the power to make one see Intellectually the Thing is or Assent joyn'd with this that notwithstanding 't is not seen those Terms are Opposit or Inconnectible the Soul becomes hereupon as it were invironed with a kind of Intellectual Darkness and sees not which way to step forwards without danger of harming hor Cognoscitive or Truth-affecting Nature by Errour Whence she remains in a kind of Neutral Condition which we call Suspence But 't is to be well noted that this Suspensive Condition of the Soul not being a state of Actuality or Determination much less of utmost Actuality as is the seeing by virtue of that main Principle before-nam'd that a thing is but of Indetermination Potentiality and Confusedness its Nature admits consequently infinite degrees according as the Appearances which incline her towards Assent or Dissent are greater or less Moreover as in the passing from Indetermination to Determination for example in a motion to a Terminus of Rest there are diverse approaches of that Motions Quantity so very near the Terminus or End that their distance is undiscernable to a vulgar eye and needs exact skill to distinguish them So it happens here that there must necessarily be found divers Inclinations or Approaches towards Assent which have so small a degree of Suspence in them that they are hard to be distinguisht from absolute Assents but by a learned Reflecter and the way he takes to distinguish them must be to observe whether the Understanding acting reflectingly that is looking into the Nature of its own Act finds there that it absolutely yields it self over to judg the thing is existent or true or whether it onely judges it very probable or Truthlikely For any Assent to the greatest Likelihood of a thing is as far from being an Assent to the things Existence as the Notion of Existent or True is from the Notion of very likely to be true And if the Assent to the former be not actually an Assent to the later yet tend towards it as it does then 't is Potential in respect of it and so includes some degree of Suspence which defect only can in our present case hinder the other from being actually it according to our former Discourse Assent then to the meer Likelihood of a thing is or at least implies Suspence of its Existence § 2. Another thing which inclines men to confound the Assent to the Likelihood of a thing with the Assent to its Existence or Truth is Habituation or Custom For men being us'd to proceed naturally to outward Action upon a very high Probability without more adoe or examination they are hence apt to apprehend that a Conceit which had so little and so undiscernable a proportion of Suspence in it was a perfect Assent and that because the Soul quite yielded to the Motive as to Exterior Action therefore it yielded likewise as to Interior Assent Whereas by reflecting on the Nature of this Act in the Soul and by retriving its Grounds we come to discover that however the Soul runs promptly and rationally to Outward Action upon such a Motive when she is concern'd to act even after deliberation yet not so to Interiour Assent if she acts rationally but upon reflexion finding in her self nothing to fix in her the Existence of the thing or elevate it beyond the possibility of not-being or being False she hangs back from assenting the thing is and is constrain'd to say interiorly or acknowledg in her own breast she may possibly be mistaken and the thing possibly be not-Existent for ought she sees which restrains her from truly assenting that the thing is § 3. An Instance will render our Discourse clearer 'T is propos'd then for example to our Judging Power whether America be or no And we 'l suppose to avoid a disputed case the Evidence of Authority has convinc'd the Understanding it once was by the Impossibility the several Attesters should either be deceiv'd in a plain Object of Eye-sight or have a common Motive able to make them conspire to bely their Eyes But the Question is whether it be now or no. And the uncouthness and unlikelihood that so vaste a place should be destroy'd joyn'd with the Customariness of acting upon a very great probability makes him who is to act in order to it for example send a ship thither proceed to his intended outward action fearlesly and esteem him mad who desists upon a conceit of so unlikely a failure For since all Action is in particulars and Particulars are the very Sphear of Contingency it follows that we must not act at all if we expected Demonstrations of the several Objects and Adjuncts of our outward Action Whence he deserves justly to be accounted frantick who should desist from Action where there is so high a Probability for this extravagant cautiousness were in effect to take away the Motives to any Exteriour Action in the world and consequently all such Action it self But now let two Speculaters or Scholars meet together who consider not the Practicableness but meerly the Truth of things and aim not to better their Purse by Merchandizing or outward Endeavours but their Understandings by rightly-made Judgments or Assents that is by Knowledges and we shall see their working on the Point turns upon other hinges In the other there was Necessity of acting without which the world could not subsist but here 's no necessity of Assenting which we suppose onely aim'd at at present nor can there be any unless that Principle or Cause of all Assent The same is the same with it self comes to exercise its over-powering Virtue upon the Soul There it was enough that prudential considerations discover'd a betterness to act exteriourly all things weigh'd to which needed not a severity of Principles forcing the Truth of the thing but here those Principles which are the Maxims of Metaphysicks or Supreme Wisdom are the only things to be consulted and the prudential weighing of Particulars avails little or nothing towards the secure establishment of the Truth aim'd at There some harm was likely to ensue if they acted not exteriourly and went not about their work but here no harm at all could come by not acting interiourly I mean by not-Assenting but Suspending till the beams of Truth by the Fountain-light of that First Principle clear'd their Understandings rather on the contrary a great harm was certain to ensue upon assenting in that case that is an Injury to Reason their true Nature by concluding without seeing a middle Term connecting the two Extreams on which every act of right Reason is built These Scholars then or Pursuers of Truth consult with Speculative not Practical Principles to guide their Assents by They are certain that such an Effect as is the destruction of America cannot be without a Cause and Experience tells them such Causes seldom or never happen Yet knowing that all material things have Contingency annext to their Natures and not discovering any evident Principle in Nature hindering the
their attempting or neglecting to do this and onely by that Test it will be seen whether my Evictions stand or fall whereas from flashy wit so little is gain'd that even what 's solid suffers disgrace by such a managery And I here very penitently beg pardon of my Readers that I have sometimes heretofore spent my precious time and less-fruitful labour which might have been better employd in pursuing that way of Folly For such my more deliberate Thoughts now discover it however the reputed profoundness but indeed real shallowness of my Adversaries made it at that season seem most convenient FINIS Corrections of the Press PAge 6. line 5. built upon p. 14. l. 13. the Ten et p. 25. l. 10. Acts. as p. 33. l 5. not be is p. 43. l. 9 is deniable p. 89. l 25. Objects on p. 112. l. ult 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 121. l. 2. 