false tho we may oppose certain Instances wherein they may stray from the Truth but to be satisfy'd if they may be extended from others beyond their just limits that they ought not to be taken too rigorously according to the Letter 2. OBSERVATION There are some Propositions that ought to pass for Metaphysically Universal tho they may admit of Exceptions that is when those Exceptions are exotic and such as according to common use are not comprehended in those Universal Terms As when I say All Men have two Arms. This Proposition ought to pass for true according to ordinary use And it would be but mere brangling to oppose against it that there have been Monsters who were Men though they had four Arms. It being plain that there was nothing intended concerning Monsters in these general Propositions and that the only meaning of the Assertion was that according to the order of Nature all Men had two Arms. In like manner it may be said that all Men make use of words to express their thoughts but that all Men do not make use of writing Nor would it be a rational Objection to contradict the truth of the Proposition by instancing dumb People because it is evident though the sence be not express'd in words that it was not meant of such as had a natural impediment to make use of sounds either clude it will not be amiss to speak of another sort of Knowledge which ofttimes is no less certain nor less evident in its manner then that which we draw from Authority For there are two general ways by which we know a Thing to be true The first is the knowledge which we have by our selves whether we have attain'd it by Observation or Ratiocination whether by our Sences or by our Reason which may be generally term'd Reason in regard the Sences themselves depend upon the judgment of Reason or Knowledge the word being here more generally taken than in the Schools for all manner of knowledge of an object drawn from the same object The other way is the Authority of Persons worthy of credit who assure us that a thing is so Tho of our selves we know nothing of it Which is call'd Faith or Belief according to the words of St. Austin for what we know we owe to reason for what we believe to Authority But as this Authority may be of two sorts either from God or Men so there are two sorts of Faith Divine and Human. Divine Faith cannot be Subject to error because that God can neither deceive us nor be deceiv'd Human Faith is of its self subject to error for all Men are Lyars according to Scripture And because it may happen that he who shall assure us of the certainty of a thing may be deceiv'd himself Nevertheless as we have already observ'd there are some things which we know not but by a Human Faith which nevertheless we ought to believe for as certain and unquestionable as if they were Mathematically demonstrated As that which is known by the constant relation of so many Persons that it is morally impossible they should ever have conspir'd to affirm the same things if they were not true For example Men have been naturally most averse from conceiving any Antipodes nevertheless though we never were in those places and know nothing of any Antipodes but by human Faith he must be a Fool that does not believe ' em And he must be out of his wits who questions whether ever there were any such Persons as Caesar Pompey Cicero or Virgil or whether they were not feigned Names as Amadis de Gaul True it is that it is a difficult thing to know when Human Faith has attain'd to this same assurance and this is that which leads Men astray into two such opposite Deviations So that some believe too slightly upon the least report Others ridiculously make use of all the force of their wit to annul the belief of things attested by the greatest authority when it thwarts the prejudice of their understanding And therefore certain Limits are to be assign'd which Faith must exceed to obtain this assurance and others beyond which there is nothing but uncertainty leaving in the middle a certain space where we shall meet with certainty or uncertainty as we approach nearer to the one or the other of these Bounds Now then if we do but compare the two general ways by which we believe a thing to be true Reason and Faith certain it is that Faith always supposes some Reason For as St. Austin says in his 122. Epistle and in several other places we could never bring our selves to believe that which is above our reason if reason it self had not perswaded us that there are some things which we do well to believe tho' we are not capable to apprehend 'em Which is principally true in respect of Divine Faith For true Reason teaches us that God being truth it self he cannot deceive us in what he reveals to us concerning his Nature and his Mysteries whence it appears that though we are oblig'd to captivate our Understanding in obedience to Faith as saith St. Paul yet we do it neither blindly nor unreasonably which is the original of all false Religions but with a knowledg of the Cause and for that it is but a reasonable Act to Captivate our selves to the Authority of God when he has given us sufficient Proofs such as are his Miracles and other Prodigious Accidents which oblige us to believe that he himself has discovered to Men the Truths which we are to believe As certain it is in the second Place that divine Faith ought to have a greater Power over our Understanding then our own Reason And that upon this Dictate of Reason it self that the more certain is to be prefer'd before the less certain and that is more certain which God assures us to be true then that which Reason perswades us when it is more contrary to the Nature of God to deceive us then the nature of our own Reason to be deceiv'd CHAP. XIII Certain Rules for the guidance of Reason the belief of Events that depend upon Human Faith THE most customary use of sound Judgment and that faculty of the Soul by which we discern Truth from falshood is not employ'd in speculative Sciences about which so few Persons are oblig'd to spend their time and yet there is no occasion wherein it is more frequently to be made use of and where it s more necessary then in that Judgment which we ought to make of what passes every day among Men. I do not speak of judging whether an Action be good or bad worthy of applause or reproof for that belongs to the regulation of Morallity but of judging of the Truth or Falshood of human Events which may only be referr'd to Logic whether we consider 'em as past as when we only endeavour to know whether we ought to believe 'em or not or whether we consider 'em as being to come
as when we fear or hope they will come to pass which regulates our hopes and our fears Certain it is that some Reflexions may be made upon this Subject which perhaps may not be altogether unprofitable or rather may be of great use for the avoiding of certain Errors into which most People fall because they do not sufficiently study the Rules of Reason The first Reflexion is that there is a vast difference to be made between two sorts of Truths the one that only relates to the nature of things and their Immutable Essences abstracted from their existence the other that relates to things existent that relate to human and contingent events which may or may not come to pass when we speak of the future and may probably never have been when we talk of what is past I speak this with reference to their next causes making an abstraction of their Immutable order in Divine Providence because on the one side it does not hinder Contingence and on the other side being unknown to us it contributes nothing to make us believe the things themselves Now as all things are requisite in truths of the first sort there is nothing sure which is not Universally true and so we must conclude that a thing is false if it be false in any case But if we think to make use of the same Rules in human Events we shall always judg falsly and make a thousand false Arguments For these Events being naturally contingent it would be ridiculous to seek out in them for a necessary Truth And so that person would be altogether void of Reason who would believe nothing of such things unless it were made out to him that it was absolutely necessary they should be so Now would he less deviate from Reason that would require me to believe any particular Event suppose it were the Conversion of the