THE BOOKE OF HONOR and Armes AT LONDON Printed by Richard Ihones dwelling at the signe of the Rose and Crowne neere Holburne Conduit 1590. THE BOOKE OF HONOR and Armes VVherein is discoursed the causes of Quarrell and the nature of Iniuries with their repulses Also the meanes of satisfaction and pacification with diuers other things necessarie to be knowne of all Gentlemen and others professing Armes and Honor. Fortes magnanimi sunt habendi non qui faciunt sed qui propulsant iniuriam TO THE RIGHT HOnorable Sir Christopher Hatton Knight of the most noble Order and Lord Chancellor of England Richard Ihones Printer wisheth long life with encrease of happinesse RIght Honorable the manifold testimonies of your loue both vnto Honor and Armes haue induced me to think the first sight of this small booke doth of right belong vnto your Lordship being by the due degrees of vertue ascended to that place which among others in this Realme is and long hath been reputed most honorable To your L. therefore I humblie dedicate the same as vnto him that by censure of our Soueraigne with the applause of people hath in hand the consideration of actions apperteining to equitie Honor and Iustice. The propertie of which vertue as Cicero saith is to foresee that no violence be offered but onlie by him that with iniurie is thereunto prouoked and that things common should bee commonlie vsed and priuate things priuatlie enioyed By which rule appeareth that vertue alloweth iust reuenge and admitteth the defence of propertie and right But for that your Lordship hath been as well an actor in Armes as a knower of what is due to Honor I omit to say more either of the one or the other beseeching your good Lordship to pardon my boldnesse and take in acceptable wise the entent of the Author who both by election and obligation acknowledgeth himself yours Your Lordships euer to commaund Richard Ihones To the Reader THE cause of all Quarrell is Iniurie and reproach but the matter of content is Iustice and Honor. For loue whereof we shun no care of minde losse of wealth nor aduenture of life Hereof proceedeth all disputation in Schooles pleading in lawe warre and all worldlie wrangling For who so is either in deede or opinion perswaded to haue truth and reason on his side doth not onlie constantlie beleeue that so it is but also being thereof denied holdeth himselfe iniured and consequently burthened True it is that the Christian lawe willeth men to be of so perfect patience as not onlie to indure iniurious words but also quietlie to suffer euerie force and violence Notwithstanding forsomuch as none or verie fewe men haue attained such perfection the lawes of all Nations for auoyding further inconueniences and the manifestation of truth haue among many other trials permitted that such questions as could not bee ciuilie prooued by confession witnesse or other circumstances should receiue iudgement by fight and Combat supposing that GOD who onelie knoweth the secret thoughts of all men would giue victorie to him that iustlie aduentured his life for truth Honor and Iustice Seeing then that al humaine lawes haue permitted the triall of Armes and that euerie iniurious action not repulsed is by common consent of all Martiall mindes holden a thing dishonorable infamous and reproachfull it cannot be but at some times and occasions such questions and quarrels shall arise as necessarilie must receiue triall by the Sword And Cicero saith that hee who repulseth not an iniurie being able offendeth no lesse than if he had abandoned his friends parents and countrie By these reasons appeareth that the triall by Armes is not onlie naturall but also necessarie and allowable Notwithstanding for that the vulgar sort and many right noble also be ignorant what are the true causes requiring triall of Armes and what words or deedes are of such qualitie as ought bee repulsed or reuenged I haue at the earnest requests and often desires of verie honorable friends by way of abreuiation reduced into this small volume all causes of Quarrell or Combat the nature of Iniuries and repulses the equalitie and disequalitie of men who may bee challenged and for what respects Challenges ought bee refused with many other things in matter of Honor and Armes worthie to be knowne and considered And albeit I am not ignorant that publique Combats are in this age either rarelie or neuer graunted yet for that as is before said no prouidence can preuent the questions and quarrels that daylie happen among Gentlemen and others professing Armes it shall not be amisse but rather behouefull that all men should be fullie informed what iniurie is and how to repulse it when to fight when to rest satisfied what is Honor and good reputation how it is gained and by what meanes the same is kept preserued which was the respect that the Earle Balthazar Castilio in his booke of the Courtier doth among other qualities requireable in a gentleman specially aduise he should bee skilfull in the knowing of Honor and causes of quarrell This booke doth not incite men to vnaduised fight or needles reuenge as some simple wit may surmize but enformeth the true meanes how to shunne all offences or being offended sheweth the order of reuenge and repulse according vnto Christian knowledge and due respect of Honor. And for that the dignitie of Knighthood apperteineth chieflie to Martiall merite I haue thought fit brieflie to touch the original thereof