't is neither Affirmation nor l. 9 usually p. 126. l. 26. Such Truths p. 128. l. 9. their power l. 18. at all p. 130. l. 25. of the Schools p. 134. l. 26. find p. 139. l. 18. being to l. 21. both at p. 149. Objection VIII p. 161. l. 13. parologysm l 21 nut at p. 164 l. 1. Objection IX l. 5. to have p. 171. l. 22. onely-true Postulata The Thesis demonstrated from the nature of Evidence From the nature of the Subject in Faith-Propositions From the nature of the Copula From the nature of the Predicatâ— in most of those Propositions From the nature of Distinction as apply'd to the Predicate From the impossibility of distinguishing the subjects of Faith-propositions From the nature of Truth consisting in an Indivisible From the nature of Connexion From the nature of Opinion The Origin and Natures of Suspence and Assent The Point evinc't from the natures of Suspence and Assent From the nature of Holding From the nature of Knowing From the nature of Certainty in many regards From the Impossibility that what may be false can have any Principles From the Identity of Certainty with Infallibility From the contrary opinion's unavoidably subjecting Faith to Chance and Contingency From the Incompossibility of Truth with Falsehood From the nature of Disputation and the Impossibility otherwise to evince the Truth of faith The main Thesis demonstrated from the want of Potentiality in the Subject From the otherwise necessity of putting a consistency of Truth with Falshood From the otherwise necessity of putting Contradictories to be true From the otherwise necessity of putting it possible the minde should be at once conformable and disconformable to the thing From the Impossibility of different Respects here so to avoid a Contradiction From the nature of the Soul From the necessity of putting the Soul at once determin'd and indetermin'd in order to the same Point From the Formal Natures of Tâ—uth and Falshood From the notion of Metaphysical Unity From the notion of Metaphysical Verity From the notion of Metaphysical Bonity or Goodness From the contrary Thesis being destructive to the Fiâ—st Principle in all Metaphysicks From the Impossibility of a sufficient Motive to judg a thing True with a Motive to judg it possible to be False From the nature of the First Cause or the Deity From the nature of the proper Agent in instructing Mankind From the nature of the Persons instructed From Faith's being a Virtue From Faith's being an Intellectu al Virtue From Faith's being a Supernatural Virtue From the firmness Supernatural Faith ought to hâ—vâ—â—bove Natural Another Proof from the same head From the requisiteness that Christian Action should proceed from the Acters in the perfectest manner That otherwise Christian Religion would be more defective in point of Principles than any other Art or Science From Faith's being the Knowledg of our last End and of the way to it From the Certainty the Heathens had of the Principles of their imperfect Morality From mans last End being only attainable by Intellectual means From Virtue 's being the connatural Effect of Truth and Vice of Falsehood From the otherwise Inability of Faiâ—h to resist overcome Temptations From the otherwise Uncertainty of the Existence of Spiritual Goods or the Attainableness of them in the next life From the otherwise preternaturaliâ—y in producing a due love of Heaven From the Incredibleness of the Mysteries nor superable by any Motive possible to be False From the otherwise greater plausibility of Objections against Faith From Faith's being a Knowledg of God of his Will From Faith's being plac'd beyond Contingencie From the manner in which Christians express themselves when they profess their Faith From this that otherwise it were lawful to lay a wager Christian Faith is a Ly. From the Carriage of the Martyrs if suppos'd Honest Prudent From the Blasphemousnes of the Equivalencies to this Proposition Faith is Possible to be False From the Practice of Learnedst Christians in captivating their understandings to Faith From the Duty incumbent on the maintainers of the impugn'd Tenet to remain Seekers all their lives From the inefficaciousness it brings to Christian Preaching and Exhortation From the Churches constant Practice of Obliging to Belief * Rule of Faith * Infer 4 * Infer 2.
Affection pre-requisit to Faith derogates nothing from it's Certainty but is perfectly consistent with the Evidence of those Motives which are to generate it and that the Governours and Officers of the Church though proposing the most convincing reasons in the world for the Authority conveying down Faith to us can prevail nothing unless the Great Governour of the world and Giver of every good gift by his peculiar Power plant antecedently in their hearts this good disposition and prepare terram bonam that their endeavours may take effect and the Sowers Seed take root no more than Paul though miraculous could convert all that saw his Miracles or heard his Preaching but only such whose hearts God open'd as he did Lydia's It appears also by the same discourse how the Acts of Faith are free that is as depending on this pious disposition of the Will which sets the Understanding on work to consider the Motives and so produce them The whole Humane Action is free because the Will orders it though she do not produce it all or though freedom be not formally in the Body so the Act of Faith is free because it is order'd by the Will which is free though no freedom be found in the Understanding which is incapable of such a qualification but pure necessity of assenting when the Motives are seen to be Conclusive No need then is there upon any account of a pious disposition of the Will to peece out the defect of the Reasons why we believe and to oblige the Understanding to assent beyond the Motive that is assent to a degree beyond what it had reason to do An Impossibility in Humane Nature rightly and connaturally govern'd and I much fear no small disgrace to Christian Faith considering the obstinate bent of the Church's Adversaries to confound the Speculative Thoughts of Divines explaining Faith and its Grounds less carefully with their Sentiments issuing naturally from them as Christians nay with the Doctrin of the Catholick Church it self What can revincingly be reply'd to an Atheist objecting on this occasion that Christians make the Evidence of Faith's grounds stand need to be pecc'd out by Obscurity our Knowledg of them by Ignorance and the Rationality of them by Will without Reason that is Willfulness Wherefore I carnestly obtest and beseech even per viscera Christi all who shall read this Treatise and yet have Speculatively held and maintain'd this Opinion I here impugn for practically and as Christians they hold the contrary Conclusion seriously to weigh the Point once more and not to obstruct the Resolving Christian Faith into immoveable Principles or absolutely Certain Grounds by an Opinion onely sprung from the conceited difficulty in making out those Grounds to be Impossible to be False which yet themselves to a man profess and hold as they are Christians I humbly beg leave to propose to them these few Considerations First 'T is Certain Faith is no less Faith or an Assent upon Authority though that Authority be demonstrated to be Infallible but on the contrary that 't is both firmer and more rational even for that very regard Secondly 'T is Certain that the Generality of Christians hold their Faith to be True or Impossible to be False that is 't is True to us and withall perfectly Rational and consequently that its Grounds or Principles are so able to ascertain it that they place it beyond Possibility of Falshood Thirdly 'T is no less evident that an inclination or motion of the Will being of such a nature that it can have neither Truth nor Falshood in it can be no Rational Principle or Ground of our Assents or Acts of Faith that is apt to ascertain them or indeed apt to establish the Truth of any Tenet Fourthly That 't is most evident from my foregoing Discourse that an antecedent pious disposition of the Will is still requisite to Faith notwithstanding the perfect Conclusiveness of the Grounds on which 't is built and that all Acts of Faith depend on this quoad exercitium at least as the Schools speak which in the Judgment of many Divines is sufficient Fifthly That 't is the common Opinion of the solidest Divines that Faith consists with Evidence in the Attester Sixthly That Faith or a firm and immoveable Assent upon Authority is not thoroughly rational and by consequence partly faulty if the Motives be not alone able to convince an Understanding rightly dispos'd without the Will 's Assistance for what can be said for that degree of Assent which is beyond the Motive or Reason Is it not evident from the very Terms that 't is Irrational or without any Reason But the worst is that whereas all good Christians hold their Faith Impossible to be False or judge their Acts of Faith Immoveable Assents these Authors as Speculaters put all the Reasons for Faith to leave it still Possible to be False and make this pious Affection the onely thing which elevates it to Impossibility of Falshood which is vastly higher in point of Certainty as if a rational Creature not deviating totally from its nature but acting according to right Reason ought therefore to hold a Point Impossible to be False because it self has an Affection or as we say a great mind it should be so Seventhly This Assertion renders the Impossibility of Faith's Falshood not only