drawn and hammered out with much pains study and speculations from the abovesaid Principles which Deductions and Conclusions are called Sciences whose chiefest property and richest piece of satisfaction whereby they gratifie the Understanding of man is their clear and convincing Evidence placed beyond all contradiction from Sense or Reason Nor lastly is it in Opinions as in those supernaturall Truths made known unto us by Divine revelation and are of Faith where there is absolute Certainty though without Evidence for Faith wears a scarf before her eyes and believes what she sees not Both which to wit Faith and Science as they justly command and challenge so withall they fully secure our assent from all danger and suspicion of errour the one by its Evidence the other by its Certainty the one interessing the light and patronage of the First Principles the other engaging a Divine and infallible Authority for the truth of their Proposalls But in Opinions it fares quite otherwise for an Opinion having neither the Evidence of Science nor the Certainty of Faith nor indeed any other inferiour degree of Certainty physicall or morall as the Schools speak but onely the slippery knot of Probability to hold by leaves the considering Opiner in a state of suspence and indetermination not daring nor indeed knowing how to yield any more then a faint and timorous assent to either side of the Tenet seeing that neither side is any more then onely probably true or probably false And because true and onely probably true false and onely probably false are not the same but two very different things and at so great a distance that no art or law of consequence can ever bring them together or convincingly argue from the one to the other hence it is that what is onely probably true is not therefore true and what is onely probably false is not therefore false from whence it is finally and manifestly concluded that neither side of an Opinion is lawfully attestable by Oath as simply true nor safely abjurable as simply false To come now to the particular Tenet which denies the Pope's Deposing power in all cases circumstances and emergencies whatsoever If we address our selves to the Maintainers and Abettors of this Tenet if we consult the Authour and Publisher of the Questions if we propose the Case to the Sorbon Doctours and the Faculty of Paris we shall find all their answers concurring in this That their negative Tenet is no more then an Opinion For first the Publisher of the Questions coming to speak of the difference between the Deniers and Abettors of this Power and the nature and quality thereof plainly professeth that this difference is no difference of Faith but onely of Opinions and the Authour of the Questions calls it an Opinion a safe Opinion indeed but no more or other thing then an Opinion an Opinion also the Sorbon Doctours take it for nor is their own Censure or Doctrine any more then their Opinion Neither do they nor indeed could they with any shew of reason or coherence to their own principles discourse at any other rate or ever intend to screw it up any higher then an Opinion For it is not to be imagined that those grave learned and prudent Divines who in their publick Articles concerning Papal and Regal Authority in the year 1663. do not own or look upon any Censures Decrees or Definitions of Rome antecedent to and abstracting from the joynt consent or acceptation of the Church as inerrable would ever goe about to set up an independent or infallible Chair in the Sorbon and deliver their Doctrine either as a Point or Article of faith in it self or as a Rule of faith to others but onely as a Rule of Opinion if you please and a Judgment whereby such as were under their charge might remember to frame and regulate not their Faith but their Opinions which are the express words of the Decree it self Since then the deniall of the Pope's Deposing power neither doth nor can pretend any higher then an Opinion admit that its being the Opinion of so many Learned Divines might render it safe to hold and embrace it yet it s being but an Opinion though of Learned Divines renders it unsafe to swear it and no less unsafe to abjure what is contrary to it The Reason I have already given Because nothing can lawfully be sworn as true which is not more then meerly probable or probably true that is which is not either certain or infallible now all the Learned know that a certain or infallible Opinion is as great a bull as an uncertain fallible Article of faith so that to swear to an Opinion as certainly true is as much as to swear an Opinion is no Opinion and the Swearer doth thereby at one breath intangle himself in his own words his Reason in a Contradiction and his Soul in Perjury CHAP. VI. A particular Danger of Abjuring the Pope's Deposing power according to the form set down in the Oath of Allegeance I Shall here annex a particular consideration of the wofull Snare those souls run themselves into and apparent Danger of Swearing they know