declaring how many Orders or degrees of Knights were in times past and of them how many yet extant We haue not in this worke medled with Armorie or blazing of Badges but chieflie touched matters offenciue to reputation and Honor whereof Combat or particular triall of Armes ought to ensue If ought els is looked for it may bee taken from the learned Tractant Fabrilia fabri FINIS The Contents of this worke diuided into fiue Bookes The first Booke WHat a Combat is and the originall thereof cap. 1. Of the order of challenging and defending cap. 2. For what cause the partie belied ought to challenge and of the nature of the Lie cap. 3. Of the nature and diuersitie of Lies cap. 4. Of Lies certeine cap. 5. Of Lies conditionall cap. 6. Of Lies generall cap. 7. Of Lies speciall cap. 8. Of vaine Lies cap. 9. Whether a man iniured in presence of a Prince it sufficeth of answer in presence of priuate Gentlemen cap. 10. Of the returne of Lies cap. 11. How vpon euerie Lie the triall of Armes is not necessarie cap. 12. Of the forme of a Cartel or letter of Defiance cap. 13. The second Booke OF Iniurie and Burden cap. 1. How shamefull and dishonorable it is to offer iniurie with aduantage and cowardlie cap. 2. That euerie Lie giuen ought not occasion Combat cap. 3. For what causes the Combat is to be granted cap. 4. How betweene Padrines no fight or quarrell ought be cap. 5. Of Armes both offenciue and defenciue cap. 6. Of the election
a bodie voyde of reason Likewise if two Gentlemen vppon some vnkind words doo drawe and the one hurt the other to make them friends the way is thus He that gaue the hurt or wound shal say that the Gentleman wounded behaued himselfe as a valiant man ought and although he receiued the hurt yet his vertue did sufficientlie appeare Vpon these or like speaches a peace may reasonablie ensue with reputation to both for the one by giuing the hurt hath gained honor and the other receiuing praise of his enemie is acquite of euill imputation whereby all men shall knowe that both the one and the other hath tried himselfe a manlie and valiant Gentleman If one man doth strike or offer violence vnto the other presentlie runne away or if the partie offended by any other meane cannot bee presentlie reuenged yet in that case if he lay hand on his weapon and endeuour to make reueÌ„ge he shal be reputed valiant and the other a coward But to make peace betweene them the onelie way is that he who offered the violence shall in plaine termes confesse the manner how it was done and pray pardon And although it may seeme contrarie to the courage of man not to mainteine that is begun yet when he considereth in his owne conscience that the act was iniurious and dastardlie it shall bee better christianlie to repent than wilfullie to persist against all truth and reason If one man dooth chaunce to hurt another vnwares or vnknowing him as sometimes it happeneth in the night or darke places the amends must be to say I know you not for knowing I would not haue so done nor might so doo without offering wrong and discourtesie and therefore pray you hold me excused Sometimes it happeneth that one challengeth an other to haue striken him and the other doth denie that so he did in that case the satisfaction must bee thus The partie charged to haue striken shall say if so the truth be Indeed I did not strike you if I had hauing no such cause I might iustlie bee accused of Iniurie After this sort many other questions may be ordered vsing such words and reasons as to discreete Gentlemen shall be thought conuenient And here I will remember all Gentlemen making profession of Honor and Truth that they should not in any wise mainteine any vniust words or wrongfull action But being by choler or other occasion entred into Iniurie they ought rather reforme their error than obstinatlie continue to the offence of their owne conscience and knowledge Neither can it be dishonorable to confesse that which is true nor bee sorie for misdooing Other meanes of Pacification and composition CAP. 9. THe first of these is that aswell the Iniurer as the Iniured should bee drawne into the presence of some honorable personage and before any act of submission or repetition of words before passed to agree and referre the order and ending of all questions vnto one man indifferentlie chosen by consent of both parties That being done the man vnto whoÌ„ this office is committed shall particularlie and a part entreate with the Iniurer to affirme what he will say on his behalfe Then calling the Iniured shall say and assure him that the Iniurer hath made a good reasonable satisfaction in euerie thing that may bee preiudiciall to the honor or reputation of the Iniured And therefore require aswell the one as the other to stand satisfied and repute themselues in such estate and condition as they were before the quarrell was commenced This order hath been oftentimes vsed and satisfaction so made thought effectual for sometimes it prooueth a thing verie difficult to bring the aduersaries together face to face before a Iudge or other person of authoritie sometimes also being met they fall into newe quarrell vpon newe occasion either els before they come a doubt will arise how they shall bee accompanied and whether they shall come armed or without weapon Another while there groweth difficultie vpon the words of satisfaction It hath been also seene that in such conference there hath passed some