hinders me from placing it in this is Because I allow not any reflex act of Willing in God besides that direct act of Working who is yet a most Free Agent For beside other reasons that if need were might be produced it stands not with Gods Simplicity to admit distinct acts in God whereof one should be the Object of another Now what strength there is in this to hinder the placing of Freedome in this Reflex act I propose to be considered rather then Affirm But I rather place the nature of the Wills Liberty in a Freedome from Servitude that it is not under the command of any Creature or a Naturall Determination of its own And therfore though it be free from such servitude as a Naturall agent or such as may be Forced is subject to yet it is not free from Gods Command Nor perhaps from the dictate of Reason neither Or if it be yet is not this its Freedome but its Weaknesse And this is not far distant from the received opinion which makes it consist in Indifferentiâ For the Will can agere vel non agere notwithstanding anything to the contrary from the Creature but it cannot agere vel non agere notwithstanding the Decree of God and therfore is not Free from that Determination And whereas other things are from God determined mediante causa secundâ the Will is Immediately determined a causa primâ And therefore what he cites out of Rutterfort That granting all things to be under an absolute Decree it is fond to aske Whether the Free Creature remain indifferent to doe or not to doe I willingly assent unto But you must consider withall that This Freedome neither the Angels have nor had Adam in his Innocencie And therefore when Divines tell us that by the Fall we have lost our Liberty or Freedome of Will in Spirituall things which yet we retain in Morall and Civill Actions I desire that they would more punctually set down What the Liberty is which we retain in Naturall things but want in Spirituall What Liberty that is which the Angels have and Man once had but hath now lost And not speak of such a Liberty as neither Man or Angel ever had nor is it possible for any Creature to have Nay not for God himselfe For God having once decreed cannot with his Truth revoke it nor is indifferent to execute it or not But as They say of Jupiter which make Him to be the Author of their Stoicall unavoidable Fate understanding it cum grano salis He once Commanded and ever after Obeyed There follows in the next place an Objection How it comes to passe if Faith and Knowledge be One that some who have more Knowledge have lesse Faith I need not recite his Lordships Answer I will only propose my own If there be meant a Physicall Identity whereby two Modi of the same Thing doe subsist by the subsistence of their common Subject it is not hard to determine For two Modifications of the same Thing may yet be independent of each other And therefore it is not requisite they should be both in the same measure or degree 2. If by Knowledge be meant an assent to Naturall truths and by Faith an assent to Supernaturall truths neither is here any difficulty For the Knowledge of one thing is not inconsistent with the Ignorance of another thing 3. â—f Knowledge and Faith be considered in relation to the same Object Spirituall truths or Saving truth and Faith be taken for an Intellectuall assent to them Then is it not true that there is in any if you speak adidâ—m more Knowledge and lesse Faith what any Knows to be Thus he cannot Beleeve to be Otherwise For the Understanding is not a Free faculty that it can either Accept or Reject a reveiled Truth 4. If by Faith be meant not an Assent in the Vnderstanding to the Truth Known but a Consent in the Will an imbracing of it which is the Iustifying act of Faith Neither is this difficulty much greater then the former For the too too frequent sinnes even in Gods children against light makes it over manifest That the Action of the Will doth not always follow the Knowledge of the Understanding And yet if this too cleare experience be not able to prove it but that you still lay all the blame upon the Understanding as not being cleare enough in its Apprehensions or not sufficiently Peremptory in its Dictates and so excuse the Will of all Remissenesse I demand then what disability there is in the Will of Man since the fall more then in the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven I cannot think but that the Image of God by the Fall is defaced in the Will as well as in the Understanding and yet if the Will doe never disobey the Light of Reason which is its sole immediate Guide I see not wherein this disability doth appear I grant that the Will doth always Follow the Understanding that is it never goes before it or without it it goes never but where the Understanding hath led the way in discovering some Good more or lesse something Desirable For the Will is Caeca potentia and Knows of nothing desirable but what the Understanding discovers And Knowing nothing can Desire nothing Ignoti nulla Cupido But yet I grant not that Proposition in this sense The will Allwayes follows the Understanding that is It never stays behind For to Omit what the Understanding commands requires not a discovery of some other Good but only an Impotency a Backwardnesse or Remisnesse to doe its Duty To goe without direction requires a Positive Cause because it is a Positive Act But Not to goe when it is directed may proceed from a Negative Cause Negatio Causae because it is a Negative Act or a Not-doing A lame man doth not runne when he knows that he ought to runne yet here is no need of a Positive Cause to stay him but his Impotency a Negative cause sufficeth And thus farre do I admit that distinction of Libertas Contrarietatis and Libertas Contradictionis though in that way in which it is ordinarily made use of I doe wholly reject it There is not in the Will an Indifferency to choose Good or to choose Evill neither yet to Choose good or Reject good velle nolle both which they call Libertas Contrietatis For the Understanding doth not shew any Amiablenesse or Lovelynesse in Evill nor any Odiousnesse in Good quatenus sic and therefore the Will cannot Desire Evill nor Reject Good Nolle or Velle non For Bonitas is Objectum formale Appetitûs and Malum is the formall Object of Nolition Now the Soule cannot velle quatenus bonum that in which no Good is apprehended nor nolle quatenus malum that is velle ut non sit that wherein it apprehends no Evill But for the other kinde of Indifferency which they call Libertas Contradictionis to Will good or Not Will it to Nill Evill or Not to Nill it
wee should make Reason and Faith the Same that there is to make the Faculty and the Habit the Same Reason is a Faculty Faith a Habit Now a Faculty and a Habit I have before sayd not to be res res but res modus Their Physicall Difference therefore I mean if you consider Faith and Reason in the same man is but Modall But it doth not follow from hence That they differ not in Nature For though an Habit have not Entitatem Rei distinct from the Faculty yet it hath Entitatem Modi so that the Habit is not a Faculty neither is the Faculty an Habit. To enquire of a Physicall Identity and of a Metaphysicall or Formall Identity are quaere's farre distinct The Faith of Peter is Really and Physically distinct from the Faith of Paul and yet their Metaphysicall Formall nature is exactly the Same Again all the Modall Beings in the same subject though their Essence and Nature be never so distinct v. g. Duration Augmentation Situation c in the same man be Really the same for neither of them being Modi have any Entitatem Rei beside the Entity of their common Subject and so cannot make a Reall distinction because there is not res res Yet each Modus hath a distinct Formall nature of its own The nature of a Figure is not the nature of a Habit though both in the same Subject But yet though it doe not follow from that Reall Identity between Res Modus that the Nature of Reason and the Nature of Faith be the same Yet if he change but the terms and say in stead of Reason that Knowledge and Faith are the same in nature I will not contend So that he mean Faith as it is an Act or Habit of the Vnderstanding and not of the Will For so Faith is an Assent to a Truth reveiled the same individuall Assent to the same