King of China to the Christian Religion upon this only ground because it is not Impossible to be so For seeing that another who should assure me to the contrary may make use of the same Reason it is clear that that reason alone cannot determine me to believe the one rather then the other We must therefore lay it down for a certain and unquestionable Maxim upon this occasion that the Possibillity alone of an Event is not a sufficient reason to make me believe it and that I may have reason also to believe a thing tho I judg it not impossible but that the contrary may have come to pass So that of the Two Events I may rationally believe the one and not the other tho I believe 'em both possible How then shall we resolve to believe the one rather than the other if we judg 'em both possible Observe the following Rule To judge of the Truth of an Event and to perswade my self into a Resolution to believe or not to believe a thing it must not be consider'd nakedly and in it self like a Proposition in Geometry but all the circumstances that accompany it as well internal as external are to be weigh'd with the same consideration I call Internal Circumstances such as belong to the Fact it self and external those that relate to the Persons whose Testimonies induce us believe it This being done if all the Circumstances are such that it never or very rarely happens that the same Circumstances are accompany'd with Falshood Our Understanding naturally carrys to believe the thing to be true and there is a reason for so doing especially in the Conduct of the Actions of our Life that never requires a greater assurance than a moral Certainty and which is satisfy'd upon most occasions with a great Probability But on the other side if these Circumstances are such as are frequently accompany'd with Falshood Reason requires us to suspend our Belief or that we should look upon as false what is told us when we see no likelyhood that it should be true tho we do not find any absolute Impossibility For Example we demand whether the History of the Baptism of Constantine by Silvester be true or false Baronius believes it true but Cardinal Perron Bishop Spondanus Petavius Morinus and the most eminent of the Roman Church believe it false Now if we insist upon the sole Possibility we have no reason to reject Baronius For his opinion contains nothing absolutely impossible and to speak absolutely it is also possible that Eusebius who affirms the contrary affirm'd an untruth in favour of the Arrians and that the Fathers that follow'd him were deceiv'd by his Testimony But if we make use of the Rule already laid down which is to consider what are the Circumstances both of the one and the other Baptism of Constantine and which are those that carry the greatest marks of Truth we shall find 'em to be the latter For on the one side there is no great reason to rely upon the Testimony of a Writer as fabulous as the Author of the Acts of Sylvester who is the only person of Antiquity who has spoken of Constantin's being baptiz'd at Rome And on the other side there is no liklihood that a Person so Serious and Learned as Eusebius should presume to report an untruth relating to a thing so remarkable as the Baptism of the first Emperor that restor'd the Church to her Liberty and which ought to have been spread over all the World at the same time that he wrote which was not above four or five Hundred years after the Death of the said Emperor Nevertheless there is an Exception to this Rule by which we ought to be satisfied with possibillity or likelihood That is when an action which is otherwise sufficiently attested is contradicted by Incongruities and apparent contrarieties with other Histories For then it suffices that the Solutions brought to enervate these Repugnancies be possible and probable and it would be unreasonable to require other positive Proofs for that the Act it self being sufficiently prov'd it is not equitable to require that we should prove all the Circumstances in the same manner Otherwise we might call in question a thousand most certain Histories which we cannot make agree with others of less Authority but by Conjectures which it is impossible to prove positively For example we cannot bring to an agreement what is deliver'd in the Kings and Chronicles concerning the years of the Reigns of several of the Kings of Juda and Israel but by assigning to some of the Kings two beginnings of their Reigns the one during the Life of the Reigning Prince and the other after the decease of their Parents Now if it be ask'd what Proof we have that such a Prince raign'd for some time with his Father we must confess there is none Positive But it suffices that it is a thing Possible and which has often come to pass at other times to make it Lawful for us to suppose it as a Cicumstance necessary to reconcile Histories otherwise certain And therefore there is nothing more ridiculous
in the Golden Legend or the Metaphrast In regard those Books are so full of Fables that there is nothing to be credited upon their Authority As Cardinal Bellarmin has made no scruple to confess of the last But I affirm that every Man of Sence bating his Piety ought to acknowledge for true the Miracles which St Austin recites in his Confessions and his Book de Civitate Dei some of which he saw and others of which he was inform'd by the Persons themselves in whose sight they were wrought As of the Blind Man cur'd at Milan before all the People by touching the Relics of St. Gervace and Protasius which he reports in his Confession and of which he speaks in the 22d Book de Civitate Dei cap. 8. A certain Miracle was wrought at Milan when we were there when a Blind Man was restor'd to his sight which could not be unknown to Thousands For it is a large City and there was then the Emperor and the thing was done before a vast Multitude of People crowding to the Bodies of the Martyrs St. Gervase and Protasius Of a Woman cur'd in Africa by Flowrs that had touch'd the Relics of St. Stephen as he testifies in the same Book Of a Lady of Quality cur'd of a Cancer by the sign of the Cross which she caus'd to be made upon the Soar by one that was newly Baptiz'd according to a Revelation which she had had Of a Child that dy'd unbaptiz'd whose restoration to Life the Mother obtain'd by her prayers to St. Peter in the strength of her Faith invoking him in these words Holy Martyr restore me my Son thou knowest I ask his Life for no other reason but because he should not be eternally separated from God Now if these things may be suppos'd to have happen'd as they are related there is no rational Person but must acknowledge these things to be the Finger of God So that all their Incredulity could do would be to doubt of the Testimony of St. Austin and to believe him a falsifyer of the Truth to gain a Veneration of the Christian Religion among the Pagans Which is that which they have no colour to imagine First because it is not likely that a Person of his judgment would have told an untruth in things so public wherein he might have been convinc'd of falshood by infinite Numbers of Testimonies which would have redounded to the Ignominy of the Christian Religion Secondly because there was never any Person more a profess'd Enemy of Falshood then this Holy Man especially in matters of Religion having made it the work of entire Treatises to prove that it is not only unlawful to tell a lie but a thing so detestable that it is not to be made use of though for the Conversion of Men to the Christian Faith I have the more enlarg'd my self upon this remarkable example of the judgment that is to be made of the Truth of Actions to serve as a Rule upon the like occasions because we most commonly deviate in those things For every one thinks that it is sufficient for the decision of these to make a common Place which for the most part is only compos'd of Maxims which not only are not Universally True but not so much as probable when they are joyn'd with the particular Circumstances of Actions that fall under Examination And therefore Circumstances are to be compar'd and consider'd together not consider'd a part For it often happens that an Act which is not very probable in one Circumstance ought to be esteem'd and taken for certain according to other Circumstances And on the other side an Action which appears to us true according