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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A39389	To en archy: or, An exercitation upon a momentous question in divinity, and case of conscience viz. whether it be lawfull for any person to act contrary to the opinion of his own consicence, formed from arguments that to him appear very probable, though not necessary or demonstrative. Where the opinions of the papists, Vasquez, Sanches, Azonius, &c. are shewed, as also the opinions of some Protestants, viz. Mr. Hooker, Bp Sanderson, Dr. Fulwood, &c. and compared with the opinions of others; the negative part of the question maintained; the unreasonableness of the popish opinions, and some Protestants, for blind obedience, detected; and many other things discoursed. By a Protestant.	Protestant.; Collinges, John, 1623-1690, attributed name.	1675 (1675)	Wing E718; Wing C5314_CANCELLED; ESTC R214929	62,722	96

Foundations of the Protestant Religion as it stands disting●●●●d from Popery This is that which Divines call The Judgment of Private and Practical Discretion Divines say there is 〈◊〉 ●●●●fold Judgment concerning Propositions of Truth 1. The first is Authoritative or Nomothetick This belongeth onely to God all the Men in the World all their Opinions and Arguments cannot add a Cubit to the stature of Truth nor make an hair of its Head either white or black 2. The Second is Ministerial and Declarative This belongs to the Church in the Scriptural Notion of it The Apostle therefore calls her the Pillar and ground of Truth She keeps the Sacred Records and when there is a doubt about any portion of them Ministerially declareth what is the Truth 3. The third Divines call The Judgment of Private and Practical Discretion This Protestants say belongs to every private Christian who by his own Conscience using the best means first which he can for the Information of it is to determine as to his own belief and Practice what is true and Lawful And indeed here lyes the great difference betwixt the Religion of Papists and Protestants The Papists will not allow the Private Christian to Judge of Truth with reference to his own Practice but Obligeth People To believe as the Church believeth and defendeth Blind Obedience to Superiours as Christians Duty They make it Lawful for Men contrary to their own Judgment and the Dictate of their Conscience from intrinsick Arguments to Practice according to the Opinion of one or more Doctors and necessary to Obey all the Decrees of the Popes and the Commands of Superiours if things be not apparently and demonstratively unlawful It may be one Adrianus or another or two may enter their dissent to this Brutish Doctrine but they do generally agree it and this is Fons Origo mali The very first thing to be taught their Prosilytes as silence was in the School of Pythagoras Hence their vernacular Bibles are burnt and all their other Doctrines are easily swallowed The necessity of an Infallible Judge is Concluded c. § 15. On the other side it is essential to a Protestant to be free and in Bondage to no Man nor as to his Practice to be guided by any but God alone and his own Conscience and his Superiours Commanding him what his own Conscience first perswades him to be necessary or at least Lawful He who denyeth this and pretendeth to hate Popery doth but abhor Idols and commit Sacriledge Nay he doth indeed but deny that in words which he owneth chuseth and preferreth nor is it possible there should be greater Factors for Popery in any place than those that perswade Men that it is Lawful for them under what Circumstances they can Imagine to Act contrary to the Opinion of their own Conscience and do what from which to them seem very probable seems utterly to swerve from that which is right to use Mr. Hooker's Phrase § 16. Now let any pluck up this Flood-gate of Private and Practical Discretion and tell us what should hinder most of the absurd Doctrines of Popery coming in upon us like an overflowing Flood if ever we should be so miserable which is not a thing impossible as in Future Ages to have a Superiour that shall Command the receiving of them or Practice according to them As to the falshood of most of them we have but a Moral certainty at least our perswasion must be Judged no more according to the Modern Divinity for how can we be Infallibly and demonstratively certain in things as to which so great a part of the World is of another mind and so many such Learned Men as Bellarmine Stapleton and an hundred more who dissent from us Besides as we shewed before we are told that in Disputable things we can have but an Opinion of one part And this we take to be a Meditation worthy of those Honourable Persons amongst the Nobility and Gentry of England who have shewed their Zeal so much of late against that Religious Pageantry of Rome If any doubt whether Christians have such a Priviledge given them by God as this of Private and Practical Discretion let them consider those Texts 1 Thes 5.21 1 John 3.1 usually quoted for it and but Read what Bishop Davenant in his most Learned Treatise De Judice Normâ fidei and all other Protestant Writers have said for it Whoever plucks up this Hedge we understand not if he doth not feel the Romish Serpent quickly biting him by the heel and we cannot but think that Man will be Cursed that goes about to remove this Land-mark of all Protestants and cry out to our Superiours in the words of Solomon Prov. 22.28 Remove not the Ancient Land-mark which our Fathers have set § 17. We