unmaintainable as hath been now shown but also unperswadable to others for how shall I be able to give account to others that my Affection which works this Perswasion in me is rational and not apt to mislead me when as the very Position obliges me to profess the contrary and to grant that this Affection pushes forward my Understanding to assent beyond the reason it has that is as to this degree in my Assent which is no small one since it raises it from judging Faith possible to be false to judge it Impossible to be such without reason Or will not this Speculative Tenet seem to force this Inference that the Grounds of Faith as to its most intrinsecal consideration viz. the Impossibility of its Falshood is made by this Doctrin full as dark a hole as 't is to alledge the private Spirit Nor can the Reverence due to the Divine Authority suffice for such an Effect both because 't is Impossible God should will that Mankind for his sake should act irrationally as also because there is no poison in the world so pestilent as an Errour abetted by the most Sacred Patronage of God's Authority as the Histories of the Fanaticks in all ages and our home-bred experience testifies Whence that very Reverence to the Divine Authority obliges us to be so sure 't is engag'd for a Truth e're we admit it for such that we may securely though with an humble truth say with Richardus de Sancto Victore Domine si error est quod credimus à te decepti sumus so that there is indeed no greater injury and abuse to the Divine Name imaginable than to hazard the making it
patronize Falshoods against this deceit our Saviour hath fore-arm'd us by his fore-warning us with a Nolite credere when any one pretends Loe here is Christ or there is Christ. Lastly 't is visible to any indifferent understanding that those Divines who defend this influence of the pious Affection upon the settling of Faith's Certainty though in other Points very rational and acute yet when they come to this they are at an utter loss and can make nothing cohere Philippus de Sancta Trinitate contradicts himself twice or thrice in one leaf while he attempts to defend it But I instance in one for all that is Father Vincentius Baronius a Doctour of Tholouse and of the Holy Order of S. Dominick a Person of as much Eminency Gravity and Learning as any of late dayes This Great Writer in his Manuductio ad Moralem Theologiam p. 130 131. falls upon Caramuel in these words Distinguit Caramuel duplicem honestatis Certitudinem seu veritatem formalem unam vocat alteram objectivam istam negat cuilibet opinioni probabili ill am concedit c. Sed hoc nobis ignorantiae prodiglum est aut temeritatis dari veritatem aut falsitatem certitudinemque cui nulla Objectiva correspondeat Hoc ne deo quidem concessum est ut Scientiam habeat rei non scibilis i. e. veritatem formalem rei quae objectivâ careat Yet the same Authour p. 271 is forc't by the defence of this ill grounded Tenet which he had espous'd into the same paralogysm which he had so gravely severely and learnedly reprehended in another Where putting the Objection very home he asks Si praevium illud ad Fidem Iudicium sit intra probabilitatis fines quâ ratione poterit mens assurgere in assensum illo seu opinione firmiorem ergo fidei Certitudo nutlat si ab illo Iudicio quod prudenter probabile dixi pendeat nec aliunde repetatur This done acknowledging that tota Controversia fidei summa is contain'd as indeed it is in this argument he addresses himself to answer it First sleightly by an example that this precedent Judgment is to Faith as Accidental Alteration to the Substantial Form and so being onely a disposition to it may be less noble or Certain than Faith is it self whereas if our Assent of faith ought to be thoroughly rational this previous Judgment being that on which this Assent is built as to us or as to our knowledg must at least be Firm and Immovable it self since the Assent of Faith built on it ought to be such and consequently beyond Probability whence the example is most unsuitable signifying that as Nature disposes matter by imperfect degrees towards a perfect and ultimate Effect so infirm Principles may rationally beget a firm Assent After this he alledges that the Certainty of Faith is to be fetch 't from God the Authour of it who infuses Light and gives most efficacious strength to beleeve But the question is whether God ordinarily and abstracting from Miracle infuses Light into rational Creatures but by means of motives or reasons and whether it requires such strength or rather be not an unwise Credulousness that is a great weakness to beleeve beyond what we have reason to do and so unworthy God the giver of every good and perfect gift Lastly he affirms that the Certainty of Faith is to be fetch 't from the pious Affection of the will qui mentem rebus credendis indubitato immoto assensu alligat quasi nodo indissolubili Which as it were by an indissoluble Knot ties the mind to the things to be believ'd with an undoubted and unmov'd Assent But the question is how this knot is indissoluble in case the probable reason prove false unless the Soul be wilfully blind or why a resolvedness in the will can rationally establish a true Intellectual Certainty What I chiefly conclude from these answers of his is that he perpetually waves Certainty had from the Object and so unavoidably is forc't to put a formal Certainty in as to which no Objective Certainty corresponds which his excellent wit in another circumstance saw to be prodigiously faulty and a Certainty that is a perfection not competent even to God himself So Impossible 't is that Errours prejudicing the Rule of Faith should not either by Opposition to First Principles be discover'd to be Falshoods or by self-contradictions in their maintainers confess it themselves Objection VII 'T is manifest that diverse weak people assent upon very Inconclusive nay silly or less than probable Motives whom yet no sober man will deny have saving Faith the true nature of Faith then requires not necessarily motives Impossible to be False or that Faith be True to us but may be without any such qualification Answer When we say Faith is Impossible to be False we take the word Faith in its proper and primary signification now that being the proper signification of a word that is most usual and that most usual which is found in the Generality of the users of it the proper signification that is the true nature of Faith is that which is found in the generality of Christians which being evidently an Assent to be adher'd to all one's life to be dy'd in and dy'd for and the Object or Form of that Assent being Truths and so it self True 't is most manifestly in each of those regards imply'd that it must be Impossible to be False to us or to the Generality of Christians that is it must have Grounds able to show it nay actually showing it so to them whatever Contingency may happen in a few particulars for want of applying to them the right Rule of Faith Besides Faith must be a Knowledg of Divine things a virtuous Act and so ratâ—onal and a most efficacious Cause of working for Heaven Also its Grounds must be apt to establish the most Speculative Faithful to convert or confound the most acute Witts denying or opposing it c. all which and much more is prov'd in the First discourse of Sure Footing by arguments as yet not attempted to be invalidated by any however something hath been offer'd against those Conclusions Which Attributes it cannot possibly justify nor yet perform those Offices without being True to us or having Grounds Impossible to be False The word Faith then apply'd to those weak persons now spoken of signifies not the same as when 't is found in the Generality of Assenters but meerly a simple credulity of any thing told them by a person that looks seriously when he speaks it and is conceited by the Beleever to be wiser or to have heard more than himself Which kind of Assent if it be seconded by favourable circumstances laid by God's Providence especially by such means as are found in the Discipline of the Church so as it begets a love of Heaven above all things may suffice to save those weak and well meaning Catholicks But how incompetent an Assent no better grounded were
