deduce some Corollaries that may be of use for the better understanding of the whole Matter 1. Reason is certain and infallible This follows from the state I gave of the Nature and Notion of Reason in the beginning It consists in First Principles and the Conclusions that are raised from them and the Observations of Sense Now first Principles are certain or nothing can be so for every possible Conclusion must be drawn from those or by their help and every Article of Faith supposeth them And for the Propositions that arise from those certain Principles they are certain likewise For nothing can follow from Truth but Truth in the longest Series of Deduction If Error creep in there is ill consequence in the case And the sort of Conclusions that arise from the Observations of Sense if the Sense be rightly circumstantiated and the Inference rightly made are certain also For if our Senses in all their due Circumstances deceive us All is a delusion and we are sure of nothing But we know that first Principles are certain and that our Senses do not deceive us because God that bestowed them upon us is True and Good and we are as much assured that whatever we duly conclude from either of them is certain because whatever is drawn from any Principle was virtually contained in it 2. I infer That Reason is in a sense the Word of God viz. That which he hath written upon our Minds and Hearts as Scripture is that which is written in a Book The former is the Word whereby he hath spoken to all Mankind the latter is that whereby he hath declared his Will to the Church and his peculiar People Reason is that Candle of the Lord of which Solomon speaks Prov. 20. 27. That Light whereby Christ hath enlightned every one that cometh into the World John 1. 9. And that Law whereby the Consciences of the Heathen either accuse or excuse one another Rom. 2. 15. So that Hierocles spoke well when he said 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 To be perswaded by God and right Reason is one and the same thing And Luther called Philosophy within its own bounds The Truth of God 3. The belief of our Reason is an Exercise of Faith and Faith is an Act of Reason The former part is clear from the last Particular and we believe our Reasons because we have them from God who cannot mistake and will not deceive So that relying on them in things clearly perceived is trust in God's veracity and goodness and that is an exercise of Faith Thus Luke 12. The not belief of Reason that suggests from God's clothing the Lillies that He will provide for us is made by our Saviour a defect of Faith Vers. 28. O ye of little Faith And for the other part that Faith is an Act of Reason that is evident also For 'T is the highest Reason to believe in God revealing 4. No Principle of Reason contradicts any Articles of Faith This follows upon the whole Faith befriends Reason and Reason serves Religion and therefore they cannot clash They are both certain both the Truths of God and one Truth doth not interfere with another 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith Aristotle Truth agrees with all things that are Whatsoever contradicts Faith is opposite to Reason for 't is a Fundamental Principle of that That God is to be believed Indeed sometimes there is a seeming contradiction between them But then either something is taken for Faith that is but Phansie or something for Reason that is but Sophistry or the supposed contradiction is an Error and Mistake 5. When any thing is pretended from Reason against any Article of Faith we ought not to cut the Knot by denying Reason but endeavour to unite it by answering the Argument and 't is certain it may be fairly answered For all Hereticks argue either from false Principles or fallaciously conclude from true ones So that our Faith is to be defended not by declaiming against Reason in such a case which strengthens the Enemy and to the great prejudice of Religion allows Reason on his side But we must endeavour to defend it either by discovering the falshood of the Principles he useth in the name of Reason or the ill Consequence which he calls Proof 6. When any thing is offered us for an Article of Faith that seems to contradict Reason we ought to see that there be good cause to believe that this is divinely revealed and in the sense propounded If it be we may be assured from the former Aphorisms that the Contradiction is but an Appearance and it may be discovered to be so But if the Contradiction be real This can be no Article of Revelation or the Revelation hath not this sense For God cannot be the Author of Contradictions and we have seen that Reason as well as Faith is his I mean the Principles of Natural Truth as well as those of Revelation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 faith Aristotle Truth is throughout contrary to falshood and what is true in Divinity cannot be false in Reason 'T is said indeed in the Talmud If two Rabbins differ in Contradictories yet both have their Opinions from Moses and from God But we are not obliged to such an irrational kind of Faith And ought