far as for the sake thereof to reward the Men. So that if Epicurus was vertuous beyond these degrees that we must impute to the Man rather than to the Philosopher rather to his vertuous temper than to his principles So that whatever he was as to his own person yet I believe his followers made but right consequences from his false principles when they inserr'd Let us eat and drink for to morrow we dye Nor can the particular excellencies of some of that Sect be any just vindication of any false principle or wicked practice in the first Founder of it any more than Alexander's great Courage and Conduct in War can be made use of as an argument to prove the truth of his Master Aristotle's opinion concerning the Eternity of the World Marcus Antoninus was as great an example of all natural and moral excellencies in the Sect of the Stoicks as any other could possibly be in the Sect of the Epicureans and yet in respect of any ones particular endowments being able to vindicate an error in his Founder we may say here as it was proverbially said of a desperate and ruin'd state Ne Marcus quidem And whereas 't is said That Epicurus took great satisfaction at his Death by reflecting upon his Life and his I suppose Physiological Inventions the greatest invention that he seem'd remarkable for was his solving the liberty of the Will meerly by the motion of senseless Atoms declining uncertainly from the Perpendicular now this seems no such pious invention as to take such solid comfort in at his Death I shall here only add these two general Observations First That Vertue according to his principles must be founded on very weak and uncertain grounds and reasons especially as to the more difficult duties of an holy Life they being at present both unpleasant and afterwards unrewardable So that if the Epicureans did give themselves to the practice of such Vertues out of an absolute sense of Duty or from the consideration of the excellency of the thing it self then were they the most Heroickly Vertuous not only of any sort of Philosophers but also of any other People in the world for then were they vertuous without either hopes of reward or fear of punishment Besides I know not what motions such men can have according to those principles to return to the Practice of an holy Life who by a constant and habitual course in á well regulated extravagance have made such a degree of Vice easy and pleasant to ' em Secondly Happiness according to Epicurus is impossible for he founds it in an impossible condition in rooting out all fear of Death and all doubtful suspicions that may succeed it Now the hopes and fears of future good and evil are anticipations so implanted in us that the rooting them out is a thing absolutely impossible now he tells us that we cannot attain sincere pleasure without Physiology that is I suppose such an Hypothesis of Natural Philosophy as his own which excludes all Divine Providence out of the World and takes away the immortality of the Soul Neque prodesset aliquid humanam sibi parare securitatem cum superna quae sub terrâ sunt suspecta essent Diog. Laert. Now what the Stoicks were among the Heathens that in some resemblance are the Enthusiasts among Christians and then as for the Epicureans we have a sort of Men amongst us who cannot be said so properly to resemble 'em as really to be the same Now whereas the great design of the Gospel was to root out sin and plant the most exemplary Vertue and Piety in the World the Enthusiasts instead of this make the design thereof to consist in something pretendedly above it As First In a Pompous sett of high flown Notions and speculative Truths as if the Sun of Righteousness came only to enlighten the understanding but not either to regulate the Will or warm the Affections as if it was enough to be seraphical in our understandings tho' in the mean time our Wills be vicious and irregular Though this is not so to be understood as if it was indifferent for us what we believe provided that we be careful and conscientious in the way we are in For it is impossible for us to lead a truly good and holy Life without a firm belief of the Christian Articles but then we must not rest in a bare belief of Truth for Truth without Practice becomes not only useless but of bad consequence to us Secondly The Enthusiasts place a great deal of Considence in vain pretences to Divine Revelation as if their Souls were the only Seats of the Deity and as if they were the only Ministers of State here below and Heavens great Privy Councellors As if God's written Word were only a dead Letter unless enlivened by their Interpretations all which tho' different Comments must be of greater Authority than the Text it self not only when they contradict that but also one another Thirdly The Enthusiasts entertain such an imaginary Opinion of Perfection as states 'em not only above all Humane but Divine Laws as if their Wills and Actions were the only Rules of Right and Wrong and that what ever they did was therefore good because done by them Thus are they grown such Giants in Religion as that they have baffled all checks of Conscience and Obedience to Laws which they look upon as mean and low dispensations quite to be laid aside when once Men arrive at this State of Perfection Fourthly Enthusiasm consists in an ill-guided Zeal prodigiously Partial and Indulgent to those of its own perswasion but Furious and Cruel to those who differ from ' em Now as the Stoicks pretended by their false Opinions of Humane Nature to be more than Men So the Enthusiasts by the like mistakes concerning true Religion pretend to be more than Christians tho' indeed they both come short of what they severally pretended to Having thus briefly stated the Question betwixt the Stoicks and Epicureans I shall here further enquire how far God makes use of the lower faculties of the Soul in the communications of himself to Mankind I shall not here go about to explain the manner how God now under the Gospel works upon the minds of Men by the gracious influences of his Holy Spirit for these may be more happily experienc'd than successfully explain'd however I conceive it would be a very preposterous method to do it by beginning at the lower faculties of the Soul for these are not immediately and in the first place wrought upon but by the mediation of an enlightned Understanding and a rectifi'd Will and from those Fountains is Grace and Goodness deriv'd into the Soul Thus our Remedy is apply'd in a way answerable to our Disease the Corruption and Depravation of our Nature Now this consists more especially in these two things in ignorance of the Understanding and impotence and irregularity of the Will answerably hereunto in the Restitution of Man God first