not what who venture to abjure the Deposing power as it lies expressed in its several Branches in the Oath of Allegeance whereas those Learned persons who undertook to defend and explain the Oath render it not onely difficult but next to impossible to understand what it is that is to be abjured I think I may take it for granted that no person of integrity and candour can ever conceive it lawfull for him to swear without first endeavouring to gain a right understanding of what he is to swear for to swear what a man understands not is blindly to rove at a venture and to swear he knows not what wilfully abandoning the conduct and slighting the inward upbraidings and reproofs of his Reason and which is worse it bewraies a feared Soul a wretched and sinfull preparednesse of mind to prostitute an Oath to the attesting of any thing that comes next to hand where Self-indemnity or other secular ends and advantages are proposed as the accursed purchace or reward of Perjury In the Oath of Allegeance it is required of us to abjure the Pope's Deposing power in all and every its respective Branches therein expressed one of which Branches is That the Pope hath not any Power to authorize any forrein Prince to invade or annoy the King or his Countries Which Branch by the way the Authour and Publisher of the Questions in the form of the Oath set down by them have wholly omitted in both Editions as well that of the year 61. as the other of this present year 74. through what mistake or how occasioned I know not It is not easily to be conceived what subtle Obscurities and learned Intricacies Roger Withrington one of the greatest Champions that ever appeared for the Oath and his friend C. I. who confesseth to have compiled his Book out of
swear contrary to the inward dictates of his conscience is that wherein consists the formall notion and malice of Perjury Now this Swearing contrary to what a man thinks in his conscience may happen two ways not onely when he is conscious to himself and knows that what he swears is not true but also when he knows not and therefore doubts or hath just cause to doubt whether it be true or no in which case if he chance to swear it is at the perill of his Soul and contrary to the secret information of his Conscience which must needs check at the act and inwardly protest against it For it is a folly beyond dotage and carries with it the prejudice of the highest self-condemnation imaginable for a man to say I will swear such a thing is true and yet I know not I doubt or have just cause to doubt whether it be so or no. CHAP. III. An Objection answered with a farther display of the former Evidence IF any one shall here pretend that he for his part is so far from doubting that he is already fully perswaded and thinks verily in his conscience the Pope hath not any Power or Authority to depose Kings and why then may not he safely swear as he thinks because no more is required of him then onely to swear according to the best of his knowledge Let him who pretends this please to remember that neither is less required of him then to swear according to a true knowledge that is that he be sure or certain and have no just cause to doubt of the truth of what he swears Let Knowledge then signify Knowledge let it not be a meer term or the abuse of a term let not I think but I know not I am perswaded but I am certain be the ground of his Oath and he is secure But if his knowledge signify no more then his uncertain perswasion and judgment that the thing is so or so then the best of his knowledge is to him no better then ignorance and to swear according to the best of his knowledge will be the same as to swear according to the best of his no-knowledge And it is this want of knowledge will arraign convict and condemn him at the bar of his own heart for a forsworn man Thus if a Witness in any publick Court of justice should offer to swear a thing as true and yet being ask'd if he were sure of it should answer No though we should suppose that he verily thinks it true yet if he be not certain of it 't is manifest it may be as well false as true for any thing he knows for thinking is one thing and knowing another And therefore if upon no better ground then his thinking it to be true he should offer to swear it is so no honest man would stick to say this Witness owes a forfeiture to the Pillory and satisfaction to God and man for so foul a scandal in offering to swear a thing to be true which he knows not whether it be so or no. True it is where an Oath is tendered requiring no more but onely to swear a man's perswasion and judgment not absolutely what is or is not true but onely what he thinks is or is not true there indeed a man may swear according to true knowledge in regard the familiar converse and intimacy with his own thoughts may give him a sufficient assurance and certainty of the truth of what he is to swear because in this supposition he is to swear no more then what he thinks but if any one should goe about to transfer