Truth may be both Cognitio Scientiae and Cognitio Fidei I will instance in the Creation of the world By Faith we know that the worlds were made and Assent to it And by naturall Demonstrations it may be proved that the world was made and these also are sufficient to perswade assent Now we from both grounds joyntly assent to this Proposition That the world was made The which Assent in respect of the one Ground propter evidentiam rei is an assent of Science or Naturall Knowledge in regard of the other Ground Propter authoritatem dicentis is an assent of Faith or Supernaturall and reveiled Knowledge The assent of Science and of Faith differ not in their Form but in their Efficient But if he speak of Saving Faith quatenus Salvifica as it doth Save so it is an act of the Will and not of the Understanding and therefore differs from Knowledge But to conclude this If we speak of a Physicall difference or distinction Then all the Modi that belong to the same Thing can admit of no more then a Modall distinction because having no other Entitatem Rei but that of the common Subiect their Entitas Rei must be Common there cannot be Res Res the difference must be either tanquam Res Modus or tanquam Modus Modus And here is no consideration of the Nature of these Modi In distinct Things The Modi are Really distinct and not Modally though these Modi be exactly of the same nature as the Roundnesse of severall Circles For they not having Entitatem Rei besides the Entity of their Subjects their Subjects being really distinct they must be really distinct also Thus in the present case The Faith of Peter is really distinct from the Faith of Paul But Faith in Peter from Reason in Peter is only Modally distinct tanquam Res Modus viz. If you make Reason to be Res or a Faculty Really distinct from the soule and the Habit of Faith in Peter will be distinct from all other Habits in Peter v. g. from the Habit of Knowledge tanquam Modus Modus But if wee speak not of a Physicall but of a Metaphysicall Difference Here it little avails to enquire of their Physicall Difference or Identity For those things that are really distinct as two Souls may yet agree in the same Specificall Nature and those which are not really distinct as severall Modi of the same Thing may have their Formall Specificall differences Again though it be granted that Naturall Knowledge attained by by the use of Reason without a supernaturall Revelation be of the same Nature with Faith Yet doth it not presently follow That their difference is Graduall and the one but a greater Degree of the same Light For Skill in Musick and Skill in Metalls or Mineralls are both Naturall Habits yet the Skill of a Musician and the Skill of a Chymist are not the Same though of the same nature neither yet is their difference Graduall For the one is not the way to attain the other and the other a Perfection of that former And moreover a man may be skilfull in either of them without a knowledge of the other whereas a Greater Degree of Knowledge in the same Kind cannot be without the Lesser That which follows concerning Falling from Grace and the Freedome of the Will as also what proceeds How farre we do acti agere that is How farre and In what manner the First cause doth concurre with the Second in its Operations require a larger discourse for the deciding of them then to be toucht at in transitu and by the way I shall therefore say onely this and so passe them over Liberty and Servitude are opposit and both are Relative terms He that is Free from the Dominion of one Master may be a Servant a Slave to another Thus the Will though it be Free from any Naturall Necessity either from within or without so that it be neither determined by an inward Principle as meer Naturall Agents are neither can have either Compulsion or Necessity imposed upon it by the command of another Creature Yet is it not Free from the Command and Power of God by whose Absolute Decree it is determined We must not so farre affect to be Liberi that we become Sacrilegi we must not vindicate our Liberty by committing Sacriledge exempting our selves from being under the Power of a Deity If I were now to examine the nature of Freedome wherein it consists I might perhaps place it in a Spontaneity that it acts without reluctancy Sponte agit Were it not that even Naturall Agents as a Stone falling have such a free action without Constraint without Reluctancie Or it might be placed perhaps in a Reflection upon its own Act whereby it doth not onely Agere yea and Sponte or volens agere without a Nolition a Renitentia But also Vult agere Whereas a Naturall agent though perhaps Sponte or Volens agit yet you cannot say Vult agere because there is not a Reflection whereby it Willeth its Action That which
thus also Ens Verum converâ—uâ—tâ—r For whatsoevâ—r is may bâ—e â—nâ—wn to be This Veritas iâ— nothing â—lse but Cognoscibilitas Thâ—reâ—ore Veritas as it is Affectio Entis is dâ—finâ—d by some to be Convenieâ—â—ia râ—i seu Coâ—formitâ—s rei â—um Iâ—tellâ—ctâ— â—ive humano â—ive diâ—â—â—â— Thus Truth in the Things and Knowledge in the Understanding have â—elation to each other as Objectum aâ—â— Pâ—tentia As Colour in the Object to Sight in the Eye Colour as it is inherent in a Body makes it to be Coloured corâ—us coloratum The same Colour as it stands in relation to the Eye makes it to be Visible corpus visibilâ— Thus Essence or Being as it is in the â—hing constitutes it in the nature of a Thing or a Being And the saâ—e â—â—â—â—nce in the thing as it hath relation to the Understanding makes it â—ognosâ—ibile â—n the first sense it is Veritas Essendi in the second it is Veritas Cognosâ—endâ— Where tâ—e consâ—â—uction will be somewhat hard excâ—â—t you give Philosophers leave to use the Gâ—â—â—â—d in a Possive signification which amongst pure â—rammariaâ—s is more raâ—â—ly â—â—und For by the sâ—me Eâ—seâ—câ— by which it is Ens by the same it is Cognoscibile That Being by which it is by the same it â—â—y be â—â—own to be As by the same Colour by which the object is Colorâ—tum it is also Visibile And this â— conceive to be the right acceptation of Metaphysicall Truth or Truth as it is taken in Metaphysicks for an Affection of Being not being a Thing Really diâ—â—incâ— for that thing that truly is and may be truly known to be But as they call it Modus Entis And now we be come somwhat nâ—eâ—er that acceptation of Truth wherein his Loâ—â— takes it though if I mistake him not that sense wherein he useth it is somewhat distinct from all these For whether you consider the Truth of â—eing or the Truth of Knowledge they are in themselves really the Same and the same â—lâ—â— really with that Ens tâ—â—â— Being which truâ—y Is and is truly Kâ—oâ—n â—â— be which thing 〈…〉 a being and as truly Cognosâ—â—ble when there is no Understanding present to take notice of it as when it is actually Undersâ—â—â—d â—â—â—e aâ— an Object is â—â—uly Colâ—uâ—ed and truly Visible even then when â—â—â—re is no â—ye present to behold it And therefore this truth cannot be One with the Understanding because it may be then and there where the Understanding is not Again Truth being as I said One with the Thing known if it â—â— also One with the Understanding or the Soule the Understanding or Soule knowing shall be One with the Thing understood A Sâ—one and the Soule shall be one Individuall Being For how can Truth be the same with the Stone and the same with the Soul except the Soul and the Stone be the same Object But you will say thiâ— is that he contends for not only that Truth understood is one with the Soul but that both the Thing understood and the Souâ— understanding are this Truth Answ 1. To proceed therefore If the Stone understood and the Soule understanding be the Same then when began this Unity â—â—â—â— Identy Were they the Same before the Stone was actually understood Or did they then contract this Unity when first the Soul did actually Know it Why they should be the same Before the act of Knowing there 〈…〉 no more reason then why one â—â—â—ne should be the same with â—…ne â—â—y one man should be the same with another man And so Peter or Paul might be â—s truly said to bâ—â—ray Christ as Juâ—â—â— if Peter and Judas be one and the same And if they should â—â—â—n â—â—ntrâ—â—â— aâ— Unity