' em But then he says That since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with Esteem and Reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage and to blame and discountenance the contrary 't is no wonder that Esteem and Discredit Virtue and Vice should in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong c. But then suppose Men should so far mistake themselves as to place their Commondation or Blame on that side that really deserves it not and such a thing may possibly sometimes happen would this alter the nature of things and make Vice Vertue and Virtue Vice Lastly Tho' thou dost not find in these Papers that profoundness of Thought that depth of Reasoning that may be elsewhere met withal yet I hope what is here offered is free and natural easie and obvious and therefore probably not less true but more useful for I never look'd upon Intricacy and Obscurity either as any certain sign of Truth or any ways to promote the Benefit and Advantage of the Reader Contents of the Chapters CHAP. I. THE Excellency of the Knowledge of a man's self briefly intimated Mr. Hobbs's Interpretation of Nosce Teipsum examin'd and confuted The Knowledge of our selves in six particulars the possibility of this Knowledge the certainty of it hereby we come to the knowledge 1. of the Being of God 2. of the Nature of God 3. of the Worship of God CHAP. II. Of Man as compounded of Soul and Body A Physical Account of Man not here intended The Question stated betwixt the Stoicks and Epicureans Pride and Ignorance of the true state of Human Nature justly chargeable upon the Stoicks the Epicureans ascribe too much to the Body Epicurean Tranquility of Mind not true Peace of Conscience how far Epicurus chargeable with Atheism Virtue according to him founded upon very uncertain grounds Happiness according to him impossible Enthusiasts among Christians resemble the Stoicks among the Heathens some short Reflections upon the first and second Chapt. of Tractatus Theol. Posit concerning Prophets and Prophecy CHAP. III. Of Natural Notions of Truth and Goodness Natural Inscription and Divine Revelation the two great means of preserving Truth among all the Disadvantages it labours under Dr. Parker the late Bishop of Oxford's Opinion concerning Experimental Observation examin'd and confuted Our Faculties not false Des Cartes's opinion concerning Eternal Truths examin'd Dr. Cumberland the present learned Bishop of Peterborough no direct Enemy to Natural Notions some Remarks upon his opinion herein Some short Reflections upon the Ingenious Author of the Essay of Human Understanding Mr. Norris's opinion examin'd That opinion that distinguisheth betwixt the Idea's of the Understanding and the Phantasms of Sense and Imagination seems no ways to favour Enthusiasm Some Remarks upon P. Poiret's Cogitationes Rational de Dco and upon Cuperus his Arcana Atheismi the one asserting That there is nothing good or evil antecedent to the Divine Placitum the other that it doth not appear by the light of Nature that there is any difference betwixt Vice and Virtue CHAP. IV. Of the Being of GOD. How an Atheist ought in Prudence to demean himself seeing he cannot be positively certain that there is no God the belief of a God antecedent to all Atheism not first invented by Statesmen the two great Arguments to prove the Being of God the Constitution of the Universe and the general Consent of Nations The production of Mankind not the result of blind Chance No Reason why the Christian Philosopher should willingly give up that Argument drawn from the Consent of Nations Unseasonable Differences among our selves in the choice of our Arguments to prove the Divine Existence so preferring one as to invalidate the force of all the rest Cuperus's opinion herein examin'd CHAP. V. The state of Nature neither a state of Equality nor a state of War A fault in Mr. Hobbs in not first setling the significations of those words Nature Naturally and by Nature His Arguments to prove the equality of Men frivolous and insufficient those to prove the state of Nature a state of War the same Man a sociable Creature by Nature not only by Education Me. Hobbs's Principles of Politicks a meer Hypothesis and not a good one neither as wanting the necessary Qualifications of such a one Of Self-preservation CHAP. VI. Religion the best Foundation of Civil Government The nature of Religion in general in reference to Government Two Considerations to prove the consistency of the one with the other The divine original of Civil Power Grotius's Opinion examin'd Dr. Donn's Opinion of the original of Civil Power asserted Dominion not founded in Grace not the Honour or Interest of a Prince to be wicked against Machiavil some of his Arguments answer'd Christianity doth not depress or effeminate Mens Spirits CHAP. VII Of Moral Virtue Virtue in general natural and essential to Man in Innocence Moral Virtue distinguished from original Righteousness and Evangelical Holiness founded in Nature not by inspiration from God Plato's Opinion herein examin'd natural and original Excellencies of Human Nature in respect of the Soul the adventitious Dignities thereof such as are conferr'd upon it by Divine Benignity their Reasons briesly intimated who would willingly grant a possibility of some Heathens being saved CHAP. VIII Some short Observations upon Mr. Hobbs's First Chap. of his Kingdom of Darkness Mr. Hobbs inconsistent with himself in his Discourses concerning Phantasms the Church in a proper sense the Kingdom of Christ Mr. Hobbs's notion of a Covenant no ways applicable to God Almighty his Answers to those places of Scripture which are commonly brought to prove the Immortality of the Soul no ways sufficient Appendix to the 7th Chapter CHAP. I. Of the Nature and Excellency of the Knowledge of a Man's Self THE true Worth and Value of a Thing consists either in its Intrinsick Nature or in the Relation it bears to us either that it is in it self Excellent or to us Useful Now both these meet together in the Knowledge of a Man's Self this being that which so nearly concerns us that no one ought in Honour to be ignorant of it Thus those whose ancient Families or personal Merits have Entituled to a Coat of Arms do usually think themselves bound at least to attain to such a degree of Skill in Heraldry as to be able to Blazon them So would it be a Disparagement to a Man as such to be owner of so many and great Excellencies of Nature and not rightly to understand them not to be able to derive their Descent from their first and divine Original not fully to know and duly to consider that nobleness and generosity of Action which even his Order obliges him to Now since there is no more effectual Way or Method to recommend a Thing truly Excellent than only fully to explain it I shall therefore shew wherein the Nature of this Knowledge of a Man's Self consists Mr. Hobbs in his Introduction to his
