to do so I am as sure that once there were such persons as William the Conquerour and Henry the Eight and that there are or lately were such Cities as Rome and Constantinople as I am that Two and Two make Four or that the Whole is greater than the Parts 91. Firm Assent in matters in themselves mutable and of a contingent nature may be called Confidence but in matters of a necessary firm and immutable nature it is Science Infirm Assent or Assent with Dubitation is called Opinion Suspition is a beginning Assent or an inclination to believe a thing and is short of Opinion Suspition on grounds is called just suspition Suspition on no grounds is mere suspition Probability is appearance of Truth And ground of Suspition is Appearance of Probability Suspition is also called Presumption 92. Assent on Evidence by the testimony of our own Senses rightly circumstanced and conditioned is as firm as firm can be and is called Knowledge Assent to a thing upon anothers knowledge and not our own is called Belief To Believe is to take a thing upon anothers word and if that word be divine the belief is called Faith or if but humane it is called simply Belief or Credit Belief is grounded on the wisdom and veracity of the person believed for he that believes another believes him to have wisdom enough not to be imposed upon or deceived himself and Veracity or Truth which among men is called Honesty enough not to impose upon or to deceive him The Word of God therefore is the most proper object of belief God being so wise he cannot be deceived and so true he cannot deceive Notoreity of a thing of a fact is the certainty of it on Common Knowledge It is not Presumption nor Probability but Certainty 93. Assent to Falsity under the notion of Truth if it be firm is called Errour If infirm and with dubitation it is erroneous Opinion 94. Ratiocination Speculative is either Euretick or Hermeneutick Inventive or Interpretative and this latter again is either interpretative of the World the Book of Nature or of the Scriptures the Book of God But of these perhaps another time as also of the method of Reasoning which I called Practical and is either that of Prudence 1. Humane or 2. Christian or of Conscience Now on the whole Matter who seeth not the share and interest that Reason hath in matters of Religion Men are reasonable Creatures and therefore their Religion must be reasonable Every Tree must bring forth Fruit in its kinde Faith it self it is a rational Act If I have any reason to believe Men I have all reason to believe God and Ratiocination is as much imploy'd in points of Revelation as in points of mere Reason Truth is the immediate reason of Assent in matters of Revelation as well as in others and there is an Analogie of Faith as well as of Nature the Mediums are different but Ratiocination is the same in both We are as well obliged to compare Spiritual things with Spiritual in the one as Natural things with Natural in the other Thus are the Bereans applauded as persons of nobler and more generous Mindes than those of Thessalonica because they took not all on trust as these did but examined the things were told them and compared them with the Scriptures It is easie also to infer that if any person shall give himself the trouble of disproving what in my Apologie I presented to the World to do it to Conviction he must produce a frame and Scheme of Thoughts more Congruous and Harmonical than mine and must account for those Phaenomena which I therein essay'd to solve in a method more perspicuous and natural and with more agreeableness and uniformity of Notions than I have or else he will not Confute but confirm it I say this to shew the fairer play to those that undertake to answer me if after I have said it any shall resolve to do so and I say no more to shew the Opinion I yet avow to be mine of all the Objections whispered up and down that in themselves they have as little force and evidence and as little conviction as those that make them have yet had either Courage to own them to the world or Candour to own them to me Thus Sir I have performed what I principally designed I have shew'd the nature of Reason I have shewed the true method of Reasoning as also the nature of Truth and up and down my Discourse dispersedly the causes of Errour and I have shew'd the extent of Reason In which performance whatsoever other Incongruity or Errour I may have been guilty of sure I am I have committed none in dedicating it For to whom could I address a Discourse of Reason and of Truth more properly than to a Person who is so great a Lover and owner of both and withal who is so perfectly honoured as you are by all that have the happiness to know you But by none more than Sir Bowdon Aug. 14. 1677. Your most humble Servant and Son Richard Burthogge BOOKS Printed for and sold by Samuel Crouch in Popes-head-ally FEltham's Resolves Divine Moral Political with new Additions Clark's Martyrologie His Lives of the Fathers The Sabbath of Rest to be kept by the Saints here By N. Smith Master of Arts. Cole's English Dictionary Dr. Thomson's method of Curing His Epilogismi Chymici Sleepy spouse of Christ alarm'd in several Sermons By J. B. Recommended in a Preface by Mr. Nath. Vincent Purchasers Pattern much enlarged The English Tutor or the plain Path-way to the English Tongue with examples of most Words from one to six Syllables both in whole Words and also divided with Rules how to spell them by way of Question and Answers
