Selected quad for the lemma: truth_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
truth_n	believe_v	faith_n	justify_v	5,380	5	8.8463	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A97067	Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.	Wallis, John, 1616-1703.	1643 (1643)	Wing W615; Thomason E93_21; ESTC R11854	114,623	143

hinders me from placing it in this is Because I allow not any reflex act of Willing in God besides that direct act of Working who is yet a most Free Agent For beside other reasons that if need were might be produced it stands not with Gods Simplicity to admit distinct acts in God whereof one should be the Object of another Now what strength there is in this to hinder the placing of Freedome in this Reflex act I propose to be considered rather then Affirm But I rather place the nature of the Wills Liberty in a Freedome from Servitude that it is not under the command of any Creature or a Naturall Determination of its own And therfore though it be free from such servitude as a Naturall agent or such as may be Forced is subject to yet it is not free from Gods Command Nor perhaps from the dictate of Reason neither Or if it be yet is not this its Freedome but its Weaknesse And this is not far distant from the received opinion which makes it consist in Indifferentiâ For the Will can agere vel non agere notwithstanding anything to the contrary from the Creature but it cannot agere vel non agere notwithstanding the Decree of God and therfore is not Free from that Determination And whereas other things are from God determined mediante causa secundâ the Will is Immediately determined a causa primâ And therefore what he cites out of Rutterfort That granting all things to be under an absolute Decree it is fond to aske Whether the Free Creature remain indifferent to doe or not to doe I willingly assent unto But you must consider withall that This Freedome neither the Angels have nor had Adam in his Innocencie And therefore when Divines tell us that by the Fall we have lost our Liberty or Freedome of Will in Spirituall things which yet we retain in Morall and Civill Actions I desire that they would more punctually set down What the Liberty is which we retain in Naturall things but want in Spirituall What Liberty that is which the Angels have and Man once had but hath now lost And not speak of such a Liberty as neither Man or Angel ever had nor is it possible for any Creature to have Nay not for God himselfe For God having once decreed cannot with his Truth revoke it nor is indifferent to execute it or not But as They say of Jupiter which make Him to be the Author of their Stoicall unavoidable Fate understanding it cum grano salis He once Commanded and ever after Obeyed There follows in the next place an Objection How it comes to passe if Faith and Knowledge be One that some who have more Knowledge have lesse Faith I need not recite his Lordships Answer I will only propose my own If there be meant a Physicall Identity whereby two Modi of the same Thing doe subsist by the subsistence of their common Subject it is not hard to determine For two Modifications of the same Thing may yet be independent of each other And therefore it is not requisite they should be both in the same measure or degree 2. If by Knowledge be meant an assent to Naturall truths and by Faith an assent to Supernaturall truths neither is here any difficulty For the Knowledge of one thing is not inconsistent with the Ignorance of another thing 3. ●f Knowledge and Faith be considered in relation to the same Object Spirituall truths or Saving truth and Faith be taken for an Intellectuall assent to them Then is it not true that there is in any if you speak adid●m more Knowledge and lesse Faith what any Knows to be Thus he cannot Beleeve to be Otherwise For the Understanding is not a Free faculty that it can either Accept or Reject a reveiled Truth 4. If by Faith be meant not an Assent in the Vnderstanding to the Truth Known but a Consent in the Will an imbracing of it which is the Iustifying act of Faith Neither is this difficulty much greater then the former For the too too frequent sinnes even in Gods children against light makes it over manifest That the Action of the Will doth not always follow the Knowledge of the Understanding And yet if this too cleare experience be not able to prove it but that you still lay all the blame upon the Understanding as not being cleare enough in its Apprehensions or not sufficiently Peremptory in its Dictates and so excuse the Will of all Remissenesse I demand then what disability there is in the Will of Man since the fall more then in the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven I cannot think but that the Image of God by the Fall is defaced in the Will as well as in the Understanding and yet if the Will doe never disobey the Light of Reason which is its sole immediate Guide I see not wherein this disability doth appear I grant that the Will doth always Follow the Understanding that is it never goes before it or without it it goes never but where the Understanding hath led the way in discovering some Good more or lesse something Desirable For the Will is Caeca potentia and Knows of nothing desirable but what the Understanding discovers And Knowing nothing can Desire nothing Ignoti nulla Cupido But yet I grant not that Proposition in this sense The will Allwayes follows the Understanding that is It never stays behind For to Omit what the Understanding commands requires not a discovery of some other Good but only an Impotency a Backwardnesse or Remisnesse to doe its Duty To goe without direction requires a Positive Cause because it is a Positive Act But Not to goe when it is directed may proceed from a Negative Cause Negatio Causae because it is a Negative Act or a Not-doing A lame man doth not runne when he knows that he ought to runne yet here is no need of a Positive Cause to stay him but his Impotency a Negative cause sufficeth And thus farre do I admit that distinction of Libertas Contrarietatis and Libertas Contradictionis though in that way in which it is ordinarily made use of I doe wholly reject it There is not in the Will an Indifferency to choose Good or to choose Evill neither yet to Choose good or Reject good velle nolle both which they call Libertas Contrietatis For the Understanding doth not shew any Amiablenesse or Lovelynesse in Evill nor any Odiousnesse in Good quatenus sic and therefore the Will cannot Desire Evill nor Reject Good Nolle or Velle non For Bonitas is Objectum formale Appetitûs and Malum is the formall Object of Nolition Now the Soule cannot velle quatenus bonum that in which no Good is apprehended nor nolle quatenus malum that is velle ut non sit that wherein it apprehends no Evill But for the other kinde of Indifferency which they call Libertas Contradictionis to Will good or Not Will it to Nill Evill or Not to Nill it