more immediate applications of himself to the minds of Men as fully assure 'em of the truth of his Revelations as they can be of any thing by any Natural Principles and that it really and actually was so may appear from hence that those to whom God convey'd these Revelations have by vertue hereof undertaken the performance of such things which arguments drawn from mere Sense and Reason in all probability could not have perswaded 'em to Cum it aque mens nostra ex hoc solo quod Dei naturam objectivè in se continet de eadem participat potestatem habeat ad formandas notiones c. Merito mentis naturam quatenus talis concipitur primam Divinae Revelationis causam statuere possumus This seems very strange mystical Divinity if by Divine Revelation he mean Revelation truly so call'd then it is altogether unconceiveable how any impressions of Natural and Moral Truths and that is all that he ought to understand by those expressions quod Dei Naturam objective in se continet de eâdem participat How these can any ways be the cause of Divine Revelation if by Divine Revelation he mean nothing but Natural Knowledge besides the impropriety of the Expression I do not see how the Soul can so truly be call'd the first cause even of that neither but rather the first and immediate subject of it Upon the whole matter one might almost be perswaded from hence to think That by our Souls containing in it the Nature of God objectively and partaking of the very same that hereby he design'd as it were to melt down God and the Soul of Man into an equal constitution and both into parts of a material Universe Then he tells us that Quicquid dici potest ex Scripturâ solâ peti debet What ever is said of things relating to Divine Revelation ought to be fetch'd from Scripture alone This in general is a very good Rule yet it is to be understood with some certain limitations as he himself acknowledges in the same Paragraph unless we had rather say that the latter part thereof contradicts the former for he tells us That the Iews never took any notice of Second Causes but did generally recur to God as the cause of all great and excellent things they had occasion to speak of And therefore we must only take that for Supernatural Revelation which Scripture expressly says is such or what may be gathered to be so from the circumstances of the Relation First I grant that God may declare that again which a Man either by Natural Principles or some other way knew before Secondly When God makes any Revelation to a Man it is necessary that he should make such a reduplicative Declaration as this That this which I now speak is Pure Simple unmixt Divine Revelation such as exceeds the Power of Natural Causes to make known if so then it may be questioned Whether God ever made any supernatural Revelation to Mankind or no because we no where meet with any such Declaration And as to the circumstances of the Narration we can never according to his Principles from thence gather any thing to be truly Divine because as I intimated before he makes the Power of God and the Power of Nature the same or however asserts that we are very much ignorant how far the Powers of Nature may extend However we may make use of this assertion against himself that if we may argue from the circumstances of the Relation then it is not necessary that whatever is said concerning these things should be fetch'd from Scripture only 'T is easily observable how this Author by unsetling the significations of Words and confounding the Notions of things designs to bring all into confusion he argues much what at a rate with Mr. Hobbs that is weakly and probably with the same design that is Wickedly But Providence hath so ordered affairs that a bad Cause should always be a weak one He founds all Prophecy meerly in the imagination hence he says it is that the Prophets conceiv'd all things parabolically and express'd spiritual things after a Corporeal manner because this agrees more with the Nature of Imagination Hence it was that those that were with Christ saw the Spirit descending like a Dove and the Apostles as it were Tongues of Fire and S. Paul when he was Converted saw a great light because all these things did suit with the nature of Imagination As if either there was no Foundation in Nature for any such belief but only the imagination of Men or as if these appearances reach'd no further than the Fancy without any Divine Influence making any further impressions upon the minds of those who were concern'd herein Si igitur sacra volumina percurramus videbimus quod omnia quae Deus Prophet is revelavit iis revelat a fuerunt vel verbis vel figuris vel utroque modo That all the Prophecies we meet withal in Scripture were convey'd to the Prophets by Words or Figures and sensible Representations or both I shall here show First That this assertion is false Secondly If it was true yet it would not prove what he thereby designs 1. It doth not appear that all the Divine Revelations in Scripture were convey'd one of these two ways There are some instances where there is no mention made of either of these two and to say that one of these was made use of tho' not express'd this is gratis dictum and contrary to his own Rule That whatever is said of these things must be drawn from Scripture The instances I mean are those of Ioseph's interpreting the Dreams of the Butler and the Baker and of Pharoah's Dream concerning the Seven Years of Dearth c. Gen. 40 and 41 chap. Now the Interpretation of Dreams is as much Prophecy or Divine Revelation as the Dreams themselves and yet here we do not find either any Voice or sensible Representation Nor are his Reasons any whit more cogent than his Instances for tho' he grants it possible for God immediately to communicate himself to Men Attamen ut homo aliquis solâ mente aliqua perciperet quae in primis nostrae cognitionis fundamentis non continentur nec ab iis deduci possant ejus mens praestantior necessariò atque humana longe excellentior esse deberet But I know no reason why the Soul of Man is not of capacity enough to perceive and apprehend the Objects of Divine Revelation when duly communicated to the perceptive Faculties without the assistance of Fancy or Imagination For this is certain and both Reason and Religion obliges us to believe That God doth convey his gracious Assistances by which he both enlightens the Understanding and reforms the Will without the mediation of the Phancy and it is also very reasonable to believe That God did many times under the Old Testament convey the Intimations of his Will to Men without either Voice or Vision however this is certainly done by the
