Selected quad for the lemma: truth_n

Word A Word B Word C Word D Occurrence Frequency Band MI MI Band Prominent
truth_n believe_v true_a word_n 6,623 5 4.5200 4 true
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ID Title Author Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) STC Words Pages
A28958 A discourse of things above reason· Inquiring whether a philosopher should admit there are any such. By a Fellow of the Royal Society· To which are annexed by the publisher (for the affinity of the subjects) some advices about judging of things said to transcend reason. Written by a Fellow of the same Society. Boyle, Robert, 1627-1691.; Fellow of the same Society. aut 1681 (1681) Wing B3945; ESTC R214128 62,180 202

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