the King-Key unlocking all the Mysteries of Nature The Great Creator framed all things in the Universe in Number Weight and Measure Extremes in it are united by participating Middles and in the whole System there is so admirable Uniformity as ravishes every one that beholds it every thing in its place is aptly knit with what is next it and all together into one most regular Frame of most exact Proportions Every thing we look on affords Examples and Galen in his Books of the use of Parts has a Thousand to whom if in so plain a matter it be necessary I remit the Learned Reader 80. And 't is a common sense that what is congruous is true and what is true is congruous so common that none ever fancied any notion of Truth but in Congruity some School-men in Congruity to the Divine Intellect Others in Congruity to our Faculties and all men though they speak not out and it may be minde not that they do so in Consistence and Congruity of things with one another all generally concluding that Narration for instance to be probable which seems consistent and Probability being appearance of Truth if what seems consistent be probable what is so is true But to give a Mechanical instance one that would repair a broken China-dish or make up a Watch or other Engine taken abroad what Measures doth he naturally take to do so what Rule proceeds he by None verily but by that of Congruity he makes no question but that when he hath found a place for every part wherein it lies consistently and aptly with others so that in the whole there is exact Coherence and Congruity no Flaw no Unanswerableness it is truely set together and every part in its place Truth is Harmony 81. And seeing Truth is Harmony and the Universe it self as it consists in our Analogy is but one System it follows that properly there is but one Science which some will call Pansophy one Globe of Knowledge as there is of Things As also that the partition of Sciences or rather the crumbling of them into so many hath been a great impediment of Science the dependency of Things and their Relations one to another thereby becoming unobserved and unconsidered And in fine that the more large general and comprehensive our Knowledge is the more assured and evident it is It is in Science as it is in Arch-work the Parts uphold one another and mutually contribute strength and beauty The consinement of the Understanding to particular Knowledges as also the limiting of it in any unto certain Methods and Terms of Art is like too straight a swathing of the Childe and spoils its growth 82. So much for the two Topicks of natural speculative Reasoning namely Truth and Falsity It now lies on me more expresly to describe How Reasoning is performed in reference to them and so what the Nature of it is And natural speculative Reasoning is Systematical and Harmonical it is a shewing an evincing the Truth or Falsity of a thing by conferring and comparing thing with thing it is a shewing a Notion to be true or not true by representing of it in a Frame a Scheme of real Notions with all its Relations in it and so by Comparing Evidencing how it squares agrees and harmonizes or otherwise 83. That Natural Reasoning is Harmonical Systematical that it is conferring comparing is evident in the Natural Reasonings of Plain and Illiterate but Understanding men who not having other Logick but that of kinde to verifie their Tales desire but to have them heard out from end to end and who no otherwise confute their Adversaries than by telling over again in their own way the whole Relation that so both may be compared Besides the comparative method of Reasoning used by the Minde in intelligible Objects is no other than that we naturally use in those that are sensible For be it a visible Object we enqure into and examine the truth of we turn it every way and into all postures so to make a certain judgement of it and Circumspection which is Cicero's word for it or the Mindes comparing and conferring of things is no other And if Truth indeed be Harmony Proportion Congruity an Object cannot be evinced true but by being evinced Harmonical Congruous Proportionable and it cannot be evinced Harmonical Congruous Proportionable but by being conferred and compared and upon collation and comparison shewn to be so 84. To prove Harmonically is in a Scheme and Frame of Notions bottomed on things to shew the thing to be proved to quadrate lie even and to be entirely congruous and answerable To disprove a thing Harmonically is in a Frame and Scheme of Notions bottomed on things to shew it not to quadrate but to be incongruous unanswerable and unadequate 85. The best way