to one Circumstance which is usually joyn'd with truth ought to be deem'd false according to other weakning Circumstances as we shall make out in the following Chapter CHAP. XV. Other Remarks upon the same Subject of the Beleif of Events THere is yet one other Remark of great Moment to make upon the Belief of Events Which is that among those Circumstances which we ought to consider that we may know whether credit be to be given to the Fact or no there are some which we may call common Circumstances because they frequently occur and are far oftner joyn'd to Truth then Falshood and then if they be not Counter-ballanc'd by other particular Circumstances that ruin the motives of belief drawn from common Circumstances we have reason to believe those events if not to be certain yet at least to be probable which probability is sufficient when we are bound to pronounce our opinion in such cases For as we ought to be satisfy'd with a moral assurance in things not capable of Metaphysical certainty so when we cannot obtain a full moral assurance the best we can do when we are to resolve is to embrace the most probable for it would be contrary to reason to embrace the least probable But if on the other side these common Circumstances which would have induc'd us to believe a thing be joyn'd with other particular Circumstances that ruin the motives of belief drawn from common Circumstances or be such as are rarely found without falsehood we are not then any longer to believe that event But either we remain in suspence if the particular Circumstances enfeeble the weight of common Circumstances or we believe the action to be false if the Circumstances are such as are usually the marks of Falshood For example it is a common Circumstance for many Contracts to be sign'd by two public Notaries that is by two public Persons whose chiefest Interest it is to be just and true in their employments because not only their Conscience and Reputation but their Lives and Estates lie at Stake This consideration alone is sufficient if we know no other particularities of the contract to make us believe that the Contract is not Antidated Not but that it might be so but because it is certain that of a Thousand Contracts Nine Hundred Ninety Nine are not So that it is infinitely more probable that this contract is one of the Nine Hundred Ninety Nine then the only Antidated Contract of a Thousand So that if withal the integrity of the Notary that sign'd it be known to me I shall most certainly believe that there is no foul play in the Writing But if to this common Circumstance of being sign'd by two Notaries there are joyn'd other particular Circumstances as that the Notaries are Persons of no Conscience or Reputation so that they might be instrumental in falsifying the deed yet shall not this make me conclude that the deed is antidated But if besides all these I can discover other proofs of the Antidate either by Witnesses or convincing Arguments as the inability of the Person to lend Twenty Thousand Crowns at a time when it shall be demonstrable that he had not a Hundred in cash I will then resolve to beleive the contract to be falsify'd and it were unreasonable for any Person to
LOGIC OR THE ART OF THINKING IN WHICH Besides the Common are contain'd many excellent New Rules very profitable for directing of Reason and acquiring of Judgment in things as well relating to the Instruction of a Mans self as of others In Four Parts The First Consisting of Reflections upon Ideas or upon the first Operation of the Mind which is called Apprehension c. The Second of Considerations of Men about Proper Judgments c. The Third of the Nature and various kinds of Reasoning c. The Fourth Treats of the most profitable Method for demonstrating or illustrating any Truth c. TO WHICH Is added an INDEX to the whole BOOK For the Excellency of the Matter Printed many times in French and Latin and now for Publick Good translated into English by SEVERAL HANDS LONDON Printed by T. B. for H. Sawbridge at the Bible on Ludgate-hill 1685. AN ADVERTISEMENT OF THE AUTHOR THIS Small Treatise is altogether more beholding for its Birth to Fortune or rather to an Accident of Divertisement then to any serious Design For it happen'd That a Person of Quality entertaining a Young Nobleman who made appear a Solidity of Judgment and a Penetration of Wit much above his years among other Discourse told him that when he himself was a Young Man he had met with a Person from whom in fifteen days time he had learnt the greatest and most material Part of Logic. This Discourse gave occasion to another Person then present and one who was no great Admirer of that Science to answer with a Smile of Contempt That if Monsieur would give himself the trouble he would undertake to teach him all that was of any use in the so much cry'd up Art of Logic in four or five Days Which Proposal made in the Air having for some time serv'd us for Pastime I resolv'd to make an Essay And because I did not think the vulgar Logic's either Compendiously or Politely written I design'd an Abridgment for the particular use of the Young Gentleman himself This was the only Aim I had when I first began the Work nor did I think to have spent above a day about it But so soon as I had set my self to work so many new Reflections crowded into my Thoughts that I was constrain'd to write 'em down for the discharge of my Memory So that instead of one day I spent four or five during which time this Body of Logic was form'd to which afterwards several other things were added Now tho it swell'd to a greater Bulk of Matter then was at first intended yet had the Essay the same success which I at first expected For the young Nobleman having reduc'd the whole into four Tables he learnt with ease one a day without any assistance of a Teacher Tho true it is we cannot expect that others should be so nimble as he who had a Wit altogether extraordinary and prompt to attain whatever depended upon the Understanding And this was the accidental occasion that produc'd this Treatise But now whatever censure it may undergo in the World I cannot be justly blam'd for committing it to the Press since it was rather a forc'd then voluntary Act. For several Persons having obtain'd Copies of it in Writing which cannot well be done without several Errors of the Pen and understanding withal That several Booksellers were about to Print it I thought it better to send it into the World corrected and entire than to let it be Printed from defective Manuscripts But then again I thought my self oblig'd to make divers Additions which swell'd it above a Third Part believing the Limits of the First Essay too short for a Public View And to that purpose we have made it the Subject of the following Discourse to explain the End which we propose to our selves and the reason why we have included so much variety of Matter THE TRANSLATORS TO THE READER THE Common Treatises of LOGIC are almost without number and while every Author strives to add something of his own sometimes little to the purpose sometimes altogether from the matter the Art is become not only Obscure and Tedious but in a great measure Impertinent and Vseless Thus the Schoolmen may be said to have clogg'd and fetter'd Reason which ought to be free as Air and plain as Demonstration it self with vain misapplications of this Art to Notion and Nicety while they make use of it only to maintain litigious Cavils and wrangling Disputes So that indeed the common LOGICS are but as so many Counterscarps to shelter the obstinate and vain-glorious that disdain Submission and Convincement and therefore retire within their Fortifications of difficult Terms wrap themselves up in Quirk and Suttlety and so escape from Reason in the Clouds and Mists of their own Raising For remedy of which we are beholden to this Famous Author who has at length recover'd this Art then a noble Science when not Pedantic from Night and Confusion clear'd away the Rubbish that oppress'd it and prun'd off those Vnderwoods and superfluous Boughs that overshaded and ecclipsed the light of true Reason so that now LOGIC may be said to appear like Truth it self naked and delightful as being freed from the Pedantic Dust of the Schools It has had this Influence upon the World already that several Books have been already Written from the Rules of this LOGIC