or the clearness of the Proposal of it which only can oblige connaturally the Understanding to conceit it as it ought and consequently the Will to love it accordingly in which conceiting and heartily loving not onely the Intending and Commanding part of the Action is plac'd in our case as it happens in our acting for material Goods but also the Executive and Assecutive Parts of it Not the same sleightness of Motive therefore or Moral Certainty will here serve the turn but true Certainty or Impossibility of Falshood is requir'd this being the best and properest to beget a hearty lively steady and all-over-powering Affection for Heav'n and such as may as it ought make Christians practically repute all other things as Dung in comparison of That § 9. But the main consideration which forces the Certainty of Faith and the Motives which are to beget it that is of the Rule of Faith above those which ground our Action of pursuing Temporary Goods is the unconceivable Mysteriousness of the Points of Faith Truths exalted above the ordinary Course of Nature as far as Heav'n is above the Earth Many of them looking so odd and uncouth to our course Humane Reason unrefin'd by Faith that as they seem'd of old to the Greeks Foolishness so still they are acknowledgedly most unsuitable to the grossness of Fancy by which the Generality of the world especially those who are yet unelevated by Christian Principles are led and confessedly above Reason insomuch as it costs the best Wits of Christianity no small pains to maintain them not to be Contradictory or Impossible to be True Putting then the Motives of Faith and consequently Faith it self Possible to be False the only seeming Certainty I might say the confest want of Certainty of the Motives to believe would be so counterballanc'd by the Incredibleness and seeming Contradictâ—riness of the Thing or Object or rather indeed overballanc'd in the Conceit of all those who are yet to embrace Faith that there would be no over-plus of weight left to incline them to hold those Points True rather than False much less to make them absolutely hold they are Certain Truths And he that shâ—uld assert the contrary I wonder how he would go about to prove it or by what Standard he would measure whether is the greater of the two counterpos'd Unlikelihoods viz. that the possibly false Motive of Faith should hap to be actually such or that the seeming-Impossibility in the Objects should chance to be a real one For 't is not enough to say here that we are in reason to expect the Divine Nature should be exceedingly exalted above its Creatures and incomprehensible and therefore we are not to measure his Perfections by the ordinary Rules found in Creatures but think it reasonable he should infinitely exceed them For however this has weight in Points of Faith which concern the Divine Nature and its Perfections as in it self yet here it will not serve the turn in regard Faith teaches us many other Points seemingly repugnant to the Divine Nature it self and most strangely debasing and vilifying it as that God infinitely happy in himself should be expos'd to injurious Bufferings Scourgings and an ignominious Death for a Creatures sake that in comparison of him is a meer Nothing and that Omniscience and Omnipotence could not invent and practice some easier and more honorable way to work the End they intended and lastly that it should beseem Infinite Goodness that a Person superlatively innocent should be so severely punisht to do an undue favour to those who were enormously wicked This consideration then necessitates plainly the Impossibility of Faith's being false for else 't would be irrational to believe it And lastly it shews the case of Christian Interiour Acts utterly unparallel to that of Acting Exteriourly for sensible and material Goods which one may apprehend to be attainable and also comprehend the Way to attain them without puzz'ling his Understanding with any unconceivable mysteriousness in the business to check his Assent E're I leave this Point I must desire the Reader to reflect well on the condition those persons are in who are yet to embrace Faith They have no Light but their pure Natural Reason and to this are propos'd for Objects to the one side the Motives to Faith or the Authority in our case that God has spoke it on the other the strangeness of the Mysteries Let then those persons understandings no better elevated go about to scan the profound Mysteries of Faith 't is clear and I think confest by all they must needs seem to them Impossible to be True which therefore nothing but a Motive of its own nature seemingly Impossible to be false can conquer so as to make them conceit them really True But this Motive or this Rule of Faith is confest by our Adversaries Possible to be false nor it being a fit and proportion'd Object for Humane Reason is there any thing to make it seem better than it is or Impossible to be false 't is then against all reason to believe were Faith and its Grounds Possible to be false the Motives of Dissent being in that case evidently greater than are the Motives of Assent § 10. Again since 't is incomparably more easie to throw down than to build or less difficult for the Understanding to comprehend an Objection than 't is to lay orderly in the Soul a severely-connected frame of Discourse forcing the Truth of a Point particularly when those Points are utterly unsuitable to Fancy and even exalted above Reason and so lie open to very plausible and easily penetrable Objections on which disadvantage or disproportion to weak Judgments that is indeed a high excellency on the Object 's side Atheists ground their drollery against the Mysteries of our Faith It follows that were not the chief motives to Faith or Rule of Faith practically self-evident and so Impossible to be False there would be considering the rudeness and unelevatedness of the Generality of those who are to come to Christian Faith and the unsuitableness of the Mysteries to their fancyled Understandings greater Temptations and more plausible that is to them stronger motives laid to make them dissent to those Mysteries than to make them assent The motives to Faith then must be Practically self-evident and so Faith it self must be Impossible to be False Seventh Eviction § 1. PErhaps the Language and Practise of Christianity expressing most manifestly their sentiments may give to some a more natural and penetrable satisfaction that 't is Impossible Faith should be false than all the Speculative and Scientifical Proofs hitherto deduc'd § 2. For their Language then I onely hint to the memory of my prudential Readers for to transcribe them were endless all those Expressions so frequent in Scriptures Fathers Councils and the mouths of the Faithful to these very days viz. That Faith is the Knowledg of God his Will and of revealed Truths Nor will I streighten the signification
of the Mysteryes themselves exceedingly enhauncing the other 't is manifest there would be a high disadvantage on Faith's side Nay granting a pretty high Probability which is perhaps as much as they care for yet the not-onely Improbability but seeming-Impossibility of the Mysteries of Faith if taken not as standing under Authority but as Objects of our Humane Reason as in this counter-ballancing case they ought to be would quite overpoise the Probable motive and incline the Soul strongly towards Dissent unless Interest Custom or some other Affection come in to the Assistance of the weaker Motive Printing it in a bigger Letter and diminishing the difficulty in the Object by not letting it be considered or penetrated that is by hindring the working of Right Reason Now in this case if this Discourse holds a Protestant may with a safe Conscience lay odds and wager two to one at least his Faith is all a Fâ—lshood A strange Impiety but yet the natural Consequence of that impious Tenet Faith is possible to be False as this is the genuine Sequel of denying the right Rule of Faith § 10. The same is deduc'd from the very notion of a Martyr and the proper signification of that word which is to be a witness and this as appears by his Circumstances of all witnesses the most Solemn and serious and the perfectest under that Notion that can be imagin'd as engaging not onely his word but his Life and dearest Bloud for what he testifies Now all witnessing or Attestation being most evidently of what the Witnesser knows to be True and nothing sounding more unnaturally or being more disagreeable to the nature of that kinde of Action than to have a Likelyhood for its object or to witness what he knows not as will appear by the constant practice of it in all other occasions it follows that a Martyr or Witness of the Truth of Christs Faith must know it to be True that is he must know it to be more than likely to be True and consequently nothing being more Impossible than that one can know what is not Impossible not to be True or to be False § 11. No less unnaturally would it sound should we gather together