also a more dark side in which respect it comes short of it and must give it the Precedency And I think it may be very properly call'd a Dark side because it consists in Darkness and Obscurity and which is still so much the darker because 't is so peculiar to Faith and makes so great a part of its Character being the Main Difference that distinguishes it from Science or that Second Assent before spoken of For as to Firmness and Certainty therein they agree For Faith may be Firm because he that believes in God may be supposed not in the least to hesitate or doubt of the truth of what he reveals And 't is also certain because it relies upon the most certain Foundation the Testimony of God who is Infallible himself and cannot deceive And hitherto they run parallel one to the other But here begins both the difference and the disproportion that there is Clearness and Evidence on the side of Science and that Second Assent whereas there is none on the side of Faith which walks indeed upon firm Ground but altogether in the dark For he that Believes does not give his Assent because either by Sense or Reason he perceives the Object of his Faith to be thus or thus but merely because he has the Word and Authority of God for it Which though it be sufficient to found a Firm and Certain is yet however not enough to beget a Clear and Evident Assent So that the great and distinguishing Character of Science and the Second Assent is Light and Evidence and that of Faith inevidence and Obscurity which accordingly is commonly said to be an inevident Assent But how and in what sense it is so seems not commonly to be so well understood and for the Consequence of what depends upon the right stating of it deserves to be explain'd with all possible exactness 13. In order to which we are carefully to distinguish between the thing believ'd and the Reason or Motive that induces us to believe it even as in Knowledge we distinguish between the thing Known and the Argument or Medium by which it is Known the Scitum and the Formalis ratio Sciendi The thing Believ'd I would call the Matter or the Object of Faith and the Motive that induces me to believe it I would call the Formal Reason of Faith Aquinas I know calls them both Objects and then after distinguishes them by calling the Former the Material Object and the latter the Formal Object of Faith Accordingly he says that the Formal Object of Faith is the First Truth meaning as he afterward explains himself that Faith relies upon the Truth of God as its Medium or Argument Which Medium I chuse rather to call and I think more intelligibly the formal Reason than the formal Object of Faith Since the Term Object seems more properly to design the Matter of Faith or the thing Believ'd and is hardly applicable to the Motive or Reason of Believing However since we both mean one and the same thing there need be no debate upon the different manner of expressing it especially since if any one think his Term more intelligible and expressive of the Notion intended by it or has any reverence for it upon any other Consideration he is at liberty to substitute it in the room of the other 14. This necessary Distinction being premised 't is in the first place to be well heeded that when Faith is said to be an obscure and inevident Assent this Obscurity or inevidence is not to be applied to the formal Reason or Motive of Faith but only to the Matter or Object of it I say not to the formal Reason of it For as there may be in general a clear Reason why a Man should believe an Obscure thing so 't is most Certain that the formal Reason for which we assent to the things of Faith is very clear For this formal Reason is no other than the Authority of God Or rather since this includes the Truth of the Revealer as well as the Revelation it self for otherwise of what Authority would be the Revelation I would chuse to say that the Truth and Revelation of God do jointly make up the formal Reason of Divine Faith which accordingly proceeds upon this double Principle 1. That whatever God reveals is true 2. That this or that thing in particular is reveal'd by God For Faith has its Reasons as well as Science though of another Nature and its Reasons are these two as will more distinctly appear by disposing the Process of Faith into a Syllogistical Form which will be this Whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is Reveal'd by God Therefore this is true The Conclusion of this Syllogism contains both the Matter and the Act of Faith as it is an Assent to such a thing upon such a ground which is implied by the Illative Particle Therefore The two other Propositions contain the Ground it self or the formal Reason of Faith which you see consists of the double Principle before-mention'd Now 't is most apparent that these two Principles are both of them sufficiently clear or at least may be so 'T is clear in the first place that whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is either self-evident or may be proved from the Idea of God and so has either the Light of a Principle or of a Conclusion either an immediate or a Mediate Evidence And it may be also clear and to be sure is so whenever our Faith is well-grounded that such a thing in Particular is reveal'd by God And in both these respects it is true what is commonly said that Faith is the Highest Reason For you see it is perfectly reasonable in its Fund and Principle and does at last resolve as much as any Mathematical Conclusion into a rational ground of unquestionable Light and Evidence With this only difference that a Conclusion in Geometry is founded upon a Ground taken from within from the intrinsic Nature of the thing whereas our Conclusion of Faith proceeds upon a ground taken from without viz. from the Authority of God but such as however in Light and Evidence is no way inferiour to the other 15. This by the way may serve to shew the vanity and impertinence of those who when they are to prove that there is nothing in Christianity above Reason run out into a Popular Veâ—â— of Harangue about the Reasonables of the Christian Religion and its great Accommodation to Human Nature crying out with repeated importunity that Man is a Reasonable Creature Christianity a reasonable Service and Faith a Rational Act nay even the Highest Reason and the like As if we were for a Blind and unaccountable Faith and denied the use of Reason in Religion or that Faith was founded upon Reason Or as if because there is a Reason from without for Believing therefore the thing Believ'd might not from within and as to the inward Matter of it be above Reason so as
of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what has an internal Evidence and what in its self and by its own Lights is Comprehensible by us as they seem to mean or else their distinction of the Case of Reason and the Case of Revelation is here impertinent then I conceive that they set too narrow limits to our Assent in Matters of Reason when they allow it to be given only to things which in this sense are Evident to us For 't is plain that there are many things in Nature which we fee are True and must be True and so not only may but cannot help Assenting to them though at the same time we are not able to Comprehend how they are or can possibly be 7. Not that our Assent is then Blind and wholly without Evidence for then we might as well Assent to the contrary as to what we do and would do better not to Assent at all but only that it has none from within and from the intrinsic Nature of the Object but only from some External Consideration much after the same manner as it is in â—atch In both which there may be a Clear Reason why we should Assent to an Obscure thing But then as the internal Obscurity does not destroy the External Evidence so neither does the External Evidence strike any Light into the internal Obscurity or in other words as the Reason for Assenting is never the less Clear because the Matter assented to is Obscure so neither is the Matter assented to ever the less Obscure because the Reason for assenâ—ing to it is Clear And yet notwithstanding this internal Obscurity of the Matter we assent to it because of the prevailing Light of the External Evidence And this we do not only in Matters of Faith according to the Restriction of some but in the things of Nature and Reason too where we are oftentimes forced by the pressing urgency of certain External and Collateral Considerations to assent to things internally obscure and whose very possibility we cannot Comprehend as is plain in the great Question of the Divisibility of Quantity and other Instances whereof every Thinking Man's Obseâ—â—ation cannot but have already furnish'd him with variety The Incomprehensibility then of a thing is non just Objection against our Assent to it even in Matters of a Rational Nature much less then is it in Matters of Faith For if not in Matters that belong to the Court of Reason and where she sits as Judge then much less in things that are not of her proper Jurisdiction and if notwithstanding the internal inevidence of an Object we think fit to