it are these First Because Syllogism serves our Reason but in one only of the fore-mentioned parts of it and that is to shew the Connexion of the proofs of any one Instance and no more but in this it is of no great use since the Mind can perceive such Connexion where it really is as easily nay perhaps better without it We may observe that there are many Men that reason exceeding clear and rightly who know not how to make a Syllogism and I believe scarce any one makes Syllogisms in reasoning within himself Indeed sometimes they may serve to discover a Fallacy hid in a Rhetorical Flourish or by stripping an absurdity of the cover of Wit and good Language shew it in its naked deformity But the Mind is not taught to reason by these Rules It has a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of its Ideas and can range them right without any such perplexing Repetitions and I think every one will perceive in Mathematical Demonstrations that the Knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without Syllogism Secondly Because thò Syllogism serves to shew the force or fallacy of an Argument made use of in the usual way of Discoursing by supplying the absent Proposition and so setting it before the view in a clear Light yet it no less engages the Mind in the perplexity of obscure and equivocal Terms wherewith this artificial way of reasoning always abounds it being adapted more to the attaining of victory in Dispute than the discovery or confirmation of Truth in fair Enquiries But however it be in Knowledge I think it is of far less or no use at all in Probabilities For the Assent there being to be determined by the Preponderancy after a due weighing of all the proofs on both sides nothing is so unfit to assist the Mind in that as Syllogism which running away with one assumed Probability pursues that till it has led the Mind quite out of sight of the Thing under Consideration But let it help us as perhaps may be said in convincing Men of their Errors or Mistakes yet still it fails our Reason in that part which if not its highest perfection is yet certainly its hardest Task and that which we must need its help in and that is The finding out of Proofs and making new Discoveries This way of Reasoning discovers no new proofs but is the Art of Marshalling and Ranging the old ones we have already A Man knows first and then he is able to prove Syllogistically so that Syllogism comes after Knowledge and then a Man has little or no need of it But it is chiefly by the finding out those Ideas that shew the Connexion of distant ones that our stock of Knowledge is increased and that useful Arts and Sciences are advanced Reason Thô of a very large Extent fails us in several Instances as First Where our Ideas fail Secondly It is often at a loss because of the Obscurity Confusion or Imperfection of the Ideas it is employed about Thus having no perfect Idea of the least Extension of Matter nor of Infinity we are at a loss about the Divisibility of Matter Thirdly Our Reason is often at a stand because it perceives not those Ideas which would serve to shew the certain or probable Agreement or Disagreement of any two other Ideas Fourthly Our Reason is often engaged in Absurdities and Difficulties by proceeding upon false Principles which being followed lead Men into Contradictions to themselves and inconsistancy in their own Thoughts Fifthly Dubious Words and uncertain Signs often puzzle Mens Reason and bring them to a Non-plus In Reasoning Men ordinarily use Four sorts of Arguments The First is to alledge the Opinions of Men whose Parts Learning Eminency Power or some other Cause has gained a Name and settled their Reputation in the common Esteem with some kind of Authority This may be called Argumentum ad Verecundiam Secondly Another way is to require the Adversary to admit what they alledge as a proof or to assign a better This I call Argumentum ad Ignorantiam A Third way is to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles or Concessions This is already known under the name of Argumentum ad hominem Fourthly The using of Proofs drawn from any of the foundations of Knowledge or Probability This I call Argumentum ad Judicium This alone of all the Four brings true Instruction with it and advances us in our way to Knowledge For First It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right because I out of respect or any other consideration but that of Conviction will not contradict him Secondly It proves not another Man to be in the right way nor that I ought to take the same with him because I know not a better Thirdly Nor does it follow that another Man is in the right way because he has shewn me that I am in the wrong This may dispose me perhaps for the reception of Truth but helps me not to it that must come from Proofs and Arguments and Light arising from the nature of Things themselves not from my shame facedness Ignorance or Error By what has been said of Reason we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of Things into those that are according to above and contrary to Reason According to Reason are such Propositions whose Truth we can discover by examining and tracing those Ideas we have from Sensation and Reflection and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable Above Reason are such Propositions whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles Contrary to Reason are such Propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct Ideas Thus the Existence of one God is according to Reason the Existence of more than one God contrary to Reason the Resurrection of the Body after Death above Reason Above Reason may be also taken in a double Sense viz. Above Probability or Above Certainty In that large Sense also Contrary to Reason is I suppose sometimes taken There is another use of the word Reason wherein it is opposed to Faith which thô authorized by common use yet is it in it self a very improper way of Speaking For Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind which if it be regulated as is our Duty cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good Reason and so cannot be opposite to it He that believes without having any Reason for believing may be in love with his own Fancies but neither seeks Truth as he ought nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him to keep him out of Mistake and Error But since Reason and Faith are by some Men opposed we will so consider them in the following Chapter CHAP XVIII Of Faith and Reason and their distinct Provinces REason as contra-distinguished to Faith I take to be the discovery of the Certainty or
Probability of such Propositions or Truths which the Mind arrives at by deductions made from such Ideas which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties viz. by Sensation or Reflection Faith on the other side is the Assent to any Proposition upon the credit of the Proposer as coming immediately from God which we call Revelation concerning which we must observe First That no Man inspired by God can by any Revelation communicate to others any new Simple Ideas which they had not before from Sensation or Reflection Because Words by their immediate Operation on us cannot cause other Ideas but of their natural Sounds and such as Custom has annexed to them which to us they have been wont to be signs of but cannot introduce any new and formerly unknown Simple Ideas The same holds in all other Signs which cannot signify to us Things of which we have never before had any Idea at all For our Simple Ideas we must depend wholly on our natural Faculties and can by no means receive them from Traditional Revelation I say Traditional in distinction to Original Revelation By the One I mean that impression which is made immediately by God on the Mind of any Man to which we cannot set any bounds And by the Other those Impressions delivered over to others in Words and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another Secondly I say that the same Truths may be discovered by Revelation which are discoverable to us by Reason but in such there is little need or use of Revelation God having furnished us with natural means to arrive at the knowledge of them and Truths discovered by our natural Faculties are more certain than when conveyed to us by Traditional Revelation For the Knowledge we have that this Revelation came at first from God can never be