not to receive any thing as an Article of it in a sense that palpably contradicts Reason no more than we may receive any sense that contradicts the direct Scriptures Faith and Reason accord as well as the Old Testament and the New and the Analogy of Reason is to be heeded also because even that is Divine and Sacred 7. There is nothing that God hath revealed to oblige our Faith but he hath given us reason to believe that he hath revealed it For though the thing be never so clearly told me if I have not reason to think that God is the Revealer of what is so declared I am not bound to believe it except there be evidence in the thing it self For 't is not Faith but vain credulity to believe every thing that pretends to be from God So that we ought to ask our selves a Reason why we believe the Scripture to be the Revelation of God's Will and ought not to assent to any sense put upon it till we have ground to think that that sense is his mind I say we must have ground either from our particular Reasons or the Authority of the Church otherwise our Faith is vain Credulity and not Faith in God 8. A Man may hold an erroneous Opinion from a mistaken sense of Scripture and deny what is the truth of the Proposition and what is the right meaning of the Text and yet not err in Faith For Faith is a belief of God revealing And if God have not so revealed this or that as to give us certain ground to believe this to be his sense he hath not sufficiently revealed it to oblige our Faith So that though I deny such or such a sense while I believe
to stick to nothing being confidently to perswade them to swallow all things For among a multitude of things carelesly receiv'd many will be false and many doubtful and consequently a mind not wholly stupid will some time or other find reason to distrust and reject some of its Opinions Upon review of which perceiving it imbraced Falshoods for great Certainties and confided in them as much as in those it yet retains it will be in great danger of staggering in the rest and discarding all promiscuously Whereas if a Man proportion the degree of his Assent to the degree of Evidence being more sparing and reserv'd to the more difficult and not throughly examin'd Theories and confident only of those that are distinctly and clearly apprehended he stands upon a firm bottom and is not mov'd by the winds of Fancy and Humour which blow up and down the conceited Dogmatists For the Assent that is difficultly obtain'd and sparingly bestow'd is better establish'd and fixt than that which hath been easie and precipitant Upon the whole Matter it appears that this Learned Person had no cause to write against me as a Sceptick And I somewhat the more wonder at it because I find such things attributed to those he is pleas'd to call by that name that no way agree with the Way and Spirit of those Philosophers whose genius I recommend and desire to imitate On which account I thought he had some other notion of Sceptick than was usual and casting mine eye over his late Purgation presented to the Cardinals of the Inquisition I found that his Scepticks were some of the Modern Peripatetical Disputers These it seems by their many complaints against his Writings had obtain'd a general condemnation of them from the Pope and Consistory of Cardinals whom therefore in his Appeal to the said Cardinals he accuseth of Ignorance Corruption of the Aristotelian Doctrines and Tendency to Heresie and Atheism And that these are the Scepticks he means appears from the Preface against me and divers other Passages of his Book So that 't is yet more wonderful that Gossendus and the Author of the Vanity of Dogmatizing should be call'd by a Name which he bestows upon those of so different a temper And thus of that charge of Scepticism with which he begins as the occasion of his writing Having premised which he endeavours to lay the sure Foundations of Science and to establish Certainty in Knowledg But what-ever imperfections there are in that pretended demonstration I shall not for the present take notice of them but only observe that this Gentleman is the Author of that Science Demonstration and Self evidence of which M. Sargeant a late controvertial Writer for the Roman Church makes such boasts of and here are his Grounds Which those learned Men that are concern'd with him may if they please when they have nothing else to do examine Having said thus much of Scepticism and the Scepticks I shall enquire a little into the matter of Certainty a subject of both difficulty and importance It is taken either 1. for a firm Assent to any thing of which there is no reason of doubt and this may be call'd Indubitable Certainty or 2. for an absolute Assurance that things are as we conceive and affirm and not possible to be otherwise and this is Infallible Certainty In the first of these Des Cartes lays his Foundations I cannot doubt but I think though nothing should be as I conceive and there I cannot suspect neither but that I my self that think am I am as sure that I have Idaeas and Conceptions of other things without me as of God