of Confuting Errour is to do it by shewing the Truth There is so great a delicacy in Proportions that a Scheme of Thoughts may seem congruous and agreeing by it self which compared with another is observed no longer so as two pieces of fine Cloath looked on at a distance and not compared together may be judged equally fine and one no better than the other whereas when put together and felt and so compared the difference is plain and discernible 86. The Effect of Reasoning and as it were the Conclusion is Assent or Dissent according to evidence Evidence is the Assurance we have a thing is true or false and so is either of Truth or of Falsity and answerably bottomes either Assent or Dissent 87. Assent is the judgement of the Minde upon evidence of Truth that the thing is true Dissent is the judgement of the Minde upon evidence of Falsity that the thing is false 88. Evidence of Truth is either certain or probable Certain Evidence is full Assurance Probable Evidence is good Assurance but not full Certain Evidence is evidence of certain Truth Probable Evidence is evidence of probability Probable Evidence is now a-days termed a Motive of Credibility 89. In Proportion as the Evidence is so is the Assent If the Evidence be certain that is indubitable and unquestionable and that is to be understood to be so of which there is no cause to doubt or make any Question then the Assent is firm and certain and without doubting but if the Evidence be but probable the Assent then is infirm and with doubting more or less as the Evidence is lesser or greater To Doubt is to fear lest the thing to which Assent is given should not be true 90. Evidence of Certainty is to the Minde as to its Assent all as much as Evidence of Infallibility For the Minde as firmly adheres to what it hath all reason for and no reason against all reason to believe it to be so or so and no reason to believe it to be otherwise as to what it apprehends impossible to be otherwise seeing it were unreasonable and contradictious for Reason any wise to doubt when it hath no reason at all
and effective as the first By first and Second Notions I both understand Terms or Words and the Notions signified by them 27. So much for the Object of Apprehension which is Sense and Notion and for the Grounds of that Object which is Sentiment Now for the Affections of Apprehension if a good one and they are two namely Cleerness and Distinctness 28. Cleerness of Apprehension which is in the Minde the same that Cleerness of Seeing is in the Eye is opposed to Obscurity and Darkness and presupposes Light 29. Light is that which manifests and consequently Intellectual Light is that means whereby the Understanding comes to See and Apprehend its Objects or that which manifests them to it and is either Light of Revelation which is also called Light of Faith or Light of Nature which is also called Light of Reason where Reason is Appropriately taken and most strictly 30. The Light of Revelation is that Discovery or Manifestation God himself is pleased to make of things by his Spirit and is chiefly in the Holy Scriptures The Light of Nature is All other Light whatever but that of Revelation whereby we See and Apprehend things and is that we have by Sense and Discourse 31. Some things there are that may be seen in both Lights in that of Nature and that of Revelation though more cleerly in the latter than in the former as that God is Good and that he is the Maker and Conserver and supreme Director of All things Other things are onely to be seen in the Light of Revelation being of a nature not to be discovered but in and by it as the Mysteries of Christian Religion the Doctrine of the Trinity the Incarnation of God c. 32. The Lights of Faith and Nature of Revelation and Reason though they be not the same yet are not contrary I mean that what is shewn or seen to be true in one Light can never be shewn or seen to be false in the other What is Apprehended by Sense rightly circumstanced and condition'd to be This or to be That or else by Reason rightly acting to be so or so it is never contradicted by Revelation Things are nothing to a man but as they stand in his Analogie for him to believe against his Faculties is to believe a Contradiction If in the Holy Sacrament of the Lord's Supper the Elements first and last are Bread and Wine to Sense and to Reason judging according to Sense I cannot hold my self obliged by any Revelation to believe them Flesh and Blood but in a Notion consistent with the judgment Sense and Reason make of them that is not flesh and blood substantially but sacramentally not flesh and blood really but only by signification Else Truth might be Incongruity Inconsistency Transubstantiation is to me a Mystery I am so far from making truth of it that I cannot make any sense of it I might as well believe that two and two make not four or three and three six as that it is not Bread or Wine which to my Eye my Taste my Touch in a word which being an Object of Sense to all Examinations of my Sense is so What is against Sense is against