiv'd in his Understanding otherwise his Distraction had not been voluntary nor his Attention meritorious But Nature however corrupted is not destroy'd God has not desisted to will what he once will'd And the same Laws still subsist Therefore our manifold Volitions are still the Occasional or Natural Causes of the Presence of Ideas to our Mind But because the Union of the Soul with the Body is chang'd into a Dependence on it by a Natural Consequence of Sin and the immutable Will of God as I have explain'd elsewhere our Body at present disturbs our Ideas and speaks so loud in favour of its respective Goods that the Mind but seldom consults and distractedly listens to Internal Truth XXXIX Moreover Experience daily teaches us that our Conversation with Understanding Persons is capable of instructing us by raising our Attention that Preaching Reading Converse a thousand Occurrences of all sorts may raise some Ideas in us and likewise inspire us with good Thoughts The Death of a Friend is doubtless capable of putting us in Mind of Death unless some great Passion takes us up And when a Preacher of great Natural Endowments undertakes to demonstrate a most simple Truth and convince others of it it must be own'd that he may persuade his Hearers and even move their Conscience give them Fear and Hope and raise in them such other Passions as put them in a less State of Opposition to the Influence of the Grace of Jesus Christ. Men being made for a sociable Life 't was requisite they should mutually communicate their Thoughts and Motions 'T was fit they should be united in Mind as well as Body and that speaking by the Voice to their Ears and by Writing to their Eyes they should infuse Light and Understanding into one anothers Minds XL. But Light whatever way produc'd in us whether by particular Desires or fortuitous Instances as the Occasional Causes of it may be call'd Grace especially when it nearly relates to Salvation though it be but a Consequence of the Order of Nature because since Sin God owes us nothing and all the Good we have is merited for us by Jesus Christ in whom our very Being subsists But this kind of Grace though merited for us by Jesus Christ is not the Grace of our Lord but that of the Creator since Jesus Christ is not usually the Occasional Cause of it but the Cause of it is discoverable in the Order of Nature XLI There are still several other Natural Effects which we might reasonably look upon as Graces For Example Two Persons have at the same time two Desires of Curiosity The one to go see an Opera the other to hear a celebrated Preacher If they satisfie their Curiosity he that goes to the Opera shall find such Objects as according to his present Disposition of Mind shall raise in him Passions that will damn him whilst the other shall find in the Preacher so great Force and Light that the Grace of Conversion working in him at that moment shall be able to save him Which suppos'd Let but a shower of Rain or any other Accident happen that may stay them at home Though the Rain be a Natural Effect as depending on the Natural Laws of the Communication of Motions yet it may be said to be a Grace in respect of him whose Damnation it prevents and a Punishment to him whose Conversion it hinders XLII Grace being conjoin'd to Nature all the Motions of our Soul and Body have some relation to Salvation This Man is sav'd by having in a State of Grace made a false Step which happily broke his Neck and another is damn'd by having on some Occasion misfortunately avoided the Ruines of a falling House We know not what is for our Advantage but we well know there is nothing of it self so indifferent but has some reference to our Salvation because of the Mixture and Combination of Effects depending on the General Laws of Nature with others that depend on the General Laws of Grace XLIII As therefore Light points out to us the True Good the Means to obtain it our Duties to God in a word the Ways we are to follow it is sufficient to cause those who are animated with Charity to do good to merit new Graces and to conquer some Temptations as I shall explain in another Place so I think we may lawfully give it the Name of Grace though Jesus Christ be only the Meritorious Cause of it And whereas External Graces which have no immediate Influence on the Mind come nevertheless into the Order of Predestination of Saints I consider them also as True Graces In a word I see not why we may not give the Name of Grace to all Natural Effects when relating to Salvation subservient to the Grace of Jesus Christ and delivering us from some Hindrances to his Efficacy Yet if others will not agree with me I shall not contend with them about Words XLIV All these Graces if we may be allow'd to call them so being those of the Creator the General Laws of these Graces are the General Laws of Nature For we must still observe that Sin has not destroy'd Nature though it has corrupted it The General Laws of the Communications of Motions are always the same and those of the Union of the Soul