so sure as the Knowledge we have from our own clear and distinct Ideas Thâ—s also holds in matters of Fact knowâ—â—le by our Senses as the History of the Deluge is conveyed to us by Writings which had their Orignal from Revelation and yet no boâ—y I think will say he has as certain and clear Knowledge of the Flood as Noah that saw it or that he himself would have had had he then been alive and seen it For he has no greater assurance than that of his Senses that it is writ in the Book supposed to be writ by Moses inspired But he has not so great an assurance that Moses writ that Book as if he had seen Moses write it so that the assurance of its being a Revelation is still less than our assurance of his Senses Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of Reason For since no evidence of our Faculties by which we receive such a Revelation can exceed if equal the Certainty of our Intuitive Knowledge we can never receive for a Truth any that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge The Ideas of One Body and One Place do so clearly agree that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms the same Body to be in two distinct places at once however it should pretend to the Authority of a Divine Revelation Since the Evidence First That we deceive not our Selves in ascribing it to God Secondly That we understand it right can never be so great as the Evidence of our own Intuitive Knowledge whereby we discern it impossible for the same Body to be in two places at once In Propositions therefore contrary to our distinct and clear Ideas it will be in vain to urge them as matters of Faith For Faith can never convince us of any thing that contradicts out Knowledge Because thô Faith be founded upon the Testimony of God who cannot lye yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a Divine Revelation greater than our own Knowledge For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer Evidence of any thing to be a Divine Revelation than it has of the Principles of its own Reason it can never have a ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reason to give place to a Proposition whose Revelation has not a greater Evidence than those Principles have In all things therefore where we have clear Evidence from our Ideas and the Principles of Knowledge above-mentioned Reason is the proper Judge and Revelation cannot in such cases invalidate its Decrees nor can we be obliged where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reason to quit it for the contrary Opinion under a pretence that it is Matter of Faith which can have no Authority against the plain and clear dictates of Reason But Thirdly There being many Things of which we have but imperfect Notions or none at all and other things of whose past present or future Existence by the natural use of our Faculties we can have no knowledge at all These being beyond the discovery of our Faculties and above Reason when revealed become the proper matter of Faith Thus that part of the Angels rebelled against God that the Bodies of Men shall rise and live again and the like are purely matters of Faith with which Reason has directly nothing to do First then Whatever Proposition is revealed of whose Truth our Mind by its natural Faculties and Notions cannot judge that is purely Mater of Faith and above Reason Secondly All Propositions whereof the Mind by its natural Faculties can come to determine and judge from natural acquired Ideas are Matter of Reason but with this difference that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence and so is perswaded of their Truth only upon probable grounds in such I say an Evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent even against Probability Because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive But yet it still belongs to Reason to judge of the truth of its being a Revelation and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered Thus far the Dominion of Faith reaches and that without any violence to Reason which is not injured or disturbed but assisted and improved by new discoveries of Truth coming from the Eternal Fountain of all Knowledge Whatever God hath Revealed is certainly true no doubt can be made of it This is the proper object of Faith But whether it be a Divine Revelation or no Reason must judge which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident nor prefer less Certainty to the greater There can be no Evidence that any Traditional Revelation is of Divine Original in the words we receive it and the Sense we understand it so clear and so certain as those of the Principles of Reason and therefore Nothing that is contrary to the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason has a right to be
and sometimes turbulent and tempestuous Passions tumble them out of their Cells The defects of the Memory are Two First That it loses the Idea quite and so far it produces perfect Ignorance Secondly That it moves slowly and retrieves not the Ideas laid up in store quick enough to serve the Mind upon occasions this if it be to a great degree is stupidity In the having Ideas ready at hand on all occasions consists what we call Invention Fancy and Quickness of Parts This Faculty other Animals seem to have to a great degree as well as Man as appears by Birds learning of Tunes and their endeavour to hit the Notes right For it seems impossible that they should endeavour to conform their Voices as 't is plain they do to Notes whereof they have no Ideas CHAP. XI Of Discerning and other Operations of the Mind ANother Faculty of the Mind is That of discerning between its Ideas on this depends the evidence and certainty of several even general Propositions which pass for Innate Truths whereas indeed they depend on this clear discerning Faculty of the Mind whereby it perceives two Ideas to be the same or different In being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another where there is the least difference consists in a great measure that Exactness of Judgment and Clearness of Reason which is to be observed in one Man above another which is quite opposite to Wit which consists most in the assemblage of Ideas and putting those together with quickness and variety which have the least resemblance to form agreeable visions whereas Judgment separates carefully those Ideas wherein can be found the least difference to prevent Error and Delusion To the well distinguishing our Ideas it chiefly contributes that they be clear and determinate and when they are so it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them thô the Senses should convey them from the same Object differently on different occasions The comparing of our Ideas one with another in respect of Extent Degree Time Place or any other circumstances is another Operation of the Mind about its Ideas which is the ground of Relations Brutes seem not to have this Faculty in any great degree They have probably several Ideas distinct enough but cannot compare them farther than some sensible circumstances annex'd to the Objects themselves The power of comparing general Ideas which we may observe in Men we may probably conjecture Beasts have not at all Composition is another Operation of the Mind whereby it combines several of its simple Ideas into Complex ones under which Operation we may reckon that of Enlarging wherein we put several Ideas together of the same kind as several Unites to make a Dozen In this also I suppose Brutes come far short of Man for tho' they take in and retain together several combinations of simple Ideas as possibly a Dog does the Shape Smell and Voice of his Master yet these are rather so many distinct marks whereby he knows him than one Complex Idea made out of those several simple ones Abstraction is another Operation of the Mind whereby the Mind forms general Ideas from such as it receiv'd from particular Objects which it does by considering them as they are in the Mind such appearances seperate from the circumstance of real Existence as Time Place c. These become general Representatives of all of the same kind and their names applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract Ideas Thus the Colour which I receive from Chalk Snow and Milk is made a representative of all of that kind and has a name given it Whiteness which signifies the same quality wherever to be found or imagin'd And thus Universally