also a more dark side in which respect it comes short of it and must give it the Precedency And I think it may be very properly call'd a Dark side because it consists in Darkness and Obscurity and which is still so much the darker because 't is so peculiar to Faith and makes so great a part of its Character being the Main Difference that distinguishes it from Science or that Second Assent before spoken of For as to Firmness and Certainty therein they agree For Faith may be Firm because he that believes in God may be supposed not in the least to hesitate or doubt of the truth of what he reveals And 't is also certain because it relies upon the most certain Foundation the Testimony of God who is Infallible himself and cannot deceive And hitherto they run parallel one to the other But here begins both the difference and the disproportion that there is Clearness and Evidence on the side of Science and that Second Assent whereas there is none on the side of Faith which walks indeed upon firm Ground but altogether in the dark For he that Believes does not give his Assent because either by Sense or Reason he perceives the Object of his Faith to be thus or thus but merely because he has the Word and Authority of God for it Which though it be sufficient to found a Firm and Certain is yet however not enough to beget a Clear and Evident Assent So that the great and distinguishing Character of Science and the Second Assent is Light and Evidence and that of Faith inevidence and Obscurity which accordingly is commonly said to be an inevident Assent But how and in what sense it is so seems not commonly to be so well understood and for the Consequence of what depends upon the right stating of it deserves to be explain'd with all possible exactness 13. In order to which we are carefully to distinguish between the thing believ'd and the Reason or Motive that induces us to believe it even as in Knowledge we distinguish between the thing Known and the Argument or Medium by which it is Known the Scitum and the Formalis ratio Sciendi The thing Believ'd I would call the Matter or the Object of Faith and the Motive that induces me to believe it I would call the Formal Reason of Faith Aquinas I know calls them both Objects and then after distinguishes them by calling the Former the Material Object and the latter the Formal Object of Faith Accordingly he says that the Formal Object of Faith is the First Truth meaning as he afterward explains himself that Faith relies upon the Truth of God as its Medium or Argument Which Medium I chuse rather to call and I think more intelligibly the formal Reason than the formal Object of Faith Since the Term Object seems more properly to design the Matter of Faith or the thing Believ'd and is hardly applicable to the Motive or Reason of Believing However since we both mean one and the same thing there need be no debate upon the different manner of expressing it especially since if any one think his Term more intelligible and expressive of the Notion intended by it or has any reverence for it upon any other Consideration he is at liberty to substitute it in the room of the other 14. This necessary Distinction being premised 't is in the first place to be well heeded that when Faith is said to be an obscure and inevident Assent this Obscurity or inevidence is not to be applied to the formal Reason or Motive of Faith but only to the Matter or Object of it I say not to the formal Reason of it For as there may be in general a clear Reason why a Man should believe an Obscure thing so 't is most Certain that the formal Reason for which we assent to the things of Faith is very clear For this formal Reason is no other than the Authority of God Or rather since this includes the Truth of the Revealer as well as the Revelation it self for otherwise of what Authority would be the Revelation I would chuse to say that the Truth and Revelation of God do jointly make up the formal Reason of Divine Faith which accordingly proceeds upon this double Principle 1. That whatever God reveals is true 2. That this or that thing in particular is reveal'd by God For Faith has its Reasons as well as Science though of another Nature and its Reasons are these two as will more distinctly appear by disposing the Process of Faith into a Syllogistical Form which will be this Whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is Reveal'd by God Therefore this is true The Conclusion of this Syllogism contains both the Matter and the Act of Faith as it is an Assent to such a thing upon such a ground which is implied by the Illative Particle Therefore The two other Propositions contain the Ground it self or the formal Reason of Faith which you see consists of the double Principle before-mention'd Now 't is most apparent that these two Principles are both of them sufficiently clear or at least may be so 'T is clear in the first place that whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is either self-evident or may be proved from the Idea of God and so has either the Light of a Principle or of a Conclusion either an immediate or a Mediate Evidence And it may be also clear and to be sure is so whenever our Faith is well-grounded that such a thing in Particular is reveal'd by God And in both these respects it is true what is commonly said that Faith is the Highest Reason For you see it is perfectly reasonable in its Fund and Principle and does at last resolve as much as any Mathematical Conclusion into a rational ground of unquestionable Light and Evidence With this only difference that a Conclusion in Geometry is founded upon a Ground taken from within from the intrinsic Nature of the thing whereas our Conclusion of Faith proceeds upon a ground taken from without viz. from the Authority of God but such as however in Light and Evidence is no way inferiour to the other 15. This by the way may serve to shew the vanity and impertinence of those who when they are to prove that there is nothing in Christianity above Reason run out into a Popular Veâ—â— of Harangue about the Reasonables of the Christian Religion and its great Accommodation to Human Nature crying out with repeated importunity that Man is a Reasonable Creature Christianity a reasonable Service and Faith a Rational Act nay even the Highest Reason and the like As if we were for a Blind and unaccountable Faith and denied the use of Reason in Religion or that Faith was founded upon Reason Or as if because there is a Reason from without for Believing therefore the thing Believ'd might not from within and as to the inward Matter of it be above Reason so as
not to be comprehended or accounted for by it But this will cross my way again in another place and therefore I shall not anticipate here what further Considerations I may have occasion to bestow upon it there 16. To return therefore I say that this Obscurity and inevidence that is in Faith and upon whose account it is commonly said to be an inevident Assent does not belong to its formal Reason which you see may be clear enough as clear as any Principle of Natural Science but only to the Matter or Object of it That is in other words the inevidence does not lie in the Reason of Believing but in the Nature of the thing Believ'd Not that the matter of Faith again is wholy and all over without Evidence for then there would be no reason to believe it but only that it has no evidence from within and from the Nature of the thing it self as was remarqu'd before Not that this again is so to be understood neither as if the Proposition to be believ'd were not so much as simply intelligible as to the very litteral sense and direct signification of its Terms No we are no more to believe we Know not what than to believe we Know not why and whatever Darkness there may be in Faith it is still so much a Luminous Assent and an Act of Reason as to require that we understand the simple Meaning of the Proposition we are to believe as well as the Grounds of Credibility upon which it Challenges our Assent For the general Object of Faith is Truth and Truth is the relation of Connexion between Ideas I say Ideas for Truth does not lie in Sounds or Words but in Things Therefore to believe such a Thing to be True is the same as to believe that there is a Connexion between such Ideas But then a Man must know what those Ideas are or else how can he believe they are connected Therefore he must understand something more than the Terms themselves he must also have the Ideas of those Terms which is the same as to under stand the Meaning and Signification of them And indeed he that has no Idea or Conception of what he believes believes he knows not what and he that believes he knows not what cannot be properly said to believe any thing In all Faith therefore the Proposition Must be simply intelligible and though the Truth of it be to be Believ'd yet the Meaning of it must be understood 17. For we are again Carefully to distinguish between the Meaning of a Proposition and the Truth of a Proposition The meaning of a Proposition is only the Determination of the Ideas that are signified by such Terms the Truth of it is the Union or Connexion that is between those Ideas Now though a Man does not see the Connexion that is between the Ideas of that Proposition he is said to Believe yet he must in some measure perceive the Ideas themselves because in believing the Proposition he is supposed to believe that such Ideas are so related and Connected together When therefore 't is said that the Matter of Faith is inevident as to the intrinsic Nature of the thing the inevidence must not be thought to lie in the Ideas whereof the Proposition to be Believ'd Consists but in the Connexion of those Ideas that is not in the Meaning of the Proposition but in the Truth of it which is properly the Object of Faith as the Ideas themselves are of Perception Which again by the way may serve to discover another Instance of Impertinency in the Reasoning of those who when they are Maintaining that there can be no Article of Faith above Reason divert into pompous Flourishes and Declamations about the Intelligibility of the Objects of Faith and the utter impossibility of Believing what is not intelligible As if we denied the simple intelligibility of the Proposition or would have Men believe they know not what which certainly would be a strange degree of Implicit Faith and more Nonsensical than that of the Collier or as if that Proposition which is clear enough as to its simple Meaning might not be inevident and so above Reason as to its Truth or in other words as if Clearness of Ideas might not consist with Obscurity of their Connexion 18. But then it must be observ'd again that when we say that the Inevidence that is in the Matter of Faith respects the Truth of the Proposition not the Meaning of it or the Connexion of the Ideas and not the very Ideas themselves this is not so to be understood neither as if the Matter of Faith even thus consider'd were Absolutely and in its self necessarily inevident and such as could not possibly be known without altering its Nature and ceasing to be any longer the Object of Faith I know the contrary Supposition has prevail'd in some Schools where it passes almost for Principle and Maxim that Knowledge and Faith are mutually Exclusive of each other that the same thing cannot be at once the Object of both and that therefore if a thing be believ'd it cannot be known and if known that it cannot be believ'd St. Austin was of this Opinion and has in many places declared his mind to this purpose particularly in his XL Treatise of his Exposition upon St. Iohn's Gospel And his Authority has recommended it as it did most other things to several of the Schoolmen particularly Aquinas whence it has been transmitted down among many Modern Writers of the Systematical way both Philosophers and Divines But we must follow Reason before Authority and whoever can be prevail'd with to lay the latter quite aside and to use the other as he ought will I believe clearly perceive that nothing hinders but that the same Proposition may be at once the Object of both Faith and Science or that the Same thing may be at the same time both Known and Believ'd provided it be by different Mediums according to the diversity of the respective Acts. 19. For not to enter into the wrangle and Dust of the Schools upon this Occasion it may be sufficient to consider that there is no manner of Opposition between Faith and Knowledge or the Most evident Assent as to the Essence of the Proposition that being not supposed to be denied in the one which is Affirm'd in the other or the contrary but only as to the Medium of the Act. And that 't is not the Absolute Nature of the thing Believ'd but the Quality of the Motive that specifies Faith and distinguishes it from other Assents So that 't is no matter what the Absolute Nature of the thing be in it self whether it be evident or not evident Knowable or not Knowable provided it be assented to upon the proper Medium and Motive of Faith that is upon Authority without any respect had to the Natural evidence of the thing though otherwise never so evident in its own Absolute Nature so as to be the Object of Science
though upon a different Medium at the same time For as I said before 't is not the Nature of the thing but the Quality of the Medium that specifies Faith and tho' the same thing cannot have two Natures or be in it self at once evident and not evident yet why may it not sustain two different Relations or be consider'd in two different Mediums so as to be said to be known when perceiv'd by its Evidence and to be believ'd when assented to upon Authority Which certainly may be done as fully and with as little regard to its evidence as if there were no evidence in the thing at all So that the Evidence of the thing does not hinder the Belief of it supposing the Belief not to proceed upon that Evidence but upon its own proper Medium Authority 20. But to use a way of Arguing less Abstract though it may be with some more pressing and convincing Suppose God should reveal to me a Geometrical Truth as that two Triangles having the same Base and being within the same Parallels are equal and I who at first receiv'd it upon his bare Authority should come afterwards to be able to demonstrate it my self upon the known Principles of Art who that well considers the Natures of these things would say that my Science evacâ—â—ted my Faith and that I ceas'd to be a Believer assoon as I became a Mathematician For though I am now supposed to Know what before I only Believ'd yet why should this Knowledge destroy my Faith since I may still have as much regard for the Authority of God and as little to the Evidence of the thing as I had before the Demonstration and would still be ready to assent to it though there were no evidence to be produced for it only upon the Ground of Divine Authority And to use another Sensible though not so Artificial way of arguing I would fain know whether any one of those who are of the Contrary Sentiment would refuse a Demonstrative Account of a Reveal'd Truth suppose the Creation of the World merely for fear of injuring or destroying his Faith which yet he were bound in Conscience to do if Knowledge and Faith were so exclusive of each other and inevidence and Obscurity were so absolutely of the Essence of Faith as some pretend For then it would not be lawful to acquire the Natural Knowledge of any reveal'd Truth because 't is unlawful to destroy one's Faith and every Believer would have just reason to fear all further Light and Information about what he believes which yet I think would be acknowledg'd by all an extravagant Scruple such as can hardly enter much less stay long in any Considering head And is withal Contrary to a plain Exhortation of the Apostle who bids us add to our Faith Knowledge 21. When therefore the Matter of Faith as it is taken for the Truth of the Proposition Believ'd is charged with Obscurity and Faith it self upon that account is said as it commonly is to be of inevident things the Meaning ought not to be of an Absolute but of a Relative inevidence Not that what is Believ'd is so all over dark and obscure that it cannot while Believ'd absolutely be known but only that it cannot under that Formality and so far as it is Believ'd being necessarily in that respect inevident how bright or clear soever it may be in other respects That is in other words though the thing Believ'd absolutely consider'd may be Evident yet it is not so as Believ'd or in relation to Faith because that has no regard to the Evidence how bright soever it may shine but proceeds wholy upon another Argument between which and the Evidence of the thing there is not the least Affinity or Communication The short is the Object of Faith simply and absolutely speaking may admit of Evidence but then though it be never so evident and demonstrable in it self yet as Believ'd it is always Obscure Faith having no regard to the proper light and Evidence of the thing but only to the Testimony of the Revealer whose bare Authority is the only Motive that determines her Assent and the only Ground upon which she lays the whole weight of it though the Truth of the thing in it self absolutely Consider'd may also stand upon other Foundations be rationally accounted for by Arguments from within and so be seen by its own Light But let the Light shine never so bright upon the Object from other sides Faith lets in none nor has any regard to that which she finds there but connives at it and walks as I may say with her eyes shut contenting her self with the certainty of Revelation and leaving to Science if there be any the Evidence of the thing So that the Object is always dark to her how clear and bright soever it may be in it self or appear when absolutely consider'd to a Philosophic Eye In which respect it falls very short of the Perfection of Science though in respect of Firmness and Certainty it be equal to it as was said before All which is briefly couch'd in that excellent Account of Faith given by the Author to the Hebrews when he says that it is the Substance of things hoped for and the Argument of things not seen Where by Substance and Argument he equals it with Science in regard of the Firmness and Certainty of the Assent but by saying that 't is of things not seen he makes it vail and stoop to it in point of Evidence in which respect indeed Faith as Firm and as Certain as it is is as much inferiour to Science as Darkness is to Light 22. To gather up then what has been here discours'd at large concerning the inevidence of Faith into one view When we say that Faith is an inevident Assent we are not to understand this inevidence of the formal Reason of Faith but of the Matter of it And when we say that the Matter of it is inevident we should not intend by it that it is wholy and all over without Evidence but only that it has none from within or from the intrinsic Nature of the thing And when we say that the Matter of Faith is inevident from within this again is not to be intended of the simple Meaning of the Proposition but of the Truth of it And when we say that the Truth of it is inevident this again lastly is not to be understood as if it were always and necessarily so in its own Absolute Nature but only so far forth as it is Believ'd or as 't is consider'd under the formality of an Object of Faith Or in other words the inevidence of the Matter of Faith in respect of the Truth of the Article is not an Absolute but a Relative inevidence Not that the Matter of Faith is Never Absolutely and in the Nature of the thing inevident for it may be so too as will be seen afterwards but only that it is not necessarily so there
of Reason we must Assent to nothing but what has an internal Evidence and what in its self and by its own Lights is Comprehensible by us as they seem to mean or else their distinction of the Case of Reason and the Case of Revelation is here impertinent then I conceive that they set too narrow limits to our Assent in Matters of Reason when they allow it to be given only to things which in this sense are Evident to us For 't is plain that there are many things in Nature which we fee are True and must be True and so not only may but cannot help Assenting to them though at the same time we are not able to Comprehend how they are or can possibly be 7. Not that our Assent is then Blind and wholly without Evidence for then we might as well Assent to the contrary as to what we do and would do better not to Assent at all but only that it has none from within and from the intrinsic Nature of the Object but only from some External Consideration much after the same manner as it is in â—atch In both which there may be a Clear Reason why we should Assent to an Obscure thing But then as the internal Obscurity does not destroy the External Evidence so neither does the External Evidence strike any Light into the internal Obscurity or in other words as the Reason for Assenting is never the less Clear because the Matter assented to is Obscure so neither is the Matter assented to ever the less Obscure because the Reason for assenâ—ing to it is Clear And yet notwithstanding this internal Obscurity of the Matter we assent to it because of the prevailing Light of the External Evidence And this we do not only in Matters of Faith according to the Restriction of some but in the things of Nature and Reason too where we are oftentimes forced by the pressing urgency of certain External and Collateral Considerations to assent to things internally obscure and whose very possibility we cannot Comprehend as is plain in the great Question of the Divisibility of Quantity and other Instances whereof every Thinking Man's Obseâ—â—ation cannot but have already furnish'd him with variety The Incomprehensibility then of a thing is non just Objection against our Assent to it even in Matters of a Rational Nature much less then is it in Matters of Faith For if not in Matters that belong to the Court of Reason and where she sits as Judge then much less in things that are not of her proper Jurisdiction and if notwithstanding the internal inevidence of an Object we think fit to assent to it upon Rational Considerations much more may we and ought we upon the Authority of the Infallible God 8. Indeed if whatsoever is Above our Reason were also as some pretend as Contrary to it and there were nothing true but what was also Comprehensible and so the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then I conâ—ess we could not as Rational Creatures assent to an incomprehensible Proposition upon any Consideration whatsoever No not even that of Divine Authority 'T is true indeed there could then be no such Authority for Incomprehensible things But if there were 't is impossible we should regard it because we could not have greater assurance either of the Existence or of the Truth of it than we have already upon this Supposition that the things reveal'd are not true But now if this Supposition be no more than a Supposition if to be above Reason does not involve any Contrariety to it if there are incomprehensible Truths and Consequently the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument oâ— it s not being true all which has been already proved then 't is plain that what is an incomprehensible may yet be a Believable Object because within the Possibility of Truth and then to render it actually believ'd there needs only some External Evidence either from Reason or Authority For what should hinder our Assent to an Incomprehensible thing when we have plain Evidence from without for it and its own internal Obscurity is no Argument against it 'T is plain therefore that we ought to give our Assent And since we do so oftentimes upon a Ground of Reason much more ought we upon that more Firm and Immoveable ground of Revelation The short is whatever is no Objection against the Truth of a thing is none against the Credibility of it since Truth is the General Object of Faith unless you will say that a thing is unfit to be believ'd upon any other account besides want of Truth and therefore since we have already shewn that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Truth of it it visibly follows that it is no Argument against the Belief of it neither Therefore an Incomprehensible thing may be believ'd and accordingly he that refuses to believe any thing is bound to give a better Reason for it than because it is Incomprehensible 9. If it be said that this is reason enough because Faith is a Rational Act and therefore what is above the Comprehension of Reason is as much above a Rational Belief to this besides what I have already remarqu'd upon this Occasion in the Chapter of Faith I here further reply that it is true indeed and on both sides agreed that Faith is a Rational Act but in what Sense is the Question There are two very different Senses according to which it may be said to be so either in regard of the Clearness of its Formal Reason or in regard of the Clearness of its Object Either because it is founded upon an External Evidence or Argument for believing or because it proceeds upon an Internal Evidence that appears in the very Nature of the thing Believ'd Iâ— Faith be said to be a Rational Act in the latter Sense the Assertion is then False for so that â—s in respect of the Object we have shâ—wn it to be an inevident Assent But i◠〈◊〉 be said to be a Rational Act in the former Sense then indeed it is true but nothing to the purpose since nothing hinders but that this External Evidence may well consist with an Internal Inevidence or in other words that the Clearness of the Reason for Believing may stand with the Obscurity of the Object Believ'd And therefore though Faith be a Rational Act yet it does not hence â—ollow that what is Above Reason is also above Faith and cannot rationally be believ'd because the Act of Faith is said to be Rational Not in respect of the Evidence of the Object but only that of its Formal Reason or Motive And therefore though there be no Evidence in the Object yet it is not thereby render'd uncapable of being the Matter of Faith because the Evidence which Faith as a Rational Act supposes is wholly of another kind There seems indeed a kind of opposition as to the Sound between Faith's being an Act of Reason
much Heathenized Religion of some Christians may also very deservedly retire behind the Curtain and decline coming to the Light for fear the Absurdities and Monstrous Inconsistencies of it should be laid open But certainly there is not any thing neither Doctrine nor Precept in that true Religion that is reveal'd by God in Evangelical Christianity that need fly the Light of Reason or refuse to be tried by it Christian Religion is all over a Reasonable Service and the Author of it is too reasonable a Master to impose any other or to require as his Vicar does that Men should follow him blindfold and pull out their eyes to become his Disciples No he that Miraculously gave Sight to so many has no need of nor pleasure in the Blind nor has his Divine Religion any occasion for such Judges or Professors For it is the Religion of the Eternal and uncreated Wisdom the Divine Word the true Light of the World and the Universal Reason of all Spirits and 't is impossible that he should reveal any thing that Contradicts the Measures of sound Discourse or the immutable Laws of Truth as indeed it is that any Divine Revelation should be truly Opposite to Right Reason hower it may sometimes be Above it or that any thing should be Theologically true which is Philosophically False as some with great profoundness are pleas'd to distinguish For the Light of Reason is as truly from God as the Light of Revelation is and therefore though the latter of these Lights may exceed and out-shine the former it can never be Contrary to it God as the Soveraign Truth cannot reveal any thing against Reason and as the Soveraign Goodness he cannot require us to believe any such thing Nay to descend some degrees below this he cannot require us to believe not only what is against Reason but even what is without it For to believe any thing without Reason is an unreasonable Act and 't is impossible that God should ever require an unreasonable act especially from a Reasonable Creature 5. We therefore not only acknowledge the use of Reason in Religion but also that 't is in Religion that 't is chiefly to be used so far are we from denying the Use of it there And it is a little unfairly done of our Adversaries so much to insinuate the Contrary as they do For I cannot take it for less than such an Insinuation when they are arguing with us against the Belief of the Christian Mysteries to run out as they usually do into Harangues and Flourishes whereof by the way I know none more guilty than the Author of Christianity not Mysterious about the Reasonableness of the Christian Religion and the Rational Nature of Faith what a Reasonable Act the One is and what a Reasonable Service the Other is c. as if we were against the Use of Reason in Religion or were for a Blind Groundless and Unaccountable Faith or if because we hold the Belief of things above Reason therefore we are for having no Reason for our Belief This I say is an unfair Insinuation and such as argues some want either of Judgment or Sincerity I don't know which in those that suggest it For they seem plainly by running so much upon this Vein to imply as if it were part of the Question between us whether there be any Use of Reason in Religion or whether Faith is to be Founded upon Reason or No. But Now this is no part of the Controversie that lies between us we acknowledge the Use of Reason in Religion as well as they and are as little for a Senseless and Irrational Faith as they can be This therefore being Common to us both is no part of the Question and they do ill to insinuate that it is by so many Popular Declamatory Strains upon the Reasonableness of Religion and in particular of Faith whereas they do or should know that the thing in Question between us is not whether there be any Use of Reason to be made in Believing but only what it is or wherein the true Use of it does Consist 6. Now this we may determine in a few words having already laid the grounds of it For since the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument against the Truth of it nor Consequently against the Belief of it as is shewn in the three foregoing Chapters it is plain that the proper Office and Business of a Believers Reason is to Examin and Inquire Not whether the thing proposed be Comprehensible or not but only whether it be Reveal'd by God or No since if it be the Incomprehensibleness of it will be no Objection against it That therefore ought to be no part of its Questistion or Deliberation because indeed it is not to the purpose to Consider whether such a thing be when if it were it would be no just Objection The only Considerable thing then here is whether such a Proposition be indeed from God and has him for its Author or no. And here Reason is to clear her Eyes put the Matter in the best Light call in all the Assistance that may be had both from the Heart and the Head and determine of the thing with all the Judgement and all the Sincerity that she can But as to the Comprehensibility or Incomprehensibility of the Article this is quite besides the Question and ought therefore to be no part of her scruting or debate since if it were never so much above her Comprehension it would be never the less proper Object for her Belief 7. The Sum is the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Belief of it therefore in the believing of a thing the proper work of my Reason is not to Consider whether it be incomprehensible But when a thing is proposed to me as from God all that my Reason has to do in this Case is Seriously Soberly Diligently Impartially and I add Humbly to Examine whether it comes with the true Credentials of his Authority and has him for its real Author or no. This is all that Reason has to do in this Matter and when she has done this she is to rise from the Seat of Judgement and resign it to Faith which either gives or refuses her Assent Not as the thing proposed is Comprehensible or not Comprehensible but as 't is either Revealâ—d or not Reveal'd CHAP. IX An Application of the foregoing Considerations to the Mysteries of Christianity 1. HAving thus raised the Shell of our Building to its due â—itch we have now only to Roof it by making a Short Application of the Principles laid down and setâ—led in the Former Chapters to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion against the Truth and Belief of which it plainly appears from the Preceding Considerations that there lies now no Reasonable Objection For if Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth and if therefore the Incomprehensibility of a â—hing to Human Reason be no Argument of its 〈◊〉 being True