frighted as if bitten by a Serpent He perceives this little Evil and judges of it as of the greatest Misfortunes so intolerable it appears to him His Reason fainting by the Slumber incapacitates him from suspending his Judgment To him the least Goods as well as Evils are almost always insuperable For 't is the Senses which judge in him and these are hasty Deciders which must be so for several Reasons When Reason is less disabled little Pleasures are not invincible nor little Evils intolerable and Men are not always bound where most Pleasure is to be found For some Pleasures are so little that they are despicable to Reason which is never quite destitute of the Love of Order The presence of little Evils is not very frightful A Man for Example resolves to be let Blood and suffers it he judges not so hastily but suspends and examines and the stronger is Reason the longer is its Suspence against sensible Invitations and Discouragements Now there is nothing more certain than that all Men who partake of the same Reason partake not of it equally that all are not equally sensible at least to the same Objects that they are not all equally well born equally well bred equally aâ—â—isted by the Grace of Jesus Christ and therefore not equally free or capable of suspending the Judgment of their Love in point of the same Objects XV. But we are to take notice that the chief Duty of Minds is to preserve and increase their Liberty since 't is by the good use possible to be made of it they may merit their Felicity if succour'd by the Grace of Jesus Christ at least lessen their Misery if left to themselves That which weakens our Liberty or makes most Pleasures irresistible to us is the Eclipse of our Reason and the Loss of Power we ought to have over our Body Reason therefore must be instructed by continual Meditations we must consider our Duties that we may perform them and our Infirmities that we may have recourse to him who is our Strength And since we have lost the Power of stopping the Impressions made by the Presence of Objects on the Body which thence corrupt the Mind and Heart we ought to avoid these Objects and make use of the Power that is left us We ought to watch constantly over the Purity of our Imagination and labour with all our Powers to efface the adulterate Traces imprinted by false Goods since they kindle Desires in us which divide our Mind and weaken our Liberty By this means the Man whose Liberty is just expiring who cannot conquer the least of Pleasures may obtain such a Strength and such a Freedom as not to yield to the greatest Souls their Succours being suppos'd equal For at least at the time whilst these Pleasures do not importune us to Evil we may lay in to avoid them We may fortifie our selves by some Reason that may through future Pleasures countervail those we don't actually enjoy For as every one has some Love of Order there is no Man but may vanquish a feeble and light Pleasure by a strong and solid Reason by a reasonable Fear of some Evil or by the Hope of some great Good Lastly there is no one but may by the Ordinary Supplies of Grace vanquish some Pleasures and avoid others Which Pleasures formerly invincible or studied being vanquish'd or avoided are a Preparatory to our assaulting others at least before they tempt us For the Satisfaction we find in the Victory provokes us again to Battle and the Joy of a good Conscience and the Grace of Jesus Christ administer Courage And even the Fear of a Defeat is not useless since it makes us fly to him who can do all things and make us discreet in avoiding perillous Occasions Thus we are always Gainers in this sort of Exercise for if we are worsted we become more humble wise and circumspect and sometimes more earnest for the Combat and more capable of Conquering or Resisting XVI As in the study of the Sciences those who submit not to the false Glimpses of Probabilities and who are wont to suspend their Judgment till the Light of Truth breaks into them fall rarely into Errour whereas the vulgar part of Men are daily deceiv'd by their precipitate Judgments So in Moral Discipline those who use to sacrifice their Pleasures to the Love of Orders and who continually mortifie their Senses and Passions especially in things which seem of little moment which every one may do will in things important obtain a great Facility of suspending the Judgment which regulates their Love Pleasure does not surprize them like other Men at least does not drag them along unawares It seems on the contrary that whilst it sensibly affects them it cautions them to take care of themselves and to consult Reason or the Rules of the Gospel Their Conscience is more nice and tender than that of others who in the Scripture Phrase drink Sin like Water They are sensible to the secret Reproaches of Reason and the wholsome Precautions of inward Truth So that the acquir'd Habit of resisting feeble and light Pleasures makes way for the conquering the more violent at least for the suffering some Regret and Shame when a Man is conquer'd which creates forthwith Dislike and Abhorrence Liberty thus insensibly increasing and perfecting it self by Exercise and the Assistance of Grace we may at last put our selves in a Capacity of performing the most difficult Commandments in as much as by the ordinary Graces which are constantly afforded Christians we may overcome common Temptations and for the most part avoid the greatest and by the Assistance of the Grace of Jesus Christ there is none but may be vanquish'd XVII 'T is true that a Sinner so dispos'd as not able so much as to think of resisting a surprizing Pleasure cannot