and not before when the Understanding â—oâ—h â—â—â—sâ— Actually understand it we must taâ—e â—â—â—â— saying Intellâ—ctâ—s iâ—â—elligâ—â—do â—mâ—â—a â—it â—mnâ—a in a more grâ—â—â—e 〈…〉 it wâ—â— mâ—â—â—â— Aâ—â— â—â—â—y jâ—â—â—emenâ— it iâ— uttâ—â—ly impossible for that which hath â—â—â—â— been Alâ—udâ—â— â—â— be made Idem â—s also for that which is Oâ—â— to â—e made Aâ—â—ud a sâ—ipsâ— I say â—â— iâ— impossible for two things to be made oneâ—nd â—nd the sâ—me by a Reâ—ll Identitie 'T is true Two things may be so united as to be made One Aggregaâ—um as the Body and the soul make one Mâ—n the Diviâ—â—â—y and Humanity of Christ make â—nâ— Person But that two things can become the same that the Soule is the Body and the Body the Soule that the Humanity of Christ is his Divinity and his Divinity his Humanity I conceive not onely false but impossible The Hand and the Foot with the rest of the members make one Body but neither the Hand is the Foot nor is the Foot the Hand but really distinct Answ 2. But further as it is hard to shew when this neer kindred either of Affinity or Consanguinity this Union either of Identity or of Identification had its first Originall So if there be any such Vnion either conâ—ate or contracted between the Soul and a Stone Then will not onely One but All Soules at least all soules actually understanding and apprehending it be the same with this Stone And these Soules being one and the same with this one individuall stone they will be one and the same with each other Thus we shall have but one Soule informing all Bodies not by a Pythagoricall Metempsychosis by translating of soules from one body to another but as Aâ—â—mus Averroisticus one soule extended through the whole Universe informing so many men as there be bodies wherof every man is partaker tanquam communis aurâ— Nay neerer for of the Ayr each takes a part but as for this Soul each Is each Hath this Soule entire Neither doth it inferre onely an Identity of Soules but an Identity of Objects also For all Objects being apprehended by one Soul they become all One with it And being all one with the same numericall Soule they must be also One with each other So that all Soules will thus be One all Objects will be but One and this One Object one and the same with that One Soule and all the World but Vnum Ens whose every parcell is alteri â—dem the same with each other Object You 'l say All this is no more then he contends for to make Truth One with the Soule and that all things that are are nothing but this One Truth Answ If this be his opinion To prove an Identity of all creatures because their Being from whence proceeds their Cognoscibility is all One with the Soule or Understanding His Lord must give me leave to dissent from him if for no other reason yet because â—e dissents from himselfe For if his Argument be good That all things are One with the Soul because Truth or Cognoscibility which differs not really from their Essence being the Object of the Soules Operation must also be One with the Soule It will follow also that God is likewise One and the Same with the Soul because He also is
Cognoscibilis and may be known by the Soul And also that all things else are one with God because they are al known by Him And so he falls upon the first of those Errours which he mentions in the â—nd of his Prooemium immediately before the first Chapter which is by mounting too high in the exalâ—ing of Truth to confound the Creator with the Creature by making her God Neither doth it onely make Truth to be one with God but even all things else being one with Truth to be One with God Again if so how is it that in the end of his 3. Chapter concerning the Body and the Soule he tells us not that they are the Same or that the Body is the Soul but as husband and wife each bringeth his part towards the making up of the Compositum At least Mâ— Sadler is mistaken as well as I who is presumed at least to understand his Lorâ— mind suâ—â—â—ciently who â—ells us in his Epistle that Corporall Vnion â—â— materialls is sometimes Miscalled Identity which is at best but a â—â—ld touch in a point or two But I suppose there may be another acception of Truth which may better sute with at least the first part of his Lordships discourse You may call it Veritas Cognoscendi as well as the former buâ— in a different sense There Knowledge was taken in a Passiveâ—â—â—se â—â—â—se and Truth was that which makes the thing Cognoscibâ—le or fit to be understood Here you must take it in an Active sense and so Veritas Cognoscendi or the Truth of Knowledge will bee that which makes the understanding Cognoscitivum or fit to conceâ—ve and apprehend that Cognoscâ—â—liâ—y which is in the Objâ—ct And thuâ— Truth will be that â—rinciple whereby the Soule is able to â—…hend or conceive that which may be known Veritas Cognoscendi in the former sense and that in this sense are both Principia cognoscendi Principles of knowledge but in a severall way You may distinguish them if you please thus Truth of knowing and Truth of being known and veritas cognosceâ—di may be 〈…〉 both They differ as Colour in the Object from the power of seeing in the Eye The former makes the Object Visible and fit to be perceived the other makes the Eye Visive and fit to discern it If the first were wanting Vision would be hindered because there is nothing Visible Hence it is that the Ayr and Spirituall substancâ—â— are not seen even by the sâ—arpâ—st sight If the latter be wanting â—â—â— sight is hindered from a desect in the Organ Thus the most perspâ—â—â—ous Colouâ—s are not discerned by a blind Eye whereas the â—ame Colours are in themselves sufficiently Visible and actually Discerned by others Thus Veritas cognoscendi in the former sense makes the Object to be Cognoscible Truth in the latter sense gives the Understanding or Soule ability to know it Now if you call the Power of seâ—ing which is in the Eye by the name of â—â—â—ate light â—o disâ—â—â—guâ—sh iâ— from Light either in the Object or in the Medium You may also call Reason which is this principle of knowing in the Soule or Understanding by the name of innate Truth or Light And this signification of Truth I conceive to be most sutable to his Lorâ— meaning But Verum or Truth in this sense is not convertible with Ens For though all Beings have in them Truth wherby they may be Known yet all have not this Truth or Power to Know. And thus if you understand it it will not seem so strange a Paradox â—o 〈…〉 thâ—â— Reason which he calleâ—h Truth is all one with the Vnderstanding and that the Vnderstanding is not distinct from the Soule For this will be granted by all those which affirm that Potentiâ— non realâ—ter distinguuntur ab Animâ that the Powers or Faculties of the Soule are not really distinct from the Soule it selfe And these aâ—e 〈…〉 I mistake not the greater part of â—ound Philosophers And â—â—us his Lorâ— opinion is but the same with theirs in other words Yet may we â—â—â—ll speak distinctly of these severall Faculâ—ies as wâ— do of the Wisdom of God the Power of God the Will of God c. which are as enâ—â—rely one with God as these Faculties can be with the Soule And thus much for explaining the state of the 〈…〉 â— proceed next to examine the Grounds of this his Lorâ— opinion CHAP. â— Whether the Vnderstanding and Truth understood be One. IN his first Chapter he tells us That Truth that is Reason is enthron d in the Vnderstanding and there appears under a double Notion Thâ—â—â—â—â— the Fountain or Ground-work which is Reason it self We call it saith he the form or substance And then those workings which breathe from thence the Streams issuing from it viz. the Operations and exercise of Reason the effects of a reasonable soule We call them usually actus primus and actus secundus The first of these he begins with proving it to be the Vnderstanding in its Essence The second he proceeds to in the tenth Chapter His Argument is this What is the Vnderstanding other then a Ray of the Divine Nature warming and enlivening the Creature conforming it to the likenesse of the Creator And is not Truth the same If you take Truth in any other acceptation beside that last mentioned I see not how the Argument will hold For if you take it either for the Truth of Being or the Truth of Knowing in