Consideration viz. That therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Belief of it neither where also I Consider that seemingly Opposite Maxim of Des Cartes that we are to Assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident and reconcile it to the other Position Whence my next step was to state the true use of Reason in Believing which I shew'd to Consist not in examining the Credibility of the Object but in taking account of the Certainty of the Revelation which when once resolv'd of we are no longer to Dispute but Believe In fine I have made an Application of these Considerations to the Mysteries of the Christian Faith by shewing that they are never the less to be Believ'd for being Mysteries supposingâ— them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd against which also I have shewn their Incomprehensibility to be no Objection So that every way the Great Argument against the Mysteries of the Christian Faith taken from the Incomprehensibility of them vanishes and sinks into nothing In all which I think I have effectually overthrown the General and Fundamental Ground of Socinianism and truely in great Measure that of Deism too whose best Argument against Reveal'd Religion in general is because the Christian upon all Accounts the most preferable of those that pretend to be Reveal'd Contains so many things in it which transcend the Comprehension of Human Understanding But whether this Best Argument be really a good one or no the whole Procedure of this Discourse may sufficiently shew and whoever knows how to distinguish Sophistry from good Reasoning may easily judge 2. And now you Gentlemen for whose sakes I have been at the pains to write this Treatise give me leave in a few words to Address my self a little more particularly to you and to Expostulate with you Whether it be the good opinion you have of your Cause or the present Opportunity you have to appear in the behalf of it that invites you so freely to Come abroad as you have done of late you have certainly to give your Courage its due taken a very rational and Polite Age for it and I hope the Wise Conduct of Providence may turn this juncture to the Advantage of the Truth and that the Light to which you have adventur'd to expose your Novel Opinions may serve to make you see their Absurdities if you do not too Obstinately shut your Eyes against it Some of you are Considerable Masters of Reason otherwise truly I should not think it worth while to argue with you and you all profess great Devotion to it I wish you do not make it an Idol and to be very Zealous and Affectionate Disciples of it Reason is the great Measure by which you pretend to go and the Judge to whom in all things you appeal Now I accept of your Measure and do not refuse to be tried in the Court of your own Chusing Accordingly you see I have dealt with you all along upon the Ground of Logic and in a Rational way being very Confident that Reason alone will discover to you your undue Elevations of it and the Errours you have been misled into by that Occasion if you do but Consult even this Oracle of yours as you ought and make a right use of its Sacred Light 3. But I am afraid you do not Instead of imploying your Reason in the first place to examin the Certainty of the Revelation whether such a thing be truly Reveal'd and if so to believe it notwithstanding its being incomprehensible your Method is to begin with the Quality of the Object to Consider whether it be Comprehensible or no and accordingly to proceed in your Belief or Disbelief of its being Reveal'd 'T is true indeed you are not so gross as to argue thus this is Comprehensible therefore 't is Reveal'd But you cannot deny but that you argue thus this is Incomprehensible therefore 't is not Reveal'd proceeding upon this general Principle that though whatever is Comprehensible is not therefore presently Reveal'd yet whatever is Reveal'd must be Comprehensible But now judge you whether this be not to make your Reason the Rule and Measure of Divine Revelation that is that God can reveal nothing to you but what you can Comprehend or that you are able to Comprehend all that God can possibly Reveal for otherwise how is your not being able to Comprehend any thing an Argument of its not being Revealâ—d I say Consider whether this be not to set up your Reason as the Rule of Revelation and Consider again whether this does not resolve either into a very low Opinion you have of God and his Infinite Perfections or an extravagantly high one you have of your selves and your own Rational indowments 4. And yet as if this were not Presumption enough do you not also make your Reason the Rule of Faith as well as of Revelation To be the Rule of Faith is a very Great thing and yet so far 't is plain that you make your Reason the Rule of Faith that you will allow nothing to be believ'd but whose Bottom you can Sound by that Line this being an avow'd Principle with you that you are to believe nothing but what you can Comprehend But hold a little before your Reason can be the Measure of Faith must it not be the Measure of Truth And I pray Consider seriously and tell me truly do you verily think in your Consciences that your Reason is the Measure of Truth Do you think your Rational Faculties proportion'd to every intelligible Object and that you are able to Comprehend all the things that are and that there is nothing in the whole extent of Science too high too difficult or too abstruse for you no one part of this vast Intellectual Sea but what you can wade through If you say yes besides the Blasphemous Presumptions and Luciferian Arrogance of the Assertion and how little it falls on this side of Similis ero Altissimo which banish'd the vain-glorious Angel from the Court of Heaven because nothing less would Content his Aspiring Ambition than to be as God there though by the way there is more Sense and Congruity of Reason in pretending to be a God in Heaven than to be a God upon Earth I say besides this I would put it to your more sober thought to Consider whether it be not every whit as great an Extremity in the way of Rational Speculation to Dogmatize so far as to pretend to Comprehend every thing as to say with the Sceptics and Pyrrhonians that we know nothing The latter of which however in regard of its Moral Consequences may be more innocently and safely affirm'd than the Former since in that we only humbly degrade our selves and are Content to sink down into the Level of Brutes whereas in this we aspire to what is infinitely above us and advance our selves into the Seat of God And you know an Excess of Self-dejection is of the two the more tolerable Extreme But if
you say that your Reason is not the Measure of Truth as upon this and the other Considerations there lies a Necessity upon you to Confess how then I pray comes it to be the Measure of your Faith and how come you to lay down this for a Maxim that you will believe Nothing but what you can Comprehend Why if your Reason be not the Measure of Truth and you your selves Care not and I believe are asham'd in terms to say that it is then do you not evidently discern that there is no Consequence from the Incomprehensibility of a thing to the incredibility of it and that you have no reason to deny your Belief to a thing as true merely upon the account of its incomprehensibility And do you not then plainly see that your great Maxim falls to the ground that you are to believe nothing but what you can Comprehend But if yet notwithstanding this you will still adhere to your beloved Maxim and resolve to believe Nothing but what you can adjust and clear up to your Reason then I pray Consider whether this will not necessarily lead you back to that Absurd and withal Odious and Invidious Principle and which therefore you your selves care not to own viz. That your Reason is the Measure of Truth 5. But why do you not care to own it Do you not see at the first cast of your Eye that you are unavoidably driven upon it by your profess'd Maxim Or if you do not think fit to own it as indeed it is a good handsom Morsel to swallow why do you not then renounce that Maxim of yours which is the immediate Consequence of it and necessarily resolves into it Why will you whose Pretensions are so high to Reason act so directly against the Laws of it as to own that implicitly and by Consequence which neither your Head nor your Heart will serve you to acknowledge in broad and express Terms Be a little more Consistent with your own Sentiments at least if not with Truth and be not your selves a Mystery while you pretend not to believe any If you do not care to own the Principle then deny the Consequence or if you will not let go the Consequence then stand by and own the Principle Either speak out boldly and roundly that your Reason is the Measure of Truth or if you think that too gross a defiance to Sense Experience Religion and Reason too to be professedly maintain'd then be so ingenuous to us and so Consistent with your selves as to renounce your Maxim of Believing Nothing but what you can Comprehend since you cannot hold it but with that Absurd Principle And which is therefore a Certain Argument that you ought not to hold it 6. And are you sure that you always do I mean so as to act by it that you hold it in Hypothesi as well as in Thesi Do you never assent to any thing but what you can Comprehend Are there not many things in the Sciences which you find a pressing Necessity to Subscribe to though at the same time you cannot conceive their Modus or account for their Possibility But you 'l say perhaps these are things of a Physical and Philosophical Consideration and such as have no relation to Religion True they are so but then besides that this visibly betrays the weakness of your ground since if the incomprehensibility of a thing were a good Argument against assenting to the Truth of it it would be so throughout in the things of Nature as well as in the things of Religion I would here further demand of you why you are so particularly shy of admitting incomprehensible things in Religion why is it there only that you seem so stiffly and zealously to adhere to your Maxim of Believing nothing but what you can Comprehend Since there are so many inconceivable things or if you please Mysteries in the Works of Nature and of Providence why not in Religion Nay where should one expect to find Mysteries if not there where all the things that are Reveal'd are Reveal'd by God himself and many of them concerning Himself and his own Infinite Perfections And what deference do we pay to God more than Man if either we suppose that he cannot reveal Truths to us which we cannot Comprehend or if we will not believe them if he does Nay may it not be rather said that we do not pay him so much since we think it adviseable to receive many things from our Tutours and Masters upon their Authority only though we do not Comprehend them our selves and justifie our doing so by that well known and in many Cases very reasonable Maxim Discentem oportet Credere But as there is no Authority like the Divine so if that Motto become any School 't is that of Christ. 7. Now 't is in this School that you profess to be Scholars and why then will you be such Opiniative and uncompliant Disciples as to refuse to receive the Sublime Lectures read to you by your Divine and Infallible Master merely because they are too high for you and you cannot Conceive them when at the same time any one of your that is not a Mathematician pardon the Supposition would I doubt not take it upon the word of him that is so that the Diameter of a Square is incommensurable to the Side though he did not know how to demonstrate or so much as Conceive it himself Since then you would express such implicit regard to the Authority of a fallible though Learned Man shall not the Divine weigh infinitely heavier with you and since you would not stick to assent to things above your Conception in Human and Natural Sciences why are you so violently set against Mysteries in Religion whereof God is not only the Authour but in great Measure the Object too 8. You know very well that in the great Problem of the Divisibility of Quantity there are Incomprehensibilities on both sides it being inconceivable that Quantity should and it being also inconceivable that it should not be divided infinitely And yet you know again that as being parts of a Contradiction one of them must necessarily be true Possibly you may not be able with the utmost Certainty and without all hesitation to determine which that is but however you know in the general that One of them indeterminately must be true which by the way is enough to Convince you that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the truth of it and you must also further grant that God whose Understanding is infinite does precisely and determinately know which of them is so Now suppose God should Reveal this and make it an Article of Faith 'T is not indeed likely that he will it being so much beneath the Majesty and besides the End and Intention of Revelation whose great Design is the direction of our Life and Manners and not the improvement of our Speculation But suppose I say he should would you not believe it
Perusal of the Candid and Considerate Reader and to the Blessing of God THE CONTENTS Chapter I. OF Reason Page 18. Chapter II. Of Faith p. 53. Chapter III. The Distinction of things Contrary to Reason and above Reason Consider'd p. 100. Chapter IV. That Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth p. 137. Chapter V. That therefore a things being Incomprehensible by Reason is of it self no Concluding Argument of its not being true p. 230. Chapter VI. That if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being True Human Reason would then be the Measure of Truth p. 243. Chapter VII That therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no just Objection against the Belief of it With an Account of the Cartesian Maxim that we are to Assent only to what is Clear and Evident p. 251. Chapter VIII Wherein is shewn what is the true Vse of Reason in Believing p. 282. Chapter IX An Application of the foregoing Considerations to the Mysteries of Christianity p. 294. Chapter X. The Conclusion of the Whole with an Address to the Socinians p. 307. Post-script p. 339. The Introduction 1. AMong the various Conjectures Men of a Prophetic Spirit have fall'n into Concerning the last events we have had this Opinion not long since advanc'd for one that as God formerly by rejecting the Iews made way for the Gentiles so in the latter days he will in like manner by rejecting the Gentiles make way for the Iews to enter into the Christian Church That the state of Christianity being become intirely Corrupt and all over Anti-christianiz'd the First of those Viols of the Divine Wrath that are to exterminate the Wicked and usher in the Terrours of the Great Day shall fall upon the Christian World that Christendom shall be utterly dissolv'd broken in pieces and destroy'd and that the Iews shall be replaced and reâ—establish'd upon its Ruins And to render it Worthy of so Sore a Calamity that the generality of its Professors shall not only greatly depart from the Primitive Power of the Evangelic Spirit by Apostatizing from the Purity and Perfection of both Christian Faith and Life which we have already seen come to pass but shall even lay down their Holy Profession renounce their very Faith and Religion and turn Infidels Upon the latter part of which Opinion those Words of our Saviour seem to cast a very suspicious Aspect VVhen the Son of Man cometh shall be find Faith upon the Earth As upon the Former do also those words of St. Paul Thou wilt say then The Branches were broken off that I might be graffed in VVell because of unbelief they were broken off and thou standest by Faith Be not high-minded but fear For if God spared not the Natural Branches take heed lest he also spare not thee Behold therefore the Goodness and Severity of God On them which fell Severity but towards thee Goodness if thou continue in his Goodness Otherwise thou also shalt be cut off that is as a dead wither'd and unfruitful Branch as were the Iews for the same Reason before and as our Saviour tells us every unfruitful Branch shall be 2. And truly if one were to judge of these Mens Opinion by the present face and state of things one would be inclined to think it true and that they had the right Key of Prophecy in their hands For sure by all Signs and Appearances the Course of the World seems to drive this way and if there be such a Fatal Revolution to come no doubt but that we are with large steps hastening to it For how are the Vitals of Religion continually struck at the Foundations of it unsettled and undermined its venerable Articles disputed and ridiculed and by what a slender thread does Christianity hang The great Complaint for a long while has been of the Decay of Christian Piety and the Universal Corruption of Manners But now our Religion is corrupted as well as our Manners and we every day make shipwrack of our Faith as well as of a good Conscience So that we have now fill'd our measure and are every way ripe for Destruction Some deny all Reveal'd Religion and consequently the Christian others allowing the Divinity of the Religion deny that of its Author together with the Doctrines of the Trinity Incarnation and Satisfaction others again owning his Divinity deny the necessity of Believing it others again granting that and the other Points deny the necessity of his Satisfaction which is not only resolv'd into mere Prudential Reasons as formerly instead of being grounded upon the Essential Order and Iustice of God but is brought down so low of late as to be made an Accommodation and Condescension to and a gracious Compliance with the common Weaknesses and Prejudices of Mankind Thus is the Christian Religion so mangled and dismember'd by some and so odly and insidiously represented by others that between them both the general Faith of the thing is indanger'd and a ready way prepared to Scepticism and Infidelity 3. Not that I think it ought to be any just matter of Scandal to any considering Christians or Prejudice to their Holy Religion to see so many Corruptions of it and Apostacies and Revoltings from it since this is no more than what the Holy Spirit of God has often forewarn'd us shall come to pass in the latter days wherein we are expresly told that perillous times shall come and that Men shall resist the Truth be proud and high-minded of corrupt minds and reprobate concerning the Faith And moreover that they shall privily bring in damnable Heresies even denying the Lord that bought them This therefore I say ought in reason to be no matter of scandal to any Christians And so neither ought the poor humble suffering condition of Jesus Christ to have been any to the Iews since this also was plainly foretold of the Messias and made a notable part of his Character And yet we find that the Cross of Christ was a stumbling-block to the Iews and so no doubt are the present sufferings I may say Crucifixion of his Religion to many Christians the generality of which measure the certainty of their Faith by the firmness and constancy of its Professors and are apt more to stagger and take offence at the untoward appearance of any Event than to be confirm'd in their belief from its agreement with Antient Prophecies 4. In the mean time what do those without think of us Particularly the Heathens among whom no doubt there are some that neither want Intelligence nor Curiosity to acquaint themselves with the present state of Christendom What a confirmation must it be to these Men in their Infidelity to see Christians grow weary of their own Religion and willing to part with those great and weighty Articles of it for which the holy Martyrs shed their Blood and which could not be extorted from them by all the might and power of their cruel Emperours Can it
be expected that these Men should embrace a Religion which they see thus continually deserted by its own Disciples Or rather instead of converting themselves to Christianity will they not look every day when the Christians shall come over to them For truly this seems to be the state of the Christian World at this time We are posting as fast as we can into Heathenism and stand even upon the brink of Infidelity The great Articles of our Religion are giving up every day and when Men have parted with these we are very much beholden to them if they retain any of the rest there being nothing in Christianity considerable enough when the great Mysteries of the Trinity Incarnation c. are taken away to make it appear an Institution worthy of God or to challenge the Assent of any thinking and consideringâ— Man But why do I talk of running into Heathenism I am afraid we are tending further For as from a Socinian 't is easie to commence a Deist so he that is once a Deist is in a hopeful way to be an Atheist whenever he please 5. I do not speak these things out of a Spirit of Peevishness and Dissatisfaction as some who being full of a Querulous Splenetick Humour and knowing not how better to dispose of it to their ease give it vent upon the Times of which they are always complaining right or wring No the deplorable and dangerous state of Christianity and the too visible growth of Socinianism and Deism among us extort these Reflections from me and have given me many a troublesome and uneasie Thought in my private Retirements For my Satisfaction under which my best Salvo has been to consider that God governs the World and that Jesus Christ who is the Head of his Church will preserve it from all the Powers of Earth and even from the Gates of Hell And that tho' now he seems to be asleep in this Sacred Vessel while the Tempest rages and the Waves beat against it and almost cover it yet 't is to be hoped he will awake and rebuke the Winds and the Sea and make all calm and quiet again However in the mean time 't is fit the Mariners should work and neglect the use of no means that are necessary to the safety of their Ship some by Writing others by private Discourse and all by Prayers and a good Life 6. But now whereas all Rational Method of Cure is founded upon the knowledge of the Cause of the Distemper he that would contribute any thing to the stopping this Contagion of Religious Scepticism that now reigns among us ought in the first place to consider the Reason of it what it is that makes Men so disposed to waver in their Religion and so ready to part with the great Articles and Mysteries of it Now to this purpose I call to mind a very considerable Observation of Descartes concerning Atheism which I take to be equally applicable to Infidelity particularly to this of the Mysteries of the Christian Faith The Observation is this That those things which are commonly alledged by Atheists to impugne the Existence of God do all turn upon this that either we attribute some Humane Affection to God or else arrogate so great force and penetration to our own minds as to go about to comprehend and determine what God can and ought to do So that if we would but carry about us this Thought that our Minds are to be consider'd as Finite but God as Incomprehensible and Infinite there would be no further difficulty in and of their Objections Thus that very Acute and Judicious Person concerning the Grounds of Atheism And in like manner I think it may be said of Infidelity as to the Mysteries of Christianity That the great Reason why so many that call themselves Christians do so obstinately cavil at them and dispute them is that either they think too meanly of God or too highly of themselves that either they ascribe something Humane to his Nature or something Divine to their own that either they set too narrow limits to the Divine Power and Greatness or carry out too far those of their own understandings in one word that either they Humaniâ—e God or Deify themselves and their own Rational Abilities 7. And they confess in effect as much themselves For the Reason that these Men commonly give out and pretend for their not allowing the Mysteries of the Christian Religion any room in their Creed is that they are above the reach of their Understandings They cannot comprehend them or conceive how they can be and therefore will not believe them having fix'd it as a Law in the general to believe nothing but what they can comprehend But now where does the Ground of this Consequence rest at last or upon what Principle does it ultimately depend How comes the Incomprehensibility of a Point of Faith to be a presumption against it why is its being above their Reason in Argument that it is not true Why I say but only because in the first place they attribute so much to their Reason at least by a Confuse Sentiment as to presume it to be the Measure and Standard of all Truth and that nothing that is True can really be above it Here I say the stress of the matter will rest at last For should the Argument of these Men be reduced to a Syllogistical Form it must necessarily proceed thus Whatever is above our Reason is not to be believ'd as true But the Reputed Mysteries of Christianity are above our Reason Therefore the Reputed Mysteries of Christianity are not to be believ'd as true Now the only contestable Proposition in this Syllogism is the Major which can be prov'd by no other Principle than this That our Reason is the Measure of all Truth and whose Proof must be in this Form Whatever is above the Measure of all Truth is not to be believ'd as true But our Reason is the Measure of all Truth Therefore whatever is above our Reason is not to be believ'd as true By this Analysis of their Argument into its Principle it is plain that this their Reason of disbelieving the Mysteries of the Christian Religion viz. Because they are above their Reason does at last resolve into this That their Reason is the Measure of all Truth and that they can comprehend all things For otherwise how should their not being able to comprehend a thing be an Argument that it is not true This I presume is a Principle our Adversaries would be loth to own and indeed with good Reason it being the most extravagantly absurd and self-arrowgating one that can possibly enter the Thought or proceed from the Mouth of a Man And accordinly I do not know any Socinian that had the immodesty in terms openly to assert it But this is what they must come to if they will speak out and what in the mean time they do vertually and implicitly say So then their procedure in short seems