might further add that the admission of this absurd and brutish principle that if a thing be not apparently and demonstratively sinful it is Lawful for Men to Act contrary to the Opinion of their own Consiciences representing it to them from Arguments which seem to them very probable unlawful All Books of Topicks as to Matters of practice all Argumentative Books in Divinity would be of no Use at all but noxious and mischievous rather Yea the Holy Scriptures themselves would be of very little or no use for the use of Argumentative Discourses in any Science or Discipline is to make a proposition either Demonstrative or Probable to us Yea this is the use of the Holy Scriptures as they inform us of Truth Things are Demonstrable to us upon the Evidence of Revelation Sense or Reason indeed the first is improper for the certainty arising from Divine Revelation is called Faith not Demonstration or Demonstrative certainty but it is quiddam majus what is certain to us upon a certainty of Faith or Demonstrative Reason is not so Ordinarily in a moment This Certainty is Ordinarily hatched out of Topicks and most Propositions even of Divine Truth usually at first appear to the Soul probable before they appear indubitably certain The Gray hairs of that other certainty which is distinguished from Moral Certainty rarely grow up in a Night This being granted which every one experienceth Suppose but a Convocation or a Colledge of Superiours to determine de Omnibus agendis of all things to be Religiously Observed and done To what purpose should any read or study any Books for the disquisition of Truth as to any part of a Proposition for when he hath done so long as the thing to be done appears to him but probably Lawful or probably unlawful which it must do before it appears to him indubitably and out of all Question the one or the other he is according to this Opinion bound in Conscience if he be by Superiours Commanded to do quite contrary to what he Judgeth Lawful if he be not indubitably certain it is unlawful What need he Read and study the Scriptures as to Matter of Practice When he hath found

Foundation of the Popish Religion which almost wholly owes it self to Blind Obedience Reader we shall not complement thee Read acquit or condemn us as thou seest cause upon weighing what we say and judge what is against us praeter merum imperium convitia Whether it be lawful to act contrary to an Opining Conscience CHAP. I. The Question shortly stated The terms Conscience and Opining opened The Various complexions of Conscience arising from the different mediums by which light shines into a soul about a Practical Proposition The terms of Faith Science Opinion Doubting Suspition Scruple opened The true notion of a Fixed Conscience an Opining Conscience a doubting and a Scruputons Conscience The Schoolmens Notion of an Opinion The Question fully stated The method propounded for handling it SECT I. THe question is shortly and plainly this Whether without sinning against God a man can act contrary to the dictate of his own Conscience though but Opining By Conscience not to trouble our Reader with the various Notions and Homonymies of it which have little relation to our intended discourse we mean That Judgement in man by which he determineth concerning good or evil as it relateth to practice according to the Dictate of Natural or enlightened Reason We think it well described by the Schoolmen Judicium quo aliquid bonum esse vel malum judicamus Sanehes in Op. mor. lib. 1. cap. 9.1 Reason is a noble faculty in man by which he discourseth Conclusions from Principles and these either Connate or Natural or acquired from exercise reading and comparing things with things Now the work of Reason is when a practical Proposition is exhibited to it to sit as a Judge upon it enquiring either upon the Truth or falshod of it by comparing it with these Principle hence it maketh up a Judgement whether the Proposition be true or false good or bad This Judgment Divines call Judicium singulare or Judicium conscientiae practicum The Judgment of Conscience or Conscience it self Sect. 2. This Judgment is made up by certain Mediums or arguments which do not in all cases shine with the like degree of light upon the soul for as there is a difference in Propositions some are True some are false of those which are some are necessarily so So as it is impossible they should be false Some are contingently so which are true but it is possible they may be or might have been false as now That God is good is a Proposition necessarily true That Peter was good is true but no more than contingently so for he was bad So there is likewise a great difference in the minds assent to Propositions some it agrees to some it denieth Of those to which it agreeth There are some to which it agreeth firmly and fixedly without the least doubt of them Now these are either such as are Propositions of faith being things plainly revealed in the word of God or Matters evident to sense Thus every man will agree the fire is hot and that the Sun shines at noon day or else such which have a certain cause of their truth which we can see The Assent of the mind to the first is called Faith which is the minds assent to the truth of a Proposition upon the authority of God revealing it The Assent of the mind to the two latter is called Science Now there are other Propositions for which the soul can have no such Mediums as these to discern them by But either some Humane Authority or some probable Reason The Assent which