Heaven Earth c. Thus far that Philosopher is safe and our Assent is sull and it is so in this likewise That we can compound or disjoin those Images by affirming and denying and that we have a faculty of Reasoning and inferring one thing from another So much as this we clearly perceive and seel in our selves what-ever uncertainty there may be in other matters To these we give a resolv'd and firm Assent and we have not the least reason of doubt here Besides which Principles we find others in our minds that are more general and are us'd and supposed by us in all our Affirmations and Reasonings to which we assent as fully such are these Every thing is or is not A thing cannot be and not be in the same respects Nothing hath no Attributes What we conceive to belong or not to belong to any thing we can affirm or deny of it These are the Principles of all Propositions and Ratiocinations whatsoever and we assent to them fully as soon as we understand their meaning to which I add this great one more That our Faculties are true viz. That what our understandings declare of things clearly and distinctly perceiv'd by us is truly so and agreeing with the realities of things themselves This is a Principle that we believe firmly but cannot prove for all proof and reasoning supposeth it And therefore I think Des-Cartes is out in his method when from the Idaea's he endeavours to prove that God is and from his Existence that our Faculties are true When as the truth of our Faculcies was presupposed to the proof of God's Existence yea and to that of our own also So that that great Man seems to argue in a Circle But to let that pass This we constantly assent to without doubting That our Faculties do not always delude us That they are not mere Impostors and Deceivers but report things to us as they are when they distinctly and clearly perceive them And so this may be reckon'd one of the prime certain Principles and the very Foundation of Certainty in the first sense of it These and such like Principles result out of the nature of our Minds But 2. There are other Certainties arising from the evidence of Sense As That there is Matter and Motion in the World That Matter is extented divisible and impenetrable That Motion is direct or oblique That Matter and Motion are capable of great variety of Modifications and Changes We learn that these and many other such things are so from Sense and we nothing doubt here although the Theory and Speculative consideration of those Matters be full of difficulty and seeming contradiction In these our Assent is universal and indubitable But in many particular cases we are not assured of the report of our Senses yea we dissent from and correct their Informations when they are not in their due Circumstances of right Disposition Medium Distance and the like and when they pronounce upon things which they cannot judg of on which account though our Senses and the Senses of Mankind do represent the Earth as quiescent Yet we cannot from thence have assurance that it doth Rest since Sense cannot judg of an even and regular Motion when it self is carried with the movent so that though it should be true that the Earth moves yet to Sense it would
the plain things they are taught without busie intermedling in Speculative Opinions and things beyond their reach Such a Liberty of Judgment as this they taught and such was necessary for the Age in which the Minds of Men were inthrall'd by the Masters of Sects and the Opinions then stil'd Orthodox from which it was accounted Heresie and Damnatiou to recede So that nothing could be done to set them at large from those vain Fancies and Ways till they were perswaded to examine them with freedom and indifference and to conclude according to the Report of their Faculties They knew That Truth would have the advantage could it but procure an impartial Tryal That the False Doctrines and Fanatical Practices of the Times would be detected and sham'd were it not for the superstitious straightness that supprest all Enquiry and that those Old Truths that were exploded with so much abhorrence would in all likelyhood gain upon the Judgments and Assents of all that were free and durst to be inquisitive On such accounts they prest the Liberty of Judgment and in a time when it was very seasonable and no hurt could directly arise from it Since 2. They taught and urged much modesty together with it and allow'd not Dogmatical Affirmations but in things that were most fundamental and certain They consider'd That our Understandings at best are very weak and that the search of Truth is difficult that we are very liable to be imposed on by our Complexions Imaginations Interests and Affections That whole Ages and great Kingdoms and Christian Churches and Learned Counsels have joyn'd in Common Errors and obtruded false and absurd Conceits upon the World with great severity and flaming Zeal That much Folly and great Non-sense have many times generally obtain'd and been held for certain and Sacred That all Mankind are puzled and bafled in the disquisition of the seeming plainest and