the common acceptation for that Essence whereby every Creature both is and may be known to be It may be granted that the understanding is one of those Rays of the Divine Nature somewhat of that Excellency implanted in Man of that Image of God whereby Man is conformed to the likenesse of the Creator It will be granted also That the Essence or Truth of every Creature whereby it Is or is Known to be is a Ray proceeding from the same Center though to another point of the Circumference a Stream issuing forth from the same Fountaine of Being and carryes some weak Resemblance some Sparkling of that Primitive Light or Truth that Originall Essence which is in God For thus every Creature hath somthing of God in it Refert quaelibet herba Deum Yet will it not follow from hence That this communicated Ray of Being is the same with the Understanding For the Argument will prove erroneous as being Affirmative in the second Figure in which no Affirmative Proposition can be concluded And the Consequence will be the same with this What is the Body of Man but a materiall substance And is not a Stone the same Which you would hardly admit as a sufficient argument to prove our Body to be a Stone If you take Truth for Reason the Argument will admit of a reduction into an exact Form thus That Ray of the Divine Nature which doth solely or principally expresse Gods Image in Man is the Vnderstanding but Truth or Reason is this divine Ray Therefore Truth
that is Reason is the Vnderstanding And this Argument will hold good if we grant the Soule to be the immediate worker in rationall Operations without an intervenient Facultie But otherwise those that are of the contrary Opinion would deny or distinguish the Major and say That this divine Ray this Image of God consists not wholly in the Understanding by it selfe but in the Soule or Understanding accompanied with its severall Faculties and â—perations And indeed it cannot be denyed but that the Operations of the Soule do containe part of this Divine Image â—s well as the Soule in its Essence and yet They are the Soules immediate Progeny and are not immediately produced by God Now what others admit concerning the Operations They will aâ—â—â—rm concerning the Faculties That they are but parcels of this Ray or Divine Image That they are but lesser Rivulets derived from the greater stream or branches annexed to it Now from hence That the Soule in its Essence together with the severall Faculties and Operations wherewith it is endowed doth make up the chiefest part of Gods Image in Man to prove That every part of this Image are the same with each other and so the Faculties to be the same with the Soule is that which they will not allow And to presume or take for granted That this Image of God consists but in One single Ray iâ— but petere principium it being no lesse hard to prove then that the Faculties and the Soule are One That Truth or Reason is One and the Sâ—â—e with the Understanding or Reasonable Soule They would say rather That the Soule is One of those Braâ—â—heâ— which issuing from the same Root of Being in God from whence all other Created Beings doe arise divides it selfe into severall Twigs And we have no way to convince them of falshood in this particular till we have first proved the Soule and its Faculties to be one Simple oâ— Single Essence The prosecution or explication of his Lorâ— Argument doth no way oppose this acceptation of Truth which I have given but confirms it which if I rightly understand it may be thus explained That Truth Reason is Light none will dâ—ny by Light understand that internall Principle whereby the Soule can See oâ— Know which is so called by a Metaphor drawn from the Innate light we call it potentia visiva whereby the Eye is enabled to See That Light this power or principle of Knowing or Reasoning iâ— a reasonable creature iâ— the Foâ—ntaiâ— of Life iâ— maâ—â—fâ—sâ— by Life understand the Life of the Soule if I may so speak That which specificates the rationall Soule and makes i◠〈…〉 For â—â—â—â—â—â—â— of a reasonable Soul that which makes it to be Reasonable is Light that principle whereby it knowâ— and understands And therefore when the Soule informeth or giveth life to Animal rationale making it Rationall it inableth the Creature to work according to that Light according to this principle of Knowing that is It inableth the Reasonable Creature to Know or Understand c. Thus whilst Life that which makes a reasonable creature to be Reasonable and Light this power of Knowing is Truth or Reason And Truth or Reason is Conformity to God or Gods Image in us And the Vnderstanding also as we yet discourse of it is this Light this principle of Reasoning to the Soule The Vnderstanding and Truth or Reason can be but One. The whole Argument iâ— briefly thus the Image of God in us is our Understanding and this Image or divine Radius consists in Reason which he calls Truth therefore Truth or Reason is our Understanding His minor that this Ray or Beam of Divinity in us is Truth or Reason is thus proved Because Reason in us is â— derivative Beam a sparkling of that primitive Light or Wisdome which is in God And so That which enlightens us and inables us to Know or Understand according to our measure that which furnisheth Vs with Knowledge is a representation of Gods Sapience or Wisdome whereby He is said to Know Now that Truth or Reason which is all one is this derivative Beam of Light wherby we are able to Know and That this ability to Know or Understand is that which makes uâ— to be Reasonable is manifest Wherefore he concludes That whilst â—ur Life or Rationality consists in Light that is in an Ability to know and understand and this Ability consists in Truth or Reason which is a conformity to God as being a Stream issuing from his Ocean of Wisdom And whilst as Reason is this abilitâ— of knowing so the Vnderstanding also is this Light this Ability or power of Knowing The Vnderstanding and Truth that is Reason must be all One. Those who deny his Conclusion would answer That both Reason and the Vnderstanding doe inable the Soule to Know or Understand but in a severall way as distinct principles and therefore are not the same The one Instrumentally or Ministerially The other by using this as its Minister Thus Fire by its Heat burns a Stone by its Heavinesse descends Glasse by its Lâ—vity or smoothnesse reâ—â—ecteth and the like If you say the Weight of the Stone or Smoothnesse of the Glasse are not Things distinct from the Stone and Glasse but rather Modifications of these Things I contend not For neither doe I hold the Understanding or any other of the Soules Faculties to be a Thing distinct from the Soule but at the most only an accidentall Modification of it not Really distinct from it Yea rather That it is the Soule it self quatenus intelligens as the Power of God is God himself quatenus potens admitting no other but a distinction of Reason CHAP. II. A second Argument from the three Requisites to every Being examined IN the second Chapter he proposeth first the Opinion of those that stile the Understanding a Faculty whereby the Soule receiveth or entertaineth Truth and Acteth accordingly But here his Lordship if I mistake not varieth from his former acceptation of Truth Comparing it not to the Innate Light or power of Seeing in the Eye but to the Advenient Light which streames to it through the Ayr bringing with it the Idea or visible Species of the Object seen For soon after he calls it those sweet beams of Light which beat upon us continually which cannot be meant of any innate Light but of an advenient Light And thus I see no inconvenience at all to say That the Soule or Understanding by its Innate Light of Reason which whether you say to be distinct from the Soule or not it is not much materiall doth daily receive or entertain new Truths or new Representations of that Truth of Being which is really existent in Things either by a reiterate actuall understanding of those things which it had formerly understood or by a new apprehension of somwhat whereof before it was ignorant Like as the Eye by its innate Power of Seeing discerns new Species conveyed to it by advenient Light either from
