of Superiours will depend on the will and the fancy of their inferiours He holds not onely that the priviledge of probability may dispense with an inferiour for the obedience which he owes to his Superiour but also to elevate him above his Superiour and to oblige the Superiour to obey his subject He demands n Tenetur poenitentis opiuionem probabilem confessarius sequi relicta sua probabiliori Tenetur quia poenitens habet jus ad absolutionem opinioni probabili nitens In prooem exam 3. cap. 6. num 27. dag 25. whether a Confessor is obliged to follow the probable opinion of his penitent and to quit his own which is more probable His answer is that he is obliged thereto because the penitent grounding himself upon a probable opinion hath a right unto absolution So absolution and pardon of sins is no longer a grace and favour unto the sinner according to Escobar but a right and this right is not founded on the Word of God but upon the word of man and upon a probable opinion and even upon the word of a single man who may be the Author thereof and stand single in this opinion according to the Jesuits But as a probable opinion gives right unto a penitent to demand absolution so it might seem that a probable opinion should give a right to a Consessor to refuse it if he judged it neither to be his duty nor to be in his power to give it him But Escobar maintains that he is obliged to give it him renouncing his own right as well as his opinion to submit it to that of his penitent o Quod si Confessario falsa videatur opinio pâ—nitent is debet se accommodare si à probat is autoribus probabilis reputetur Ibid. n. 27. p. 29. and if it happen that the opinion of the penitent appear not onely not probable to the Confessor but that he also believes it assuredly false Escobar wills not to refuse to comply with the will of his penitent and that if the penitent will not submit nor abate any thing of his pretended right the Confessor must accord to what he demands For if he pretend to use rigour and to passe sentence upon this difference these new Doctors who have established themselves judges in the Church and of the Church it self and of the Holy Fathers will almost all with one voice condemn him to give him absolution and in case he fail therein p Vasquez 1.2 tom 1. disp 92. a. 7. n. 4. addit Confessarium non proprium negantem absolutionem secundum opinionem probabilem solum venialiter delinquere At credidero mortaliter pecoare si de mortalibus facta confessio Ibid. n. 27. Vasquez will declare he sinneth mortally if he be an ordinary Confessor as are the Parish Priests or venially if he be a delegate as are the Monks And Escobar with others having no regard at all to this distinction will condemn absolutely them both of mortal sins SECT III. The opinion of Sanchez concerning the probability of opinions WE might produce upon this subject almost as many Authors as there are of the Society because they have in a manner all written of it and they are all agreed in the principal questions so important is this point in their Diviuity of which we may say that it is as it were the foundation and that there upon their Doctrine and their conduct is built But there is none that hath more enlarged and cleared this matter nor by consequence who hath more discovered the spirit of the Society then Sanchez For this purpose I thought meet to give him a title apart Amongst many maximes which he establisheth as fundamentals in this matter this is a principal one a Opinio probabilis est quae rationi alicujus momenti inniâ—tur ita tamen ut pro opposita parte nihil convincens sit Sanch. op mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 6. p. 28. An opinion is probable when it is founded on some considerable reason provided there be nothing to convince the contrary opinion From whence he draws this consequence with Val. b Tunc manere apud aliquem intra opinionis certitudinem quidpiam quando sibi persuadet rationem illius solvi posse aut ab ipsomet aut ab aliis A man may hold an opinion probable when he is perswaded that he himself or some other can answer the reasons used for ground thereof And when he is perswaded that neither he nor any other can answer the reasons he hath against an opinion c Licet quis rationem peculiarem habeat contra oppositam sententiam quam ipse solvere nequit sibi solvi non posse videctur non ideo censere debet opposiram aliorum opinionem improbabilem esse ut eam sequi nequeat He ought not to believe for all that if it be held by others that it is not probable so that he may not follow it himself Of which he renders this reason which breathes nothing but modesty and humility d Quiae solo suo jubicio non debet aliorum sententiam improbabilem judicare Ibid. Because he ought not judge of himself alone that the opinion of others is not probable And to make all men resolve to pass by all sorts of difficulties and reasons how strong and insoluble soever they appear he saith that it e Vel eo maxime quod sibi persuadere debeat quotidie contingere subito inveniri solutionem rationum quas quis insolubiles putabat aut ab aliu facile solvi Ibid. happens dayly that new answers are found to reasons which were believed to be invincible And so although one single person or many cannot answer the convincing reasons which are given for an opinion yet they ought perswade themselves that others may do it and that so the contrary opinion ceases not to be probable and by consequence may be followed in conscience So that according to this Author it is lawful to put in practice an opinion which we believe false and pernicious thinking that this own judgement made thereon may possibly be false so there will be nothing which can be capable to retain these libertine spirits nor to hinder them from despising all sorts of reasons and lights how clear and strong indeed soever they be and that by their own judgement and after that from doing what they please They may extend this liberty much more easily to the most certain truths of Religion which have not always convincing reasons for them because they subsist only by authority and faith and if they had a libertine f Sibi persuadeat rationem illius solvi posse ab ipsomet aut ab aliis Supra might easily perswade himswade himself that either he or some other might answer them And if he should not happen on any person who were able to do it he might always imagine that it was not impossible to meet some one hereafter since that as
sapiant quia minores vocantur Lactant. lib. 2 divin instit c. 8. These deprive themselves of wisdom who suffer themselves to be led by others like Beasts receiving without discerning all that which the ancients have invented That Which deceives them is the name of Ancestors Imagining that they cannot be Wiser then they because they come after them and because these are called neoteriques And in the same place l Deus dedit omnibus pro virili portionem sapientiae nec quia nos illi temporibus sapientia quoque antecesserunt Quia si omnibus aequaliter datur occupari ab antecedentibus non potest Ibid. God hath given wisdom to every man according to his capacity and those who precede us in time do not therefore exceed us in wisdom For being it is given indifferently to all men they who came first cannot by their possession eject others from it He considered not when he alledged these passages that what these Authors say is for reproof of those who suffer themselves to be carried with humane customs and traditions to the prejudice of manifest truth or who are too credulous and timorous in the inquiry after natural things which depend on reason and that they speak not of matters of Faith and Religion such as those are which he handles in his Book But if he have perceived this truth he abuses the authority of these great personages applying it against their sence and using it without reason to justifie a thing quite remote from their thoughts and contrary to their judgements and from that of all antiquity which were easie to be made appear if it were not a thing too remote from my subject He alledges also these words which he attributes to the Council of Constantinople m Beatus qui prosert verbum inauditum id est novum Syn. Const art 1. Happy is that man who produces an unheard word that is a now one Finally he cites those words of the holy Scripture n Omnis scriba doctus similis est patrifamilias qui profert de thesauro suo nova vettra Matth. 13. ver 53. every learned Doctor is like unto a Father of a Family who brings out of his treasure things new and old I passe by this last passage of the Gospel of Saint Matthew which he abuseth manifestly against the sence of the Son of God and that of all interpreters But I cannot passe over the remarkable falsity and visible corruption of the pretended words of the Council of Constantinople For the true words of the Council are Beatus qui profert verbum in auditum obedientium Blessed is he who utters a word into obedient ears From which he first cuts off the word obedientium obedient Afterwards he joins two words into one and instead of in auditum in to the hearing which were the Councils words he makes it say inauditum unheard In the third place adding corruption of sence unto falsification of words he saith that this word inauditum signifies new But there is no cause to marvel that the desire of novelty leads to falsity and consequently to errours and heresies Azor and after him Filliutius who doth nothing in effect but follow him speak also very advantagiously for novelty saying generally that the Apostolical Traditions are of humane right and that by consequence they may be changed o Ex quo officitur ut traditiones divinae ad â—us divinum specteat ac proinde sunt immutabiles Apostolicae vero ad jus humanum propterea Ecclesiae authoritate mut abiles Azor Instit mor. l. 8. c. 4. q. 4. pag. 743. Filliutius tom 2. tr 22. c. 1. n. 11. p. 65. Divine Traditions saith Azor appertain to Divine right and by consequence they are immutable but the Traditions of the Apostles are humane Laws and for that cause the Churoh may change them He expounds a little above what he means by Divine and Apostolical Traditions in these terms p Divinae traditiones sunt quaâ— ab ipsius Christi ore Apostoli acceperunt vel quas Spiritu Sancto dictante vel gubernante vel Christo Domino imperante promulgarunt Apostolicae sunt qu as ipsi Apostoli tanquam Ecclesiae Praelati Doctores magistri recto es instituerunt Azor. Ibid. Divine Traditions are those which the Apostles have learned from the mouth of Jesus Christ or which the Holy Ghost hath dictated and they have written by his Command or by that of Jesus Christ The Traditions of the Apostles are those which the Apostles have instituted in the quality of Prelats Doctors Tutors and Governours of the Church In such manner that according to them the Traditions of the Apostles are no other then the Inventions of the Apostles which they ordained of themselves and of their own proper motion without having learned them of Jesus Christ or the Holy Spirit This is no more then his words clearly signifie and the division he makes suffers not any other sence to be given them since he opposes those Traditions which the Apostles have instituted of themselves quas ipsi Apostoli instituerunt to those which they have received from the mouth of Jesus Christ and from those which the Holy Ghost taught them and which he established by their Ministry quas ab ipsius Christi ore Apostoli receperunt vel quas Spiritu Sancto dictante jubente vel Christo Domino imperante promulgarunt He makes then of these two sorts of Traditions as it were two opposite members dividing Traditions into Divine and Humane or Apostolical He calls the first Divine because they draw their original from God and his Spirit who hath instituted them the Apostles having onely published them by his motion and order he affirms that the other are humane and of humane right ad jus humanum spectant because according to him they proceed from an humane spirit and not from Gods and that the Apostles who were men instituted them and are become their Fathers and Authors If it be true as he faith that the Apostles have made these rules in the Church whether concerning faith or manners and that they have not received them from Jesus Christ nor the Holy Ghost he hath reason to say that the constitutions and traditions which he terms Apostolical are onely of humane right because they take their original and their authority from the spirit of man and which by consequence may be changed by men and it may follow also from the same principle that they are subject unto errour the spirit of a man how holy soever it be may always deceive him when he is the Author and original of his thoughts and actions It will follow thence also that the Apostles have governed the Church as Princes and Politicians govern their estates and their common wealths by their wit and reason It would follow likewise that the Church is not governed by the Spirit of Jesus Christ being they who first governed it and
no lesse easie then the former For a reason may be convincing in respect of one man which is not so unto another and he who favours an opinion may find it good when he who is of a contrary opinion may think it weak and an obstinate person will not suffer himself to be convinced by one reason and at worst he may easily perswade himself that when he cannot answer solidly the reasons of his adversaries some other more learned then he may do it This is that Tambourin affirms upon the Decalogue So that by these two conditions all sorts of opinions are easily made probable For on one side those which of themselves have neither probability nor truth nay become probable if we can find any plausible reason to sustain them and on the other side a proposition most assured and best established by Tradition by demonstration and faith it self will become onely probable considered by humane reason which is this Jesuits rule to discern of probable opinions For what reason so ever you can bring to prove it they who know the evasions of the Schools may elude it by some distinction or imagine that it may be eluded by some other and so it shall not be convincing and by consequence the proposition shall be onely probable by the definition of the Jesuits He pretends also that the e Infertur 2. unius Doctoris probi docti auctoritatem opinionem reddere probabilem quia non leve fundamentum est ejus auctoritas Ibid. n. 134. authority of one honest and knowing man makes an opinion probable because this authority is a foundation which is not of little consideration And though his Author be alone in his opinion they hold that his opinion ceases not to be probable provided that he believes that he hath reason to sustain it against all others f A communi opinione non facile recedendum viro tamen docto qui utriusque partis fundamenta perpenderit licet si suam etsi singularem probabiliorem judicet Ibid. n. 135. Because although we ought not easily divide from the common opinion yet it is lawful for a learned man if after he hath poised the grounds of the two opinions he judge that his own though singular is the more probable And by consequence others may follow his advice and repose themselves on him for their Salvation especially if they have not been Students and made profession of learning For this Jesuit assures us that g Unus etiam indoctus potest sequi alterius docti singularem sententiam Confidit enim prudenter doctrinae ejus Ibid. a man who is not learned may follow the opinion of him that is though it be a singular one For prudence wills that he confide in his Doctrine He onely would have us to take heed that this Doctor so singular in his opinion be none of the ancients So that if a man knows for certain that one or more of the ancient Doctors have heretofore held and taught publickly a proposition it must not prevail so far with us for all that as to believe therefore that it is probable if it be not approved by the Casuists and Divines of our times h Parum versato in mo alibus non liceâ— quodcunque in uno bel altero Doctore ex antiquioribus invenerit sequi non sciat etiam à recentioribus illam sententiam teueri Ibid. num 136. It is not lawful saith he for one that is not well verst in moral Divinity to follow all that he shall find in one or two ancient Doctors if he do not know that it is also the judgement of the moderns He pretends then that a new Divine may make his opinion probable against the judgement of all others by his own sole authority and that nevertheless many Doctors of the Church have not together the same credit because as Reginaldus and Celot after him say in the name of all the Society i Quae circa fidem emergunt difficultates eae sunt à veteribus hauriendae quae vero circa mores homine Christiono dignos à novitis scriptoribus the resolution of difficulties which concern faith must be taken from the ancients but that which concerns the life and manners of Christians ought to be taken out of the modern authors This seems to be the extreamest debasement and contempt of that can be done to them whom all antiquity and the whole Church have honoured as their Fathers and Masters not onely to defeat them of this quality but to set them below the meanest Authors and the last Divines of these times to whom is given the power and authority to make an opinion probable by their single approbation and by their single opinion secluding that of all others and this right is refused to the Fathers of the Church though they be many consenting together in the same judgement submitting them to the new Divines as their Masters and Judges in such manner as it is not lawful to hear them if they be not approved by the moderns I know not that the hereticks have said any thing more outragious and insolent against the Fathers of the Church Escobar knows not to be more reasonable in the point of probability then his Fraternity since he makes profession to report nothing but their opinions He proposes this question k Varietas opinionum inter superiorem subditum adest teneturne subditus obedire Escobar in preoem exam 3. n. 31. p 30. when a Superiour and those that are under his charge are of different apprehensions is the inferiour bound to obey him The first opinion he relates is that of l Asserit Salas teneri subditum obedire qurties potest absque peccato Salas who holds that the inferiour is bound to obey always whilst he may do it without sin The other opinion which he sets latter as the more probable is that of m At Castro Pelao Quando subditus inquit nititur opinione probabili quod praeceptum sit illicitum vel extra superior is jurisdictionem potest non obedire quia â—nicuique fas est sequi probabilem opinionem Castro-Palao who saith that when an inferier believes according to a probable opinion that the command of his Superiour is unjust or that he exceedeth the bounds of his jurisdiction he may disobey him because it is lawful for all men to follow a probable opinion According to this maxime there will be no more Superiours in the Church nor in the World nor obedience unto them it being manifest that there is no subject nor inferiour who cannot easily think in himself that the command of his Superiour is unjust and find reasons too to perswade himself of it and others also or at the least meet some Casuist who will tell him that it is probable that his Superiour hath gone beyond his power or hath no reason to command this and therefore he is not obliged to obey him So the authority of all forts
it is not only lawfull to accept but also to offer them And one of the Casuists of the Society who taught publickly at Caen of late years after he had endeavoured to justifie this brutal madness by many reasons which we shall represent in their place concludes in this manner e Qui haec responsa non probaâ—t ignari sunt communis consuctudinis vitae Licet enim homini hac ratione honorem suum tutari These who approve not these answers know not the manner of living and the ordinary custom of those who are in the world For it is lawfull for a man to maintain his Honour by this way There is no custom more wicked nor more general amongst people of base condition than to swear blaspheme and to break out into curses and imprecations against cattel men and every thing that gives them trouble Bauny considering this cursed custom saith according to his ordinary lenity Bauny Sum. c. 6. p. 73. For my part I believe that it may be said with truth that it is their choler by which such people suffer themselves to be transported it is no fault neither mortal nor venial to curse Dogs Hawks and other such things as are without reason The abuse which Merchants ought most to fear and avoid in their Traffick and which yet is very common at this day is falshood and deceit whether it be in falsifying and altering Merchandizes or in selling them dearer than they are worth or selling them by false weights and false measures But Layman following this custom saith f Mercatores statim injustitiae damnari non possunt si merci substantiam alienam puta tricico secale vino aquam picem cerae admisceant modo inde emptoribus nullum damnum inferatur merces proportione pretii quo venditur satis idonea sit ad consuetum usum Layman l. 3. tr 4. c. 17. n. 15. That we must not alwayes condemn the injustice of the Merchants when they mingle in their Merchandizes things of different kinds as Rye amongst Wheat Water with Wine and Pitch amongst Wax provided that this do not damnifie them that buy it and that the Merchandize be good enough of the price it costs and proper enough for common usage And he confirms his opinion by that of Lessius and Lopez saying g Addit Lessius n. 83. cum Lopez loco citato si additio materiae secundum se deterioris eò artificio industria fiat ut merces non sit minus bona idonea ad usum quam sine tali admixtione posse tunc consueto pretio divendi luerum majus repoâ—tari quippe quod industriae esse censetur sine damno emptorum percipitur Ibid. that Lessius and Lopez assure us that if the mixture of the matter which of it self is of less value be done with such artifice and industry that the Merchandize is not less good nor proper for mans use than it would be without this mixture it may be sold at the ordinary price and take more than it is worth because this gain belongs to the address and industry of the Merchant and is no wrong to those that buy it The ordinary vice of women and principally of those of Quality is luxury and vanity They cannot have a fairer pretence for to nourish nor a better excuse to justifie themselves in the excess they commit therein and the scandals which fall out thereupon than to say that it is the custom and that they do nothing but what is commonly done in the World by women of their condition Bauny approves this reason and makes use of it in his Summe ch 46. p. 717 718. where he proposes this question If maids and women who exceed modesty and duty and as we may say necessity of decency in their habits because they seek out therein curiosities not suitable to their estates may be thought capable of absolution when they know that some take thence occasion of sinning He acknowledgeth that many condemn this insupportable vanity and maintain that maids and women who are so disposed and will so continue are uncapable of absolution but he declares against their judgement and concludes in these terms Nevertheless we must say 1. that the woman who trims and adorns her self to please her Husband ought not to be blamed though she doth it as he saith through vanity and curiosity and against modesty knowing well that some draw from thence occasion of sin He saith moreover that neither is she more to be blamed if she trim her self in this sort with scandal when she doth it to satisfie the custom of the Countrey and not to be singular unlike and inferiour to those of their own sex He would then that the pretence of pleasing her Husband and a disorderly and shamefull custom should give liberty to a woman to break out into all sorts of luxury and vanity without being blameable and that custom hath power to change the nature of things to cause that it shall be lawfull to transgress the bounds of modesty that vanity shall be no longer vanity that luxury shall not be longer luxury and that scandal shall be no longer scandal He continues speaking in this manner 2. I say though this said woman had knowledge of the bad effects which her diligence in trimming her self would cause in the body and soul of those who behold her adorned with rich and precious clothes nevertheless she sins not in making use thereof The reason is Because to prevent the offence of another this woman is not bound to deprive her self of what the Law of the Countrey and nature it self permits That is to say that as custom makes luxury and vanity lawfull for her so it makes scandal also lawfull for her and that the abuses which happens very frequently in this point by the corruption of the World are just and true Laws and proper to regulate all things in a Country I might speak here of Usury and Symony which are two vices so common at this day that the Jesuits cover them much easier than others because that custom hath made them publick But I referr these disorders to be represented in the places proper for these matters that I may avoid repetitions CHAP. III. Of the Occasions of Sin That the Jesuits retain men in them and that according to their maxims there can be no next occasions of Sin ONE of the most important and most necessary counsels which can be given to a person who would avoid sin is that he fly the occasions and if we observe it we shall find that the most ordinary cause why the most part of those who have some good desire and care for their salvation attain not to a true and solid conversion or fall back after a while is because they have not received this advice or have not been faithfull in the observation of it This is such that the Jesuits acknowledge well indeed the importance and necessity