actually accomplish the Commandment that orders him not to enjoy it For the Pleasure is insuperable to him in that Estate And if we but suppose this Person in this State of Impotence through a Natural Necessity his Sin not being free could not make him more culpable I mean more worthy of the Punishment of Pain than if he were inordinate in his Sleep Nay if this Impotency were a necessary Consequence of the free Disorders which had preceded his Conversion it would not be imputed to him by reason of his Charity But since he was both able and oblig'd to use himself to resisting Pleasure and combating for the Preservation and Augmentation of his Liberty this Sin though actually committed by a kind of Necessity renders him guilty and punishable if not by reason of his Sin at least because of his Negligence which is the Principle of it The Commandment of God is not absolutely impossible but the Sinner may and ought for the foregoing Reasons to put himself into a Condition of observing it since Men are oblig'd as well as able to labour constantly to augment and perfect their Liberty not only by
they are communicated to others with greater Facility The Study of Nature is undoubtedly more Noble than of Books Visible and Sensible Experiments afford us much more certain Proofs of things than the Reasonings of Men and no Objection can be made to those Men whose Circumstances of Life have engag'd them in the Study of Natural Philosophy for endeavouring to excel in it by making continual Experiments provided their greatest Application be made to the more necessary Sciences We find no fault with Experimental Philosophy nor the Improvers of it but only with their Defects The first of which is that usually 't is not the Light of Reason which conducts them in the Method of their Experiments but only Chance Which is the reason that they grow little more Learned or Skilful after having wasted much of their Time and Fortune therein The second is their insisting rather upon Curious and Extraordinary Experiments than on those that are more Common when 't is plain that the Commoner being the more simple they ought first to be dwelt upon before a Man applies himself to the more Compounded and to those which depend upon a multitude of Causes The third is their earnest and diligent Search after Profitable Experiments and their neglect of those which only serve to illuminate the Mind The fourth that they are too un-exact in their Observations of all the particular Circumstances of Time Place the Quality of the Drugs made use of though the least of these Circumstances is capable of frustrating the desir'd Effect For 't is observable that the Terms the Virtuoâ—i use are Equivocal The Word Wine for instance signifies so many different things as there are different Soils various Seasons and several ways of making and preserving it So that it may be said in general there are no where two Vessels of it altogether alike And when a Chymist says To make such an Experiment take wine we have but a very confus'd Idea of his meaning For which Reason they should use a most exact Circumspection in Experiments and not descend to the Compound sort till they are very well acquainted with the more Simple and Ordinary The fifth is That they make too many Deductions from a single Experiment when on the contrary to the Establishing any one good Conclusion there should go generally many Experiments Though a single Experiment may be assistant to the inferring many Conclusions Lastly The most part of Naturalists and Chymists consider only the particular Effects of Nature They never ascend up to the first Notions of the Things Bodies are compos'd of When yet it is most certain we can have no clear and distinct knowledge of any particular Phaenomena unless we are first masters of the most general Principles and run them up as high as Metaphysicks To conclude they commonly want Courage and Constancy and are tir'd and discourag'd with the Toil and Expence There are many other Faults these Gentlemen are subject to but I design not to reckon them all up The Causes of these Faults which I have remark'd are the want of Application the Properties of the Imagination explain'd in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapters and Men's judging of the Difference of Bodies and the Changes they undergo only from the Sensations they have of them according to the Explication given in the First Book The THIRD PART Concerning The CONTAGIOUS COMMUNICATION Of Strong IMAGINATIONS CHAP I. I. Of the Disposition we have to imitate others in all things which is the Original of the Communication of those Errors that depend on the Power of Imagination II. Two things that more especially increase this Disposition III. What that strong Imagination is IV. That there are several kinds of it Of Fools and of those that have a Srong Imagination in the Sense 't is here taken V. Two considerable Imperfections of Men of a Strong Imagination VI. Of the Power they have to perswade and impose on others HAVING already explain'd the Nature of the Imagination the Failings it is subject to and shewn how our own Imagination engages us in Error all that remains in this Second Book is to speak to the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations I mean that Sway and Power some Minds have of drawing others