this qualifying gloss and milder exposition to the Oath of Allegeance as an expedient to prevent the sad danger and heavy charge of Perjury in abjuring the controverted Doctrine of the Deposing power as if no such abjuring was intended by the Oath which yet the Authour of the Questions terms the very Substance of the Oath let him who either makes or values this gloss but cast an eye upon the first the middle and the last Branches of the Oath and he will plainly perceive this is onely an exchange of one Perjury for another it alters indeed the mode but shuns not the guilt and by striving to weather out one Rock splits upon another For first in the beginning of the Oath the Swearer solemnly calls God and the world to witness the truth of what he is about to acknowledge profess testify and declare in his conscience and then having uttered all he has to say and particularly in one of the middle clauses having not onely abjur'd the Pope's Deposing power but also abjur'd it as hereticall in the end concludes thus And all these things I do plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear according to these express words by me spoken and according to the plain and common sense and understanding of the same words without any equivocation or mental evasion or secret reservation whatsoever By which last clause he again ratifies and binds afresh all his former asseverations and already-sworn engagements by a repeated and reflex Oath looking universally back upon the premisses And all these things says he I do plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear Now amongst all these things which he doth thus plainly and sincerely acknowledge and swear the chief and principal of all others was That the Pope hath not any such Power and Authority as we speak of And he farther adds that he swears this according to the express words by him spoken without any equivocation mental evasion or secret reservation that is without any farther gloss or comment upon his own thoughts or words whatsoever Whereas on the contrary if we should suppose that whilst he expresly abjures the Deposing doctrine and absolutely swears that the Pope has not any such Power and Authority he yet reserves in his mind a mental evasion and secret meaning of his words viz. that he onely thinks and is perswaded he hath no such Power and Authority then directly he forswears himself in swearing otherways then what he professes to swear that is in swearing not according to his express words but according to an unexprest meaning of his words which thing he utterly disavowed and renounced by his Oath And is not this a remedy as bad as the disease and a rare expedient to prevent the danger of Perjury to make a man forswear himself for fear of being forsworn Let us make the best hand of it we can here is onely choice of Perjuries for the comfort and relief of the Swearer whether he do or do not abjure the Deposing power For if he pretend not to abjure it this is contrary to his express words according to which he professeth to swear and by which he doth expresly swear that the Pope hath not any Deposing power and so he is perjur'd by pretending to swear one thing and actually swearing another which is as much as to swear two Oaths in one the one directly cross and contradictory
to the other But if he do abjure as absolutely he doth if he takes the Oath this same abjuring is the very charge of Perjury which is now under my pen and as I conceive inevitable by reason that the necessary knowledge certainty and assurance of the truth of what he swears or of the falsehood of what he abjures without which every such assertory Oath necessarily ends in Perjury is not to be had nor expected whilst this speculative Point remains under dispute a dispute as experience too clearly testifies not yet effectually determined by any publick nor I am sure determinable by any private authority as shall appear yet more fully in the next Chapter CHAP. IV. A Continuation of the former Discourse shewing the manifest unlawfulness as of Swearing so of Abjuring the Deposing power A Duty we owe to the Pope saith the Authour of the Questions a Duty to the King both commanded by God both obliging under sin yet both confined to their proper limits too much of the Temporal may be ascribed to Popes too much of the Spiritual to Kings too much may be challenged by both All which is most true but the difficulty is when these two Supreme Powers contest as actually they do concerning Power in Temporalls who shall then be Judge The Pope claims a Deposing power the King denies it if the Pope be Judge the Deposing power will carry it if the King it will be cast If we consult or appeal to the authority of the Learned and bring the cause to their bar there is nothing but noise censures and loud disagreements Bellarmin and Suarez write for the Deposing power and are condemned at Paris Barkly and Withrington appear against it and are condemned at Rome the Censurers all this while on both sides