Maxims to those of the Apostle and the Gospel The horrour which he is constrained to receive hereof himself or rather the fear which he hath to make himself odious and unsufferable in the society of men is the cause that he dares not absolutely counsel men to practise this and he himself alledges inconveniencies which may render it difficult or dangerous For after that he had said that it is lawful to kill him who is become an accuser of us of pretended or even of true crimes but secret and concealed he adds 2 Sed haec sententis etsi fortasse speculative probabilis videri queat non ramen in praxi admittenda ob incommoda quae ex ea sequi possunt Facile enim bomines sibi persuadent se per calumniam accusari non esse effugium nisi morte accusatoris sicque multae caedes injustae patrarentur Denique talis in Republica benâ— constitute ut homicida pâ—ecteretur Dub. 8. num 47. pag 85. But this opinion also though it may be probable in the Theory yet for all that is not to be admitted in the practice because of the inconveniencies which may arise thereupon For men easily perswade themselves that they are scandalized when they are accused and that they have no other way to avoid the calumny than by killing him who accuseth them And by this means there would be a multitude of unjust murders committed Finally they who should practise this opinion in a Common-wealth well constituted would be punished as Murderers And below num 55. having said that it is a wholesom advice rather to endanger our own life than to kill him that assaults us he supports his advice with this reason 3 Quia periculum est ne ira aut odium se admisceant neve modum excedamus sic dum volumus servare vitam corporis vitam perdamus animae num 55. Because herein there is danger lest choler or hatred mingle it self therewith or that we should be transported with some excess and so thinking to preserve the life of our body we should lose that of our Soul And in Chap. 12. num 78. after he hath set down of himself a Proposition of which he declares himself to be the first Author saying that he had not found it in any that had written before him which is that it is lawful to kill him who hath spoken any contemptuous word unto us or who hath made only some sign thereof he brings in this restriction 4 Cavenda tameâ— vindictae libido Dub. 12. num 78. Yet he ought notwithstanding avoid herein the desire of revenge And though afterwards num 80. having proved by three different reasons that an honourable person who hath received a box on the ear may pursue him who gave it him and kill him though he were withdrawn speaking always of this as of an opinion he holds for true in it self or at least probable because of the reasons upon which he hath grounded it yet he seeks to sweeten a little the rigour of it concluding in these terms 5 Ob has rationes haec sententia est speculative probabilis tamen in praxi non videtur facile permittenda For these reasons this opinion is probable in the Theory yet for all that it ought not as it seems be easily permitted in the practice 6 Primum ob periculum odii vindictae excessus num 80. First because of the peril there is therein lest hatred and revenge should transport unto some excess This judicious Jesuit requires some prudent man to the practice of this so reasonable and humane a Doctrine he would have one kill in cold blood after he had well thought of it without heat or precipitation and that having well weighed what he goes about and being prepared for it as an action of importance he should follow this rare Doctrine with so great simplicity that he should thrust the sword into his brothers breast and presently withdraw it again without any kind of emotion that he should shed his blood and wash his hands in it as soberly as if it were in water It is therefore clear enough that all these precautions and apparent limitations proceed only from the apprehension he hath that this Doctrine which he believes to be good might become odious by the imprudence and evil conduct of those who know not rightly to make use of it He distrusts not the truth of this opinion since he saith that it is probable in the Theory but doubts of the capacity of many persons for executing it as he desires because of the danger that is therein lest hatred or revenge should transport them unto some excess He produces also some other reasons to the same purpose which are all taken from considerations purely humane and politick As when after he had given a liberty to kill upon an injury or word spoken in drollery he adds 1 Verum haec sententia non est sequendâ— Satis enim esse debet in Republics ut injuriae verbales verbis repelli legitima vindicta comprimi castigari possint num 78. That for all that we ought not to follow this opinion because in a Common-wealth we ought to content our selves with the power of repelling injuries by words which consist only in words and to repress and chastise them by a lawful and reasonable punishment And a little after num 82. to prevent the reproach which might be cast upon him for saying we might make use of all sorts of means which we should judge necessary to kill an accuser who charged us with false crimes or would discover and publish secret ones though true he endeavours to cover this pernicious Maxime by saying 2 Verum haec quoque sententia mihi in praxi non probatur quia multis caedibus occultis cum magna Relp perturbatione praeberet occafionem In jure enim defensionis semper confiderandum est ne ejus usus in perniciem Reip. vergat Tune enim non est permittendus num 82. Haec sententia est speculative probabilis For all that neither do I approve this opinion in the practice And his reason is because it would make way for many secret murders not without great trouble and disorder to the Common-wealth For we ought always in making use of the right we have to defend our selves take heed we do nothing which might tend to the prejudice of the Common-wealth For in this case it must not be used So he always maintains his opinion which teacheth to kill to be at least probable he also vindicates the licence he gives to kill to be a true and lawful right though he dares not advise us to use it at all times because of the consequences thereof Because as he now said 3 In jure enim desensionis semper considerandum est ne usus ejus in perniciem Reip. vergat Tunc enim non est permittendus We must always beware that
them in whose hands the Government now is By this discourse it is easie to conclude according to this Fathers Morals that Dr. Arnauld having proposed a Doctrine contrary to that which is in credit amongst the Jesuits deserved death and that he should do no other than a very laudable act who should draw the running knot about his neck to strangle him nay that it is necessary for them who have the Government in their hands to act thus and to make themselves the instruments of the passions and interests of these Fathers It is an incredible thing that a Priest a Monk and a Christian durst speak in this sort and durst rise up in a manner so cruel and shameful against a Priest and Sorbonne Doctor But it is more incredible that he would extend this fury as he makes shew of against so many Bishops and Doctors who approved his Book of frequent Communion and generally against all those who followed and esteemed the opinions of this Book that is to say against an infinity of learned and pious persons of all conditions It must be avowed that those who have allowed Murders who have given liberty to dispatch enemies by killing them were never transported to so great excess and that there are few men who have in their whole lives committed so great and abominable homicides as this Father so good and gentle hath a will to do with his own hand I speak not here though this seems to be its place of that detestable Doctrine which teaches Subjects to kill their Kings under pretence of their being Tyrants women great with child to cause the fruit in their wombs to perish when they cannot be delivered thereof without endangering their lives young Maidens defloured to expose their children to save their credit which is the Jesuits Doctrine I shall represent all these things more conveniently when I shall come to speak in particular of the Duties of every person according to his condition I will only observe here that if the Murder which is committed in all these cases and in all others which we have formerly related and extracted out of the Jesuits Books be not against the Commandment of God which forbids to kill as the Jesuits maintain it will not be easie to imagine on what occasion one may possibly break that Commandment or make himself criminal in the violation thereof if he may kill an enemy a slanderer a thief an invader an informer in false crimes and even in true ones but secret and which is yet more an innocent person and from whom he never received any displeasure an Infant a Prince a King all sorts of Superiors without excepting Fathers and Mothers If he may challenge into the field assassinate publickly kill by surprise or upon advantage cause to dye secretly by poyson or otherwise for the preservation of his life honour or goods and even for the least thing in the world as for an Apple when he believes himself obliged in honour not to let him carry it away who hath taken it I say if one may kill or cause to be killed in all these cases without punishment or sin as the Jesuits teach publickly it will necessarily follow that according to their Maxims for a man to make himself criminal against the Commandment which forbids Murder he must kill in a frolick and without any true or apparent cause Which cannot be suitable to any but Devils and those that have a diabolick malice ARTICLE V. Of Vncleanness which the Jesuits allow against the Command of God and natural Reason THe Jesuits allow almost every thing in this matter excepting the last act of this sin and it would be even hard to justifie according to their Maxims and Reasons that they condemn it at all in good earnest since they approve as we shall see presently and discharge from all crime all the ways and means that conduce to that end as lewd company impudent discourses kisses looks dishonest thoughts pollution it self which is in some sort the accomplishment of fleshly lust I know not whether we may not fear after what Father Tambourin hath written lest the Jesuits should at length affirm that Fornication may be lawful See here his words 1 Fornicationem esse peccatum mortale contrariuni afferete esse haereticum decretum est in Clement Ad nostram De haereticis Sed an sit solum prohibita jure positivo an etiam jure natureli atque adeo ex se sit intrinsece mala quaeritur à Doctoribus Et Durandus quidem Mardnus de Magistris Caramuel aliique putant esse solum ex jure positivo Verum communis omnium fere Doctorum sententia docet esse de lege naturali Mihi vero duo sunt certs Primo hanc communem esse veram sententiam Secundo data hac veritate dicendum à nobis esse dari rationem naturalem id certo probantem sed ingenue fateri nos debere eam à priori nondum clare esse compertam Ita solemus respondere cum de coeli quibusdam occultis cum de quadratura circuli aliisque similibus etiam in Philosophia disputamus ea nimitum certa esse certisque rationibus posse probari verum eas nondum adhuc fuisse manifeste ab ullo proposi as Dixi à priori nam à posteriori satis manifeste probatur praesertim ex eo quod si non esset jure naturali prohibita in aliquo tandem urgentissimo casu postet in ea dispensari quod nullo modo dici potest Tambourin lib. 7. decal cap. 1. sect 2. num 1. It is defined by the Clementine Ad nostram De Haereticis That Fornication is a mortal sin and that to say the contrary is an Heresie But whether it be forbidden by positive or natural Law and by consequent whether it be evil in it self is a question amongst the Doctors Durand Martinus de Magistris Caramuel and some few others believe that it is forbidden by positive Law only But the common opinion and of almost all the Doctors is that it is forbidden by the Law of Nature As for me I hold two things for certain First that the common opinion is true Secondly that this truth being presupposed we must say that there is some natural reason which proves it But I must ingenuously acknowledge that the Principle whence this Conclusion is drawn is not yet entirely discovered After this manner it is that we are accustomed to answer concerning some secrets of Heaven or the squaring of the Circle or other like questions when we dispute of them in Philosophy For we say that these things are certain and that they may be proved by demonstrative reasons but no man hath yet propounded them I say the Principle whence this Conclusion is drawn For if the consequences of it be considered it may be proved manifestly enough principally from this that if it were not forbidden by the Law of Nature it might be granted by dispensation in some
true piety and true vertue and the eternal Salvation of Souls and not the appearances and shadows of falshood and hypocrisie He repeats the same thing afterwards and he saith it also more clearly and strongly in these terms 2 Duplex est lex legislatrix potestas Ecclesiastick civilis Differunt inter se tum ratione originis quia Ecclesiastica potestas proxime immediate à Deo instituta est civilis vero ab hominibus provenit tum ratione objecti finis quia Ecclesiastica versatur peâ— se directe â—rga res spirituales ad salutem vitam aeternam ordinatas sicut constat ex verbis Christi Matth. 16. Tibi dabo claves regni coelorum Joan. 21. Pasce oves meas ex Apostolo Paulo cap. 2. Act. Posuit nos Spiritus Sanctus Episcopos regere Ecclesiam Dei quam acquisivit sanguine suo Ibid. cap. 6. num 1. pag. 53. There are two sorts of Laws and two sorts of Powers to make Laws Ecclesiastick and Civil They are different as well in their original because the Ecclesiastick Power is instituted immediately from God and the Civil Power comes immediately from men as in their objects and their ends because the Ecclesiastick Power regards properly and directly spiritual things which conduct Souls unto Salvation and eternal life as those words of our Saviour in Matth. 16. do testifie I will give thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven and in S. John 21. Feed my lambs and those of S. Paul in Act. 20. The Holy Ghost hath established you Bishops to govern the Church of God which he hath purchased with his Blood He explicates the same truth yet more fully and discovers the principal foundation thereof pursuing his discourse and drawing this consequence from what he now said 3 Quare cum Christus sanguinem suum fuderit ut acquireret fundaret Ecclesiam sanctam ad vitam aeternam ordinatam idcirco etiam Pastores Episcopos el constituit qui ad cundem vitae aeâ—ernae finem Ecclesiam dirigerent gubernatent Civilis vero potestas per se ac directe temporalem tantum commoditatem ceu pacem spectat Ibid. Wherefore Jesus Christ having shed his Blood to purchase and found a Church which is holy and ordained to eternal life he hath also given it Pastors and Bishops to govern and conduct it to this very eternal life But Civil Power regards properly and directly wealth and peace temporal only Which shews clearly the difference which is betwixt Politick and Church power and betwixt the Laws of the one and the other For the Civil Power regards the outward order and civil tranquillity alone and prescribes none but outward and humane means to attain this end But the Church being established for procuring unto men eternal life inward and divine peace it ought to have power to ordain means and to give commands proportionate to that end whereunto we cannot attain but by actions of the Soul altogether spiritual and divine And for that cause it must needs be that its commands should be more internal than external spiritual than corporal divine than humane We need then no other proofs against the errours of Layman and his Brethren than his own confession which is more than sufficient to overturn all that they said before that we might satisfie the Commandments of the Church by actions of vain-glory lust avarice and Sacriledges That we may fulfil them without any will to fulfil them and even with an express will not to satisfie them and to despise them provided we do outwardly what is commanded For these actions thus done have no communication with the Salvation of Souls and eternal life and being rather formally opposite thereto they also have nothing common with the Commandments of the Church which ordains for its Children no other than means to attain unto eternal life and works which procure the Salvation of the Soul that is to say actions of vertue and charity sobriety penitence and obedience especially which is the Soul and Spirit of all other actions For to answer unto a truth so clear what Sanchez doth that the Church commands only a material obedience is to forget the respect due unto the Church and to oppose the light of reason as well as of Faith and the Gospel 1 Quod si objicias praecepra obligare ad â—bedientiam quae non adesse videtur ubi non adest intentio satisfaciendi praecepto Râ—spondeo non obligare ad obedientiam formalem sed materialem nempe ut fiâ—t quod praecipitur quamvis non fiat proprerea quod praecipitur Sanchez mor. qq lib. 1. cap. 13. num 9. pag. 63. But if you object saith this Jesuit that the Commandments oblige unto obedience and that it seems that he hath it not who hath no intent at all to satisfie the Commandment I answer that they oblige not to a formal but material obedience that is to do that which is commanded though it be not done for the reason it was commanded And if this Explication make you not to understand sufficiently what this material obedience is Layman will declare it unto you more perspicuously and will tell you that it is a corporal and purely external obedience maintaining that the Church demands no other and proving it by Seneca's Authority who was without doubt very intelligent in the Government of the Church and an excellent Judge of the Authority it hath received from Jesus Christ for conducting Souls unto eternal life 2 Convenienter videtur ut humana potestas fire jurisdictio solum se extendat ad actiones humanas quatenus in externam materiam transeunt ut signo aliquo produntur quod etiam Seneca notat lib. 3. de Beneficiis Etrat si quis puter servitutem in totum hominem descendere Pars enim melior excepta est Corpora obnoxia sunt adscripts dominis mens sui juris est Layman l. 1. tr 4. c 4. n. 5. pag 49. It seems saith Layman that it is reasonable that humane Power and Jurisdiction should not be extended farther than to humane actions which are discernable by their objects and some external sign Which Seneca also observes in 5. Book de Beneficiis It is an errour to believe that servitude extends it self over all that which is in man his best part is exempt from it The body only is subject to the will of a Master and depends on his power but his spirit is always independent and its own We must then believe according to the opinion of this Jesuit since he hath learned it of Seneca that the Church hath no power save over the bodies of Christians no more than Masters have over those of their slaves and Princes over their Subjects that Christ hath not subjected unto it the whole man but the least part of him which is his body and it hath no power over Souls which are free and independent in respect of it and in
If amongst many passages which I commonly produce on the same Subject there be some which appear not clear enough there may be found in others that which seems to be wanting in them But I have reason to believe that there is no cause to reproach me herein for I have taken a particular care not only to speak things so as I understood them but also to enter as far as I could into the very thoughts of the Fathers whom I have alledged knowing that it is never lawful to wound Justice or Charity under a pretence of combating Errour and defending Truth and that Errour it self may not be assailed nor Truth defended by lying and disguisement I am so far from desiring to augment this evil or to exaggerate these things that I oftentimes abstain from speaking as I could without departing from my design They that have any love or knowledge of the Truth will easily perceive this my moderation and they will oftentimes find nothing else to reprove me for in many important points but that I have not spoken enough therein and that I give over many times where they would cry out to me that I ought to go on and follow my Subject to the utmost If there be any who find herein expressions which seem to them to be too vehement and far removed from that sweetness and moderation which they love I beseech them not to judge according to their disposition but according to the things whereof I speak The passion or the praeoccupation they may be under either for the pernicious Maxims which I represent or for the Authors or for the Defenders of them may be capable to perswade them that I ought to have spoken of them with so much respect and moderation as belongs to the most serious and holy things But the reason and the nature even of the things themselves may easily undeceive them if they consider that expressions ought to correspond with their subjects and that it would introduce a disproportion to represent those things which are ridiculous and contemptible as seriously as if they were not and that this were to give too much advantage to presumption and insolence which speaks proudly to make Errour triumph over Truth and to give it in some sort the victory to treat it otherwise than with such force and vigour as is capable to repress and humble it So it is that Truth would be defended and hath it self declared that it will one day revenge it self on them that have assailed it with scorn and obstinacy not only bruising their heads but also insulting over them that they may be covered with confusion So that I have some cause to fear in this point on the behalf of Truth that I have been rather too reserved than too free And it seems that they who have any love for it may complain of me that I have not defended it with force and ardour enough in an encounter where it hath been assaulted by a very extraordinary Conspiracy of persons who for their own interest sufficiently well known have endeavoured to blot out of the memory of the Faithful and Books of the Church the most pure and safe Maxims concerning the Regulation and Conduct of Christian life and Manners And I may perhaps have some trouble to defend my self from this reproach and to hinder that it be not believed That I have not defended the Cause of the Church and of Truth with the zeal which they deserved but that I have already declared that I have not at all undertaken properly to defend it or refute those who have assailed and hurt it so cruelly but to make appear only the Errours and the pernicious Maxims by which they have overturned all Discipline and all the Rules of Manners and Christian life even the most holy and best established upon the Scriptures and Books of the Saints and also by their Examples Hereunto I have limited and obliged my self in this Work It may be God will raise up some other who shall go on where I leave and will undertake to refute fully the Errours which I have discovered and to establish by the Principles of Faith and Tradition the Truths which I have only noted in my passage The manner in which this first Book shall be received and the profit which will come thereon may procure a disposition to receive also yet better another of greater importance and be a motive to engage God to stir up some other person to labour therein We are all in his hands our travels and our thoughts whereof the first and principal ought to be never in any thing to have other than his designs He knows that which he hath given me in this Work is no other than to perform some Service to his Church and my Neighbour I beseech him to bless it with success leaving it to his Providence to dispose of it according as he shall please and I do for the present accept with all respect and submission whatsoever he shall ordain thereof The Necessity and Utility of this Work IF the pernicious Maxims of the Jesuits Morality should for the present be presented no otherwise than in an extract without adding any thing thereto but what is found in their Authors the World is at this day so indifferent in things which respect their Salvation and Religion there would be found very few persons who would be touched therewith or who would take any pains to consider them But it is come to pass by the particular order of Divine Providence that he who hath enterprised to discover them some years ago hath exprest them in a manner so taking that hath attracted the whole World unto him to read them by the grace of his style and thereupon hath made them easily to appear odious and insupportable by their proper excesses and extravagancies This so happy beginning had hath success much more happy for mens minds being touched with a desire to know particularly things so important and so prejudicial to their Consciences and Salvation my Masters the Parochial Rectors of Rouen and Paris have in pursuit thereof published with a zeal worthy of their Charge many learned Writings which have given to all the World enough of instruction and light to conceive the distance and horrour they ought to keep towards that wicked Doctrine and the danger whereinto they put them who follow these Guides who pursue or practise them But as their design was only to make a speedy order against an evil which then did but begin to appear they believed that it was sufficient to advise their people thereof in general terms in notifying unto them some of the more pernicious propositions without extending them further to discover their principles consequences and unhappy effects as it had been easie for them to do and they thought that to strangle them in their birth it would have been sufficient only to expose them to the view of the whole World being in themselves so odious and monstrous