the mind giveth upon either of these accounts is called Opinion which is but the Judgement of Conscience from probable Arguments usually called dialectick arguments for there are not many things capable of demonstration § 3. Hence the certainty of the Mind as to the Truth or Falshood of any proposition is 1. Either Supernatural from Divine Revelation or 2. Natural from the Evidence of Sense or Demonstration or 3. Moral from probable Authority or Arguments But now in regard of the differing Force of Arguments and the variety of them for or against the same proposition This assent is capable of various degrees and may variously be incumbred A Christian may give some Credit to a proposition yet have some scruples about it which like little stones in the shooe from whence the term is borrowed may trouble his Practice Or may have some doubts whether the thing be true or no Or I may have an Opinion that is verily judge the thing to be so or not so § 4. The Philosopher tells us that in Moral things a Moral certainty is enough to Act upon and indeed it must be so for as to most things of particular practice we can neither be Naturally nor Supernaturally ascertained Not Naturally because we cannot see the certain Causes Not Supernaturally for it had been impossible that God's Word should have set every individual Man a particular Rule for every individual Action In these Cases therefore as we said a Moral certainty is ground enough for Action which is or may be consistent with some Scruples or Fears For Example suppose this the Question Whether a Man be sit to Receive the Supper of the Lord It may be he cannot fully satisfie himself but he may have some fears and jealousies and Scruples of the Reasonableness of which he can give himself no very good Account but yet he finds so much ground to conclude he is that he is Morally certain In this case he is bound not to omit it Suppose one sick of a Quinsie or Pleurisie or some other Disease usually Mortal without timely Bleeding and application of means He is not Mathematically or Demonstratively certain that he shall dye if he doth not use such means his Natural strength may Conquer it but he may be Morally certain and so Obliged to Act. Whether a Man may be said to know that of which he is onely Morally certain is a little Velitation among Critical Philosophers Aristotle tells us that what falleth under Science considered as an Habit of the Mind must be something demonstrable but this is onely a strife about words § 5. Much in the present Debate depending upon the term Opining the fixing of the true Notion of an Opinion or at least such a one as we understand in the Question is of great Consequence It is sometimes used to signifie a sudden and rash assent of the Vnderstanding to a proposition But in this sence we have nothing to do with it 2. It is taken for the assent of the Mind to one part of a proposition as true yet not without fear of being mistaken 3. But Thirdly in which sence we use it It is also taken to signifie the Souls assent to a proposition upon probable Arguments That is such Arguments as do not demonstrate the thing to the Soul so as to put it out of all possibility of doubting but make it appear very like to be true Probabile est quod quum certum

non sit magis tamen videtur esse verum vel falsum saith the Logician Aquinas in his Summs Qu. 1. Art 4. Describes an Opinion according to the Second Notion thus It is saith he the Act of the Vnderstanding inclining to one part of a Contradiction not without a fear of the Truth of the other part Valentia as he is quoted by Sanchez Op. Mor. l. 1. c. 9. will allow no Man any longer to keep within the Latitude of on Opinion than while he perswades himself that although he hath probable Reasons to judge this or that Lawful or unlawful yet they are not such but if he could hit on it might be Answered by himself or some other But yet neither Sanchez nor Vasquez nor Azorius will allow this streightned Notion of an Opinion though we cannot see how they will avoid it till they put cum formidine alterius out of their own Descriptions for what should he who openeth be afraid of but that his Arguments are Answerable So as in effect they all agree That a Man perswaded upon probable Arguments of the Lawfulness or Unlawfulness of a th●ng no longer Opineth than he feareth his own Reasons may be Answered But to us Be it so or so it is all a case we call that an Opinion which is The Assent of the Mind to a Proposition upon Arguments not Demonstrably but Probably certain And we have here the Advantage for if we prove it not Lawful to act against an Opining Conscience in their sence they will yield it much more Unlawful to act against an Opining Conscience in this sence which with them is a fixed Conscience either in good or evil And that it is unlawful to act against such a Conscience Vasquez is so confident that he Disputeth against Almainus and Andreas de Castra who had reserved unto God a Liberty to dispense with a Man acting against a fixed Conscience so as that a Man may do it without guilt and contends That God himself cannot dispense with it because it is an acting against the Law of Nature Vesquez in 12. Disp 61. Cap. 2. § 6. There are besides Opinion some other terms Divines take Notice of Suspition which they make the Jealousie of the Mind or some light Inclination to one part yet without an Assent Aquinas makes it the Younger Daughter of an Opinion and calls it an Opinion with a very light Evidence Doubting is another which they make the