Objects formerly seen or now first represented Next he lays down three Requisites to the constitution of every Being A Fountaine commuâ—icating a Channell entertaining and Waters imparted Conferenâ— Collatum Recipiens And he asks Where we shall find these three if the Vnderstanding be a Faculty I answer If you speak of Advenient light last mentioned which is a Representative Truth or an Idea of that Râ—all Truth which is in the Things Known I say the Reall Truth or Veritas Essâ—ndi sends forth this Representative Truth or Idea which is conveyed by a Deferent Light either of Discourse or Information or the like till it come to the Vnderstanding where it is received and entertained by the Innate Light or Truth of Reason Like as the Inherent light of Colour in the Object sends forth a Representative light of visible Species which is conveyed by a Deferent light in the Ayr till it come to the Eye where it is entertained by the Innate light which is the faculty of Seeing And as the Remotenesse or Obscurity of the Object the Darknesse of the Medium or the Weaknesse of the Faculty may hinder Sight so that we see not at all or not perfectly In like manner the Distance of the Object as in things quite out of our reach or the Obscurity of them which send forth no Species or manifestation of their essence towards us our imperfect Discourse or insufficient Information which is as a dark Medium and lastly the weaknesse of our Apprehension doe cause Ignorance in the Understanding which is answerable to not-seeing in the Eye Again as in Ignorance so in Errour A reflection of a false Light upon the Object casting a false seeming colour which may be mistaken for the true colour of it an indisposed Medium as when we see through Red glasse c. and a distempered Organ by reason of some vitious humours accidentall in the Eye c. may cause a mistake and Errour in Sight So here when there is a False Light upon the Object as when we conceive that to be the effect of one thing which indeed proceeds from some other cause fallacia non causae pro causâ or the like a false Discourse or Inference or a false Relation which is as a stained Medium or a distempered Vnderstanding by reason of Passion of lâ—sa Phantasia or the like may cause an Erroneous Judgement apprehending things to be otherwise then indeâ—d they are And thus I have shewed not onely those three requisites which his Lordship requires but some others besides them supposing in the mean time the Vnderstanding to be a Faculty and taking Truth for those sweet Bâ—ams of Light which beat upon us Advenient Light If you take Truth for Reason and withall suppose Reason to be distinct from the Vnderstanding and â—t also from the Soule You may say The Understanding is the Recipâ—ent Reason the thing Received in it and that Then and from Those when and from whence it received its Essence to which Reason is a connaâ—e and appendent Faculty That is either from God by immediate Creation which many think or from the Parents by Propagation which others â—old But I suppose there be few or none that hold Reason to be distinct from the Vnderstanding and That also from the Soule For when they speak of Reason as a faculty of the Understanding by Vnderstanding they mean the Soule it selfe quatenus intelligens being considered aâ— the Subject of Reason And when they speak of the Vnderstandingâ—â— â—â— a faculty whereby the Soule is able to conceive and judge of Truth Then they take the Vnderstanding to be the same with Reason I should rather say That Reason and the Vnderstanding as it denotes a Faculty are two words Synonima denoting the same Faculty or Power of Knowing and Judging Which Faculty I would not grant to be another Thing from the Soule-Knowing or the Soule-Understanding but a Modus As neither doe I allow to Any Naturall-Power or Faculty which they make the second Species of Quality any other Being then the Being of a Modus and not the being of â— Thing And thus we may safely say the Soule receives the Faculty of Reason or Understanding Thence from whence it receives its Being as a Stone receives its Heavinesse from that which Produceth it That which gave it to Bee gave it to be Thus. Sometimes indeed Accidents are not received from that which produceth the Substance but from some other Efficient as the Smoothnesse of Marble proceeds not from the Producer but from the Polisher And yet I hold not the Smoothnesse to be One Thing and the Marble to be another Thing but the Marble to be a Thing and the Smoothnesse to be Modus And thus it must be granted in Acquiâ—â—te Habits where the Giver and Receiver are the Same and the Thing Received Modally but not really distinct from either But for Faculties or Naturall-Powers If you look for an Externall Efficient or Giver it will be the same that produceth the Substance But if you be contented with an Efficient per Emanationem Thus they are said to flow or arise from the Form or Substance And then the Giver and Receiver is the Same for the Form which iâ— the Subject Receiving is also per emanationâ—m Effectiva from whence it ariseth as an Essentiall Consequent and if you say the Faculty Received is not so much as Modally distinguisht from it but onely ratione 〈…〉 I contend not But so much distinction at least I suppose we must allow it Having thus answered his Lordships Qu re I proceed to answer his Objections If the Vnderstanding saith he be the Recipient then the Light of Reason which differenceth us from the Vegetative and Sensitive creatures lieth in the Vnderstanding and not in the Soul And so the Soul is either not enlightened at all but only a Theca to the Intellect or else there be two Enlightened rationall Beings in â—â—â— Reasonable creature For answer First I suppose as I said before that there are few if any that will affirm the Soul the Understanding and Reason to be Three things But they will either say Reason Is the Understanding and not in the Understanding or else Reason is in the Understanding which Understanding is the Soul considered only under this Notion quatenus Intelligens as it is the Subject of Reason And thus the difficulty appears not For the Light which differenceth us from Unreasonable creatures whether you call it Reason or call it the Understanding is seated in the Soule and so denominates it Intelligent or Vnderstanding But secondly we want not a Recipient for Truth though the Soul be not it It may be the Understanding Yet thirdly though the Soul be not the Immediate Subject it may yet be the Vltimate which is more then a Theca Object But you will reply However it be so that wee make this Light to be inherent in the Soul yet it is not sufficient to make an Essentiall difference
mediante animâ rather then by himself immediately together with it he might do either But in generall By what means soever saith he Truth or Reason be convâ—yed if the Vnderstanding do at all receive Truth then it is Truth For God doth not communicate Light but to Light If he mean God gives Lucem non nisi Lucido or Lumen non nisi Luminoso I grant it saking the words iâ— sensu composito but not insensu diviso And so God gives not Animam nisi Animato nor Rationem nisi Rationali That is God gives not Light but to that which is Light â— Lucide or Illuminate viz. when that Light is bestowed But in sâ—nsu diviso That this was before Lucid it is not to be admitted Light communicated to the Ayr makes it Illuminate but finds it not so God inspires not a Soule but into a Living-creature And so breathing into Adam the breath of Life he made him a Living-creature but found him his body Inanimate a â—ump of Earth So here God gives not the Light of Reason but to that which is Light or Inlightned viz. Then Inlightned when this Light of Reason is bestowed But if by this God gives not Light but to Light he means Lucem non dat nisi Luci or Lumen non nisi Lumini I cannot admit it either in sensu composito or in diviso When the Sunne imparts Light Lumen to the Ayr the Ayr is Illuminate or Enlightned But that the Ayr is Lumen I must never grant till we cease to hold Lumen non est Corpus So if God communicate to the Soule or Understanding the Light of Reason the Soule or Understanding becomes thereby Illuminate or Enlightned with Reason But that the Soule or Understanding is this Light this Reason follows no more then if you would say That Water is Heat when it grows Hot The Ayr is