Communications of Divine Grace to Christians now under the Gospel 2. Suppose that God always made use of these imaginary Representations in the Conveyance of his Will to the Prophets will it therefore follow ad prophetizandum non esse opus perfectiore mente sed vividiore imaginatione Will it therefore follow that they did tantùm per imaginationem percipere Will it therefore follow that they did non nisi ope imaginationis percipere Though God in the wise methods of his Providence did make use of second Causes will it therefore follow that the whole Causality must be ascribed to them Could the Fancy alone or the Fancy and Understanding together rightly judge of the sense and meaning of those Representations without the further assistance of Divine Illumination to assert either of these would argue him either a bad Philosopher or a worse Divine so that it would be hard to conceive how these imaginary Representations without a more immediate interpretation of their sense and meaning would be any thing better than idle shows and insignificant appearances CHAP. III. Of natural Notions of Truth and Goodness THere is nothing that affords us more noble or more useful matter whereon to exercise our Speculations than a serious Enquiry into the respective natures of Truth Goodness which are things of so great Excellency in themselves and of such near relation to us that it doth not become a Man a Philosopher or a Christian to be ignorant of either 'T is observ'd by some that Pilate immediately upon his propounding that Question to our Saviour What is Truth He went forth not staying sor an Answer yet Providence hath not left us in the dark in things of this nature we have the certain Guides of Reason and Revelation as much as God thought fit to impart to us sufficient to satisfy all sober though not over-curious Enquiries sufficient to all the ends and purposes of this humane State Truth indeed both natural and reveal'd hath ever since its first appearance in the World variously suffer'd by the Ignorance of some and the Malice of others by the contrary and eager pretences of opposite Parties by the weaknesses and follies of Men and by the power and subtlety of the Devil and especially by that universal deluge of Sin and Wickedness which both upon a natural and moral account is very prejudicial to the concerns of Truth both as Vice is naturally destructive of good Principles and also as wicked Men are ready to believe though never so false what they think would be their Interest to be true Thus if we consider the state of the Gentile World in the first Ages we shall there find a very bad face of things For not to speak of the grossness of popular Errours and the no less impious than false apprehensions of the generality of the common sort the most exact Enquiries of their Philosophers were often false but always mixt with a great deal of uncertainty in their Discourses having commonly a contrary Sect and Company of Men that whatever was asserted by one was many times with as much vigour and equal probability of reason contradicted by another So that a sober and serious Enquirer after Truth though he might have reason enough not to profess himself a Sceptick but to believe that there was such a thing as truth yet he might then see too much cause to despair of ever finding the certain way that led to it among so many By-paths of errour and uncertainty And even now in the Christian World the many errours in Opinions and the more fatal Heresies of wicked practices do sufficiently-testify that Truth doth not enjoy such an undisturb'd Empire as might have been hop'd and wish'd since Christ's appearance in the Flesh. Now among all these disadvantages under which Truth always labour'd and even still labours Providence hath more especially provided these two ways for the preservation of it 1. By natural inscription upon the minds of men 2. By after revelation for the further illustration and confirmation of it And these two are as it were the two Pillars that have preserved it both from the deluge of Sin and the violence of all other opposition 1. Natural Inscription I hope I shall not need to desire the Reader not to impose any such gross sense upon this word as is inconsistent with the nature of an Immaterial Soul I shall here therefore first briefly explain what I mean by truth of first Inscription or natural Notions For the Defendant has always leave to state his own Question and to declare in what sence he undertakes the defence of it this I the rather intimate because some Men will put such a Sense upon these words innate imprinted or impress'd frequently made use of in this Question as none that I know of go about to defend First I do not here assert the Opinion of the Platonists concerning innate Ideas in all its circumstances I do not here suppose the Soul to praexist nor do I make all the knowledge we have in this state to be nothing but reminiscence or recollection of what we knew in the other Secondly These natural Notions are not so imprinted upon the Soul as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves even in Children and Ideots without any assistance from the outward Senses or without the help of some previous Cultivation For thus reason it self which yet we say is natural to a Man is not so born with him but that it requires some supervenient assistances before it arrive at the true exercise of it self and it is as much as I here contend for if these notions be in the same sense connatural to the Soul as reason it self is But Thirdly The use of our Understandings being first suppos'd that is our faculties labouring of no natural defect nor depriv'd of those other advantages that God and Nature have made necessary thereunto then our Souls have a native power of finding or framing such Principles or Propositions the Truth or Knowledge whereof no ways depends upon the evidence of sense or observation thus knowing what is meant by a whole and what by a part hence naturally results the truth of this Proposition totum est majus sui parte without being any ways oblig'd to sense for it Of this nature are those universal Propositions the truth whereof doth not depend upon the actual Existence of any thing as quicquid agit est c. Now I suppose we may easily discern a difference betwixt the Truth of such Propositions as these and those others which are brought by some to vie with those natural Notions viz. White is not black Fellowness is not sweetness c. I shall here 1. enquire into the grounds and reasons upon which Dr. Parker late Bishop of Oxford in his account of the Platonick Philosophy asserts Experimental Observation to be the great Rule and Measure of Truth And first he blames the Platonick Theology for resolving Knowledge into its first
