which is the only way to perceive their agreement or disagreement And Self evident Principles or Propositions and the use that can be made of them to help us to Certainty are so far from having any opposition to the way of Ideas that neither their Truth can be known nor any Profitable Use with respect to Truth be made of them but by the way of Ideas § VI. The second Charge produced against this Proposition is That it is of dangerous consequence to and inconsistent with the Articles of the Christian Faith This Charge seems to be grounded on the last words of Mr. Lock 's Proposition viz. As expressed in any Proposition Now some Propositions come to us by Divine Revelation and several of these Propositions are such we cannot perceive by comparing the Ideas signify'd by the words of which they consist that they do so agree or disagree as the Propositions do express It follows therefore from Mr. Lock 's Proposition that we cannot be certain of or know the Truth of those Propositions and this is said to be inconsistent with or of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith but I cannot understand for what reason it is said to be so For as the truth of all Propositions come they to us by what way soever consists in what hath been before mentioned so our being certain of or knowing the truth of any Proposition let it come to us by what way soever must consist in that wherein our being certain of or knowing the truth of any Proposition doth consist For the way how a Proposition is brought to us doth not alter its nature consider'd as a Proposition nor the nature of Certainty or Knowledge which are fixed and unchangeable and always the same and therefore cannot make Certainty or Knowledge of its truth to consist in any thing but what Certainty or Knowledge of the truth of a Proposition brought to us some other way doth consist in If it shall now be ask'd Whether seeing there are certain Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation and we cannot perceive that the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas signify'd by the words in those Propositions is such as the Propositions express Mr. Lock 's Proposition is not inconsistent with and of dangerous consequence to those Articles of the Christian Faith I answer That when an account is given of the determined Ideas for which those phrases inconsistent with and of dangerous consequence do stand whether they are used in different senses or both be designed to signify one and the same thing And what that or those precise Ideas are which are meant by them distinct and proper Answers may be given to the Question or Questions propounded If by inconsistent with those Articles is meant inconsistent with the truth of those Articles and so the Question amounts to this Whether that Proposition of Mr. Locks can be true and those Articles true too The Answer is Yes very well for the truth of those Propositions doth not depend on our being certain of or knowing the truth of them If by inconsistent with those Articles be meant that we cannot be certain of or know the truth of those Articles then the Question will be Whether it will not follow from Mr. Lock 's Proposition that we cannot be certain of or know the truth of those Articles To which the Answer is Yes But the Proposition for all that is inconsistent enough with those Articles tho' it cannot conâ—ist well with Peoples pretending to know what God hath set out of their reach and which they cannot attain to know It is no wrong at all to those Articles to say we cannot be certain of or know the truth of them it is a speaking of the truth and an attributing unto them the preâ—eminence which God hath given them If Peâ—sons are resolv'd they will use this phrase inconsistent with Articles of the Christian Faith in this sense there is no help for it yet Mr. Lock 's Proposition will continue true and cannot do any injury to any one Article of the Christian Faith But what will become then may some say of those Articles of the Christian Faith or of those Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation and the truth of which we cannot be certain of or know Answer They will continue just as they are very great even Divine and Incomprehensible Truths and they are to have all the Entertainment given them by us that Divine Revelation designs they should have Whatever Propositions are brought to us by Divine Revelation and proposed to us by it to be the Objects of our Knowledge they are so formed that we may perceive that the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas signified by the words of which they do consist is such as the Propositions express And we have no other way to be certain of or to know the truth of those Propositions but by perceiving that the Ideas do so agree or disagree as the Propositions express But as for those Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelations and are such that we cannot perceive that the Ideas signify'd by the woâ—ds of which they consist have such agreement or disagreement as the Propositions express they are not proposed to us by Divine Revelation to be Objects of our Knowledge but only of our Faith And tho' we do not nor can know or be certain of the truth of these Propositions yet if we do firmly and with full assurance believe them to be true because we have good satisfaction that God hath revealed them and if our belief of their truth hath all that efficacy and influence on us which Divine Revelation requires we do fully answer the design of Divine Revelation with respect to these Articles of the Christian Faith But is not Faith may some say a Reasonable Act Yes But all reasonable Assent is not Certainty or Knowledge My assent to the truth of a Proposition or my believing it to be true is a Reasonable Act not