assent to it upon Rational Considerations much more may we and ought we upon the Authority of the Infallible God 8. Indeed if whatsoever is Above our Reason were also as some pretend as Contrary to it and there were nothing true but what was also Comprehensible and so the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then I conâ—ess we could not as Rational Creatures assent to an incomprehensible Proposition upon any Consideration whatsoever No not even that of Divine Authority 'T is true indeed there could then be no such Authority for Incomprehensible things But if there were 't is impossible we should regard it because we could not have greater assurance either of the Existence or of the Truth of it than we have already upon this Supposition that the things reveal'd are not true But now if this Supposition be no more than a Supposition if to be above Reason does not involve any Contrariety to it if there are incomprehensible Truths and Consequently the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument oâ— it s not being true all which has been already proved then 't is plain that what is an incomprehensible may yet be a Believable Object because within the Possibility of Truth and then to render it actually believ'd there needs only some External Evidence either from Reason or Authority For what should hinder our Assent to an Incomprehensible thing when we have plain Evidence from without for it and its own internal Obscurity is no Argument against it 'T is plain therefore that we ought to give our Assent And since we do so oftentimes upon a Ground of Reason much more ought we upon that more Firm and Immoveable ground of Revelation The short is whatever is no Objection against the Truth of a thing is none against the Credibility of it since Truth is the General Object of Faith unless you will say that a thing is unfit to be believ'd upon any other account besides want of Truth and therefore since we have already shewn that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Truth of it it visibly follows that it is no Argument against the Belief of it neither Therefore an Incomprehensible thing may be believ'd and accordingly he that refuses to believe any thing is bound to give a better Reason for it than because it is Incomprehensible 9. If it be said that this is reason enough because Faith is a Rational Act and therefore what is above the Comprehension of Reason is as much above a Rational Belief to this besides what I have already remarqu'd upon this Occasion in the Chapter of Faith I here further reply that it is true indeed and on both sides agreed that Faith is a Rational Act but in what Sense is the Question There are two very different Senses according to which it may be said to be so either in regard of the Clearness of its Formal Reason or in regard of the Clearness of its Object Either because it is founded upon an External Evidence or Argument for believing or because it proceeds upon an Internal Evidence that appears in the very Nature of the thing Believ'd Iâ— Faith be said to be a Rational Act in the latter Sense the Assertion is then False for so that â—s in respect of the Object we have shâ—wn it to be an inevident Assent But i◠〈◊〉 be said to be a Rational Act in the former Sense then indeed it is true but nothing to the purpose since nothing hinders but that this External Evidence may well consist with an Internal Inevidence or in other words that the Clearness of the Reason for Believing may stand with the Obscurity of the Object Believ'd And therefore though Faith be a Rational Act yet it does not hence â—ollow that what is Above Reason is also above Faith and cannot rationally be believ'd because the Act of Faith is said to be Rational Not in respect of the Evidence of the Object but only that of its Formal Reason or Motive And therefore though there be no Evidence in the Object yet it is not thereby render'd uncapable of being the Matter of Faith because the Evidence which Faith as a Rational Act supposes is wholly of another kind There seems indeed a kind of opposition as to the Sound between Faith's being an Act of Reason
not to be comprehended or accounted for by it But this will cross my way again in another place and therefore I shall not anticipate here what further Considerations I may have occasion to bestow upon it there 16. To return therefore I say that this Obscurity and inevidence that is in Faith and upon whose account it is commonly said to be an inevident Assent does not belong to its formal Reason which you see may be clear enough as clear as any Principle of Natural Science but only to the Matter or Object of it That is in other words the inevidence does not lie in the Reason of Believing but in the Nature of the thing Believ'd Not that the matter of Faith again is wholy and all over without Evidence for then there would be no reason to believe it but only that it has no evidence from within and from the Nature of the thing it self as was remarqu'd before Not that this again is so to be understood neither as if the Proposition to be believ'd were not so much as simply intelligible as to the very litteral sense and direct signification of its Terms No we are no more to believe we Know not what than to believe we Know not why and whatever Darkness there may be in Faith it is still so much a Luminous Assent and an Act of Reason as to require that we understand the simple Meaning of the Proposition we are to believe as well as the Grounds of Credibility upon which it Challenges our Assent For the general Object of Faith is Truth and Truth is the relation of Connexion between Ideas I say Ideas for Truth does not lie in Sounds or Words but in Things Therefore to believe such a Thing to be True is the same as to believe that there is a Connexion between such Ideas But then a Man must know what those Ideas are or else how can he believe they are connected Therefore he must understand something more than the Terms themselves he must also have the Ideas of those Terms which is the same as to under stand the Meaning and Signification of them And indeed he that has no Idea or Conception of what he believes believes he knows not what and he that believes he knows not what cannot be properly said to believe any thing In all Faith therefore the Proposition Must be simply intelligible and though the Truth of it be to be Believ'd yet the Meaning of it must be understood 17. For we are again Carefully to distinguish between the Meaning of a Proposition and the Truth of a Proposition The meaning of a Proposition is only the Determination of the Ideas that are signified by such Terms the Truth of it is the Union or Connexion that is between those Ideas Now though a Man does not see the Connexion that is between the Ideas of that Proposition he is said to Believe yet he must in some measure perceive the Ideas themselves because in believing the Proposition he is supposed to believe that such Ideas are so related and Connected together When therefore 't is said that the Matter of Faith is inevident as to the intrinsic Nature of the thing the inevidence must not be thought to lie in the Ideas whereof the Proposition to be Believ'd Consists but in the Connexion of those Ideas that is not in the Meaning of the Proposition but in the Truth of it which is properly the Object of Faith as the Ideas themselves are of Perception Which again by the way may serve to discover another Instance of Impertinency in the Reasoning of those who when they are Maintaining that there can be no Article of Faith above Reason divert into pompous Flourishes and Declamations about the Intelligibility of the Objects of Faith and the utter impossibility of Believing what is not intelligible As if we denied the simple intelligibility of the Proposition or would have Men believe they know not what which certainly would be a strange degree of Implicit Faith and more Nonsensical than that of the Collier or as if that Proposition which is clear enough as to its simple Meaning might not be inevident and so above Reason as to its Truth or in other words as if Clearness of Ideas might not consist with Obscurity of their Connexion 18. But then it must be observ'd again that when we say that the Inevidence that is in the Matter of Faith respects the Truth of the Proposition not the Meaning of it or the Connexion of the Ideas and not the very Ideas themselves this is not so to be understood neither as if the Matter of Faith even thus consider'd were Absolutely and in its self necessarily inevident and such as could not possibly be known without altering its Nature and ceasing to be any longer the Object of Faith I know the contrary Supposition has prevail'd in some Schools where it passes almost for Principle and Maxim that Knowledge and Faith are mutually Exclusive of each other that the same thing cannot be at once the Object of both and that therefore if a thing be believ'd it cannot be known and if known that it cannot be believ'd St. Austin was of this Opinion and has in many places declared his mind to this purpose particularly