both Ideas and Terms are made This puts the great difference between Man and Brutes they seem to reason about particular Objects and Ideas but there appear no footsteps of Abstraction in them or of making general Ideas CHAP. XII Of Complex Ideas IN the reception of Simple Ideas the Mind is only Passive having no power to frame any to its self but as these Simple Ideas do exist in several combinations united together so the Mind may consider them as united not only as they are really united in external Objects but as it self has joyned them Ideas thus made up of several ones put together I call Complex as a Man Army Beauty Gratitude c. By this faculty of repeating and joyning together its Ideas the Mind has great power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts But it is still confin'd to those Simple Ideas which it received from the two Sources of Sensation and Reflection It can have no other Ideas of sensible Qualities than what come from without by the Senses nor any other Ideas of the Operations of a thinking Substance than what it finds in it self but having once got these Simple Ideas it can by its own power put them together and make new Complex ones which it never received so united Complex Ideas however compounded and decompounded tho' their number be infinite and their variety endless may all be reduced under these three heads First Modes Secondly Substances Thirdly Relations Modes I call such Complex Ideas which contain not the supposition of subsisting by themselves but are consider'd as dependences on and affections of Substances as Triangle Gratitude Murder c. These Modes are of Two sorts First Simple which are but the combinations of the same Simple Idea as a Dozen Score c. which are but the Ideas of so many distinct Unites put together Secondly Mix'd which are compounded of Simple Ideas of several kinds as Beauty which consists in a certain composition of Colour and Figure causing delight in the Beholder Theft which is the concealed change of the possession of any thing without the consent of the Proprietor These visibly contain a combination of several Ideas of several kinds Secondly Substance the Ideas of Substances are only such combinations of Simple Ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves in which the confused Idea of Substance is always the chief Thus a combination of the Ideas of a certain Figure with the powers of Motion Thought and Reasoning joyn'd to Substance make the ordinary Idea of Man These again are either of single Substances as Man Stone or of collective or several put together as Army Heap Ideas of several substances thus put together are as much each of them one single Idea as that of a Man or an Unite Thirdly Relations which consist in the consideration and comparing one Idea with another Of these several kinds we shall Treat in their Order CAAP. XIII Of Simple Modes and First of the Simple Modes of Space COncerning Simple Modes we may observe that the Modifications of any Simple Idea are as perfectly different and distinct Ideas in the Mind as those of the greatest distance or contrariety Thus Two is as distinct from Three as Blueness from Heat Under this Head
our Sun and the grosser Masses of Matter that visibly move about it What several sorts of Vegetables Animals and Intellectual corporeal Beings infinitely different from those of our little spot of Earth may probably be in other Planets to the knowledge of which even of their outward Figures and Parts we can no way attain whilst we are confined to this Earth there being no natural means either by Sensation or Reflection to convey their certain Ideas into our Minds There are other Bodies in the Universe no less concealed from us by their Minuteness These insensible Corpuscles being the active parts of Matter and the great instruments of Nature on which depend all their Secundary Qualities and Operations our want of precise distinct Ideas and their Primary Qualities keeps us in incurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them Did we know the Mechanical Affections of Rhubarb or Opium we might as easily account for their Operations of Purging and causing Sleep as a Watch-maker can for the Motions of his Watch. The dissolving of Silver in Aqua fortis or Gold in Aqua Regia and not Vice versâ would be then perhaps no more difficult to know than it is to a Smith to understand why the turning of one Key will open a Lock and not the turning of another But whilst we are destitute of Senses acute enough to discover the minute Particles of Bodies and to give us Ideas of their Mechanical Affections we must be content to be ignorant of their Properties and Operations nor can we be assured about them any farther than some few Trials we make are able to reach but whether they will succeed again another time we cannot be certain This hinders our certain Knowledge of Universal Truths concerning Natural Bodies and our Reason carries us herein very little beyond particular Matter of Fact And therefore I am apt to doubt that how far soever Humane Industry may advance useful and Experimental Philosophy in Physical Things yet Scientifical will still be out of our reach because we want perfect and adequate Ideas of those very Bodies which are nearest to us and most under our Command This at first sight shews us how disproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole extent even of Material Beings to which if we add the Consideration of that infinite number of Spirits that may be and probably are which are yet more remote from our Knowledge whereof we have no cognizance we shall find this cause of Ignorance conceal from us in an impenetrable Obscurity almost the whole Intellectual World a greater Certainly and more beautiful World than the material For bating some very few Ideas of Spirit we get from our own Mind by Reflection and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all Spirits the Author of them and us and all Things we have no certain Information so much as of the Existence of other Spirits but by Revelation much less have we distinct Ideas of their different Natures States Powers and several Constitutions wherein they agree or differ one from another and from us And therefore in what concerns their different Species and Properties we are under an absolute Ignorance The Second cause of Ignorance is the want of discoverable Connexion between those Ideas we have where we want that we are utterly incapable of Universal and Certain Knowledge and are as in the former case left only to Observation and Experiment Thus the Mechanical Affections of Bodies having no affinity at all with the Ideas they produce in us we can have no distinct Knowledge of such operations beyond our Experience and can reason no otherwise about them than as the effects or appointment of an Infinitly Wise Agent which perfectly surpass our Comprehensions The operation of our Minds upon our Bodies is as unconceivable How any Thought should produce a Motion in Body is as remote from the nature of our Ideas as how any Body should produce any Thought in the Mind That it is so if Experience did not convince us the consideration of the Things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us In some of our Ideas there are certain Relations Habitudes and Connexions so visibly included in the nature of the Ideas themselves that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any Power whatsoever In these only we are capable of Certain and Universal Knowledge Thus the Ideas of a right lined Triangle necessarily carries with it an Equality of its Angles to two right ones But the coherence and continuity of the Parts of Matter the production of Sensation in us of Colours and Sounds c. by Impulse and Motion being such wherein we can discover no natural Connexion with any Ideas we have we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleasure of the wise Architect The Things that we observe constantly to proceed regularly we may conclude do act by a Law set them but yet by a Law that we know not whereby thô Causes work steadily and effects constantly flow from them yet their Connexions and Dependencies being not discoverable in our Ideas we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them Several Effects come every day within the notice of our Senses of which we have so far Sensitive Knowledge But the Causes Manner and Certainty of their