upon the internal Light and Evidence of the thing but upon Authority and so agree in the general Nature of 〈◊〉 only as the Authority differ 〈…〉 Faith also varies and Human Authority differing from Divine just as much as Fallible differs from Infallible the same in proportion will also 〈…〉 between Human and Divine â—aith That is the former will always be a Fallible and the latter an Infallible Assent 8. Human Faith though sometimes as actually undeceiv'd as Divine is yet always liable to Error and Deception and so doubtful hazardous and uncertain even when actually true like a Conclusion drawn from uncertain Premisses in which respect it resembles Opinion and that so much that some have confounded it with it though I think illogically enough since though there be a like uncertainty in both Assents yet they differ extremely in their Formal Motives one being grounded upon Reason and the other upon Authority And the Distinction of these Assents is not taken from the degree of Certainty wherein they agree but from the Quality of the Motive wherein they differ However tho' this makes a great difference in Notion it makes None in the Affairs of Civil Life and the Faith of him that believes the Testimony of a Man will as to all real intents and purposes go for no more than his Opinion And that because though different Assents as to the Formality of their Motives they are yet Much at one rate for Certainty being both Fallible in their Grounds and so subject to Error and Deception 9. But the Case is quite otherwise as to Divine Faith whose Foundation stands too sure not only to be overturn'd but even so much as shaken This Faith is strictly and Absolutely infallible not subject to the least Error or Possibility of Erring as having the very Ground and Pillar of Truth it self the Omniscience and Veracity of God for its Security than which there neither Needs nor Can be Greater 'T is Most Certain that God is both Actively and Passively Infallible his Omniscience will not suffer him to be deceiv'd himself and his infinite Veracity and Truth will not suffer him to deceive us And therefore he that builds his Faith upon his Authority goes upon the Most sure Grounds and cannot possibly Err in his Assent And as he is secure from Error so he is also from all just reason of Scruple or Fear and leaning upon a firm and indefectible Support may stay and repose himself upon it with full Acquiescence So that there is all the Certainty that can be in this Faith both Objective and Subjective that of the Thing and that of the Person The thing assented to is most undoubtedly true in it self and he that assents to it may be most firmly assured and perswaded of the Truth of it in his own Mind and among all Temptations to Doubt and Distrust may with great Triumph and Confidence say with the Apostle I know whom I have believ'd 10. It was observ'd a little before of Humane Faith that it resembles Opinion in as much as they are both dubious and uncertain Assents as proceeding upon grounds of like uncertainty though otherwise of different Natures Now as this Faith resembles Opinion so in like manner it may be observ'd of Divine Faith that it resembles Science or rather that Second Assent for so I am forc'd to call it for want of a better Name which we lately discours'd of and plac'd between Opinion and Faith The Comparison here bears the same proportion as to Certainty as it did in the other Case as to uncertainty Divine Faith has all the Certainty that is possible and therefore to be sure as much as Science or that Second Assent can have There is as much Certainty in the thing assented to and there may be as much Assurance and firmness of Perswasion in the Assent it self or in other words what a man believes upon the Authority of God is in it self as certain as what he knows and he may also be as Certain of it For he that assents to a thing upon full evidence can but assent fully and perfectly without suspense or hesitation and so also can he that assents to a thing upon Divine Authority only His Ground is every whit as Firm and Sure as the others and why then should the Measure of his Assurance be less It cannot possibly be if he Knows and Considers upon what Ground he stands So that thus far both in regard of the Certainty of the Object and the Firmness of the Perswasion Divine Faith may be justly placed upon a level with the Most Evident Assent whatever 11. Nor I suppose will this be thought an undue Elevation of Divine Faith On the Contrary I expect to be Complain'd of for setting the Dignity of it at too low a Pitch by those who say that Divine Faith is Firmer than Science But 't is for want of the Latter that these Men so excessively exâ—ol the Former I call it excessively because 't is what strictly and exactly speaking cannot be For what I Perceive or Know is even by that very supposition unquestionably true or else I cannot be said to Know it and what I believe upon the highest Authority can be no more To say therefore that Faith is Firmer than Science is like saying that one streight Line is streighter than another But perhaps their Meaning only is that 't is safer relying upon the Autâ—ority of God than upon our own Rational Faculties which indeed is right and I heartily wish all Men were convinc'd of it For though what I do actually and really Know be to the full as true and certain as what I Believe and I can no more be out in one than in the other yet it is More Certain in the general that God cannot deceive me than that my Reason cannot be deceiv'd Not that what I assent to by Divine Faith can have a greater Objective Certainty than what I clearly and distinctly Perceive or Know but only that there is a Possibility not to say Danger of my taking that for a clear and distinct Perception which â—ndeed is Not so and so though I cannot be deceiv'd in what I do truly know yet I may be deceiv'd in thinking that I know when I do not So that Divine Faith though not more Certain than Knowledge it self is yet of greater Certainty than our Knowing Faculties and generally speaking the Believer goes upon surer grounds than the Man of Reason and Demonstration Because his Reason may possibly lead him into Error whereas the Other 's Authority cannot And when they are both in the right yet still there will be this difference between them that his Reason is only not Deceiv'd whereas the Other 's Faith is Infallible 12. And thus far we have taken a view of the more bright and perfect side of Divine Faith I mean that of its Firmness and Certainty in respect of which it stands upon a just level with Science But it has
because he is infallible Infallibility then is the proper ground of Implicit Faith and accordingly the Church of Rome assuming to her self the Character of Infallible does upon that Supposition rightly require it I say upon that supposition for she is right enough in her Consequence supposing her Principle to be true But the truth of it is that is Most Extravagant and such as carries in it such matchless Arrogance and Presumption as befits only him who as God sitteth in the temple of God shewing himself that he is God For God only is Infallible and therefore he only has right to require Implicit Faith And to him indeed it is due from every one of his Creatures in the highest Measure imaginable as is also Implicit Obedience upon the same Ground Of both which we have a signal Example in Abraham who when he was call'd by God to go out into a place which he should after receive for an Inheritance is said by Faith to have Obey'd and to have gone out not knowing whither he went 26. But now what can be more dark and inevident than this Implicit Faith It s Formal Reason indeed is sufficiently clear and it resolves at last into a Ground highly Rational and so may be said in that respect to be the highest Reason For certainly nothing can be more Reasonable than to believe whatever God who is Infallible reveals There is therefore no Darkness on this Side Nay even the Light it self does not shine more Clear But as for the Matter of it if I may call it so where nothing distinctly is believ'd that is sure as dark and obscure as can well be conceiv'd so dark as even to be Invisible For a Man to believe at large without any restriction or limitation whatever God shall propose to him let it be what it will not Knowing what that is like Abraham's going not knowing whither he went is such a dark and obscure act of Faith as has nothing clear in it but the Humility and Devotion of him who so believes This is a Faith Worthy of God as well as peculiar to him and 't is the great inevidence and obscurity of it that makes it so For so far is the Matter of it from having any Evidence in it that it is not so much as Evident what the Matter of it is Here then is the very Blackness of Darkness and he that has this infolded Faith as every true Believer has and can thus trust God in the Dark where he sees nothing but only the general Reason of his so doing is not likely in any of the more explicit instances of it to plead the inevidence of the Article to excuse his Infidelity or to deny his Faith to an otherwise sufficiently clear Revelation merely because it is above his shallow Reason 27. Upon what has been hitherto discours'd it will not be difficult to give in few words a Satisfactory Resolution of a Celebrated Question which among the Schoolmen has made a great many and that is whether Faith belongs to the Vnderstanding or to the Will It is plain by the Measures already laid down that it belongs to the Latter For Faith as all acknowledge is an Assent and Assent is a Species of Judgement and Judgement as has been shewn already is an act of the Will not of the Understanding whose only Operation is Perception and consequently Faith is an act of the Will consenting to imbracing acquiescing and reposing it self in what the Understanding represents as proposed and reveal'd by God And indeed unless Judgment and consequently Faith did belong to the Will as their proper and immediate Principle 't is impossible to Conceive how a Man should be blame-worthy for any of his Opinions or how he should stand accountable either for Error on the one hand or for Infidelity and Heresy on the other For if Faith be an act of the Understanding then since the only Operation of the Understanding is Perception the greatest Fault of an Infidel or a Heretic will be Non-Perception which indeed is not Error but Ignorance whereas Infidelity and Heresie are always supposed to include Error and to be also the worst of Errors And this Non-perception is only a Negation and such as resolves into want of Parts which is not a Moral but a Natural defect whereas Infidelity and Heresie as indeed all that is Faulty are understood to be Privations and Defects of a Moral Nature But then to make them so they must be voluntary nothing being faulty but what is so that is again they must be Wilful that is they must be acts of the Will and Consequently Faith which is the Habit whereof those Sins are Privations must also belong to the same Principle or else in short there would be neither Vertue in having it nor Vice in being without it And accordingly our Saviour in upbraiding the Iews with Infidelity does all along not only by Confequence but directly and expresly Charge it upon their Wills Ye will not come to me that ye may have Life 28. And thus I have gone thorough what I intended and what indeed is of greatest Consideration upon this Subject of Faith In the account of which if I differ from any Authors of the better Character that have either professedly or occasionally written upon it particularly Baronius and Dr. Pearson 't is not that I love to lay aside great Authorities or affect to be by my self but because I follow the best Light of my Understanding write with Freedom and Ingenuity what I think and endeavour to represent things as they are without having regard to Authority any further than I think it joyn'd with Truth and Reason Which shall also be my Rule in what remains of this Treatise In the Mean time what has been hitherto discours'd concerning Reason and Faith may serve as a good Preparation in order to an Account of the Great Question Concerning the Belief of things above Reason But before we enter upon any thing of that Nature 't is fit the Distinction of Above Reason and Contrary to Reason be Consider'd and rightly Stated which is the task allotted for the next Chapter CHAP. III. The Distinction of things Contrary to Reason and above Reason Consider'd 1. THere are some Distinctions in the World that are without a Difference though Difference be the Ground of all Distinction and this by some is pretended to be of that Number who will have the Parts of it to be Coincident and that Contrary to Reason and above Reason signifie in reality alike and are but different Expressions for one and the same thing And though they may be reasonably suspected to do this to serve the interest of a Cause for whose advantage it would be to have this Distinction taken away yet they have the Confidence to Charge the same upon those that hold it pretending that it is only a dextrous Shift and Evasion invented by Subtile Men as an Expedient to relieve the Distress of
and so much Contested whether true or no can never be made too Clear and sometimes a different though not better Representation of a thing may contribute to its further Illustration every Reader having his particular Point of View so as that the very â—ame Notion or Truth that does not Meet with him in one Posture may shine full in his Face and strike him with success in another I shall therefore under the Shelter of Mr. Boyle's Authority and by the advantage of his Light venture to set down my own Thoughts concerning this weighty Point applying my self chiefly to that part of it wherein I think the other Account Most defective 14. And first though it should be true that to be above Reason is to be Incomprehensible and to be Contrary to Reason is to appear repugnant to some Principle or Conclusion of Right Reason yet I do not think this of it self sufficient either to Clear or to Justifie the Distinction since it may be both again demanded what it is to be incomprehensible and what repugnant and again disputed whether incomprehensible and repugnant be not the same as well as whether that which is above Reason be not also Contrary to it And then we are but where we were before This Account of the Matter is then too Gross and General to be rested in and we must be therefore more minute and particular in our Explanation of it if we would be more Clear 15. However since Generals are to go before and do also prepare the way for Particulars I shall first propose the general Idea of things above Reason and contrary to Reason and then particularize upon that Idea by opening and unfolding more distinctly and explicitly what is contain'd in it and by so comparing and collating together the two parts of the Notion as to shew the real Difference that is between them So that I shall make but one work of the Explanatory and Iustificatory parts supposing that there needs no more to the Justification of the Distinction than only to have the Members of it well explain'd For if the Idea of Above Reason be distinct from the Idea of Contrary to Reason as the Explanation of them will shew that it is then the Distinction proceeds upon a real Difference is grounded upon the Nature of things and has all that is necessary to a true and good Distinction 16. By things above Reason then as the Expression is used in this Distinction I conceive to be Meant Not such as Reason of it self cannot Discover but such as when proposed it cannot Comprehend And by things Contrary to Reason I conceive such as it can and does actually comprehend and that to be absolutely Impossible Or in other words a thing is then above Reason when we do not comprehend how it can be and then Contrary to Reason when we do positively comprehend that it cannot be Thus in the General 17. But to be a little more Particular we are to Consider upon the first Part that when we speak of things above Reason the word Reason here as was shewn in the first Chapter signifies the same as Vnderstanding and there being but one only Operation of that namely Perception by Comprehend here must be meant the same as by Perceive So that when we say of things above Reason that they are such as Reason cannot Comprehend 't is the same as to say they are such as the Understanding cannot Perceive But then when we say Cannot Perceive 't is to be carefully noted that this is not to be understood of the literal and Grammatical Meaning of the Proposition as if the thing said to be Above Reason were perfectly unintelligible but only of the Truth of it as was observ'd before concerning Faith And then again when we say that Above Reason is when we do not Comprehend or Perceive the Truth of a thing this must not be meant of not Comprehending the Truth in its whole Latitude and Extent so that as many Truths should be said to be above Reason as we cannot thus thorougly comprehend and pursue throughout all their Consequences and Relations to other Truths for then almost every thing would be Above Reason but only of not comprehending the Union or Connexion of those immediate Ideas of which the Proposition supposed to be above Reason consists And which is therefore said to be above Reason not because the simple and direct Meaning of its Terms is unintelligible or because the Truth of it is not comprehensible in its remotest and utmost Extent but purely because the Connexion of its Ideas or the manner of it is not discernible and that partly for want of sufficient clearness of the Ideas themselves so as to be able to perceive their Union Intuitively and partly for want of a due and proper Medium whereby to compare them so as to discern their Union in the way of Science and Demonstration 18. 'T is also to be Observ'd upon the Second part of the Explanation that I chuse rather to say that things contrary to Reason are such as we Perceive to be Impossible than such as appear contrary to some Principle or some Conclusion of Right Reason This being the more General and Absolute Idea whereof the two other are but Instances and Specifications For then is a thing said to be Impossible when its Ideas cannot stand together or be united Which may be either because of the immediate Opposition and Inconsistency of the Ideas themselves with themselâ—â—s so as Mutually to Exclude each other as in a Contradiction or because of their inconsistency with some other Truth with which it cannot Comport Or in other words either because one of the Ideas cannot consist with the other by reason of the immediate opposition that is between them or because the Union of both is inconsistent with some Truth or other which therefore will not suffer them to be United Which Truth will be indeed either a Principle or a Conclusion of right Reason And then we are said to Perceive a thing to be Impossible when we perceive that its Ideas cannot stand together and that either immediately by the very inconsistency of the Ideas themselves or mediately by the Repugnance that they carry to some other Truth whether Principle or Conclusion Which Repugnance I take to consist in this that the supposed Principle or Conclusion cannot stand with the Union of such Ideas and that therefore if such a Principle or such a Conclusion be true as is supposed then such Ideas are not United and indeed are as uncapable of Union that is as impossible as if there were an immediate inconsistency between the Ideas themselves So that for a thing to be Contrary to Reason is in short for the Understanding to perceive the Absolute impossibility of it or that its Ideas cannot stand together which it does either Immediately by perceiving the direct inconsistency of those Ideas or Mediately by perceiving their inconsistency with some evident and incontestable Truth
to be true this plainly demonstrates the thing in Question if there can be yet any Question about it most evidently shewing that what is Above Reason is not as such Contrary to Reason it being impossible that what is Contrary to Reason should be true whatever is Contrary to Reason being also as Contrary to Truth I might also further alledge that to be Above Reason does equally abstract from True and False which Contrary to Reason does not and that not only because as I observed before it determines nothing concerning its Object but also because 't is a thing not of an Absolute but of a Relative Importance as being an extrinsecal Denomination taken not from the Nature of the Object as it is in it self but only as it is to us and in relation to our not only Finite but very Limited Capacities For to be Above Reason is not to be Above Reason in general or all Reason so as to be absolutely incomprehensible but only Human Reason But then that which is Above the Reason of a Man may not be Above the Reason of an Angel as indeed what is Above the Reason of one Man may not transcend that of another and what is above the Reason of an Angel may yet be perfectly comprehended by God the Supream and Soveraign Reason So that to be Above Reason here is of a respective signification such as does not express the quality of the Object as it is in its own Nature but only as it is in reference to such a particular Faculty whereas to be Contrary to Reason is not a Relative but an Absolute thing and whatever is Contrary to Reason is Contrary to all Reason and so consequently to Truth I say I might further insist on these and some other Considerations but being partly prevented here by Mr. Boyle whose Account I would have used to supply the defects of Mine as Mine is intended to supply some of his and having so abundantly clear'd the difference of these things already I shall not so far distrust either the Strength of the Argument or that of my Reader 's Understanding as to prosecute this Matter any further than only to shape an Answer out of what has been laid down to an Objection which I meet with in a Modern Writer against Monsieur Iurieu and which to do it the utmost Justice I will set down in his own words 24. I have Consider'd says he the Distinction which they use between being Contrary to Reason and being above Reason 'T is agreed that 't is not possible to believe what is Contrary to Reason But 't is said that we can well believe what is above Reason This Distinction seems to me of no use or else I do not comprehend it For if by being above Reason it be meant that we do not comprehend a Truth in its whole Extent though what we conceive of it be clear and certain I own that in this sense one ought to believe what is above Reason But if by being above Reason be meant a Doctrine wherein we see nothing Clear a Doctrine which our Reason loses the sight of on all its sides I mean that all the Propositions which may be extracted from it appear incomprehensible such a one as this for example that the three Divine Persons make but one God c. It seems that to be above Reason in this sense is the same as to be intirely inaccessible to Reason which differs nothing but in words from being Contrary to Reason 25. I suppose whoever has duely consider'd and well comprehended the Tenour of the foregoing Discourse can neither be insensible of the Deficiency of this Allegation nor be long at a loss what Answer to return to it But to spare my Reader this Trouble My Reply is that this Author's Argument proceeds upon a wrong Supposition He supposes here that to be Above Reason must be either the Not Comprehending a thing in its whole Latitude and extent or the Comprehending Nothing at all of it Whereas I have shewn before that 't is neither of them That we do not mean by Above Reason what is all over unintelligible even as to the very Meaning of the Proposition nor what is not to be Comprehended in its utmost extent but only what is incomprehensible to us as to the Truth of the thing or the Manner of it 'T is true indeed if the Proposition were perfectly unintelligible so that as he says we could see nothing clear in it even as to the very Sense and Meaning of it we could no more believe it than what is Contrary to Reason though even then it would not as this Author confusely enough pretends be the same with it because what is Contrary to Reason is supposed to be well understood But 't is much otherwise if it be incomprehensible only as to the Truth or Manner of the thing This as I shall shew hereafter may very well be Beleiv'd though what is Contrary to Reason cannot and what is utterly unintelligible cannot And I have sufficiently shewn already that what is thus only inaccessible to Reason differs a little more than in words from being contrary to it 26. And now if Humane Nature were not a very unaccountable thing I should stand greatly amazed at either the Natural or wilful Blindness of those who are for confounding things so vastly different as the parts of this Distinction of things above Reason and contrary to it most apparently are There are indeed some things which we are ordinarily taught to distinguish and yet when strictly examin'd and compared will be found to have no real ground of Distinction in them And 't is every whit as great and almost as Common a Fault to distinguish things that do not differ as to confound those that do And there are also other things of such near Resemblance and Cognation to each other that there needs a great deal of Art Subtlety and nice Inspection to discern their Difference So Fine and Minute and almost imperceptible are the Lines that terminate their Natures and divide them from one another But the Ideas of these things are as different as those of a Man and a Tree a Triangle and a Square so that a Man must wink hard not to perceive it or be very insincere not to acknowledge it And I cannot imagine why those especially who are known to serve themselves upon occasion of Distinctions which have no other Foundation than the mere Will and Pleasure unless you will say Interest of those that use them should yet reject such a Solid and well-grounded as well as well Authorized one as this but only because it is not for their turn and if admitted would like a Bomb thrown into their Garrison blow up and lay wast their Main Strength and force them to desert and give up a Cause which they are now especially most Zealously Fond of and seem resolv'd even against Reason to Maintain 27. For I must further remarquâ— and 't is an
Observation not lightly to be pass'd over that if this One Distinction of things above Reason and things contrary to Reason be once admitted or shewn to be real Solid and well-grounded the main part of the Socinian Controversie is immediately or at least in the very next Consequence at an end For the Reason why they will not believe things above Reason is because as they pretend Above Reason differs nothing in reality from Contrary to Reason and so those things that are above Reason are also as much contrary to it as above it and what is Contrary to Reason is on both sides acknowledg'd impossible to be believ'd Well but then if it be made appear as I think by this time is sufficiently done that these two are quite different things and that to be above Reason is not the same as to be contrary to it then even by their own Confession there can be no pretence why what is above Reason may not be Believ'd Which I take to be the true inducement that makes these Men stand out so fiercely and obstinately against this Distinction for they are aware what mischief it will do 'em as it is also the reason why I have bestow'd so much care and pains to clear and justifie it 28. And thus having given an Account of these great and Fundamental things what Reason is what Faith is and what it is to be Above and what Contrary to Reason we have now prepared the way to the more full and direct Consideration of the Belief of things above Reason the true state of which Question by what has been hitherto discours'd appears to be this Whether we may not Assent upon the Authority of Divine Revelation to such things as our Understanding or Reason cannot perceive or Comprehend as to the Truth or Manner of them Or whether our not being able thus to Comprehend them be a sufficient Reason why we should not believe them For the Resolution of which we have already laid the Grounds and shall now proceed more directly to build upon them in the following Chapter CHAP. IV. That Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth 1. WE have gain'd a most wonderful Point in the foregoing Chapter by proving the Distinction between things Above and things Contrary to Reason and such as of it self alone is sufficient Not only immediately to decide but even forever to Silence the Controversie between us and our Socinian Adversaries concerning the Belief of things above Reason For the only Objection that is or can possibly be pretended against the Belief of things above Reason being the supposed Contrariety of the same things to Reason if it be shewn that to be above Reason involves no such Contrariety then the Objection against the belief of such things is fairly and wholly removed and consequently there remains no Reason why they may not be Believ'd So that I cannot but look upon the Substance of my Work as most effectually done already and those of our Adversaries that have any reasonable Measure of Penetration and Sincerity must needs be sensible of it And I dare appeal even to their own Consciences whether they are not However considering the importunity of those I have to deal with as well as the weight of the Cause it self I shall endeavour the further establishment of it upon some other Considerations whereby I shall also give further Confirmation and so repay what I am endebted to the Point contended for in the preceding Chapter since we may as well argue backwards from the Believableness of things above Reason to their not Contrariety as forwards from their not Contrariety to their Believableness the Consequence being full as good thus Above Reason Believable therefore not Contrary as thus Above Reason not Contrary therefore Believable Now in order to the fuller Conviction and demonstration of the Believableness of things above Reason I set out upon this Ground that Humane Reason is not the Measure of Truth 2. 'T is agreed among the Masters of Reason that as all Proof ought to be only of such things as need it so there are Propositions so Clear and Evident of themselves that they have no need of being demonstrated and that there are some again that are not capable of Demonstration the Fulness and immediateness of their Evidence rendring them strictly indemonstrable And it has been charged by one of the most Considerable of them as a Fault in the Method of the Geometricians that they set themselves to prove things that have no need of Proof whereof he gives an Instance in Euclid who goes formally to work to prove that two sides of a Triangle taken together are greater than one although this be most Evident even from the Notion only of a Right Line which is the shortest that can possibly be between two Points and the Natural Measure of Distance from one Point to another which it could not be if it were not also the shortest of all Lines that can be drawn from Point to Point 3. Now though I cannot say that the Proposition of this Chapter is so Evident of it self as not to be capable of Demonstration yet I must Confess I cannot but think it of the Number of those that do not need any that is I mean to those who will but take the Pains to consider it with Attention and are withal so sincere as to say ingenuously what they inwardly think For to unattentive or Captious Persons nothing is plain since there is Nothing but what some will contradict and there are those who profess to doubt of every thing and even the Sun it self can't make a Man see if either he want eyes or will shut ' em I cannot therefore say that to such men either this or any other Proposition is plain but I would venture to be tried by any competent and indifferent Considerer whether this be not indeed a very plain and certain Proposition as plain as most of those which pass for Principles and Maximes in Discourse that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth And accordingly I should justly fear incurring the same Censure that is charged upon the Geometricians of going to prove what is evident were there not something peculiar in the present Case that makes it very different from theirs For they dealing in Matters of an Abstract and indifferent Nature and such wherein the Lusts and Passions of men are altogether uninteressed have no real need to prove evident things because for that very reason their Evidence is never Contested whereas the Point I have now in hand being of a Moral Concernment and such as incounters the Partialities and false Biasses of Humane Nature particularly that great and governing one of Self-Love though it should be of equal evidence with some of their Maxims will yet not be equally secure from Opposition and pass alike uncontested And so there may be need of proving it if not to do any necessary Service to the Proposition it self yet to satisfie