not only by the Author himself no less Celebrated for his Writings then for many other worthy Actions that recommend him to the Commonwealth of Learning Nor is his diligence in this particular less to be applauded for having cleans'd the Augean Stables of so many Systems from studied Barbarism and Delirium For which reason this LOGIC was thrice Reprinted in France so great was the satisfaction in those Parts and likewise Translated into Latin for Vniversal Benefit and now is rendered into English as being a Small Treatise no less Vseful for the Conduct of Human Life than to instruct and guide us wandring in the Labyrinths of Unsettl'd Reason Let not the Reader slightly pass these Pages over but seriously digest This Art of Thinking and being digested let him disperse the Applications into all the Judgments which he makes of Things and into all the Actions of his Life if Knowledg and Understanding be his Aim THE FIRST DISCOURSE Shewing the DESIGN Of this New Logic. THERE is nothing more worthy of Esteem than soundness of Judgment and an exact measure of Wit to discern between truth and falshood All the other faculties of the Mind are of singular use but exactness of Reason is universally profitable upon all occasions and in all the employments of Life For it is not only in the Sciences that it is a difficult thing to discern truth from error but also in all those affairs and actions both of the Body and Mind which are the subjects of human discourse There is in every one a signal difference while some are true and some are false and therefore it
belongs to Reason to make the choice Who chuse aright are they who are indu'd with an equal poise of Wit such as make a wrong choice are they whose Judgments are deprav'd wherein consists the chiefest and most Important difference between the faculties of the Understanding And therefore it ought to be the most principal Study of a Man to form and shape his Judgment and to render it the most exact that possible may be the main aim to which his utmost diligence ought to tend To this end we must make use of Reason as the Instrument to acquire Knowledg and on the other side we ought to make use of Knowledg to perfect Reason Truth of Understanding being Infinitely of greater value than all speculative Knowledg by means of the most solid and certain Sciences Which ought to be a caution to all men of Prudence not to engage farther in those speculations than while they serve to that end and only to make tryal of those Studies not to employ therein the whole force of their Wit For if the diligence of Men do not tend to this end they will not find the study of the speculative Sciences such as Geometry Astronomy and Physick to be other than a vain amuzement or that they be much more to be valued than the Ignorance of those things which at least has this advantage that it is less troublesome and does not puff Men up with that sottish vanity which they ascribe to themselves from the knowledg of those fruitless and barren Sciences The hidden secrets and misteries of those Arts are not only of little profit but altogether useless if Men consider 'em only in themselves and for themselves For Men were not born to employ their time in measuring Lines in examining the proportion of Angles or considering the different motions of Substance Their Souls are too lofty their Life too short their time too precious to busy themselves about such petty Objects But they are obliged to be just to be upright to be judicious in all their discourses in all their actions and in all affairs which they undertake Which Care and Industry is so much the more necessary by how much this one rare perfection exactness of judgment is to be admired above all others for every where we meet with none but wandring Understandings uncapable of discerning Truth who in all things take a wrong Course who satisfy themselves with corrupted reasons and fain would impose the same upon others who suffer themselves to be led away with the smallest Experiences who are always in excesses and extremities who want sufficient staidness to preserve themselves constant to the Truths which they know as adhering thereto rather by hazard then sound and judicious choice or else quite contrary continue so obstinately fix'd in their opinions that they will not so much as listen to those that could undeceive them who boldly decide and determine Arguments which they neither know nor understand and which were never yet understood by any other who make no difference at all between Speaking and Speaking or only judg of the truth of things by the tone of the Voice he that talks smoothly and gravely speaks reason he that cannot readily explain himself and seems to be in a heat must be in the wrong and more then this they know not Which is the reason that there are no absurdities how insupportable soever which do not find their Champions He that has a design to deceive the World shall not fail of Persons as ready to be gull'd and the most ridiculous Fopperies shall meet with Understandings proportionate to their Folly And indeed we ought not to wonder at any thing while we find so many People infatuated with the Fooleries of judicial Astrology and persons of gravity so seriously handling that Subject There is a certain Constellation in the Firmament which some men have been pleas'd to call a Ballance as like a Ballance as a Wind-Mill and all one This Ballance they cry is an Emblem of Justice and all that are born under that constellation shall be upright and just There are three other Signs in the Zodiac which they call the one a Ram the other a Bull the third a Goat and which they might as well have call'd an Elephant a Crocodile or a Rhinoceros Now the Ram the Bull and the Goat are Beasts that chew the Cud and therefore they that take Physick when the Moon is in any of these Constellations shall be in danger to vomit it up again These are strange extravagancies yet as extravagant as they are there are persons that utter 'em abroad for sound ware and others that as easily believe ' em This falshood of the Understanding is not only the Cause of those Errors that are intermix'd in the Sciences but of the greatest part of those faults and Crimes that are committed in Civil Life and Conversation of unjust Quarrels of ill grounded Law-suits of rash advice and of Enterprizes ill contriv'd and worse mannag'd There are few of these miscarriages that have not their source from some Errour or Defect of Judgment 〈◊〉 that there is no Defect which it more concerns a man to Correct in himself then this But as this amendment is greatly to be desir'd and wish'd for so is it equally as difficult to maintain seeing it depends much upon that measure of Intelligence which we bring into the World at our Birth For common Sence is no such Vulgar Quality as men take it to be There are an infinite company of dull and stupid Heads which are not to be reform'd by Instruction but by restraining 'em within those bounds which are proper for their Capacity and hindring 'em from medling with those things of which they are uncapable Nevertheless 't is very true that the greatest part of the fallacious Judgments among men proceed not from this Principle as being rather caus'd by the precipitation of the Brain and through defect of Consideration from whence it comes to pass that they judge rashly of what they only know obscurely and confus'dly The little regard and love of Truth in Men is the reason that they take so little pains the cheifest part of their time to distinguish what is true from what is false They admit into their Breasts all sorts of Discourses and Tenents rather choosing to suppose them to be true then to examine ' em If they understand them not they are willing to believe that others do And thus they load their memories with an infinite number of falsities and afterward argue upon those Principles never considering what they say or what they think Vanity and Presumption also contribute very much to this Miscarriage They think it a shame to doubt and not to know and they rather chuse to talk and determine at a venture then to acknowledge their not being sufficiently inform'd to judge aright Alass we are full of Ignorance and Errour and yet it is the most difficult labour in the World to draw