and make use of all the Equivalent Speeches to this Proposition Faith is Possible to be False such as are There is no Certain way to Heaven No man knows there is a Heaven a Hell a Iesus Christ a Trinity c. No man sees any reason securing Faith from being a lye The Ground of all our Hope is unstable and may be overthrown Absolutely speaking it may be there is no such thing as that which Christians are to profess and ought to dye for It may be Points of Faith are so many lyes and false as so many old-Wives Tales The Light of Faith may be Spiritual Darkness and Errour What we hold to come from God the Author of all Truth may perhaps come from the Devil the Author of all Lyes All our Supernatural Truths may be Diabolical Falshoods Faith has no Principles The Points of Faith are not Truths but Likelihoods onely These and innumerable such others are all Equivalent Periphrases to this Proposition Faith is Possible to be False as in this Treatise has been manifested but how horrid and blasphemous needs no proof but thebare rehearsing of them § 12. From the Language and Practise of the Generality of the Faithful professing Faith we come next to the Practise of the Wits of Christianity not proceeding as Speculaters and Scholars a most trifling impertinent Topick when we are speaking of Faith yet most frequently us'd by our Adversaries especially Mr. Stillingfleet and Mr. Pool who are obstinately bent to practise that wilful mistake but as Christians or Faithful and this not only acting or speaking in Abstraction from Humane Knowledg but as in direct Opposition to it and as it were in defiance and despight of it Now with these intelligent Persons 't is very solemn after by penetrating the Grounds of Faith they have come to embrace Faith itself immediately to discard renounce all Tenets opposit to the said Faith how Certain soever they held them formerly Nay to stand with a mind prepared to disassent to anypiece of Humane Learning how Scientifical soever it look't which they saw evidently to thwart any of those Believed Truths Making account it was their duty captivare Intellectum in obsequium Fidei to captivate their Understandings to the Obedience of Faith or to yeild them totally up by an absolute and perfect Assent to the Truth of those Mysteries and not to heed or credit any objections or Proposals of Humane Reason to the contrary when once the stable and immovable Grounds or Motives of Divine Belief that is the Rule of Faith had subdu'd their Judgments to that invincible Assent but to rest well assur'd that all reasons were fallacious and all Positions False which went against those Sacred and Establish't Truths This was ever their unanimous and constant Profession particularly the Fathers are full of Expressions of that kind An Evident Argument that as Christians they ever held Faith and it's Grounds Impossible to be False for otherwise they had bin oblig'd by Honesty and their love of Truth not to have so readily rejected their formerly-conceited Truths nor to have stop'd their ears so obstinately to new Reasons against Faith but as long as Faith was possible to be False they ought in due candor to have still weigh'd the Opposit Thesis and the Objections perpetually alledg'd against the strength of Faith and it's Rule and consider'd which was more likely to be true and not have still concluded so partially on Faiths side and obstinately resolv'd to hear nothing against it bearing themselves as if all must needs be True which Faith's Rule teacheth us that is indeed as if Faith could not possibly be false § 13. Whence follows that all who hold Faith is possible to be false ought in Conscience and their natural duty or love to Truth remain Seekers all their Lives For however they may hope at present that what they adhere to is true yet since they hold 't is possible to be false for any thing they know they ought the affair and its concern being so weighty to be still examining it's Grounds and casting about to see whether this Possibility of Falshood which they already see be not indeed Actually such though as yet they see it not or at least whether some other Profession may not after long consideration appear less possible to be False and another still less than that that so they may go as near Truth as they can weighing discreetly and impartially what Deism Paganism Turcism and such others wisely represented without their Poetical Fancyes and Fooleries can say for themselves Or lastly if they come to such a Scepticism in Religion which I doubt is the true case as to judg such a quest lost labour because when all 's done the sullen Dame Truth
none but onely an Affection or determination of a Thing both known by plain Nature whatever som Schoolmen speculate For these put meer Experience teaches us that that thing which is call'd Pillar is the same thing which is call'd Round or which is all one that in this Proposition The Pillar is round the two extream notions are indeed that is with a Conformity to the Thing identifi'd or that that Proposition is True But to return home to our purpose 'T is clear that Pillar and Roundness Existing by the same existence or in the same Thing are found in the thing after it's manner and in my Judgment or Soul as apt to judg after it 's that is judgingly But Truth hath nothing to do with either of these manners of Being as was discourst formerly in the parallel case of Notions but purely and adequately consists in the Unity or Community of Form which my Judgment has with the Thing by having which in her the Soul gains a Conformity to it In this Common Form consider'd as in the Thing consists it's Metaphysical Verity or it 's Being what it is and this Verity consider'd as apt to stamp or imprint it self on my Iudging Power is call'd Objective Truth as receiv'd in me and fashioning or conforming my said Power to the Thing as in it self and so making my Judgment True 't is call'd Formal Truth This declar'd I deny that I any where confound Objective Truth with Formal or what 's in the Thing with what 's in me as in me for that were to identifie those two most vastly and most evidently different States A Supineness too gross for any attentive Discourser to fall into I conceive then what the Objecter would alledge is that I confound those Truths spoken of with Truth to us or quoad nos as the Schools speak For though what 's Truth to us must needs be Truth in it self and in us in regard we cannot know that to be which is not yet what 's Truth in it self or Truth in us is not therefore Truth to us in regard one may upon probable nay improbable or even False Grounds light upon a right judgment in which case his mind as judging is conformable to the thing or True yet still that thing is not true to him in regard he hath no reason able to conclude it such or to make him see it to be true Truth then to us is the same with our Sight of it that is with Certainty or Determination of our Understanding by force of Intellectual Motives and this indeed I often seem to confound with Truth in the two former Acceptions but I therefore seem to do it because I am loath to transcribe and apply so often my Postulata and suppose my Judicious Reader bears them in mind Which if he pleases to understand as subjoyn'd to those Discourses it will follow that what is so in the thing it self or perhaps in us if it be so severely obligatory to be thus constantly profest and held so and consequently by my later Postulatum necessary to be known to be so all my mistaken proofs will be brought to conclude it True to us that is Certain You will say why is it not enough for God to provide that our Acts of Faith be indeed True in us since so they would perfect our Understandings by conforming them to the thing and guide us right but they must also be True to us or be known to be True I answer for two Reasons One because God's Government of Mankind would by this means be preternatural obliging him to hold profess and dye for professing the Truth of those Points which he knows not to be such The other Reason is because every Act of Faith as exercis'd would perpetually involve an Errour in case the Motives to those Assents were not conclusive of the Truth of those Points For however one may light by hap-hazard or through weakness on a Truth from an Inclusive Motive yet since 't is impossible a rational Creature should assent but upon some Motive good or bad hence every Assent practically implies 'T is true for this reason Wherefore if the Reason grounding such Assents be unapt to conclude the Truth of the thing that Judgment necessarily involves a Falshood or Errour however it be