Knowledge 33. An Object onely to be seen by the Light of Faith may be said to be seen by Reason above Reason by Reason assisted with the Light of Revelation above Reason not so assisted but acting onely by the Aids of Nature but still it is Reason sees in both As I can see an Object with a Tube that with my naked and unarmed Eye I cannot or see in the Sun-light an Object that I cannot by Moon-light but still it is the Eye that sees in both the Organ is the same although the Lights be not It is the same Reason and Understanding the same Faculty that sees in the Light of Revelation as it is that sees by the Light of Nature and the same that Argues and Discourses in the one as by the other 34. The great Designe of God in all the Doctrines and even in the highest and most sublime Mysteries of our Religion is to affect the hearts of men and therefore as 1. He represents and reveals them in first Notions so 2. He also doth it in sensible and comparative ones and usually 3. He representeth one thing by many Notions 1. To make it more Affective and withal 2. to signifie that no one Notion he represents the thing in is adequate and just to it Thus he represents the great Mystery of our Union unto Christ and our Communion with him by that between the Vine and Branches between the Husband and Wife between the Head and Members As also the great work of Conversion that passes upon Men in the change he makes on them from their Darkness into his most marvellous Light He compares it to Generation to Adoption to Creation In fine the New Covenant is not only stiled a Covenant but also a Testament and a Promise All which resembling and comparative expressions may and ought to be employed and used for the apprehending of the things they are designed to signifie and the making of them more affective but neither of them so to be insisted on as if it were adequate or just 35. The Light of Faith and Revelation must not be confounded with that of Reason and Nature I mean we ought not to consider points of mere Revelation in the light of mere natural Reason Spiritual things cannot be discern'd but spiritually and therefore must not be compared but with Spirituals In Points of mere Revelation we ought entirely to confine our selves to the Notions Comparisons Similitudes and Representations God himself hath made of them without pretending to be wise above what is written and to say or understand just how in themselves the things are abstractly from the Dresses Revelation puts them in 36. He that pretends to understand the Mysteries of Christian Religion or any Point of meer Revelation stript of those Notions Resemblances and Comparisons when they be not revealed or discovered but in them as he looketh not on these things in the Light of Faith and Revelation but in that of Reason or Nature so not looking on them in their own Genuine and Proper Light no wonder if he either erre or trifle about them 37. Justly liable to this Reproof I judge them that are not content to think and speak of God the proper Object as well as Author of Revelation in that manner that he speaks of himself who Reveals himself to us men in Analogous and Comparative Notions not in such as adequate and adjust him but such as do proportion and suit with us as if he had an Understanding Will and Affections and did purpose Ends and elected Means to compass them did consult and decree and were touched with the Affections of Joy Grief Love Hatred Anger Revenge c. 38. They that tell us that he is not angry that Revenge is an Imperfection not to be imputed to him and
be Falsity 64. Wherefore to prove a Truth to be one is but in a right method to shew it to the Minde the Understanding apprehending a thing to be true when rightly shewed as the Eye doth see the shew to be white that is duely held before it A Notion may be true yet not acknowledged to be so because not rightly apprehended or seen and it is not rightly seen or apprehended because not rightly shewed Then Truth is rightly shewed or shewed to be Truth when 't is shewed Systomatically or Harmonically The like is to be said of Falsity But to enlighten this Point I am to shew at large what Truth and consequently what Falsity is 65. Truth in the apprehensions of some of the School-men and of others is that conformity which is in things to their original Ideas in the Divine Intellect All second Beings are but Copies of the Minde of the first in which they have their Exemplars and wherein doth the verity the truth of Copies consist but in a conformity to their Originals 66. But this notion of Truth however true it may be is not pertinent to us 't is Metaphysical Truth that it relates unto a Truth of things as standing in the Analogy of God but the Truth we treat of and whose notion we are enquiring after is Logical a Truth of things as standing in our Analogy and which is the ground of Assent Certain it is this notion that the Schools afford us is not nor can it be to us a Medium of Reasoning since we cannot say what is conformable or what is not unto the divine Exemplars