in his XL Treatise of his Exposition upon St. Iohn's Gospel And his Authority has recommended it as it did most other things to several of the Schoolmen particularly Aquinas whence it has been transmitted down among many Modern Writers of the Systematical way both Philosophers and Divines But we must follow Reason before Authority and whoever can be prevail'd with to lay the latter quite aside and to use the other as he ought will I believe clearly perceive that nothing hinders but that the same Proposition may be at once the Object of both Faith and Science or that the Same thing may be at the same time both Known and Believ'd provided it be by different Mediums according to the diversity of the respective Acts. 19. For not to enter into the wrangle and Dust of the Schools upon this Occasion it may be sufficient to consider that there is no manner of Opposition between Faith and Knowledge or the Most evident Assent as to the Essence of the Proposition that being not supposed to be denied in the one which is Affirm'd in the other or the contrary but only as to the Medium of the Act. And that 't is not the Absolute Nature of the thing Believ'd but the Quality of the Motive that specifies Faith and distinguishes it from other Assents So that 't is no matter what the Absolute Nature of the thing be in it self whether it be evident or not evident Knowable or not Knowable provided it be assented to upon the proper Medium and Motive of Faith that is upon Authority without any respect had to the Natural evidence of the thing though otherwise never so evident in its own Absolute Nature so as to be the Object of Science
though upon a different Medium at the same time For as I said before 't is not the Nature of the thing but the Quality of the Medium that specifies Faith and tho' the same thing cannot have two Natures or be in it self at once evident and not evident yet why may it not sustain two different Relations or be consider'd in two different Mediums so as to be said to be known when perceiv'd by its Evidence and to be believ'd when assented to upon Authority Which certainly may be done as fully and with as little regard to its evidence as if there were no evidence in the thing at all So that the Evidence of the thing does not hinder the Belief of it supposing the Belief not to proceed upon that Evidence but upon its own proper Medium Authority 20. But to use a way of Arguing less Abstract though it may be with some more pressing and convincing Suppose God should reveal to me a Geometrical Truth as that two Triangles having the same Base and being within the same Parallels are equal and I who at first receiv'd it upon his bare Authority should come afterwards to be able to demonstrate it my self upon the known Principles of Art who that well considers the Natures of these things would say that my Science evacâ—â—ted my Faith and that I ceas'd to be a Believer assoon as I became a Mathematician For though I am now supposed to Know what before I only Believ'd yet why should this Knowledge destroy my Faith since I may still have as much regard for the Authority of God and as little to the Evidence of the thing as I had before the Demonstration and would still be ready to assent to it though there were no evidence to be produced for it only upon the Ground of Divine Authority And to use another Sensible though not so Artificial way of arguing I would fain know whether any one of those who are of the Contrary Sentiment would refuse a Demonstrative Account of a Reveal'd Truth suppose the Creation of the World merely for fear of injuring or destroying his Faith which yet he were bound in Conscience to do if Knowledge and Faith were so exclusive of each other and inevidence and Obscurity were so absolutely of the Essence of Faith as some pretend For then it would not be lawful to acquire the Natural Knowledge of any reveal'd Truth because 't is unlawful to destroy one's Faith and every Believer would have just reason to fear all further Light and Information about what he believes which yet I think would be acknowledg'd by all an extravagant Scruple such as can hardly enter much less stay long in any Considering head And is withal Contrary to a plain Exhortation of the Apostle who bids us add to our Faith Knowledge 21. When therefore the Matter of Faith as it is taken for the Truth of the Proposition Believ'd is charged with Obscurity and Faith it self upon that account is said as it commonly is to be of inevident things the Meaning ought not to be of an Absolute but of a Relative inevidence Not that what is Believ'd is so all over dark and obscure that it cannot while Believ'd absolutely be known but only that it cannot under that Formality and so far as it is Believ'd being necessarily in that respect inevident how bright or clear soever it may be in other respects That is in other words though the thing Believ'd absolutely consider'd may be Evident yet it is not so as Believ'd or in relation to Faith because that has no regard to the Evidence how bright soever it may shine but proceeds wholy upon another Argument between which and the Evidence of the thing there is not the least Affinity or Communication The short is the Object of Faith simply and absolutely speaking may admit of Evidence but then though it be never so evident and demonstrable in it self yet as Believ'd it is always Obscure Faith having no regard to the proper light and Evidence of the thing but only to the Testimony of the Revealer whose bare Authority is the only Motive that determines her Assent and the only Ground upon which she lays the whole weight of it though the Truth of the thing in it self absolutely Consider'd may also stand upon other Foundations be rationally accounted for by Arguments from within and so be seen by its own Light But let the Light shine never so bright upon the Object from other sides Faith lets in none nor has any regard to that which she finds there but connives at it and walks as I may say with her eyes shut contenting her self with the certainty of Revelation and leaving to Science if there be any the Evidence of the thing So that the Object is always dark to her how clear and bright soever it may be in it self or appear when absolutely consider'd to a Philosophic Eye In which respect it falls very short of the Perfection of Science though in respect of Firmness and Certainty it be equal to it as was said before All which is briefly couch'd in that excellent Account of Faith given by the Author to the Hebrews when he says that it is the Substance of things hoped for and the Argument of things not seen Where by Substance and Argument he equals it with Science in regard of the Firmness and Certainty of the Assent but by saying that 't is of things not seen he makes it vail and stoop to it in point of Evidence in which respect indeed Faith as Firm and as Certain as it is is as much inferiour to Science as Darkness is to Light 22. To gather up then what has been here discours'd at large concerning the inevidence of Faith into one view When we say that Faith is an inevident Assent we are not to understand this inevidence of the formal Reason of Faith but of the Matter of it And when we say that the Matter of it is inevident we should not intend by it that it is wholy and all over without Evidence but only that it has none from within or from the intrinsic Nature of the thing And when we say that the Matter of Faith is inevident from within this again is not to be intended of the simple Meaning of the Proposition but of the Truth of it And when we say that the Truth of it is inevident this again lastly is not to be understood as if it were always and necessarily so in its own Absolute Nature but only so far forth as it is Believ'd or as 't is consider'd under the formality of an Object of Faith Or in other words the inevidence of the Matter of Faith in respect of the Truth of the Article is not an Absolute but a Relative inevidence Not that the Matter of Faith is Never Absolutely and in the Nature of the thing inevident for it may be so too as will be seen afterwards but only that it is not necessarily so there