and to oppose themselves to those that teach them as the Shepherds obliged to resist the Wolves who would devour their stock Yet they omitted not to have recourse to the Authority of the Church and to address their complaints and requests to my Lords the Bishops and to the General Assembly of the Clergie of France in the year 1656. who seeing that it was not at all in their power at that time to do them justice did at least make it known to the whole Church that opportunity only was wanting unto them And for that cause ordained that the Instructions of S. Charles should be imprinted by the order of the Clergie with a circular Letter to all my Lords the Prelates which served to prejudge their opinions and to give as it were a commencement to the condemnation of all these Maxims in general expecting till some opportunity were offered to do it more solemnly The voice of these charitable Pastors was heard and faithfully followed by their sheep who by the submission they owed to them and through the confidence which they had in their honesty and sufficiency entred into an aversion against this new Doctrine as soon as it was declared unto them that it was contrary to the Doctrine of the Church and that of the holy Fathers It were also to be wished that this same voice which came from Heaven being Jesus Christ speaks in the Church by its Pastors had turned or at leastwise stayed the Authors of this Doctrine and had kept them in silence and that they had themselves also suppressed these strange opinions and pernicious Maxims against which they saw the whole World to rise with a general indignation and with a most just zeal But this did nothing but provoke them yet more so that instead of receiving Christian-like the charitable correction of these worthy Pastors of Souls they had the confidence to appear in publick to maintain so great Errours by Writings yet more wicked imitating those fierce beasts who issue in fury out of the Forests and Dens to defend their young when they are about to be taken from them My Masters the Parochial Rectors had by an extraordinary temperance and moderation suppressed the names of the Jesuits and not distinguished them from the other Casuists attacquing the Doctrine only without touching the persons of any particular Order But these good Fathers could neither lye hid nor keep silence and judged themselves unworthy of the favour which they had received upon this occasion And as if this Doctrine had been their own particularly they would needs declare themselves the Defenders of it as indeed they are the principal and even the first Authors thereof in many of its most important points They made for it an Apologie wherein so very far were they from disavowing and retracting those pernicious Maxims wherewith they were reproached that they did highly maintain them and to testifie that they never intended to recant them they have declared that in many matters wherein their excesses are most visible they can yet speak more and give yet more licence to their spirits An evil so publick and so obstinate cannot be healed nor stayed by simple words Which thing hath obliged my Masters the Parochial Rectors to renew their complaints and their instances to my Lords the Prelates Some of them have already worthily acquitted themselves in this their duty to the Church and People who depend on their charge And it is hoped that the zeal and charity of the rest will press them to give the same testimony unto the truth and that if some of them for some particular reasons cannot do it so solemnly as they desire yet they will not cease to condemn in their hearts and upon occasions which shall be offered this novel Doctrine and to keep those whom they can at a distance from it as a most pernicious Divinity After all this it was thought to be high time farther to discover this Doctrine and to represent it in the whole extent it hath in the Books of the Jesuits that the corruption and the venom of it might be better known It had been to little purpose to have done it sooner because that the excess and overthrow it hath given to all the true Rules of Morality and Christian piety are so great and so incredible that the world having yet never heard any thing like unto it would have been surprized at the novelty and impiety of the principal Maxims of these dreadful Morals so that many would have been troubled to believe it others would have been offended at it and many would have altogether neglected it and would not so much as have taken the pains only to have informed themselves so far as that they might not suffer themselves to be surprized therein The Jesuits themselves would not have failed to have broken out into complaints calumnies and impostures which are common with them in use against such as discover their secrets and the shame of their Divinity and they would have employed all their artifices and disguises to elude or obscure the most clear things wherewith they should have been reproached though they had been represented simply as they are expressed in their Books But yet notwithstanding that these pernicious Maxims had been confounded and decryed by my Masters the Parochial Rectors fulminated by the censures of the Bishops there is cause to hope that exposing them to the day will be useful to many of the Faithful and hereby will be seen more clearly the justice and necessity of the pursuits which the Parochial Rectors made for obtaining a censure of them the equity of the Judgment of the Prelates made in pursuance thereof and the obligation which all the Faithful have upon them to stiffle these Monsters of Errour and Impiety which multiply continually and prey upon the Church So that this will even contribute very much to redouble the submission and confidence which they ought to have towards their Pastors seeing from what mischiefs their vigilance and their zeal hath preserved them and with what prudence and wisdom they have conducted them in this affair having not discovered the greatness of the evil to them before as it may be said they had delivered them from it And it may also come to pass that the Authors and Defenders of these wicked Doctrines may themselves be surprized and have horrour when they see together in a sequence of Principles and Conclusions the opinions which they have maintained to this present Because it is very common for things good or evil which apart make no great impression upon the spirit surprize and touch it powerfully when as they are united and joyned together There is also cause to believe that many of those who have followed unto this present these novel Maxims of the Jesuits only because they did not perceive all the unhappy consequences and pernicious effects of them now coming to know them as this Book will give them means to do will relinquish them
motive whatsoever it be swear that he hath not done a thing which notwithstanding he hath done indeed It is not sufficient for him to lye formally he will also joyn perjury to lying in saying that one may swear that he hath not done that which he hath done and he would cover this lye and this perjury by the thought of a man onely in what estate and in what circumstances soever he be alone or in company speaking for recreation or for other motive whatsoever it be pretending that he may swear that he hath not done which he hath done without fear of taking a false oath provided b Intelligendo intra se aliud revera fecit that he intend onely in his mind some other thing that he had not done See here Sanchez first method which serves for nothing but to learn to lye purely simply and without equivocation by using words that are not equivocal in themselves at all and which cannot signify that which one saith nor that which is in ones mind at all as he affirms himself So that such words are contrary to the thoughts which he hath and he saith really other things then he thinketh which is to lye formally and simply The second method is no better then the former for he saith one may c Vel intelligendo aliam diem ab ea aqua fecit understand or supply out of ones mind that he hath not done the thing on an other day then that on which he did it or else that he hath not done it in an other place an other time or an other company or with other circumstances of which he gives him choice leaving him entire liberty to make use of which he pleases to deceive without scruple For his words are clear and general d Vel intelligendo aliud quodvis additum verum quodcunque illuct sit Or intending saith he some quite other thing and quite other circumstance which he pleases to add which is true of what sort soever it be And with these precautions if you will believe him e Revera non mentitur nec perjurus est he lyes not at all in effect and is not perjured imagining and pretending to make us believe that he hath spoken no false thing and that he hath spoken the very truth though he say not that which is demanded of him nor that which the words he uttereth signifie of themselves but an other truth altogether different sed aliam veritatem disparatam This is a true way to be able to justifie all manner of lyes and perjuries the greatest lyar and the greatest impostor may make use hereof to justify and to maintain himself in these crimes in saying that his meaning was other than his saying and that so f Revera non mentitur nec perjurus est sed tantum non dicit unam veritatem determinatam qaam auditores concipiunt ac verbo illo significant sed aliam veritatem disparatam He is really neither lyar nor perjured but onely did not speak precisely a truth which they understood who did hear him and which his words signified but another truth which had no thing ommon therewith But that for this they had no cause to complain of what he said to them and answered in this manner they having no right to question him For he presupposeth as a general maxime g Quia alteri respondere non obligatus nec obligatur respondere ad ejus mentem that when one is not obliged to answer a person neither is he obliged to answer according to his thoughts Which he supports by a maxime of Logick which saith h A quo enim removetur genus omnis quoque species removetur That when the general kind of any thing is removed the special sorts are also removed This reasoning he saith he learned from Navarre who saith that when one is not obliged to answer a person he may answer him in what manner he pleases he is not obliged to give him an honest civil true sincere faithful one but that he may make one in all points contrary for that we may make him none if we please There is none that sees not clearly what follows from this that incivil conversation especially amongst equals where one hath no authority over others nor right to question them nor to oblige them to answer to that which is proposed or demanded of them every one may say what he will and understand what he will by his words without apprehending that he lies and believing that he speaks the truth because he represents it in his minde though he hide it or expresse even the contrary in his words But there is great difference betwixt conceiving or thinking the truth and speaking or signifying it to others Those who will follow this Jesuit shall have the truth in their thoughts but not in their words they conceive it well but they do not speak it at all and in this they are lyars and perjured notwithstanding all their intentions and secret thoughts for to lye is no other thing then to speak otherwise then a man thinks and to say one thing having another in his thoughts Filliutius seems at first sight not to agree with Sanchez in this point a Quinto quaeritur quale peccatum sit uti amphibologia absque rationabili causa Filliutius qq mor. tom 2. tract 25. c. 11. n. 330. p. 204. It is demanded saith he what sin it is to make use of equivocations without any reafonable cause His first answer is b Respondeo dico primo probabile esse quod sit mendacium atque adeo perjurium si confirmetur juramento It is probable that it is a lye and by confequence perjury when it is confirmed with an oath But a little after his inclination which he hath for looseness and to flatter the lust and corruptions of men make him say c Dico 2. probabilius videri non esse mendacium nec perjurium Ibid. That it seemeth more probable that in rigour it is no lye nor any perjury His principal reason is d Quia qui sic loquitur jurat non habet intentionem dicendi falsum vel jurandi salsitatem ut supponimus Ibid. because that he who talks and swears after this manner hath no intention as is presupposed to speak nor to swear false though he indeed both speak and swear so He pretends then as Sanchez that the inward will of man alone can change the signification of words and give to them such as he pleases It is true that Sanchez gives not this power to the intention alone without joyning some mental restriction untoâ—t by which he forms in his mind a true sense in saying in himself that he will neither lye nor forswear Filliutius notwithstanding fails not to approve these restrictions and mental additions of Sanchez e Et quod profertur in rigore habet aliquem sensum verum quem talis intendit
must be very dull who cannot make use of this invention since it is not of necessity no not to know in particular nor what he doth nor what he saith whether it be true or not indeed and that it is sufficient to believe or suppose in general that it may be so and that a nimble witted man may finde some sense in which he can make the words true which are false in their natural and onely sense and which by consequence are not equivocations though he who pronounces them cannot do it SECT V. The method of the same Jesuits to hinder their equivocations from being ever discovered and that no person may be deprived of his liberty to make use of them AFter they have made the use of equivocations so free so common and so easie that all the world may make use of them indifferently on all occasions there remains nothing for the Masters of this art that is to say the Jesuits to do but to establish well the practice and to fortify themselves in such sort against all opposition that whatsoever precaution they use no person may be able to hinder them from making use thereof when they will nor to discover it when they have used it This Sanchez hath attempted to do and in this he hath laboured with great care and he hath proceeded therein beyond all other who have written on this matter After he hath established many rules given many advices about equivocations and the manner to form and make use of them he concludes with this advice as the last and most important a Tandem id observandum est quotier licitum est ad se tuendum uti aliqua aequivocatione id quoque erit licitum etsi interrogans urgeat excludens illam aequivocationem Sanch. op mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 45. p. 30. That so often as it is lawful in our own defence to use equivocations they may be used though he who examines us do presse us to answer him without making use of this very equivocation That is to say that so often as you believe that you may use equivocations which is alway lawful according to this Casuist and his Fraternity as we have already reported on all occasions and even without necessity and reason though you be admonished not to make use of it when it is forbidden you when you are caused to promise and even to swear that you will make no use of it notwithstanding all these precautions these defences these promises and the oath that you have made you have always the liberty to make use thereof None can speak more clearly and more favourably Notwithstanding if the practice of this rule seem to you too hard or too large he will help your understanding by examples which he brings and your belief by the authority of other Casuists whom he cites for you in these terms b Atque idem docent de reo qui rogatus de delicto secreto urgetur ut dicat sive fecerit publice sive occulto sive ipse Judex juridice interroget sive noa dicentes posse adhuc respondere se non fecisse intelligendo non ut tu in iniquitate tua rogas sed ut teneris tanquam Judex rogare Ibid. The Casuists say the same thing of a man accused who being axamined upon any secret crime is prest to answer whether it be publiquely or privately whether it be before a Judge juridically or not For they hold in this very case that he may answer that he hath not done it intending his answer not in that manner as the Judge examines him maliciously but in the manner he ought to examine him in the quality of a Judge It is sufficient that a malefactor or a witness form within himself a probable opinion that the Judge who examine him juridically ought not to examine him in the manner that he doth for to mock him and to elude his interrogatories by equivocation or by confidently denying most clear and certain things so that this mischief cannot possibly be hindred or prevented by him what precaution soever he useth The Judge is malicious and he interrogates this malefactor maliciously according to Sanchez because that in examining he uses the precautions which he believes necessary to draw the truth out of his mouth This malefactor is not malicious he answers not malicously but reasonably and wisely according to the Divinity of this Father because he observes exactly the rules of the equivocations and omits no jugling slight of mind to obscure the truth and to deceive the Judge who interrogates him by lying and perjury He brings also another example of the same subject c Atque idem docet de rogato à custodibus urbis aliqaem locum peste infectum esse falso ex stimantibus rogantibus quempiam an ex co loco venerit sive infectus peste sit five non nempe posse ipsum respondere non venire ex eo intelligendo non ut vos rogatis sed ut deberetis rogare Ibid. He holds the same thing saith he speaking of Navarre touching him who is interrogated by a Town-guard who believe falsely that the Town from whence he comes is infected with the plague and demands from him if he came from thence whether it be infected or it be not infected he may answer that he came not thence making this mental restriction in his minde I came thence not according to the question you make but according to the question you ought to make This method is not very favourable to civil government nor gives it much weight to the authority of Magistrates and their Officers also it is not very favourable for the establishment of Laws and for assuring the obedience which people owe unto Princes When a Soveraign commands any thing to his subjects there is no private man who shall receive his orders who may not promise to obey him though he be resolved to do nothing of that he shall command him by making use of this mental restriction and saying in himself d Non ut tu imperas sed ut deberes imperare I will do this not according as you command me but as you ought to command me Also in like manner when he is demanded any thing whereunto he imagines that he is not obliged to answer according to truth he may speak contrary to that which he thinks and to that which is true by the favour of this equivocation and of this secret thought which he bears in his minde e Non ut tuâ—ogas sed ut debâ—es interragaâ—e In answer saith he in himself not to that which you demand of me but according to that you ought to have demanded of me One may say by proportion the same thing of a child in relation to a Father of a servant in relation to a Master of a Monk or any other inferiour in relation to his Superior and so this rule banisheth absolutely truth and sincerity out of
the world and dispenseth with all sort of persons for the fidelity and obedience they owe to whomsoever it be Sanchez joyns a reason to the example and authority that he may yet more confirm the possession and use of these equivocations f Quorum omnium ea est ratio quiâ—etsi interrogans excladat eo ipso omnem alium modum sciendi responsio ex se id significet id tamen verum est ex formali iniqua interrogant is intentione cui imputari debet repugnantia in ipsis verbis interrogatione Ibid. The reason of all this saith he is because though he who interrogates in this sort reduces his demand to one sole sence excluding all others and that the answer hath in it self a reference unto this sence notwithstanding this is true onely because of the ill intention of him who interrogates to which ought to be imputed the discordance betwixt the Author and the interrogations It suffices not him to justify him who forswears himself before the civil Officers or before a Judge that examines him juridically but he casts this perjury and crime upon the Judge himself He confesses that there is falsity and by consequence perjury in the answer of those who make use of these equivocations in the manner he teaches them to illude the intergatories of a Judge and he notes himself this falsity and perjury though he expresse it modestly enough calling it g Repugnantia in ipsis verbis interrogatione a repugnance and discordance from the answer of the persons that are forsworn and the intergatories which a Judge or other Magistrate puts to him And because he will not have this crime fall on them who commit it by his counsel and his order he casts it upon the Officer or the Judge h Cut imputari debet repugnantiain ipsis verbis interrogatione to whom must be imputed saith he the discordance which is found betwixt the answer and the interrogation Though both the one and the other are in no wise accessory thereto and give onely occasion to commit it by forbidding it expressely and using all the precaution they could to hinder it So that there is nothing to be imputed unto them on this occasion but onely that they desired him to speak sincerely and would hinder him from using equivocations of which this Jesuit believes he hath right to make use And this is that without doubt for which he imputes the malice to the Judge that he would hinder the accused from using his right that he hath and cause him to speak sincerely where he hath right to speak equivocally and by consequence to condemn him of injustice and malice who would hinder him from using this right He then sets the Judge in the place of the malefactor and the malefactor in the place of the Judge making the malefactor Judge of his Judge himself and giving him liberty to judge and condemn him even when he forswears himself in his presence by answering according to his own fancy and not according to the Judges interrogatory and makes him say unto his Judge unawares to him for this is the secret and the retentum of the equivocation which passeth inwardly in his minde i Non ut tu in iniquitate tua rogâ—o sed ut teneris tanquà m Judex interrogare I answer thee not in the manner which thou dost examine me maliciously but in the manner thou oughtest to examine me as a Judge Which he testifies yet more clearly when he saith that all this disguisement deceit and lying of this man who forswears himself k Ex formali iniqua interrogantis intentione cui imputari debet repugnantia in verbis ipsis interrogatione comes from the wicked intention of him that examines him to which ought to be imputed the discordance which is found betwixt the answer and the interrogation But he justifies highly the lyar and the perjurer saying l Utitur jure suo respondendo ad mentem legitimam quae inesse debet Ibid. pag 31. he makes use of his right in answering his Judge following the lawful thought which he ought to have and not following that which he hath maliciously That is to say not onely reforming the Sentence of his Judge but in condemning his judgement his thoughts his proceeding as of a mischievous or ignorant man who knows not how to execute his charge and he doth all this lawfully if we believe Sanchez as having a particular right which this Jesuit hath given them utitur jure suo From these principles and conclusions Sanchez draws this conclusion to establish these equivocations m Quare idem consco ob candem rationem quantumcunque reduplicet inquus interrogator ut juret se nulla aequivecatioâ—e uti absque omni prorsus aequivocatione id intelligere Adhuc enim jurare potest intelligendo ita ut plane debeat loqui explicare vel aliud mente concipendo quo verum id reddatur Ibid. p. 31. For this cause I am always of this judgement for this same reason whatsoever the Judge urgeth who interrogates unjusâ—lyâ— so fareven as to make the examinant swear that he doth not make use of equivocations and that he intends that which he saith without any equivocation For he may also swear understanding secretly that he doth it as far as he is obliged to speak clearly and to expound himself or by forming some other thought which may make his answer true So that what instance soever the Judge can make or other person that examines him and conjures him to speak the truth although he oblige him to promise and even make him to swear that he will answer sincerely and not make use of any equivocation notwithstanding after his promise and after his oath he may yet delude the Judge and him that examines him and answer by equivocation even then when he promiseth and sweareth that he will not make use thereof n Intelligendo ita ut plaene debeat loqui explicare Vel aliud mente concipicendo quo vtrum id reddatur understanding always that he speaks and answers him as he ought that is according to the right he thinks he hath if he know no other occasion or if there come in his mind no other sence to which he may secretly referre his words to give them some colour and some appearance of truth His reason is the self-same which he hath already made often use of o Quia cum non teneatur ad formalem interrogantis mentem respondere sed ad debitam illa responsio juxta debitam ejus mentem vera est Ibid. pag. 31. because he is not obliged to answer to the intention and the thoughts which he hath who examines him but to that which he ought to have his answer is true following this intention and this thought which he ought to have This man doth not say that which he thinks also he answers not that which