those that shall undertake the Solution of them by the real Chimeras of Substantial Forms Qualities Sympathys Antipathys c. or that shall go to account for them by the yet more Obscure Principles of the Chymists striking and filling their Ears with those great but empty Sounds Archeus Seminal Spirit Astral Beings Gas Blas c. which they receive with great satisfaction not for their Scientific Light for they are dark as may be mere Philosophic Cant but only because they are Mysterious and Abstruse and therefore they fancy there must be somewhat more than Ordinary in them tho they know not nor it may be never Consider'd what And herein as in some other Instances Men love Darkness better than Light 2. But then at another time you shall have them inquiring after Truth as Diogenes did after an Honest Man with a Candle in their hands and not caring to go a step any further than they can see their way Now upon a sudden they are all for Clear and distinct Ideas Full and adequate Perceptions Demonstrative Proofs and Arguments and nothing will serve or Content them but Light and Evidence and they will believe nothing but what they can Comprehend Strange diversity of Conduct Who would think two such vastly distant extreams should meet together I will not say in the same Man but in the same Human Nature and that the very same Creature and such a One as Stiles it self Rational too should proceed by such uncertain Measures and act so inconsistently with it Self sometimes embracing a thing for the sake of it's Obscurity and sometimes again in another Fit making that alone an Invincible Objection against the Belief of it 3. But it is plain by the foregoing Measures that it is not For since Truth is the general Object of Faith 't is evident that nothing can argue a thing to be absolutely incredible or not reasonable to be beleiv'd but that which at the same time argues it not to be True For if true then 't is still within the Compass of the general Object of Faith But now we have shewn already that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of it 's not being true whence it clearly and closely follows that 't is no Argument neither against it's Credibility And if so then we may believe it Notwithstanding it's Incomprehensibility because we may believe whatever is not Absolutely incredible So that there is no Necessity that we should discard every thing we cannot Conceive as unworthy of a Rational Belief or that what is Above our Reason should be therefore above our Faith too 4. It is true indeed that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is in it Self no proper and direct Argument why it should be believ'd and he would be thought to give but an ordinary account of his Faith who being askâ—d why he believ'd such an Incomprehensible thing should answer because it is Incomprehensible which at best could pass only for a Religious Flourish much such another as Credo quia impossibile And that because the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not directly and per se a Criterion of Truth whether it may be per Accidens may be Consider'd afterwards whose Natural and genuin Character is not Obsecurity but Light and Evidence Not that nothing is True but what has this Character for we have already shewn the Contrary in proving Incomprehensible Truths but that as whatever we clearly perceive is True so our Clear perceiving of a thing is the only sign from the Intrinsic Nature of the thing it Self of the Truth of it Incomprehensibility therefore is none but as such abstracts from true and not true and is equally Common to both But now that which may Consist with a thing supposing it false can no more prove it True than that which may Consist with a thing supposing it True can prove it false according to the Tenour of the Fifth Chapter The Incomprehensibility therefore of a thing is no proper Argument of the Truth of it and Consequently no Reason of it Self why it should be believ'd and that because it abstracts as such from True and False and is too Common to Both to prove either 5. And because it is so it is also further granted that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not only in it Self no proper Reason why it should be believ'd but has also so far the Nature of a Disswasive from believing as to be a Caution against a too hasty Belief till there appear some other Motive from without either from Reason or Authority that shall determin the Assent In the mean while it advises to Suspend For the Incomprehensibility of a thing being as such No Reason why a Man should believe it 't is plain that if he did believe it Consider'd only as in that State he would believe it without Reason That therefore is a Reason why he should suspend a Negation of Reason being enough to with-hold ones Assent though to give it one had need have a positive Reason When therefore a thing appears Incomprehensible that indeed is sufficient Reason to suspend our Belief till some prevailing Consideration from without shall over-rule that Suspension by requiring our Assent But when it does so then the Incomprehensibility ought to be No Argument to the Contrary and it would be every whit as absurd to reject a thing now because of its Incomprehensibility as to believe it before for that Reason And that because as the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no reason for Believing it so it is no Absolute Reason against it 6. If it were so it would be in Natural things the objects of Human and Philosophic Science such as belong properly and immediately to the Province and Jurisdiction of Reason Here if any where the Incomprehensibility of a thing would forbid all Assent to it And so it is supposed to do by some who though far from denying the Belief of Incomprehensible things in Religion will yet tell you that in Physical Contemplations Clearness and Evidence is to lead the way and we are to proceed with our Light before us assenting to nothing but what we well Comprehend In Matters of Faith indeed they will allow that Reason is to be submitted to Revelation and that we are to believe many things which pass our Comprehension but in Matters of pure Reason they will have us go no further than Reason can carry us Which indeed is right enough it their Meaning be that we are to Assent to Nothing but what upon the whole Matter all things Consider'd from without as well as from within we have reason to believe true and that we are never to proceed to judge or determin without some Evidence or other but then this will equally hold in Matters of Faith too which is too rational an Assent to be given at a Venture and we know not why and whose Formal Reason as has been already discours'd is always Clear But if their Meaning be that in Matters
Incomprehensible But if by Evidence here be Meant Evidence at large abstracting from Internal or External and the Sense be that we are to assent to nothing but what has some Evidence or other either Internal or External or what is some way or other evident to us and what we see plainly to be true by a Light shining from within or from without in short what we have one way or other sufficient ground or Reason to assent to then the Maxim is undoubtedly true and will hold Universally not only in Matters of Reason but also in Matters of Faith too which as was shewn in the Chapter of Faith is the Conclusion of a Syllogism and so a Rational Act and proceedt upon as Much though not the Same kind of Evidence as any other Conclusion does And that even in the Belief of Incomprehensible things which it would be absurd nay impossible to believe if there were no Reason to believe things above Reason According to a saying as I take it of St. Austin in one of his Letters to this purpose That we could not bring our selves to believe what is Above our Reason if Reason it self did not perswade us that there are things which we should do well to believe although we are not capable of Comprehending them So then in â—hort if this Maxim that we are to assent to nothing but what is Evident be understood of Internal Evidence then 't is False not only in Matters of Faith but also in Matters of Reason wherein things intrinsecally inevident are assented to But if it be understood of Evidence at large then â—tis true not only in Matters of Reason but also in Matters of Faith which as has been often noted is reasonable in its Fund and Principle and whose Evidence must be Clear though its Object may be Obscure 14. In this large therefore and indefinite Sense of the Word Evidence the Maxim is to be understood We are to assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident that is we ought to make use of our liberty of Suspension so far as not to give our Assent to any thing but what all things Consider'd and upon the whole appears Evident to us what by some Light or other we see and plainly perceive to be true and what in one word we find sufficient Reason either from within or from without to Assent to According to that well known Sentence wherewith Des Cartes Concludes his wonderful System Nihilque ab ullo Credi velim nisi quod ipsi Evidens invicta ratio persuadebit I would have nothing believ'd by any one but what by evident and irresistible reason he shall be Convinc'd of And certainly he would be very unreasonable that should desire more For to assent without Evidence of one sort or other that the thing assented to is true is to assent without a why or wherefore and to assent so is to assent without Reason which again is to assent not as a Rational Creature and as Man ought not so to be sure God cannot require such an Assent To assent therefore to nothing but what upon some Consideration or other is Clear and Evident to us and what we have good reason to imbrace as true is certainly a Maxim of unquestionable Truth and of universal Extent that holds in all Matters whatsoever whether of Reason or of Faith in the former of which an Assent without Evidence would be the Act and in the latter the Sacrifice of a Fool. 15. And that this is the true Sense wherein Des Cartes intended his Maxim as well as the true Sense of the Maxim it self is plain from the Occasion of it which as all know who are not utter Strangers to or very Negligent Readers of his Books was the bringing in and obtruding so many things in the Vulgar Philosophy whereof the Introducers of them had such Confuse Notions and of whose reality and Existence they had no Firm and Solid Reasons to assure them such as Substantial Forms really inhering Accidents and Qualities and the like which served rather to darken than clear up the Science of Nature and were the Occasions of a thousand Errours in the Superstructures that were rais'd upon those Imaginary and Chimerical Principles In Opposition to and as a Remedy for which he lays down this Fundamental Maxim to be Carefully observ'd by all the Disciples of Truth in their whole Intellectual Progress never to assent to any thing but what is Clear and Evident that is to nothing but of Whose Truth and Reality they are fully assured and have sufficient Reason to assent to This is the true Sense of the Maxim this is the Sense of its Author and in this Sense it is undeniably true And that without any prejudice to our present Conclusion with which as thus explain'd it is very Consistent For 't is now very easie to discern that we may believe an Incomprehensible thing and yet at the same time according to this Cartesian Maxim assent to nothing but what is Clear and Evident because the Evidence of Faith is External and that there may be an External Evidence to assent to a thing Internally Inevident is no Contradiction 16. Which by the way may serve to discover as well the Injustice as the Impertinence 1. Of those who make use of this Maxim as an Objection against the Belief of things above Reason 2. Of those who take occasion from hence to traduce the Cartesian Philosophy as favourable to and looking with a very propitious Aspect upon Socinianiâ—â— and indeed as little better than an Introduction to it only because it talks so much of clear and distinct Ideas and Conceptions and of assenting to nothing but what is Clear and Evident But Most of all 3dly Of those who proceed even to traduce the Author himself as a secret Friend to the Cause and no better than a Socinian in Disguise It would have been indeed a Considerable Glory and Advantage to that or any other Interest to have had so great a Master of Reason a Friend to it But he Certainly was not if with his Words he has transmitted to us his real Thoughts which would be great uncharity to question and with a witness to Assent to what is not Evident 17. He was indeed a great Master in the Rational way but no Magnifier or Exalter of Human Reason So far from that that he seems to have had the most inward and feeling Sense of its Infirmities and Defects and the best to have understood what a poor little thing 't is to be a Man of any one in the World As may be abundantly Collected from several passages in his Writings besides that the whole vein of them runs that way particularly those two final Sentences wherewith he shuts up his Principles and his Metaphysics At Nihilominus memor meaetenuitatis nihil affirmo c. and Naturae nostrae infirmitas est agnoscenda Which plainly shew what a low debasing Sense he had both of Himself and of
nor Consequently against its being Believ'd and if the only Use and Imployment of Reason in Believing be to Consider not the Internal Evidence of the thing whether the Article be Comprehensible or no but whether it be truly reveal'd by God I say if these things are so as we have abundantly prov'd them to be then from these Premises the Clear and undeniable Consequence is that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just reason why they should not be Believ'd and so thaâ— we may Believe them though we should suppose them what yet some deny to be Incomprehensible 2. Nay so far is the Incomprehensible Sublimity of these Mysteries from being a sufficient Objection against the Belief of them that Accidentally and indirectly it may be improved into a Considerable Argument for them and such as may serve to recommend them to our Faith inasmuch as it is a very strong Presumption that they are of no Human Origin but have God for their Authour it being reasonable to suppose that what does so very much transcend the Capacity of Man to Comprehend does no less exceed his Ability to invent And accordingly the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries for which some will have them to be false is made use of by a very Rational Authour as an Argument of their Truth And it may be worth while to let the Reader see how he Manages it in relation to One of the Most Sublime of them The more Obscure are our Mysteries Strange Paradox the more Credible they now appear to me Yes I find even in the Obscurity of our Mysteries receiv'd as they are by so many different Nations an invincible Proof of their Truth How for instance shall we accord the Vnity with the Trinity the Society of three different Persons in the perfect Simplicity of the Divine Nature This without doubt is Incomprehensiblâ— but not Incredible It is indeed above us but let us Consider a little and we shall believe it at least if we wâ—ll be of the same Religion with the Apostles For supposing they had not known this ineffable Mystery or that they had not taught it to their Successours I maintain that it is not Possible that a Sentiment so extraordinary should find in the Minds of Men such an Vniversal Belief as is given to it in the whole Church and among so many different Nations The More this Adorable Mystery appears Monstrous suffer the Expression of the Enemies of our Faith the More it Shocks Human Reason the More the Imagination Mutinies against it the more Obscure Incomprehensibâ—â— and Impenetrable it is the less Credible is it that it should Naturally insiâ—â—ate it self into the Minds and 〈◊〉 of all Christians of so many and so distant Countries Never do the same Errours spread universally especially such sort of Errours which so strangely offend the Imagination which have nothing sensible in them and which seem to Contradict the most Simple and Common Notions If Iesus â—hrist did not Watch over his Church the Number of the 〈…〉 would quickly exceed that of 〈◊〉 â—â—â—hodox Christians For 〈…〉 in the Sentimen◠〈…〉 that does not 〈…〉 the Mind And 〈…〉 that 〈…〉 to our Vnderstandings may establish themselves in time But that a Truth so Sublime so far removed from Sense so Cross to Human Reason so Contrary in short to all Nature as is this great Mystery of our Faith that a Truth I say of this Character should spread it self Vniversally and Triumph over all Nations where the Apostles had Preach'd the Gospel supposing that these First Preachers of our Faith had neither known any thing nor â—aid any thing of this Mystery this Certainly is what cannot be Conceiv'd by any one that has never so little knowledge of Human Nature That there should be Heretics that should oppose a Doctrine so Sublime is nothing strange nor am I surprized at it On the Contrary I should be very much if never any body had opposed it This Truth wanted but little of being quite oppress'd 'T is very possible For 't will be always reckon'd a Commendable Vndertaking to attaque that which seems to Clash with Reason But that at length the Mystery of the Trinity should prevail and should establish it self Vniversally wherever the Religion of Iesus Christ was receiv'd without its being known and taught by the Apostles without an Authority and a Force Divine there needs methinks but an Ordinary Measure of good Sense to acknowledge that nothing in the World is less Probable For it is not in the least likely that a Doctrine so Divine so above Reason so remov'd from whatever may strike the Imagination and the Senses should Naturally Come into the Thought of Man 3. You see here how this Excellent Person strikes Light out of Darkness by improving even the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries into an Argument for the Truth and Credibility of them and so turning the Artillery of our Adversaries against themselves This indeed is a bold Atchievement anâ— as Fortunate a one too for I think there is a great deal of Force and Weight in his Reasoning But I need not push the Matter so far nor follow so home into the Enemies Camp as to plant their own Cannon against them 'T is sufficient to the design of the present undertaking and as much as I am led to by the Principles before Establish'd to Conclude that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no Argument against them This therefore I insist upon and if my Reason mightily deceive me not dare ingage finally to stand to For if as it has been shewn the Incomprehensibility of a thing in general be no Conclusive Argument against either the Truth or the Credibility of it then since Negative Propositions do separate the Attribut from the Subject according to all the Extent which the Subject has in the Proposition what Consequence can be more Clear than that the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries is no Argument against the Belief of them I Conclude therefore that it is None and that they ought never the less to be believ'd for their being Incomprehensible supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd 4. Whether they are so or no is besides my Undertaking at present to examin nor need I ingage my Pen in this Question since the Affirmative side of it is so Obvious to every Eye that can but read the Bible and has been withal so abundantly and convincingly made good by those abler hands which have gone into the Detail of the Controversie and undertaken the particular defence of the Christian Mysteries This part of the Argument therefore being so well discharged already I shall Concern my self no further with it than only in Consequence and Pursuance of the Former Principles to bestow upon it this one single Necessary Remarque viz. That as the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just Objection against the Belief of them supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd so neither is it a just Objection
AN ACCOUNT OF Reason Faith In RELATION to the MYSTERIES OF CHRISTIANITY By JOHN NORRIS M. A. Rector of Bemerton near Sarum Holding Faith and a good Conscience which some having put away Concerning Faith have made Ship-wrack 1 Tim. 1. 19. LONDON Printed for S. Manship at the Ship near the Royal Exchange in Cornhil 1697. To the Right Honourable Henry Lord of Colerane My Lord YOur Lordships Learning and Knowledge in Matters of Religion and Sincerity in the Belief and Profession of its Sacred Articles are both so well known that I cannot be supposed to Present this Book to your Lordship with a Design to instruct you in the Former or to Settle and Confirm you in the Latter There are indeed but too many in the World to whom it may be necessary upon those Accounts but all that I intend in reference to your Lordship by it is only to express my Reverence and Respect for your great Worth and Goodness and my grateful Acknowledgments for that particular Share and Interest I have had in your Favours Which give me further Occasion to hope that you will be as kind to the Book aâ— you have been to the Author and that as you were pleas'd to incourage the Undertaking so you will now favour the Performance which with all deference and Submission is humbly presented to your Lordship by My Lord Your Lordships most Obliged and very humble Servant J. Norris THE PREFACE COntroversies of Religion and particularly this have been managed of late with that Intemperance of Passion and Indecency of Language after such a Rude Bear-Garden way so much more like Duelling or Prizing than Disputing that the more good Natured and better Bred part of the World are grown almost Sick of them and Prejudic'd against them not being able to see Men Cut and Slash and draw Blood from one another after such an inhuman manner only to vent their own Spleen and make diversion for the Savage and brutalized Rabble without some troublesom resentments of Pity and Displacency And truly 't is hard for a Man to read some certain things of this Character without being disturb'd and growing out of humour upon 't and being even out of Conceit with Mankind such an Idea do they raise of the Malignity of Human Nature and so do they ruffle anâ— Chagrine the Mind of the Reader From which impressions he will hardly recover himself till he meets with some Book or other of a Contrary Spirit whereof the Bishop of London-Derry's Excellent Discourse of the Inventions of Men in the Worship of God is a very eminent Instance which may serve to recompose the One and give him a better Opinion of the Other I have endeavour'd in the Management of the present Argument to use such Christian Temper and Moderation as becomes the Search of Truth and may argue a Mind Concern'd only for the finding it For of all the ill-sorted things in Nature I think it the most improper and disagreeable to reason in a Passion especially when 't is in defence of that Religion which neither needs at nor allows it And therefore laying aside all Anger and Disaffection which even for the advantage of well reasoning ought to be laid aside I have set my Self to observe the Laws of Decency as well as those of good Discourse to Consider things as they really are in their own Natures to represent them as I find them with all Calmness and Sedateness to regard nothing but the pure Merits of the Cause and to treat that Party of Men I write against with that Candour and Respect as may the better dispose them to lend Attention to my Arguments Considering it as one of the Principal Rules of the Art of Perswasion to gain upon the Affections of Men in order to the Conviction of their Iudgments And I do not know that I am guilty of any incivility towards the Men I deal with unless it be that of Contradicting them Wherein as they are even with me so I hope they will not be less so in the other part but will treat me with the like return of Civility and good Temper in Case they shall think fit to make any The Occasion of this undertaking was a Certain late Book call'd Christianity Not Mysterious one of the most Bold daring and irreverent pieces of Defiance to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion that even this Licentious Age has produced and which has been supposed to have done great Battery and Execution upon them and to be indeed a very shrewd and notable Performance even by people of competent Sense and Learning not excluding the Author himself who to shew his good Opinion both of his Cause and of his Management of it has since publish'd a Second Edition of his Book with inlargements and with his Name To which I thought once to have return'd a direct and Formal Answer by way of Solution of his Objections till upon further Consideration I judg'd it better to give an Absolute Account of the Positive Side of the Question and after having laid such grounds in it as might be made use of for the Confutation of his Book to make a short Application of them in a few Strictures upon it at the End of Mine But after I had laid those Grounds in the Absolute part I found the Application of them was so easie to the Author's Objections that they might as well be made by my Reader who might with such readiness out of the Principles here establish'd form an Answer to all that deserves one in that Book that I thought there was no need of inlarging the Bulk of mine upon that account Which accordingly tho' I do not call by the Name of an Answer to Christianity Not Mysterious I cannot but reckon to have all the Substance though not the Formality of a Reply to that Treatise it being much the same thing in effect either to unlock a door for a Man or to put into his hands a Key that will I write neither for Favour nor for Preferment but only to serve the Cause of Christianity for so I call that of its Mysteries and the interest of that Church which is so great a Friend to it and Maintainer of it according to its purest and most Primitive State of Apostolical and Evangelic Perfection Of whose Communion 't is my Happiness to be a Member my Glory to be a Priest and that I had better Abilities to do her Service my highest Ambition However such as they are I humbly devote and imploy them to that purpose as I do this and all other my Labours I hope what I have written may do some Service to the Cause whose Defence it Undertakes and if it does I shall not much regard the resentments of any Designing or not so well affected Persons Great or Little whose displeasure it may provoke tho' I have taken all due Care not to give any body any reasonable Offence And so I Commit the following Papers to the attentive
to be this They first set their Reason above all things and then will believe nothing that is above their Reason And if this be not in an unreasonable measure to exalt that Faculty to carry it beyond its due bounds nay to set it no bounds at all but strictly to make it Infinite and so to ascribe to it no less than a Divine Perfection I must profess my despair ever to know what is 8. To be the adequate Measure of all Truth so as to have no one Truth above the comprehension of it is as much as can be said of the Reason and Understanding of God himself His Infinite Understanding is indeed truly and necessarily so and whatever is above his Reason is for that very reason most certainly not true Because he essentially comprehending all that truly is it must necessarily follow that whatever he does not comprehend must be nothing But to say the same of the Reason of a Man or of the Intelligence of the most illuminated Angel would be to confound all distinction between Finite and Infinite God and Creature and to advance the most absurd and withal the most impious and blaspemous Proposition imaginable And yet this is the general Principle upon which the Body of Socinianism turns and by which it would be most directly and most compendiously confuted 9. I shall therefore take hold of it by this handle And since that which is a Principle one way as we argue forwards from the Cause to the Effect may be considered as a Consequence another way as we argue backwards from the Effect to the Cause and since there are these two general ways of Reasoning I shall therefore proceed both these wayes in the management of the present Argument which accordingly shall turn chiefly upon this double Hinge First I shall overturn their Principle I call it theirs because 't is what they must at last necessarily come to by shewing that Humane Reason is not the measure of Truth or that there may be some things True which are above the comprehension of Humane Reason and that therefore a things being above Reason is no concluding Argument of its not being True Secondly I shall argue ab Absurdo by shewing that if a things being above Reason were an Argument of its not being True then it will follow that Humane Reason is the Measure of all Truth which if I bring them to I shall think them reduced to a sufficient Absurdity These I intend as the two great Pillars of this Work which like the sides of an Arch will strengthen and bear up one another that which is liable to exception in the former part being made out in the latter and that which is liable to exception in the latter being made out in the former For if it be questioned in the First Part whether this be indeed their Principle That Humane Reason is the Measure of all Truth that will appear in the Second wherein it will be shewn to follow from their supposition And if it be question'd in the Second Part whether this their Principle be absurd and so whether they are reduced to an Absurdity that will appear in the First wherein this Principle is shewn to be False 10. And when by this Method I have shewn in general both a Priori and a Posteriori that a things being above Humane Reason is of it self no sufficient Argument of its not being true I shall then make application of all to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion which I shall shew may be true notwithstanding their being above Humane Reason and so that their being above it is no just ground to conclude them False and that therefore they ought to be believed notwithstanding their being above our Reason which in this case ought to be no prejudice to our Faith supposing them otherwise sufficiently revealed Which whether they are or no I shall not discuss my design at present not being to enter into the detail of the Controversie to prove the particular Mysteries of the Christian Faith such as the Trinity Incarnation or the like but only to lay a general ground and foundation for the belief of those Articles and to destroy that upon which the Body of Socinianism stands The Great and General Principle of which I take to be That nothing is to be believ'd as reveal'd by God that is above the comprehension of Humane Reason or That a Man is to believe nothing but what he can comprehend Which Principle I hope by the help of God with the utmost Evidence and Demonstration to overthrow And because in order to this I must first give a direct and profess'd Account of Reason and Faith besides what will be said Incidentally and Occasionally of them in the Course of the Treatise whose main design is so to adjust and accommodate the Natures and Properties of these two things together as to shew the Reasonableness of believing the Mysteries of the Christian Religion thereupon it is that I intitle the whole An Account of Reason and Faith in relation to the Mysteries of Christianity This is the Gross of what I design the Particulars of which will be more distinctly laid down and accounted for in the following Chapters CHAP. I. Of Reason 1. AMbiguity of Words being one great occasion of Confusion of Thoughts whoever will Discourse clearly and distinctly of any Subject must in the first place fix and settle the signification of his Terms in case they are Ambiguous that is if one and the same Term be applyed to different Ideas In this case Definition of the Name is to go before the Definition of the Thing between which two I conceive the difference to be this That in a Nominal Definition the word is only determin'd to such a certain Idea whereas in a Real one the Idea it self is opened and explained by some other Ideas that are supposed to be contain'd and involv'd in it Upon which account it is that Nominal Definitions are Arbitrary and therefore incontestable and therefore may be used as Principles in Discourse as they are in Geometry whereas Real Definitions are not Arbitrary but must be conform'd to the Nature of things and so are not to be taken for Principles whose Truth is to be supposed but for disputable Propositions whose Truth is to be proved 2. Reason therefore being an ambiguous word and of various acceptation before I proceed to give an account of the Nature of the thing it will be necessary that I define the Name which will also be the better defined if it be first distinguisht Now all Distinction being a sort of Division in which according to the Rules of Logick the Distribution ought to be into the most general and most immediate Members I shall accordingly distinguish of the several meanings of this word Reason by the same measure as I would divide any whole into its parts 3. I consider therefore that the most general distribution of Reason is into that of the Object and