much Heathenized Religion of some Christians may also very deservedly retire behind the Curtain and decline coming to the Light for fear the Absurdities and Monstrous Inconsistencies of it should be laid open But certainly there is not any thing neither Doctrine nor Precept in that true Religion that is reveal'd by God in Evangelical Christianity that need fly the Light of Reason or refuse to be tried by it Christian Religion is all over a Reasonable Service and the Author of it is too reasonable a Master to impose any other or to require as his Vicar does that Men should follow him blindfold and pull out their eyes to become his Disciples No he that Miraculously gave Sight to so many has no need of nor pleasure in the Blind nor has his Divine Religion any occasion for such Judges or Professors For it is the Religion of the Eternal and uncreated Wisdom the Divine Word the true Light of the World and the Universal Reason of all Spirits and 't is impossible that he should reveal any thing that Contradicts the Measures of sound Discourse or the immutable Laws of Truth as indeed it is that any Divine Revelation should be truly Opposite to Right Reason hower it may sometimes be Above it or that any thing should be Theologically true which is Philosophically False as some with great profoundness are pleas'd to distinguish For the Light of Reason is as truly from God as the Light of Revelation is and therefore though the latter of these Lights may exceed and out-shine the former it can never be Contrary to it God as the Soveraign Truth cannot reveal any thing against Reason and as the Soveraign Goodness he cannot require us to believe any such thing Nay to descend some degrees below this he cannot require us to believe not only what is against Reason but even what is without it For to believe any thing without Reason is an unreasonable Act and 't is impossible that God should ever require an unreasonable act especially from a Reasonable Creature 5. We therefore not only acknowledge the use of Reason in Religion but also that 't is in Religion that 't is chiefly to be used so far are we from denying the Use of it there And it is a little unfairly done of our Adversaries so much to insinuate the Contrary as they do For I cannot take it for less than such an Insinuation when they are arguing with us against the Belief of the Christian Mysteries to run out as they usually do into Harangues and Flourishes whereof by the way I know none more guilty than the Author of Christianity not Mysterious about the Reasonableness of the Christian Religion and the Rational Nature of Faith what a Reasonable Act the One is and what a Reasonable Service the Other is c. as if we were against the Use of Reason in Religion or were for a Blind Groundless and Unaccountable Faith or if because we hold the Belief of things above Reason therefore we are for having no Reason for our Belief This I say is an unfair Insinuation and such as argues some want either of Judgment or Sincerity I don't know which in those that suggest it For they seem plainly by running so much upon this Vein to imply as if it were part of the Question between us whether there be any Use of Reason in Religion or whether Faith is to be Founded upon Reason or No. But Now this is no part of the Controversie that lies between us we acknowledge the Use of Reason in Religion as well as they and are as little for a Senseless and Irrational Faith as they can be This therefore being Common to us both is no part of the Question and they do ill to insinuate that it is by so many Popular Declamatory Strains upon the Reasonableness of Religion and in particular of Faith whereas they do or should know that the thing in Question between us is not whether there be any Use of Reason to be made in Believing but only what it is or wherein the true Use of it does Consist 6. Now this we may determine in a few words having already laid the grounds of it For since the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument against the Truth of it nor Consequently against the Belief of it as is shewn in the three foregoing Chapters it is plain that the proper Office and Business of a Believers Reason is to Examin and Inquire Not whether the thing proposed be Comprehensible or not but only whether it be Reveal'd by God or No since if it be the Incomprehensibleness of it will be no Objection against it That therefore ought to be no part of its Questistion or Deliberation because indeed it is not to the purpose to Consider whether such a thing be when if it were it would be no just Objection The only Considerable thing then here is whether such a Proposition be indeed from God and has him for its Author or no. And here Reason is to clear her Eyes put the Matter in the best Light call in all the Assistance that may be had both from the Heart and the Head and determine of the thing with all the Judgement and all the Sincerity that she can But as to the Comprehensibility or Incomprehensibility of the Article this is quite besides the Question and ought therefore to be no part of her scruting or debate since if it were never so much above her Comprehension it would be never the less proper Object for her Belief 7. The Sum is the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Belief of it therefore in the believing of a thing the proper work of my Reason is not to Consider whether it be incomprehensible But when a thing is proposed to me as from God all that my Reason has to do in this Case is Seriously Soberly Diligently Impartially and I add Humbly to Examine whether it comes with the true Credentials of his Authority and has him for its real Author or no. This is all that Reason has to do in this Matter and when she has done this she is to rise from the Seat of Judgement and resign it to Faith which either gives or refuses her Assent Not as the thing proposed is Comprehensible or not Comprehensible but as 't is either Revealâ—d or not Reveal'd CHAP. IX An Application of the foregoing Considerations to the Mysteries of Christianity 1. HAving thus raised the Shell of our Building to its due â—itch we have now only to Roof it by making a Short Application of the Principles laid down and setâ—led in the Former Chapters to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion against the Truth and Belief of which it plainly appears from the Preceding Considerations that there lies now no Reasonable Objection For if Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth and if therefore the Incomprehensibility of a â—hing to Human Reason be no Argument of its 〈◊〉 being True
Consideration viz. That therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Belief of it neither where also I Consider that seemingly Opposite Maxim of Des Cartes that we are to Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident and reconcile it to the other Position Whence my next step was to state the true use of Reason in Believing which I shew'd to Consist not in examining the Credibility of the Object but in taking account of the Certainty of the Revelation which when once resolv'd of we are no longer to Dispute but Believe In fine I have made an Application of these Considerations to the Mysteries of the Christian Faith by shewing that they are never the less to be Believ'd for being Mysteries supposingâ— them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd against which also I have shewn their Incomprehensibility to be no Objection So that every way the Great Argument against the Mysteries of the Christian Faith taken from the Incomprehensibility of them vanishes and sinks into nothing In all which I think I have effectually overthrown the General and Fundamental Ground of Socinianism and truely in great Measure that of Deism too whose best Argument against Reveal'd Religion in general is because the Christian upon all Accounts the most preferable of those that pretend to be Reveal'd Contains so many things in it which transcend the Comprehension of Human Understanding But whether this Best Argument be really a good one or no the whole Procedure of this Discourse may sufficiently shew and whoever knows how to distinguish Sophistry from good Reasoning may easily judge 2. And now you Gentlemen for whose sakes I have been at the pains to write this Treatise give me leave in a few words to Address my self a little more particularly to you and to Expostulate with you Whether it be the good opinion you have of your Cause or the present Opportunity you have to appear in the behalf of it that invites you so freely to Come abroad as you have done of late you have certainly to give your Courage its due taken a very rational and Polite Age for it and I hope the Wise Conduct of Providence may turn this juncture to the Advantage of the Truth and that the Light to which you have adventur'd to expose your Novel Opinions may serve to make you see their Absurdities if you do not too Obstinately shut your Eyes against it Some of you are Considerable Masters of Reason otherwise truly I should not think it worth while to argue with you and you all profess great Devotion to it I wish you do not make it an Idol and to be very Zealous and Affectionate Disciples of it Reason is the great Measure by which you pretend to go and the Judge to whom in all things you appeal Now I accept of your Measure and do not refuse to be tried in the Court of your own Chusing Accordingly you see I have dealt with you all along upon the Ground of Logic and in a Rational way being very Confident that Reason alone will discover to you your undue Elevations of it and the Errours you have been misled into by that Occasion if you do but Consult even this Oracle of yours as you ought and make a right use of its Sacred Light 3. But I am afraid you do not Instead of imploying your Reason in the first place to examin the Certainty of the Revelation whether such a thing be truly Reveal'd and if so to believe it notwithstanding its being incomprehensible your Method is to begin with the Quality of the Object