otherwise conformable to the thing abstractedly consider'd Truths then being bastard illegitimate and monstrous both the Intellectualness and Supernaturalness of that Virtue call'd Faith make it scorn to own such defective Prâ—ductions Objection III. The Meanings of Words are indeed to be taken from the Vulgar but the Truth of Propositions is to be taken onely from the Judgments of Learned Men though then that be indeed the meaning of the word Faith which the Generality of Christians mean by it yet the Truth of this Proposition Faith is possible to be False must be judg'd of by the Sentiments of the most Learned Divines the Generality at least the Best of which and Catholicks amongst the rest grant the Grounds of Faith as to our Knowledg and consequently Faith it self to be Possible to be False Answer That Maxim is to be understood of those Propositions which require some Speculation to infer them in which case also even the Unlearned are not bound to Assent upon the Authority of Learned men taken precisely as men of Skill because generally 't is Practically-self-evident to them that such Speculative men differ oft times in their Sentiments and they are unfurnisht of due means to discern which is in the right yet if they are to act in such affairs they are bound in Prudence to proceed upon the Judgments of that part which is generally reputed most and ablest and then their proceedure is laudable because they do the best secundum ultimum potentiae or that lies in the power Whence Learned men who have ability to judg of the Reasons those Speculaters give behave themselves imprudently and blameably if they even proceed to outward action meerly upon their Judgments without examining the Reasons they alleadge in case they have leasure and opportunity to do so But now the Maxim holds not all for those Propositions in which 't is either self-evident or evident to common and uncultivated Reason that the Predicate is to be connected with the Subject as 't is for example in this Man is a rational Creature or this which is palpably consequent from the former Man is capable of gaining Knowledg for in such as these the natural Sentiments of the Vulgar are full as Certain as those of Speculaters perhaps Certainer And with the same Evidence the Predicate Possible to be False must necessarily be seen to be connected with Faith by all those who esteem themselves oblig'd by Gods Command to profess and dye for the Truth of those Points they believe Besides they hold that Faith makes them know God and his Will that their Assent of Faith is to be Immoveable or adher'd to all their lives that is such as cannot be
none had the least actual doubt or suspicion of doubt of it else surely they would never have staid in them inform us sufficiently to what a changeable tottering and ruinous condition Christian Faith would be reduc'd by these Principles and Parallels No fewer than three Houses fell in the compass of a short time and none had the least suspicion of doubt beforehand of such an Event therefore may an Atheist say Down falls Christian Faith too whose Foundation was by this Doctrin but Parallel for strength to the other or if it fall not in so long time it has only something better luck not better grounds than had the three Houses As for the objected Unsuitableness of such a Certainty as I require 't is reply'd that nothing is more natural for the Generality of Mankind than to be led by Authority nothing more penetrable by those of all sorts than the Infallibleness and Veracity of exceedingly vast and grave Authorities relating matter of Fact as we experience in their beleef that there was a Q. Elizabeth and such like to comprehend and assent immovably to which costs them not the least over straining as the Obiecter imagins Which being so I make account that God both in his power and wisdom could in his Goodness would render the Authority of his Church the Ground and Pillar of Truth as evident to all her Children both as to its Inerrableness and Veracity as the other nay incomparably more it being in every regard so requisit Objection VI. If the Motives to Faith must be Impossible to be False to us they would necessarily conclude the Truth of Faith wherefore they would of themselves oblige the Understanding to assent and so there would need no precedent pious affection of the Will which yet both Councils Fathers and Catholick Divines with one consent require Nay more were not such a pious affection put Acts of Faith would not be Free Answer If Experience teaches us that even assent to Humane Sciences though Evident from Intrinsecal reasons Comprehensible by our Understanding and purely Speculative is not to be acquir'd without an affection to see Truth as is evident from the carriage of meer Scepticks who having entertain'd a conceit of it's hopelesness come thence to want Love or Affection for it and so never come to see it how Conclusive soever the reasons be Much more by far must some good affection be pre-requisit to assent to Divine and Supernatural Truths which are Obscure in themselves as depending upon Authority Incomprehensible to our natural reason and Practical that is obligingly-Efficacious to break out into Christian Action or Love of Heaven above all sublunary things as True Faith must be The First obstacle of the three mention'd has this difficulty that the beams of Truth which come directly from the things themselves are generally apt to strike our Understanding more naturally penetrate it more deeply and to stick in it more immovably than those which are reflected to us from the Knowledg of another such as are Points of Faith besides the new difficulty of seeing the Veracity of the Attester which how evident soever it be yet it puts the Understanding to double pains whereas Evidence had from the Thing is but a single labour and so less confounding and distracting the thought The Second Obstacle Incomprehensibleness is apt to stupify the Understanding and retard Assent nay even to deter it from considering them as Truths The Atheistical temper of the world which could not subsist were Metaphysicks duly advanc'd sufficiently informs us how difficult it is for men to apply and fix their thoughts upon those considerabilities in things and those natures which are abstracted from matter the reason whereof is because it being natural that our Fancy be in act while our Understanding is so and there being not Proper Phantasms the onely agreeable ones to material men who are not strong enough to guide their Judgments purely by Principles and Connexions of Terms which sute to such abstracted Conceptions but Metaphorical ones onely which the Understanding must in rigour deny to be right ones even while by necessity 't is forc't to make use of them Hence the life of a Christian as such being to serve God in Spirit and Truth and so the Objects and Principles of his new Life for the most part and principally Spiritual ones it comes to pass that for this very regard alone there will need a great love of Truth and Spiritual Goods to make the Understanding appliable to them or even admit a consideration of them I was told by a worthy Friend of mine that discoursing with an acute man but a great hater of Metaphysicks and mentioning a Spirit he in a disgust broke out into these words Let us talk of what we know By which expression 't is manifest that he mistook the Question An est for Quid est But what makes for my purpose is that the unknowableness of the Essence or nature of a Spirit to us in this State obstructed even his desire to consider whether there were any such thing or no consequently that there needs a contrary desire or affection to know Spiritual things to make us willing even to entertain a thought of their being much more to conceit it But incomparably more needful is such an Affection when to the Spirituality of those points there shall be added an Incomprehensibleness nay if onely those points be consider'd an Incredibleness when no Parallel can be found in Nature nor scarce any similitude weakly to shadow out the thing and it's possibility nay when some of those points directly thwart the course of natural Causes whence all our other Knowledges have their Stability Then I say if ever there is requisit an Affection for the Nobleness and Excellency of those high Spiritual Objects to make us willing to hearken to any Authority proposing them how evident soever the Motives be for the Credibleness of that Authority The third Obstacle follows taken from the End for which Faith is essentially ordain'd that is from what it essentially is viz. a mover of the Will to Virtue and Goodness or a Practical Principle Now nothing is more evident than this Truth that by-affections and contrary inclinations are apt to hinder the understanding from assenting or even attending candidly and calmly to these Reasons how clear soever they be which make against any beloved Interest whence there needs a contrary affection to these other to remove the mists those passions had rais'd and purge the Eye of the Mind that so it may become capable of discerning what it could not before though in it self most visible How much more not only requisite but even necessary must some pious affection be to permit the mind freely to embrace the doctrin of Christian Faith containing Principles which enjoyn a disregard and posthabition of all that is sweet to Flesh and Blood nay even of Livelihood and Life it self 'T is most manifest then that a Plous