Production we must for the foregoing reasons be content to be ignorant of In these we can go no farther than particular Experience informs us of matter of Fact and by Analogy guess what Effects the like Bodies are upon other Tryals like to produce But as to perfect Science of Natural Bodies not to mention Spiritual Beings we are I think so far from being capable of any such thing that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it The Third cause of Ignorance is our Want of tracing those Ideas we have or may have and finding out those intermediate Ideas which may shew us what Habitude of Agreement or Disagreement they may have one with another and thus many are ignorant of Mathematical Truths for want of application in enquiring examining and by due ways comparing those Ideas Hitherto we have examined the Extent of our Knowledge in respect of the several sorts of Beings that are There is another Extent of it in respect of Universality which will also deserve to be considered and in this regard our Knowledge follows the Nature of our Ideas If the Ideas are Abstract whose Agreement or Disagreement we perceive our Knowledge is Universal For what is known of such general Ideas will be true of every particular thing in which that Essence that is that Abstract Idea is to be found And what is once known of such Ideas will be perpetually and for ever true So that as to all general Knowledge we must search and find it only in our own Minds and it is only the examining of our own Ideas that furnishes us with the Truths belonging to Essences of Things that
must be such and such only as are made up of such Simple ones as have been discovered to co-exist in Nature Wherever then we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas there is Certain Knowledge and wherever we are sure those Ideas agree with the reality of Things there is Certain real Knowledge CHAP V. Of Truth in General TRuth in the proper import of the Word signifies the joyning or separating of Signs as the Things signified by them do Agree or Disagree one with another The joyning or separating of Signs is what we call Propositions so that Truth properly belongs only to Propositions whereof there are Two sorts Mental and Verbal as there are Two sorts of Signs commonly made use of Ideas and Words 'T is difficult to treat of Mental Propositions without Verbal because in speaking of Mental we must make use of Words and then they become Verbal Again Men commonly in their Thoughts and Reasonings use Words instead of Ideas especially if the subject of their Meditation contains in it Complex Ideas If we have occasion to form Mental Propositions about White Black Circle c. we can and often do frame in our Minds the Ideas themselves without reflecting on the Names But when we would consider or make Propositions about the more Complex Ideas as of a Man Vitriol Fortitude Glory c. we usually put the Name for the Idea because the Idea these Names stand for being for the most part confused imperfect and undetermined we reflect on the Names themselves as being more Clear Certain and Distinct and readier to occur to our Thoughts than pure Ideas and so we make use of these Words instead of the Ideas themselves even when we would Meditate and Reason within our selves and make tacit Mental Propositions We must then observe Two sorts of Propositions that we are capable of making First Mental Propositions wherein the Ideas in our Understandings are put together or separated by the Mind perceiving or judging of their Agreement or Disagreement Secondly Verbal Propositions which are Words put together or separated in Affirmative or Negative Sentences So that Proposition consists in joyning or separating Signs and Truth consists in putting together or separating these Signs according as the Things they stand for Agree or Disagree Truth as well as Knowledge may well come under the Distinction of Verbal and Real That being only Verbal Truth wherein Terms are joyned according to the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for without regarding whether our Ideas are such as really have or are capable of having an Existence in Nature But then it is they contain Real Truth when these Signs are joyned as our Ideas agree and when our Ideas are such as we know are capable of having an Existence in Nature which in Substances we cannot know but by knowing that such have Existed Truth is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as it is Falshood is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas otherwise than it is and so far as these Ideas thus marked by Sounds agree to their Archetypes so far only is the Truth Real The knowledge of this Truth consists in knowing what Ideas the Words stand for and the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of those Ideas according as it is marked by those Words Besides Truth taken in the strict Sense before-mentioned there are other sorts of Truths As First Moral Truth which is speaking Things according to the perswasion of our own Minds Secondly Metaphysical Truth which is nothing but the Real Existence of Things conformable to the Ideas to which we have annexed their Names These Considerations of Truth either having been before taken notice of or not being much to our present purpose it may suffice here only to have mentioned them CHAP. VI. Of Universal Propositions their Truth and Certainty THE prevailing Custom of using Sounds for Ideas even when Men think and reason within their own Breasts makes the consideration of Words and Propositions so necessary a part of the Treatise of Knowledge that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one without explaining the other And since General Truths which with Reason are most sought after can never be well made known and are seldom apprehended but as conceived and expressed in Words it is not out of our way in the Examination of our own Knowledge to enquire into the Truth and Certainty of Universal Propositions But it must be observed that Certainty is Twofold Certainty of Truth and Certainty of Knowledge Certainty of Truth is when Words are so put together in Propositions as exactly to express the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for as really it is Certainty of Knowledge is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Propositions This we usually call Knowing or being Certain of the Truth of any Proposition Now because we cannot be Certain of the truth of any General Proposition unless we know the precise Bounds and Extent of the Species its Terms stand for it is necessary we should know the Essence of each Species which is that which constitutes and bounds it This in all Simple Ideas and Modes is not hard to do for in these the Real and Nominal Essence be-being the same there can be no doubt how far the Species extends or what Things are comprehended under each Term which it is evident are all that have an exact Conformity with the Idea it stands for and no other But in Substances wherein a Real Essence distinct from the Nominal is supposed to constitute and bound the Species the extent of the general Word is very uncertain because not knowing this Real Essence we cannot know what is or is not of that Species and consequently what may or may not with Certainty be affirmed of it Hence we may see that the Names of Substances when made to stand for Species supposed to be constituted by Real Essences which we know not are not capable of conveying Certainty to the Understanding Of the Truth of General Propositions made up of such Terms we cannot be sure For how can we besure that this or that Quality is in Gold for Instance when we know not what is or is not Gold that is what has or has not the Real Essence of Gold whereof we have no Idea at all On the other side the Names of Substances when made use of for the Complex Ideas Men have in their Minds thô they carry a clear and determinate Signification with them will not yet serve us to make many Universal Propositions of whose Truth we can be certain because the Simple Ideas out of which the Complex are combined carry not with them any discoverable Connexion or Repugnancy but with a very few other Ideas For Instance All Gold is fixed is a Proposition we cannot be certain of how Universally soever it be believed For if we take the Term