Pendulousness of the Mind as to the Lawfulness or Unlawfulness of a thing after Debate Now from this variety of Propositions and the variety of Mediums through which a Light comes into our Minds discovering the Truth or Falshood of them and the variety of our assent consequent to such Mediums arise the various Notions of a fixed Conscience A Doubting Conscience An Opining Conscience A. Scrupulous Conscience These are but the several Complexions of Conscience caused from the variety or degree of that Light in which it seeth a Proposition as true or false § 7. If the Matter in Question be of that Nature that it thinks it can find a plain and particular Evidence for it in Scripture or can judge of it by the certain Evidence of sence or see it in the certain Causes the Conscience is fixed either truly or erroneously and as to this thing beareth the Name of a fixed Good or Erroneous Conscience as it is or is not deceived in its apprehension of the Medium If the Matter of the Proposition or that part to which the Soul adhereth be of that Nature that the Soul cannot find a plain Revelation in Scripture nor discern it by sense nor see it in the certain necessary Causes but hath many probable Arguments rather for the one part than the other Whether it thinks these Arguments Answerable or no or thinks that possibly they may be Answerable but as yet it can see no Answer to them which it judgeth sussicient this now is an Opining Conscience If the Mind be equally ballanced on both sides with Arguments that it hath as much to say why such a thing should be Lawful as why it should be unlawful or unlawful as Lawful this is now a Doubting Conscience and rarely happeneth to a knowing and intelligent Soul If the Soul be afraid that this or that is not Lawful or fancieth that such a thing is Lawful but hath none or if any very light Reasons for it possibly such or such Men say so or such or such Men do it or do it not this is a Suspitious or Scrupulous Conscience § 8. In short in Order to a Man's spotless walking There are infinite Propositions to be weighed God hath hung up a Beam called Conscience in every individual Soul in Order to the weighing of them upon this Beam is written 1 Thes 5.21 PROVE ALL THINGS hold fast that which is good The Weights which God hath allowed us to weigh things by are Divine Revelation Demonstrations Evidence of Sence Topicks or more probable Logical Arguments made up from Logical places and Conclusions formed from the comparing of Rational and Spiritual things 't is Evident with Rational or Spiritual things more Evident when any of these fully weigh down the Souls assent there 's a Fixed Conscience When they equally incline the Balance one way or another there is a Doubting Conscience When they strongly incline the Soul more one way than another ther 's an Opining Conscience When they cause a very light inclination of the Soul to one part rather than to the other there is a Suspitious or a Scrupulous Conscience § 9. Now what the Duty of Christians is under these various Complexions of Conscience is a point which hath justly exercised valuable Divines of all perswasions for as we are capable by any of our Actions to incurr the wrath of God so as to them generally our Consciences are Complexionated one way or another for if we Act we either do a thing being fixedly perswaded it is Lawful or unlawful or doubting whether it be so or strongly inclined to think it is so or so or suspecting and being scrupulous Concerning a Conscience that is fixed in that which is truly good none ever doubted of the Lawfulness of Acting according to it or unlawfulness to Act against it But concerning Conscience in all the other Circumstances there have many Questions been started as to the Truth in which the World is very far from being Universally agreed Whether a Man may Act against a Conscience fixed in an Error is a Question spoken to by most School-men and Casuists It is usually said that such a Conscience doth Ligare non Obligare It is not our business to dispute how well that distinction Ordinarily Father'd upon Durandus is worded but we do not remember we ever met with any Deliberate Divine that would affirm That in case a Man were fully though falsly perswaded that this or that thing was unlawful to be done yet he might Lawfully do it Though indeed if the

an Action appear probably Lawful though at the same time from intrinsick Arguments we Judge it probably unlawful A Pill so nauseous so brutish as it is impossible we should swallow it till we have vomited up our rational Souls And 't is the more odious to us because it is of such affinity to the detestable Blind Obedience of the Church of Rome But to defeat these men of any hopes of prevailing by such Mediums we will shortly enquire into another Question though not the same yet of great Cognation with this which we have now so largely discussed CHAP. VI. Second Quest Whether it be Naturally possible for any Person in a Practical Proposition to judge that part probably Lawful from extrinsick Arguments the contrary to which he at the same time Judgeth probably unlawful from intrinsick Arguments The Question opened The Opinions of Vasquez Sanchez The Negative part of the Question maintained because this is contrary to the Principles of a Rational Soul The Conclusion § 1. WE have had Occasions once and again to hint the known distinction between Speculative and Practical Propositions Divines call those Propositions Speculative whose use and advantage is onely terminated in