He must see the Original and compare the Copy with it that on knowledge will affirm this to be true 67. Of late the old Catalepsis has seen the light again that comprehension discoursed of by Cicero in his Lucullus The meaning of which is that there is no other Criterium no other judicial note of Truth no other Rule Mark or Measure whereby to know a thing to be true than clear and distinct Perception And thus also the Cartesians 68. But on the contrary clear and distinct Perception is not the Cause and Ground of Assent but onely a Condition of causing Truth is the onely Adequate and effectual Motive or Reason of Assent but to be so it must be clearly and distinctly perceived Truth as whiteness is something in the Object that invites Assent clear and distinct Perception is not in the Object but of it and consequently is not Truth but conversant about Truth Sight is not Colour but of Colour so neither is Perception Truth but of Truth Besides that cannot be a certain mark of Truth which may be affirmed as well of Errour as of Truth I may as clearly and distinctly perceive a thing to be false as to be true A thing may be evidently false as well as evidently true 69. If any say as doubtless some will that by clear and distinct Perception they mean nothing but a clear and evident apprehension of the truth of things I answer That then either they know what Truth is by its mark and definition and by the impression that it makes on the Minde as well as what Whiteness is by the impression made thereby on the Eye or they do not If they do not how can they say they clearly and distinctly perceive a thing to be true who know not Truth They might as well say they clearly and distinctly see a thing to be white when they know not whiteness Or if they know what Truth is then that Impression that Form that Notion of Truth they have ought rather to be insisted on and not the bare Perception They should say The thing is true we see clearly the Form and Notion of Truth in it For indeed nothing makes a thing true but the Form and Notion of Truth therein For did I apprehend a thing to be true never so clearly and distinctly yet if I did but apprehend it so as I may and many do and that the Notion and Form of Truth were no wise in it it were not true by vertue of the Apprehension I had of it but onely seemed so As I clearly and distinctly see an Image in the Glass when indeed it is not there or an Oar in the Water bowed and crooked when indeed it is not so It is an Errour and a most dangerous one too to assert that seeming or intellectual sense for clear and distinct Perception signifies no more is the measure of Truth There are so many ways wherein a thing may be seen clearly and distinctly that is may seem true and yet not be so No convincing Hereticks or opinionate Philosophers if Seeming be the mark of Truth 70. To this Opinion I am now to adde another much of kin to it That of the truly-Noble and Learned the late Lord Herbert namely That Truth consisteth in the Analogy Agreement Harmony of things to our Faculties inviting a most free and full Assent Or in his own Terms Veritas est Harmonia inter object a Facultates habens sensum gratissimè lubentissimè sine ulla haesttatione Respondentem 71. All the difference between the Former and the Latter Opinion is that in the former Apprehension clear and distinct in the latter Assent Free and Full is made the Mark and Measure of Truth Of this Latter Opinion as that eminent Person last mentioned among the Moderns so among the Antients were a many noble Philosophers in Tully it is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and as described by him it hath the same Foundation that his Lordship builds on namely the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Truth That Truth is so Domestical and Congruous to the Faculty so Analogous and fit to it that the Inclination of the Minde thereto in Nà ture and Necessity resembles that of a Stone or whatever or other heavy Body you 'll imagine to the Center 72. But 1 a bare Congruity between the Object and the Understanding is not the ground of Truth but of Sense or Intelligibility and though there be a Congruity in all Truth because there is a sense in it and happily more Congruity because a more agreeable Sense Yet since that Congruity is unobservable unremarkable but by Assent and Assent of it self is no sufficient Evincement of Truth I lay it by as Illogical and useless 2 Nor doth the Understanding blindly incline to Truth and as it were by Sympathy or a natural Motion of Aggregation its Assent is an act of Judgement The Minde proceeds therein judicially upon Allegations and Proof judging a thing to be true that is assenting to it onely because it sees therein the Form Notion and Mark of Truth as it judges a thing to be white wherein the Eye assures it there is the form of Whiteness And 3 one may readily and chearfully assent to Falsities and Errours and mistake them for Truths and therefore free and full Assent is no sufficient evincement of Truth Not to urge that chearfulness