professing a previous mature and impartial examination of the Books and Doctrines they condemn Caron the laborious defender of the first Remonstrance in his loyalty asserted what betwixt Canonists and Divines Schoolmen and Fathers Popes Councils Universities and Kingdomes is said to have made a catalogue of more then 250 Opposers of the Deposing doctrine On the contrary what number of favourers and abettors there are for it may appear by this that even the Authour of the 8 th Controversial Letter tells us pag. 5. that the face of Authority is on that side and again pag. 7. that of Learned men those who write of this subject write generally in favour of it as likewise the Authour of the Questions in his Preface acknowledgeth the Maintainers of the Deposing power to be the more numerous party and that he himself sides with the few against the many and withall granteth pag. 24. that this act of Deposing Kings hath not onely been done by Popes but approved by Councils If we step over into France there we are strangely surprized with instances on both sides Behold in the year 1626. Eight Universities of that Realm declare smartly against the Deposing power and yet but a few years before viz. in the year 1614. in the General Assembly of the Three Estates in which were present 5 Cardinals 7 Archbishops and 47 Bishops besides many other learned Ecclesiasticks and Dignitaries of the Gallican Church two parts of three of this great Representative of that Kingdome were of another mind and so far from hearkening to or countenancing the hot Proposalls that were made against the Deposing doctrine that they left it in possession as they found it of whatsoever right or title it could pretend to What now shall the private Christian and loyal Subject doe who passionately desireth to share himself in all humble duty between God and Caesar what I say shall he doe in this unfortunate competition of the two grand Powers Shall he by his single sufficiency dare to assume to himself the right of judicature and boldly swear either for or against the Deposing power and to pass a decisive sentence under Oath that the Pope hath or hath not the Power in contest Were I worthy to offer my advice in this particular I should conceive it much more pertinent and proper for him seriously to consider with himself whether an act of this nature be not the same or rather indeed much worse then if a stander by upon hearing an Assembly of grave Divines or Counsellours learned in the Law all of them much above his size and abilities in their respective professions warmly debating a perplext Law-case or sturdy knot in Divinity should by a rash and unlicensed confidence take upon him the Umpirage of the cause and without any more adoe bluntly swear these men are in the right and the other in the wrong or the others are in the right and these in the wrong And whether he proceed not upon as meer a blind peradventure whatever part of the contradiction he swears in this last case and that it be not as slippery a piece of pure contingency in him whether he hit or miss as if upon the sight of an handfull of Guinnies he should all at a venture swear odde or even for a wager since that he hath no true knowledge for his guidance nor the least degree of certainty to steer by or fix him CHAP. V. A farther confirmation of the premisses ALL this which I have hitherto discoursed is no more then what is evidently deducible from and throughly grounded in the Principles and Concessions of those Learned persons who utterly deny the Pope hath any Power to depose Princes who yet neither do nor can make out a title and claim for their Doctrine to any higher pretence or degree then that of Opinion and in this I presume I shall speak the sense of all if I say it is never lawfull nor justifiably safe to swear to an Opinion as true nor to abjure an Opinion as false speaking as here I do of such free and debatable Tenets as are openly and avowedly held and taught by Catholick Divines divided amongst themselves in their private sentiments and School-disputes because no one of these Opinions can sufficiently answer for its own truth nor secure the officious Swearer who lends it his Oath that he goes Christianly and groundedly to work whether side soever of the Opinion he makes choice of to be sworn or abjur'd For it is not in Opinions as in things which we know by clear and certain evidence as it happens in those early and fair Notions implanted in us by nature from the first glimmering of Reason called First Principles as that Every whole is greater then a part of the whole It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time c. which great Maxims of Nature sufficiently speak for and evidence themselves without the help of Syllogisms moods or figure and are no sooner understood then readily and necessarily assented unto Nor is it in Opinions as in certain scientifical Deductions and demonstrative Conclusions partly flowing connaturally by a train of immediate consequences partly