to Consider whether it be Comprehensible or no and accordingly to proceed in your Belief or Disbelief of its being Reveal'd 'T is true indeed you are not so gross as to argue thus this is Comprehensible therefore 't is Reveal'd But you cannot deny but that you argue thus this is Incomprehensible therefore 't is not Reveal'd proceeding upon this general Principle that though whatever is Comprehensible is not therefore presently Reveal'd yet whatever is Reveal'd must be Comprehensible But now judge you whether this be not to make your Reason the Rule and Measure of Divine Revelation that is that God can reveal nothing to you but what you can Comprehend or that you are able to Comprehend all that God can possibly Reveal for otherwise how is your not being able to Comprehend any thing an Argument of its not being Revealâ—d I say Consider whether this be not to set up your Reason as the Rule of Revelation and Consider again whether this does not resolve either into a very low Opinion you have of God and his Infinite Perfections or an extravagantly high one you have of your selves and your own Rational indowments 4. And yet as if this were not Presumption enough do you not also make your Reason the Rule of Faith as well as of Revelation To be the Rule of Faith is a very Great thing and yet so far 't is plain that you make your Reason the Rule of Faith that you will allow nothing to be believ'd but whose Bottom you can Sound by that Line this being an avow'd Principle with you that you are to believe nothing but what you can Comprehend But hold a little before your Reason can be the Measure of Faith must it not be the Measure of Truth And I pray Consider seriously and tell me truly do you verily think in your Consciences that your Reason is the Measure of Truth Do you think your Rational Faculties proportion'd to every intelligible Object and that you are able to Comprehend all the things that are and that there is nothing in the whole extent of Science too high too difficult or too abstruse for you no one part of this vast Intellectual Sea but what you can wade through If you say yes besides the Blasphemous Presumptions and Luciferian Arrogance of the Assertion and how little it falls on this side of Similis ero Altissimo which banish'd the vain-glorious Angel from the Court of Heaven because nothing less would Content his Aspiring Ambition than to be as God there though by the way there is more Sense and Congruity of Reason in pretending to be a God in Heaven than to be a God upon Earth I say besides this I would put it to your more sober thought to Consider whether it be not every whit as great an Extremity in the way of Rational Speculation to Dogmatize so far as to pretend to Comprehend every thing as to say with the Sceptics and Pyrrhonians that we know nothing The latter of which however in regard of its Moral Consequences may be more innocently and safely affirm'd than the Former since in that we only humbly degrade our selves and are Content to sink down into the Level of Brutes whereas in this we aspire to what is infinitely above us and advance our selves into the Seat of God And you know an Excess of Self-dejection is of the two the more tolerable Extreme But if
you say that your Reason is not the Measure of Truth as upon this and the other Considerations there lies a Necessity upon you to Confess how then I pray comes it to be the Measure of your Faith and how come you to lay down this for a Maxim that you will believe Nothing but what you can Comprehend Why if your Reason be not the Measure of Truth and you your selves Care not and I believe are asham'd in terms to say that it is then do you not evidently discern that there is no Consequence from the Incomprehensibility of a thing to the incredibility of it and that you have no reason to deny your Belief to a thing as true merely upon the account of its incomprehensibility And do you not then plainly see that your great Maxim falls to the ground that you are to believe nothing but what you can Comprehend But if yet notwithstanding this you will still adhere to your beloved Maxim and resolve to believe Nothing but what you can adjust and clear up to your Reason then I pray Consider whether this will not necessarily lead you back to that Absurd and withal Odious and Invidious Principle and which therefore you your selves care not to own viz. That your Reason is the Measure of Truth 5. But why do you not care to own it Do you not see at the first cast of your Eye that you are unavoidably driven upon it by your profess'd Maxim Or if you do not think fit to own it as indeed it is a good handsom Morsel to swallow why do you not then renounce that Maxim of yours which is the immediate Consequence of it and necessarily resolves into it Why will you whose Pretensions are so high to Reason act so directly against the Laws of it as to own that implicitly and by Consequence which neither your Head nor your Heart will serve you to acknowledge in broad and express Terms Be a little more Consistent with your own Sentiments at least if not with Truth and be not your selves a Mystery while you pretend not to believe any If you do not care to own the Principle then deny the Consequence or if you will not let go the Consequence then stand by and own the Principle Either speak out boldly and roundly that your Reason is the Measure of Truth or if you think that too gross a defiance to Sense Experience Religion and Reason too to be professedly maintain'd then be so ingenuous to us and so Consistent with your selves as to renounce your Maxim of Believing Nothing but what you can Comprehend since you cannot hold it but with that Absurd Principle And which is therefore a Certain Argument that you ought not to hold it 6. And are you sure that you always do I mean so as to act by it that you hold it in Hypothesi as well as in Thesi Do you never assent to any thing but what you can Comprehend Are there not many things in the Sciences which you find a pressing Necessity to Subscribe to though at the same time you cannot conceive their Modus or account for their Possibility But you 'l say perhaps these are things of a Physical and Philosophical Consideration and such as have no relation to Religion True they are so but then besides that this visibly betrays the weakness of your ground since if the incomprehensibility of a thing were a good Argument against assenting to the Truth of it it would be so throughout in the things of Nature as well as in the things of Religion I would here further demand of you why you are so particularly shy of admitting incomprehensible things in Religion why is it there only that you seem so stiffly and zealously to adhere to your Maxim of Believing nothing but what you can Comprehend Since there are so many inconceivable things or if you please Mysteries in the Works of Nature and of Providence why not in Religion Nay where should one expect to find Mysteries if not there where all the things that are Reveal'd are Reveal'd by God himself and many of them concerning Himself and his own Infinite Perfections And what deference do we pay to God more than Man if either we suppose that he cannot reveal Truths to us which we cannot Comprehend or if we will not believe them if he does Nay may it not be rather said that we do not pay him so much since we think it adviseable to receive many things from our Tutours and Masters upon their Authority only though we do not Comprehend them our selves and justifie our doing so by that well known and in many Cases very reasonable Maxim Discentem oportet Credere But as there is no Authority like the Divine so if that Motto become any School 't is that of Christ. 7. Now 't is in this School that you profess to be Scholars and why then will you be such Opiniative and uncompliant Disciples as to refuse to receive the Sublime Lectures read to you by your Divine and Infallible Master merely because they are too high for you and you cannot Conceive them when at the same time any one of your that is not a Mathematician pardon the Supposition would I doubt not take it upon the word of him that is so that the Diameter of a Square is incommensurable to the Side though he did not know how to demonstrate or so much as Conceive it himself Since then you would express such implicit regard to the Authority of a fallible though Learned Man shall not the Divine weigh infinitely heavier with you and since you would not stick to assent to things above your Conception in Human and Natural Sciences why are you so violently set against Mysteries in Religion whereof God is not only the Authour but in great Measure the Object too 8. You know very well that in the great Problem of the Divisibility of Quantity there are Incomprehensibilities on both sides it being inconceivable that Quantity should and it being also inconceivable that it should not be divided infinitely And yet you know again that as being parts of a Contradiction one of them must necessarily be true Possibly you may not be able with the utmost Certainty and without all hesitation to determine which that is but however you know in the general that One of them indeterminately must be true which by the way is enough to Convince you that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the truth of it and you must also further grant that God whose Understanding is infinite does precisely and determinately know which of them is so Now suppose God should Reveal this and make it an Article of Faith 'T is not indeed likely that he will it being so much beneath the Majesty and besides the End and Intention of Revelation whose great Design is the direction of our Life and Manners and not the improvement of our Speculation But suppose I say he should would you not believe it