blowes of the hand weapon foote or other violence whereby the enmitie was rather encreased than appeased In which respects this order is many times vsed Another way is this that some person of great authoritie should call the parties afore him and take a truce vntill hee shall at more leisure consider of the quarrell enioyning them in the meane time not to speake or doo any thing either against other which order is couertlie a truce perpetual Another way is that a Prince or personage of authoritie should perswade with the parties to put the quarrell into his hand and consent to rest satisfied with that he shall vpon his honor determine Diuers other indirect meanes haue been deuised for the compounding and appeasing of Iniuries which I leaue to the discretion of wise valiant Gentlemen Of satisfaction to be giuen vpon words CAP. 10. IT hath been alreadie said that the ground of all satisfaction is truth which cannot be denied wherfore whensoeuer one man hath vttered any vntrue imputation of another hee may without discredite confesse the thing to be otherwise than he spake saying in his owne excuse vnlesse the truth bee contrarie that which I said I thought then to bee true Or thus That I said was tolde mee of others Or thus What I said was in my choller These speaches tending to shew the truth to be otherwise than was said the partie offended is disburthened If a man hath giuen the Lie to another and after doth knowe the words wherevpon the Lie was giuen to be true he may in that case without reproach reuoke the Lie and thereby make satisfaction And if happelie he make difficultie to vse such a reuocaâ—ion directlie then may he say I confesse the words to be true whereof our quarrell groweth either els he may repeate the words and therewithal allow them Another way to procure satisfaction is That hee who gaue the Lie shall say or write vnto the partie belied to this effect I pray you aduertise me by this bearer with what intent you spake those words of iniurie wherevpon I gaue you the Lie The other will answere I spake them in choller or with no meaning to offend you Thereunto may be answered by him that gaue the Lie thus If your words were said onelie in anger and no intent to challenge me then do I assure you that my Lie giuen shall not burthen you for I acknowledge you to be a true speaker and a Gentleman of good reputation wherefore my desire is that the speach passed betweene vs may bee forgotten This forme of pacification may serue in many cases and at sundrie occasions Sometimes it happeneth that a man repenting a speach euill spoken of another will after denie that any such words were spoken which seemeth no ful satisfaction vnlesse hee adde these words I spake it not or if I had spoken it I should haue said vntruelie These
good reputation honor or honestie ought either by ciuill or martiall meanes be mainteined and auowed Therefore who soeuer being offered iniurious speach shall say to the offerer thereof Thou liest or thou saiest not truelie doth therby repulse the iniurie and force the Iniurer to challenge And euerie deniall be it neuer so simple importeth a Lie is of like effect although the maner in pronouncing deniall onlie is an answere more friendlie and courteous than the qualitie of an iniurious imposition requireth And although the manner of denials are diuers as Thou liest Thou saiest vntruelie c. yet euerie deniall is a repulse of iniurie being spoken to that which was iniurie But if the same be vttered in answere of any words wherin was no offence the same becommeth iniurious as thus If I tell or say any thing without euill imposition to any person and one standing by shall say I speake vntruelie or vse other deniall of that my speach affirmed by that manner of speach he giueth me an imputation of a Lier consequentlie offereth me iniurie Moreouer for that euerie iniurie by words may for once be wrested it is lawfull for me with euerie my deniall to repulse that iniurie and my second deniall conteineth the effect of a Lie and his first the force of iniurie by which meane the burthen shall rest vpon him But if so it be that he answereth or saith The truth is otherwise or anie other such speach that cannot bee iniurious nor shall any waies burthen me vnlesse I shall in some iniurious sort replie and then he denying may lay the burthen vpon me for the difference that maketh one word sometimes iniurious and sometimes not is that the same is sometimes spoken iniuriouslie and sometimes not as thus If I say vnto another man Thou saiest not true thereby I reproue him and consequentlie offer iniurie but if I say That which thou saiest is not true that speach is not iniurious and may be without burthen of him vnto whom it is spoken Yet in one case that rule faileth for if I say such a thing I haue done another answereth That is not true by so saying he doth burthen me To conclude I say that whosoeuer refraineth with his words and speach to offend others he can by no meanes receiue the Lie Of the nature and diuersitie of Lies CAP. 4. BVt for the more plaine conceiuing of the nature and diuersitie of Lies wee will particularlie discourse thereof and shewe how many sorts of them be how they are to bee giuen and in what sort they are to be answered It is therefore to be knowne that of Lies some be Conditionall and some be Certeine and of both them some be Generall and some Speciall To these may bee also added one third kind which