Light Lumen when it is Enlightned A Body becomes a Colour when it is Coloured Any Substance whatsoever is metamorphised into an Accident when as a Subject it Receives that Accident or That the Body of Adam formed out of the Dust was made a Soule when it received a Soule inspired That which is annexed as a proof Because Quicquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis together with the illustrations following proves no more but this Whatsoever is conferred is no further forth conferred then as the Subject is capable of and actually doth receive it And this we grant That the Soule or Understanding upon which the Light of Reason is conferred is a fit Subject to receive or entertaine Reason and is actually indued with Reason And so I admit that which he cites of Dr. Twisse Neither a quality permanent nor an act immanent unlesse they be made INHERENT IN the Soule observe the phrase and the latter also produced by it can be said to be given to the Soule Hee saith It is Inherent in the Soule not that it is the Soule Lastly How passeth saith he this Light from the Vnderstanding to the Soule there being as vast a distance between It and the Soule as between It and the will supposing them distinct Faculties whence grow those inextricable disputes How the Will is made to Understand what the Understanding judgeth fit to be Willed But here his Lordship varies somewhat the state of the Question in altering the acceptation of the word Truth from truth understanding to truth understood and instead of innate truth of Reason speaks of the advenient truth which is a Conceptus or Idea framed to represent the truth of Being in the Object For we cannot conceive Reason which is now looked upon as a permanent Faculty to be transient from one subject to another But Truth Vnderstood how it may be conveyed from the Understanding to the Soul I shall Then perhaps better tell when he shews me How the Visible Species are conveyed from the Organ to the Soul or Faculty seeing That the Organ receives species he will not deny for else the Soul might as well see when the Eye is out That the Soul also by the Organ doth apprehend these Species must likewise bee yeelded else why should not the Eye of a dead man see That the Soule and the Organ are distinct must needs be granted for we see them really separated by death whereas nothing can be separated from it selfe And when I am informed How the Soule and the Organ being distinct are conjoyned in Seeing I shall better be able to resolve How the Soule and the Faculty though distinct may joyntly Vnderstand Till then it might suffice in generall to say That As by the Organ the Soule Sâ—â—th so by Reason or the Understanding-faculty the Soule Knows and Understandeth only allowing such disproportion as must be allowed between a Materiall and Immateriall instrument And it seems to be no more vast distance between a Faculty and the Soule then is between an Organ and the Soule So that if by Visible Species in the Organ the Soule may see why not by Intellectuall Species in the Understanding though a Faculty may the Soule Vnderstand But because I love not to answer a difficulty only by opposing another you may resolve it thus We are not to conceive there is any such vast Gulfe between the Soule and the Understanding though a Faculty as that Truth should need a Ferry-boat to waâ—t it over For as the Eye doth not first see and then Inform the Soule or Visive Faculty what it hath seene but the Organ and the Faculty joyntly concurre to the Act of Seeing So neither doth the Understanding first Receive and Entertain Truth and afterward inform the Soule what it hath Understood But the Soule with and by this Faculty of Reason or Understanding doth Know and Understand Both concurring to the same Act. Thus a Stone by its Heavinesse descends Fire by its Heat warms by its Light shines Glasse by its Smoothnesse reflects light a Knife by a communicated Faculty from the Magnet draws iron And yet in some of these at least you must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei There is indeed sometimes a Reflex act of the Soule whereby it Knows what is Vnderstood But we must not think that it is an act of the Soules Essence surveying or taking account of the Vnderstanding Faculty what it hath done But the Soule by this understanding Faculty reflects upon a former Act which It selfe by the same Faculty had formerly performed The Gulfe is likewise fordable between the Vnderstanding and the Will though they be distinct faculties Not as if the Will by an act of Knowledge should Understand what the Intellect doth dictate But the Soule which by its faculty of Understanding Knows doth by its Willing faculty Command and by its Loco-motive Execute So that neither the Will Knows what the Vnderstanding Judgeth nor the Inferiour Faculties what the Will Commands But the Soule by severall Faculties executes severall Functions Thus when the Soule by the Eye discovers a
as it is capable of that is Existentia Modi for not being Res but Modus rei we must not expect that it should have any Existence of its own besides the Existence of a Modus and this Existentia Modi is the actuall Modificating of the Thing Existing after this Manner The which Existence though it be not Existentia Rei yet it is a Reall Existence existentia in re and not Mentall For the thing existent is not only supposed to exist in this manner but indeed doth so thus ordered thus modificated and therefore that Modus doth actually really modificate and is not only supposed so to doe But if you will not admit with Scotus of any Modus entis as a Medium between Ens Non-ens Res et Nihil a Thing and Nothing you must then say it is Res for Nothing I am sure it cannot be For doubtlesse there is some difference more then Imaginary between Knowledge and Ignorance between a Square stone and a Round stone between Silver Stamped and the same Smooth and Plain This difference I should call Modall accounting the Roundnesse c. not Res but Modus Rei affirming that when Wax c. is put out of one form or fashion into another thereis no new Thing propounded but that which before was is now otherwise ordered And thus it is most true which his Lordship speaks That Habituall Knowledge is nothing but Light more or lesse glorious It is Reason cleared It 's only Facultas facilitata or facultatis Facilitas And to this Facility or Readinesse to operate I cannot allow a Physicall existence of its own as neither to any Habit whatsoever as being but Modi and not Entia It 's not a Being but a Manner of Being not Ens but aliquid Entis And I should easily be perswaded to grant the same concerning all Accidents whatsoever which have long since been called Entis Entia And however an Accident hath been accounted to be Res and so to have Existentiam Rei yet not Subsistentiam Rei Though it have an Existence of its own yet its Subsistence is no other but Subsistentia Subjecti Yet I cannot with his Lordship subscribe to the Platonists to make Knowledge nothing but a Remembrance As if there were naturally in our Understanding the Pictures or Pourtraictures of all Truths but so obscured and covered as it were with dust that these glorious Colours doe not appear till such time as they be rubbed and washed over anew I approve rather of Aristotle's Rasa Tabula then Plato's Reminiscentia making the Understanding of it selfe to have no such Idea or Picture at all but capable of all Or thus I know not how it can be better expressed The Understanding is not as a Table wherein the Kings Picture is pourtrayed in lively colours but hanging in the dark it appears not that there are any such Lineaments till it be Enlightened with the Sunne and then it presents us with a Fair Description But rather as a Glasse which is able to Receive and Reflect whatsoever Colours fall upon it though before it had none of them For I demand What Principle is there implanted in nature to enform me Whether there ever were such a City as Troy Whether it were so destroyed Whether this or that were Plato's or Aristotle's Opinion What Principle to enform that it rained yesterday is faire to day Certainly matters of Fact have not such Idea's implanted in Nature for then might they by Discourse be known to have been or not to have been without the help