Gold to stand for a Real Essence it is evident we know not what particular Substances are of that Species and so cannot with certainty affirm any Thing Universally of Gold But if we make the Term Gold stand for a Species determined by its Nominal Essence be its Complex Idea what it will for Instance A Body Yellow Fusible Malleable and very heavy no Quality can with Certainty be Denyed or Affirmed Universally of it but what has a discoverable Connexion or Inconsistency with that Nominal Essence Fixedness for Instance having no necessary Connexion that we can discover with any Simple Idea that makes the Complex one or with the whole Combination together it is impossible that we should certainly know the truth of this Proposition All Gold is fixed But is not this an Universal certain Proposition All Gold is Malleable I answer it is so if Malleableness be a part of the Complex Idea the word Gold stands for But then here is nothing affirmed of Gold but that that Sound stands for an Idea in which Malleableness is contained And such a sort of Truth and Certainty it is to say a Centaur is Four-footed I imagine amongst all the Secundary Qualities of Substances and the Powers relating to them there cannot any two be named whose necessary Co-existence or Repugnance to Co-exist can be certainly known unless in those of the same Sense which necessarily exclude one another Thus by the Colour we cannot certainly know what Smell Tast c. any Body is of 'T is no wonder then that Certainty is to be found but in very few general Propositions concerning Substances Our Knowledge of their Qualities and Properties goes very seldom farther than our Senses reach or inform us Inquisitive and Observing Men may by strength of Judgment penetrate farther and on Probabilities taken from wary Observations and Hints well laid together often guess right at what Experience has not yet discovered to them But this is but guessing still it amounts only to Opinion and has not that certainty which is requisite to Knowledge To conclude general Propositions of what kind soever are then only capable of Certainty when the Terms used in them stand for such Ideas whose Agreement or Disagreement as there expressed is capable to be discovered by us And we are then certain of their Truth or Falshood when we perceive the Ideas they stand for to Agree or not Agree according as they are affirmed or denyed one of another whence we may take notice that general Certainty is never to be found but in our Ideas CHAP. VII Of Maxims THERE are a sort of Propositions which under the Name of Maxims and Axioms have passed for Principles of Science and because they are Self-evident have been supposed Innate It may be worth while to enquire into the reason of their Evidence and examine how far they influence our other Knowledge Knowledge being but the perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas where that Agreement or Disagreement is perceived immediately by it self without the intervention or help of any other there our Knowledge is Self-evident which being so not only Maxims but an infinite number of other Propositions partake equally with them in this Self-evidence For In respect of Identity and Diversity we may have as many Self-evident Propositions as we have distinct Ideas T is the First Act of the Mind to know every one of its Ideas by it self and distinguish it from others Every one finds in himself that he knows the Ideas he has that he knows also when any one is in his Understanding and what it is and that when more than one are there he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another so that all Affirmations or Negations concerning them are made without any possibility of doubt or uncertainty and must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood that is as soon as we have in our Minds the Ideas clear and distinct which the Terms in the Proposition stand for Thus a Circle is a Circle Blue is not Red are as Self-evident Propositions as those general ones What is is and 'T is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be nor can the consideration of these Axioms add any thing to the Evidence or Certainty of our Knowledge of them As to the Agreement or Disagreement of Co-existence the Mind has an immediate perception of this but in very few And therefore in this sort we have very little Intuitive Knowledge thô in some few Propositions we have Two Bodies cannot be in the same place I think is a self-evident Proposition The Idea of fitting a Place equal to the Contents of its Superficies being annexed to our Idea of Body As to the Relations of Modes Mathematicians have framed many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality as Equals taken from Equals the remainder will be Equal c. which however received for Axioms yet I think have not a clearer Self-Evidence than these that One and One are equal to Two that if from the Five Fingers of one Hand you take Two and from the Five Fingers of the other Hand Two the remaining Numbers will be equal These and a thousand other such Propositions may be found in Numbers which carry with them an equal if not greater clearness than those Mathematical Axioms As to Real Existence since that has no Connexion with any other of our Ideas but that of our Selves and of a First Being we have not so much as a Demonstrative much less a Self-Evident Knowledge concerning the Real Existence of other Beings In the next place let us consider what influence these Maxims have upon the other parts of our Knowledge The Rules established in the Schools That all Reasonings are Ex praecognitis praeconceptis seem to lay the foundation of all other Knowledge in these Maxims and to suppose them to be Praecognita whereby I think is meant Two Things First That these Axioms are those Truths that are first known to the Mind Secondly That upon them the other parts of our Knowledge depend First That these Axioms are not the Truths first known to the Mind is evident from Experience For who knows not that a Child perceives that a Stranger is not its Mother long before he knows that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be And how many Truths are there about Numbers which the Mind is perfectly acquainted with and fully convinced of before it ever thought on these general Maxims Of this the reason is plain for that which makes the Mind assent to such Propositions being nothing but the Perception it has of the Agreement or Disagreement of its Ideas according as it finds them affirmed or denied in Words one of another and every Idea being known to be what it is and every two distinct Ideas not to be the same it must necessarily follow that such Self-evident Truths must be first known which consist of Ideas that are first in the
Mind and the Ideas first in the Mind it is evident are those of particular Things from whence by slow degrees the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense are settled in the Mind with general Names to them Thus particular Ideas are first received and distinguished and so Knowledge got about them and next to them the less general or specifick which are next to particular ones Secondly From what has been said it plainly follows that these magnified Maxims are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Knowledge for if there be a great many other Truths as Self-evident as they and a great many that we know before them it is impossible that they should be the Principles from which we deduce all other Truths Thus that One and Two are equal to Three is as evident and easier known then that the Whole is equal to all its parts Nor after the knowledge of this Maxim do we know that One and Two are equal to Three better or more certainly than we did before For if there be any odds in these Ideas the Ideas of Whole and Parts are more obscure or at least more difficult to be setled in the Mind than those of One Two and Three Either therefore all Knowledge does not depend on certain Praecognita or general Maxims called Principles or else such as these That One and One are Two that Two and Two are Four c. and a great part of Numeration will be so To which if we add all the Self-evident Propositions that may be made about all our distinct Ideas Principles will be almost infinite at least innumerable which Men arrive to the knowledge of at different Ages and a great many of those innate Principles they never come to know all their Lives But whether they come in view earlier or later they are