because I am certain or do know that it is true but because my Assent is founded on such Evidence that it is true as is every way sufficient to justifie my Assenting to it There cannot be a more Reasonable Act than to believe the truth of that Proposition which we are on good grounds satisfied is declared to be true by that God who cannot Lye Let any Man produce a Proposition that Divine Revelation hath brought to Light and make it appear to me that it came to Men by Divine Revelation I shall believe it or assent most firmly to the truth of it tho' I cannot know the truth of it and my doing so will be a most Reasonable Act because my assent will be grounded on Divine Testimony But let that Person or any other Persons frame another Proposition in Philosophical Terms concerning the same matter and then pretend that that Proposition declares something more concerning that matter than God hath revealed concerning it
if I cannot perceive that the Ideas signify'd by the words of that Proposition do agree or disagree as the Proposition expresses I cannot be certain or know that the Proposition is true nor will my assenting to the truth of it upon his or their saying it is true be a Reasonable Act. For the Proposition being about a matter out of his or their reach I have not sufficient evidence to assure me that it is true yet notwithstanding the latter Proposition doth consist of different words from the former if it be declared that neither more nor less is meant by these words than is signify'd by those in the other Proposition I can assent to the truth of it and my assent will be a Reasonable Act because tho' they are two distinct Propositions consider'd as to the words yet as to sense they are but one and exactly the same Well but at this rate what becomes of the Certainty of Faith Answer Certainty and Faith are two words which stand for or signifie two distinct Acts of the Mind and they can no more be properly affirmed of one another than those distinct Acts can be said to be one and the same Indeed a Person may use the word Certainty or Knowledge if he please for Assent grounded upon probable Evidence or for Assent founded on Authority or for any other Idea he hath a mind to call by that Name and if he certifies what the Idea is he hath a mind to signifie by that word his Discourse may be Intelligible if he constantly use the word in that sense But if he will oppose another Person who hath declared that he useth the word Certainty and Knowledge strictly taken in the same sense and doth not declare that he takes the word Certainty in another sense his Discourse will unavoidably be very obscure if not perfectly unintelligible For it will be presumed he useth the word in that sense in which the other Person had declared he did use it when all the while he means another thing by it § VII When it is said that Mr. Lock 's Proposition is of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith if something else is signify'd by it than what was meant by the former phrase a distinct Account should be given of what is intended by this phrase If any shall pretend that the true and just consequence of Mr. Lock 's Proposition is this That the Arcles of the Christian Faith are not to be believed the Proposiâ—ion preâ—ended to be deduced is a very wicked Proposition But then it is as plain and certain as any thing can be That it can no way be drawn from Mr. Lock 's Proposition which has no relation at all to any Articles of Faith or Belief eiâ—her Christian or other If Mr. Lock 's Proposition can concern or affect any Christian Articles they must be Articles of Christian Knowledge not of Christian Faith And his Proposition is so far from being of dangerous consequence to Articles of Christian Knowledge that it gives the true Account wherein the knowledge of those Articles doth consist as will most evidently appear when any of those Articles shall be instanced in and considered If it shall be pretended that from Mr. Lock 's Proposition it may be regularly inferred That no Man ought to believe that any Proposition is true but what he can attain to know the truth of and that he ought not to assent to the truth of it till he attains to be certain of or to know the truth of it and that this is what is meant when it is said to be of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith then in the first place it is to be acknowledged that the Proposition intended to be regularly deduced from the other is certainly of most dangerous consequence to those Persons who shall â—ufâ—er themselves to be enslaved by it and this with respect to Articles of the Christian Faith But then in the second place it is great Injustice to charge Mr. Lock 's Proposition with that which can only in Justice be laid to the charge of another Proposition especially to do so before it is proved and made to appear that that dangerous Proposition can regularly be inferred from Mr. Lock 's Proposition which is a point altogether uncapable of being proved for there is no possibility of shewing any connection between them The two Propositions are as far distant from one another as the East is from the West From what hath been already said I think it may with reason enough be concluded that the principal Accusations advanced against Mr. Lock 's Proposition are altogether groundless § VIII Certainty or Knowledge did and will always consist in what Mr. Lock declares it doth consist and the way to attain Certainty was always by comparing Ideas What measures of knowing soever those have who speak most slightingly of the way of Ideas all their knowledge is owing to it how little soever they are aware of it or how strongly soever they are inclined to attribute it to something else There were Persons in all Ages who attained to certain measures of