be expected that these Men should embrace a Religion which they see thus continually deserted by its own Disciples Or rather instead of converting themselves to Christianity will they not look every day when the Christians shall come over to them For truly this seems to be the state of the Christian World at this time We are posting as fast as we can into Heathenism and stand even upon the brink of Infidelity The great Articles of our Religion are giving up every day and when Men have parted with these we are very much beholden to them if they retain any of the rest there being nothing in Christianity considerable enough when the great Mysteries of the Trinity Incarnation c. are taken away to make it appear an Institution worthy of God or to challenge the Assent of any thinking and consideringâ— Man But why do I talk of running into Heathenism I am afraid we are tending further For as from a Socinian 't is easie to commence a Deist so he that is once a Deist is in a hopeful way to be an Atheist whenever he please 5. I do not speak these things out of a Spirit of Peevishness and Dissatisfaction as some who being full of a Querulous Splenetick Humour and knowing not how better to dispose of it to their ease give it vent upon the Times of which they are always complaining right or wring No the deplorable and dangerous state of Christianity and the too visible growth of Socinianism and Deism among us extort these Reflections from me and have given me many a troublesome and uneasie Thought in my private Retirements For my Satisfaction under which my best Salvo has been to consider that God governs the World and that Jesus Christ who is the Head of his Church will preserve it from all the Powers of Earth and even from the Gates of Hell And that tho' now he seems to be asleep in this Sacred Vessel while the Tempest rages and the Waves beat against it and almost cover it yet 't is to be hoped he will awake and rebuke the Winds and the Sea and make all calm and quiet again However in the mean time 't is fit the Mariners should work and neglect the use of no means that are necessary to the safety of their Ship some by Writing others by private Discourse and all by Prayers and a good Life 6. But now whereas all Rational Method of Cure is founded upon the knowledge of the Cause of the Distemper he that would contribute any thing to the stopping this Contagion of Religious Scepticism that now reigns among us ought in the first place to consider the Reason of it what it is that makes Men so disposed to waver in their Religion and so ready to part with the great Articles and Mysteries of it Now to this purpose I call to mind a very considerable Observation of Descartes concerning Atheism which I take to be equally applicable to Infidelity particularly to this of the Mysteries of the Christian Faith The Observation is this That those things which are commonly alledged by Atheists to impugne the Existence of God do all turn upon this that either we attribute some Humane Affection to God or else arrogate so great force and penetration to our own minds as to go about to comprehend and determine what God can and ought to do So that if we would but carry about us this Thought that our Minds are to be consider'd as Finite but God as Incomprehensible and Infinite there would be no further difficulty in and of their Objections Thus that very Acute and Judicious Person concerning the Grounds of Atheism And in like manner I think it may be said of Infidelity as to the Mysteries of Christianity That the great Reason why so many that call themselves Christians do so obstinately cavil at them and dispute them is that either they think too meanly of God or too highly of themselves that either they ascribe something Humane to his Nature or something Divine to their own that either they set too narrow limits to the Divine Power and Greatness or carry out too far those of their own understandings in one word that either they Humaniâ—e God or Deify themselves and their own Rational Abilities 7. And they confess in effect as much themselves For the Reason that these Men commonly give out and pretend for their not allowing the Mysteries of the Christian Religion any room in their Creed is that they are above the reach of their Understandings They cannot comprehend them or conceive how they can be and therefore will not believe them having fix'd it as a Law in the general to believe nothing but what they can comprehend But now where does the Ground of this Consequence rest at last or upon what Principle does it ultimately depend How comes the Incomprehensibility of a Point of Faith to be a presumption against it why is its being above their Reason in Argument that it is not true Why I say but only because in the first place they attribute so much to their Reason at least by a Confuse Sentiment as to presume it to be the Measure and Standard of all Truth and that nothing that is True can really be above it Here I say the stress of the matter will rest at last For should the Argument of these Men be reduced to a Syllogistical Form it must necessarily proceed thus Whatever is above our Reason is not to be believ'd as true But the Reputed Mysteries of Christianity are above our Reason Therefore the Reputed Mysteries of Christianity are not to be believ'd as true Now the only contestable Proposition in this Syllogism is the Major which can be prov'd by no other Principle than this That our Reason is the Measure of all Truth and whose Proof must be in this Form Whatever is above the Measure of all Truth is not to be believ'd as true But our Reason is the Measure of all Truth Therefore whatever is above our Reason is not to be believ'd as true By this Analysis of their Argument into its Principle it is plain that this their Reason of disbelieving the Mysteries of the Christian Religion viz. Because they are above their Reason does at last resolve into this That their Reason is the Measure of all Truth and that they can comprehend all things For otherwise how should their not being able to comprehend a thing be an Argument that it is not true This I presume is a Principle our Adversaries would be loth to own and indeed with good Reason it being the most extravagantly absurd and self-arrowgating one that can possibly enter the Thought or proceed from the Mouth of a Man And accordinly I do not know any Socinian that had the immodesty in terms openly to assert it But this is what they must come to if they will speak out and what in the mean time they do vertually and implicitly say So then their procedure in short seems
to be true this plainly demonstrates the thing in Question if there can be yet any Question about it most evidently shewing that what is Above Reason is not as such Contrary to Reason it being impossible that what is Contrary to Reason should be true whatever is Contrary to Reason being also as Contrary to Truth I might also further alledge that to be Above Reason does equally abstract from True and False which Contrary to Reason does not and that not only because as I observed before it determines nothing concerning its Object but also because 't is a thing not of an Absolute but of a Relative Importance as being an extrinsecal Denomination taken not from the Nature of the Object as it is in it self but only as it is to us and in relation to our not only Finite but very Limited Capacities For to be Above Reason is not to be Above Reason in general or all Reason so as to be absolutely incomprehensible but only Human Reason But then that which is Above the Reason of a Man may not be Above the Reason of an Angel as indeed what is Above the Reason of one Man may not transcend that of another and what is above the Reason of an Angel may yet be perfectly comprehended by God the Supream and Soveraign Reason So that to be Above Reason here is of a respective signification such as does not express the quality of the Object as it is in its own Nature but only as it is in reference to such a particular Faculty whereas to be Contrary to Reason is not a Relative but an Absolute thing and whatever is Contrary to Reason is Contrary to all Reason and so consequently to Truth I say I might further insist on these and some other Considerations but being partly prevented here by Mr. Boyle whose Account I would have used to supply the defects of Mine as Mine is intended to supply some of his and having so abundantly