that of the Subject or to word it more Intelligibly though perhaps not altogether so Scholastically into that of the Thing and that of the Understanding Reason objective or of the Thing is again very various Sometimes it is taken for Truth and that both for Truth of the Thing namely the Essential relations that are between Ideas and for Truth of the Proposition which is its conformity to those Ideal Relations Thus it is taken the first way for the Ideal Relations themselves when we inquire whether the Reasons of Good and Evil are ab Eterno meaning by Reasons the Essential Relations or Differences Thus again it is taken the second way for the agreement or conformity of a Proposition with those Essential Relations as when we say This is Sense and Reason meaning that the Proposition is true and conformable to the Nature of things Sometimes again it is taken for the Medium Argument or Principle whereby as Truth is proved as when we say Do you prove this by Reason or by Authority Sometimes again for the Rules and Measures of Reasoning as suppose I should say That Reason is the â—ittest Study for a Rational Creature I should be supposed to mean those Rules and Measures whereby we ought to reason and so to intend a commendation of Logick Sometimes again it is taken for Moderation as when we say There is Reason in all things Sometimes for Right Equity or Justice the observation of which is commonly call'd Doing a Man Reason It is also taken for the End or Motive of an Action as when we say For what Reason do you this or that in which sense it is used by the Poet stat pro Ratione voluntas 4. Come we now to the Consideration of Reason as 't is taken subjectively the other general part of its distinction in which also there is some variety of Acceptation For it is sometimes taken for the Act sometimes for the Habit and sometimes for the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning For the Act as when we say of a Man asleep that he is deprived of his Reason For the Habit as when we say of a Man that he has lost his Reason when his Intellectuals are mightily disorder'd and impair'd by a Disease For the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning as when we say That Man is a Creature indued with Reason Which being a Proposition of Universal Truth and that proceeds of Man as Man must necessarily be verified of every Man and consequently must not be meant of the Act or Habit of Reason for these are not at all times in every Man but of the Natural Power or Faculty of it which is not lyable to be suspended as the Act nor lost as the Habit but is Essential to the Nature of Man that which constitutes him what he is and distinguishes him from other Creatures and consequently is inseparable from him whether asleep or awake whether sick or well 5. Reason thus consider'd as it stands for a Power or Faculty in Human Nature may be taken again either largely or strictly Largely for the Power of Thinking or Perception in general whereby a Man is capable of knowing or understanding any Truth let it be by what means or in what order or method soever Strictly for the same Power proceeding after a certain special manner and according to a peculiar order and method namely from the knowledge of one thing to that of another or to the knowledge of what is as yet obscure and unknown by the knowledge of what is more clear and better known concerning which a fuller account by and by 6. After having thus distinguisht with what exactness of order I could the several Acceptations of the word Reason I shall in the next place define in which of these Senses I now use it By Reason then in this place I intend not Reason of the Object but that of the Subject and that not as to the Act or Habit but as to the Natural Power or Faculty of Reasoning And that again not as it is taken strictly as it uses a certain particular process in its operation but as it is taken more at large for the power of perceiving or knowing in general According to which Sense Reason is here the same with Vnderstanding And so it is often used as when we say The Reason of a Man teaches him this or that meaning his Understanding at large or the general Power whereby he understands For if Science which strictly taken is that particular kind of Knowledge which is acquired by Demonstration be yet often used more largely for Knowledge in general why may not Reason the great Principle and Faculty of Science which strictly taken signifies a Power of Knowing by such a certain way and in such a certain manner of proceeding be taken as well in a greater latitude for the Power of Knowing or Understanding in general 7. And the Nature of the Subject and Question now under Consideration requires that it should be thus used here For when 't is inquired whether there be any thing in Religion above Reason the meaning certainly can be no other than whether there be any thing which surpasses the Power and Capacity of a Mans Understanding to comprehend or account for And he that says there is nothing in Religion above Reason is supposed to mean that there is nothing in it beyond the comprehension of a Mans Natural Understanding nothing but what he can profound and fathom And so also he that says that there are Mysteries in Christianity or things above our Reason must be presumed to mean that there are Reveal'd Truths that so far exceed the measure of our Intellectual Faculties and are of a size so disproportionate to our Minds that with all the force and penetration of Spirit and the utmost application of Thought we cannot possibly comprehend them be our method of proceeding what it will I do not intend by this to state the Question which shall be done more fully in its due place but only to give an account of one of its Terms and to shew that by Reason I both do and should here mean A Mans Natural Power of Knowing or Understanding in general In which use of the word 't is no 〈◊〉 Authority to me that the Excellent and most Accurate Author of L' Art de Penser defines Logâ—ck to be an Art of well conducting ones Reason in the knowledge of things Where by Reason 't is plain he must mean the same as Vnderstanding 8. What this Power or Principle of Understanding is in its self or in its own Nature and Essence I do not pretend to know as not having any clear Idea of my own Soul and indeed as not knowing my self at all by Idea but only by a confuse Sentiment of internal Consciousness And therefore I shall not go about to examine what it is For the same reason also I shall not set my self to consider whether the Understanding be any Power or Faculty really
Perswasion of the Mind particularly that which is founded upon Testimony or Authority So that the Generical and Common Part of Faith is Assent wherein it agrees with some other Acts of the Mind and the more special and peculiar part that limits and Contracts the General and whereby the whole is differenc'd and distinguish'd is the Motive and ground of this Assent 'T is it seems an Assent grounded not upon the internal Reason and Evidence of the thing but upon the bare Testimony and Authority of the Speaker 3. For I consider that there are two general grounds of Assent Reason and Authority That is we assent to a thing either because we have some Perception or Knowledge of it our selves or because its Truth is declared to us by another upon whose Knowledge and Veracity we think we may safely depend If the Reason or evidence of the thing be imperfect and incomplete that is if we perceive only in part then we yeild a partial and imperfect Assent mix'd with some Fear or Suspicion of the Contrary which is what we call Opinion But if the Evidence be full and perfect then we yield a firm and most assured Assent which is generally distinguish'd from the other by the Name of Knowledge which according to the common Notion and Definition of it is an Evident Assent But it was shewn before that Knowledge does not Formally Consist in the Assent but in the Perception which is the Ground of the Assent And indeed how is it possible it should consist in any thing else For to give yet a further Confirmation to what has been already offer'd upon this Occasion let Assent be never so evident the evidence lies in the Perception not in the Assent which of it self is a blind dark Act of the Mind and can be said no otherwise to be Evident than as 't is an Assent to an Evident thing that is to what we perceive But now Perception and Assent are not only two things but such as belong also to two different and distinct Faculties and therefore can never joyn together to make up Knowledge which is an Act only of one And indeed to speak the truth Evident Assent as 't is here applied seems to me a mere jumble of Words confusely uniting together in one Idea Operations that belong to distinct Faculties one belonging to the Will and the other to the Understanding And how the result of this heterogeneous Composition should be Knowledge I must confess to be indeed a Mystery above my Comprehension And besides after all an Evident Assent when resolv'd into more words will amount to the same as an Assent to what we know and would it not be a Notable Definition of Knowledge to say that it is an Assent to what we know 4. If then Knowledge be not an Evident Assent and indeed as to the Formality of it has nothing of Assent in it as consisting purely and wholely in Perception 't is plain that this Assent to an evident thing ought not to be call'd Knowledge For 't is necessary that the several Species of Assent should all have the general Nature of Assent in them and consequently this being a certain Species of Assent must partake of the nature of Assent in general which it cannot do if it be Knowledge for that were to pass over into another Kind Knowledge not being Assent but Perception 'T is therefore most clear and evident that our Common Systemes have here also gone upon a wrong ground and that Knowledge ought not to be put into the Number of the Three Assents which are usually reckon'd to be Faith Opinion and Science since the Assent whose ground is full Evidence and which is the only one that may pretend and is commonly presumed to be Knowledge is most apparently not so as differing from it no less than in the whole kind 5. If then it be demanded by what Name I would distinguish this Second Assent to a thing when the Evidence is full and complete from the former wherein the Evidence is supposed not to be so perfect I answer that indeed so little have these things been Consider'd as they ought there is no proper Name that I know of for it When we assent to a thing of incomplete Evidence we call it Opinion and when we assent to a thing whose Evidence is complete this has been usually call'd Knowledge but certainly with the utmost impropriety knowledge as appears being quite another thing But by what name to call it or how to distinguish it I proâ—ess I know not Not for want of real difference and distinction in the thing for my Thought of it is very distinct but merely because we want a word for it As we do in like manner for Assent upon Reason in general to distinguish it from Assent upon Authority in general For as Assent upon Authority in general Abstracting from Humane or Divine is call'd Faith so also Assent upon Reason in general abstracting from complete or incomplete should be call'd somewhat if one could tell what as every generical Idea ought to be distinguish'd by a generical Name But since our Language affords not any one word that will serve to either of these purposes we must be content with the Deâ—initio instead of the Definitum and express the things at large by saying Assent upon Reason or Evidence and Assent upon such Evidence as is full and complete which is sufficient to distinguish it from Assent upon evidence incomplete though we have no one proper word for this as we have for the other which is fitly call'd Opinion whereby we denote the imperfection both of the Evidence and of the Assent 6. But now if the Assent he not grounded upon any internal Reason or Evidence of the thing at all but only upon Testimony or Authority then we call it Faith Which appears to be an Assent of a quite different Nature from the other two For they both agree in the general Nature of Assent upon Evidence and differ only as the Evidence differs and that is gradually as complete differs from incompletâ— But Faith differs from them both in the whole Kind as having no Evidence at all but only Authority for its Ground And thus we have here a Threefold Assent though not such as is taught us in the Schools the Account of which in short proceeds thus All Assent in general is either upon Reason or Authority If the Reason be incomplete then 't is Opinion If complete then 't is another kind of Assent for which as yet there wants a Name as also there does for Assent upon Reason in General But if the Assent be upon Authority only then 't is Faith 7. Now this Authority may be either of God or of Man If the Authority whereupon our Assent is grounded be of Man then the Assent that is so grounded is Human Faith If of God then 't is Divine Faith Between which two there is this in Common that they both proceed not
being no reason from the Nature of Faith that requires it should which may consist with Evidence though it proceeds not upon it and has no regard to it as a Motive So then the formal Reason of Faith is always Clear the Matter of it Absolutely consider'd may be clear or not clear as it happens according as the Nature of the thing is but as Believ'd or as Consider'd under the formality of being the Object of Faith so it is always inevident and Obscure as being not supposed to be assented to for the sake of its Evidence even when it has any but wholy upon another Account already sufficiently represented 23. And thus having struck some Light into the Darkness of Faith by stating and explaining with what exactness I could in what Sense it is an inevident Assent I cannot forbear Observing by the way though a little of the soonest of what Service this Account may be towards the grand Question of Believing things above Reason For if Faith be an inevident Assent so far at least as not to respect the Evidence of its Object why may not a thing be believ'd though it be above Reason For what though it be above Reason is it therefore above Faith Has Faith any regard to Evidence Or is it determin'd by any Rational Motive I mean that is taken from the Nature of the Object Even when a thing is evident Faith is not supposed to assent to it because of its Evidence and why then may not a thing be believ'd though it be not evident Some Contend that Faith and Evidence cannot possibly consist together and according to them Not only what is inevident may be believ'd but whatever is believ'd must be inevident But this I look upon and have already shewn to be a Mistake And 't is a Mistake in the Extremity too For I take it to be every whit as much an Extreme to say that the Object of Faith is always inevident as to say that it is always evident However it is always inevident so far as Believ'd which is the Middle Point between the two extremes The Nature of Faith requires at least this Relative inevidence of the Object whatever it be in its own Nature and we need no More For if the Object of Faith be alwayes inevident so far as Believ'd then will it not follow that it May be believ'd though inevident For my part I see nothing that should hinder this Consequence if the Principle it proceeds upon be right The Principle is and a very moderate one sure the generality of Writers straining the Matter a great deal higher that the Object of Faith is inevident as far as Believ'd The Consequence is that therefore a thing may be believ'd though inevident 'T is true indeed one of these is an Absolute and the other only a Relative inevidence But this signifies Nothing to the Argument For why may not a thing really and in it self inevident be believ'd when even that which is Evident is Consider'd by Faith as inevident Why then 't is all one as to Faith as if it were so indeed For what does the Evidence signify or what real alteration does it make if Faith has no regard to it nor Consideration of it And what should hinder then but that a thing really inevident may be believ'd especially if reveal'd by God himself and concerning himself The short is Faith as Faith has no regard to Evidence I mean that of the thing and Faith as Divine has no need of it and therefore why an inevident thing may not be believ'd is what I do not understand and would be glad to Learn 24. But to return for I look upon this as too much a digression from the present and too much a Prevention of what is to follow to be further pursued after having thus discours'd of the Nature of Faith in General and the double Distribution of it into Humane and Divine with proper Considerations upon each of them it remains that it be now further consider'd that each of these may be either Explicit or Implicit Then we are said to believe Explicitly when we believe determinately such or such a thing in particular distinctly knowing what that Particular thing is And then Implicitly when we believe indeterminately and at large whatever is proposed to us by such an Authority not knowing what in particular is proposed or what it is we Believe Which though it seems to carry the Appearance of an Assent too blind and hood-winkt to be the act of a Reasonable Creature may yet in its proper place become him as much as the other and indeed is every whit as rational an Assent in its Ground and Principle For all Explicit Faith is founded upon Implicit and has Implicit Faith in it 25. To understand both this and the Nature of Implicit Faith the better we are to Consider what has been already intimated that Faith proceeds upon Premisses as well as Science and is the Conclusion of a Syllogism And I further Note what perhaps may not be unworthy the Observation of the Curious that the Major Proposition in Faith Explicit is the Conclusion in Faith Implicit as may be seen in the Syllogism before set down Whatever is reveal'd by God is true This is Reveal'd by God Therefore this is true The Major Proposition here whatever is reveal'd by God is true is the Conclusion of Implicit Faith whose act is as much to believe to be true whatever God reveals as the act of Explicit Faith is to believe that this or that in particular is so So that Explicit Faith proceeds upon Implicit borrows from it its Conclusion for its Principle and begins where the other leaves off Just as in the Subalternation of Sciences that which is a Conclusion in one is a Principle in the other so 't is here in the Subalternation of these two Faiths whereof that which is Explicit may be said to be Subalternated to that which is Implicit Let not any therefore vilify or disparage Implicit Faith as a blind and irrational Assent since it lays a ground for Explicit which serves it self of it using its Conclusion as a Principle even as what is a Conclusion in Geometry is a Principle in Perspective And as Geometry is therefore accounted the Superiour Science so ought implicit Faith to be reckon'd as the Superiour Faith upon whose Conclusion the other proceeds and which it self proceeds thus Whatever is reveal'd by him that is Infallible is true God is Infallible Therefore whatever is reveal'd by God is true Here besides that 't is plain to be seen that the Conclusion of this last Syllogism is the Principle of the precedent One and that Explicit Faith supposes what is proved in Implicit it may be further noted that Implicit Faith as being the highest degree of Faith is due only to the highest that is to an Infallible Authority the reason why whatever is reveal'd by God is here Concluded to be true being
much more Apposite and Exact Whereof he himself appears sensible at the end of it where offering to consider the Matter more distinctly he tells you that the things above Reason are not all of one sort but may be distinguish'd into two kinds sufficiently differing from each other which he makes to be these that there are some things that Reason by its own Light cannot Discover And others that when proposed it cannot Comprehend This indeed is true but then he should have said so sooner and have told us withal that by things above Reason as the Phrase is used in this Distinction he meant the Latter Sort only the Former not being to the Purpose 8. However he proceeds upon that part First that is to shew that there are divers Truths in the Christian Religion that Reason left to it self would never have been able to find out Of which he gives several Instances which as not being to the Point I pass over and come to his other Consideration of things above Reason meaning such as when proposed do surpass our Comprehension and that as he well observes upon one or other of these three Accounts either as not clearly Conceivable by our understanding such as the Infiniteness of the Divine Nature or as inexplicable by us such as the Manner how God can Create a Rational Soul or how this being an Immaterial Substance can act upon a Human Body or be acted upon by it c. Or else lastly as Asymmetrical or unsociable that is such as we see not how to reconcile with other things evidently and confessedly true whereof he gives an instance in the Case of Prescience and Contingency 9. He further observes and I think rightly that there may be difference of degree in things above Reason as to their Abstruseness That some things appear to surpass our understandings immediately even before attentively lookt into And other things only when a narrow inspection is made into them being intelligible enough in the 〈◊〉 and as imploy'd in common Discourse Whereof he gives instances in Place Time and Motion And he makes use of this Observation to solve a Difficulty wherein it is pretended that we cannot profess to believe things which we acknowledge to be above our Reason without discovering that we do not well consider what we say and that we then talk like Parrots To which the substance of his Answer is that we may talk of those things according to that Notion of them which is more Obvious and Superficial though not according to that which is Philosophical and Accurate 10. After this Explanation of what is meant by Above Reason and contrary to Reason he comes in the Second place to justify the Distinction by shewing that it is grounded upon the Nature of things And that he does by shewing that there is no Necessity that things above Reason should be also Contrary to Reason This he shews first of things above Reason in the first Sense viz. those that are undiscoverable by Reason alone but this being not the sense of Above Reason as it is used in this Distinction and since things according to this sense above Reason are not affirm'd by our Adversaries to be contrary to it I pass over all that he says upon this part and strike in with him again where he shews the same of things above Reason in the Second sense I cannot meet with any thing directly under that Head but only a few Passages here and there scatter'd up and down As when he says of Galileo that when he first made his Discoveries with the Telescope and said that there were Planets that mov'd about Iupiter He said something that other Astronomers could not discern to be true but nothing that they could prove to be false And again when he says that for a thing to be above Reason is Extrinsecal and Accidental to its being true or false Because to be above our Reason is not an Absolute thing but a Respective One importing a Relation to the Measure of Knowledge that belongs to Human understanding And therefore it may not be above Reason in reference to a more inlightned Intellect c. which indeed is rightly and very judiciously remarqu'd in it self and no less pertinently to the present business And again when he says that there are some things true which yet are liable to Objections not directly answerable and so above Reason He instances in the Controversie of the Divisibility of Quantity where each side of the Contradiction is press'd with unanswerable Objections and yet as parts of a Contradiction one of them must necessarily be true And yet take which you will you run into invincible Difficulties Which indeed well concludes that a thing that is above Reason may yet be true and if true then not contrary to Reason it being impossible that what is so should be true Which one Consideration is indeed enough to justifie the Distinction beyond all exception 11. Mr. Boyle has yet a further Observation concerning this Distinction too Considerable to be pass'd over and that is that he looks upon it to be of Importance not only to the defence of some Mysteries of the Christian Religion but even of some important Articles of Natural Theology in which as he shews by several Instances there are many Doctrins which must be acknowledgâ—d to be true and yet whose Modus is not explainable 12. After this he Considers an Objection wherein it is pretended that the granting this Distinction would be of bad Consequence as affording shelter to any unintelligible stuff that a bold Enthusiast may obtrude under the venerable Title of a Mystery that is above Reason To which he answers very judiciously that he does not deny but that the Distinction is liable to be ill imploy'd but that this is no other than what is common to it with divers other Distinctions which are without Scruple Admitted because useful and not rejected because they have not the Priviledge that they can never be Misapplied And that therefore both in reference to those other Distinctions and that he had been treating of it becomes Men to stand upon their Guard and strictly examine how far the Doctrine proposed as a Mystery is intitled to the benefit of this Distinction Which if it should be employ'd to justifie any thing that though styl'd a Mystery is but a pretended one the Errour as he well observes in the Close of all will lye Not in the Groundlesness of the Distinction but in the Erroneousness of the Application 13. In this you have the Sum and Substance as briefly and as clearly as I could represent it of Mr. Boyle's Thoughts concerning things above Reason and contrary to Reason which like all his are great and strong and allowing only for those inaccuracies taken Notice of just and true And now though what this Excellent Person has offer'd may serve to let in a great deal of Light into the Distinction yet since a thing of such Consequence if true