Logic we thought it might in some measure contribute to the publick advantage to draw from thence whatever it contain'd most serviceable to rectifie our judgments And this is cheifly the design of this Treatise together with some new Reflections that came into our thoughts while the Pen was in our hands and which indeed make up the greatest and most considerable part of the whole For we find that the ordinary Philosophers had no other intention then to set down the Rules of good and bad Arguments Now though it cannot be said that these Rules are altogether useless since many times they serve to discover the fraud of intricate and puzling Arguments and to dispose our thoughts to argue and refel in a more convincing manner nevertheless we are not to believe that this benefit extends very far the greatest part of the Errors of men not consisting in their suffering themselves to be deluded by ill Consequences but in permiting themselves to be sway'd by false judgments from whence false Consequences are drawn And this is that for which they who have hitherto treated of Logic have found but little remedy and which is therefore the subject of the new Reflections so frequent in this Treatise Nevertheless we are oblig'd to acknowledge that these Reflections which we call new because they are not to be found in Common Logics are not all the Author 's own but that we have borrow'd some from the Writings of a famous Philosopher of this Age wherein appears as much perspicuity and curiosity of Wit as there does confusion in others Some few other Reflections we have also drawn from a small Manuscript of the deceas'd Monsieur Paschal entitl'd The Soul of Geometry and this is that which we have made use of in the Ninth Chapter of the first part of the Difference between the Definitions of Name and the Definitions of Thing and the five Rules which are explain'd in the fourth Part more largely handl'd there then in this Treatise As to what we have taken out of the ordinary Logic Books our following observations declare In the first place we had a design to bring into this Treatise all that was really beneficial in others as the Rules of Figures the Divisions of Terms and Ideas with some reflections upon the Propositions other things we thought of little use as the Categories or Predicaments and Places but because they were short easie and common we did not think fit to omit 'em with a caution however what judgment to make of 'em to the end they might not be thought more useful then indeed they are We were more doubtful what to do with certain other Things sufficiently knotty but of little profit as the Conversion of Propositions the Demonstration of the Rules of Figures but at length we resolv'd not to leave 'em out the difficulty it self not being altogether useless For true it is that when it does not terminate in the knowledg of any Truth we may have reason to say Stultum est difficiles habere nugas 'T is a foolish thing to labour in difficult trifles Yet are they not altogether to be avoided when they lead us to something of Truth since it may prove to a mans advantage to exercise himself in the understanding of Truths that are intricate There are some stomacks that only digest light and delicate Dyet and there are some Wits that cannot apply themselves to the study of other then easie Truths array'd in the Ornaments of Eloquence Both the one and the other is a niceness not to be commended or rather a real Weakness For a man must endeavour to enable himself to discover Truth when it is most conceal'd and envelopp'd and to respect her in what shape soever she appears For if a man be not able to surmount that niceness and distaste which is easily conceiv'd of things that appear a little suttle and Scholastic he does but thereby contract and shrivel up his Understanding and render himself uncapable to apprehend any more then what is to be known by a long series of several Propositions So that when one Truth depends upon three or four Principles which he must necessarily consider and study all at one time he is amaz'd and foil'd and many times depriv'd of the knowledg of several things highly advantageous which is a fault of great consequence The capacity of Man's Understanding shrinks or dilates it self according to use and custom and therefore for the enlarging of the Intellect the Mathematicks and all difficult Studies chiefly conduce for they cause an expansion of thoughts and exercise 'em in diligence and embolden 'em in a steddy confidence to stick to what they know These are the reasons that induc'd us not to omit those thornie Subjects and to discourse of 'em as nicely as any other treatise of Logic. They who think 'em tedious may forbear to read 'em and indeed we have already given 'em that caution at the beginning that they may have no reason to complain since it is at their own choice to read or let 'em alone Nor did we think it necessary to mind the disgust of some persons that abhor certain terms of Art fram'd only to retain more easily the several figures of Argumentation as if they were some Charms in Magic and frequently spend their insipid jests upon Baroco and Baralipton as being too Pedantical for we look'd upon their Puns to be more Pedantical then the words for there is nothing ridiculous in the Terms provided they be not ador'd for too great Misteries for it would be very absurd indeed for a Man that was going to dispute to admonish his opponent before-hand that he intended to dispute in Baroco or Felapton Men sometimes make an ill use of that reproach of Pedantry and sometimes fall into it themselves while they lay it upon others Pedantry is a Vice of the Mind not of the Profession for there are Pedants in all habits of all conditions and all qualities To utter Law and mean things in bombast expressions to bring in Greek and Latin by head and shoulders to be in a pelting chafe about the order of the Attick Months the habits of the Macedonians or such like frivolous disputes outragiously to abuse another that is not of his opinion about a passage in Seutonius or about the Etimologie of a word as if his Religion and his Country lay at Stake to endeavour to raise all the World against a Man as a disturber of the peace of Christendom that has not a venerable opinion of Cicero as Julius Scaliger has endeavour'd to do against Erasmus to interest himself for the reputation of an antient Philosopher as if he were one of his nearest Relations this is properly that which entitles a Man to Pedantry But to make use of a term of Art ingeniously found out for the ease of the Memory may be easily allow'd without any such reproach It remains that we should give a reason for omitting so many questions as are found
For finding the Reputation of great Men not free from noted slips we are incited by Care and Industry to preserve our selves from the like surprizes Moreover seeing every Man is bound to make what he writes as profitable as may be therefore of set purpose those examples of Errors are to be produc'd of which it most imports us not to be Ignorant For it would be an endless toil to remember all the dreams and trifles of Flud Vanhelmont and Paracelsus And therefore it is better to search examples in famous Authors whose Errors it may be worth while to understand Now all this is to be found in Aristotle to a Hair's Breadth For nothing can so effectually perswade a Man to avoid a fault as to shew that such a Man as he stumbled at the same Block And his Philosophy is become so famous through the vast number of deserving Persons that have embrac'd it that there is all the reason in the World his defects should be expos'd Which being so we thought it would be worth while for the Reader to take a review of the maxims of the Peripatetic Philosophy yet because it is never good to be deluded those Maxims are so propos'd that what they are may be easily known as having cursorily mark'd out the defects for farther detection of their fallacies Which we have not done to lessen the Reputation of Aristotle but rather to do him honour as much as may be done by those that differ in opinion from him And 't is visible in other places that the points which are tax'd of errors are of no great Importance nor shake the foundations of his Philosophy which we had no Intention to assail But if we make no mention of those things wherein Aristotle has excell'd in several of his Books the reason was this because the