can commit any sin provided they do but follow their own natural Inclinations According to him there is no sin but when a Man is guilty of such a strange piece of Self-denial as not to comply with his own natural Appetites when there is nothing as in this case that forbids him so to do Thus p. 260. he tells us That no actions with respect to the Worship of God by the mere Light of Nature can be counted sin Praeter illas à quibus vel omnium hominum natura abhorret vel in certis hominibus illas quae ipsorum naturae sunt contrariae Where by Nature he means nothing but natural Affections Appetites and Inclinations But certainly a Man must have a new Nature and a new Bible given him before this will pass either for Reason or Religion But then for the better understanding of that place before cited some say That St. Paul there doth not speak in his own Person but in the Person of a Iew brought up under such Masters who did not understand coveting as it includes the inward act only to be a sin Others say That sin was known to be so by the Law of Nature before the giving of Moses his Law thus Theophylact 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. How was the Deluge brought upon the World And why were the Sodomites destroy'd by fire if Lust was not known to be a sin before the Law So that the Law did not first make Lust to be a sin but did more expresly declare it to be so He quotes indeed several other places of Scripture but to as little purpose p. 254. Si pietatis officia specialia c. if the special Offices of Piety were known by the Light of Nature then there must be some certain foundation from whence they might be drawn Here he mentions three 1. Natural Instinct 2. The Sanctity of God 3. Divine Power or Dominion As for the first Natural Instinct this indeed he says is not the rule of humane Actions to them who live under the Gospel but according to his Principles it must be to them who only enjoy the Light of Nature Nor Secondly says he can the Sanctity of God be the rule of our Actions but the reason he there gives is a very strange one and very odly express'd viz. because God acts nothing but by instinct of his Nature nor is there any thing holy in God but what his Nature desires But to this I Answer First That God sometimes acts as an absolute Soveraign of the Universe and Governour of the World and in these cases his Actions are not in all particulars to be the rule of ours Secondly It seems an irreverend way of speaking to say That God acts out of Instinct of Nature which is commonly and properly attributed to meer Animals yet granting the Expression in sano sensu it cannot be suppos'd that God doth daily alter the Determination of his Will concerning the same Object Thirdly Yet this we may safely say That the holiness of God is the rule of our Actions so far as either by the Light of Nature or Divine Revelation it is made known to us to be so But in the Third placo He resolves all into the absolute Power and Dominion of God That nothing is just and good but that only which he commands and for no other reason but because he does so And yet in the very next Sentence p. 255. as if something from within had whisper'd better things to him he tells us That God indeed may command any thing Madò Dei naturae non sit contrarium ut talia siant c. provided it be not contrary to his Nature that it should be done This indeed is a very pious and prudent a true and rational Assertion but then it contradicts the design of the whole Chapter Some things indeed may be more evidently and directly contrary to the Nature of God as not to love or not to obey him but then to forbid all due resemblance of himself all Vertue and Goodness and to command all filthiness both of Flesh and Spirit in rational Creatures this certainly is also contrary to the Divine Nature He then proceeds as he says to examine the principal parts both of Natural and Christian Religion in order to see whether there lies any obligation upon us to 'em but meerly by the Divine Command And here I grant That those Truths and those Duties viz. the belief of a Trinity and Faith in Christ that depend meerly upon Divine Revelation cannot be known to be such by the Light of Nature But then the reason is not the same in those other Moral Duties which Christianity did not first reveal but only further illustrate and confirm to us Nor shall I here follow him through all the parts of Natural Religion which he there instances in I shall only pitch upon one which yet seems of the greatest weight and moment that of Iustice. This he says cannot be recommended to us from the Nature of God because it doth not appear by Nature Deum neminem injuriâ afficere That God does no Body any wrong For he says that if that be injury when we hurt those who have not deserved any such thing at our hands Quid infantes in Deum peccaverunt Wherein have Infants sin'd against God who yet many times are grievously afflicted by him To this I answer 1. That I before premised this That God sometimes acts as a Soveraign or Lord of the World and in this case some actions may be injurious or unjust in Men which are not so in God 2. The consideration of original sin might give easie Solutions to what he there urges But because he doth not acknowledge any such thing I shall not therefore here insist upon it 3. It is no ways contrary to Divine Iustice to inflict very high degrees of Asflictions on rational Creatures provided that the Mercies they injoy be more than the Miseries they undergo And he will never prove that God ever inflicted such Miseries upon Infants but that if they had the power of Election they would rather chuse to undergo 'em than their own Annihilation But he lays great stress upon that action of the Israelites robbing of the Egyptians which was done by God's Command or Allowance and therefore was no sin Therefore nothing is just or unjust in it self but only as God commands or forbids it In Answer to this some say That God herein acted as the universal Creator and original Proprietor of all things and here transfer'd the Property as he justly might from the Egyptians to the Israelites Others say That as Soveraign Legislator he dispens'd with the Law in this particular yet it will not follow hence that there is nothing good or evil but with respect to God's positive Command For I humbly conceive there are some other rationes boni mali more sacred and indispensable than those of Property If the Reader here Object That my Stile