knowledge and were never able to declare distinctly and fully how they came by their Knowledge They generally stopped in their Accounts at the Artificial Methods whereby they were assisted in comparing of Ideas tho' they took no notice of that which was the true and natural way by which they perceived their agreement or disagreement and obtained knowledge Mr. Lock is the first Person I have heard of who hath observed and acquainted the World in what Knowledge or Certainty doth consist By which discovery he hath done Mankind so great a kindness in directing Men plainly to the most certain easie â—and speedy way to attain Knowledge so far as they are capable of it And how to bound their Enquiries so as not to spend their Labours in fruitless Endeavours to know what is out of Humane reach and what they can never attain to certainty in that Men will never be able to pay him thanks enough for the good Offices he hath done to the World nor to testifie sufficient Praises unto God for the Light and Favour he hath reached forth and imparted unto Mankind by him § IX The second passage which hath been thought faulty in Mr. Lock ' s Essay of Humane Understanding is this We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking but possibly shall never be able tâ— know whether any meer Material Being thinks oâ— no it being impossible for us by the contemplation of our own Ideas without Revelation to discover whether Omnspotency has not given to some Systemâ— of Matter fitly disposed a Power to perceive anâ— think or else joyned and fixed to Matter so disposed a thinking immaterial Substance It being in respecâ— of our Notions not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can if he pleases superadd to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking than that he should
kinds of substances another denomination will belong to it when consideâ—ed meerly with relation to that modification Should the modification of Moâ—ion be alone super-added to our Idea of substance it would make it Substance with motion And Mobile and Immobile Substance would as perfectly divide Substance as solid and unsolid Substance i. e. Material and Immaterial do This Mobile Substance could not certainly be concluded by us to have eiâ—her the modification of Solidity or of Thinking by reason of its Mobility Should Mobility be super-added to a substance which hath the modification of Solidity it would be a substance with Solidity and Mobility Should the modification of Thinking be super-added to a Substance which hath those other modâ—fications it would be a substance with Solidity Mobility and the Power of Thinking That which would move and think would be Matter or solid Substance the super-adding of the modification of Thinking would not destroy the other modifications that which would think would be Matter as well as that which would move For the modification could not think but that which had the modification of Solidity viz. The Substance We are sensible that it is the pleasure of God that various Powers should be superâ—added to solid Substance upon its being variously disposed or modify'd How many the Powers be which it is the pleasure of God shall be super-added to our Idea of Matter upon its being vaâ—iously disposed we cannot tell Hereupon this Question is put whether it is the pleasure of God that the modification or power of Thinking shall be super-added to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed Mr. Lock saith The Question is too abstruse and difficult for us to resolve demonstratively In opposition to this or to prove the contrary it is ask'd whether Matter without any regard to modifications can think Now can this import any thing else than either that the super-adding of modifications to our Idea of Matter signifies not any thing to Matter 's producing certain Acts or that no modifications can be super-added to our Idea of Matter If modifications can be super-added neither this Question nor the Answer that belongs to it can contribute any thing to the proving that the modification of Thinking cannot be superadded to our Idea of Matter § XXIV Thirdly I will mention some of the mistakes which may be observed in the Paragraph before set down First It supposes several things every one of which is wrong as 1. The words referring equally to both the parts of the sentence which goes immediately before them and taking them to be the same in sense tho' different in words suppose Mr. Lock to say in effect that matter may by modifying be made no matter for which there is not any ground but a mistaken Imagination 2. It supposes that it hath been demonstratively proved that the modification of thinking cannot be superadded to a solid substance 3. That it is as Intelligible that Immateriality may be superadded to our Idea of Matter as that that modification which makes substance to be matter may be super-added to our Idea of substance 4. That Mr. Lock concludes that the modification of Thinking may be super-added to matter whereas he saith it cannot be demonstratively concluded 5. That Immaterial in the strictest sense of that Term as contradistinguished from matter for so the word is to be understood in the present Dispute and the Power of Thinking stand for the same Idea 6. That we can know all the modifications or powers Matter is capable of for without that we cannot know what surpasses all the Powers and Capacities of Matter except what is a contradiction to our Idea of Matter which a Power of Thinking cannot be proved to be by bare saying That Immaterial and a Power of Thinking are the same In short the point is thus We have full Conviction that there is a Power of Thinking in some Systems of Matter Hereupon a Question arises Whether this modification of Thinking be the modification of the same