we will call Vaine Lies Of Lies certeine CAP. 5. WE call those Lies certeine which are giuen vpon words spoken and affirmed as if I should say or write vnto another man Thou hast spoken in preiudice of mine honor honestie and credite and therefore doest lie This may be called a Lie certeine because I stand certeinlie assured that such a man hath spoken euill of me yet true it is that because I doo not in these words particularlie expresse the matter or speach whervpon I giue the Lie therefore it shall be reputed a Lie generall and consequently of no force For indeed no Lie is lawfull vnlesse the matter and words wherevpon it is giuen bee plainlie and expreslie repeated Therefore the Lies which are giuen vppon certeine and apparant words are they which in truth do bind the partie belied vnto proofe vnlesse he can denie to haue spoken that wherevpon the Lie is giuen him and the fourme thereof is thus Harman thou hast said that at the Battaile of Montcontour I abandoned mine Ensigne and cowardly ranne away wherevnto I answere Thou hast lied By this apparant and particular expression of that was said the Lie giuen is made Speciall and consequentlie lawfull Of Lies Conditionall CAP. 6. CONDITIONALL lies wee call those which are vttered vpon condition as if a man should say thus If thou hast called me a theefe thou doest lie or if thou shalt hereafter so say thou liest And how often thou hast or shalt so say so oft I say thou hast and shalt lie These Conditionall lies in this sort giuen are the occasion oftentimes of much disputation because they are not in force vntill such time as the Condition is verified I meane vntil it be auowed that such words haue indeede been spoken For he vnto whom such a Lie is giuen either by words or writing as he findeth himselfe guiltie or not so may hee make answere and hauing haplie spoken such words he may in vsing generall words find an euasion yea the debating of such a Conditional quarrell may be so handled as he who gaue the Lie conditionall shall vtter some speach whereon to receiue a Lie certeine If therefore he who is charged with a Lie conditional haue not indeed said that wherewith he is charged then ought he say I neuer spake any such thing thereunto adde another Lie either Generally or Conditionallie vttered thus Whosoeuer saith that I haue spoken such words he lieth or thus If thou or any man els will affirme I haue so said thou liest Albeit this maner of proceeding from one Lie to another and from one Condition to another doth seldome occasion other effect than the multiplying of words yet doo we often see that questions are so handled and consequentlie no good or honorable resolution dooth followe Wherefore to auoide all doubts it behoueth Gentlemen and other persons of honor or credite to shunne all Conditionall lies and before he doth offer the Lie either by confession of the partie or witnesse worthie credite bee assured he hath cause to giue the Lie So shal the Lie be certeine and the belied forced either to denie that he said or stand to the iustification thereof Of Lies generall CAP. 7. A Lie generall may bee in two sorts in respect of the person and in respect of the iniurie The Lie is generall in respect of the Person when no man to whom it is giuen is named as thus Who euer hath said that I haue been a Rebell to my Prince doth lie To this manner of Lie no man is bound to make answere because many may haplie haue so said and that so being he that giueth the Lie should be forced to fight with them all which were inconuenient For it is vnlawfull vpon one quarrell to fight oftner than once and vnfit that one man should hazard his reputation vpon the sword of another man Wherfore to remooue such disorders it hath been thought good that this kind of Lie should bee vnlawfull of none effect and disallowed Touching the other Lie which we call general in respect of the iniurie is thus Simon thou hast said euill of me and spoken words in preiudice of mine honestie and therefore I say
or like speaches are in this case verie conuenient for if another man speaketh euill of me by the deniall of his speach he shameth himselfe but not satisfieth me vnlesse he also affirme mine innocencie But a Gentleman hauing indeed said any thing ought rather confesse than denie what was said which satisfaction I thinke not dishonorable but honest as proceeding from a Christian conscience If a man hath said any thing that is true yet vnfit to be spoken he ought not denie that so he said but for satisfactiō must say thus I spake the words without intent to offend and therefore pray pardon for indeed to speake a truth with intent to offend dooth giue iust cause of offence How the giuing of satisfaction is a thing not reproachfull CAP. 11. NOw for that satisfaction is commonlie made by meanes of Vnsaying for by that terme wee will call aswell euerie reuocation of words as confession to haue done euil it may be obiected that if vnsaying be so reproachfull as for it a man may be discredited and of other Gentlemen repulsed then if I haue spoken vntruelie or done euill by vnsaying or denying thereof I am to incurre infamie But for answere of that obiection I say that great difference there is betweene vnsaying in the Listes or fields by force of Armes and that vnsaying which is vttered voluntarilie for the loue of truth for the one is spoken for feare of death and the other by perswasion of reason For hee that persisteth