clear'd the difference of these things already I shall not so far distrust either the Strength of the Argument or that of my Reader 's Understanding as to prosecute this Matter any further than only to shape an Answer out of what has been laid down to an Objection which I meet with in a Modern Writer against Monsieur Iurieu and which to do it the utmost Justice I will set down in his own words 24. I have Consider'd says he the Distinction which they use between being Contrary to Reason and being above Reason 'T is agreed that 't is not possible to believe what is Contrary to Reason But 't is said that we can well believe what is above Reason This Distinction seems to me of no use or else I do not comprehend it For if by being above Reason it be meant that we do not comprehend a Truth in its whole Extent though what we conceive of it be clear and certain I own that in this sense one ought to believe what is above Reason But if by being above Reason be meant a Doctrine wherein we see nothing Clear a Doctrine which our Reason loses the sight of on all its sides I mean that all the Propositions which may be extracted from it appear incomprehensible such a one as this for example that the three Divine Persons make but one God c. It seems that to be above Reason in this sense is the same as to be intirely inaccessible to Reason which differs nothing but in words from being Contrary to Reason 25. I suppose whoever has duely consider'd and well comprehended the Tenour of the foregoing Discourse can neither be insensible of the Deficiency of this Allegation nor be long at a loss what Answer to return to it But to spare my Reader this Trouble My Reply is that this Author's Argument proceeds upon a wrong Supposition He supposes here that to be Above Reason must be either the Not Comprehending a thing in its whole Latitude and extent or the Comprehending Nothing at all of it Whereas I have shewn before that 't is neither of them That we do not mean by Above Reason what is all over unintelligible even as to the very Meaning of the Proposition nor what is not to be Comprehended in its utmost extent but only what is incomprehensible to us as to the Truth of the thing or the Manner of it 'T is true indeed if the Proposition were perfectly unintelligible so that as he says we could see nothing clear in it even as to the very Sense and Meaning of it we could no more believe it than what is Contrary to Reason though even then it would not as this Author confusely enough pretends be the same with it because what is Contrary to Reason is supposed to be well understood But 't is much otherwise if it be incomprehensible only as to the Truth or Manner of the thing This as I shall shew hereafter may very well be Beleiv'd though what is Contrary to Reason cannot and what is utterly unintelligible cannot And I have sufficiently shewn already that what is thus only inaccessible to Reason differs a little more than in words from being contrary to it 26. And now if Humane Nature were not a very unaccountable thing I should stand greatly amazed at either the Natural or wilful Blindness of those who are for confounding things so vastly different as the parts of this Distinction of things above Reason and contrary to it most apparently are There are indeed some things which we are ordinarily taught to distinguish and yet when strictly examin'd and compared will be found to have no real ground of Distinction in them And 't is every whit as great and almost as Common a Fault to distinguish things that do not differ as to confound those that do And there are also other things of such near Resemblance and Cognation to each other that there needs a great deal of Art Subtlety and nice Inspection to discern their Difference So Fine and Minute and almost imperceptible are the Lines that terminate their Natures and divide them from one another But the Ideas of these things are as different as those of a Man and a Tree a Triangle and a Square so that a Man must wink hard not to perceive it or be very insincere not to acknowledge it And I cannot imagine why those especially who are known to serve themselves upon occasion of Distinctions which have no other Foundation than the mere Will and Pleasure unless you will say Interest of those that use them should yet reject such a Solid and well-grounded as well as well Authorized one as this but only because it is not for their turn and if admitted would like a Bomb thrown into their Garrison blow up and lay wast their Main Strength and force them to desert and give up a Cause which they are now especially most Zealously Fond of and seem resolv'd even against Reason to Maintain 27. For I must further remarquâ— and 't is an
Observation not lightly to be pass'd over that if this One Distinction of things above Reason and things contrary to Reason be once admitted or shewn to be real Solid and well-grounded the main part of the Socinian Controversie is immediately or at least in the very next Consequence at an end For the Reason why they will not believe things above Reason is because as they pretend Above Reason differs nothing in reality from Contrary to Reason and so those things that are above Reason are also as much contrary to it as above it and what is Contrary to Reason is on both sides acknowledg'd impossible to be believ'd Well but then if it be made appear as I think by this time is sufficiently done that these two are quite different things and that to be above Reason is not the same as to be contrary to it then even by their own Confession there can be no pretence why what is above Reason may not be Believ'd Which I take to be the true inducement that makes these Men stand out so fiercely and obstinately against this Distinction for they are aware what mischief it will do 'em as it is also the reason why I have bestow'd so much care and pains to clear and justifie it 28. And thus having given an Account of these great and Fundamental things what Reason is what Faith is and what it is to be Above and what Contrary to Reason we have now prepared the way to the more full and direct Consideration of the Belief of things above Reason the true state of which Question by what has been hitherto discours'd appears to be this Whether we may not Assent upon the Authority of Divine Revelation to such things as our Understanding or Reason cannot perceive or Comprehend as to the Truth or Manner of them Or whether our not being able thus to Comprehend them be a sufficient Reason why we should not believe them For the Resolution of which we have already laid the Grounds and shall now proceed more directly to build upon them in the following Chapter CHAP. IV. That Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth 1. WE have gain'd a most wonderful Point in the foregoing Chapter by proving the Distinction between things Above and things Contrary to Reason and such as of it self alone is sufficient Not only immediately to decide but even forever to Silence the Controversie between us and our Socinian Adversaries concerning the Belief of things above Reason For the only Objection that is or can possibly be pretended against the Belief of things above Reason being the supposed Contrariety of the same things to Reason if it be shewn that to be above Reason involves no such Contrariety then the Objection against the belief of such things is fairly and wholly removed and consequently there remains no Reason why they may not be Believ'd So that I cannot but look upon the Substance of my Work as most effectually done already and those of our Adversaries that have any reasonable Measure of Penetration and Sincerity must needs be sensible of it And I dare appeal even to their own Consciences whether they are not However considering the importunity of those I have to deal with as well as the weight of the Cause it self I shall endeavour the further establishment of it upon some other Considerations whereby I shall also give further Confirmation and so repay what I am endebted to the Point contended for in the preceding Chapter since we may as well argue backwards from the Believableness of things above Reason to their not Contrariety as forwards from their not Contrariety to their Believableness the Consequence being full as good thus Above Reason Believable therefore not Contrary as thus Above Reason not Contrary therefore Believable Now in order to the fuller Conviction and demonstration of the Believableness of things above Reason I set out upon this Ground that Humane Reason is not the Measure of Truth 2. 