the importunity of the Men I argue with Which indeed is the present Case since as was intimated in the Beginning the Sentiment of these Men concerning the disbelief of things above Reason resolves at last into this Principle that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth Which therefore both for their Satisfaction and Refutation must be shewn to be False 4. Now when I say that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth my meaning is that it is not that Common Standard whereby Truth in the General is to be Measured so that of every thing it may be safely Concluded that it is either true or not true according as it accords with this Measure as 't is comprehensible or not Comprehensible by Human Reason 'T is true indeed there is a certain Sense in which Human Reason sometimes is and may be truely said to be the Measure of Truth in as much as whatever the Understanding does clearly and distinctly Perceive may be concluded as most certainly true it being impossible that a thing should be otherwise than as we clearly perceive it to be without supposing our Perceptive Faculties to be in themselves Naturally False and without supposing it also necessary that we should fall into Errour even in the right use of these Faculties it being impossible to conceive a More right use of them than to Assent only to what we clearly Perceive which are not only in themselves manifest Absurdities but such also as would necessarily infer the Authour of our Natures to be also the Authour of our Errours and Deceptions It must therefore be admitted by all what the Philosophers of the Cartesian way so earnestly stand and Contend for that Clearness of Perception is the great Rule and Criterion of Truth so far that whatever we do clearly and distinctly perceive to be true is really in it self True But then this is only to be a Partial and inadequate Rule and in some certain limited respect only not absolutely and in general For though I grant that whatever we clearly perceive is true yet I deny that it follows likewise Backwards that whatever is true we do also clearly Perceive and so consequently that whatever we do not clearly Perceive is therefore not True By which it is plain that this Cartesian Maxim must be very much abused to prove that Human Reason is the Common and General Measure of Truth and I dare say the Great Authors of it never intended it to that purpose 5. Reason or Understanding in general may be safely said and must necessarily be allow'd to be the Measure of Truth For Truth in general carries a necessary Relation to understanding in general as fully adequate and commensurate to it So that all Truth is simply and absolutely intelligible the greatest and sublimest Truths as much as the least and meanest those which the Angels study and desire to look into as much as those which employ the narrow Thoughts of the poorest Rustic The Former are in themselves as intelligible as the latter and if not actually so well understood 't is not because of any incapacity in the Objects but by reason of the Disproportion of the Faculties that are Conversant about them But this disproportion must not be Universal nor extend throughout the whole Order of Being For what is intelligible must be so to some Understanding since what no Understanding can Comprehend is the same as not to be intelligible and consequently there must be an Understanding that Comprehends all that is truly intelligible that is all Truth And accordingly it may be truly said of this All-Comprehensive Understanding that it is the Measure of Truth so that whatever this perfect Understanding does not understand is not intelligible and if not intelligible then also not True Besides that it might be further Consider'd were this a proper place for so Abstract and Metaphysical a Speculation that Truth it Self as to the real Nature and Essence of it is one and the same with the Divine Ideas as they are related to one another and does therefore exist Originally and intirely in the Mind of God who is Substantial Truth and accordingly does Comprehend all Truth and so consequently is the Measure of it And because this All-comprehensive Understanding is contain'd within the Extent of Reason or Understanding in General therefore it may be truly said also of Reason or Understanding in General that it is the Measure of Truth it being most certain that what is above all Reason or what no Reason whatsoever can Comprehend is as much above Truth too and cannot possibly be true 6. But though it be thus necessary to allow this of Reason in General the same cannot be allow'd of Human Reason For whatever is the Measure of Truth must be fully adequate and Commensurate to Truth That 's Certain And therefore if Human Reason be the Measure of Truth it must have the same compass and extent with Truth and possess it whole and intire if not Essentially and Substantially as God does yet at least Noetically and by way of Theory so as to be able thoroughly to Perceive and Comprehend all Truth But now that this Qualification cannot possibly agree to Human Reason though it be somewhat unreasonable that I should be put to prove such a Proposition as this I hope fully to demonstrate upon a Double Consideration one taken from the Nature of Human Reason and the other from the Nature of Truth 7. And first to begin with Truth This as the Most thinking and Metaphysical Persons Conceive of it is supposed to consist in the Relations of equality or inequality or Agreement or Disagreement Now we are to Consider that these Relations may be of Three Sorts either such as are between Created Beings or such as are between Intelligible Ideas or such as are between Created Beings and their Ideas And we are also to Consider that there are two General Sorts of Truths extremely different one from another and therefore carefully to be distinguish'd Those that regard only the Abstract Natures of things and their immutable Essences independently on their actual Existence And others again that do regard things that do actually Exist The former of these Constitute that Order of Truths which we call Necessary the latter that which we call Contingent And this double order of Truths results from that threefold Relation before-mention'd From the first and third Relations arise Contingent Truths which are nothing else but the Relations of agreement of disagreement that are either between Created Beings themselves or between Created Beings and their Ideas And these I call Contingent Truths in opposition to those that are Necessary and Eternal partly because these Relations could not begin to exist before those Beings were produced it being impossible that there should be Relations between things that are not and partly because these Relations might not have existed because those Beings might not have been produced And as Contingent Truths arise from the first and third
so from the second and middle Relations result those Truths which are Necessary Eternal and Immutable and which I understand to be nothing else but the Relations of Agreement or Disagreement that are between Ideas 8. I go here upon the common and allow'd Distinction between Necessary and Contingent Truths and upon the as much allow'd Supposition that there is such an Order of Truths as are Necessary and Eternal which therefore I take for granted as a Principle not to decline the trouble of proving it but because it is a Confess'd as well as Evident thing and I care not for proving any more evident things than I needs must And that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are in this precisely distinguish'd from those that are Contingent that they are the Relations that are between Ideas I think is plain from the very Notion and Nature of them because they are supposed to be such Truths as regard the Abstract Natures and Essences of things as they are in Idea and not as they have an actual Existence in rerum Naturâ since then they would not be necessary but Contingent Truths which would be contrary to the Supposition And Because these Necessary Truths are the most considerable and principal sort of Truths as being the Ground and Foundation of all Science and the true and proper Objects of our Theory and Contemplation and because for the same Reason whenever we speak of Truth Absolutely and in General we are presumed to mean necessary and immutable Truth hence it is that Truth is commonly said by Metaphysical Writers to consist in the Relations that are between Ideas though indeed this be strictly true only of Necessary Truth But it is sufficient to the present purpose that it is true of this And so much I suppose will readily be granted me at least that the general Nature and Reason of Necessary and Eternal Truths consists in the Relations that are between Ideas 9. I further add that these Ideas must be the same with the Divine Ideas 'T is true indeed that exactly speaking all Ideas are Divine Ideas even those which we use to call our own it being most Certain as might easily and with the greatest Evidence be shewn that the immediate Objects of our Understandings are no other than the Ideas of the Divine Intellect in which we see and contemplate all things But not to enter into this sublime Speculation at present it will be sufficient to consider that unless the Ideas whose Relations Constitute those Truths which are Necessary and Eternal be the Divine Ideas it will be impossible that Necessary and Eternal Truths should be what we suppose they are that is Necessary and Eternal For Necessary and Eternal Truths must be Necessary and Eternal Relations and it being impossible that Relations should be more Necessary or Eternal than the Subjects from which they result unless these Ideas the Subjects of these Relations be Necessary and Eternal how can their Relations be so 'T is plain therefore that these Ideas must be Necessary and Eternal But now I pray what Ideas are so but the Divine What is there in the whole Compass of Being that is Necessary Eternal and Immutable but God and his Divine Perfections As therefore we say that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are Relations between Ideas and not such as are between either Created Entities themselves or between them and their Ideas because then they would be of the Order of Contingent not of Necessary Truths For the same reason we must say that they are the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas those only being sufficiently steddy and Permanent Subjects to sustain such Stable and Immutable Relations And indeed were it not for those Representative Perfections of the Divine Nature which we call Ideas there would be no Necessary and Eternal Essences to support these Necessary and Eternal Relations and then there could be no such Relations and if no such Relations then there could be no Necessary Truths and is no Necessary Truths then no Science Which by the way would most Convineingly prove to any Capable and Attentive Understanding the absolute Necessity and Certainty of a God as the most inmost Ground and Central Support of the whole Intellectual World 10. Well then it can no longer be doubted but that these Necessary and Eternal Truths are the Relations that are between the Divine Ideas But now as these Ideas are Infinite as being the Essential Perfections of God and really identify'd with his Divine Nature and Substance so it must necessarily follow that the Relations that result from them and subsist between them must also be Infinite And then since these Truths do essentially Consist in and in their Reason and Formality are no other than these Ideal Relations it no less evidently follows that Truth also must be Infinite too 11. Which also will be necessary to Conclude upon another Account For I confider again that since Relations do not in reality differ as distinct Entities from their Subjects and Terms as the Relations of two Circles supposed to be equal to each other do not really differ from the Circles themselves so related these Ideal Relations must in the reality of the thing be one and the same with the Divine Ideas themselves and consequently with the Divine Nature with which these Ideas are identified And accordingly Truth which is the same with these Ideal Relations must also as to the real Essence and Substance of it be one and the same with the Divine Nature 12. And that indeed it is so may be further and somewhat more directly demonstrated thus That God is the Cause of whatever is besides himself or that whatever is is either God or the Effect of God is a clear and acknowledg'd Principle Necessary Truth then is either God or the Effect of God But it is not the Effect of God and therefore it can be no other than God himself Now that it is not the Effect of God the many gross Absurdities which that supposition draws after it I think will oblige him that Considers them to acknowledge For First if Necessary Truth be the effect of God either it would not be necessary which is against the Supposition or if it be then as being a necessary Effect it must have a necessary Cause that is a Cause necessarily determin'd to act and so God would be a necessary Agent even ad extra He would also be an unintelligent Agent The Consequence is not to be avoided For if Truth be the effect of God then antecedently to the effecting of it there was no Truth and consequently no Knowledge because there could be nothing known and so God in the production of Truth if indeed he did produce it must be supposed to act altogether in the dark and without any Intelligence Again if Truth be the Effect of God then the Perfection of the Divine Understanding must be supposed to depend upon something that is not God nay upon something created
when all that we can enjoy here is Finite The greatest part of the Uneasiness the Melancholy the Disconsolateness the Aridity that accompanies Human Life will be found if traced to the Original to proceed from hence viz. from the little proportion that is between our Capacities and our Gratifications between what is desired and what is enjoy'd And this Desire of an Infinite Good will be a far greater Punishment to us Hereafter when the Activity of our Faculties shall be more invigorated and inlarg'd if we have not then an Infinite Good to enjoy â—Twill be at least the worst ingredient of Hell and Damnation if not all that is to be understood by it And yet we are still to Consider that our Will is Inâ—â—nite only Ex parte Objecti because it desires an Infinite Good and not Ex parte Actûs because it desires it infinitely or with an unlimited Force and Activity For 't is impossible that a Finite Nature should have any Power or Force in it that is strictly infinite or that any such Act or Operation should proceed from it But then what would the Affliction be if the Act were Infinite as well as the Object and we were to aspire after an Infinite Good with an Infinite Desire What Conception can Frame a just Idea of the Misery of such a State And can it be much less for an Infinite Intelligence to have only a Finite Intelligible for its Object But there is Nothing Painful or Afflictive in the Condition of the Supremely and Completely Blessed And therefore we must Conclude that as the Infinite Will of God has a Good fully Commensurate and Adequate to its unlimited Activity whereon it may Center and Repose its Weight so the Infinite Understanding of God has also an Infinite Intelligible for its Object And since the Formal Object of Understanding in General and Consequently of the Divine is Truth as that of the Will is Good hence it follows again that Truth must needs be of an Infinite Nature 17. And do we not find it so when we Convert our selves to it by Study and Meditation When we apply our Minds to the Contemplation of Truth and set our selves to muse and think do we not find that we launch forth into a vast intelligible Sea that has neither Bottom nor Shore And the more we think and the more we Meditate are we not still more and more convinc'd of this and do we not discover the further we go in our Intellectual Progress that there still lies more and more beyond us so that the more we advance in the Knowledge of Truth the more we inlarge Our Idea of it as the greatest Travellers think most Magnificently of the World Do we not find as in a Spatious Campaigne so in the immense Field of Truth that our Eye wearies and our Sight loses it self in the boundless Prospect and that besides the clear view which we have of a few things at a little distance from us there lie all round us vast Tracts unmeasurably diffused whereof we have only Confuse and indistinct Images like the Faint Blew of the far distant Hills Are not the Relations and Combinations of things with one another Infinite and should but one link in this Endless Chain be alter'd would not innumerable Alterations ensue upon it Should but One Proposition that is False be supposed True or One that is True be supposed False what Understanding but the Divine could go on with the Train of New Consequences that would result from such a Supposition I say New Consequences For we are to consider that besides the Absolute Systeme of Truth which contains the Relations of Ideas with their settled Coherencies and Dependencies one upon another according as they really stand in their Natural Order there is a Secondary Systeme of Truth which I may call Hypothetical that results from any supposed Change made in the Absolute Systeme whence will still arise new and new Consequences even to Infinity But not to consider Hypothetical Truth can the Bounds of that which is Absolute be ever fix'd or its Stock ever Exhausted Does it not after all the Study that has been employ'd about it and the Numberless Number of Volumns that have been written upon it furnish perpetual matter for our Contemplation and is it not a Subject for everlasting Thoughts and Considerations Has it not been the great Research of the Thoughtful and Inquisitive for many Ages and yet does not every Age refine upon its Predecessour and produce New Discoveries Are not the Sciences continually improved and yet are there not still Depths in every Science which no Line of Thought can ever Fathom What a vast Fecundity is there in some plain simple Propositions nay who can number the Conclusions that may be drawn from any one Principle Take the most simple Figure in Geometry and where is the Mathematician who after a Thousand Years Study can reckon up all the Properties that may be affirm'd of it both as Absolutely Consider'd and as it stands in relation to other Figures And what then shall we think of the whole Science in all its Branches and Dependencies Particularly of Algebra the Main Ocean of this Bottomless Sea And what shall we say of Metaphysick's another unmeasurable Abysse and what of the endless Circle of Truth if not the same which one of Iob's Friends says of God Canst thou by searching â—ind out Truth Canst thou find her out unto Perfection It is as high as Heaven what canst thou do deeper than Hell what canst thou know The Measure thereof is longer than the Earth and broader than the Sea And that because they after all are Finite whereas this is truly and strictly Infinite Which by the way sufficiently proves a God and that this God is Truth whose Eternal and Glorious Majesty be Blessed for Ever 18. But then let us Consider if Truth be indeed as you see of an Infinite Nature then to prove that Human Reason is not fully adequate to it does not intirely possess it nor all over and wholly comprehend it and consequently cannot be the Measure of it there will be no need of laying open the great Weakness and Deficiency of our Understanding I need not represent the Imperfection of its Light nor the Shortness of its Views nor the Slenderness of its Attainments nor the very Narrow Extent of its Knowledge nor the very little Progress it is able to make in the Contemplation and Comprehension of Truth That there are a great many things whereof we have no Ideas for which we need go no further for an Instance than our own Souls and that even where we have Ideas of things we cannot always discern the Relations and Connexions that are between them and that either for want of sufficient Clearness in the Ideas themselves to have their Relations perceived immediately without comparing them with other mediate Ideas or else for want of such due and proper Mediums wherewith to compare them and
that therefore the extent of our Knowledge is not only vastly exceeded by the Natures of things but also very Considerably even by our own Ideas there being many things whereof we have Ideas and sometimes very clear ones too and yet which we know no more how to reason upon or discourse of intelligibly or with any Certainty than we do of those things whereof we have no Ideas at all being for Example no more able to tell what proportion such a Circle bears to such a Square though we have clear Ideas of both than we are to tell what proportion there is between Angels and our own Souls things whereof we have no Ideas A very remarkable Instance of the Shortness and Contractedness of our Understandings which it seems are not only destitute of the Ideas of many things and Consequently of the knowledge of them it being impossible that the extent of our knowledge should exceed that of our Ideas but are also Blind to those very Ideas which they have and cannot see even when they have the advantage of the Light But I say I need not present my Reader with a Night-piece of Human Reason describe great Blindness and gross Darkness how ignorant she is when she does not adventure to judge and how Erroneous when she does stumbling and falling as is usual in the dark out of one mistake into another out of one Errour into another either by imâ—racing false Principles or by drawing wrong Conclusions from true ones so that Ignorance seems her safest Retreat and to suspend her best Wisdom These I say and such other of our intellectual Infirmities I need not insist upon or make any advantage of it being sufficient to conclude the Point in hand that Human Reason in its largest Capacity and Extent and with all the advantages of both Nature and Artificial improvement is after all but a Finite thing and that to be sure the most Zealous of its Votaries and Advocates must confess that it is since 't is impossible that what has Bounds should be able totally and adequately to Comprehend what has None or that Finite should be the Measure of Infinite 19. I know but of one thing that can with any Pertinency be replied to this Argument and that is that though Human Reason as Finite be not able to comprehend all Truth as being Infinite yet however there may perhaps be no one Truth in Particular but what when presented to it may be comprehended by it and so Human Reason may be rightly said to be Adequate and Commensurate to Truth as Distributively though not as Collectively consider'd But to this I have several things to return First of all I say that such is the reciprocal dependence and concatenation of Truth that the want of a thorough and intire Comprehension of all Truth in its widest and most diffused Extent must needs very much Eclipse the view and darken the Perception of any one Solitary Truth in particular so that however we may have some tolerable Perception of it and such as we may call Clear in Comparison of some other Truths which we do not see so clearly yet it cannot be near so clear and Distinct a Perception as that Infinite Being has of it who sees not only the Truth it self but also the Manifold Relation Connexion and Combination that it has with all other Truths The difference between these two ways of Perception being of a like Nature with that which is between seeing a Proposition as it stands singly by it self and seeing the same Proposition with all its Relations and Dependencies and in conjunction with the whole Context and Coherence of the Discourse whereof it is a Part. I say again Secondly that though we may have a competent Perception of some plain and simple Truths without pursuing them thorough all the Relations and Dependencies that they have with other Truths since otherwise as I have hinted already we should be able to understand nothing and every thing would be above Reason yet however we do not know but that there may be some Truths of such a Nature as not to be understood without the adequate Comprehension of those Relations and Dependencies which since we have not we do not nor can ever know but that there may be some Truths that are so above us as to be out of our Reach and to lie beyond all possibility of Comprehension and consequently that Human Reason is not adequate and commensurate to Truth even Distributively consider'd I say we do not know and 't is impossible we should ever know but that thus it may be For how should we be able to know it or upon what shall we ground this our Knowledge It must be either upon the Natural Force and Penetration of our Understandings or upon our Actual Views and Perceptions or upon the Nature of Truth it self As for the Capacity of our Understandings though we do not know the precise and exact Bounds and Limits of it yet we know in the general that it is Finite and has its fix'd and determinate Measure which it would strive in vain to exceed As for the Nature of Truth that we both experiment and from the foregoing Considerations must of necessity conclude to be Infinite And what Ground of Assurance can we have from either or both of these which are apt rather to lay a Foundation of Diffidence and Distrust And then as for our actual Views and Perceptions though we should suppose them to have been hitherto never so clear and distinct never so numerous and extensive and never so fortunate and successful so that our Victorious Understandings never yet met with a Baffle nor sounded a retreat from a too difficult and impregnable Theory suppose in one word that we never yet applied our minds to the consideration of any one Truth but what we fully comprehended and were perfect Masters of which yet he must be a very Presumptuous or a very little experienc'd Thinker that shall affirm of himself how notwithstanding do we know considering the Finiteness of our Intellect and the Infiniteness of Truth but that there may be Other Truths of a Nature so far above us and so disproportionate to us as not possibly to be Comprehended by us For we cannot argue here from the past Successes and Atchievements of our Understandings to the Future or because there has been nothing hitherto proposed to us but what we Comprehended that therefore there can be nothing proposed but what we can Comprehend If we conclude thus we forget the vast disproportion between Truth and Human Reason that the one is Finite and the other Infinite the due and attentive Consideration of which would convince us that tho' we have thought never so much and never so well and comprehended never so many Truths yet for ought we know there may be Truths which our intellectual Sight though aided with all the advantages of Art that may help the Mind as much as a Telescope does the Eye
can yet never penetrate and which by the way it may be Worthy of God to reveal to us if 't were only to Check and Controle the daring Progress of our Understanding to make us understand our Measure and remember that we are but Men to be sensible of the defects of that part upon which we most value our selves and despite others and that even the Light that is in us is but Darkness Whether there be any such Truths I do not now say but only that upon the Supposition of the Infinity of Truth 't is impossible for us to be sure but that there may be such which is enough to hinder Our Reason from being at least as to us the Measure of Truth since if it be so 't is more than we know or can possibly be assured of which makes it all one to us as if it were not For we cannot make use of it as a Measure or draw any Consequence from it to the Falsehood Impossibility or Incredibility of things Incomprehensible since for ought we know or can know to the Contrary there may be Truths which we cannot Comprehend 20. But then I say further Thirdly that the Infinite Nature of Truth will Oblige us to acknowledge that there actually are and must be such For if Truth be Infinite then 't is plain that we cannot Comprehend it in its full and intire Extent and so much the very Objection supposes But then I say that as the want of a perfect Comprehension of all Truth does very much shade and darken the perception of any one single Truth in particular and that because of the mutual connexion and dependence of things one upon another as was before observ'd so it must needs quite Eclipse and totally Abscond some Truths from our View For there are some Truths so very Complex and Abstruse and that lie so deep and as I may say so far within the Bowels of the Intellectual Systeme that include such a Multitude of Relations depend upon so many Suppositions are the Conclusions of so many Premisses presuppose and require the knowledge of so many things of some of which it may be we have not so much as the simple Ideas have such a Train of Principles Planted and Intrench'd as a Guard before 'em and draw such an immense Retinue of Consequences after them and are every way so mingled involv'd and combined with other Truths that they cannot possibly be understood without an intire and all-comprehensive view of the whole Rational Systeme Instances of such Truths abound in every Science But there is nothing that may furnish us with so sensible and palpable an Illustration of this Matter as th◠Order and Measure of Divine Providence We are all fully assured from the very Notion and Idea of God as involving all possible Excellency and Perfection in it that he is a Being infinitely Wise Good Just and Holy and Consequently that his whole Conduct in the Government of the World must necessarily carry the Character of all these Attributes and that he cannot possibly do any thing contrary or repugnant to any of them any more than he can deny himself or depart from the Essential Perfections of his Infinite Nature And upon this Consideration is founded the best Argument we have for Submission and Resignation to the Will of God and Acquiescence in his Providential Dispensations Thus far then we are all satisfied and agreed And yet it cannot be denied when we come to Particulars but that there are Phenomena in the Moral as well as in the Natural World which are utterly insolvible and that a great many of these Dispensations of Providence are accompanied with desperate and invincible Difficulties such as have at once exercised and puzzled the thoughts of the most inquisitive in all Ages and still remain Obstinate and Unmoveable Objections not only to the Atheists and Libertines but even to the most sober and intelligent of both Philosophers and Divines Men of the greatest Light and Piety those who best understand and do most reverence and adore the ways of God And adore them after all they must for so intricate and intangling are the Difficulties or by the leave of some I would say Mysteries of Providence especially in those dark Scenes of it that relate to the Divine Concourse and Cooperation with the Will of Man the Ordination of his Final State the Order and Distribution of Grace the Permission Direction and Nice Conduct of Sin c. that the Capacity of our Understanding will not serve us to give a clear and unobnoxious account of them Indeed the diligent and curious Wit of Man has gone a great way in this as well as in Other Matters and several Systemes and Hypotheses have been invented about these things by Contemplative Spirits among whom the two very particular Authors of the Treatise of Nature and Grace and of L'Oeconomie Divine have I think gone the furthest of any But though some of these Accounts bid fairer for reception than others by striking some glimmering Light into these Abstrusities yet still they all agree in this that they leave a great deal more in the Dark and labour with Difficulties even where they do Explain So that after all they discover nothing so much as their own Shortness and Deficiency In the mean while we know and are most certain in the General that all is right and as it should be in the Conduct of God towards his Creatures and that he cannot make one false Step in the Government of the World So much we understand without Systemes and truly not much more with them For as for the Particular Scenes of Providence we know not what to make of them and when we have consider'd the Dispensations of God as much as we can or dare we find our selves after all obliged to confess that though Righteousness and Iudgment are the Habitation of his Seat yet Clouds and Darkness are round about him 21. But now how comes it to be so Dark and Cloudy How come we to be so little able to see the particular Wisdom Goodness Justice and Holiness of those ways of God which in the general we are convinc'd to be so Wise Good Just and Holy Why can we not enter into the Detail of Providence Why even because we do not see it throughout and have not a Comprehension of its Universal Systeme For the Passages of Providence 〈◊〉 of such a Relative and Complicated Nature there is such a kind of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or mutual in-being or indwelling in them if I may transfer an Expression hither commonly applyed to a higher Mystery they are so interwoven with and have so common a dependance upon one another that without a Comprehensive View of the whole Drama we can hardly make any thing of any one Particular Scene Indeed if we could have such a View as that a View that went round and through and grasp'd the whole Area of that immense Circle we should