to mainteine euill doth condemne himselfe as a man that would fight contrarie to iustice but the other sheweth he will not take Armes for any cause but that which is iust And as the one is the part of an euill and wicked person so is the other a signe of sinceritie loyall meaning For sith there is no man liuing faultles yet he that knoweth his error and repenteth is most to bee excused endeuouring to make satisfaction Therfore that Gentleman who knoweth his owne fault and laboureth to amend it doth not onlie deserue to be excused but is also worthie much praise in offering such satisfaction as apperteineth to reason and the office of a iust and true Christian. To conclude therfore I say albeit the vulgar sort doo thinke that satisfaction is a signe of cowardise yet who so choseth to fight against reason and truth ought bee reputed rather a beast than a Christian and a furious foole rather than a reasonable creature THE FOVRTH BOOKE Of Nobilitie accompanied with great dignitie CAP. 1. THe Emperiall lawes haue determined that no man of base calling ought be admitted to fight with any Gentlemā or other person professing Armes yet for better conceiuing what Nobilie and Gentilitie is it behoueth to know that Nobilitie is as some haue defined it auncient riches accompanied with vertuous conditions Others not allowing that opinion affirme that riches being of their owne nature vile doo nothing helpe towards Nobilitie and therfore concludeth that vertue alone sufficeth Bartholus saith that riches doo helpe to attaine vnto Nobilitie but to preserue it Vertue onelie hath power Others doo thinke that Nobilitie proceedeth from the auncient honor fame and title of Predecessors because otherwise a bondman being vertuous might challenge that honor Some men also haue thought that as before God he is most noble and and worthie vnto whom is giuen most grace euen so hee is most honorable among men whom Princes or lawes haue enhabled vnto dignitie Howsoeuer it bee most sure it is that no man giueth vnto himselfe any title but it behooueth him to receiue it from others Therefore Bartholus concludeth that to be made noble it is requisite the Prince doo bestowe some sort of dignitie or title vpon the person that is ennobled to the end he may bee knowne from the Plebeiall people but we say that men may bee reputed noble three waies First by nature or discent of Auncestors which is the vulgar opinion Secondlie for vertue onelie which the Philosophers affirme Thirdlie by mixture of auncient gentle race with Vertue which is indeede the true and most commendable kind of Nobilitie for seeing man is a creature reasonable he ought bee called man in respect of his owne vertue and not the vertue of others which moued Vlisses to say vnto Aiax boasting of Auncesters Et genus Proauos quae non fecimus ipsi Vix ea nostra voco c. But for better manifestation that naturall Nobilitie mixed with Vertue is most true and perfect thus may it be prooued The almightie God hath created all things both in generalitie and specialitie with a certeine excellencie and bountie one more perfect than the other one noble another ignoble For amōg stones some are precious others of no vertue and of the better sort of them some more or lesse precious and orient euen so among liuing creatures both in generalitie specialitie we finde some courteous gentle others rude voyd of vertue Much more is the differēce of nature in men among whō the eternall God hath dispenced his grace to some more to some lesse according to his diuine will and pleasure Wherefore they seeme to erre much that think Gentilitie in nature hath not any force when experience proueth that of one rase and progenie are commonlie wise iust valiant and temperate men of another simple vniust cowardlie and intemperate persons Notwithstanding for that we finde in ordinarie obseruation that neither the horse of excellent courage doth alwaies beget another of like qualitie nor that the vertuous man hath euer children resembling himselfe wee doo not hauing proofe of their degeneration esteeme either the one or the other which moued Iuuenal to say Malo Pater tibi Thersites dummodo tu sis AEacidae similis Vulcaniáque arma capessas Quam te Thersitae similem producat Achilles Seeing then that either by naturall instinct nurture or endeuour some men are more vertuous than others therefore ought they be reputed more gentle noble and worthie honor than are those which are voyd of noble Auncesters good education and industrie For albeit no rule is so generall or certeine but sometime receiueth exception yet appeareth it that nature in her owne operation doth seldome digresse from the order thereof The Falcon neuer or verie rarelie bringeth forth other bird than a Falcon. The Greihound engendreth a whelpe like vnto himselfe Neuerthelesse if either that bird in shape resembling her damme hath not in her like vertue or that whelpe doth prooue in delight diuers from his sire they thereby become either contemned or little esteemed Euen so is it among men descending from Auncesters of honor and vertue for if neither by celestiall grace learning nor endeuour they aspire vnto the habit of vertue then become they thereby vnfit for all publique action vnprofitable to themselues and consequentlie disdained or at the least lightlie regarded what pedigree Armes or badges soeuer are to warrant their antiquitie or nobilitie wherefore eftsoones concluding I