either of Sense or Information And if Historicall Knowledge may be acquired without any fore-implanted Idea's of those Truths so known why also may not Discursive Truth be also Known without a Reminiscentia or a Review of Forgotten oâ— Obscure Principles Next he tells us That wee may Seem by frequent actings to help the Soule and so to create Acquisite Habits whereas indeed it is not so but all Actings are only new Discoveries But how this can stand with his former doctrine of Reminiscentia I doe not see For this takes away not only Plato's Reminiscentia but all Remembrance whatsoever If all Actings be new Discoveries How and When can wee be said to Remember But is it soe doe Former Actings no way help our Subsequent Acts Iâ— so how can a Learned Schollar be said to Know more then an Ignorant Peasant For the one is as capable of a new discovery as the other iâ— his former acts make no preparation or fitnesse for future acts How comes it to passe that Learned men shall apprehend those Truths at the first relation which another cannot without much adoe be brought to conceive Nay why should an Artist be more skilfull in his Trade then another Why may not an Infant new born plead his cause as well as the best experienced Lawyer Certainly if former acts doe not indeed produce an Habituall Knowledge but only seem to doe in the one which is not in the other the one may as well act as the other for there is the same Reasonable Soule in a Child which is in him afterwards The difference surely must proceed from hence That the Former Actings have produced a Facility and Readinesse for Future Acts that so what was before more Difficult becomes now Facile Nay more That which before was utterly Impossible becoms now both Feaziâ—le and Easie All the most refined Wits in the world joyning their acutest Discoveries their strongest Iudgements together are not able without the help of Historicall Relation ever to know such a thing as the Destruction of Troy Yet when this or the like hath been either Seen by our selves or Related to us it is then easie to tell afterwards what wee have seen what we have heard without a second view or a new relation Now if the former Actings do noâ— way prepare for a future Act why might not the First discovery have been made by our own light of Reason without an Externall supply from our Senses or from Information as well as the Second Philosophers saith he affirm this boldly of the Vnreasonable Creature â—teributing it to an Instinct or new Influence Why then may we not concludâ— the same of Man That Philosophers attribute much to Instinct in Unreasonable Creatures I grant But that by an Instinct they meant a new Influence I was not aware Certainly Memory hath been accounted one of the Sensus â—ntâ—rni and soe belonging to the Sensitive Soule and therefore not to be denied to Brutes And doubtlesse daily experiments put it out of question That Brute Creatures make use of Memory and by former acts are fitted for following acts not doing all from a new Instinct I am called in the next place to search out the difference between Reason and Faith They differ saith he only in Degrees not in Nature For if Soule Vnderstanding Habits be all the same then neither doe Reason and Faith differ I grant that there is the same ground why
the Understanding dictates to the contrary Whereas the Will doth as often fail in Choosing a wrong object which the Understanding acknowledgeth to be Evill as in Not Choosing a Good Object I answer it is true the Will doth often choose what it ought not And yet I affirm that the Wills Errour is onely Negative and not Positive It is Omissive only in not-obeying some directions of the Understanding I shall make it cleer by an Instance Pleasure and Vertue may be Competitors and Rivalls as it were both courting the Will As in an Act Pleasant but Sinnefull The Understanding proposeth Pleasure as quid bonum 't is Good 't is Desirable It proposeth Vertue as quid melius 'T is Better 't is more desirable Now the Will perhaps follows the first direction it imbraceth Pleasure as being Good and so Desirable for Bonum Jucundum is Desirable as well as Bonum Honestum But the second Precept or Direction rather whereby Vertue is proposed as Better and therefore should countermand the formâ—â— this it hears not it follows not If you say the Understanding doth indeed discover some Good though a lesse Good in the Object yet this is not to be accounted the Understandings Practicall Direction dictamen But that the Understanding having examined the Good and the Evill that is in every Act and comparing them together upon this Comparison as it observes the Good or Evill to be more so it prescribes to Doe or Not to Doe Hâ—â— age or Hoc non age And if the Will doe Act when the Understanding Forbids it must be said to perform a Positive Act without direction I answer I admit not the Understandings dictate to be Imperative but onely Declarative It onely informs This is Good This is Evill but Commands not Doe this or Omit it But the Will upon proposall of Good Embraceth it upon proposall of Evill it Rejects it Yet not so but that by Negligence it may Not-embrace Good and notreject Evill And thus the proposall of Pleasure as Good is as truely declarative as the other and this the Will follows But a further declaration whereby it declares that although Pleasure be Good yet it is Evill to embrace this Good because there is a greater Evill annexed This direction by omission it imbraceth not And this I conceive to be the true nature of the Acts of the Will and Understanding If you would have the Will and the Understanding to be the Same and therefore think these distinctions superfluous understand by the Intellect Anima Intelligens by the Will Anima Volens or Anima quatenus Volens and then you are pleased And thus you see How there may be more Knowledge even of Spirituall and Saving Truths and yet lâ—sse Faith Because there may be â—n Asseâ—t a Beleeving in the Understanding which is Knowledge or Historicall Faith without a Fiduciall Trust a Reliance and resting upon it which is the Justifying Faith or the Justifying Act of Faith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 5. But if you speak of a Knowledge peculiar to Gods children wherof others partake not Such a Knowledge of God wherby no man knows him but he that hath him That Knowledge which is Life everlasting This Knowledge and Faith always go together the more there is of One the more also of the Other A Speculative Knowledge whereby we assent to the Truth reveiled is found even in the Devils and that in as large and ample measure I suppose as in the Saints on Earth For I cannot be perswaded but the Devils 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being Knowing Spirits doe Know and Assent to the Truth of every Proposition that a Child of God knows But there is an Experimentall Knowledge distinct from the former Knowledge of another nature whereby we Know what we know in another Manner We do not only Know that it is so but we Tast and See it to be so A Blind man Knows perhaps that the Sun shines but he doth not Sâ—â— it I Know that at Midnight the Sunne shines to our Antipodes but I doe not See it shine to them I Know that at such a time there is such an I â—lipse visible to such a part of the World yet doe I not See the Eclipse The Confectioner that provides a Banquet Knows that this or that dish is Sweet but they only Tast the Sweetnesse that eat of it A wicked man may Know that God is good as a blind man knows that the Sun shines by the report of others or as an Astronomer knows of an Eclipse before it come by Calculation or rationall Discourse and Illation â—ut he Sâ—es it noâ— he Tasts it not Now we read of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hâ—b 5. 14. som that have their Senses exercised to discern of good and evill there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Phil. 1. 