series of the discourse did not afford an opportunity so to do which however we would willingly and gladly have done if occasion had offer'd nor had Aristotle wanted his due applause who beyond all controversy was a person of a capacious and searching Genius upon which he relying has link'd together long Chains of consequences in such matters upon which he discours'd and therefore he has been very prosperous in what he has written in the second Book of his Rhetorick concerning the Passions Egregious also are his notions and observations which he has delivered in his Politicks his Ethics his Problems and his History of Animals and as confus'd as his Analtics are yet we must confess that almost all we know concerning the Rules of Logic is taken from thence so that there is not any Author from whom we have borrowed more then from Aristotle in this Logic as one to whom the Body of the precepts belong True it is that the most imperfect of his Works seems to be his Phisicks as being also that which for a long time has been condemn'd and forbidden by the Church as a Learned Person has made appear in a Treatise written to that purpose though the principal fault of it was not that it was false but that it was too true and taught nothing but such things as could not be conceal'd from our Knowledg For whoever doubted but that all things were composed of matter and a certain form of matter Whether matter being to put on form did not want it before that is to say whether it did not suffer Privation Or whoever question'd those other principles of his Metaphisicks wherein we are taught that all things depend upon form that bare matter is void of action that there are place motion faculties and qualities But after all this we do not seem to have learnt any thing new or are we more able to give a reason of any of Natures Effects But if there be any persons a many there are who believe it a Crime to dissent from Aristotle it will be no difficult thing to make it appear how far remote from Reason such a vain assertion is For if we are oblig'd to reverence the memory of some Philosophers that is only for two Reasons either out of a prospect of the truth to which they have adher'd or for the Reputation which they have acquir'd among the Learned For the sake of Truth we reverence 'em when they keep close to it but truth does not require that we should honour falshood in whomsoever it appears As for the consent of Men in the approbation of a Philosopher certain it is that 't is a good reason for giving respect nor can it be denied but very imprudently without great weariness And the reason is because in contradicting the generality we may be justly suspected of Presumption as believing our selves more clear-sighted then so many others But when the learned World is divided in their opinions as to the worth of an Author and that Persons of Reputation appear on both sides we are not then oblig'd to that Reservedness and we may freely declare what we approve and what we dislike in those Writings about which the Learned are divided For then we do not oppose our Sentiments against the Sense of the Author and his Abetters but side with those that maintain the contrary Party And now behold the true Condition of Aristotle at this day His Philosophy has experienc'd both Fortunes somtimes exploded and condemn'd by all otherwhile receiv'd and applauded by all at this day it is reduc'd into a middle Condition between the two Extreams In France Flanders England Germany and Holland they write frequently for and against Aristotle's Philosophy The Parisian Conferences as well as their Writings are divided into two parts nor does any one complain of this open War declar'd against him The most famous Professors no longer condemn themselves to that slavery of blindly receiving and maintaining whatever they find in his Books and some of his Opinions are utterly exterminated for what Physician will now maintain that the Nerves proceed from the Heart as Aristotle believ'd since Anatomy clearly demonstrates now that they derive ther Original from the Brain Whence proceeded that saying of St. Austin Qui ex puncto cerebri quasi Centro omnes Sensus diffudit Who diffus'd all the Senses from the point and as it were the Center of the Brain And what Philosopher dares be so obstinate as to affirm that the swiftness of ponderous things descending encreases proportionably to the proportion of their weight When any Man may end this dispute by letting two ponderous Bodies never so unequal in proportion fall from a high place at what time he shall find very little difference in the swiftness of their Motion All things violent are of short Continuance and all extreams are violent 'T is very hard measure to proscribe all Aristotle's opinions as formerly has been done On the other side it is an unreasonable Servitude for a Man to pledg his assent to all he has written and to allow only him for the standard of Philosophy as afterwards they went about to do Men
Instruction another for Flattery another for Reprehension Sometimes a man is willing that his Voice should not only reach the Ears of him he speaks to but that it should peirce and run through ' em Nor would any one think it well that a Lacquey being loudly and vehemently reprov'd should answer Sir speak lower I hear you well enough For 't is the Tone of the Voice that makes one part of the Reproof and it is necessary to imprint that Idea in the mind of the Servant which the Master would have it make But sometimes these accessory Ideas are fix'd to the words themselves for that usually they thoroughly excite those that pronounce ' em And this is the reason that among several expressions that seem to signifie the same thing some are injurious some are mild some modest others impudent some honest others dishonest for that besides the principal Idea with which they agree men have affix'd other Ideas which are the cause of this variety And this observation may serve to discover a peice of Injustice very usual among those who complain of the reproaches thrown upon 'em which is to change the Substantives into Adjectives For example if they are accus'd of Ignorance or Imposture presently they cry out for being call'd ignorant and falsifying fellows which is not reasonable because that the words do not signifie the same thing for the Adjective ignorant and falsifiing beside the signification of the offence which they discover they include the Idea of Scorn whereas the Substantives of ignorance and imposture denote the thing to be such as it is without aggravation or extenuation And we might instance other things that would signifie the same thing after such a manner as would include moreover a soft and lenifying Idea and which would demonstrate that the person had a desire to excuse and extenuate the Crime which he laid to the others charge And those are the ways which prudent and moderate men make use of unless some reason prevail with 'em to act with more tartness and vehemency Hence also may be understood the difference between a plain and a figur'd Stile and why the same thoughts seem much more lovely when they are express'd by a figure then if they were restrain'd to a plain manner of Speech Which proceeds from hence that figur'd expressions besides the principal thing signifie the Motion and Gesture of him that speaks and imprint both the one and the other Idea in the mind whereas simple expressions sets forth only the naked Truth For example of this half Verse of Virgil Vsque adeone mori miserum est were express'd simply and without a Figure Non est usque adeo mori miserum Without doubt the sentence would not have had that force and the reason is because the first Expression signifies more then the second for it does not only express the thought that it is not so miserable a thing as Men think to die but it represents also the Idea of a Man as it were provoking death and undauntedly looking it in the face which without question is a great and lively Accession to the signification of the words Hence it is no wonder that it makes a deep impression in the Hearer for the mind is only instructed by the verity of Ideas but she is not rous'd but by the representation of Affections sivis me flere dolendum est Primum ipse tibi If thou wouldst have me weep it first behoves thy self to grieve But as figur'd stile not only signifies