perjure himself if he have not a full knowledge being transported with passion and by the violence of some habit it is no mortal sin although he doth swear without necessity without utility and by an evil custom contracted by many crimes and which is yet more considerable though he also have a will and affection addicted to sin because of this evil custom That is to say that a man may have a will carryed on to sin and sin actually without sinning and without being capable of the sin which he commits Bauny in the 6. chap. of his Summe p. 73. speaks of persons accustomed to curse creatures that are without reason as Gentlemen that curse their Dogs and Hawks when they have no good Game Carters their Horses when they put them to trouble Mariners the season and the wind when it is contrary to them And after he had reported the opinion of Navarre and some others who condemn these maledictions of venial sin he adds As for me I believe that I may say with truth that setting aside choler by which such people suffer themselves to be transported in such innocent exercises it is no fault neither venial nor mortal to curse Dogs Horses Hawks or other irrational things So that there is nothing but choler according to him that causes sin in these curses he that shall utter them in cold blood and without transport or who shall make use of them onely as ornaments of language as he saith speaking of Oaths chap. 5. p. 66. or who suffers himself to go on therein by an evil custom which is become natural and makes him do it without violence without transportation and even so that he perceives it not he committeth no sin in the most strange curses and execrations But to hold to these principles of the Jesuits and others and to follow their arguments if it fall out that these same persons who are accustomed to utter these curses be also transported with choler their choler will be no sin no more then their curses especially if it come from a strong habit and that the emotion be so strong that it trouble and blind the minde Layman comprizes in a few words all that Bauny Filliutius Escobar and Sanchez have said concerning the custom of swearing and blaspheming He speaks also more precisely and more clearly then they discharging absolutely of all sin the blasphemies and perjuries which are made by an evil habit contracted by long use which he assures us of as a certain truth and which follows necessarily from the principles of his Divinity See here his terms h Ex dictis colligitur eum qui ex inveterata consuetudine velut quadam necessario impetu rem malam agit vâ—…câ— materiales blasphemias pâ—ofert vel perjuria effundit tunc non peccare nec pâ—oprie blasphemare quia nullum peccatum sine rationis deliberatione committitur Layman l. 1. tr 2. c. 3. n. 6. p. 20. It follows from that which I have said that he who from the impression of an inveterate custom as it were by a sort of impetuous necessity is transported to do evil as to speak words of blasphemy or perjury sins not at all and to speak properly blasphemes not at all because a man cannot sin at all without rational knowledge and deliberation Following his principles there are no habitual sins at all since evil custom not onely doth neither cause nor augment sin but also diminisheth it and sometimes takes it wholly away and a person who blasphemes forswears and doth every other criminal thing that can be sins not according to this maxime when it comes from an evil inveterate custom which is become natural which carryes him on to the commission of all these crimes by a kind of necessary impression almost without any sensible apprehension So the condition of this man altogether corrupt and altogether plunged in vice shall be better then of another lesse vicious and exempt from wicked habits This man by often sinning shall be put into an estate of not sinning any more and into a kind of for him happy necessity which will give him a power to commit all sorts of crimes securely freely and without being more criminal or even at all guilty But if it be true that by multitude of sins a man becomes uncapable of sinning and that multitude of sins make a man innocent this would be a powerful motive to carry men on to all sorts of vices and excesse and to set men farther from virtues whose exercise is more painful and never brings that advantage of being uncapable of sinning or to have power to commit the greatest sins without sinning CHAP. III. Of Sins of Ignorance That Ignorance excuses sins committed without knowing them and even those which are committed afterwards And that there is properly no sins of Ignorance according to the Jesuits THere is a particular connexion and as it were a natural consequence betwixt sins of evil habits and sins of Ignorance For one of the effects of an evil habit is by little and little to stifle the remorses of sin and by consequence to remove all thoughts of it and to take away the knowledge of it For this cause having before viewed what the Jesuits say of habitual sin order requires that we represent their opinion of those which are committed by ignorance Ignorance may be considered either in regard of those sins which are committed without knowledge of them or in regard of those which have been heretofore committed without thinking to do evil And it may be inquired if the first be true sins and what is to be done when we come to apprehend that the second are so As to the latter point Bauny in his Summe chap. 40. pag. 650. and 651 holds that if any one of ignorance and simplicity hath confessed his faults in grosse without determining of any one in particular it will not be needful to draw out of his mouth the repetition of those faults if it cannot be commodiously done because the Confessor is pressed so with penitents which give him not leasure He would say that on the Feast-days when the Confessors are pressed it will suffice to make a general confession without specifying any one sin in particular as the Hugenots would have it After this question he proposes another And what may we say of those who in their youth have committed muny actions of a vicious nature which notwithstanding they did not believe to be such He answers definitively that they are not obliged to confesse one word of them when they know them and understand their nature and conditions much lesse to reiterate their confessions made already Whence it follows that Saint Paul might have dispensed with himself to do penance for the sins he had committed in his youth before his conversion being he committed them through ignorance as he tells us himself Ignorans feci incredulitate I did them ignorantly in unbelief and David ought not to say a Delicta
Sa to affirm c Fabellam recitare ut auditores excitentur ad pie audiendum non est peccatum Sa verh Praedicare num 5. p. 378. that it was no sin to make fabulous relations in Sermons to stir up the auditors attention and devotion He speaks also more clearly in another place where he saith d Mentiri in concione in pertinentibus ad doctrinam quidam aiunt esse mortale alii non semper quod intellige si sit materia levis Sa verb. Mendacium num 2. pag. 494. that there are some who hold that it is always mortal sin to tell a lye in Preaching on any Doctrinal point but others deny it And he relates the opinion of these latter adding onely that it must be understood onely when the matter is sleight If to lye in the chair in points of Doctrine according to this Jesuit be but a venial sin he without doubt would make no great matter of lyes which a Preacher should speak in other matters and it may be he might give them in this the same liberty that he gives them to tell tales generally and without exception He condemns them not more rigorously who tell lyes in confession e Mentiri in consessions de peccatis venialibus out de aliis confessis mortalibus veniale solum peccatum est etiamsi illa antea apud se proposuisset vere confiteri Sa verb. Confessio n. 12. p. 88. It is but a venial sin saith he to lye unto a Confessor in confessing venial or mortal sins formerly confessed though after resolution to confesse them truly Escobar saith the same and adds some thing f Mendacium de peccaâ—o veniali veniale est nisi illud veniale esset totalis confessionis materia quia tunc daretur absolutio fine materia Sacramentum nullum esset Suarez tom 4. n. 3. par disp 22. sect 10. n. 6. Alii negant quia omne mendacium de veniali est res levis Escob tr 7. ex 4. n. 107. p. 816. Suarez holds saith he that to lye in confessing a venial sin is but a venial sin provided that this venial sin be not all the matter of the confession for in this case the absolution will have no subject and the Sacrament will be nul Others hold the contrary for that a lye which consists in a sleight and venial matter is always sleight A lyetold in confession and which makes the Sacrament null in the judgement of this Jesuit and of those whose judgement he reports seems to him a very sleight thing to furnish matter for a mortal sin though it destroy a Sacrament and turn it into an action profane and sacrilegious It is easie to see if this be to honour the Truth and the Sacrament of penance which by a particular reason may be called the Sacrament of Truth because there a man acknowledgeth that which he is truly confessing himself a sinner before God and confessing his sins before a Priest who holds the place of God nevertheless this Divinity teaches that it is no great matter to lye in this Sacrament and that fault committed herein ought to be considered according to the matter of the sin rather then by the holinesse of the Sacrament in such manner that if the matter about which the lye is told be not an important thing in it self the sin is but sleight though thereby the Sacrament be profaned made nul and sacrilegious This Jesuit commits yet a greater extravagance against the truth when he saith that it may be opposed with a resolution altogether formal that is to say by pure malice though it be acknowledged in the heart without becoming guilty of any great fault g Impugnaeâ—e perspicuam veritatem animo impugnandt contradicendi est peccatum grave aut leve juxta materiae gravitatem aut levitatem Escobar tract 2. exam 2. cap. 1. num 14. pag. 292 To conflict with the truth saith he which is evident with a formal design to oppose and contradict it is great or little according as the truth in hand is of great or little consequence He considers not the greatness of the Majesty of God who is encountred in the Truth and who is Truth it self neither doth he any more consider the wicked disposition of him who impugnes the truth by an aversion or contempt which he hath towards it opposing it by a formal design to resist and destroy it though he know it evidently animo impugnandi contradicendi perspicuam veritatem If when the King speaks any of his Officers should rise up and contradict him publickly in a thing which he knew himself to be just and true being induced to this excesse onely by insolence and to oppose himself against the King and to contradict him without cause it is certain he would be treated as in guilty of high treason and his action would passe in the judgement of all the world for an unsufferable outrage and contempt of Royal Majesty though the subject upon which he thus opposed the King were not of great importance And yet Escobar would that it should be accompted but a sleight fault to deal thus with God and his Truth One passage alone of Sanchez which I will rehearse here may suffice to prove that which I have said that in things purely spiritual the Jesuits find scarcely any sufficent matter for mortal sin h Res quantumvis sacras principal ter ob vanam gloriam officere ut Sacramenta omnia ministrare vel recipere sacram celebrare non excedit culpam venialem Sanchez op mor. l. 1. c. 3. n. 1. p. 9. Et si debitus ordo pervertatur ea tamen perversio non tanti est ut adea gravis injuria rebus spiritualibus inseratur ut poena aeterna digna sit Ibid. To perform of vanity saith he the most sacred actions as to administer the Sacraments or to receive them or to celebrate the most Holy Masse for vain glory can be but a venial sin though vain glory be proposed as the principal end He acknowledges that there is disorder in this action but he pretends that it is of small consequence and that the injury that is done to God and things Spiritual and Divine in making them subservient to vain glory is not a thing so considerable as to merit the disfavour of God and that it conserve for a matter to mortal sin and a cause of eternal damnation It is not an easie thing to judge what reason he may have thus to diminish this sin if he acknowledge that there may possibly be great ones in Spiritual matters For indeed it will be a hard thing to find greater then this considered by the light of Faith then to say Masse for vanity as the principal end thereof this is properly to sacrifice to vanity or to the Devil who is the god of vanity the body of Jesus Christ which is horrible onely to think And if the sacrifice of the Masse may be
Deiparae in which there will be found very little if all that be thrown out which he hath invented himself It had need to be copied out in a manner whole and entire to make appear all the ridiculous and extravagant things that it contains and all the excesses and errours into which he is fallen pursuing his own thoughts and imaginations having not taken so much care to given the Verigin true praises as to produce new and extraordinary which even in this do dishonour her and cannot be pleasing to her Because the praises which are to be given to Saints as well as the honour which we are to render unto God himself ought not to be founded on any thing but truth I will onely rehearse some of the most considerable places of this Author He maintains confidently that Saint Anne and Saint Joachim were sanctified from the wombs of their Mothers and that there is more reason to attribute to them this priviledge then to Jeremy and Saint John Baptist He confesses d Nullus est proâ—me in asseâ—tione hac sed neque contra me cum non sit hacterus disputata Peza in Eâ—ucidarioâ— 2. tr 8. c. 3. p. 547. that there are no persons that are for him or against him in this proposition because none have spoken of it before himself If there be no Author for him they are all against him and the silence of the Saints and all the Doctors that were before him is a manifest condemnation of his presumption and of his rashness in so declaring himself an innovator in an unheard of novelty in the Church in a matter of Religion Molina hath done the same thing where he hath gloried to have invented the middle knowledge in the matter of Grace and of Predestination with such insolence that he is not affraid to say that if it had been known in the first ages of the Church the heresie of the Pelagians possibly had never risen Maldonat who is one of the Commentators on Scripture whom they esteem doth often declare himself the Author of new sences which he gives the Word of God against the consent even of the Fathers many times in his books we meet such expressions as these e 〈◊〉 habere Antorem qui na sâ—ntret ..... â—ames qur quot ligisse me memini â—…oâ—…s sic explicâ—nt ego autem alâ—…er sentio Malden I would find some Author who was of this opinion or all Authors whom I remember to have read expound this text in this manner but I expound it otherwise Which is a manifest contempt of the Council of Trent which forbids to expound Scripture against the consent of the Fathers and an imitation of the language of Calvin and other Hereticks renouncing the tradition of the Holy Fathers and all the antiquity of the Church If Escobar could have condemned this confidence of his Fraternity he would have condemned them onely of venial sin f Novas opinio nes novas vestes exponere vâ—nialis tantùm culpâ— est Escob â—r 2. exam 2. n. 10. p. 291. Qaia ejusmodi inventione quis gestit aliorum laudem captare Ibid. To introduce saith he rovel opinions and new sorts of habits into the Church is onely a venial sin He hath cause to talk of new opinions as of new fashions of Garments for in the new Divinity of the Jesuits who hold all things probable there needs no more reason to quit an ancient opinion then to change the fashion of apparel and if there be any ill in it it is very small and that too must come from some peculiar circumstance as from vanity or ambition Though this censure of Escobar be very gentle Molina and Maldonat as more ancient and more considerable in the Society then he will not submit thereunto and Poza is so far from acknowledging that there is any ill in inventing new opinions that he had a design in his Book not to produce therein any other then the inventions and imaginations of his own mind and for this reason in the entrance and preface he makes an Apology for novelty in which he hath forgotten nothing that he believed might be of use to make it recommendable and to give it admission as well into the Church as into the World imploying for this purpose authority examples and reasons He rehearses many passages out of Seneca saying g Patet omaibus veritas noadum est occupata qui â—nâ—e nos fueruut non domini sed duces fuerunt multum ex illa futuris relictum est Seneca Ep. 33. Dum unusquisque mavult credere quam judicare numquam de vita judicatur semper creditur that truth is open exposed to all the World that none have yet taken possession thereof that they who were before us were our guides but we are not therefore their slaves that there remains yet enough for those who come after us that every one liking better to believe then judge they are always content to believe and never judge at all how they ought to live And a little after h Non alligo me ad aliquem ex Stoicis proceribus est mihi censendi jus Itaque aliquem jubebo sententiam dividere de beata vita I addict not my self to any one in particular of these great Stoical Philosophers I have a right to judge them and to give my advice upon them This is the cause why some times I follow the opinion of one and sometimes I change something in the judgement of another It is clear that these passages go to establish a right for reason above authority which had been tolerable in an Heathen who had no other guide but Reason and who speaks of questions and things which cannot be regulated but by Reason But a Christian a Monk a man who interposes himself to write in the Church in matters of Faith for the instruction and edification of the faithful to make use of the maximes and terms of a Pagan to ruine the obedience of Faith and the tradition which is one of its principal foundations staving off the Faithful from the submission which they owe to the Word of God and the authority of the Holy Fathers is a thing unsufferable in the Church of God this is almost to turn it Pagan and to give every one a liberty to opine in matters of Religion as the Heathen Philosophers did in matters of science and morality wherein they followed their senses onely and proper thoughts He alledges also some passages of Catholick Authors as that same of Tertullian i Dominus noster Christus veritatem se non consuetudinem nominavit Tertull. Our Lord Jesus Christ said that he was the truth and not the custom And this other of Lactantius k Sapicntiam sibi adimuut qui sine ullo judicio invent a majorum probant ab aliis pecudum more ducuntur Sed hoc cos fallit quod majorum nomine posite non putant fieri posse ut ipsi plus
Sanchez saith g Quotidie contingere subito inveniri solutionum quas quis insolubiles putabat aut ab aliis facile solvi It happens dayly that we meet with answers unto reasons which we believed invincible So these principles and these inventions are very proper to overturn all the truths of piety or Religion This same Author demands also h An autoritas unius Doctoris docti probi reddat opiaio tem probabil m Respondeo reddere posse quempiam amplecti opinionem quam à magistro audivit in iis quae ad mo es pertinent Sanch. Ibid. n. 7. whether the authority of one single Doctor who is learned and honest do make an opinion probable And he answers yea adding that in what concerns manners a man may hold to an opinion which he hath learned of his School-master and follow it His reason is the same with what Azor and Layman have alledged k Quia opinio probabilis est quae non levi innititur fundamento ita autoritas viri docti pii non est leve fundamentum Because an opinion established upon some foundation that is not sleight is probable But the authority of a learned and pious man is no sleight foundation Whence it is easie to conclude that there is no Jesuit especially who are regent amongst them whose opinion may not be followed and practised how new and peculiar soever it appear and be indeed because there are none of them who are not believed to have these two qualities of learned and pious and to whom the Society do not attribute them So that when P. Hereau taught in the Colledge of Clermont that it is lawful to kill a man secretly who slanders us or who persecutes us unjustly his Scholars may without fear of offending God make themselves executors of this horrible Doctrine though it were suspected by them to be false because it is so barbarous and inhumane For they hold that though a Doctor or Regent should be deceived by publishing errours for truths we may always in conscience follow his opinion even when he erreth against Divine right This is that which Sanchez maintains resolutely against them who would restrain this liberty to errours against humane right or Law l Nec limitatio Adriani Cordubae ut hoc intelligatur si sit error juris humani secus si sit divini Ducunturque quia in rebus humani juris indagandis non tanta diligentia ac in rebus juris divini exigitur sed non placet Ibid. num 7. I cannot approve saith he their restriction who would extend this to errours against humane but not Divine Law they build upon this that we are not obliged to inquire with so much care the things which are of humane as those which are of Divine Law But I cannot approve this reason And he is not content to say it once but he repeats it oft to shew how much this limitation displeaseth him And his reason is m Quippe in utrisque est magni ponderis momenti virigravis pii autoritas Ibid. Because in these sorts of things the authority of a grave and pious person is of great weight That is to say that the authority of a Regent Jesuit is great and strong enough to prevail above Divine and humane right and to carry us against the Law of God And that so we may follow in conscience the erroneous opinion of a Casuist though that which he permits atd approves be forbidden and condemned by God in the Scripture He also enquires n An ab opinione communi recedere liceat whether it be lawful to dissent from common opinions He answers with Vasquez and Azor o At melius Vasquez Azor dicunt licere viro docto qui non parum literis vacarit recte utriusque partis fundamenta expenderit suam singularem opinionem probabiliorem judicare illam sequi Ibid. n. 9. p. 29. that it is lawful for a learned man and well studied and who hath examined the reasons of both sides to maintain that his private opinion is more probable and to follow it though he be single and alone in his opinion being otherwise it should not be particular p Quod in to eventu non videatur prudenter operari Becaufe he seems not herein to act against prudence since he hath found some reason that pleaseth him and seems good unto him which will easily happen to a proud spirit who can have no greater pleasure then to imagine that he surpasseth others by his subtilty and his wit But this Jesuit so learned in this matter and this wisdom of probability discovers one of the principal foundations upon which it is established and from which many conclusions may be drawn saying q Nihil repugnat ut duas opiniones è diametro sibicontradicentes idem intellectus probabiles judicet aut aeque aut alteram probabiliorem Ibid. num 12. pag. 29. there is nothing which hinders that one and the fame person may judge two opinions directly opposite to be equally probable or that the one is more then the other Whence he concludes in this manner r His it a praemissis prima difficultas est an cuique lice at in fore conscientiae operari juxta aliorum opinionem minus tutam quam probabilem reputat contra propriam tutiorem quam sibi probabiliorem esse persuadet Ibid. n. 13. p. 29. These things being thus presupposed the first difficulty is to know whether it is lawful in conscience to regulate our actions by the opinion of another when it is not sufficiently safe and which we believe onely probable quitting our own which is more safe and which we believe assuredly to be probable He at first rejects many Authors who say that this is not lawful and a At multo probabilius est licere n. 14. declares that it is much more likely that it is lawful His reason is that which he hath already alledged many times and which he repeats commonly b Existimans opinionem esse probabilem juxta illam operans nec imprudentiae nec temeritatis notam incurret Ibid. That he who believes an opinion probable acting according to that opinion ought not be condemned as rash or imprudent And seeing it might be said that this man acting against his own proper light and quitting an assured opinion to follow one less safe puts himself in danger to violate the Law of God and indeed to offend him which is not to act prudently He answers c Nec sic se exponit periculo peccandi formaliter id est ita ut illud peccatum ei imputetur that he exposes not himself to danger of sinning formally that is in such manner that the sin which he commits should be imputed unto him believing that he need not care if the Law of God be violated and if God be dishonoured provided that we our selves be not blamed and receive no hurt