most obvious things In the Objects of Sense and Motions of our own Souls That in earnest we cannot tell How we speak a Word or move a Finger How the Soul is united to the Body or the Parts of Bodies to one another how our own were framed at first or how afterwards they are nourish'd That these nearest things and a thousand more are hid from our deepest Enquiries Thus they consider'd often and fill'd their Thoughts with a great sense of the narrowness of humane Capacity and the Imperfections of our largest Knowledge which they used not to any purposes of unwarrantable Scepticism or absolute neutrality of Judgement but to ingage their Minds to a greater wariness in Enquiry and more shiness of Assent to things not very clear and evident to more reservedness in their Affirmations and more modesty in their Arguings After this manner they practised themselves and thus they discours'd to others and nothing could be more proper for those times in which everyone almost was immoderately confident of his own way and thereby rendred insolent in his Dictates and incurable in his Errors scornful to opposite Judgments and ready to quarrel all Dissenters So that the World was hereby fill'd with Animosity and Clamours whereas modesty in Opinions would have prevented those Mischiefs and it was taught by those Men as the likelyest way of Cure For there is no hopes either of Truth or Peace while every one of the divided thinks himself infallible But when they come to grant a possibility of their being out in their Beloved Tenents there is something then to work upon towards their better Information But 3. there was still less danger in the Liberty they promoted for as much as they practised and perswaded much prudence to be us'd in the publishing of their Tenents They allowed not any declaration of private Sentiments when such a Declaration might tend to the disgrace or dissettlement of Legal Appointments or any Articles of the Establish'd Religion provided there were no Idolatry or direct Heresie in the things injoin'd But believ'd and taught That Men ought to content themselves with their own Satisfactions in the Supposed Truths they have discover'd without clamorous Disputes or Wranglings And though in the large compass of Enquiry they took and the Considerations they had of all sorts of Idaea's that enter into the various Minds of thinking Men it could not be but that they should have several Apprehensions different from vulgar Thoughts Yet they were very cautious in discovering their Conceptions among the illiterate and unqualified They had no delight in speaking strange things or in appearing to be singular and extraordinary They were not so fond of their own Opinions as to think them necessary for all others Nor were they infected with the Common Zeal to spread and propagate every Truth they thought they knew No they consider'd there were Truths which the World would not bear and that some of the greatest would be receiv'd here with the bitterest contempt and derision So that to publish would be but to expose them to popular scorn and themselves also Their main Design was to make Men good not notional and knowing and therefore though they conceal'd no practical Verities that were proper and seasonable yet they were sparing in their Speculations except where they tended to the necessary vindication of the Honour of God or the directing the Lives of Men They spoke of other Matters of Notion only among their known Friends and such as were well prepar'd able to examine and dispos'd to pardon or receive them Among these they discours'd the greatest freest Speculations with as much liberty in their Words as in their Thoughts and though they differ'd in many Notions yet those Differences did nothing but serve the pleasure of Conversation and exercise of Reasoning They begot no estrangements or distasts no noise or trouble abroad Such was the prudence that They practised and taught and this also was very proper for those Times when every Man vented his Conceits for Articles of Faith and told his Dreams for Revelations and then pretended he was extraordinarily enlightned and strove to make Proselites and quarrel'd with all that did not embrace his Fancies and separated from the Communion of the Church and endeavour'd to involve the World in Hurries and Distractions and all this for the sake of a few pittiful needless sensless Trifles In such a time this prudent Spirit and Practice was singularly seasonable and useful But though they were thus cauteous and wary about Theories more remote and not necessary yet they were not altogether indifferent to what Men believ'd and thought No They were concern'd and zealous against the Fanatick Conceits and Humours of the Age which were the occasions of so much Folly Irregularity and Disturbance And my next Business is to declare in some great Instances how they demeaned Themselves in opposing of them This was the second thing I undertook to relate namely Their particular endeavours in the Affairs of Religion But before I fall on it I must declare to you That They had not any