9. a kind of spirituall Sense whereby we do 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superâ—a Sâ—pere Relish those things that are above And where there is this spirituall Tast this Experimentall Knowledge there must needs be Faith also For Truths thus cleerly and Sensibly as it werâ— revâ—iled to the Soul it seems noâ— to be in the power of the Will to reject No more then it is in the power of the Eare not to be pleased with harmonious Musick or in the power of the Palat not to be delighted with the Sweetnesse of a Tast And thus I suppose it may appear How far and From what Ground there may be Knowledge without Faith That God is all mercy and sweetnesse to the Divels is no Article of my faith Those miserable creatures saith he cannot consent to it No more can I And yet I deny not that Mercy and Justice are One thing in God Gods Simple Essence is the same with both yet are not They so properly the same with each other The Torment of the Devils proceeds from that Divine Essence which is Love as likewise the Mercies of Gods Children proceed from that Divine Essence which is Justice for the Justice of God is equally himselfe as is his Love Yet may we not say the Torments of those are an effect of Love no more then that the Mercies of these are the effects of Anger yet Both are the effects of that Simple Essence which is Both. It is a far different thing therefore to say A Loving God doth notwithstanding Punish and to say A Loving God doth therefore Punish Punishment and Revenge are sufficiently consistent with Love but not the immediate effects of Love Thus we say Musicus Aedificat yet not his skill in Musick but his skill in Architecture is exercised in Building The Love of God as likewise his Anger Justice Power c. is I confesse the Divine Essence we allow no Accidents in God at all quicquid est in Deo est Deus But I ask Whether he think this Attribute Love and so of the rest to be an Adequate expression of that whole Essence
If so then is it all one to say God Loves his Children and God is Angry with his children or God Hates them If not then is it only inadaequatus conceptus and there remains somewhat to be expressed by other Attributes which is not expressed in this The Attributes of God therefore as likewise it is in other inadaequati conceptus may be all affirmed of the same Simple Essence but not Mutually of each other And the Effects of each may be said to be the Effects of the same Essence but not Promiscuously of every Attribute unlesse we take them Materialiter not Formaliter And consequently the ruine of the damned is not as he affirms an effect of infinite sweetnesse though of that Essence which iâ— Infinite Sweetnesse nor is God in this mercifull to them Again What we Know we are saith he I assume Sed deum scimus Ergo Dii sumus CHAP. IX How Knowledge and Affection differ FRom what hath been spoken in the former Chapter without adding any more may appear what is to be said concerning his Ninth Chapter How it comes to passe that some of mean Knowledge have Large Affections For a Speculative Knowledge doth not alwayes Breed Affection because the Will doth not alwayes follow the Understanding though neither doth it Extinguish it It is true there is an Affection which is rather a Blazing then a Warming Enlivening Love as the Fools Mirth like the crackling of Thorns Which ariseth either from a False Apprehension or else from the Novelty rather then the sweetnesse of the Object as the Smell of Flowers at the first approach doth most Affect the Sense though they be as Sweet afterwards And This perhaps may vanish at the presence of a more Clear or more Continued Light But the true Warmth of Zeal is not extinguished by the Light of Knowledge though Speculative but feeds upon it as Fewell And the greater Growth there is in especially Experimentall Knowledge the greater is the Strength of Affection from it And thus they that Know most experimentally do alwayes Love most Knowledge and Affection go together Yet are we not forced from hence to grant that Knowledge and Affection are the Same Betwixt which I must needs allow the same difference be it more or lesse that is Reall or Modall which is between the Vnderstanding and the Will Knowledge is not Affection and Affection is not Knowledge And that Objection which his Lordship from hence makes to himselfe That since men of Largest Affections doe not alwayes Know most of God but some of Weaker Affections may Know More it might appear from hence That all Being is not One differing onely in Degrees but that there are even different Natures amongst which one may Excell while the other is Deprest This Objection I say iâ— of that force that I see not how all which his Lordship brings can take it away The large Encomiums which he brings for Affectionate Knowledge preferring it before Speculative which he prosecutes very Piously very Judiciously very Affectionately though it prove That Affectionate Knowledge is the more Excellent Yet doth it not shew That Speculative Knowledge is Nothing or That the Measure of Affection alwayes follows the Measure of Speculative Knowledge One of which he ought to have proved if he conclude that Knowledge and Affection are the Same A man may truly Know that Sugar is Sweet though he neither Tast its Sweetnesse nor be Delighted or Pleased with that Tast And a Christian is sometimes to live by Faith and not by Sense That is he is to Trust and Rest upon the Speculative Knowledge of Gods Goodnesse and his own Interest in it even then when for the present he wants the Sense of it He may Know and Beleeve that the Lord is Good though he doe not Tast and See it I will wait upon God saith Isay which hath Hid his Face from the House Israel He that walketh in darknesse and Sees no Light must yet Trust in the Name of the Lord c. And thus much for the first Notion of Truth or Reason as it is the groundwork of Rationall Operations In which thus far I may go along with his Lordship That Reason is but the Soul Intelligent That Intellecâ—uâ—ll Habits are but Reason advanced As likewise That its Operations are but Reason actuated The first distinguished from the Soule at least ratioâ—e ratiocinatâ the two last Modaliter If he mean no more I wish his expressions had been clearer For then the Notions are not new but the Words If he do aliquid grandius moliri I either Understand him not oâ— cannot Assent to him But you will tell me perhaps that I am mistaken all this while His Lordshâ—p by Truth intends not Reason as I take it For the very Title of his first Chapter calls it Truth Vnderstood and this cannot be Reason for Reason is not that which is understood but that whereby we understand It is true it doâ—h so But shall I speak it once for all the Titles of his â—hapters and his Marginall Notes do so often clash with the Text that I cannot beleeve they were done by the same Pen. Iâ— iâ— like his Lordship writing it but as a Letter to a private Friend by whom iâ— iâ— since published did not at first distinguish it into chapters and give it that Analysis that now appears and since its first writing as the Epistle tels us not having so much as perused it it is not like he hath added them since But the Publisher as in the like cases is frequent in Treatisâ—s of all sorts not to trouble his Lordship with so small a matter did it hiâ—self Who ever did it it is like as else where so here he either did not Apprehend or not Attend punctually his Lordships meaning For it is clear enough if we attend it that that which he there contends to bâ— the sâ—me with the Vnderstanding cannot be Truth understood but the Rise or Groundwork from whence all actions and sayings the Effects of a Reasonabâ—e Soule breathe forth It had been more agreeable to his Lordships mind to have said Intellectus and Principium Intelligendi are the same and not that the Vnderstanding and Truth-understood are one And so his Lordships method will be Exact making the Soule or Understanding One with its Faculties chap. 1. with its Habits chap. 8. with its Operations chap. 10. Whereas how the Object of all these should come first and be that from whence all these breathe forth appears not CHAP. X. Whether the Operations of the Soule be the Soules Essence HAving done in the former chapters with the first Notion of Truth as it is the Fountain or Source of Knowing as well Naturall as Habituall In this tenth Chapter he comes to the second Consideration or Notion of Truth denoting the Streams proceeding from this Fountaine The Actions and Effects of a Reasonable Soule Indeavouring to prove The particular and various Workings of the Soule in Conclusions simple