Speculation and Knowledge and from whence nothing in Practice is Directed They call those Practical whose end is the guidance and direction of the Practice But Speculative Propositions must be again distinguished into such 1. From which no Obligation ariseth to the Exercise of any rational Act of ours Such as these That there was such a City as Troy such a King of France as Pipin c. with a thousand such like 2. Such the Truth of which inferreth the performance of some Rational Action of ours and such as is our Duty towards God as these That the Scriptures are the Word of God That Christ is the Eternally existent Son of God But our Question relates to none of these but to such Propositions onely where the Question is Whether it be Lawful for me to do this or that or no This is that we mean by a Practical Proposition § 2. In our Discourse upon the former Question we have also often hinted what we mean by Extrinsecal and Intrinscal Arguments The singular Judgment of every intelligent Person 's Conscience is formed from some Arguments drawn either from Principles of Reason or Propositions of Scripture These Arguments are either from plain letter of Scripture or Principles of Reason accounted Infallible which fix the Conscience Or else they are drawn from Logical Topicks and called Dialectick Arguments or Probable For Optimus Philosophus nondum nascitur We say These probable Arguments are again either Intrinsecal called Artificial Arguments by the Logicians fetched from the Causes Effects Consequents Adjuncts or other Affections of the Subject or predicate in the Question 2. Such as are meerly Extrinsick Logicians call them In-artificial because every Dunce may bring them they have no Art at all in them Divines call them Extrinsecal because they are Forreign to the in ward parts of the Question and the Soul that brings them These are such as are fetched from Authority and Testimony of others Testimonies of Fathers School-men former or Modern Divines c. Now it is demonstratively Truth That it is possible that a soul should have a great many Arguments appearing to it very probable and such as it cannot Answer and scarcely believes that any other can to prove a thing unlawful and at the same time meet with many Testimonies and sayings of Fathers Councils School-men Casuists Ancienter or more Modern Divines speaking the thing Lawful It is the Case of the Non-Conformists this day Though they meet not with any Fathers Councils c. who judge the things Lawful which they do judge unlawful yet many present Divines they do meet with yet they cannot but from Intrinsick Dialectick Arguments think the things utterly unlawful § 3. Now the Question is in this Case what they shall do They do not deny but it is their Duty upon the Testimonies of Superiours and their Commands or hearing the Judgment of so many Learned Men of another Mind to examine again their own Arguments and to try them to the utmost But supposing at last which is the Case the things yet seem to them from very probable Arguments unlawful what shall they do They may say the Jesuites do such things or not do them For this is the Jesuites help against the abominable absurdity of Acting contrary to an Opining Conscience They say While it it but an Opinion a Man may Opine both contradictory parts of the same Question the one upon Intrinsick the other upon Extrinsick Arguments and although as we shewed before the Opinion which is formed upon Artificial proper intrinsick Arguments must needs be more probable Yet they say a man is not tyed up to magis and minus in the Case It is ground enough say they for any man to act Conscientiously if the thing appear any way probable he is not bound to act according to that which he judgeth more probable So that say they if a thing appear probably Lawful by Extrinsick Arguments the Opinion of some Doctors c. we may do it though at the same time we judge it never so unlawful from Intrinsick Artificial Arguments fetched from all the Topicks in Logick and affections of the subject and Praedictate of the Question § 9. The Case is so weighty and this Opinion so unmanly and Brutish that it is reasonable we should bring forth one or two who shall vouch for themselves and their Brethren that this is what they say and hold Let Vasquez a Man of no small repute amongst them speak first out of his Disput in 12 ae disput 62. Cap. 3. n. 11. Tertio Observandum est eum qui habet assensum unius partis propositionis per propria intrinseca principia etiamsi assensus ille tantum sit probabilis non posse habere assensum alterius pactis per intrinseca propria principia bene tamen posse per externa principia existimari oppositam partem esse probabilem v. plura ibid. cap. 40. n. 15. Sanchez sings the same Song Op. Moral l. 1. cap. 9. n. 12. Vltimum fundamentum est ut duas Opiniones ediametro sibi contradicentes idem intellectus judicet probabiles aut aequè aut alteram probabiliorem he shews this is according to the Opinion of Azorius and Vasquez before quoted And then goeth on telling us that he seeth no Reason but the same Understanding may judge the contradictory parts of the same Proposition both probably true or false lawful or unlawful and that Experience proves it But this is surely a Note above Ela and a Riddle in Philosophy The Jesuites being pinched with that obvious Argument That then the same Soul and at the same time and the same thing may assent to contradictions and blow hot and cold bless and curse with the same breath They think to avoid it by telling us that the