into their Errors Strong Imaginations are wondrously contagious They domineer over the weaker fashion them by degrees after their own Image and imprint the same Characters upon them And therefore since Men of Conceit and of a Vigorous and Strong Imagination are the least reasonable of any there are very few Causes of the Errors of Men more â—niversal than this dangerous Communication of the Imagination In order to conceive what this Contagion is and how it 's transmitted from one to another we must know that Men are under a mutual necessity of one another's Assistance and are so fram'd as out of many Bodies to compound one whereof all the Parts have a muâ—ual Correspondence For the preserving and cherishing of which Union GOD commanded them to have Charity for each other But whereas Self-love might by little and little extinguish Charity and break the Bond of Civil Society GOD thought fit for the Preservation of it to unite Men more firmly still by Natural Ties which might subsist in case Charity should fail and also defend it against the attacks of Self-love These Natural Ties which we have in common with Beasts consist in a certain Disposition of Brain which makes all Men prone to imitate the Actions of those they converse with to frame the same Judgments with them and to be acted with like Passions they see them possess'd with Which Disposition is a much straiter Obligation to bind them to each other than Charity founded upon Reason this Charity being rarely to be met with Now when a Man wants this Disposition of Brain whereby he may be affected with our Sentiments and Passions he is Naturally incapable of uniting and making up one Body with us He may be compar'd to those Irregular Stones that cannot be plac'd in a Building because they cannot be joyn'd with the others Oderunt hilarem tristes tristemque jocosi Sedatum celeres agilem gnavúmque remissi 'T is a more considerable Vertue than is imagin'd to keep fair with those who are untouch'd with our Passions and whose Notions are contrary to our own And we shall have Reason to think so if we consider that 't is a kind of Insulting when we see a Man that has just cause of Sorrow or Joy not to take part with him in his Sentiments When a Man is in Sorrow one should not come before him with a Gay and Airy look which bespeaks Joy and violently imprints the Motions thereof in his Imagination This being to disturb him from the state that is most convenient and pleasant to him for sorrow is the pleasantest of all the Passions to a Man under any Affliction There is then a certain Disposition of Brain in all Men whatever which naturally inclines
moving Forces do perfectly agree since in that Case it is enough to add AB to AC But if those Forces are not altogether equal the composed Motion AE will be greater than one of the Compoundings AB or AC by the Line YE Whereas if those Motions be opposite in any thing the composed will be lesser than either of the compounding by the Line YE and if they be entirely opposite it will come to nothing Secondly The Line AXYE represents to the Imagination the Way which that Body shall go For we sensibly perceive in what Proportion it shall advance more to one than to the other side We likewise perceive that all the compound Motions are direct when each of the compounding is always the same though they be unequal betwixt themselves or when the Compoundings are always equal betwixt themselves though they be not constantly the same Lastly It plainly appears that the Lines described by those Motions are crooked when the Compounding are both unequal to each other and not always the same For Instance After what has been said it is enough only to know that a Body that was in A at such a time is in E at such another and that the different Forces that drive it describe Lines that make such an Angle as BAC to discover the Line of its composed Motion and the different Degrees of Celerity of the simple Motions provided we know that those Motions are equal or uniform to each other For when we have two Points of a Right Line we have it entire and we can compare the Right Line AE or the composed Motion that is known with the Lines AB and AC that is with the simple Motions that are unknown Now let us afresh suppose a Stone driven from A to B by an uniform Motion but descending towards E with an unequal like to that which ponderous Bodies are thought generally to tend to the Centre of the Earth according to the common Opinion that is to say let the Spaces which it passes over be amongst themselves as the Squares of the Times in which it passes them over the Line which it shall describe will be a Parabola and the Point in which the Stone shall be at every Moment of its Motion may be determined with the utmost Nicety and Exactness For if at the first Moment that Body falls Two Foot from A towards C in the second Six in the third Ten in the fourth Fourteen and that it be driven by an uniform Motion from A towards B which is Sixteen Foot in length 't is evident that the Line which that Body describes is a Parabola whose Parameter is Eight Foot long because the Square of the Lines that are applied the Diameter which Lines mark the Times and the regular Motion of A towards B is equal to the Rectangle of the Parameter through the Lines that mark the unequal and accelerated