all known by their Native Evidence and receive no Light nor are capable of any Proof one from another much less the more particular from the more general or the more simple from the more compounded the more simple and less abstract being the most familiar and the easier and earlier apprehended These general Maxims then are only of use in disputes to stop the Mouths of Wranglers but not of much use to the discovery of unknown Truths or to help the Mind forwards in its search after Knowledge Several general Maxims are no more than bare verbal Propositions and teach us nothing but the respect and import of Names one to another as The whole is equal to all its Parts What real Truth does it teach us more than what the signification of the word Totum or whole does of it self import But yet Mathematicians do not without reason place this and some other such amongst their Maxims that their Scholars having in the Entrance perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with these Propositions made in such general Terms may have them ready to apply to all particular Cases not that if they be equally weighed they are more clear and evident than the particular Instances they are brought to confirm but that being more familiar to the Mind the very naming them is enough to satisfy the Understanding But this I say is more from our Custom of using them than the different Evidence of the Things So that if rightly consider'd I think we may say that where our Ideas are clear and distinct there is little or no use at all of these Maxims to prove the Agreement or Disagreement of any of them He that cannot discern the Truth or falshood of such Propositions without the help of these and the like Maxims will not be helped by these Maxims to do it He that needs any proof to make him certain and give his assent to this Proposition that Two are equal to Two or that White is not Black will also have need of a proof to make him admit that What is is or That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be And as these Maxims are of little use where we have clear and distinct Ideas so they are of dangerous use where our Ideas are confused and where we use words that are not annexed to clear and distinct Ideas but to such as are of a loose and wandring signification sometimes standing for one and sometimes for another Idea from which follows Mistake and Error which these Maxims brought as proofs to establish Propositions wherein the Terms stand for confused and uncertain Ideas do by their Authority confirm and rivet CHAP. VIII Of Trifling Propositions THere are Universal Propositions which thô they be certainly true yet add no Light to our Understandings bring no increase to our Knowledge such are First All Purely Identical Propositions These at first blush appear to contain no Instruction in them for when we affirm the same Term of it self it shews us nothing but what we must certainly know before whether such a Proposition be either made by or proposed to us Secondly Another sort of trifling Propositions is when a part of the Complex Idea is praedicated of the name of the whole a part of the definition of the word defined as Lead is a Metal Man an Animal These carry no Information at all to those who know the Complex Ideas the Names Lead and Man stand for Indeed to a Man that knows the signification of the word Metal and not of the word Lead it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word Lead by saying it is a Metal than by enumerating the Simple Ideas one by one which make up the Complex Idea of Metal Alike trifling it is to predicate any one of the Simple Ideas of a Complex one of the name of the whole Complex Idea as All Gold is fusible for fusibility being one of the Simple Ideas that goes to the making up the Complex one the Sound Gold stands for what can it be but playing with Sounds to affirm that of the name Gold which is comprehended in its received signification What instruction can it carry to tell one that which he is supposed to know before For I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me or else he is to tell me The general Propositions that are made about Substances if they are certain are for the most part but Trifling And if they are Instructive are Uncertain and such as we have no knowledge of their real Truth how much soever constant Observation and Analogy may assist our Judgments in Guessing Hence it comes to pass that one may often meet with very clear and coherent Discourses that amount yet to nothing For names of Substantial Beings as well as others having setled Significations affixed to them may with great Truth be joyned Negatively and Affirmatively in Propositions as their Definitions make them fit to be so joyned and Propositions consisting of such Terms may with the same clearness be deduced one from
another as those that convey the most real Truths and all this without any knowledge of the Nature or Reality of Things existing without us Thus he that has learnt the following words with their ordinary Acceptations annexed to them viz. Substance Man Animal Form Soul Vegetative Sensitive Rational may make several undoubted Propositions about the Soul without any Knowledge at all of what the Soul really is And of this sort a Man may find an infinite number of Propositions Reasonings and Conclusions in Books of Metaphysicks School-Divinity and some part of Natural Philosophy and after all know as little of God Spirits or Bodies as he did before he set out Thirdly The worst sort of Trifling is To use words loosely and uncertainly which sets us yet farther from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain to by them or find in them That which occasions this is That Men may find it convenient to shelter their Ignorance or Obstinacy under the Obscurity or Perplexedness of their Terms to which perhaps Inadvertency and ill Custom does in many Men much contribute To conclude barely Verbal Propositions may be known by these following marks First All Propositions wherein two Abstract Terms are affirmed one of another are barely about the signification of Sounds For since no Abstract Idea can be the same with any other but it self when its Abstract Name is affirmed of any other Term it can signifie no more but this that it may or ought to be called by that name or that these two Names signify the same Idea Secondly All Propositions wherein a part of the Complex Idea which any Term stands for is predicated of that Term are only Verbal and thus all Propositions wherein more comprehensive Terms called Genera are affirmed of Subordinate or less Comprehensive called Species or Individuals are barely Verbal When by these two Rules we examine the Propositions that make up the Discourses we ordnarily meet with both in and out of Books we shall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspected are purely about the signification of Words and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these Signs CHAP. IX Of our Knowledge of Existence HItherto we have only considered the Essences of Things which being only Abstract Ideas and thereby removed in our Thoughts from particular Existence give us no Knowledge of Existence at all We proceed now to enquire concerning our Knowledge of the Existence of Things and how we come by it I say then that we have the Knowledge of our own Existence by Intuition of the Existence of God by Demonstration and of other Things by Sensation As for our own Existence we perceive it so plainly that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof I think I reason I feel Pleasure and Pain Can any of these be more evident to me than my own Existence If I doubt of all other Things that very Doubt makes me perceive my own Existence and will not suffer me to doubt of that If I know I doubt I have as certain a Perception of the Thing Doubting as of that Thought which I call Doubt Experience then convinces us that we have an Intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence and an Internal Infallible Perception that we are In every act of Sensation Reasoning or Thinking we are conscious to our selves of our own Being and in this matter come not short of the highest Degree of Certainty CHAP X. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God THO' God has given us no innate Ideas of himself yet having furnished us with those Faculties our Minds are endowed with he hath not left himself without a Witness since we have Sense Perception and Reason and cannot want a clear proof of him as long as we carry our selves about us nor can we justly complain of our Ignorance in this great point since he has so plentifully provided us with means to discover and know him so far as is necessary to the end of our Being and the great concernment of our Happiness But thô this be the most obvious Truth that Reason discovers yet it requires Thought and Attention and the Mind must apply it self to a Regular deduction of it from some part of our Intuitiv Knowledge or else we shall be as ignorant of this as of other Propositions which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration To shew therefore that we are capable of Knowing that is being certain that there is a God and how we may come by this Certainty I think we need go no farther than our selves and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own Existence I think it is beyond question that Man has a clear Perception of his own Being he knows certainly that he Exists and that he is Something In the next place Man knows by an Intuitive Certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any real Being than it can be equal to two Right Angles If therefore we know there is some Real Being it is an evident Demonstration that from Eternity there has been Something since what was not from Eternity had a Beginning and what had a Beginning must be produced by something else Next it is evident that what has its Being from another must also have all that which is in and belongs to its Being from another too All the Powers it has must be owing to and received from the same Source This Eternal Source then of all Being must he also the Source and Original of all Power and so this Eternal Being must be also the most powerful Again Man finds in himself Perception and Knowledge we are certain then that there is not only some Being but some Knowing Intelligent Being in the World There was a time then when there was no knowing Being or else there has been a knowing Being from Eternity If it be said there was a time when that Eternal Being had no Knowledge I reply that then it is impossible there should have ever been any Knowledge It being as impossible that Things wholly void of Knowledge and operating blindly and without any Perception should produce a knowing Being as it is impossible that a Triangle should make it self Three Angles bigger than Two Right ones Thus from the Consideration of our selves and what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions our Reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident Truth that there is an Eternal most Powerful and Knowing Being which whether any one will call God it matters not The thing is evident and from this Idea duly consider'd will easily be deduced all those other Attributes we ought to ascribe to this Eternal Being From what has been said it is plain to me we have a more certain Knowledge of the Existence of a God than of any thing our Senses have not immediately discovered to us Nay I presume I may say that we more certainly know that there is a God than that there is any thing else without
we shall find that the great Advancement and Certainty of Real Knowledge Men arrived to in these Sciences was not owing to the influence of these Principles but to the clear distinct and compleat Ideas their Thoughts were employed about and the relation of Equality and Excess so clear between some of them that they had a Intuitive Knowledge and by that a way to discover it in others and this without the help of those Maxims For I ask Is it not possible for a Lad to know that his whole Body is bigger than his little Finger but by virtue of this Axiom The Whole is bigger than the Part nor be assured of it till he has learned that Maxim Let any one consider from what has been elsewhere said which is known first and clearest by most People the particular Instance or the general Rule and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other These general Rules are but the comparing our more general and Abstract Ideas which Ideas are made by the Mind and have Names given them for the easier dispatch in its reasonings But Knowledge began in the Mind and was founded on Particulars thô afterwards perhaps no notice be taken thereof It being natural for the Mind to lay up those general Notions and make the proper use of them which is to disburthen the Memory of the cumbersome load of Particulars The way to improve in Knowledge is not to swallow Principles with an implicite Faith and without examination which would be apt to mislead Men instead of guiding them into Truth but to get and fix in our Minds clear and complete Ideas as far as they are to be had and annex to them proper and constant Names and thus barely by considering our Ideas and comparing them together observing their Agreement or Disagreement their Habitudes and Relations we shall get more true and clear Knowledge by the conduct of this one Rule than by taking up Principles and thereby putting our Minds into the Disposal of others We must therefore if we will proceed as Reason advises adapt our methods of Enquiry to the nature of the Ideas we examine and the truth we search after General and Certain Truths are only founded in the Habitudes and Relations of Abstract Ideas Therefore a Sagacious Methodical Application of our Thoughts for the finding out these Relations is the only way to discover all that can with Truth and Certainty be put into general Propositions By what steps we are to proceed in these is to be Learned in the Schools of the Mathematicians who from every plain and easie beginnings by gentle Degrees and a continued chain of Reasonings proceed to the Discovery and Demonstration of Truths that appear at first sight beyond Humane Capacity This I think I may say that if other Ideas that are Real as well as Nominal Essences of their Species were pursued in the way familiar to Mathematicians they would carry our Thoughts farther and with greater Evidence and Clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine This gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture which I suggest Chapter the Third viz. that Morality is capable of Demonstration as well as Mathematicks for Moral Ideas being real Essences that have a discoverable Connexion and Agreement one with another so far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations so far we shall be possessed of Real and General Truths In our knowledge of Substances we are to proceed after a quite different Method the bare Contemplation of their Abstract Ideas which are but Nominal Essences will carry us but a very little way in the search of Truth and Certainty Here Experience must teach us what Reason cannot and it is by trying alone that we can certainly know what other Qualities co-exist with those of our Complex Idea for Instance Whether that Yellow heavy fusible Body I call Gold be Malleable or no which Experience however it prove in that particular Body we examine makes us not certain that it is so in all or any other Yellow Heavy Fusible Bodies but that which we have tried because it is no consequence one way or the other from our Complex Idea The necessity or inconsistence of Malleability hath no visible Connexion with the combination of that Colour Weight and Fusibility in any Body What I have here said of the Nominal Essence of Gold supposed to consist of a Body of such a determinate Colour Weight and Fusibility will hold true if other Qualities be added to it Our Reasonings from those Ideas will carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other Properties in those masses of Matter wherein all those are to be found As far as our Experience reaches we may have certain Knowledge and no farther I deny not but a Man accustomed to rational and regular Experiments shall be able to see farther into the nature of Bodies and their unknown Properties than one that is a stranger to them But this is but Judgment and Opinion not Knowledge and Certainty This makes me suspect that Natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science From Experiments and Historical Observations we may draw advantages of Ease and Health and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life but beyond this I fear our Talents reach not nor are our Faculties as I guess able to advance From