'T is agreed among the Masters of Reason that as all Proof ought to be only of such things as need it so there are Propositions so Clear and Evident of themselves that they have no need of being demonstrated and that there are some again that are not capable of Demonstration the Fulness and immediateness of their Evidence rendring them strictly indemonstrable And it has been charged by one of the most Considerable of them as a Fault in the Method of the Geometricians that they set themselves to prove things that have no need of Proof whereof he gives an Instance in Euclid who goes formally to work to prove that two sides of a Triangle taken together are greater than one although this be most Evident even from the Notion only of a Right Line which is the shortest that can possibly be between two Points and the Natural Measure of Distance from one Point to another which it could not be if it were not also the shortest of all Lines that can be drawn from Point to Point 3. Now though I cannot say that the Proposition of this Chapter is so Evident of it self as not to be capable of Demonstration yet I must Confess I cannot but think it of the Number of those that do not need any that is I mean to those who will but take the Pains to consider it with Attention and are withal so sincere as to say ingenuously what they inwardly think For to unattentive or Captious Persons nothing is plain since there is Nothing but what some will contradict and there are those who profess to doubt of every thing and even the Sun it self can't make a Man see if either he want eyes or will shut ' em I cannot therefore say that to such men either this or any other Proposition is plain but I would venture to be tried by any competent and indifferent Considerer whether this be not indeed a very plain and certain Proposition as plain as most of those which pass for Principles and Maximes in Discourse that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth And accordingly I should justly fear incurring the same Censure that is charged upon the Geometricians of going to prove what is evident were there not something peculiar in the present Case that makes it very different from theirs For they dealing in Matters of an Abstract and indifferent Nature and such wherein the Lusts and Passions of men are altogether uninteressed have no real need to prove evident things because for that very reason their Evidence is never Contested whereas the Point I have now in hand being of a Moral Concernment and such as incounters the Partialities and false Biasses of Humane Nature particularly that great and governing one of Self-Love though it should be of equal evidence with some of their Maxims will yet not be equally secure from Opposition and pass alike uncontested And so there may be need of proving it if not to do any necessary Service to the Proposition it self yet to satisfie
those that shall undertake the Solution of them by the real Chimeras of Substantial Forms Qualities Sympathys Antipathys c. or that shall go to account for them by the yet more Obscure Principles of the Chymists striking and filling their Ears with those great but empty Sounds Archeus Seminal Spirit Astral Beings Gas Blas c. which they receive with great satisfaction not for their Scientific Light for they are dark as may be mere Philosophic Cant but only because they are Mysterious and Abstruse and therefore they fancy there must be somewhat more than Ordinary in them tho they know not nor it may be never Consider'd what And herein as in some other Instances Men love Darkness better than Light 2. But then at another time you shall have them inquiring after Truth as Diogenes did after an Honest Man with a Candle in their hands and not caring to go a step any further than they can see their way Now upon a sudden they are all for Clear and distinct Ideas Full and adequate Perceptions Demonstrative Proofs and Arguments and nothing will serve or Content them but Light and Evidence and they will believe nothing but what they can Comprehend Strange diversity of Conduct Who would think two such vastly distant extreams should meet together I will not say in the same Man but in the same Human Nature and that the very same Creature and such a One as Stiles it self Rational too should proceed by such uncertain Measures and act so inconsistently with it Self sometimes embracing a thing for the sake of it's Obscurity and sometimes again in another Fit making that alone an Invincible Objection against the Belief of it 3. But it is plain by the foregoing Measures that it is not For since Truth is the general Object of Faith 't is evident that nothing can argue a thing to be absolutely incredible or not reasonable to be beleiv'd but that which at the same time argues it not to be True For if true then 't is still within the Compass of the general Object of Faith But now we have shewn already that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of it 's not being true whence it clearly and closely follows that 't is no Argument neither against it's Credibility And if so then we may believe it Notwithstanding it's Incomprehensibility because we may believe whatever is not Absolutely incredible So that there is no Necessity that we should discard every thing we cannot Conceive as unworthy of a Rational Belief or that what is Above our Reason should be therefore above our Faith too 4. It is true indeed that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is in it Self no proper and direct Argument why it should be believ'd and he would be thought to give but an ordinary account of his Faith who being askâ—d why he believ'd such an Incomprehensible thing should answer because it is Incomprehensible which at best could pass only for a Religious Flourish much such another as Credo quia impossibile And that because the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not directly and per se a Criterion of Truth whether it may be per Accidens may be Consider'd afterwards whose Natural and genuin Character is not Obsecurity but Light and Evidence Not that nothing is True but what has this Character for we have already shewn the Contrary in proving Incomprehensible Truths but that as whatever we clearly perceive is True so our Clear perceiving of a thing is the only sign from the Intrinsic Nature of the thing it Self of the Truth of it Incomprehensibility therefore is none but as such abstracts from true and not true and is equally Common to both But now that which may Consist with a thing supposing it false can no more prove it True than that which may Consist with a thing supposing it True can prove it false according to the Tenour of the Fifth Chapter The Incomprehensibility therefore of a thing is no proper Argument of the Truth of it and Consequently no Reason of it Self why it should be believ'd and that because it abstracts as such from True and False and is too Common to Both to prove either 5. And because it is so it is also further granted that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not only in it Self no proper Reason why it should be believ'd but has also so far the Nature of a Disswasive from believing as to be a Caution against a too hasty Belief till there appear some other Motive from without either from Reason or Authority that shall determin the Assent In the mean while it advises to Suspend For the Incomprehensibility of a thing being as such No Reason why a Man should believe it 't is plain that if he did believe it Consider'd only as in that State he would believe it without Reason That therefore is a Reason why he should suspend a Negation of Reason being enough to with-hold ones Assent though to give it one had need have a positive Reason When therefore a thing appears Incomprehensible that indeed is sufficient Reason to suspend our Belief till some prevailing Consideration from without shall over-rule that Suspension by requiring our Assent But when it does so then the Incomprehensibility ought to be No Argument to the Contrary and it would be every whit as absurd to reject a thing now because of its Incomprehensibility as to believe it before for that Reason And that because as the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no reason for Believing it so it is no Absolute Reason against it 6. If it were so it would be in Natural things the objects of Human and Philosophic Science such as belong properly and immediately to the Province and Jurisdiction of Reason Here if any where the Incomprehensibility of a thing would forbid all Assent to it And so it is supposed to do by some who though far from denying the Belief of Incomprehensible things in Religion will yet tell you that in Physical Contemplations Clearness and Evidence is to lead the way and we are to proceed with our Light before us assenting to nothing but what we well Comprehend In Matters of Faith indeed they will allow that Reason is to be submitted to Revelation and that we are to believe many things which pass our Comprehension but in Matters of pure Reason they will have us go no further than Reason can carry us Which indeed is right enough it their Meaning be that we are to Assent to Nothing but what upon the whole Matter all things Consider'd from without as well as from within we have reason to believe true and that we are never to proceed to judge or determin without some Evidence or other but then this will equally hold in Matters of Faith too which is too rational an Assent to be given at a Venture and we know not why and whose Formal Reason as has been already discours'd is always Clear But if their Meaning be that in Matters