Motions so that the Squares of the applied Lines or the Squares of the Times will be amongst themselves as the Parts of the Diameter contained betwixt the Pole and the applied Lines 16 64 2 8 64 144 8 18 c. The bare looking on the sixth Figure is sufficient to persuade us of all this for the Semicircles shew that A2 is to A4 that is to the applied Line 2X its equal as 2X is to A8 That A18 is to A12 that is to the applied Line 18X as 18X is to A8 c. And therefore that the Rectangles A2 by A8 and A18 by A8 are equal to the Squares of 2X and 18X c. and consequently those Squares have the same Proportion to each other as those Rectangles The Parallels upon AB and AC which cut each other at the Points XXX do also sensibly shew the Way of that Body and the Places in which it must be at such a time Lastly They represent to the Eyes the true Degrees of the composed Motion and of its Acceleration in any determinate Time Let 's suppose again a Body moving from A towards B and C but unequally on both sides If that Inequality be always and every where alike or if it either encreases or diminishes in the same proportion the Line which it shall describe will be a Right And though there should be an Inequality either in the Augmentation or Diminution of the simple Motions whatever that Inequality be it will not be hard to find the Line that represents to the Imagination the Motion composed of the simple Motions if you express those Motions by Lines and draw to these Lines Parallels cutting each other For the Line that shall pass through all the Intersections of those Parallels will represent the Motion composed of those Motions that are unequal and unequally increased or diminished If we desire exactly to know how long a Body has been in coming to such a Point from its setting out the Parallels drawn from the Point upon AB or AC will shew it for the Divisions of AB and AC mark the Time And likewise if we desire to know the Place to which a Body shall arrive within some certain Time the Parallels drawn from the Divisions of the Lines AB and AC that represent the Time will by their Intersection shew us the Point we seek for As to its Distance from the Term whence it has begun to move it will always be easie to know it by drawing a Line from that Point towards A for the Length of that Line will be known by comparing it either to AB or AC which are known But as to the Length of the Way through which that Body has run in advancing to this Point it will still be hard to discover it because AE the Line of its Motion being crooked cannot be compared with either of those Right Lines If you would determine the infinite Points through which that Body must pass that is nicely describe and by a continual Motion the Line AE you had need make a Pair of Compasses that should move according to all the Conditions express'd in the Suppositions that have been mentioned which would be very difficult to invent and impossible to perform and almost unprofitable to discover the Relations of Things betwixt themselves since commonly we need not all the Points of which a Line is composed but only some to help the Imagining Faculty when it considers those Motions Those Instances are sufficient to shew that we may by Lines express and represent to the Imagination most of our Ideas and that Geometry which teaches to compare those Lines and thereby know their several Relations is of a greater use and extent than is commonly supposed For Astronomy Musick Mechanicks and generally all the Sciences whose Objects are susceptible of more or less and may be consider'd under the Notion of extended that is to say all accurate Sciences may be referr'd to Geometry because all Speculative Truths consisting in the Relations of things or in Relations betwixt their Relations they may all be referr'd to
Lines Geometrical Consequences may be drawn from them and when those Consequences are made sensible by Lines 't is almost impossible to mistake Thus may Sciences be carried very far with great easiness For Instance The Reason why we distinctly know and precisely mark an Octave a Fifth a Fourth in Musick is that the Sounds are expressed by Strings exactly divided and that we know that the String which sounds an Octave is in double proportion with that from whence the Octave rises that a Fifth is with it in a Sesquialter Proportion or as 3 to 2 and so of the rest For the Ear alone cannot judge of Sounds with so much nicety and accuracy as a Science requires The most skilful Practitioners the most delicate and nicest Ears are not sensible enough to observe the difference betwixt certain Sounds and judging of things by the Sensation they have of them fasly imagine that there 's none at all Some cannot distinguish betwixt an Octave and 3 thirds others fancy that the Major Tone differs not from the Minor so that the Comma which is their Difference is insensible to them and much more the Schisma which is but the half of the Comma And therefore 't is Reason alone that manifestly shews us that the space of the String which makes the Difference betwixt certain Sounds being divisible into several parts there may still be a great number of different Sounds very usefull for Musick which the Ear cannot distinguish Whence it plainly appears that without Arithmetick and Geometry we should have no exact and regular