substance that has the modification of Solidity or the modification of another Substance which not being solid is united to the material substance Some answer it is a modification of the substance of that matter others answer it is a modification of an Immaterial substance joyned to those Systems of Matter Mr. Lock saith the Question cannot be demonstratively determined but that the highest degree of probability is on their side who say it is a modification of an immaterial substance This displeases Therefore to demonstrate that a Power of Thinking cannot be super-added to our Idea of Matter or be a modification of Matter we are told that Immaterial and a Power of Thinking are the same Idea and that a Power of Thinking cannot be super-added to our Idea of matter but matter must be made Immaterial or no matter Now it is most evident that Immaterial and a Power of Thinking are as distinct Ideas as Material and Immaterial be And that should Matter be made no Matter or be changed into Immaterial Substance Substance would only lose that modification which made it matter and that it could not think till the modification or power of thinking should be superadded to it Secondly The Instance proposed in this Paragraph is not rightly stated If we would propose a Case concerning Immaterial Substances that should be parallel to that which hath been under our consideration we should first fix on some positive modification which is as essential to all Substances which have not the modification of Solidity as Solidity is to all those which are material To say the modification of Thinking is so is but saying How can we know that every substance that is not solid hath the power of thinking superâ—added to it Having fixed on this modification we should fix on another modification that the Question being proposed Whether it is a modification of immaterial substance or no More probable Arguments might be produced on the one side than on the other but no demonstrative proof could be brought either way If in this case some should be positive that it is a modification of Immaterial Substance and the highest probability was on their side others should be as peremptory on the other side and at last a Person of greater Consideration and Temper should sâ—y the point does not admit of any demonstrative proofâ— but probability carries it for them who say it is a modification of Immaterial substance and that therefore we must leave the point till demonstrative proof can be produced one way or other as God hath laid it before us and follow and be contented with probability whilst God is not pleased to afford us any greater Light concerning it what damage would any way redound from this persons saying thus Would that Wise Prudent and Good Man and Lover of Truth deserve to be evilly reflected on because he would check Peoples vain Curiosity convince the Materialists that they fight against the highest degrees of Probability and put others in mind that they should not give the Adversaries to a good Cause the Advantages they do by presuming to know more of the point than it is the pleasure of God they should know of it in this imperfect Estate I speak not this with respect to the Reverend Mr. Ienkin who concludes his Discourse with these words But tho' I have upon this occasion mentioned this Gentleman here yet it would be a great injury done him to rank him with the Authors of the Oracles of Reason but some other Writers who have on this occasion Indulged a Licentiousness which Moral Heathens would be ashamed of Thirdly There is not any thing in this Paragraph nor in all that this Learned Author hath said with relation to what Mr. Lock hath delivered that can any more prove that the modification of Thinking cannot be super-added to our Idea of Matter than it can that other modifications cannot be super-added to it For Instance Let a Person who hath a mind to affirm that the modification or power of active moving or motivity cannot be super-added to our Idea of Matter but that it is a modification peculiar to Immaterial Substance place a power of moving in this and the foregoing Sentences in the room of a power of Thinking and those very words will as fully demonstrate his point as they do the other § XXV That which may be regularly deduced from the passage in Mr. Lock 's Essay of Humane Understanding before quoted and on which so many have thought fit to reflect is this That People should not pretend a demonstrative certainty concerning Things which cannot be demonstratively proved which is a very great Truth and which would be of extraordinary good use would People strictly and rigidly govern themselves by it The greatest Service that can be done to Truth and Godliness is to preserve our Reason within its proper Bounds and to let Faith have its just scope I very much question whether any thing can give bad Men greater advantage in their endeavouring to promote Scepticism and in their opposing and talking against the Articles of the Christian Faith than Christians and especially Divines or Clergy-mens detracting any way from the Credibility of Divine Testimony and making an Ostentation of knowing Things which God hath placed perfectly out of Humane reach And treating others scurrilously who are more modest and more inquisitive than themselves because they will not acknowledge that the Truth of certain Propositions can be demonstrated meerly because they say They can tho' they will not be prevailed with to be at the pains to demonstrate their Truth FINIS ERRATA PAge 2. l. 33. for Natural r. Material p. 12. l. 10. r. Consistent p. 13. l. 11. r. Revelation p. 16. â— 27. r. pretended p. 17. l. 18. r. knowledge p. 22. l. 20. after â—â—y r. meer p. 31. l. 29. after tho' r. not p. 33. l. 10. r. Substance p. 46. l. â— for offer r. affirm