quickly see the Regularity of the most uneven and odd-figured Parts and how wonderfully they conspired like the Flats and Sharps of Musick to the Order and Harmony of that excellent and surprizing Beauty that results from them But being not able to reach this we are not competent Judges of the rest which by the way should repress our forwardness to fit in Judgment upon things so far above the Cognizance of our Court and though we know the Measures of God to be all Wise Good Just and Holy yet this is only an implicit Knowledge founded upon an External Evidence only much after the same manner as it is in Faith even the general Conception we have of the Divine Perfection without any clear and immediate discernment of the Internal Connexion that is between the things themselves We believe 't is all well and right because the Infinitely Wise God sits at the Helm but then again because he is so Infinitely Wise we cannot found the Depths of his Wisdom as indeed it would be very strange if an Infinitely Wise Agent should not be able to do things Wisely and yet beyond our Understanding nor reconcile all his particular proceedings to the Laws of Reason and Equity but the more we study about these things the more we are at a loss the further we wade into this Sea the deeper we find it till at last we find our selves obliged to cry out with the most inspired Apostle O the Depth of the Riches both of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God how unsearchable are his Iudgments and his Ways past finding out And all for want of an Intire and Comprehensive View of them For if the Knowledge of some very Compounded Truths be impossible without the Clear Perception of the Simple Principles upon which they depend and a Man would to no purpose beat his Brains about the Consideration of Conical Sections till he has first well possessed himself of Ordinary Geometry how much less then may we conclude are the Intricate and very Complicated Events of Divine Providence to be unravel'd without a Collected and Simultaneous Idea of the Universal Systeme whereof they are parts to which they relate and from their Concentricity with which they receive all their Order and Beauty but which is in a manner lost to us for want of Compass enough in our Prospect By which single Instance it appears among many others that might have been given how the Incapacity of Comprehending Truth in its whole Extent may disable us from Comprehending many Particular Truths and consequently that the same Infinity of Truth which hinders us from Comprehending it according to that Extent must also hinder us as much from being able to comprehend every Particular Truth So then there will be Particular Truths which are Incomprehensible by us and consequently Human Reason is not Commensurate to all Truth not only as Collectively but even as Distributively Consider'd And therefore not as Distributively because not as Collectively 22. But then to raise our Speculation a little higher I consider yet further that the Infinity of Truth is not only an Infinity of Extent but also an Infinity of Nature that is that the Compass of Truth is not only Boundless and illimited and that it has in it an inexhaustible Spring which like the Source of Light is never to be drawn dry by the most thirsty draught of the whole Intellectual World but also that there are Particular Truths of a Nature truely infinite and by consequence incomprehensible to any Understanding that is not so For we are here to recollect what has been already shewn that Truth is Consubstantial and Coessential with God and with the Divine Ideas Now though these Ideas are all equally of the Essence and Nature of God and so far equally Divine it being impossible that there should be any thing in God that is not God yet there is this general and very remarkable Difference between them that some of these Divine Ideas are Absolute and some Relative That is some are of the Essence of God Simply and Absolutely as He is in Himself without any Relation to any thing out of Himself And others again are of the Essence of God consider'd purely in Relation to things without Him either in Act or in Possibility and only so far forth as the Divine Essence is representative of Creatures Or if you will thus We may consider a twofold Being in Ideas Esse Reale and Esse Ideale or Repraesentativum Some Ideas are Divine not only according to their Esse Reale for so they are all but also according to their Esse Repraesentativum as representing God to the Mind that Contemplates them Others again are Divine only according to their Esse Reale being indeed of the Substance of God but not representing him but his Creatures and so are Divine in the same sense as the Idea of a Body is Spiritual viz. Essentially only not Representatively Which Diversity indeed resolves into the former because they are of the Essence of God not as it is absolutely in itself but only as it is representative of Creatures according to such a certain Modality and Limitation of Perfection And accordingly though they are truly Divine Ideas as well as the other yet they are not said to be Ideas of God as not representing him but his Creatures The short is The Essence of God may be consider'd either as it is absolutely in it self according to its Infinite Simplicity or as it is in relation to and representative of things without either of an Actual or of a Possible Existence And so the Ideas or Essential Perfections of God are of two sorts Either such as are of the Essence of God consider'd in the first sense as it is in it self or else such as are of the same Divine Essence only in the second sense as far forth as that Essence is representative of things out of it self upon which by the way I suppose must be grounded if we will resolve things into their last Principle the common distinction of the Attributes of God into Communicable and Incommunicable The Incommunicable Attributes of God being those Perfections that are of the Divine Essence Simply and Absolutely consider'd as it is in it self and the Communicable those that belong to the Divine Essence Relatively consider'd and as representative of Creatures to whom accordingly they are in their Measure truly applicable whereas the former are not but are peculiar to God alone which sufficiently shews the difference between this double order of Divine Ideas But to make it yet more intelligible by an Instance The Idea of the Divine Immensity or that Perfection in God which we call his Immensity is of the Essence of God according to the first sense as it is simply and absolutely in it self being no other than the Substance of God as it is universally diffused intirely present in and filling all places without being circumscribed by any yet without any Local Extension But now the
Idea of Extension or that Perfection in God which vertually eminently and modo intelligibili answers to Extension and is therefore frequently called by Mr. Malebranch L' ètendue intelligibl◠is of the Substance of God not as it is in it self simply and absolutely but only as far forth as it is representative of Matter or Body and imitable or participable by it according to those Limitations and Imperfections which belong to that kind of Being and which are represented by this its Idea I know not whether I express my self to the Conception of every Reader but I am sufficiently Clear and Intelligible to my self and whoever is not much wanting either in Metaphysics or in Attention cannot I think well miss my Meaning 23 Now the use that I make of this Speculation to the present purpose is this Those Ideas which are of the Essence of God only as that Divine Essence according to some certain Limitations and inadequate Considerations of it is representative of Creatures must be consider'd by us as of a Finite Nature Because however truly Divine and of the Essence of God yet not as it is absolutely and simply in it self but only as it is in relation to Creatures that is as partially and inadequately consider'd according to certain Abstractions and Limitations of Entity and Perfection such as the things whereof they are Ideas do require And accordingly such Ideas are ordinarily said not to be the Ideas of God who is Infinite for they do not represent him though Essential to him but to be the Ideas of Creatures who are Finite They are indeed Divine Ideas because Essential to God but they are not Ideas of God because they are of the Divine Essence only as it relates to Creatures and is representative of them Of Creatures therefore they are the Ideas and God in seeing them is not properly said to see himself though they are of himself but to see Creatures because though they are of his Divine Essence yet 't is only according to such Precisions Limitations and Inadequations of it as to be expressive and representative of their Finite Perfections As therefore the Realities which these Ideas represent are Finite so these Ideas must be conceiv'd by us as Finite too it being impossible that Infinite consider'd as Infinite should be representative of what is Finite And as these Ideas are Finite so are they also by Consequence so Proportionate and of a Measure so adjusted to Finite Understandings as to be Intelligible by them and within the Possibility of their Comprehension which must also in like manner be concluded of all those Truths which are Consubstantial to them And accordingly the Experiment answers the Theory We find that not only contingent Truths that regard only the Actualities and Existencies of Things such as matters of Fact Human Events c. but even a great many of those which are Ideal and Necessary and concern only the Abstract Reasons and Essences of Things independently on their Actual Existence are Comprehensible by us as in Metaphysics and Geometry in the Contemplation of which Sciences we meet with a great many things which we well understand and whereof we have Clear Ideas and Conceptions 24. But now it is not thus with the Ideas of the first Order nor with their Truths Though those Divine Ideas which appertain to the Essence of God only as representative of Creatures be both Finite and Comprehensible by limited Understandings which indeed otherwise would not be capable of any Science yet these Absolute Ideas which I now speak of are neither Finite nor Comprehensible For these Ideas are of the very Essence and Substance of God as it is in it self purely and separately consider'd according to its simple and absolute Nature and not as it is in relation to Creatures or as representative of any Reality out of it self And accordingly God in contemplating these Ideas of his may be truly and strictly said to contemplate himself and we also in the Contemplation of them do as really contemplate God and that because they are of his Divine Essence simply and absolutely consider'd as it is in it self and not as it is in reference to any thing besides or out of it self These Ideas therefore are strictly Infinite because the Divine Essence as it is in it self simply and absolutely consider'd is so and consequently Incomprehensible by any Finite and consequently by Human Understanding God only can Comprehend these Ideas and that because he only can Comprehend himself Human Reason indeed has Light enough to discover that there are such Ideas and Perfections in God and is withal able to discern enough of them to raise her greatest Wonder and Devotion and to make her despise all other Intelligible Objects in comparison of these Infinite Grandeurs and the Angelic Spirits that wait about the Throne of his Majesty and stand in a better Light are able to see yet more of them but neither the one nor the other can Comprehend them fully any more than they can God himself and that because they are God So that though the other Ideas are Finite and Comprehensible these are truly Infinite and Incomprehensible And of this we have sufficient Evidence in the Instances above proposed of each The Idea of Extension is very Clear and Intelligible to our Minds as Finite and as Narrowly bounded as they are We have a very distinct View of it we Perceive it we Comprehend it Among all Intelligible Objects there is none that is more clear nor whereof we have a more adequate and exact Notion And upon this is founded all that peculiar Clearness Evidence and Certainty that is in the Geometric Sciences which alone have the happiness to be free from Disputes and without Contestation to find that Truth which the others seek after and that for no other Reason but because we have so clear and distinct a Notion of its general Subject Extension But now as to the Divine Immensity so far are we from having a Clear Conception of that that no sooner do we set our selves to contemplate this vast Idea but we enter into Clouds and Darkness or rather into such an over-shining and insupportable Light as dazzles and blinds our Eyes yea hurts and pains them till they can no longer indure to gaze but are forc'd to refresh themselves either by letting down their wearied Lids suspense of Thought or by turning their view upon less glorious Objects In the Meditation of the other Idea we are like Men that wade in a River where we both see and feel the Bottom and go on for a pretty way together smoothly and without much difficulty only now and then meeting with an intangling Weed that lets and incumbers our progress But in the Contemplation of the Infinite Idea of the Divine Immensity we are like men that commit themselves to the Main Sea at the very first Plunge out of our depth and ready to be overwhelm'd swallow'd up and lost in an Abyss
that knows no bottom 25. I use a little Figure and Imagery here the better to impress this upon the Imagination of those who are not so well habituated to the Conception of things by Pure Intellection but the thing it self needs none of the advantages of the Metaphorical way being strictly and severely true And by these two Instances it may appear what a vast difference there is between these two sorts of the Divine Ideas the Absolute and the Relative those that are of the Essence of God as in himself and those that are of the same Divine Essence as it is in relation to Creatures The First Infinite and Incomprehensible the Second Finite and Comprehensible For you see here the Idea of Extension is clear and distinct and such as we can fully and adequately Conceive but the Idea of the Divine Immensity has nothing clear and distinct in it but is all over Darkness and Obscurity and such as quite astonishes and confounds us with a Thousand difficulties upon the first application of our Thoughts to it as indeed do all the Absolute Attributes and Perfections of God which are all equally Infinite and equally incomprehensible to Finite Spirits however they may be able to Comprehend that which in the Essence of God is representative of and carries a Relation to those Realities which either actually do or possibly may exist out of it And in this I say no more setting aside only the Rationale of the thing than those who tell us that the Incommunicable Attributes of God are Infinite and Incomprehensible They are so But what is it that makes them Infinite and Incomprehensible Even the same that makes them Incommunicable viz. their being of the Essence of God as it is in it self according to its Absolute Simplicity and not as it is in Relation to Creatures For 't is most evident that the Essence of God as it is simply and Absolutely in it self is every way Infinite and Incomprehensible and therefore all those Ideas and Perfections of his which are in this Absolute Sense Essential to him must be also of an alike Infinite and Incomprehensible Nature Which by the way may serve to Silence the presumptuous Cavils of those who draw Objections against the Existence of God from the incomprehensibility of his Attributes since if there be a God he must have incomprehensible Attributes which unless we ascribe to him we do not think either rightly or worthily of him 26. But to resume our Point we see then here what a large Field is now open'd to our Prospect of Infinite and Incomprehensible Truths even of a Compass as large as the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of the Divine Essence For though all Created things are of a Finite Nature and though even the Divine Ideas that represent them as far as representative of them must fall under the same limited Consideration yet those Absolute Ideas and Perfections of God that have no such external Reference but are of the Divine Essence as it is in its pure simple abstracted Self must necessarily partake of the Divine Infinity and be as unbounded as God himself And since Truth as was before observ'd is Coessential and Consubstantial with the Divine Ideas I further Conclude that though those Truths which regard the Actualities and Existencies of things or if you please things that do actually exist be Finite because the things themselves are so and though even those that regard the Divine Ideas themselves are also Finite supposing the Ideas to be of the inferiour Order such as are of the Divine Essence only as it is representative of and in relation to Creatures yet those Truths which respect those Divine Ideas of the Superiour Order that are of the Absolute Essence of God as it is in it self purely and simply Consider'd and so are not only Essentially but even Representatively Divine as truly representing God and being in a strict and proper sense his Ideas I say the Truths of this Order and Character must necessarily be of a Nature far exalted above all Creatures yea above all other Ideal Truths even as far as what is of the Simple and Absolute Essence of God transcends that which in the same Essence is only Relative to things without and can therefore be no less than Infinite We have here then an Order of Infinite Truths even allthose which regard the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of God These Divine Ideas and Perfections are all Infinite as that Glorious Essence whose Ideas they are and whom they represent and so also are the Sublime Truths which result from them They are of a Nature strictly Infinite and if Infinite then by Consequence Incomprehensible I mean to all understandings that are not so For as Nothing Finite has Reality enough to represent Infinite so neither can any thing Finite have Capacity enough to Comprehend it For as the actual knowledge of any intelligent Being can never exceed its intellectual Power so neither can its Power exceed the measure of its Essence A Finite Being therefore must have a Finite Understanding and a Finite Understanding must have a Finite Perception Since then our Understandings are Finite 't is plain that our Perception of Infinite must also be Finite 'T is true indeed that Objective Reality which we contemplate when we think upon Infinite has no Limits and so we may be said in some respect to have an Infinite Thought as far as the Operation of the Mind may be denominated from the quality of the Object but yet still we think according to the Measure of our Nature and our Perception of Infinite can be no more at the most than Finite But now a Finite Perception bears no proportion to an Infinite Intelligible besides that to perceive such an Object after a Finite manner is not to perceive it as it is but only Partially and inadequately But now a Partial and inadequate Perception of a thing can never be said to be a Comprehension of that thing even though the thing be Finite much less then when it is Infinite Whereby it plainly appears that if there be an Order of Infinite Truths the same will also be Incomprehensible Ones and since again as I have shewn there is an Order of such Truths even all those that regard the Absolute Ideas and Perfections of the Divine Essence it clearly follows that there is an Order of Incomprehensible Truths and Consequently that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth even Distributively consider'd since there are Particular Truths which it cannot Comprehend which was the thing to be proved 27. And of all this we may have a plain and visible illustration in the foremention'd Instance of the Divine Immensity This is an Idea or Perfection of God that is truely Insinite as being of his Divine Essence as it is Absolutely in it self and not as in Order to or representative of Creatures And as Infinite 't is also Incomprehensible by any but God himself Accordingly the Complex Truth that
regards this Absolute Idea of God is also Infinite and as such Incomprehensible As appears in this Proposition God is Immense which is an Infinite and Incomprehensible Truth We find it is so a Posteriori by casting the view of our Understandings upon it And we find it must be so a Priori by reasoning upon the Principles already laid down and establish'd And to prevent all vain cavilling in this matter I further add that though we could suppose the Truths that result from Infinite Ideas not to be Infinite which yet we cannot by reason of their real Identity and Coessentiality with those Ideas yet however they must upon another account be incomprehensible even upon the Incomprehensibility of those Ideas For if the Ideas whereof a Truth consists be incomprehensible as they must be if they are Infinite that alone would be enough to hinder us from being able to Comprehend such a Truth it being impossible we should thoroughly understand the Relations or Habitudes between those Ideas whose Simple Natures the Foundation of those Habitudes we do not Comprehend For if in Finite things the not having a clear and adequate Idea of a thing makes us unable to judge of the Truth or Falshood of many Propositions concerning that thing whereof there are a multitude of Instances in Morality especially in Questions relating to the Soul of Man which must for ever lie undetermin'd merely for want of our having a clear Idea of that Noble Essence much more then in things Infinite will the not having a Comprehension of the Ideas incapacitate us from Comprehending the Truths that Result from them which will therefore be as incomprehensible as if they were what indeed they are in themselves Infinite 28. I have hitherto shewn the Incomprehensibility of Truth by Human Reason and consequently that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth from the joynt Consideration of each Only with this difference I have consider'd and represented Truth Absolutely as it is in it self according to its own Infinite and unmeasurable Nature But as for Human Reason I have consider'd that only as Finite as supposing that sufficient to my present Purpose and that there was no need of placing it in any other Light For after it hath been shewn that Truth is Infinite to prove that Human Reason cannot be the Measure of it it is certainly enough to Consider it as a Bounded Power without representing how very strait and narrow its Bounds are since whatever is Finite can never measurer Infinite But then it so what if we add the other Consideration to it If the bare Finiteness of Human Understanding a defect common to it with all Created Intelligencies renders it uncapable of Comprehending Truth and Consequently of being the Measure of it how much more then does the littleness and narrowness of its Bounds contribute to heighten that incapacity If the having any limits does so unqualifie it for the adequate Comprehension of Truth how then does the having so very short and strait ones Strait indeed by Natural and Original Constitution but much more yet retrench'd by Sin and by all those Passions Prejudices deordinate Affections and Evil Customs which are the Effects and Consequences of Sin and which have now so darken'd our Minds and drawn such a gross Film over our Intellectual Sight that we can hardly distinguish Day from Night Clearness from Obscurity Truth from Falshood and are able to see but so very little a way into the Works of God much less into the Nature of God himself that we need nothing else to depress and humble our Pride and Vanity than that very Knowledge of ours which puffs us up So very narrow in its Compass and Extent so very Shallow and Superficial in its Depth so very Confuse and Obscure in its Light so very uncertain and conjectural in its Ground and so every way defective and imprerfect is it But how then can we found the Depth of Truth with so short a Line A Bottomless Depth with I will not say a Finite but so very scanty a Measuer And what an extravagant Folly and Weakness not to say Pride and Vanity is it to fancy that we can It would be a Vain Presumption in an Angel but sure the very Madness and Distraction of Impudence in Man who may with less defiance to Sence and Reason think to grasp the Ocean within the hollow of his hand than to Comprehend and Measure Truth Infinite Boundless Truth not only with Finite but so very limited Capacities 29. But suppose Truth were not what we have shewn it to be Infinite but had Bounds as well as our Reason yet unless it had the Same our Reason cannot be Commensurate to it or the Measure of it But does the supposition of its having Limits infer that it has the same No For though Finite its Bounds may possibly be extended further than those of our Understandings and how can we be sure that they are not We cannot then even upon this supposition be sure that our Reason is the Measure of Truth and therefore it is all one as to us as I said before as if it were not so forasmuch as we cannot use it as a Measure by drawing any Consequences from it concerning the Falshood or impossibility of things upon the account of our inability to Comprehend them since for ought we know the Limits of Truth though we should suppose it Finite may yet exceed and that very greatly too those of our Rational Faculties And Considering both the Natural and the Superaccessory defects of them it is very reasonable to think that they do 30. Some Essences perhaps there may be though even this again is more than we know that sit so high in the Intellectual Form as to be able to Comprehend all that is Finite so that the only reason why they have not an adequate Comprehension of Truth at large is because it is indeed Infinite But there is no Necessity nor so much as Probability that Human Reason should be of so rais'd an Order that nothing but Infinity should transcend its Comprehension And it must be a strange Composition of Pride and Self-love that can make us fancy that it is something like that only much more extravagant which possesses the disturb'd Heads of some in Bedlam and makes them Conceit themselves Kings and Emperours in the midst of their Irons Rags and Straw What though Truth were Finite and some Understandings too that are so were able to measure it why must this needs be concluded of Human Understanding If a Finite Being were able to Comprehend Truth why must Man be that Being The Scripture tells us he is made lower than the Angels and how many Orders and Degrees there may be among them we know not nor indeed how many Ranks of Spiritual Beings there may be in the Universe whose Understandings go beyond ours For who can define the Out-flowings of the Divine Fecundity or Number the Rounds of the Intellectual Scale