the things themselves but also those affections of the mind which we conceive in meditating and speaking we may judge from thence the use which we ought to make of it and what are the Subjects most proper for it Visible it is that it is ridiculous to make use of it in matters meerly speculative which we contemplate with a calm and placid Eye and which produce no motion in the Mind For since that Figures express the Passions of the Soul when Figures are intermix'd where the Soul is no way mov'd such agitations of the Mind are contrary to Nature and seem to be a kind of Convulsion For which reason there can be nothing more preposterous then the stir and hurlyburly which some Preachers make who fly out into fury and extravagant Bombasts upon all manner of Subjects and who are no less furious upon Philosophical Digressions then upon truths the most weighty and necessary for Salvation On the other side when the Subject of the Discourse is such that it requires a rousing and waking of the mind it is a fault to deliver himself in a jejune and frigid stile and without any manner of motion Therefore Divine Truths not being simply propos'd only to be known but much more to be belov'd reverenc'd and ador'd by Men without doubt the noble elevated and figur'd manner of Elocution observ'd by the Holy Fathers is much more proportionable to the Subject then a flat and meager Stile like that of the Scholastics since it not only teaches us the Truths we are to know but also endeavours to raise in us those Sentiments of Love Reverence and Affection which the Fathers had for those Truths when they wrote and which representing to us the Image of that Holy disposition must of necessity contribute more to imprint the like in us Whereas the Scholastic stile being plain and contenting it self with the Ideas of the Naked Truth is nothing so effectual to produce in our Souls those Motions of Respect and Love which we ought to have for the Truths of Christianity which render it not only less profitable but less delightful since the soul it self is more delighted in observing the motions of her affections then in acquiring knowledg Lastly 't is by means of this Observation that we may resolve that famous Question among the Ancient Philosophers whether there be any words to be counted unchast And by which we may also refute the Arguments of the Stoicks who justify'd that we might make use indifferently of any words though impudent and obscene They were of opinion saith Cicero in a Letter which he wrote upon this Subject that there were no words that were either nastie or obscene for they say that the obscenity proceeds either from the things or it is in the words It does not proceed simply from the things because they may be express'd in other words that are not esteem'd so nauseous nor is it in the words consider'd as they are because it happens ofttimes that one word signifies two things and so in one signification it may be nauseous in another well enough approv'd But all this is no more then a vain piece of suttlety which grew from hence that those Philosophers did not consider those accessory accidents which the mind adds to the principal Ideas of things for from thence it comes to pass that one and the same thing may be express'd honestly by one sound and lasciviously by another if one of the sounds has
excellent discourse of St. Austin upon this Subject in his tenth Book of the Trinity where he shews that there is nothing so easy as to know the nature of our Soul But that which confounds men is this that being desirous to know it they are not satisfied with what they know without any great trouble that is to say that it is a Substance that thinks desires doubts and knows but they add to what it is what it is not fancying the Soul under some of those Phantosms under which they were wont to conceive Corporeal things On the other side when we consider Bodies we have much adoe to abstain from intermixing something of the Idea of the Substance that thinks hence we affirm that heavy things tend to the Center of Plants that they seek for proper nourishment of Crisis's in Diseases that it is nature that goes about to discharge it self of what is baneful and a thousand other Whimseys More especially in our Bodies that Nature has an Inclination to do this or that when we are assur'd that we have no such desire nor ever had any such thought and that it is ridiculous to imagine that there is within us any other thing then our selves that knows what is good or hurtful for us that desires the one and eschews the other I believe moreover that we are to attribute to these incompatible Ideas all those murmurings of Men against the Deities for it would be impossible to murmur against God if we conceiv'd him aright as he is altogether Wise Omnipotent and all Goodness But the Ungodly considering him as Omnipotent and the Sovereign Lord of all the World attribute to him all the misfortunes that befall 'em wherein they are not deceiv'd but because at the same time they apprehend him to be cruel and unjust which is incompatible with his goodness they impiously inveigh against him as the Author of the miseries which they suffer CHAP. VI. Of Complex Propositions according to Affirmation and Negation of one sort of those kinds of Propositions which the Philosophers call Modal BEsides those Propositions where the Subject or Attribute is a Term Complex there are also others that are Complex because there are Terms or incident Propositions which only regard the form of the Proposition that is the Affirmation or Negation which is express'd by the Verb as if I should say I affirm that the Earth is round Here I affirm is only an incident Proposition which ought to make a part of something in the principal Proposition Nevertheless it is visible that it makes no part either of the Subject or of the Attribute for they suffer no alteration as being understood as entirely as if I should simply aver the Earth is round So that the incident Proposition falls only upon the Affirmation which is express'd in two manners the one most commonly by the Verb Est the Earth is round and the other expresly by the Verb I maintain So when they say I deny it it is true it is not true Or when they add in one Proposition that which supports the Truth as when I say The Reasons of Astronomy convince us that the Sun is much bigger then the Earth For the first part is only a support of the Argument Nevertheless it is of great Moment to know that there are a sort of these Propositions which are Ambiguous and which may be taken differently according to the design of the Propounder As when I say all Philosophers assure us that heavy things fall of themselves Now if it be my Intention to shew that heavy things fall down of themselves the first part of this Proposition will be only Incident and will only support the affirmation of the latter part But if I intend to report this opinion of the Philosophers without approving it then the first part will be the principal Proposition and the last will only be a part of the Attribute For so I affirm not only that heavy things fall of themselves but that all Philosophers assert it And it is easily seen that these two ways of changing the proposition alter it in manner that it becomes two different Propositions and different in Sence But it is easy to judg by the Consequence in which of the two Senses the Propositions are to be taken For Example the Proposition being laid down I should add But Stones are heavy therefore they fall down of themselves would be plain that I had taken the first Sence and that the first part was only Incident On the other side if I should conclude thus Now this is an Error and by consequence an Error may be taught by the Philosophers then it would be manifest that I had taken the Proposition in the second Sence that is that the first part will be the principal Proposition and the second part only the predicate As for Complex Propositions where the Complexity falls upon the verb and not upon the Subject nor the Predicate Philosophers have particularly taken notice of those that are called Modal because the Affirmation or Negation is modified by one of the four Modes Possible Contingent Impossible Necessary And because every Mode may be affirm'd or denied as it is possible it is not possible and in both manners be join'd with