Cum igitur virtus res divina sit c. upon which the Commentator's words are Omnis rei cujuscunque sit summa excellentia quae à Deo esse putatur divina appellatur quo modo rudiore quâdam Minervâ intelligi potest quod hoc loco dicitur virtutem quae hominis est perfectio rem quandam esse divinam Not but that every good and perfect Gift comes from God either immediately or mediately but perhaps this was a way of Expression common to Plato with the Iews of calling any thing that was great and excellent in its kind by the Name of Divine so that all that was probably meant by this Phrase was only to express the excellency of the thing and the great Opinion he had of it or else that Divine Providence had some more particular concern in the disposing and inclining Men to it either by giving them a more happy Constitution of Body or a more Ingenuous Temper of Mind or by affording more advantagious Circumstances of time and place yet so as that the most happy Occurrences do not necessitate Men to be Vertuous without their own Industry and Inclination nor the most Unhappy force 'em to be wicked without their own fault However if this be Plato's Opinion That Vertue is so from God that it cannot be gotten by Humane Industry in conjunction with the ordinary Influences of Divine Providence this Opinion is neither reasonable in it self nor is it sufficiently prov'd by that Argument made use of by Socrates for that purpose If says he Vertue was possible to be taught then would Good Men more especially teach their Sons that so they might inherit their Father's Vertues as well as Fortunes but the contrary frequently appears To this I Answer First That nothing can be prov'd from particular Instances seeing as many may be brought to the contrary where Vertue has been as it were propagated with the Family and we may furnish our selves even from our own Observation with Examples of the happy success of a Vertuous Education Secondly Vertuous Parents tho they may desire their Children may be such too yet many times such is their Tenderness and Indulgence to 'em that they do not make use of those Methods which are most proper thereunto which are commonly joyn'd with some degrees of Severity Thirdly Vertue though it may be taught and is capable of being learn'd yet is it a very conditional thing and depends upon the concurrence of many Circumstances together for the producing the effect and that which often defeats all the rest is the liberty of the Will which many Men use in opposition to all those Moral means which are otherwise sufficient in themselves and design'd by others to moderate their Passions and reduce 'em to Vertue Nor 2. Doth Vertue proceed from any Natural Influx of the Stars for if we consider the Nature of the Heavens and natural Causes and compare 'em with the Nature of the Soul and the Native Liberty of the Will it will be impossible to conceive how any Sydereal Influences can any ways certainly or necessarily determine the Minds of Men. And the same Arguments that prove the Vanity of Iudicial Astrology in other respects do much more evince the folly of their pretences who go into Heaven to fetch down Vertue from thence when indeed it is nearer us even in our Mouths imprinted upon our very Hearts and Natures I shall here give you Savanorola's Argument in a case much what to this purpose If says he the Christian Faith and Life proceed from the Stars then their Faith is either true or false if it be true then it cannot proceed from thence because it condemns that Opinion and asserts the Vanity of Iudicial Astrology if it be false and proceed from the Stars then it follows that the Stars incline Men to falshood and the falshood of the Effect will be no good reason why we should believe the truth of the Cause Whereby Men by the mere strength of Nature c. And thus Vertue is distinguished from Grace thus the Heathen Moralists have discours'd very well of Vertue in their Writings and given great Instances thereof in their Practices who yet were very Strangers to all Supernatural Revelation And this Notion of it seems fitly to assign the just Limits betwixt the Gentile and the Christian Religion it deprives not the one of what it may justly challenge as its right it allows to men in the state of Nature some inclinations and abilities too to Vertue but yet that without supernatural assistance he can never arrive at Evangelical Perfection it doth not so far depress humane nature Modices to make it perfectly stupid nor on the other hand doth it raise it to a pitch of Pelagianisin it grants Heathens to be Men and reminds Christians of their Original Sin and the present depravation of their Natures And though the Heathen Moralists do sometimes mention such a thing as afflatus divinus yet it cannot be in reason extended so far as to signify that which Christian Writers commonly understand by that expression To perform that which is most agreeable to the duty and dignity of his nature Thus though vertue in the proper acceptation of it be distinguish'd from Grace as to the Principle from whence it flows the one proceeding from nature the other from a more divine original yet do they agree in their end and Friendly conspire together to carry on the same designs of Providence in the World viz. the glory of God and the good of Men. Now the dignities or excellencies of humane nature are of two sorts 1. Natural and original 2. Such as are the results of the divine benignity afterwards 1. Natural and Original and under this head I shall only consider the excellencies of the Soul in particular 1. As to the excellency of its nature and essence that it is a spiritual being and ray of Divinity now considering this natural preheminence of the Soul above the Body we act unworthy of the dignity and excellence of the Soul when we make it only a Slave to the Body and only as it were the Bodies Purveyor to make provision for the flesh to fulfil the Lusts thereof 2. As to its intellectual Endowments Man only of all this lower Creation is endowed with a power of reasoning now certainly God never gave us such excellent faculties only to employ 'em upon mean objects and debase 'em by unworthy Employments Phil. 4. 8. What soever things are true what soever things are just c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 think on these things 3. As to its moral Endowments that is all those natural Inclinations and Capacities the Soul has to Vertue and Goodness that inward sense of Honesty that tactus quidam divinitat is as Iamblicus calls it now this also obliges us to be true to that inward sense of obligation that lies upon us 2. Such dignities as are the result of divine benignity afterwards and these I shall consider