whence it is obvious to conclude That since our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate the Real Essences of Bodies but yet plainly to discover to us the Being of a God and the Knowledge of our Selves enough to give us a clear discovery of our Duty and great Concernment it will become us as Rational Creatures to employ our Faculties about what they are most adapted to and follow the direction of Nature where it seems to point us out the way For it is rational to conclude that our proper Employment lies in those Enquiries and that sort of Knowledge which is most suited to our natural Capacities and carries in it our greatest Interest that is the condition of our Eternal State And therefore it is I think that Morality is the proper Science and Business of Mankind in general who are both concerned and fitted to search out their Summum Bonum as several Arts conversant about the several parts of Nature are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men for the common use of Humane Life and their own particular Subsistance in this World The ways to enlarge our Knowledge as far as we are capable seem to me to be these Two The First is to get and settle in our Minds as far as we can clear distinct and constant Ideas of those Things we would consider and know For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas where they are either imperfect confused or obscure we cannot expect to have certain perfect or clear Knowledge The other is the Art of finding out the intermediate Ideas which may shew us the Agreement or
Doubt Wavering Distrust Disbelief c. It is a Rule generally approved that any Testimony the farther off it is removed from the Original Truth the less Force it has and in Traditional Truths each Remove weakens the force of the Proof There is a Rule quite contrary to this advanced by some Men who look Opinions to gain Force by growing Older Upon this ground Propositions evidently false or doubtful in their first beginning come by an inverted Rule of Probability to pass for Authentick Truths and those which deserved little Credit from the Mouths of their first Relators are thought to grow venerable by Age and are urged as undeniable But certain it is that no Probability can rise above its First Original What has no other Evidence than the single Testimony of one Witness must stand or fall by his only Testimony thô afterwards cited by Hundreds of others and is so far from receiving any Strength thereby that it becomes the weaker Because Passion Interest Inadvertency Mistake of his Meaning and a thousand odd Reasons or Caprichois Mens Minds are acted by may make one Man quote another's Words or Meaning wrong This is certain that what in one Age was affirmed upon slight grounds can never after come to be more valid in future Ages by being often repeated The Second sort of Probability is concerning Things not falling under the reach of our Senses and therefore not capable of Testimony And such are First The Existence Nature and Operations of Finite Immaterial Beings without us as Spirits Angels c. or the Existence of material Beings such as for their smallness or remoteness our Senses cannot take notice of As whether there be any Plants Animals c. in the Planets and other Mansions of the vast Universe Secondly Concerning the manner of Operation in most parts of the works of Nature wherein thô we see the sensible Effects yet their Causes are unknown and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced We see Animals are generated nourished and move the Loadstone draws Iron c. but the Causes that operate and the manner they are produced in we can only guess and probably conjecture In these matters Analogy is the only help we have and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of Probability Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently upon one another produces Heat and very often Fire we have reason to think that what we call Heat and Fire consists in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute Parts of the burning Matter This sort of Probability which is the best conduct of rational Experiments and the rise of Hypotheses has also its use and influence And a wary reasoning from Analogy leads us often into the discovery of Truths and useful Deductions which would otherwise lie concealed Thô the common Experience and the ordinary course of Things have a mighty influence on the Minds of Men to make them give or refuse Credit to any thing proposed to their Belief yet there is one case wherein the strangeness of the Fact lessens not the Assent to a fair Testimony given of it For where such supernatural Events are suitable to Ends aimed at by him who has the power to change the course of Nature there under such Circumstances they may be the fitter to procure Belief by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to ordinary Observation This is the proper case of Miracles which well attested do not only find Credit themselves but give it also to other Truths There are Propositions that challenge the highest degree of our Assent upon bare Testimony whether the Thing proposed Agree or Disagree with common Experience and the ordinary course of Things or no The reason whereof is because the Testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived and that is God himself This carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt Evidence beyond Exception This is called by a peculiar Name Revelation and our Assent to it Faith which has as much Certainty in it as our Knowledge it self and we may as well doubt of our own Being as we can whether any Revelation from God be True So that Faith is a settled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Hesitation only we must be sure that it be a Divine Revelation and that we understand it right else we shall expose our selves to all the extravagancy of Enthusiasm and all the error of wrong Principles if we have Faith and Assurance in what is not Divine Revelation CHAP. XVII Of Reason THE word Reason in English has different Significations Sometimes it is taken for True and Clear Principles Sometimes for Clear and Fair Deductions from those Principles Sometimes for the Cause and particularly for the Final Cause but the Consideration I shall have of it here is as it stands for a Faculty whereby Man is supposed to be distinguished from Beasts and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them Reason is necessary both for the enlargement of our Knowledge and regulating our Assent for it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion and is necessary and assisting to all our other Intellectual Faculties and indeed contains Two of them viz. First Sagacity whereby it finds intermediate Ideas Secondly Illation whereby it so orders and disposes of them as to discover what connexion there is in each link of the Chain whereby the Extremes are held together and thereby as it were to draw into view the Truth sought for which is that we call Illation or Inference and consists in nothing but the Perception of the Connexion there is between the Ideas in each step of the Deduction whereby the Mind comes to see either the Certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas as in Demonstration in which it arrives at Knowledge or their probable Connexion on which it gives or with-holds its Assent as in Opinion Sense and Intuition reach but a little way the greatest part of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions and intermediate Ideas In those Cases where we must take Propositions for true without being certain of their being so we have need to find out examine and compare the grounds of their Probability In both Cases the Faculty which finds out the Means and rightly applies them to discover Certainty in the one and Probability in the other is that which we call Reason So that in reason we may consider these Four Degrees First The discovering and finding out of Proofs Secondly The regular and methodical Disposition of them and laying them in such order as their Connexion may be plainly perceived Thirdly The perceiving their Connexion Fourthly The making a right Conclusion There is one thing more which I shall desire to be considered concerning Reason and that is whether Syllogism as is generally thought be the proper instrument of it ant the usefullest way of exercising this Faculty The Causes I have to doubt of