the Affirmative or Negative Proposition every Mode may have four Propositions and the four together sixteen which are denoted by these four words PVRPVREA ILIACE AMABIMVS EDENTVLI of which this is the Mistery Every Syllable marks one of the four Modes 1. Possible 2. Contingent 3. Impossible 4. Necessary And the Vowels in every Syllable which are A. E. I. or U. denotes whether the Mode be affirm'd or denied and whether the Proposition which they call the Thing said ought to be denied or affirm'd in this manner A. The Affirmation of the Mode and the Affirmation of the Proposition E. The Affirmation of the Mode and denial of the Proposition I. The denial of the Mode and Affirmation of the Proposition U. The denial of the Mode and denial of the Negation It would be lost time to produce Examples which are easily found out We are only to observe that PVRPVREA answers to the A of Propositions Incomplex ILIACE to the E. AMABIMVS to the I. EDENTVLI to the U. So that if we intend the Example should be true having chosen a Subject we must take for Purpurea an Attribute that may be universally affirm'd For Iliace one that may be universally denied For Amabimus one that may be affirm'd particularly and for Edentili one that may be denied particularly But whatever Predicate we take this is always certain that all the four Propositions of the same word have always the same Sence so that one being true all the rest are true CHAP. VII Of several sorts of Compos'd Propositions WE have already said that compos'd Propositions have either a double Subject or a double Predicate Now of these there are two sorts One where the Composition is expresly mark'd the rest
then the endeavours of some persons of this latter Age to prove that St. Peter never was at Rome They cannot deny this Truth to be attested by all the Ecclesiastic Writers and those the most ancient as Papias Dionisius of Corinth Caius Irenaeus Tertullian against whom there is not any one that has made the the least Contradiction Nevertheless they imagine they can ruin this Truth by Conjectures for example because St. Paul makes no mention of St. Peter in his Epistles written to Rome and when they are answer'd that St. Peter might be then absent from Rome in regard he is not said to have fix'd his seat there as being one that often travail'd abroad to Preach the Gospel in other places they reply that this is urg'd without any Proof which is Impertinent because the Act which they oppose being one of the most confirm'd Truths in Ecclesiastical History it is sufficient for those that uphold it to reconcile these pretended Contrarieties as they do those of the Scripture it self for which as we have shew'd Possibillity is sufficient CHAP. VII An Application of the preceeding Rule to the Belief of Miracles THE Rule which we have explain'd is without doubt of great Importance for the well regulating our Reason in the belief of particular Acts. For want of the due Observation of which we are in great danger of falling into the two dangerous extremities of Credulity and Incredulity For example there are some who make a Conscience of questioning any Miracle because they have a fancy that they should be oblig'd to question all should they question any and for that they are perswaded that it is enough for them by knowing that all things are possible with God to believe whatever is told 'em touching the Effects of his Omnipotency Others as ridiculously imagin that it is in the Power of the Understanding to call all Miracles in question for no other reason because so many have been related that have prov'd to be false and therefore there is no more reason to believe the one than the other The Inclination of the first is much more tolerable than that of the latter tho true it is that both the one and the other argue equally amiss They both depend upon common Places The first upon the Power and Goodness of God upon certain and unquestionable Miracles which they bring for proof of those that are called in question and upon the Blindness of Libertines who will believe nothing but what is proportionable to their Reason All this is very good in it's self but very weak to convince us of a particular Miracle For God does not always act according to his Power nor is it an Argument that a Miracle was wrought because others of the same nature have been wrought And we may do well to believe what is above our Reason without being oblig'd to believe all that Men are pleas'd to obtrude upon us as being above our Reason The latter make use of common Places of another sort Truth says one of 'em and Falshood appear with Countenances alike the same Gate the same Steps we behold with the same Eyes I have seen the rise of several miracles in my Time And tho' they vanish'd in the birth yet we cannot but foresee the Train they would have gathered had they liv'd to their full Age. For it is but to find out the end of the Thread and to cut it into as many peices as we please and there is not a greater distance between nothing and the smallest thing in the World then there is between this and the greatest Now the first that were intoxicated with this beginning of Novelty coming to spread their History find by the opposition which they meet with where the difficulty of Perswasion lodges and make it their business to Fucus over that part of a false Peice Particular Error first causes publick Mistake and afterwards publick mistake causes particular Error Thus the whole Structure of the miracle by some pull'd down by others upheld and by addition enlarg'd at length grows up to a considerable Pile So that the most remote Witness is better instructed then he that lives close by and the last that heard of it better confirm'd then the first Publisher This Discourse is ingenious and may be profitable to prevent us from being led away with every Idle Report But it would be an Extravagance from hence to conclude generally that we ought to suspect whatever is said of Miracles For certain it is that what is here alledg'd relates only to those things which are taken up upon common Fame without enquiring into the original cause of the Report And we have no reason to be confident of what we know upon no better grounds But who so blind as not to see that we may make a common place opposite to this and that at least upon as good a Foundation For as there are some miracles that would deserve but little credit should we enquire into their Original so there are others that vanish out of the memories of Men or which find but little credit in their judgments because they will not take the pains to inform themselves Our understanding is not subject only to one sort of distemper but several and those quite contrary There is a sottish stupidity that believes all things the least probable But there is a conceited presumption that condemns for false whatever surpases the narrow limits of the understanding Sometimes we hunt after trifles and neglect things of greatest moment False stories spread themselves every where while true ones can hardly get liberty to creep abroad Few Persons have heard of the miracle that happen'd in our time at Faramonstier in the Person of a Nun so blind that hardly the Balls of her Eyes were left in her Head who recover'd her sight by touching the Reliques of St. Fara as I am assur'd by the Testimony of a Person that saw her in both conditions St. Austin affirms that many real miracles were wrought in his time that were known but to few and which though most remarkable and wonderful spread no farther then from one end of the Town to the other Which induc'd him to write and relate in his Sermons to the People such as were most certain And he observes in his Twenty second Book of the City of God that in the single city of Hippo near Seventy Miracles were wrâ—â—â—â—â— within two years after the Building of a Chappel in Honour of St. Stephen besides a great number of others which he did not commit to writing which however he testifies to be true upon his knowledge We therefore see that there is nothing more irrational then to guide our selves by common places upon these occasions whether it be in rejecting all Miracles or embracing all And therefore we must examin 'em by their particular Circumstances and by the credit and knowledg of the Reporters Piety does not not oblige a Man of Sence to believe all the Miracles