the Understanding dictates to the contrary Whereas the Will doth as often fail in Choosing a wrong object which the Understanding acknowledgeth to be Evill as in Not Choosing a Good Object I answer it is true the Will doth often choose what it ought not And yet I affirm that the Wills Errour is onely Negative and not Positive It is Omissive only in not-obeying some directions of the Understanding I shall make it cleer by an Instance Pleasure and Vertue may be Competitors and Rivalls as it were both courting the Will As in an Act Pleasant but Sinnefull The Understanding proposeth Pleasure as quid bonum 't is Good 't is Desirable It proposeth Vertue as quid melius 'T is Better 't is more desirable Now the Will perhaps follows the first direction it imbraceth Pleasure as being Good and so Desirable for Bonum Jucundum is Desirable as well as Bonum Honestum But the second Precept or Direction rather whereby Vertue is proposed as Better and therefore should countermand the form●● this it hears not it follows not If you say the Understanding doth indeed discover some Good though a lesse Good in the Object yet this is not to be accounted the Understandings Practicall Direction dictamen But that the Understanding having examined the Good and the Evill that is in every Act and comparing them together upon this Comparison as it observes the Good or Evill to be more so it prescribes to Doe or Not to Doe H●● age or Hoc non age And if the Will doe Act when the Understanding Forbids it must be said to perform a Positive Act without direction I answer I admit not the Understandings dictate to be Imperative but onely Declarative It onely informs This is Good This is Evill but Commands not Doe this or Omit it But the Will upon proposall of Good Embraceth it upon proposall of Evill it Rejects it Yet not so but that by Negligence it may Not-embrace Good and notreject Evill And thus the proposall of Pleasure as Good is as truely declarative as the other and this the Will follows But a further declaration whereby it declares that although Pleasure be Good yet it is Evill to embrace this Good because there is a greater Evill annexed This direction by omission it imbraceth not And this I conceive to be the true nature of the Acts of the Will and Understanding If you would have the Will and the Understanding to be the Same and therefore think these distinctions superfluous understand by the Intellect Anima Intelligens by the Will Anima Volens or Anima quatenus Volens and then you are pleased And thus you see How there may be more Knowledge even of Spirituall and Saving Truths and yet l●sse Faith Because there may be ●n Asse●t a Beleeving in the Understanding which is Knowledge or Historicall Faith without a Fiduciall Trust a Reliance and resting upon it which is the Justifying Faith or the Justifying Act of Faith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 5. But if you speak of a Knowledge peculiar to Gods children wherof others partake not Such a Knowledge of God wherby no man knows him but he that hath him That Knowledge which is Life everlasting This Knowledge and Faith always go together the more there is of One the more also of the Other A Speculative Knowledge whereby we assent to the Truth reveiled is found even in the Devils and that in as large and ample measure I suppose as in the Saints on Earth For I cannot be perswaded but the Devils 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being Knowing Spirits doe Know and Assent to the Truth of every Proposition that a Child of God knows But there is an Experimentall Knowledge distinct from the former Knowledge of another nature whereby we Know what we know in another Manner We do not only Know that it is so but we Tast and See it to be so A Blind man Knows perhaps that the Sun shines but he doth not S●● it I Know that at Midnight the Sunne shines to our Antipodes but I doe not See it shine to them I Know that at such a time there is such an I ●lipse visible to such a part of the World yet doe I not See the Eclipse The Confectioner that provides a Banquet Knows that this or that dish is Sweet but they only Tast the Sweetnesse that eat of it A wicked man may Know that God is good as a blind man knows that the Sun shines by the report of others or as an Astronomer knows of an Eclipse before it come by Calculation or rationall Discourse and Illation ●ut he S●es it no● he Tasts it not Now we read of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 H●b 5. 14. som that have their Senses exercised to discern of good and evill there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Phil. 1. 9. a kind of spirituall Sense whereby we do 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 super●a S●pere Relish those things that are above And where there is this spirituall Tast this Experimentall Knowledge there must needs be Faith also For Truths thus cleerly and Sensibly as it wer● rev●iled to the Soul it seems no● to be in the power of the Will to reject No more then it is in the power of the Eare not to be pleased with harmonious Musick or in the power of the Palat not to be delighted with the Sweetnesse of a Tast And thus I suppose it may appear How far and From what Ground there may be Knowledge without Faith That God is all mercy and sweetnesse to the Divels is no Article of my faith Those miserable creatures saith he cannot consent to it No more can I And yet I deny not that Mercy and Justice are One thing in God Gods Simple Essence is the same with both yet are not They so properly the same with each other The Torment of the Devils proceeds from that Divine Essence which is Love as likewise the Mercies of Gods Children proceed from that Divine Essence which is Justice for the Justice of God is equally himselfe as is his Love Yet may we not say the Torments of those are an effect of Love no more then that the Mercies of these are the effects of Anger yet Both are the effects of that Simple Essence which is Both. It is a far different thing therefore to say A Loving God doth notwithstanding Punish and to say A Loving God doth therefore Punish Punishment and Revenge are sufficiently consistent with Love but not the immediate effects of Love Thus we say Musicus Aedificat yet not his skill in Musick but his skill in Architecture is exercised in Building The Love of God as likewise his Anger Justice Power c. is I confesse the Divine Essence we allow no Accidents in God at all quicquid est in Deo est Deus But I ask Whether he think this Attribute Love and so of the rest to be an Adequate expression of that whole Essence