essentialiter proprietatem for these truths are only things of an intellectual nature such as terminate the act of Divine Wisdom and Understanding but no body says that they have any radical or essential propriety univocally equal or like to God But further What inconsistency or what unbecomingness would there be in the Notion if we thus conceiv'd of God that he is an insinitely wise and Omnipotent Being comprehending Himself and the extent of his own Power that is the Idea's of all the possibilities of things together with all their several either necessary or accidental relations one towards another So that according to this Scheme of things these truths are but the necessary objects of Omniscience or infinite Wisdom so that it is impossible that these necessary and immutable truths should any ways derogate from the Divine Perfections seeing we cannot suppose God to be Omniscient that is infinitely perfect without 'em neither would these truths be so absolutely Independent of themselves for we can scarce suppose any moral good or evil unless we first suppose a God in Conformity or Non-Conformity to whose pure and holy nature and to his Will acting always according thereunto consists the nature of both The second thing I shall observe from his management of this Question is this that as to things which relate to moral goodness such is the awful power of truth such is the natural modesty of Mankind that inward sense they have of and profound veneration for these things that many times they are asham'd openly to assert that which yet may be the natural consequence of some false Principles they have entertain'd And this seems the Case of this Author in this particular for it is observable through his whole Discourse he no where plainly and expresly asserts which yet according to his Principles will necessarily follow that God might if he had so pleas'd have appointed a quite contrary Scheme of Morality or a Set or Systeme of moral truths just contrary to what they now are Indeed he does say p. 126. that this Divine Placitum was of its own nature indifferent vel ad haec statuenda vel plane omittenda vel diversa decernenda and that God might have represented himself to the minds of Men per alia nescio quae quam per naturas rerum quales jam sunt p. 136. Yet these seem to come short of asserting the quite contrary way and method But some perhaps will say that this is too favourable an interpretation put upon his words but suppose it be yet I would rather err on this side than on the other yet if it be but thus far true it will be notwithstanding a sufficient confutation of his Opinion But give me leave only to suggest the reason of that my charitable interpretation viz. because he osten mentions a certain decency which he seems to make the Rule of Divine Actions even antecedent to the Divine Will Thus p. 131. he says that the justice of God did appoint things modo ipsum decenti in a way becoming him which would seem an impertinent expression if all the decency that things have arise only from God's appointing 'em to be so and immediately after speaking of God's liberty and freedom in making things thus or thus he says that he was indifferent vel ad nulla statuenda vel ad alia stabilienda quae aequè Deum decuissent which words seem to imply that there was something truly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 worthy of God antecedent to his positive appointment But then let us see how he answers that Objection that according to his Principles the hatred of God might have been good and the love of him evil if he had so appointed Now this might either have been so or not if it might then why did he not plainly say so if it could not then his Principles are false viz. that there is something good or evil antecedent to the divine positive appointment But when Men either cannot or will not return plain Answers to a plain Question it is a certain Argument that they ly under either some natural or some moral defect that their notions either do not ly smooth and clear in their Heads or else upon some worse design they thus purposely wrap themselves in Clouds But he tells us p. 136. amor praesupponit mentis naturam haec voluntatem sive placitum Dei sese hoc modo adumbrandi But we must abstract he says from all these but now to comply with him in his own way I am willing to abstract as far as is possible for us to abstract only he must not abstract us into nothing he must suffer us to remain subjects capable of abstracting and yet I believe after all these he is not that hardy Man as in plain words to say That God might have made the lovc of himself a Sin and the hatred of him a vertue However it doth not seem any good Argument of the truth or any great commendation of the goodness of an Opinion that we must abstract from every thing that is at least at present either rational or religious before we can possibly frame any conception of it And yet this is the opinion which he is so fond of and seems to value himself so much upon that in his Appendix p. 304. where he makes some reflections upon his former work he particularly commends this 10th Ch. de Dei dominio cujus excellentiam sine jactantiâ ob ipsam rei veritatem utilitatem non satis possum commendare And yet this seems a truer Character of it that it is in it self false unworthy of God and of dangerous consequence to Men. I shall only here clear one place of Scripture relating hereunto from a forc'd and false interpretation which Cuperus p. 246. Arcana Atheismi has put upon it Rom. 2. 14. the Gentiles having not the Law do by Nature the things contain'd in the Law these having not the Law are a Law unto themselves The Apostle here designs to assert that natural knowledge which the Gentiles had of good and evil But says he before this can be made appear we must prove these two things 1. That by the Gentiles are here to be understood the Pagan Gentiles those who had neither heard of the Law of Christ nor the Law of Moses 2. That the words by Nature are not to be join'd with those going before thus the Gentiles having not the Law by Nature do the things contain'd in the Law But first he has no warrant from any Copy or good Authority thus to place the Comma and so to read it now if Men may take that liberty to place Comma's where they please they may soon make the Scripture quite another thing But then further it would not be worthy of the Apostles way of discoursing to tell us that the Gentiles had not the Law of Moses by Nature for who ever imagin'd they had Now he does not grant here any other Law not