Knowledge of Musick neither could we succeed in that Science but by Chance and Imagination and so Musick would cease from being a Science grounded upon undeniable Demonstrations In the mean while it must be granted that the Songs which owe their birth to the strength of Imagination are for the most part finer and more pleasant to the Senses than those that are composed by Rule And likewise in Mechanicks the Heaviness of a Body and the Distance of the Centre of Heaviness from its Prop being capable of more of less both may be figured by Lines So that Geometry is usefull to discover and demonstrate an infinite number of new Inventions very convenient to this Life and pleasing to the Mind because of their Evidence For Instance If a Weight of six pounds is to be put in aequilibrium with one of three let that Weight of six pound hang on the Arm of a Balance at two Foot distance from the Prop then only knowing this general Principle of all Mechanicks That Weights to stand in aequilibrium must be in a reciprocal Proportion with their Distances from the Prop that is That one Weight must be to the other as the Distance betwixt the last Weight and the Prop is to the Distance of the first Weight from the said Prop it will be easie to find out by Geometry what must be the Distance of a Weight of Three pounds that all may remain in aequilibrio if you find by the Twelfth Proposition of the Sixth Book of Euclid a fourth proportional Line which here will be of four Foot So that you may plainly discover all the Truths that depend upon that fundamental Principle of Mechanicks when once known by the use of Geometry that is by representing with Lines whatever can be considered in Mechanicks Geometrical Lines and Figures are therefore most proper to represent to the Imagination the Relations betwixt Magnitudes or betwixt things that differ in degree of more and less as Spaces Times Weights c. as well because they are most simple Objects as that they are imagin'd with great easiness It may even be said to the Honour of Geometry That Lines can represent to the Imagination more things than the Mind can know Since Lines can express the Relations of incommensurable Magnitudes that is such Relations as cannot be known because there is no common Measure to compare them together But that Advantage is not very considerable as to the Search after Truth because those sensible Representations of incommensurable Magnitudes discover nothing to the Mind Geometry is therefore exceedingly useful to make the Mind attentive to those things whose Relations we desire to discover However it must be granted that it is sometimes an Occasion of Errour because the evident and pleasant Demonstrations of that Science takes us up so much that we have not a sufficient Regard for the Consideration of Nature Thence it comes that the new-invented Engines do not all succeed that those Musical Composures in which the Proportions of Consonances are best observed are not always the most grateful and that the most accurate Calculations of Astronomy do not always best foretell the Incidence and Duration of Eclipses Nature is not abstracted Levers and Wheels in Mechanicks are not Mathematical Lines and Circles All Men are not pleased with the same Musical Tunes nor even the same Man at different times for their Satisfaction proceeds from the Commotions of their Spirits than which nothing can be more variable And as to Astronomy the Course of the Planets is not perfectly regular whilst floating in the vast Spaces they are irregularly carried by the fluid Matter that surrounds them So that the Errours of Astronomy Musick Mechanicks and all Sciences in which Geometry is used are not to be ascribed to that undoubted Science but to the false Application that is made of it For Instance we suppose that Planets by their Motion describe Circles and Ellipses perfectly regular And though that be not exactly true yet wâ— doe well to suppose it so that we may draw Inferences from thence and because it wants but little of being true but we must still remember that the Principle from which we argue is a Supposition Likewise in Mechanicks we suppose Wheels and Levers perfectly hard without gravity and rubbing and like to Mathematical Lines and Circles or rather we have not a sufficient consideration for the said Gravity and rubbing for the Nature of the Matter and the Relation those things have betwixt them We mind not that Hardness and Bulk increase Heaviness Heaviness fretting whilst fretting diminishes Force and causes the Engine to break or wears it out very quickly So that what often succeeds upon a small portion of Matter seldom takes effect upon a great Body No wonder therefore if we mistake since we argue from Principles not fully known nor yet because it rids us not of all Errours must we imagine Geometry useless It makes us draw from our Suppositions very true and consequential Inferences and affords us an evident Knowledge of what we consider by making us attentive We can even discover by its means the Falshood of our Suppositions for being certain of the Truth of our Reasonings which however do not agree with Experience we discover that our Principles are false But without Geometry and Arithmetick we can discover nothing that is somewhat difficult in the most accurate Sciences though we argue from