for the establishment or propagation of Christianity that is how insufficient for the Body of the Faithful or the Church how unfit for the Ends and unable to produce the Effects true Faith or the Faith found in the Generality of the Faithful ought to do needs no declaration to manifest it since no person of ordinary capacity can without difficulty refrain from smiling at the ridiculous levity of such kind of Assenters INFERENCES From the foregoing Discourses concluding all Controversy 1. IT rests then evinc'd and demonstratively concluded with as great Firmness as First Principles made use of for Premisses and Immediate Consequences from those Principles can establish it that that most firm or Unchangeable Assent call'd Christian Faith laying an obligation on its Profâ—ssors to assert it with the greatest Seriousness Constancy and Pledges imaginable to be TRUE and its Object Points of Faith to be TRUTHS is not possible to be False to us that is to be an Erroneous Iudgment or a Mistake of our Understanding 2. 'T is with the same Certainty concluded that the Ground of Faith as to our Knowledge and so the Rule of Faith must be likewise Impossible to be False For since nothing can or ought in true Reason be stronger than the Ground it stands on if This be not Impossible to be False it can be no Rule of Faith because it would weaken Faith it self which is built on it into a Possibility of Falshood inconsistent with its nature 3. It follows with the same Clearness that if the Rule of Faith or the Immediate Means to convey the Knowledg of Christ's Doctrin to us be any Living Authority that Authority must be Infallible as to that Effect For if Fallible Faith which is built on it would still be Possible to be False As Likewise that if it be any Book both the Letter of that Book must be known to be Impossâ—ble to have been corrupted as to what concerns Faith built on it and withall the Sense known to be Impossible to be â—istaken For in case either of these all the Causes being put to preserve them such as we have said be truly judg'd or found to be Possible Faith which is to depend on them will still be left possible to be False 4. It follows immediately that those pretended Faithfull who have not Grounds of Faith thus qualify'd have no true Faith that is no Act of Belief but what notwithstanding all that they know or can know of it may possibly be False nor consequently are they to be accounted truly Faithfull as not having true Faith that is in our case an Assent built either on Infallible Living Authority or on unmistakeable Letter and Sense of a Book § 3. but Opinion onely 5. It follows with like Evidence that a Controvertist being one who is to assert Faith not by looking into the Mysteries of Faith and explaining them this being the Office of a School-Divine but into the Motives to it or Rule of Faith if he goes not about to bring Proofs which he judges and is ready to maintain nay which are of their own nature apt to shew Faith and its Rule Impossible to be False he does not the duty he ows to Faith nor behaves himself like a Controvertist but he betrays Faith by his Ineffectual and Probable managery of it making it seem a sleight Opinion or lightly grounded Credulity Especially if he professes that all Proofs which can be produc'd in this matter are Possible to be False For then 't is a plain and open Confession all his Endeavours are to no purpose because he is to shew Faith the Subject of his Discourse to be what in reality it is that is Impossible to be false Nay since Faith must be thus Certain he manifestly destroys Faith when he should defend and establish it by professing all its Proofs or Grounds possible to be false 6. It follows immediately that unless some other Medium can be found or way taken in that Skill or Science call'd Controversie which is able to show Faith Impossible to be false than what is laid down in Sure-footing which partly by our Adversaries confession of the Inability of theirs to reach Infallible Certainty partly out of the nature of the Thing as is seen Sure-footing Corol. 16 and 40. is evidently impossible nor was it ever yet attempted by any other Means except by looking into the nature of Tradition It follows I say that as it is Certain that Faith and its Grounds are Impossible to be false that is false to us or may be shown thus Impossible to be False So 't is by consequence Certain likewise that the main Doctrin there deliver'd will stand whatever particular miscarriages may have happen'd in the managing it which are to be judg'd of by the strength of my Reasons there given and the force of my Adversaries Objections 7. 'T is necessarily consequent from the foregoing Paragraphs that if I have discours'd right in this small Treatise of mine and have prov'd that Faith and consequently its Grounds must be Impossible to be False then Mr. Tillotson's Confession p. 118. to which M. Stillingfleet's Doctrin is consonant that It is Possible to be otherwise that is to be False that any Book is so antient as it pretends to be or that it was written by him whose name it bears or that this is the sense of such and such passages in it is a clear Conviction that neither is the Book-Rule he maintains the True Rule of Faith § 3. nor have he and his Friends True Faith § 4. and consequently there being no other Rule owned taking away Private Spirit but Tradition that Tradition is the onely-true-Rule of Faith § 6. and so the main of Sure-Footing stands yet firm and lastly 't is evinc'd that his own Book which opposes it opposes the onety-true because the onely-impossible-to-be-False Ground of Faith that is he is convinc't in that Supposition to go about to undermine all Christian Faith Whence the Title of his Probable-natur'd Book is manifested to be an improper Nick-name and the Book it self to merit no Reply 8. This last point is hence farther confirm'd because Mr T. and Mr. St. can claim no admittance into a dispute whether this or the other be the True Rule of Faith till they approve themselves to be Christians and show they hold there is such a thing as Faith or that it can bear the having any Rule at all since an Assent to a point seen and acknowledg'd Possible to to be False can never rise to be more than an Opinion nor can the Motive of assenting to what may possibly be False in true speech be call'd The Rule of Faith both because there is in that case no Faith Infer 1. and so it cannot be a Rule to what is not as also because what we see Possible to be False cannot with any propriety be cal'd a Rule to the Understanding directing it to Truth in regard for any thing it sees 't