as in reason it can desire and so satisfy its own just demands 1. The Law of Nature is a Divine Law and brings us under the obligation of its Commands so that whatever is directly contrary hereunto cannot be made part of any suture Revelation because one Divine Light is not contrary to another 2. The rational exercise of their Faculties might be and probably was made use of by the Prophets and Apostles in their revealing the Will of God to Man yet still under the Influence and Superintendence of the Holy Spirit guideing and directing them in such a measure as was necessary in order to such an end 3. This light of natural Reason together with the concurrence of those other means design'd by God in order thereunto may be made use of for the better understanding of God's reveal'd will in Scripture now after such fair Concessions made to it it ought not to exalt it self above or make it self equal to that of Divine Revelation Theism in a Christian state where Men have not only all the Opportunities of knowing and understanding the Christian Religion but also live in the outward profession of it this of all things is the most unreasonable for even the best and wisest Asserters of the Light of Nature and Human Reason do grant that in those places where Christianity is known Reason it self will find more and much stronger Arguments for the Christian than for any other Belief what soever These Theists must also prove one of these two things either 1st That there never were any such persons as the Prophets our Blessed Saviour and his Apostles in the World which is contrary to the universal Consent and Confession of all both Friends and Enemies Or else 2ly That they never made any new revelation of God's Will to Mankind which they can never be able to do As for the practical Duties of Religion we grant they are founded in Nature and agreeable to Reason but then withal we say That Revelation hath both added to the clearness of the Truth and to the necessity of the Obligation of those Duties But here they tell us That Natural Reason has discover'd enough and that there is no need of any farther Revelation to be made to Man but it is a very weak and illogical way of arguing against a Matter of Fact from a supposed needlesness that there should be any such thing we ought rather in this case to argue thus It doth sufficiently appear That God hath made such and such Declarations of his Will to Man therefore it was not needless because God doth nothing in vain Farther It is disingenuous and ungratesul for Natural Reason thus to boast it self upon its own sufficiency and not acknowledge its Benefactor seeing it now owes its present improvement in a great measure to the Benefits and Advantages it has received from Divine Revelation The Author of the Discourse of Human Reason with relation to matters of Religion printed 1690. tell us That the whole Substance of Christianity it self according to St. Iohn's account of it is most certainly founded upon that universal light which enlightens every man that cometh into the World Pa. 4. of his Presatory Letter But to this I answer 1. That St. Iohn there doth not speak of the Light of Nature but of Christ and tho' Christ be the Author of that Light yet his thus enlightning every one that comes into the World doth not supersede the necessity or lessen the excellency of Divine Revelation 2. The whole Substance of Christianity cannot be founded therein because Christianity contains in it Articles of Faith above the natural power of Reason to find out as well as matters of Practice 3. Tho' the practical part be founded in this universal Light of Nature yet Christianity may carry on the Superstructure higher than meer Nature was ever able to do 4. It is not most certain that that is the right Translation of that place of St. Iohn it may be also render'd thus He was that true Light which coming into the World enlightens every man that is every man that hath the Happiness to hear the glad tydings of the Gospel The said Author pag. 92. having before made an exact and full enumeration as he thinks it of the Principles of all or rather of meer Natural Religion In the Belief and Sense says he of these general Traths and in the practice of the Duties that result from 'em according to their full extent and tendency consists all true Religion and whatever else is introduc'd into any Religion either notional or practical I say what either doth not necessarily flow from some of these Branches or tend to enforce the observance of 'em is no essential part of true Religion but the meer Product of Superstition Folly or Design But according to his Scheme of Principles what shall we think of those Articles of the Christian Faith the Trinity the Incarnation and resurrection of the Body for these are neither included in that Enumeration nor do they necessarily flow from any Branch thereof If he say that these may tend to enforce the observance of those Duties before-mentioned this I grant but it seems a preposterous way of proving Articles of Faith to bring 'em in only by the by because the belief thereof may enforce the practice of Christian Duties though this also is true that they do so yet the true reason of our belief of 'em is because they are revealed in Scripture What Monsieur le Clerk's design or whoever else was the Author of those five Letters concerning the Divine Inspiration of holy Scriptures lately translated into English was I shall not here enquire Truth indeed forbids me to think him a Deist in the first sence before mention'd but Charity it self doth not forbid to think him one in the second that is one who would bring Divine Inspiration into as narrow a room as he could and believe as little of it in Scripture as possible Yet we ought not to be too severe in charging the consequences of an Opinion upon its Author especially when he disowns 'em to be his Opinions but on the other side we ought to be very watchful over our selves that we do not broach or defend any Opinion that may any ways tend to unhinge the Principles and undermine the Foundations of Christianity and we ought the more to suspect and carefully examine such from whence men generally draw dangerous consequences That a Papist should industriously set himself to lessen the Authority of holy Scripture and upon all occasions seek advantage against it is not so much to be wonder'd at because hereby he serves a turn and by this means endeavours to advance the Authority of his own Church that what is pretended to be wanting in Scripture may be supplied by Roman Tradition But then why they who call themselves Protestants should joyn in such a Design and pick up all the little Arguments of ill-designing Men against Scripture this is not