manner in stead of removing from him this indisposition he will augment it in him there being nothing more proper to make a man yet more obstinate and more insolent and to confirm him in his wicked opinions then therein to approve and follow him and by consequence this man shall continue to remain in an incapacity of receiving absolution since he persists in one of the greatest sins and one of the worst dispositions of sinners which is a resolution to oppose himself to his Confessor without reason and of mere obstinacy and blinde passion if the Confessor do not come over to his opinion Sanchez proposeth also another question in the matter of the Sacraments which he resolveth according to the same principles The question is c Octavo deducitur quid in ea quaestione dicendum sit An licitum sit in Sacramentorum administratione uti opinione minus probabili minus tuta quando de Sacramenti valore agitur Ibid. n. 32 p. 32. if in the matter of the Sacraments it be lawful to rule ones self by the opinion which is less probable and less safe when the validity of the Sacrament is in question He answers in reporting the opinion and reasons of them who maintain that this is not lawful but he pretends d Quamvis tamen hoc probabile sit existimo tamen probabilius esse licere in Sacramentorum adm mstratioae uti opinioue minus probabili relicta probabilio iâ—ac tuta non obstante irritandi Sacramenti peâ—iculo Ibid. n. 33 that though what they say is probable yet it is more probable that in the administration of the Sacraments it is lawful to rely upon an opinion which is less probable leaving that which is safe and more probable notwithstanding the danger of rendring the Sacrament null He requires onely two conditions The first is that here in nothing be done outwardly against the custom and ordinary manner of administring the Sacraments The second is that it be not prejudicial to the salvation of our Neighbour For in these cases that more safe opinion ought to be followed out of these two cases he declares that it is lawful to put the Sacrament in hazzard and administer it in an uncertain manner onely to have the satisfaction of putting in practice a probable opinion making less accompt of the validity of a Sacrament and of the respect which is due unto the Sacred Mysteries and the blood of Jesus Christ then of the goods and advantages of private men and of the customs and outward forms which they observe in the administration of the Sacraments as if it were more evil to offend the eyes of men then those of Angels and God himself who sees the Sacrament made void by the sleightness and rashness of the Minister But he makes one exception worth the noting e Excipitur tamen ab hac regula quando opiniones circa jurisdictionem Sacerdotis ad audiendas confessiones versantur atque opinio probabilis docet illum habere probabilior autem negat Talis enim Sacerdos nullo modo peccabit audiendo confessiones Ibid. n. 35. We must except saith he from this rule the case in which the opinions differ about the jurisdiction of a Priest for hearing of confessions when one probable opinion holds he hath this jurisdiction and the other which is more probable denyeth it For in this case the Priest sins not at all in hearing confessions It may here be questioned whether the same charity towards his neighbour which made him before establish the rule which he proposed have made him also to adjoin this exception to the same rule But if this be not clear enough by his answer it will appear with advantage by his reason which is f Quia communis error ex prebabili opinione ortus satis est ad gestorum per eum Sacerdotem valo em Ibid. that an errour which hath taken its original from a probable opinion and which in consequence thereof is become common is sufficient to authorize and make valid all that which the Priest doth That is to say that a false opinion and an errour in the fact and practice may serve for a rule and foundation to the conduct of Christians when it is by use or rather by abuse past into a custom The Son of God saith that it is truth that delivers men and this Jesuit will have that errour and falsehood may deliver them from their sins and save them He ad joins also this other reason g Tum etiam quoniam in confessionibus semper quispiam fatetur aliqua venialia cum mortalibus At quilibet Sacerdos certam in venialia jurisdictionem habet ideo cum poenitens non ponat obicem sit certa jurisdictio in aliquam materiae partem erit certus confessionis valor Et quamvis careat ille jurisdictione in mortalia ca indirecte per accidens vn tute illius absolutionis remittuntur atque excutabitur poenitens ab eis iterum confitendis ratione justae ignorantiae eo quod juxta probabilem opinionem credatur vera Sacerdotis illius jurisdictio Ibid. that in confessions he that accuses himself of mortal sins accuseth himself also of venial Now it is certain that every â—riest hath jurisdiction of venial sins and by consequent the penitent for his part putting no bar and the Priest on his part having an assured jurisdiction of one part of the matter he is assured that the confession will bevalid albeit the Priest have no jurisdiction over mortal sins they shall be nevertheless remitted indirectly and by accident in vertue of the absolution which he shall give for venials and the penitent shall be dispensed from a new confession his ignorance sufficing for his excuse because it is just and reasonable being built upon a probable opinion which is the cause he believes that the Priest who absolveth him hath a right and true jurisdiction The Priest is in an errour as he now said and the penitent ignorant and yet he believes that the Priest gives absolution and the penitent receives truly the remission of his sins marvellous force of errour and ignorance or rather of probability and of an opinion probable in appearance onely which gives such vertue to errour and ignorance Nothing can be spoken more to purpose to conclude that there needs no approbation nor jurisdiction of Bishops and ordinaries to confesse and this is that which Sanchez regards and pretends in his exception rather then the good and salvation of souls For if this be truth which he saith the Monks without having recourse to Bishop or Pope may of themselves take liberty to confesse in all things and all sorts of persons They need onely command their regents to teach that without this their absolution may be valid For so this opinion becoming probable it will become lawful So that putting themselves afterwards into possession they will acquire some right and the opinion whereupon this right shall be founded
than his own Sect though it do not cease to appear unto him also credible But he answers in the second place that this opinion pleaseth him not at all and pretends that in this very case a Pagan is not bound at all to embrace the Faith a Caeterum hoc non placet it a generaliter dictum quippe dum Infidelis sibi persuasum habet suam sectam esse probabitem quamvis contraria sit probabilior tenetur utique in articulo mortis constitutus veram fidem quam probabiliorem judicat amplecti utpote in coarticulo constitutus in quo de extrema salute agitur ac proinde partem quam tutiorem probabiliorem judicat amplectitenetur At extra eum articulum non tenetur quod adhuc prudenter existimet se posse in sua secta perseverare Sanch. op mor. l. 2. c. 1. n. 6. p. 86. Because that when an Infidel is perswaded that his Sect is probable though the contrary which is the Christian Religion appear unto him more probable it is true that at the point of death when his Salvation is reduced to extremity and when by consequence he is obliged to follow that part which he judges to be more sure and more probable he is bound to embrace the true Faith which he believes to be more probable But out of this extremity he is not obliged because he judgeth prudently that he may persist in his idolatry In pursuance of this rule of probability that he acts prudently who follows a probable opinion I believe this Jesuit would not answer for the Salvation of a man who dyes in this estate since he must then believe that he may be saved without Faith and in Idolatry which is the greatest of crimes So that in saying he acts wisely in persisting in Idolatry he saith in effect that it is wisdom to walk in the darkness of death that it is prudence to destroy and precipitate himself into Hell in persuance of his rules of morality and grounding himself upon the principles of probability SECT II. That this Doctrine of Probability favours the Heretiques and nourisheth them in Heresie THe Doctrine of Probability is no lesse favourable to Heretiques then Infidels in that the ordinary arms whereof the Church makes use to defend it self against Heretiques and to assail them being Scripture Counsels Fathers and all that which we have received from the Ancients by Tradition the Jesuits and those who with them defend this Doctrine of Probability find not these evidences for their advantages and are so far from making use of them that they fear and fly from them all they can They cite in their Schools in their writings in a manner as often the Books of the Pagans as of the Scriptures they professe openly to preferre the new Authors above the Ancient they acknowledge not properly for Masters and Fathers any but those of their Society to the judgement and the censure of whom they submit frequently enough the judgements of the Saints which the Church hath always acknowledged for Masters and Fathers Divine or Ecclesiastick authority as well as Faith have scarce any credit in their Schools all as regulated and resolved by the authority of men and humane reason and in all contests and difficulties which they encounter if they cannot prevail by dispute they have recourse to those whom they regard as their Masters and Soveraign Judges in all sorts of matters They appeal to Suarez to Vasquez Molina Lessius and to others such like without making almost any mention of Jesus Christ the Apostles or the Ancient Fathers unless for form and without producing the definitions of the Councils or Traditions of the Church to determine the questions because they find them not conformable to their Spirit nor their designs some can make no use of them because they understand them not and even will not give themselves the trouble to study them and the others because they find not in them what is for their purpose Besides they wish they could content the whole World and answer all persons that consult them according to their humour and disposition Which obligeth them to look out for a Doctrine that is flexible and manageable and which may be accommodated to all occasions The maximes of Faith seem to them too fixed and the rules of the Church and the Gospel too firm and the opinions of the Holy Fathers too exact and too unmoveable For this cause they being not able to make use of them to establish the maximes of which they have need that they may make their designs to prosper and fearing on the other hand that they might be made use of against them to overturn their naughty maximes they find themselves as it were constrained by necessity to do all that they can directly or indirectly to corrupt them weaken them and to take away all credit from them In this they imitate and favour the hereticks of whom they have learned to reject the Holy Fathers especially in the difficulties which regard manners and the conduct of life and to despise Antiquity and Tradition through a blind love of their own novelties and proper imaginations and they are even in some sort more blameable then the Hereticks because they renounce the Father and the Tradition upon a pretence of holding to Scripture and these to follow their new Authors from whom they declare openly that we ought to take Law and rules for Christians Morals rather then from the Fathers of the Church Quae circa fidem emergunt dissicultates eae sunt ex veteribus hauriendae quae vero circa mores homini Christiano dignos à novitiis scriptcribus Colot l. 8 c. 16. p. 714. And indeed there hath never been any heresie which hath not had at the least some sort of probability because there hath yet never been any which hath not had some appearance of truth without which it could have found no followers the spirit of man not being capable to follow any thing but truth nor to be deceived but by the shaddow of it And it often happens that the greatest Heresies took for their foundation the greatest truths and have built on the strongest reasons Which shews clearly that if to follow a probable opinion be to act prudently and if an opinion be probable when it is grounded on the authority of some learned man or some likely reason as the Jesuits and those who hold their Doctrine of Probability tell us there is no heretick who may not maintain against them that he acts prudently whilest he lives in his heresie It is true that the Hereticks have misconceived the truths of which they would make use and especially those of the Scripture which they have corrupted in their sence and in their words that they might fit them to their thoughts and errours b Communis error ex probabili opinione ortus satu est ad gestorum per Sacerdotem vaâ—…em Sanch. op mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 35. p.
32. But as according to these new Doctors a probable opinion which hath taken its original for an errour becoming common in processe of time become also safe and may be followed in conscience So although the Hereticks were convinced to have had their rise from errour they might according to this maxime pretend that time and custom have purged away this defect and have put them in possession by a good title which is sufficient to quiet their consciences and justifie them before God And to fortifie them yet more in this their imagination and to defend it against those that would trouble them they may say that though it were true that the Catholick Religion were more probable then the Lutherans or the Calvinists they would yet cease to be probable though they were not so much and that of two probable Religions as well as c Dico 2. licitum esse sequi opinionem minus probabilem â—tramsi minus tuta sit Filliutinâ— mor. qq rom 2. tr 21. c. 4. n. 128. pag. 12. two probable opinions we may follow that which is lesse probable according to the Jesuits Doctrine though it were also lesse safe and with much stronger reason when that which is the lesse probable is the more safe as they may pretend theirs to be For considering this other rule of the Doctrine of probabilty d Omnes opiniones probabiles sunt per se aeque tulae benigniores etsi â—…iquando sint minus probabiles per accidens sunt semper utiliores ac securiores Caramuel sup that of two probable opinions the more pleasant is always the more safe though it be lesse probable a Calvinist or a Lutheran may say that he hath more reason to continue in repose and security of conscience in his Religion then the Catholick in his since it is manifest that the Doctrine of Calvin and Luther is more pleasing and favourable to nature and the inclinations of men then that of the Catholick Church and by consequence it is more safe I should have refrained from reasoning in this sort and drawing these consequences from the Jesuits Doctrine though they be clear and evident knowing how far it is from the Spirit of the Church to raise new difficulties in the matters of Faith and to meet with the objections of the adversaries then especially when they notably dishonour the truth and when they are capable of hurting the weak spirited if the Jesuits themselves and their disciples had not raised these doubts and proposed these instances and if they had not put these reasons in the mouths of the hereticks to teach them to answer those who would presse them to return to the union of the Church They go so far as to confesse that these instances and these reasons of which they acknowledge that the Hereticks may make use to nourish themselves in their obstinacy are taken from their Authors and are no other then the principles and consequences of their Doctrine of probability without troubling themselves to change or correct this evil Doctrine no more then to answer the Hereticks nor to let them see that they mistake their opinions and the fundamental Doctrines of their Divinity whereby they testifie that they disapprove not the reasonings of these Hereticks and that they are not far from believing that a man may be saved in the Religion of Calvin and Luther It cannot be but from this imagination and observations that one of their principal disciples from whom I have extracted all these reasons and all these consequences favourable unto herefie which we now above observed to be their product protesteth e Ad solamen coram qui in Germania habitant multos viros oliter probos infectos dolens haeresi aliquas periodos scribe verius ex selectissimis authoribus exscribo Caramuel Theol. fund p. 472. that he hath taken these discourses from good Authors as are all those of the Society for the comfort of the Germans and many others otherwise honest men whom he is troubled to behold infected with heresie For in matter of Religion we can give no consolation nor repose of conscience to any man but by giving him hope that he may be saved in that whereof he makes profession After this protestation he represents first of all a Man born in heresie amongst the Lutherans and well instructed in Lutheranisme He supposes in the second place that this Lutheran is entred into conference with many Catholicks and amongst others with a Capouchin one of the chief of their Order who to presse him to conversion represents unto him that it is necessary for him either to renounce Jesus Christ or to return to the Roman Church And in the processe of his discourse he teaches him to answer this Capouchin according to the rules of probability which we have represented above and he furnisheth him with all the reasons and all the instances which I now deduced being draw from the same principles See how he makes him speak f Christianismus probabilissima Religio est sub ipso dantur sectae antiquiores juniores severiores benigniores universaliores minus universales praecipue Romana Lutherana Calviniana quae si vere probabiles Ergo mihi Lutherano non est necessario redeundum ad Romanam Ecclesiam aut secedendum à Christo Nam praeter Romanam Ecclesiam cui probabilitatem non nego etiam Lutherana est Christiana probabilis multo Romana benignior Caram Theol. fund p. 472. Christianity is the most probable of all Religions and it contains in it many Sects of which some are more ancient and some others are more novel some more safe and some more pleasant some more diffused and other more narrow amongst which the Roman the Lutheran and the Calvinist are truly probable And by consequence being a Lutheran as I am it is not true that there is a necessity for me to return to the Roman Church or to renounce Jesus Christ For besides the Roman Church which I acknowledge to be probable the Lutheran is also Christian and probable and it is besides more pleasant then the Roman And by consequence more safe in conscience according to the rules of probability After that this Author had made this heretick to speak thus he interrupts his discourse that he might himself expound that which he said or rather that which he made him say And to give more weight unto him g Vim rationis jam penetras Jam vides quo respicit haereticus Tenet primo probabile quod Deus mentiri nequeat Secundo esse probabile quod revelarit sacram paginam si velis ut sic loquar dictaâ—crit Tertio esse probabile quod eandem Romana Ecclesia bene exponat Ibid. You see saith he the force of his reason and what it is he pretends First of all he holds that it is probable that God cannot lye In the second place that he hath revealed the Holy Scripture and even that he endited
rule of Truth the Doctrine from whence issues by infallible consequence so great errours is truly pernicious and entirely false because it is indubitable in Logick that from a true conclusion nothing but truth can follow and likewise that that from whence false and pernicious conclusions may be drawn must needs be false and pernicious it self without troubling ones self to seek other reasons to prove it this same being evident and certain by the light of Nature only and by the acknowledgement of them who are the Authors and Defenders of this Doctrine We need no other proofs to make appear that this Doctrine introduceth Independency and the ruine of all sorts of Authority since the principal Defenders of it acknowledge it and by the same reason it is entirely opposed to the spirit and conduct of Faith and leads to Irreligion For the true Faith and true Religion being nothing but Obedience and being given us of God to captivate our understanding to revealed Truths the one and the other keeps our spirit under a perpetual dependance and voluntary submission unto the Word and Will of God But the Jesuits Doctrine of Probability gives the spirit of man a Soveraign liberty which submits it self to nothing and reserves alwayes to it self a power not only to condemn and approve what it pleases but also to condemn that which it approves and to approve what it condemns passing from one to another and even from the more probable to the less probable without fearing to engage it self at all in the least sin and pretending alwayes to walk in an assured way and more then probable in the midst of Probabilities which environ us on every side since they have made probable almost all the rules of life and humane converse and have even elevated mens spirits above all these Probabilities to a Soveraign Independance Caramouel expresses this in this manner y Fidei Orthodoxae dogmatibus demonstrationibus ac principiis per se notiâ— subest ingenium probabilibus sententiis superest Caram Theol. fund p. 138. The wit of man is subject to the Doctrines of Orthodox Faith and the evident principles of natural reason which it cannot resist but it is above all probable opinions So that to reduce the substance of this Article into a few words the Doctrine of the Jesuits Probability withdraws the Spirit from all sorts of obedience from that which is due to Superiors by giving it power to resist them upon the least appearance of reason from that which is due unto God himself by permitting to dispense with a great part of his Commandments and from that which is due to the Church teaching to deride its Laws and clude its Ordinances from that which is due to reason by giving liberty to follow that which is less probable if it please better and be more conformable to our interests and also attributing unto it an Empire greater than that of God himself who can never depart from that which is most just and most reasonable and giving it an incomparable power and Independance in the Kingdom of Probabilities SECT V. That an opinion probable being once received all the Prelates of the Church and all the men in the World cannot hinder that it should be probable and safe in conscience according to the Jesuits THere is nothing more easie than to introduce into the Schools a new opinion and to make it probable according to the Jesuits and their followers because they hold that it needs only one reason by which it may be maintained or one Author that approves it There is also nothing more easie than to cause it to be received in the World because they believe that the most pleasant which are those that all enquire after are the best and most safe Finally there is nothing more easie than to uphold and bring it in credit it s own pleasantness and the approbation that some give it being sufficient to acquire unto it new Partizans and new Defenders who will publish it and induce it unto practice and so it will have for it the approbation of Divines the example of private persons and plausible reasons which are all foundations of Probability And being once established in this manner it will as it were be impossible to destroy and discredit it and consequently there will be no means to hinder the World from following it or the Authors who have undertaken its defence to teach and publish it For 1. It is well known what trouble it is to undo things that are passed into custom and evil things rather than good and amongst evil things those which are most pleasing and favourable to the corrupt inclinations of nature give most trouble in rooting them out and we hardly ever obtain our design therein 2. When a custom which hath taken birth from an evil maxim is also propped up by apparent reasons and the authority of those that have reputation of being vertuous and learned the evil becomes as it were incurable and without remedy And this is that which we have seen to happen to the most part of the new and pernicious opinions under which the Church groans at this day whilst it endures them 3. The Authors of these opinions make use of no other armes commonly to defend them nor admit of others to oppose them than reason they submit all to dispute they examine all by the rules of Logick by Syllogismes and Subtilties So that he who is most proper to catch at niceties and contest about them carries it commonly though his cause be the weaker and less reasonable 4. It is clear that there is scarcely any that will give way to another in wit and reason especially in the heat of a dispute but the opinions which carry men on to looseness and vice have yet more advantage in this kind of combat which is made by reason and disputation that they are there as it were invincible because of the force which the natural corruption of our spirits give them It were easie to produce many proofs hereof if one of the newest and withall of the most eager defenders of Probability did not testifie it openly by his words a Qui rem dicit esse illicitam ad multa tenetur Primo enim debet ostendere rationes quae malitiam probant esse demonstrativas nempe tales quibus dari responsio probabilis noâ— possit 2. Debet etiam ostendere rationes quae bonitatem probant ne quidem probabilem esse ostendet si omnibus ad unam dederit solutionem quae evidenter sit vera 3. Etiam debebit ostendere partem illam quae bonitatem astruit non haâ—ere sufficientes authoritates ut dicâ—tur probabilis Haec omnia tria simul ostendere debet casurus causa etsi duâ— ex illis ostâ—ndat modo unum non ostendat Caram Theol. fund p. 138. He that saith that an action is evil and unlawfull is obliged unto many things 1. To make appear that the reasons which prove
the malice of the action be demonstrative that is that they be such as whereto no probable answer can be given 2. And in the second place he ought also shew that the reasons which prove this same action to be good and lawfull be not so much as probable which cannot be done but by giving to every one in particular a solution which is indubitable and evident 3. In the third place he is also obliged to make appear that the opinion which maintains that this action is good hath not sufficient authority to be held probable He is obliged to prove these three things together and if he fails but in one though he prove the other two he will lose his cause There needs nothing more to make invincible all sorts of wicked opinions and which lead men unto looseness and vice it being certain that it is impossible to convince them by the rules and conditions which this Disciple of the â—efuits prescribes For there being no reasons so evident which the wit of man can not obscure and entangle by his passion and artifices it is clear that if evil mexionâ— must be judged by reason and dispute none will ever be convict because the animosity of men may alwayes maintain them by contrary reasons And if we cannot be assured of any truth unless we can entirely salve all the difficulties which occurre therein as this same Author pretends it will follow that there shall never be any thing assured in Morality nor in Doctrine nor in Faith nor in Nature since it is manifest that the greatest and most indubitable Truths are subject to innumerable difficulties which the most learned and the most ingenious know not oftentimes how to explicate And so every thing shall be uncertain and probable There shall be no difference betwixt good and bid Doctrine and it shall be lawfull for all men to follow what they please in every kind of matter which is the proper scope of these Doctors of Probabilities The evil Doctrine shall have even all sorts of advantage above the good because according to this Casuist he that maintains it needs prove nothing of that he saith nor answer to any thing that can be said against him but by Probabilities And on the contrary he that speaks for truth and who condemns errour looseness and vice is obliged to prove all that he saith by demonstrations and to answer and refute all that which his adversary can say with reasons so clear and cogent that he cannot reply any thing that hath so much as an appearance of truth And when he hath entirely disarmed him and destroyed all his reasons making him see clearly that they are of no value and that they are not so much as probable only he hath yet gained nothing at all For if you believe this Casuist he must besides this take from him all his Authority of every sort and reduce him to that pass that he may be able to find none sufficient to support his opinion and render it probable which is in a manner impossible because it suffices as to this to have one single Casuist that teaches it and though none have yet ever taught it he that invents and first maintains it may make it probable if he be accounted a man of learning and piety and there are none but such amongst the Masters of this Science So his opinion shall be alwayes probable and though false and pernicious it shall be shot-free under probability 5. This is one rule of these great Doctors that b Benigniores eisi aliquando sint minus probabilts per accidens sunt sempâ—r utiliores securiorâ—s Caram Theol. fued p. 134. the opinion more sweet is alwayes better and more safe though it be less probable By this rule the opinions which favour looseness and corrupt inclinations will be more safe and their probability alwayes invincible For if the reasons which are applyed against them be more forcible and pressing they will thereby become indeed less probable but they will not thereby become less pleasing and consequently they will become alwayes better and more sure according to the maxims of this marvellous Science 6. But if you oppose against them the authority of the Saints and Antient Fathers they will say that their opinions are very probable but those of the Casuists of these times are no less probable that the Moderns carry it even above the Antients c Quod ownia quae pulcbie cogitarunt jâ—m sunt à junioribus summo sludio ingenio elimata Ibid. p. 22. Quae circa sidem emergunt difficultates eae sunt à veteribus hauriendae quae vero circa mores homine Christiano dignos à novitiis scriptoribus Celor l. 8. c. 16. p. 714. because their best thoughts are cleared up and perfected by those that followed them But though the opinion of the Antients be more probable that of the Moderns being more pleasant they conclude by their principles that it is better and more safe They maintain also that when the question is about Faith we may well have recourse unto the Antients and hold that which they have believed and taught in their Writings but in matter of manners and the conduct of life we must take our rules from the new Casuists 7. One of the most certain wayes to know that an opinion is bad are the bad consequences and pernicious effects which naturally follow thereupon but this is not capable to stay the defenders of the Jesuits probability They acknowledge the dangerous consequences and pernicious effects which issue infallibly from many Novel opinions which they teach and they for bear not to maintain them at all and protest that they will maintain them alwayes because they seem probable and no person can condemn them d Multa inoonvenientia suboriuntur ex restrictionibus mentalibus multae â—x occultis compensationibus multa ex licentia occidendi injustum Judicem aut teslem quam nonnulli concedunt multa ex illa opinione quae docer de occultis non judicare Reelesiam multa ex aliis Quibus tamen non obstantibus inconvenientibus illae sentensiae in terminis quibus bodie traduntur in Scholis sunt ut minimum probabilissimae à nemine damnari pessunt Caram Theol. fund p. 549. Hereupon follow many inconveniences saith Caramouel which arise from these mental restrictions secret compensations the liberty which some give to kill an unjust Judge or Witness the opinion which holds that the Church cannot judge of secret things and other like opinions and yet all these inconveniences hinder not but that these opinions so as they are taught at this day in the Schools are at the least very probable and cannot be condemned by any 8. If it be represented unto them that a good part of these Novel opinions are contrary to the Laws of the Church and some of them to the Civil Laws also they pretend that because they be Novel they are exempt from the censure