In the mean while though man knows not how many Orders of Intelligent Creatures there are above him yet 't is with great Reason and Consent presumed that there are none below him so that he is placed even by his own Confession in the lowest Form of the Intellectual Order And why then may not his Understanding as much as he values himself upon it be of so Shallow a Depth and so low a Size that even Finite Objects may be disproportionate to him Especially since we find him so often puzzl'd and gravell'd in Natural things as also in those Ideal Truths that have relation to the Natural and Ectypal World such as Philosophical and Mathematical Problems Or if the Reason of any Creature could be the Measure of Truth why should he be that Creature who is seated in the very Confines of the Material and Immaterial World and is as it were the Common-Point where Matter ends and Spirit begins who brings up the rear of the Intellectual kind and is both the youngest and the least indow'd among the Sons of God 31. These Considerations sufficiently shew that there is no Necessity nor so much as Probability that Human Reason should be the Measure of Truth even upon the Supposition of its being Finite Which indeed is enough of it self to carry the Point Contended for as far as the Design of the present Argument is Concern'd For if it be not necessary that Human Reason should be the Measure of Truth then it is Possible that it may not be and if it is Possible that it may not then we can be never Sure that it is and if we cannot be Sure that it is then we cannot Use it as a Measure which as I have remarqu'd already and for the Moment of it do here reinculcate makes it the same to all intents and purposes as if it were not such at all But yet to carry our Plea a little highter I further Contend that as the foregoing Considerations suffice to shew that Human Reason may not so there is One behind that very positively Demonstrates that it Cannot be the Measure of Truth even tho' we should allow it to be of a Finite and bounded Nature as well as our own understandings 32. As there are many things whereof our Ideas are very Confuse and Obscure so 't is most 〈◊〉 that there are some things 〈◊〉 we have no Ideas at all it 〈◊〉 not pleas'd the Eternal and 〈◊〉 Intelligence to Exhibit that in Himself which is Representative of those things to our Understandings But now besides the Difficultys and disadvantages we shall always ly under in the Comprehension of things from the Confuseness and Obscurity of our Ideas which of it Self will many times render those things and also whatever nearly relates to those things incomprehensible by us and besides that our not having any Ideas of Certain things is an invincible Bar to all Knowledge and Comprehension of those things unless we could be supposed to be able to see without Light 't is also further Considerable that possibly the Knowledge of that Truth which we set our Selves to Comprehend and whereof we have the Ideas may depend upon the truth of another thing whereof we have no Idea If it should be so tho Truth in general be never so Finite or the Particular Truth we would Contemplate be never so Finite 't is plain we shall be no more able to Comprehend it than if it were Infinite Now I say that 't is not only Possible that this may be the Case which yet of it Self as I have again and again Noted is sufficient to debar us from using our Reason as the Measure of Truth but there are also some Instances wherein it appears actually to be so We know well enough what we mean by Liberty and Contingency and are withal well assured that we are Free Agents We have also a Sufficient Notion of Prescience and are also no less assured of the Reality of it And because both these are true and there can be no real repugnance between one Truth and another we are also by Consequence assured that there is a good Harmony and Agreement between them and that they are Consistent with each other But now how to adjust their apparent Opposition or reconcile those Instances of seeming Contradiction and inconsistency wherewith they press us this we neither Know nor are able with all our Meditation to Comprehend and that because we have not an Idea of the Human Soul without which there is no possibility of Comprehending how its Free Workings may be the Objects of Prescience tho our Ideas of Prescience and Liberty were never so Clear Or if this Instance shall not be thought so proper because the Men with whom our present Concern lies are pleas'd to disown the Doctrine of Prescience let me desire them to Consider whether there be not many other Difficulties concerning Human Liberty besides that taken from Prescience which they are no more able to get over then they are that And that for the very same Reason even because they ahve not an Idea of the Soul upon the Knowledge of which the Solution of those as well as some other Difficulties in Morality does Necessarily depend Or if they please let them take an Instance of a Physical Nature We know well enough what it is to be in a Place and we know also as well what it is to be Coextended to a Place But now how Being in a Place may be without Coextension to a Place this is what we cannot Comprehend tho as to the thing it Self upon other Considerations constrain'd to grant it and that because we are ignorant of the general Nature of Spirit upon the clear Conception of which the Comprehension of the other does so depend that it cannot be had without it And indeed we may concluded in general that when ever we have clear Ideas of things and yet are not able to Comprehend the Truth of them 't is because the Knowledge of those things depends upon the Truth of something else whereof we have either no Idea or not such as is sufficiently Clear Which must be the true Reason of the hitherto presumed impossibility of finding out the exact Proportion between a Circle and a Square Why Circle and Square are very Intelligible things and how come we then not to be able to determin the precise and just Proportion that is between them It cannot be from any Obscurity in the things themselves much less from our want of having Ideas of them for we have as clear and exact Ideas of these Figures as we can have of any thing in the World It must be therefore because the Knowledge of their Proportion depends upon the Knowledge of some other thing whereof the Idea fails us which till we are posses'd of we shall in vain endeavour to discover the other Whereby it plainly appears that we are not only uncapable of Comprehending those Truths that relate to things whereof we
have no Ideas but that even where we have Ideas and those very Clear ones too we may be as far from Comprehending a Truth as if we had none merely upon the account of the Dependence which that Truth has upon some other thing whereof we have not at least a just Idea Which single Consideration is enough for ever to spoil Human Reason for setting up for the Measure of Truth even upon the Supposition of its being Finit So very False is that arrogant Assertion of a Modern Philosopher Quaecunque existunt humanae Menti pervestigabilia praeterquam Inâ—initum Whatever is may be thoroughly Comprehended by the Mind of Man except Infinite And again Vnum duntaxat est quod omnem mentis nostrae vim longissime excedit ipsâque suâ Naturâ ut in se est ab eâ Cognosci nequit Inâ—initum puta There is but one only thing that far exceeds the Force and reach of our Mind and that cannot of its own very Nature be known by it as it is in it self namely Infinite What but One thing excepted from the Verge and placed beyond the reach of Human Knowledge 'T is well that One thing is a pretty large one but sure the Authour was ignorant of something else that is Himself or else he could never have advanc'd such a Crude and ill-consider'd a Proposition 33. And thus I have shewn at large in a rational way by arguing a Priori and from the Nature of things that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth and that even upon the most Liberal Supposition of its being Finite And if it be not so supposing Truth to be Finite much less is it supposing it what it has been prov'd to be of an Infinite Nature If upon the Former Supposition it exceeds the Proportion of our Reason certainly upon the latter there will be no Proportion between them But whether our Reason bears no Proportion to Truth or whether it be only Disproportionate to it either way it follows that it cannot be the Measure of it which I cannot but now look upon as a Proposition sufficiently demonstrated And in all this I contend for no more than what is implied in that Common and universally approv'd Maxim even among those of the Rational way that we ought not to deny what is Evident for the sake of what is Obscure or depart from a Truth which we see a Necessity to admit because of some Difficulties attending it which we cannot solve which they say is an Argument only of our Ignorance and not of the Falshood of the thing This indeed is a true Rule and such as must be allow'd to hold good in all our Reasonings let the Matter of them be what it will Only I wish that the Implication of the Rule were as much minded as the Rule it self is generally receiv'd For it plainly implies that there are some things which though plain and certain as to their Existence are yet incomprehensible and inexplicable as to their Manner But then as the Incomprehensibility of the Manner should not make us reject the Truth of the thing when otherwise Evident so neither should the Evidence we have of the Truth of the thing make us disown the Incomprehensibility of the Manner since it is so far from being against the Nature of Truth that it should be incomprehensible that you see we have discover'd even from the Contemplation of its Nature that there are incomprehensible Truths Of which I might now subjoyn some particular Examples but that I should fall very deep into a Common Place being herein prevented by many other Writers particularly by the admirable one of L' Art de Penser to the First Chapter of whose Fourth Book I refer my Reader where he shews by several and some of them uncommon Instances that there are things which the Mind of Man is not capable of Comprehending After which he Concludes with a very grave and useful Reflection which for the great advantage and Pertinency of it to the present Affair though I refer my Reader to the rest of the Chapter I shall here set down The Proâ—it says he that one may draw from these Speculations is not barely to acquire the knowledge of them which of it self is barren enough but it is to learn to know the Bounds of our understanding and to force it to confess that there are things which it cannot Comprehend And therefore it is good to fatigue the mind with these kind of Subtilties the better to tame its Presumption and abate its confidence and daringness in opposing its Feeble Lights against the Mysteries of Religion under the Pretence that it cannot comprehend them For since all the Force of Human Vnderstanding is constrain'd to yield to the least Atom of Matter and to own that it sees Clearly that it is infinitely divisible without being able to Comprehend how this may be Is it not apparently to transgress against Reason to refuse to believe the wonderful effects of the Divine Onnipotence Merely for this Reason that our Vnderstanding cannot Comprehend them Yes without doubt it is as will better appear in the sequel of this Discourse In the mean while before I take leave of the Subject of this Chapter I have a double Remarque to make upon it 34. The First is that since Truth in its full extent is Incomprehensible we should not vainly go about to Comprehend it but be contented to be ignorant in many things And since there are some special Truths in particular that are incomprehensible we should not apply our Thoughts to the Comprehension of all things at a Venture as some who are for understanding every thing but sit down first and Consider whether they are proportionate to our Capacities or No and as far as we can learn to distinguish what Truths may and what may not be Comprehended by us that so we may not lose that Time and Pains in the Contemplation of them which might be profitably imploy'd in the Consideration of other things better suted to our Capacity As a great many do who busie themselves all their Lives long about such things which if they should study to Eternity they would not Comprehend and that indeed because they require an Infinite Capacity to Comprehend them Whereas the shortest Compendium of Study and the best way to abridge the Sciences is to study only what we can Master and what is within the Sphere of our Faculties and never so much as to apply our selves to what we can never Comprehend 35. The other Remarque is that the Conclusion prov'd in this Chapter does very much Fortifie and Confirm that which was undertaken to be made out in the last Concerning the Distinction of Things Above and Things Contrary to Reason For if there are Truths which we cannot Comprehend then it seems what is above our Comprehension may yet be True and if True then to be sure not Contrary to Reason since whatever is Contrary to Reason is no less
Contrary to Truth which though sometimes above Reason is yet never Contrary to it CHAP. V. That therefore a things being Incomprehensible by Reason is of it self no Concluding Argument of its not being True 1. AS there is nothing in Man that deserves his Consideration so Much and Few things without him that deserve it More than that part of him wherein he resembles his Maker so there is Nothing more worthy of his Consideration in that part or that is at least more necessary to be Consider'd by him than the Defects of it without a due regard to which it would not be very safe for him to dwell much upon the Consideration of the other as being apt to seduce him into â— ride and Vanity to blow him up with Self-Conceit and so by an imaginary Greatness to spoil and corrupt that which is Genuine and Natural 2. Now the Defects of our Intellectual part Consider'd in their general Heads are I suppose Sin Ignorance and Errour And though Sin in it self must be allow'd to be of a worse Nature and Consequence than either Ignorance or Errour however some may fancy it a greater Reproach to 'em to have their Intellectuals question'd than their Morals and so upon that score may require more of our Consideration yet upon another account the Defects of the Understanding seem to need it more than those of the Will since we are not only apt to be more proud of our Intellectuals than of our Morals but also to Conceit our selves more Free and Secure from Errour than we are from Sin though Sin in the very Nature and Principle of it implies and supposes Errour 3. Pride the presumed Sin of the Angels is also the most Natural and Hereditary one of Man his dominant and most cleaving Corruption the Vice as I may call it of his Planet and Complexion And that which we are most apt to be proud of is our Vnderstandings the only Faculty in us whose limits we forget In other things we are Sensible not only of the general Bounds of our Nature but also of the particular narrowness of them and accordingly do not attempt any thing very much beyond our Measure but contain our Selves pretty reasonably within Our Line at least are not such Fools as to apply our Strength to Move the Earth out of its place or to set our Mouths to drink up the Sea or to try with our Eyes to look into the Regions beyond the Stars But there is hardly any Distance but to which we fancy our Intellectual Sight will reach scarce any Object too bright too large or too far remov'd for it Strange that when we Consider that in us which makes us Men we should forget that we are so And yet thus it is when we look upon our Understandings 't is with such a Magnifying Glass that it appears in a manner boundless and unlimited to us and we are dazzled with our own Light 4. Not that it is to be presumed that there are any who upon a deliberate Consideration of the Matter have this Form'd and express Thought that their Understandings are Infinite Human Nature seems hardly capable of such Excess But only as the Psalmist says in another Case of some Worldly Men that their Inward Thought is that their houses shall continue for ever Not meaning that any could be so grossely absurd as positively and explicitly to Conceive that their Houses any more than their own Bodies should last always and never decay but only that they had such a kind of a wandring and Confuse Imagination secretly lurking in their Minds and loosely hovering about them so in like manner there are a sort of People who are Parturient and teeming with a kind of Confuse and unform'd Imagination tho' perhaps they never bring it to an express and distinct Thought that their Understandings have no bounds or limits belonging to them tho' they cannot deny but that they have if directly put to the Question 5. Accordingly you shall find those whose Conduct betrays this inward Sentiment who venture at all in their Studies stick at nothing but will undertake to give a Reason for every thing and positively decide whatever Comes in their way without Suspense or Reserve imagining confusely at least they have a Comprehension of all things and that there is nothing too hard or knotty for them nothing but what they either actually do or are capable of Comprehending if they once set themselves to it And from hence they roundly Conclude that whatever they are not able to Comprehend is not true and accordingly deny their Belief to whatever transcends their Comprehension 6. Now I confess there is no fault to be found with the Consequence of these Men nor with their Practice as it relates to that Consequence which are both as far as I can see exceeding right if their Principle be once admitted For if indeed it be really so that Human Reason is adequate and Commensurate to Truth so that there is no Truth but what it is able to Comprehend then it will certainly follow that whatever it cannot Comprehend is not True and there will need no other nor better Argument of the falshood of any thing than the Incomprehensibility of it For their Reasoning resolves into this Form Whatever is true we can Comprehend This we do not Comprehend Therefore this is not true Or thus If whatever is true we can Comprehend then what we cannot Comprehend is not true But whatever is true we can Comprehend Ergo c. Where 't is plain that if the Major of the First or the Minor of the Second Syllogisin wherein the Principle of these Men is Contain'd be allow'd there will be no avoiding the Conclusions of them So that if we admit that Human Reason is Comprehensive of all Truth we are not Consistent with our Selves if we do not also grant that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is a just Warrant to Conclude it not True 7. But then on the other side if this Mighty Principle upon which such a Weight is laid and such great things built be false if Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth as I think is with great Evidence Demonstrated in the last Chapter then is not the Consequence as good this way that therefore a thing 's being Incomprehensible by Reason is no Concluding Argument of it 's not being True For how are we inconsistent with our Selves if granting Human Reason to be Commensurate to Truth we deny that the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be True but only because in denying that we Contradict our Principle or which is all one Suppose the Contradictory Proposition to it to be true viz. that Human Reason is not Commensurate to Truth But now if in saying that the Incomprehensibility of a thing does not argue it not to be true we in the Consequence of what we affirm Suppose that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth then 't is as plain that the
Supposition of Reason's not being the Measure of Truth will also Oblige us to say that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of it 's not being True Whereby it is plain that the Consequence is every whit as good thus Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument that it is not True as thus Human Reason is the Measure of Truth therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument that it is not True The only Reason why he that denies this latter Consequence upon the Supposition or Concession of this latter Principle is inconsistent with himself being this because in denying the latter Consequence he Supposes the Former Principle which Principle therefore must as much inter the Consequence that Supposed it viz. That a things being Incomprehensible by Reason is no Warrant to Conclude that it is not true 8. And because this Principle that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth has been already proved at large I look upon the grounds of this Consequence as already laid and therefore to shew the Connexion that is between the one and the other besides what I have even now said to that purpose need only add this further Remarque That since Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth or since there are Incomprehensible Truths then it seems the Incomprehensibility of a thing and the Truth of a thing may Consist together or in other words the same thing may be at once True and Incomprehensible But now there cannot be in the whole Compass of Reasoning a more certain or more evident Maxim than this That that which is when a thing is or would be supposing it were is no Argument that it is not As for Instance Suppose it should be Objected against the Copernican Hypothesis of the Motion of the Earth that it is repugnant to Sense since we see the Sun and the Stars Rise and Set and Move round about us It is thought a sufficient Answer to this to say That supposing the Earth and not the Sun did really Move these Appearances would yet be the same as they are now since Sailing as we do between the Sun and the Stars as a late Writer expresses it not the Ship in which we are but the Bodies which surround us would seem to Move And 't is most Certain that if supposing the Earth did really Move the Motion would yet seem to be in the Sun and Stars then the seeming Motion of those Bodies is no Argument that the Earth does not Move 9. Why just so it is in the present Case when 't is Objected against the Truth of a thing that 't is Incomprehensible by Human Reason 't is a sufficient Answer to say that this argues nothing since if the thing were true it might yet be Incomprehensible And 't is most certain that if supposing a thing to be True it might yet be Incomprehensible then the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no good Objection against the Truth of it And therefore since we have proved that there are Incomprehensible Truths and Consequently that the Truth of a thing and the Incomprehensibility of the same thing may Consist together we may now with all Rational assurance Conclude that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument that it is not True any more than the seeming Motion of the Sun is an Argument against the real one of the Earth since the Former would be even Supposing the Truth of the Latter And both by Vertue of this most Evident and incontestable Principle That what may Consist with the Truth of any thing can be no good Argument that it is not True 10. And indeed when it shall be Consider'd how many things surpass our Conception when we are Children which yet we are able well to Comprehend when we are Men how many things again are beyond the Ken of Ignorant and Illiterate Men which yet are very Intelligible and Shine forth with full Light to the Men of Art and Learning and how many things again even among the Learned are now discover'd and well understood by the help of Algebra which were Mysteries to former Ages and are still beyond even the Imagination of those who have not that Noble and Wonderful Key of Knowledge When again it shall be further Consider'd how many of those things which we cannot even with the Assistance of that Commanding Key unlock in this state of Mortality we may yet have a clear view of in that of Separation when deliver'd from the Burthen of our Flesh and that many of those things which are too high for us then may yet be of a level with the Understanding of Angels and that what is above their Capacity may yet be most clearly and distinctly perceiv'd by the Infinitely penetrating and All-Comprehensive Intellect of God I say he that shall but seriously enter into this single Reflection must needs discover himself much wanting in that Stock of Sense and Reason he pretends to if he still continue to Measure the Possibilities of things by their Proportionableness to his Understanding or Conclude any thing False or Impossible when he has no better Reason for it but only because he cannot Comprehend it CHAP. VI. That if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true Human Reason would then be the Measure of Truth 1. AS there is Nothing more Common than for people to hold Certain Principles that have an inseparable Connexion with very bad Consequences and yet not professedly to hold those Consequences because either they do not attend to them or are not sensible that they do indeed follow from such Principles whereof we have two very pregnant Instances in the Maintainers of the Predestinarian and Soliâ—idian Systemes so on the other hand and for the same Reason there are those who take up and with great Fixedness adhere to certain Consequences without Professedly holding those Principles from which they truly flow and to which if traced to the Head they will infallibly lead them 2. Of this we have a very particular Instance where I confess one would not expect to find it in those of the Socinian Perswasion The Reason these Men of Reason give why they will not believe the Mysteries of the Christian Faith is because they are above their Reason they cannot Comprehend them Whereby they plainly imply that they will believe Nothing but what they can Comprehend or that Nothing is to be believ'd that is Incomprehensible which is also a common Maxim among them who accordingly make Above Reason and Contrary to Reason to be one and the same thing And whereas 't is only the untruth of a thing that can make it unfit to be the Object of Faith in saying they will not believe what they cannot Comprehend they do as good as say that what they cannot Comprehend is not True and so that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is a just warrant to conclude it
False And all this they own and expresly declare if not in these very terms yet at least in such as are equivalent to them as is too Notorious and well known to need any Citations for the proof of it But now though they do thus professâ—dly own that the Incomprehensibility of a thing by Reason is an Argument of its not being true yet that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth or that all Truth is Comprehensible by it are as I take it Propositions which they do not openly and professedly avow For as I noted in the Introduction 't is such an Odious and Arrogant Assertion that they cannot with any Face of Modesty or common Decency make a plain and direct Profession of it though at the same time 't is most Certain that this is the true Principle of that Consequence which they do professedly hold viz. that the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be true and that this Consequence does as necessarily lead back to that Principle 3. For as if Human Reason be the Measure of Truth it follows in the descendintg line as a direct Consequence that the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be true so it follows as well Backwards per viam ascensûs that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be True then Human Reason is the Measure of Truth Since if it were not the Incomprehensibility of a thing as is shewn in the Preceding Chapter would then not argue it not to be True If therefore it does 't is plain that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth Which Principle whoever disowns ought also to renounce the other Proposition viz. That the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument of its untruth which if yet he will imbrace notwithstanding 't is plain he holds the Consequence without its Principle and has indeed no Reason for what he Affirms 4. For as he who granting Human Reason to be the Measure of Truth denies yet that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument of its not being true is therefore inconsistent with himself because in so doing he supposes the Contradictory to what he had before granted viz. that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth So he that Affirms that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument of its not being True and yet denies that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth is also as inconsistent with himself because in so doing the supposes the Contradictory to his own Assertion and does in effect say that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not an Argument of its not being True as most Certainly it would not be in case Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth as the foregoing Chapter has sufficiently shewn The short is if the Not being of A proves that C is not then the being of C proves that A is since if it were not according to the First Supposition C could not be And so here if Reason's not being the Measure of Truth proves that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not an Argument of its not being True then if the Incomprehensibility of a thing be an Argument of it 's not being True 't is plain that Reason is the Measure of Truth since if it were not then according to the first Supposition the Incomprehensibility of a thing would not be an Argument of its not being True 5. For how I pray comes the Incomprehensibility of a thing to conclude the untruth of it I cannot Comprehend such a thing therefore it is not True where 's the Consequence By what Logic does this Latter Proposition follow from the Former why we have here the Minor Proposition and the Conclusion and to make a Complete Argument of it we must add another thus If it were true I should Comprehend it but I do not Comprehend it therefore it is not true Whereby it appears to the eye that my not being able to Comprehend a thing is no otherwise an Argument of the â—â—truth of it than as it is first preâ—â—pposed that if it were true I should 〈◊〉 â—ble to Comprehend it Which again resolving into this Absolute â—â—â—â—osition that I am able to Comprehend all Truth it plainly follows that if my inability to Comprehend a thing be an Argument that it is not true then I am able to Comprehend all Truth and that my Reason is the Measure and Final Standard of it 6. I Conclude therefore that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of it 's not being true then Human Reason will be the Measure of Truth and that they that hold the Former ought also if they will be Consistent with themselves to admit the Latter But because this is a False Principle that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth therefore I Conclude again that the Consequence that Resolves into this Principle is also False since we may as well Conclude a Consequence to be False because it leads back to a False Principle as a Principle to be False because it is productive of a bad Consequence Which still further Confirms and Establishes the Conclusion of the last Chapter viz. That the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of its untruth which you see is now proved both Backwards and Forwards and so made impregnable on all sides We have proved it Forwards by shewing the Falseness of that Principle that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth and by thence arguing the said Conclusion and we have also proved it Backwards by shewing that the Contrary Supposition Resolves into that False and already Confused Principle And I do not see how any Conclusion can be better proved CHAP. VII That therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no just Objection against the Belief of it With an Account of the Cartesian Maxim that we are to Assent only to what is Clear and Evident 1. T Is a Wonderful thing to Consider the Caprice of Human Nature by what unaccountable Springs it's Movements are ordered and how odly and unsteddily Men act and manage themselves even in the same Circumstances and in Relation to the same Objects Sometimes the Obscurity and Mysteriousness of a thing shall be a Motive of Credibility and recommend it the rather to their Belief Thus you shall have a great many reject that Philosophy as idle and Chimerical which undertakes to explain the Effects of Nature by insensible Particles their different Bigness Figure Contexture Local Motion Rest c. Merely because this is a plain Simple and Intelligible Account such as they can easily and well Conceive The very easiness and clearness wherewith they Conceive these Principles is Made an Objection against them though indeed it be a good Presumption for them and for that very Reason they will not believe them to be the true Principles of Nature whose Effects they fancy must be Resovled into Causes more hidden and Abstruse And accordingly they find in themselves a greater inclination to lend attention to