Princes over their Divines and their Books of the Society than to the Authors of these Books or their Superiors Others saith he to whom opposition is made write either at Rome by the commandment of the Pope or in other Countries at the instance of Foreign severe Princes who carry things at their pleasure with a high hand so that it comes to pass oftentimes that they have no more power over their Books than over the Winds or Stars So the Books of the Jesuits fall sometimes into the hands of certain of their easie Fathers who let them pass easily and their Authors whatsoever they advance otherwhiles they fall into the violent hands of Foreign Princes who do what they please with the same Books and Authors so that the Superiors have no more power over them than over the Winds or Stars It must needs be that the Spirit and Divinity of the Jesuits is very manageable very pliant and very obsequious that they may make of it whatsoever they will or rather whatsoever the Princes and Grandees of the World would have After this confession they have made themselves we may say that they are very near the estate which the Jews were in when the Prophet objected unto them o Princeps postulat Judex in reddendo est magnus locutus est desiderium animae suae conturbaverunt cam Micheae 7. v. 3. The Priuce demands what he pleases and the Judge speedily grants it him and the mighty man doth only declare his desire and they trouble and intangle his conscience heartning him in wicked designs by false reasons instead of opposing or redressing and regulating them by the Law of God and maxims of the Gospel This is to acknowledge and declare himself a slave in an abject manner to violent powers and strangers as this Jesuit talks to say as he doth speaking for the whole Society that they carry things with a high hand as they list against them and their Divines and this slavery is yet in this more shamefull and less excusable because it is voluntary since many times they stay not till they be sought out and urged but they present themselves and offer their pens and their Divinity which by rendring every thing probable is capable to maintain and overturn whatsoever they please and they must engage themselves in a strange manner and enter into an extraordinary vassallage since they declare that after they have so addicted themselves to the Grandees of the World and have devoted unto them their Spirits and Learning that their Superiors have no more power over their Books which they compose and which they cause to be printed than over the Winds and Stars who receive their motions not from Celestial intelligences but from Terrestrial and Temporal powers It is easie to judge by this what their fidelity may be and what reason there is to confide in their Discourse and Divinity so fickle and voluntary not only for private persons but also for Princes since being thus for all they are for none and abandoning truth so easily they will yet more easily for sake men according as their interests shall require them ARTICLE IV. That the Jesuits Divinity is subject to contradictione and change in opinions THey that are not at all informed of the maxims of the Jesuits wonder when they hear say that they are so little constant and faithfull in their words and in their actions others who have some knowledge of their opinions report that ordinarily the cause of this proceeds from the Doctrine of equivocations of which they make profession But those who know them better give thereof a reason more clear and more easie drawn from the principles of their Divinity For there is no need to have recourse to equivocations to deceive if we believe we may lye with a good conscience and it seems foolish to rack ones wits to find a word with double sense to cover and disguise his thought if he be perswaded that it is lawfull to speak and do quite contrary to what he thinks and to quit his own opinion to follow that of another when he finds it more favourable for him keeping still the liberty to resume his own and to follow it when he shall have occasion for it and so to pass from the one to the other giving unto the same difficulties contrary advices and resolves following his own humour or complying with theirs who demand his counsel These are the certain maxims of the Jesuits Divinity as I have made appear above after which it ought not be thought strange that they are so inconstant in all their wayes that they believe they may affirm and deny approve and condemn the same things and that we see nothing but disguises and contradictions in their words and carriages One of their most ordinary contradictions is to acknowledge Truths in their general Propositions and to destroy them in the particulars and practice This may be seen clearly in F. Bauny in many places of his Books as in his Summe c. 3. p. 49. where speaking of Penance he agrees that if we look for heaven and eternal life without first doing penance for our sins it is mortal sin And in the 43. ch and 69. p. he declares that pardon of sin and correction are two things inseparable and that the one is not given but after the other Non datur venia nisi correcto And in the 38. ch p. 589. speaking of a Consessor and of the cognisance he ought to have of the disposition of a penitent In truth saith he as he holds the place of a Judge in the Sacrament as saith the Council in the 14. session and 9. ch he cannot nor ought pass sentence but on what he hath a full and perfect cognisance of And in the following page he cites the C. Omnis utriusque sexus where the Confessor is spoken of in these terms a Debet diligenter inquirere peccatoris circumstantias peccati quibus prudenter intelligat quale debeat ei praebere consilium cujusmodi remedium adhibere diversis experimentis utendo ad sanandum aegrotum He ought carefully inform himself of the circumstances which respect the sinner as well as which respect his sin that he may judge prudently what counsel he ought to give him and what remedy he ought to prescribe him making use of sundry experiments to cure his disease And in his Practique book 1. chap. 14. pag. 121. speaking of the principal things whereof a Bishop ought to inform himself in making a Visitation in his Diocess he observes this same which is taken out of the second Council of Remes under Charlemain and Leo 3. in the 16. ch That they should observe b Quinto quomodo confitentium peccata dijudicant tempus poenitentiae constistuunt how the Confessors judged of the sins of the penitents and what time of penance they prescribed them The other Jesuits acknowledge with him the same maxims as the fundamental
their Benefice is or to the pâ—or the fruits received according to the rate of their omissions as he collects from the Bull of Pius V. So his mind appears floating betwixt errour and truth which dazles his eyes and constrains him to acknowledge and confess it and it would be hard to judge what may be concluded of Propositions so different and contrary if he did not himself discover throughout his Book a design he hath to let the Reins loose unto the corrupt inclinations of Nature and to give men liberty to follow their desires and lusts as well in Civil as Religious matters For there is nothing but the consideration of men and the fear of scandal that holds him back a little and hinders him from doing it so openly and this fear and this carriage engages him continually in these manifest contrarieties which are inevitable unto those who would flatter men and corrupt the truth Here would be a proper place to speak of the Dispensations which the Jesuits give Ecclesiasticks from reciting the Office upon Reasons so slight and oftentimes so ridiculous that they themselves unto whom this obligation seems most grievous and troublesom durst not demand them if they did not by offering them unto them prevent them and in some sort force them to receive them by assuring them that they may make use of them with a safe conscience though their own altogether corrupt as it is reproach them for it and that the light of Nature only suffices to discover that they ought not do it But because we have already produced some in the Treatise of Probability for Example sake I will content my self to add only one more here in this place out of Tambourin who saith 1 Hinc luscus quicunque ex oculis laborat si timet legendi vim ta legendo paulatim deperdere horas canonicas non legat 14. Quid si hic luscus vel ille valetudinarius legat voluntariè fabulas vel historias omittit autem officium peccabitne Respondeo non peccaturum contra obligationem recitandi officium peccaturum non ambigo illum quia fabulas cum sanitatis detrimento legit quod tamen detrimentum saltem notabile rarò eveniet quia hisce lectionibus quantum ex hoc capite recreatur animus non multum opprimitur Tambur l. 2. decal c. 5. sect 8. n. 14. That he who is purblind or any other who hath any disease in his eyâ—s if he fears to lose his sight by little and little in reading is not obliged to read his Breviary But if this purblind or otherwise of weak eyes do voluntarily read Fables or Histories whilst he dispenses with himself for reading his Breviary doth he sin I answer that he sins not against his obligation of saying his prayers But I am assured he sins in reading these Fables to the prejudice of his health which yet will rarely happen because that sort of reading is recreative and hurts not much This Ecclesiastick who hath eyes to read Fables and hath not to read his Office will easily be confirmed in so good a disposition by Tambourin This Jesuit is not troubled at all to dispense with the obligation of rehearsing his Office because of the weakness of his sight and though after that he durst not openly justifie him that weakens it yet more by reading of Fables yet to leave him this liberty nevertheless he pretends that he will not weaken it by this reading as by that of the Breviary or at least that this will rarely happen quod detrimentum saltem notabile rarò evenit And the reason is because he recreates his spirit and finds pleasure in reading Fables supposing that he cannot take any in that of his Office Which agrees very well with what he and his Fellows do commonly call the Divine Service the Charge the Burthen the Drudgery onus diei the load of the day Whence it comes that they teach the Ecclesiasticks to discharge themselves thereof the most they can as of some burthensom and odious thing assuring them as we have made appear that they sufficiently satisfie their obligation and the intent of the Church in reciting them externally without any attention with voluntary distraction and busying themselves with all sorts of extravagant dishonest impious thoughts and even with design not to satisfie the Precept of the Church CHAPTER IV. Of Good Works That the Jesuits Maxims destroy them GOod Works may be destroyed two ways either by inclining men to do them ill or by diverting them from doing them at all It would be easie to prove that the Jesuits teach to do them ill in this that they maintain that such may be done as are truly good without any succour of Grace and that we may do those which are ineritorious of eternal life without respect had unto God or eternal life and without once thinking thereof provided that in doing them we be not under mortal sin But because this Point is more subtle and I have spoken thereof already before I will not insist on it here contenting my self to make appear that they excuse and justifie those who do no good Works at all though they be able testifying unto them that they are not bound thereunto and by this means they divert men from the practice of them removing from them the obligation and abolishing the Commandment as much as in them lyes Escobar after he had acknowledged that there is a Commandment which obligeth us by divine and natural light to do alms inquires 1 Quandonam hoc obligat praeceptum Respondeo quaestioni teneri nos elâ—…mosynam exhibere in necessitate extrema ex rebus vitae superfluis licet statul sint necessariae quia proximi vita superat mei status decentiam Escob tr 5. ex 5. n. 43. p. 632. When this Precept obligeth He answers That in extream necessity we are obliged to do alms of such things as are not necessary unto life though they be needful to support us in our condition His Reason is Because the life of our neighbour ought to be preferred to the decency of our condition He presupposeth as he expounds himself before that by extream necessity we are to understand that on which the life of man depends So that if he be not assisted he will surely dye and in this estate he believes that we are obliged to give of what we have superfluous and which may help him to live more commodiously This is no great excess of Charity to give for saving our neighbours life what is not at all necessary unto us But he extends not this Charity much farther demanding concerning the same subject 2 Qâ—i vero statui habet superfluâ— teneturne communibus necessitatibus subvenite Probabile est teueri probabilius non teneri Ibâ—n 47. p. 633. If he that hath more than he needs for to live according to his condition be obliged to help the common necessities He answers That it is probable that he
the world to affirm doubtful things by these words As true as there is but one God which cannot be considerately uttered without the sin of blasphemy He acknowledges the Commandment neither to swear nor blaspheme and the sin committed in the violation thereof but he abolisheth it as speedily adding that this sin is mortal when there is an intention therein aequandi humanam veritatem divinae to equalize the truth of humane things to Gods This Clause is remarkable When we have an intention For it presupposes that when we have not this intention there is no mortal sin And to expound and establish this Doctrine yet farther he brings this reason Because this is against his sacred honour and the reverence which we owe him to compare uncertain and mutable things to the constancy and eternal duration of his immutable and divine Essence Sanchez in the 1. Part of his Sum in the Book of an Oath and by necessary consequence to attribute unto him that instability which is contrary to his perfection and holy Nature and so to blaspheme pag. 70. He always measures blasphemy by the intention of him that commits it so that according to him to conclude that any person offends mortally in uttering these words As true as there is but one God or other such like it is necessary that he have an express intention to attribute instability unto God and that he believe that God is as mutable and inconstant as the Creatures Which they do not for all that saith he who by this form of speech would not compare any thing unto God but only shew indeed that the thing is true in a certain manner as it is true that God is And by consequence they blaspheme not by the Principles of this Father As if the sin of Blasphemy could not be committed but when by an errour of the understanding or a false opinion of God or by affected malice or a formed design to destroy and dishonour him he is blasphemed If this be so then to be Blasphemers we must become Hereticks or rather Atheists or Devils He expounds himself yet more clearly upon this very matter in the 66 67 and 68 pages of the same Chapter where giving out Rules of Practice for a Confessor he saith That he ought to inform himself of the Penitent who accuses himself of blasphemy whether he have done it with a formal intention to dishonour God and whether he were maliciously affected towards God and whether he blasphemed him out of hatred whether he were touched with any despite against God And he adds in the sequel That if the Penitent answer that he hath not been touched with any despite against God c. the said Confessor is not to repute him for a Blasphemer nor deprived of Grace because he hath used blasphemous words And in the 66. page after he hath said That it is a sort of blasphemy when we name with contempt shame and dishonour the holy and most sacred Members of the Son of God he adds in favour of these Blasphemers Which they seem not to do who make use of them in their common discourse as ornaments of speech saying Death Head Belly c. He confirms his opinion by the Authority of some who hold after Bonacina that to name these parts in choler and not through any indignation against God is no blasphemy His reason is because in these words By the Head by the Belly nothing is uttered concerning God which is false since it is true that God being become man hath these members though as he said in the beginning these members be named with contempt reproach shame and dishonour to the Son of God If he could excuse this crime of all sin as well as of Blasphemies and make it wholly innocent it may be he would do it But not dating to undertake that he doth at least what he can to diminish it making use of Laymans Authority who by his relation saith That this is a sin of irreverence against God which is but venial when it is without perjury scandal or danger of swearing false At the end of the same p. 66. continuing to give his advice and Rules of Practice to the Confessor he saith That be ought to examine his Penitent whether he have an ill will and despite against his Creator And in the beginning of the following Page he declares that his advice is that if the Penitent declare that his choler hath transported him to these scandalous words we may be perswaded that in uttering them he hath sinned only venially He saith also a little after That we must make the like judgment of those who without consideration do use them that is to say that they sin only venially Finally he acknowledges none for Blasphemers properly but those who voluntarily of set purpose and knowingly name these sacred members of the humanity of the Son of God if they do it out of formal contempt wittingly against the truth in which case it is a mortal sin of blasphemy or perjury I let pass all these passages without making any reflection thereon neither do I represent them with all their extent having already related part of them in the Chapter of the Intention where they may be seen I have here only touched them in my passage that I might make appear what is the opinion of Father Bauny concerning Blasphemy and that to find it such as he sets it forth and with the conditions he requires in it we must go into Hell For we may speak and judge of things by his Principles and Arguments that he hath taken blasphemy from the face of the Earth by multiplying Blasphemers and giving them liberty to blaspheme freely and means to excuse themselves from all the blasphemies they can commit if they know how to make use of the Rules which he hath taught them One will say that he useth no blasphemous words but as ornaments of his language Another may say that he did it through choler and despite against some one whom he will and not out of any evil affection or indignation he had against God The most part may say that when they let flye blaspheming cursing and despitefully railing against their Creator passion and choler transported them unto these scandalous words And if they be all examined as Father Bauny counsels a Confessor to examine them who address themselves unto him saying That it is very pertinent to the purpose that he may learn of them and know their intention from their own mouth and what hath moved them to blaspheme he will it may be find none who will not answer that he did it not through any formal intention to dishonour God or through any hatred which he had against him nor through any formed design to reproach contemn and dishonour God or Jesus Christ or his most holy and sacred members And thus there shall no more Blasphemers be found in the world and we must no more have recourse to the Ordinances of
the Church nor of Princes to punish Blasphemers nor count that amongst the Commandments of God which forbids blasphemy since according to the Divinity of this Father there will be none in effect they will be only sins of irreverence and venial The other Jesuits seem more moderate on this subject but if they appear in this less to blame they are it may be more indeed and they are much more dangerous than Bauny For the vice that proceeds to extremity and is visible in its excess is only for them that have no conscience but it surprises and insensibly engages those who have yet some fear of God when it is propounded with some temperament and when it is covered with some pretence which serves as a reason to commit it without scruple Escobar by Example in his Moral Divinity places amongst Problematick Questions whether all blasphemy be mortal sin And though he rank himself indeed amongst them that hold the affirmative yet he forbears not to say that it is no blasphemy when 1 Amans amasism Deam suam suum vocitat idolum a Lover calls his Mistress his Goddess and his Idol For after he had related divers opinions about this question according to his custom he joyns himself to those who excuse it from blasphemy and saith 2 Si coram medioctiter prudentibus obloquatur nullatenus blasphemiae nota afficiendus est hujusmodi utens locutionibus quia amanti a peria est adulatio at coram ruâ—icis haud cum omnino a gravi materialis blasphemiae piaculo liberarim Escob tom 1. Theol Mor. lib. 4. probl 21. If this Lover speak before persons of indifferent discretion be ought not in any sort be esteemed a Blasphemer because it is clear that it is only flattery but if he speak before gross witted persons he would not altogether exempt him from a grand material blasphemy If this reason take place there will be no blasphemy at all unless he who hears it believe that he who utters it speaks according to his judgment so this shall be only a material blasphemy that is the matter of blasphemy only So that there will be no true blasphemies but what are uttered by Infidels and impious persons who believe they speak truth when they blaspheme And according to this Rule the Tyrians and Sidonians blasphemed not when they said unto King Herod to flatter him that he spoke as a God and not as a man And this proud King ought not to have been eaten of worms as he was by the just Judgment of God for suffering these blasphemous words since the flattery was altogether manifest This reason may be made use of for a foundation of the Proposition of Tambourin and Azor who hold that to say This is as true as the Gospel or this is as true as God is no blasphemy And their reason is because it is visible that this is an excess against the divine Truth That is to speak properly that this is no blasphemy because it is visible that it is one Sanchez saith that he who swears lightly and unconcernedly without thinking on what he saith or through vanity sins only venially 3 Juramentum cui desuit tertius comes nempe judicium quod attinet ad necessariam jurandi causam debitam reverentiam est sola venialis culpa 3 siquidem sollus vanitatis superffuitatis peccatum est Sanch. op mor lib. 3. cap. 4. num 35. p. 17. The oath saith he whereunto the third condition is wanting to wit judgment when men swear without necessity or without the respect and reverence that is requisite is but a venial sin because the irreverence herein committed is not great being only a sin of vanity or of superfluity Filliutius saith the same thing and almost in the same words 4 Si desit juramento tantum judicium hoc est si fiat absque necessitate aut utilitate peccatum aliquod committitur Tale juramentum non est mortale si desit contamptus Filliut tom 2. qq mor. tr 25. cap. 11. num 332. 333. pag. 205. If judgment only be wanting to an oath that is to say if it be uttered without necessity or utility there is in it some fault And a little after An oath is not a mortal sin if it be without contempt We must not then say any longer in the Commandment that forbids Swearing Thou shalt not swear by God in vain but only thou shalt not swear falsely since that according to these new Divines we may without great sin swear in vain and out of vanity without necessity profit occasion or reverence which in swearing is due to God whom we take for Judge and Witness Filliutius's reason is 5 Licet aliquo modo sit contra Dei authoritatem tamen quia non fit contra illam in se sicut destruitur veritas ejus per mendacium sed tantum fit contra illam non tractando illam cum debita reverentie 3 ideo tantum committitur culpa venialis Ibid. num 333. Because though this oath thus made without necessity or reverence be in some sort against the Authority of God nevertheless because it destroys it not in it self as a lye destroys his truth and is not contrary unto him otherwise than as it renders him not all the respect that is due unto him it is but a venial sin As if it were a small matter to fail of our respect towards God and to demean our selves irreverently towards him and not to be troubled for offending against his Authority provided we do not absolutely destroy it This Author considers not that to destroy truth in our selves is no less a mortal sin than to destroy it in it self which is impossible For we are obliged to have it in us as our life by loving and honouring it and to chase it from us by contempt or negligence or by preferring other things before it which please us more can be no other than a mortal sin since this is truly to kill our selves and it in us And for the Authority of God it is certain that we cannot indeed deprive him of it any more than of his Power and to deny it were to become a Fool or an Atheist Since then it cannot be destroyed in it self nor in the opinion and judgment of men that have their reason found there remains but one way to destroy it so much as may be which is by contempt and irreverence which is committed against it by using it indifferently without respect to confirm what we say swearing without necessity or occasion and even of meer vanity So that if in this case and these circumstances the sin committed against the Authority of God and the reverence which is due unto him be a slight one as these Jesuits say it is it seems that there can never be any great one according to them in this matter Filliutius proceeds farther and maintains that to swear not only without occasion and reverence but
without making use of a Perjurer this is to give great liberty or rather a great and dangerous temptation to all Agents Proctors and Sollicitors of Affairs The other Example is of a man who hath need of a Knight of the Post to reform a Contract and make it valid 8 Insuper potest deservire hoc juramentum confirmando contractui qui alià s infirmus erit Ibid. Moreover saith Sanchez this oath may be made use of to fortifie and make valid a Contract which without it would be null This is to make good penny-worths of conscience and our neighbours Souls to abandon it in this manner and to help him even to cast himself into perdition and the power of the Devil to secure a debt or to avoid the reproach or suspicion of being negligent in the conduct of an affair Escobar puts also this Question about an Oath 9 Num liceat per faisos Deos ad jurandum inducere Determinate inducere mortale crimen est petere vero juramentum ab eo qui per falsos Deos est juraurus per se malum non est Escob tr 1. exam 3. num 57. pag. 79. Whether it be lawful to induce one to swear by false gods The Answer is 10 That to engage him expresly thereto is a mortal sin but to demand an oath of him who will swear by false gods is no evil thing in it self He holds then that it is no evil in it self to take such an oath of an Infidel but it would be to demand it that it may be demanded but not expresly that we may sollicite an Infidel and engage him to swear provided we tell him not in express terms that he shall swear by his false gods though we be assured that he will not swear otherwise not acknowledging the true God Who sees not that this is to deride God and men to treat of matters of Religion and Salvation in a manner so unhandsom and gross that common sense only is sufficient to perceive the excess and baseness of it Escobar cites Filliutius upon this Point and he saith in effect the same thing with him and in the same terms 1 Petere juramentum ab co quem constat esse juraturum per falses Deos non est per se malum Filliutius tom 2. mor. qq tr 21. cap. 11. num 339. pag. 265. To demand saith he an oath of him who wâ—…are assured will swear by his false god is not a thing evil in it self This is also the Judgment of Sanchez who with his Brethren acknowledging that it is to contribute to an action of Idolatry or at the least to give occasion of it also with them that it may not be done without some reason for it But instead of what the others say generally that we ought to be engaged thereto by some necessity or utility he saith more that it cannot be so little as not be sufficient thereunto 2 Vel modica utilitas satis est ad excusandum ab hoc praecepto vitandae hujus occasionis Sanch. ut supra num 23. pag. 37. The least benefit or interest sufficeth saith he to dispense with the Precept which obliges us to avoid this occasion And it is in a manner upon this reason that he gives a solution to another difficulty which he propounds a little after 3 Secunda difficultas est quale peccatum fit exigere hoc juramentum ad Infideli parato ad jurandum per falsos Deos quando defuit necessitas aut utilitas excusans Ibid. num 22. Quam difficultatem in terminis non enodant Authores Quia generale charitatis preximl ac correctionis fraternae praeceptum obligat quemlibet sub mortâ—li ad vitandum lethale alterius peccatum quando commode absque suo damno id potest What sin is it to require an oath of an Infidel who is ready to swear by false gods without necessity or utility which might serve for excuse He answers 1. That none have declared nor explicated this Question in the terms he hath proposed it And after he acknowledges that some condemn this action of mortal sin because it is entirely against the Charity which we owe to our Neighbour which obliges us to hinder and much more not to tempt him to offend God mortally at least when we can do it conveniently and without any loss This so weighty a consideration startles him a little but it is not capable to make him to quit his opinion and yield unto the truth 4 Quamvis autem hoc probabilius esse credam quia ratio adducta fortiter urget at probabile est culpam solum venialem admitti Though I believe saith he that this opinion is more probable because the reason of these Authors which I now related is very urgent it is very probable that it is but a venial sin His reason is that since there needs so small a matter to be able without sin to prevail against the Precept forbidding us to demand an oath of an Infidel this is a sign that this Command is not so rigorous as to oblige under mortal sin though we should violate it expresly and without any particular reason 5 Quia ut vidimus n. 2. seq vel modica utilitas satis est ad excusandum ab hoc praecepto vitandae hujus occasionis at à praeceptis sub mortali obligantibus non tam levis causa excusare solet Ibid. Because saith he the least consideration of benefit sufficeth to exempt us from the Precept which obligeth to avoid this occasion and it is not ordinary for so slight an occasion to dispense with Commands which oblige under mortal sin This manner of arguing is very ordinary with the Jesuits to establish one Errour by another and to make use of one disorder which they have already introduced to make way for a second by drawing consequences from the one to the other Because they give liberty without sin to demand an oath of an Idolater when we have any small pretext for it they infer from thence that when we demand it without any reason it cannot be any great evil Thus it is that they take from themselves authority to dispense with the Commandments of God and abolish them as they please and that they make use of their own dispensations to give them liberty to violate them freely or at least without any great sin ARTICLE III. Of the Commandment of God HONOUR THY FATHER AND THY MOTHER THis Commandment obligeth Children to their Fathers and Mothers in four principal things as the Catechism of the Council of Trent observes to love reverence obedience and assistance These are also the four Duties in which the Jesuits undertake to dispense with them 1. For what concerns love Dieastilius saith 1 Defiderare filium v. g. parentis mortem aut de illa gaudere ob haereditatem eldem provenientem non ita certum est esse licitum quamvis de
to deprive me of my honour before a Prince Judge or Persons of great quality by accusing me of feigned crimes and I have no other way to divert this loss of reputation but by killing you secretly And a little after he adds alledging Bannez for it * Idem dicendum si crimen est verum si tamen est occultum * Pâ—obari potest 1. quia si baculo vel alapa impacta velis meum honorem famam violare possum armis prohibere ergo etiam si id nitar lingua Nam parum videtur referre quo instrumento quis nitatur inferre injuriam si aeque efficaciter nocebit Ibid. num 81. 2. Quia contumeliae possunt armis impodiri ergo detractiones 3. Periculum samae aequiparatur periculo vitae at qui ob periculum vitae evadendum licitum est occidere ergo c. Quia honor merito apud homines pluris aestimatur quam damnum multarum pecuniarum ergo si potest occidere ne damnum pecuniarum accipiat potest etiam ne ignominiam cogatur sustinere Ibid. num 77. The same is to be said where the crime is true so it be hid and secret And that he may establish this so strange Doctrine of which there is none who may not see how dangerous and fatal the consequences are he brings three instances which are so many reasons whereof he makes use to prove it * Idem dicendum si crimen est verum si tamen est occultum * Pâ—obari potest 1. quia si baculo vel alapa impacta velis meum honorem famam violare possum armis prohibere ergo etiam si id nitar lingua Nam parum videtur referre quo instrumento quis nitatur inferre injuriam si aeque efficaciter nocebit Ibid. num 81. 2. Quia contumeliae possunt armis impodiri ergo detractiones 3. Periculum samae aequiparatur periculo vitae at qui ob periculum vitae evadendum licitum est occidere ergo c. Quia honor merito apud homines pluris aestimatur quam damnum multarum pecuniarum ergo si potest occidere ne damnum pecuniarum accipiat potest etiam ne ignominiam cogatur sustinere Ibid. num 77. This may be proved saith he first because if one attempt to damnifie me in my honour and reputation by smiting me with a cudgel or giving me a box on the ear I may betake me to my arms to keep him off and by consequence I have the very same right if he endeavour to do me the same wrong by reproaching me for it is of small consideration what means are made use of to do me an injury if I be hurt as much the one way as the other In the second place Recourse may be had to arms to hinder an affront and so likewise by consequence to silence reproaches In the third place The danger of losing honour is equal to that of lâ—sing life But it is lawful to kill to avoid the peril of losing life and by consequence also for avoiding the danger of losing honour * Idem dicendum si crimen est verum si tamen est occultum * Pâ—obari potest 1. quia si baculo vel alapa impacta velis meum honorem famam violare possum armis prohibere ergo etiam si id nitar lingua Nam parum videtur referre quo instrumento quis nitatur inferre injuriam si aeque efficaciter nocebit Ibid. num 81. 2. Quia contumeliae possunt armis impodiri ergo detractiones 3. Periculum samae aequiparatur periculo vitae at qui ob periculum vitae evadendum licitum est occidere ergo c. Quia honor merito apud homines pluris aestimatur quam damnum multarum pecuniarum ergo si potest occidere ne damnum pecuniarum accipiat potest etiam ne ignominiam cogatur sustinere Ibid. num 77. Because as he saith a little before men by good reason esteem their honour more than wealth and money and by consequence as he will say hereafter if one may kill for fear of losing his money he may also for fear of taking an affront I have no design for the present to consider or examine this whole discourse nor all these reasons which contain almost as many excesses as words I shall content my self to say in general of him and those who imitate him in this kind of reasoning in matters of Christian Morality that the farther they advance the farther they stray and are removed from the truth and fall continually from one errour into another and the latter are usually the greater their conclusions are worse than the Maxims from whence they draw them and the reasons which they produce to prove the one and the other are also oftentimes of yet more dangerous consequence than all their propositions The same Lâ—ssius after the three reasons which we have now related gives thereupon also a fourth which comprehends all the rest which alone may serve as a general Maxime to resolve a multitude of cases in this matter but which may also be both the cause and justification of all sorts of Murders 1 Quia jus defenfionis videtur se extendere ad omne id quod necessarium ut te ab omni injuria serves immunem Ibid. num 81. Because the right of self-defence saith he seems to give liberty to employ all the means which are necessary to secure ones self fromall sorts of injuries He seems to have taken this Maxime as good store of others from Molina who expounds it also more clearly 2 Fas est quacunque via ratione quibuscunque armis id totum efficere quod ad tuâ—m defenâ—…onem suâ—rit necessarium Molina de just jure tom 4. tract 3. disp 2. num 5. pag. 1757. It is lawful saith he to employ all sorts of means and to make use of all sorts of ways and of all sorts of arms to do that which is necessary for self-defence The Proposition of the one and the other is universal in all these points They give no boundaries to mens passions suspicions jealousies and pretences whereof they may make use to cover and justifie their interests and vain-glory If we believe these Jesuits all men have right to make use of all sorts of expedients to maintain their reputation true or false against all sorts of people who offend against it in any manner whatsoever or who hurt their interest and pretensions He may kill his adversary himself or employ other persons whom he shall judge more proper to kill him by open force or surprize All this is lawful for every private man according to these Doctors Jus defensionis videtur se extendere ad omne id quod est necessarium c. They hold also that we may use this right not only in important occasions but even in the least also to repel or repair a petty as well as a grand injury to have
satisfaction for an offensive word as well as if we had suffered the greatest reproachful outrage And in a word that we may make use of this right to protect our honour by all sorts of effectual ways so that it may not receive the least diminution ut te ab omni injuria serves immunem After Lessius hath established so detestable a Maxime which is equally prejudicial to the Church and State and which overthrows all Laws divine and humane he is constrained by the horrour he had towards it in himself to declare that he approves not the practice of it Verum haec quoque sententia mihi in praxi non probatur But there is cause to believe that this word comes rather from the secret check of his conscience than that it is a testimony of his true judgment and that it proceeds not so much from the fear of God as men who might as he well perceived reproach him justly therewith and impute unto him all the unhappy effects of a Doctrine so abominable and pernicious to humane Society For if he had had God before his eyes and had truly condemned the practice of this bloody and barbarous opinion he would never have published and maintained it with so many reasons as true just and reasonable since this is at the same time to approve the practice thereof there being none who doth not easily believe that it is lawful to follow in the practice of a Rule which is just and conformable to reason and truth And though he had proposed it only as probable and not as his own opinion he had thereby sufficiently approved the use of it and ought to be responsible for all the mischiess which may arise from it since according to him and all his Society it is lawful in practice to follow a probable opinion even so as to prefer it before that which is more probable SECTION III. That it is lawful to kill in defence of ones goods according to Lessius THe third concern for which Lessius holds that it is lawful to kill is for the preservation of our goods His reasons are 1 Primo quia bona temporalia sunt ad vitam conservandam necessaria ergo sieut licet vitam tueri ita etiam haec quae sunt vitae necessaris non solum ut praecise vivamus sed â—tiam ut convenienter honeste vivamus Lessius de just jure lib. 2. cap. 9. dub 11. num 67. pag. 88. First because temporal goods are necessary to preserve life and by consequence it is lawful to preserve them in the same manner as life it self as being necessary not only to live absolutely but also to live honourably according to our rank and condition He made use of the same reason a little before to prove that a man may fight a duel for the defence not only of his life and honour but of his goods also 2 Et â—adem videtur esse ratio in invasione fortunarum Nam fortunae sunt necessarium vitae instrumentum subsidium orâ—…mentum Ibid. dub 8. num 49. It seems to me saith he that the same reason for killing takes place when our goods are invaded for our wealth is a necessary instrument support and ornament of our life So that according to Lessius we may deprive our neighbour of his life for fear he should deprive us of our goods It is manifest enough that this Maxime cannot appear very Christian but the reason on which he grounds it is much less because saith he wealth is a necessary instrument support and ornament of life That is to say that the commodity and advantage which we reap from wealth in that it gives means not only to live but to live at ease and in honour ought to be preferred before the life of our brother and so we need not make any scruple to kill him if he attempt to disseize us of our temporal commodities without fear of violating the Laws of the Gospel The second reason is 1 Sâ—cundo quia daretur alioquia eccasio furibus latronibus viros probos spoliandi Nihil enim ab illis esset tutum si deâ—eâ— sio necessaria non posset objici Concessa autem defensionâ—attiam concessa censetur occisio sine qua saepe non poteâ—t esse defensio Ibid. num 67. Because otherwise occasion would be given to Thieves and Robbers to pillage honest men For if it were not lawful to resist them by doing what is necessary for our defence there would be nothing safe and secured from their enterprises But as it is lawful to defend our selves so it is also lawful to kill because oftentimes we cannot defend our selves without killing He proves by the same argumentation that we may kill to preserve our honour and to repel or prevent an affront 2 Quis alias daretur occasio improbitati optimos quosque contumelils vexandi Dub. 12. num 78. Because if this were not lawful occasion would be given to wicked persons to commit all sorts of outragious abuses upon honest persons And a little after he repeats the same reason 3 Qâ—ia alias daretur licentia improbis quodvis genus conâ—umeliae in quemvis ingerendi Ibid. Because otherwise liberty would be given to wicked men to outrage any person whomsoever as they pleased He is very much afraid to give way to robbery detraction calumny but he fears not at all to make way for the murdering and damning of his neighbour which follows thereupon inevitably in such encounters since a thief a calumniator a defamer can no more avoid the loss of his Soul than of his body when they are slain in the act or in the design of committing these crimes But the Divinity of the Jesuits judge that true charity may contemn these mischiefs to avoid the loss of temporal goods He contents not himself to establish in this manner this inhumane and barbarous Maxime but to render it more easie to be practised he notes out many particular cases wherein he pretends that it is lawful to kill of which one is 4 Si conjuraveris in mea damna When you conspire to ruine us And another 5 Si impedis inique meos creditores ne mihi satisâ—aciant Ibid. When you unjustly hinder my Creditor from paying me So that as soon as any man shall threaten to undo us or we shall know that he will hinder our Creditors from paying us whether he do it of animosity or because the same persons who are indebted to us are also accomptable to him and he may lose his debt if we be first paid it will be lawful for us to attempt upon the life of this man and to kill him publickly or privately This Doctrine is so horrible that Lessâ—us himself foreseeing the extremities and deadly accidents which are inseparable from this liberty of killing which he gives all sorts of people indifferently and without excepting any person endeavours to moderate it by two
he be ready to charge thâ—se crimes on him or his Order publickly before considerable persons if he be not slain before One of his reasons is 5 Nâ—m quo jure licitum est seculari in tali casu calumniatorem occidere codem jure licitum videtur Clerico Religioso cum in hoc Religiosus secularis sinâ— omnino pares Ibid. Because that in this case it seems that a Clergie-man or a Monk hath the same right as a Lay-man lawfully to kill a slanderer there being no difference in this point betwixt a Lay-man and a Religious That is to say that he would have the Clergy in this point conform themselves to the world and that he would be sorry that Monks should have less liberty than Lay men to follow their passions and to revenge themselves before-hand of an injury they have not yet received Which cannot but seem very strange to a person never so little equitable seeing that instead of putting a stop to the passions of the world by the Example of the Religious he would overthrow the vertue of the Religious by the Example of the World without considering that worldly men that have any conscience would themselves refuse the power he attributes unto them of killing him that only threatens or hath a simple design to hurt their reputation by some calumny and though they should believe they had a liberty to defend their honour in this manner at the expence of another mans life honour it self and natural generosity alone would forbid them to use it though this Jesuit dares to lead on the Religious unto it A Disciple of the Society desirous to defend this Doctrine that he might clear up and make it better comprehended propounds it in a very remarkable Examample 6 Legiâ—…i hanc doctrinam inquitis an homo Religiosus qui sragilitati eedens foeminam vilem cognovit quae honori ducens se prostitutam esse tanto viro rem narrat candem infamat possit illam occidere Caranuel fund 55. sect 7. pag. 551. You have read saith he this Doctrine of Amicus and you demand whether a Monk that hath sinued through frailty of the flesh with a woman of base condition who takes it for an honour to be prostitute to so great a Personage boasts her self of it and defames him may kill this woman He dares not at first declare his opinion and he acknowledges he is in great suspence and knows not which way to resolve speaking thus 1 Quid scio At audivi ab eximio P. N. S. Theologiae Doctore magni ingenii doctrinae viro Potuiffet Amicus hanc resolutionem omisisse at semel impressam debet illam tueri nos candem defendere Doctrina quidem est probabilis sed qua posset uti Religiosus pellicem occidere ne se infamaret Ibid. I know not what to answer It is true I have heard an excellent Father a Doctor in Divinity of great wit and learning say that Amicus might well have forborn to propound this proposition but it being once published in print he was obliged to maintain it and we to defend him This Doctrine indeed is probable and a Monk may kill a woman with whom he hath sinned for fear she should defame him He saith well that it had been better that Amicus had never published this mischievous Doctrine but he saith not that it is wicked and though he saw well enough the falfity and errour thereof as he testifies by the difficulty he makes to approve it yet he believes that Amicus was obliged to maintain it after he had published it semel impressam debet illam tueri For that it is a kind of disgrace to a learned man as he is and to the Society to seem to have been ignorant of any thing or to have erred and a Jesuit knows not what it is to recant sincerely when he hath once set forth a Proposition by the order and with the approbation of his Superiors This Doctrine though altogether brutish and inhumane ceaseth not to be probable in the Judgment of this Casuist Doctrina quidem est probabilis because Amicus hath set it out and because he who is a Doctor as well as Amicus by the engagement he stands in to the party and that he might gratifie his Master and his friend finds himself obliged to give him his approbation Et nos debemus candem defendere And upon a probability so well founded a Monk may kill a woman with whom he hath sinned for fear she defame him Poterit Religiosus pellicem occidere ne se infamet taking from her in this manner her life after her honour and clearing an adultery by a murder A Judge cannot put to death a Malefactor if he be not lawfully and evidently convicted and if he condemn him upon simple conjectures presumptions and probabilities he makes himself guilty of his death So that the Casuists give more power to a Malefactor and an Adulterer then the Laws give unto Judges assuring him that he may upon a probable opinion kill her with whom he hath sinned for fear she discover his crime This is not sufficient to have made this opinion probable he must also that the Religious may have entire liberty to follow it without any scruple remove from the contrary opinion all manner of probability and this Caranuel doth saying 2 Doctrinam Amici solam esse veram oppositam â—mprobabilem censemus omnes docti Ibid. sect 6. p. 544. That all able men and learned persons amongst them hold with him not only that the opinion of Amicus is true but that the contrary opinion is not so much as probable It must needs be that this opinion which authorizes Murder in favour of Adultery hath in a little time made a marvellous progress since Amicus declares that he invented it and Caranuel not daring at first to say that he approved it speaks of it a little after as certain and evident truth the contrary whereof seems not to him to be maintainable because that upon his and Amicus Authority all the learned of the Faction of Probability have embraced it Then he fortifies this Authority by reason which he proposes in this manner 3 Conformius rationi videtur honorem tueri gladio quam mendacio generofius sanctius famam desendere occidendo aggreflorem quam ei falsum testimonium imponendo Ibid. fund 55. sect 6. pag. 550. It seems more agreeable to reason to defend honour by the Sword then by lying That it is a thing more generous and holy to maintain reputation by killing an Assaillant then by hearing false witness against him He takes it for granted that both the one and the other are reasonable and that there is no difference but as of less and more That it is an equitable generous and holy act to bear false witness against him that assails our reputation but it is more generous and holy to kill
make use of the latter than former way 4 E duobus mediis licitis illud videtur eligendum quod tutius est ex parte ejus qui seipsum defendit ad vitandam certam mortem ejusve certum periculum Because of two ways which are both lawful it seems that ought to be preferred which is most secure for the defendant that he may avoid evident peril or death it self And a few lines after he adds 1 Haec intelligenda sunt in foro fori quod dicitur forum Dei conscientlae Nam in foro litigioso ubi lecus est praesumptionibus ita praeveniens actorem injustum haberetur reus homicidii nisi seipsum purgaret That all this ought to be understood in the soveraign and inward Court of God and Conscience For in the outward Court which proceeds according to forms of Justice and considers presumptions and conjectures he who should thus prevent his Adversary how injurious soever would be condemned as a Murderer if he could not clear himself As if Gods Law did not forbid Murder as strongly as those of men and it were lawful to abuse his goodness by fearing him less than his Creatures because his Justice doth not commonly punish with so great severity and speed as that of the Princes of the Earth This Jesuit raises yet another Question whether one may kill a person from whom he yet never received any displeasure aâ—an infant when he cannot secure his own life but by his death And after he had said that there are many who cannot approve so barbarous an action he adds 2 Respondeo nihilominus cum quibusdam probabiliter id licere Propterea quod hoc praecepto Non occides non prohibetur absolute omnis occisio innocentis sed cum limitatione ne videlicet indebite sine justa causa fiat Sicut docet S. Thomas 1. 2. q. 100. a. 3. Ista autem occisio non fit sine justissima causa urgentissima qualis est conservatio propriae vitae That according to the opinion of some others which is also his own it is probable that this is lawful because this Commandment Thou shalt not kill forbids not absolutely to kill an innocent but with this exception not to kill him without obligation and just cause according as S. Thomas speaks Now in this case he that kills doth it not without just and very urgent reason such as is the preservation of his own life This reason may be extended yet farther For hence it will follow that liberty may be taken to kill an innocent not only to preserve life but honour and goods and if he should be blamed who had done it he may alledge for his justification that if he had not done this he had been ruined in estate and honour whereof the one is necessary to life and the other more dear than life it self and he will say as the Casuist here Ista occisio non fit sine justissima causa urgentissima Tambourin hath very lately caused the same thing to be imprinted If any one saith he assault you and make use of an innocent person to shelter him you may kill him that you may hit him who invades you Escobar is of the same opinion tr 1. ex 7. num 52. pag. 121. and Lessius whom he quotes proposeth the Question in these terms 3 Si is qui invaditur non posset se tueri nisi cum periculo innecâ—ntis quo invasor se protegit utrum liceat cum eo periculo se defendere It is demanded whether if a person assanlted cannot secure himself but by hazarding the death of an innocent wherewith the Aggressor covereth himself he may defend himself notwithstanding that hazard He answers 4 Respondeo probabilius esse posse Lesstus de just lib. 2. cap. 9. dub 9. num 57. pag. 86. That it is more probable he may He afterwards proposes the same case in another fashion 5 Petes si fugiens hostem non possit evadere ulsi per angustum iter ubi proteret infantem vel claudum poteritne illac sugere ut se salvet Suppose saith he that a man flyes from his enemy and he cannot escape but through some strait way wherein he will crush to death some infant or lame person it is demanded whether he may take that way to save himself He answers first 6 Petrus Nivarra negat nisi sit aliqua probabilis spes non interficiendi That Navarra saith that he may not unless he have probable hopes not to kill him But though this be always a great injustice to hazard the life of an innocent over whom we have no power to secure our own yet this satisfies not Lessius who outvying Navarra adds 7 Sed revera videtur eadem ratio quae in casu superiori Ibid. num 59. That in truth it seems that we ought to say the very same thing of this case as of the former That is that as to save my life I may kill an innocent with my own hand so one may ride over him though we be assured that he will dye thereof His reason is 8 Qâ—ia qui invaditur jus habet se defendendi quo jure non privatur ex illa innocentis interpositione Because he who is assaulted hath right to defend himself and that his meeting with or the interposure of an innocent doth not take from him this right Which is no other than an application of the general Maxime whereon he grounds all this Doctrine of Murder under pretence of defending life honour and goods which is 1 Jus defensionis videtur se extendere ad id omne quod est necessarium ut te ab omni injuria serves immunem That this pretended right of self-defence is generally extended to whatsoever is necessary to secure ones self from all injuries But he gives a charitable advice to temper a little these answers if they be found too rigorous That is to consider 2 Adverte tamen primo si potes fugere teneris saltem ex charitate ne innocentem interficies Ibid. num 58. That we are obliged at least by Charity to flye if we can for fear of killing an innocent But this language as we have already observed elsewhere according to the Principles of the Jesuits Divinity is not intended to signifie any more than that if being assaulted you can flye without any inconvenience to you rather than kill an innocent in your defence you shall do well though you are not obliged to it absolutely and in doing the contrary you cannot be blamed of any injustice This is that which the same Lessius saith in another case 3 Si tamen nolis fugere non peccab's contra justitiam If notwithstanding you will not flye you sin not against Justice All this murderous Doctrine hath also been taught at Paris in the Colledge of Clermont by Father Hereau under the view and with the
him believe their innocence And in case they meet not with a prudent Confessor who understands well these shifts and deceits and fall into the hands of one who seems to them too exact and would oblige them to restore what they have privily taken away he holds that they are excused from giving credit unto him and though the Church it self should interpose and employ its Authority and press them by vertue of a Monitory to come unto Confession and Restitution they would not be obliged to obey it Because in this occurrent saith he neither the wife nor the children aforesaid ought or can be forced by the Confessor to reveal the things they so purloyn'd though the Creditors should obtain Mandates and Letters monitory from the Bishop From the same Principle he affirms in the same Chapter pag. 200. That a person who is indebted for very great and notable sums may to the prejudice of his Creditors give away part of his goods so that he to whom the gift is made shall not be obliged to restore any part thereof to his Creditors if he be not constrained by Law See how he concludes after he had proposed contrary opinions upon this point I say then that he who hath received by Deed of Gift any moveable or immoveable of a man in great debt is not obliged to quit it in favour of the Creditors of such a Debtor before the Law constrain him In the following Page he propounds another Case upon the same Subject and he resolves it after such a manner as authorizes and maintains not only injury but revenge also and murder Some one saith he entreats a Souldier to smite and beat his neighbour or to burn the Farm of a man who hath offended him It is demanded whether the Souldier failing the other who prayed him to do all these outrages ought to repair out of his own Estate the damage which proceeded thence Upon which he makes a Relation of some Authors who hold the affirmative and without quoting any one for the contrary opinion he broaches it as from himself and saith for refuting the first My opinion is not as theirs For no man is obliged to restore if he have not violated Justice Doth he so who submits himself to anothers pleasure when he only entreats of him a favour This goodly reasoning may serve to justifie from doing wrong not only all men who employ their friends or other persons to do mischief making use of them as their hands and instruments and so doing the very same action and injury with them whether they commit theft or murder or other violences but it may also justifie all persons who induce and sollicite others unto wickedness and the Devil himself when he tempts men and causes them to sin because temptation and sollicitations unto evil force not the will and are only inducements and prayers as it were which depend absolutely on them who are tempted and sollicited to do evil which many do also refuse and reject Behold whereunto the Maxims of this Casuist are reduced They teach to steal with subtilty and confidence without being obliged unto restitution to speak against ones conscience without lying to forswear without treachery to make a mock of Justice without being deficient in the respect due thereto to contemn the Authority of the Church without disobedience and finally to defraud Creditors ruine Commerce destroy publick Faith and make havock of our neighbours goods without injustice ARTICLE VII THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESSE BEaring false witness is a sin so odious and contrary to the Law of Nature that the most corrupted persons and who boast of all other sins cannot endure to be accused of this nor even of a simple lye God hath always forbidden it whether before a Judge or in private but the Jesuits favour it at any time and the sins which depend on it to wit slander and detraction Dicastillus demands 1 An teneatur quis retractare suum falsum dictum quando ex co inferenda est alteri mors seu mutilatio etiamsi testi se retractantâ— fidem resultet simile damnum Exi stimo si non peccaverit mortaliter dicendo illam falsitatem non teneri cum tanto suo incommedo cognita veritate dictum retractare Legatur Tolet. lib. 5. cap. 59. Less dub 7. Reginald sect 2. num 45. Dicastill lib. 2. tract 2. disp 8. dub 7. num 92. Whether he be obliged to retract who hath affirmed some falsity which will cost the loss of life or member to another when the witness by his retractation will himself incur the same penalty He answers That he believes that if the false witness have not sinned mortally by bearing this false testimony he is not obliged after that he understands the truth to retract what he hath said so exposing himself to so great evils That is to say it is lawful to kill an innocent after we have slandered him rather than put our selves into any danger by retracting since it is not so much the offences or the Hangmen as the witnesses that put him to death who is condemned upon their depositions That we may have a clearer Exposition of this Question this Jesuit sends us his to Treatise of Restitution where he saith 1 Ad nibil tenetur is qui falâ—um testimonium dixit ex ignorantia vel inadvertentia etlaâ—si ex â—llo tesâ—imonio contingaâ— aliquem damnari Less cap. 3. dub 7. Haec sententia in praxi tuta est sed prior magis videtur consona rationi Dicastill lib. 2. tract 2. disp 3. dub 2. num 57. That the opinion which holds that a person who hath born false witness through ignorance or inadvertence without sinning mortally is obliged to nothing though this false testimony do occasion the condemnation of a man is safe in practice though the opinion seem to him more agreeable unto reason For he regards no more to follow the light of natural reason and equity than the Rules of Faith but only his own sense and the Authority of such as he is in resolving difficulties which refer to Manners and Religion And this is one of the most goodly and commodious Principles of the Jesuits Divinity that we are not obliged to restitution when we have not sinned mortally in wronging our neighbour For if this Principle be sure they who find a great sum of money or take it by ignorance and heedlesness are not obliged to restore it because they have not sinned mortally in taking of it We may see the consequence of this in the Chapter of Restitution But if you joyn hereto the conditions the Jesuits require to make an action a mortal sin false witnesses will thereby receive great comfort and encouragement boldly to act and acquit themselves in this duty The same Author is not less favourable to him who suffers himself to be corrupted by money not to bear false witness but not to testifie the truth He approves Azors observation who saith
Church and Nature it self since it can prevail without incurring any penalty against the Laws of the one and the other And since the Laws of the Church are also the Holy Ghost's who by it hath given us them and who guides it in all it doth and ordains if custom carry it against the Laws of the Church as this Casuists pretends it must needs be according to him that it hath more power than the Holy Ghost and that the Authority it hath in their School is more to be considered than that of 〈◊〉 himself since he believes that we ought to yield to the abuses it hath introduced into the Church to the prejudice of the primitive Orders and Laws which the Holy Ghost hath established But if these things seem extraordinary and incredible in themselves and considered according to the Rules of Truth and natural Sense alone yet they are not so in the Maxims of these new Doctors For it is not in this case only but in occasions of all other sorts that the custom being sound opposed and contrary to the Laws of God and the Church it ordinarily gains the cause by their Judgment as hath been observed in many places of these Writings Escobar follows the same Rules with Layman to determine what labour is lawful or forbidden on Feast-days that is 1 Servile opus est ad quod servi deputati sunt Nec opus servile fit quia â—b lucrum est factum si de se servile ante non erat Escobar tract 7. exam 5. cap. 2. num 4. pag. 99. Servile work saith he which is for servants and slaves And he adds as Layman that if a work be not servile in it self it doth not become servile when it is done for gain He afterwards sets down in the number of actions which are not servile studying writing travelling dancing And although he affirm that hunting and painting are servile actions he forbears not to say afterwards 2 Pingere ex suo genere servile est Venatio si fist ex officio servile est ut pictura ob voluptatem recrcaâ—ionem minime Ibid. num 8. Mundare scopis tapetibus vestire parietes Ecclesiarum hujusmodi nisi aliqua intercedat excusatio saltem venislia sunt Ibid. n. 6. Num misericordiae opera exercenda De se servilia non licent ut consuere vestem pauperi deferre ligna eidem c. Ibid. num 7. That if hunting be followed upon obligation and of duty as when a Hunts-man or a servant hunts at the command of his Master it is servile as well as painting but that it is not so if it be pursued of pleasure and for pastime That is to say that a servant may not go on hunting in obedience to his Master when he sends him but the Master may go for his pleasure and the servant also and by consequence that obedience in labour profanes a Holy day but pleasure in the same work profanes it not Speaking in the same place of those who labour in cleansing hanging and trimming Churches on Feast-days he saith that they sin at the least venially if they have not some lawful cause He saith the same thing of the outward works of mercy which are exercised towards our neighbour as to mend the cloaths of the poor to carry them wood or other things whereof they have need these actions according to him are servile and forbidden on Feast-days He would have it lawful to paint and hunt for pleasure on Feast-days and he will not have it lawful to sweep hang and adorn the Church for the Service of God He would have us have power to walk dance travel and go whither we will for our pastime but he will not have it lawful to visit the poor and sick and to give them some assistance pretending that works of mercy are more contrary to the Sanctification of Feasts than the sports and pastimes of the world He will not have it lawful to carry alms themselves unto the poor on Feast-days as he saith expresly a little after For having put the Question if those who by a motive of piety do actions which are called servile sin against this Commandment of the Church he answers in these terms 3 Excuiandine aliqui ratione pietatis Aliqui liberant à reatu exercentes die Festo opera servilia ad templa aedificanda vel resicienda gratis ad â—lâ—emosynam gerendam ad ornanda delubra c. At ego cum illis sentio qui laborantes vel hoc praetextu sint necessitate non excusant There are some who exempt them from sin who busie themselves in servile works on Feast-days to build or re-edifie Churches gratis to carry alms to the poor to adorn Temples c. But as for me I am of the opinion of those who exempt them not who labour without necessity on Feast-days though they do it under this pretence that is to say by a motive of piety He believes then that it is lawful to play dance walk abroad without necessity and for pleasure only on Feast-days because according to the Jesuits Divinity these actions are not servile He pretends also though painting and hunting be servile of themselves yet the motive of pleasure and contentment which we look for in them hinders them from being so and makes them lawful And yet he maintains that to sweep a Church for devotion or to take delight to dress an Altar to hang a Chappel to carry alms unto the poor are actions prohibited on Feast-days and that necessity only not pleasure can hinder them from being servile As if the pleasure taken in hunting or painting were more noble and holy â—…an that which is taken in serving the poor and God himself in the Churches He finds it difficult to exempt these actions of Piety and Religion from mortal fin so rigorous would he appear in this point They are saith he at the least venial sins Saltem venialia sunt Filliutius had said it before him in the same terms and yet more clearly 1 Mundate scopis templum vestice parietes tapetibus hâ—jusmedi vidertur servilia nisi aliqua excusatio intercedat erit saltem peccatum veniale non motrale secluâ—o contemptu Filliutius qq moral tom 2. tract â— cap. 9. n. 156. pag. 267. It seems that to sweep Churches to hang them and other such like actions are servile and to do them without lawful excuse is at least a venial sin though not mortal if not done through contempt Strange Divinity that we need not to fear to contemn the Command of God forbidding us to work on the Feast and Lords-days by working for our selves because we take our pleasure in the work as in hunting and that we ought to fear contempt and mortal sin in working only for the Service of God and the Church So that these days which God hath ordained particularly for his Service may be employed according to this Divinity to serve any thing but
we promise obedience to the Superiors of the Church in becoming Christians and we promise to render them this obedience as to them who hold the place of God according to the Word of Jesus Christ 1 Qui vos audit me audit Luc. 10. v. 16. He that obeys you obeys me And according to that of S. Paul 2 Pro Christo ergo legatione fungimur tanquam Deo exhortante per nos 2 Cor. 5. v. 20. Gods speaks unto you by us we are but the Ministers and Embassadors of Jesus Christ If then the Superiors of a Religious Order can command the internal actions because the submission rendred unto them depends on the will and promise of their Inferiors which regards God in them it must also be confessed by the same reason that the Ecclesiastick Superiors Prelates have the same power and may as well command the internal actions of them that are subject unto them for their Salvation Also it is incredible and contrary to the most common apprehensions of Christianity that the Superiors of Religious Orders should have more Power and Authority in their Congregations than the Bishops and Pope himself have in the Church and that the Power of the Pope and the Bishops should not be more internal and spiritual than that of Magistrates and Secular Princes unto whom these Jesuits compare them setting them all equally in the same inability to command internal things without acknowledging any difference betwixt them in this point and giving this advantage above them only unto Superiors of Religious Orders when they say 3 Discrimen est inter obligationem regularium ex voto obedientiae obâ—igationem aliorum ex lege civili vel Ecclesiastica That this is the difference which is betwixt the obligation of Regulars who come under a vow of obedience And if the Laws of the Church differ not in this point from the Civil Laws and the Prelates of the Church no more than Civil Magistrates have any power to command internal actions we must say that the Superiors of Religious Orders unto whom they ascribe this power hold it not from the Church and cannot receive from it that power which they say it hath not it self Also they pretend to hold it from the will of those who make vows of Religion since they say 4 Praeceptum Praelati regularis fundatur in voluntate voventis pacto seu promissione ejuâ— c. That the command of a Superior in a Religious Order is founded upon the will of him who makes the vow and on the covenant and promise by which he is obliged to obey him c. They would then that the Superiors of a Religious Order receive not from the Church the Authority and Power which they have to command but from the will of those who become Religious and they are herein soveraign and independent on the Church Which is both against the modesty of Religious persons the Order of the Church truth it self and evident reason the Superiors of the Religious Orders being not capable of so much only as to receive any Religious into their Order but by the power which they have received from the Superiors of the Church who consequently have all the power of the Superiors of the Religious Orders and much more but they have it in a manner more eminent as the Spring and Principle of this Power And if the Inferiors can by their will and by their vows give to the Superiors of Religious Orders Authority and Power to command them even internal things Jesus Christ might with stronger reason give it unto the Prelates of the Church over them and over all other the Faithful since Jesus Christ hath more power over us than we have over our selves and we are without comparison more his than our own So that he might give the Church all power over us which private persons can give over themselves to Superiors of Religious Orders by their vows and much more Which shews that the Ecclesiastick is far different from the Civil Jurisdiction with which the Jesuits nevertheless do confound it and the Ecclesiastick are other than the Civil Laws which they notwithstanding would make equal For the Jurisdiction which Jesus Christ hath given the Church over all Christians is more extended holy and divine than that of Secular Magistrates and it respects Souls more than bodies the inward than the outward since it respects eternal Salvation which depends altogether on the actions of the Soul and not of the body which do nothing without those of the Soul Also Jesus Christ hath not given unto Secular Powers the Holy Ghost to govern their people as he hath given it to his Church He hath not given them the power to open and shut Heaven unto them to cut them off and re-unite them to his body to nourish them with his flesh and blood and to fill them with his Spirit and he hath not said unto them that when they speak it is the Holy Ghost who speaks in them that it is the Holy Ghost who commands what they command that whoso despise and dishonour them despise and dishonour the Holy Ghost For thus the Apostles have spoken in the Scripture since S. Peter saith to Ananias and his Wife that they lyed unto the Holy Ghost because they had lyed unto one of the Ministers of the Church And this is the reason that the Councils and the Fathers so often call the Laws of the Church Sacred and Divine knowing that they proceed from the Holy Ghost who is always in the Church as Jesus Christ was with the Apostles and conducted them till his Passion and death Which is so true that Layman himself could not refrain from acknowledging it more than once in very clear terms 1 Quis enim neget quin lege vel praecepto Ecclesiae utpote animarum salutem sptctante praecipi possit ut ministri Ecclesiae vere non simulatorie orent Sacramenta ministrent Fidelibus omnibus ut Sacramenta vere non per fictionem suscipiant Qui autem sine interna intentione orant sine ullo animi dolore peccata confitentur c. si non vere sed ficte orant non verae sed fictae poenitentiae Sacramentum postulant Ergo non satissaciunt Ecclesiae praecepto Ibid. Who doubts saith he that the Church which in all its conduct regards the Salvation of Souls may command its Ministers to pray and administer the Sacraments with sincerity and not only in appearance and to all the Faithful to receive in like manner the Sacraments with a true internal disposition Now they who pray without inward attention and they who confess without a true sorrow for their sins neither pray nor confess truly but in appearance And by consequence they satisfie not the Commandment of the Church Which may be extended to all the Commandments and all the Laws of the Church since they are all of the same nature and all have reference to