stand to it and deliver himself in some rude saying or other in behalf of it For example tell him he believes there was a K. Iames because those who pretended to live then have told us so but what if they were mistaken His answer would in likelihood be to this purpose what a God's name were they blind in those dayes that they could not see who was King then Which expresses naturally his conceit of their Inerrableness in such a point in case they had eyes which nature taught him men generally have Insist farther Perhaps they were not mistaken but had a mind to cozen all England that came after them Nature will lead him to this or some such kind of Reply To what purpose should they all make fools of every body Which words though rudely exprest yet couch in themselves the full reason given in Sure Footing as far as 't is built on Nature For first it implies that man's nature with which he hath a fair acquaintance in common is to do a thing for a purpose end or reason Next his Interrogatory way is in his rude style equivalent to a Negative and so it signifies there could be no reason for it and lastly his standing to his former Tenet implies virtually a Conclusion from the reason given that the thing could not be done which involves necessarily a knowledg of that First Principle on which all force of consequence is grounded and also of that Principle no Effect can be without a due Cause both perfectly suppos'd and held by him though not exprest in his rude Enthymeme From this discourse is collected what this Practical Self-evidence is and that 't is distinguish'd from Experience in this that Experience is onely found of what uses to make the Minor in this virtual discourse but Practical Self-evidence is of Conclusions deduc't as it were from a common maxim naturally known as the Major and a Minor for the most part experientially or else Practically known which joyn'd with the Self-evident Principle in which the force of Consequence consists make up that virtual discourse Again it differs from Science in that a man of Science reflectingly sees a Medium identifying the two Extreames and is aware of the virtue of those Causes which beget Evidence whereas the other is rather Passive from Natural Impressions than Active by any Self-industry in these Knowledges and rather feels the force of those Causes in his own Adhesion than sees it Secondly 'T is collected that this Practical Self-evidence is notwithstanding True Knowledge though perhaps it be the sleightest kind of it in which 't is differenc't from Opinion built on probabilities For seeing such Assenters have both by Experience or by Common Conversation true Knowledg of the natures of diverse things in common which make the Minor as also by Nature of all the Principles of our Understanding which countervail the major and force the Consequence it comes to pass that this Practical Self-evidence is intirely and adequately grounded on true Knowledges both as to Premises and Consequence and cossequently 't is it self a True Knowledg likewise Which consideration will help to explain my later Postulatum and shew by what means 't is possible all Christians may know their Faith to be True or the same the Apostles taught by the Churches Testimonie because they know the Inerrableness and Veracity of vast and grave multitudes in open matters of Fact which are practiceable daily And lastly 't is collected that what is Practically Self-evident to the Unlearned is Demonstrable to the Learned in regard These are capable of seeing by what virtue the causes of this Self-evidence bred that Knowledg which the other 's incultivated Reason would give no account of Objection V. That first Principle Every thing while it is is necessarily what it is seems to be often times misapply'd particularly Evict 2. § 11. 13. to Truth at present whence the Arguer would conclude that 't is Impossible that a thing should be also at present False Which is true if it be meant of Objective Truth but then it seems to miss the Question But the consequence holds not in case the Discourse be of Formal Truth that is of Truth in us or of Truth to us that is of Certainty for none pretends that his Judgment can at the same time be Conformable and Disconformable to the thing which speaks those inrintsecall Dispositions call'd Truth and Falshood in us or that himself can be Cetrain or Uncertain of it at once which expresses Truth and Falshood to us this being put those Motives which only he had at present in his Understanding able to prove the Point true and false both or at once whereas what is pretended by the Objecter is only this that though upon present Motives he now judges it True and Certain yet afterwards upon other Motives he may come to see it False Answer I mean in those places Truth to us or Certainty But the Objection proceeds as if there were but one man in the world or as if True False Certain and Uncertain could be relative to one person only First then my Position is that whoever puts a thing True to himself yet possible to be False to another puts no less a capacity of the thing 's being at once thus True and False though in several Subjects than as if it were in one Subject onely Next he supposes each of those different Judgers to have possibly just Grounds for so judging since he puts in one Motives sufficient to evince the Truth of the thing in the other possible ones to conclude it's Falsehood For our Question is not to what degree weak Souls can miscarry in assenting but what degree of strength is found in the Motives to Faith which the Objecter as a Christian that is as a Holder that Points of Faith are Truths must affirm to be sufficient to conclude it True and yet as himself contends leaves it still Possible to be False that is proveable by other Grounds to be so for else the word False cannot mean False to us or in the Subject as is pretended that is he must make it possible to be justly or in right reason held by one True by the other False Now 't is the Impossibility of such opposite Grounds I constantly maintain or that the Grounds of Faith are Impossible to be False Thirdly hence I go farther and urge that if those different Motives can oblige justly one man to hold Faith True the other to hold it False then putting them in the same man it ought to oblige him to hold both sides of the Contradiction and this enforces my proofs of this nature in my Third Eviction I know it will be readily answe'rd that this will not follow because the Motives being disparate the more probable one would when in the same subject over-power the other and so hinder the opposite Assent But I desire it may be consider'd that Intellectual Motives or Reasons have their power to
bind the Understanding to Assent not from their relation to other extrinsecall Proofs corresponding or discorresponding with them but from the Truth of the Premisses on which they intrinsecally depend and the Goodness of the Consequence and finally by virtue of their being built on first or self-evident Principles If then the Motives one man has at present be sufficient of their own nature to oblige him acting according to right reason to judg Faith True who ever has humane Reason ought to assent upon them and if Faith be still possible to be False that is False to us that is be possible to be shown False or possible that others may have just ground to hold it so put those Grounds also in the same man and since they must be convictive of humane understanding they ought to have their formal Effect where they are that is convince it of Faith's Falshood too which however absurd yet 't is the genuine and necessary sequel of this Source of Absurdities viz. That Faith and its Rule may possibly be False How the force of this Discourse is avoidable but by alledging that no man acting according to right reason has just grounds to hold his Faith True to us or can ever have just Grounds to hold it False to us which is to deny the Possibility of Faith's Falshood to us the Opposers own position I profess my self utterly unable to discern Now he that holds these Positions is a perfect Sceptick or a Pyrrhonian as to matters of Religion since he puts an absolute desperateness of knowing the Truth on either side in that matter or subject Objection VI. When 't is said that Faith and its Rule may be False the Arguer misunderstands it to mean that we assert it may actually and indeed be shown so whereas 't is only meant by those words that 't is Possible to be False for any thing we know or for any thing the Grounds of Faith as to our knowledg evince or force to the contrary Answer I know not what Possibility to any thing means if it be not a relation to its being actually and indeed nor a Possibility of being False to us but a Possibility of being actually and indeed such that is of being actually shown so to us And all this must be forcibly admitted by him who puts no proper or necessary Causes in the Thing nor consequently Conclusive Motives in mens Understandings why this Faith now profest should necessarily be the same Christ and his Apostles taught 'T is indeed a different thing to say it may be so and to say I do not know but it may be so But he who maintains that Faith may possibly be False if he be honest knows what he maintains to be True otherwise certainly he were very wicked who would thus disgrace or diminish Faith if he did not know his Position to be a Truth whence follows that such a man must not onely say I know not but it may be False but he must if he will speak out what he thinks be oblig'd to say I know it may be False however he be loath to declare Categorically and sincerely his Tenet in so odious a Point or hazard his credit with the Generality of Christians whose Sentiment he contradicts so expresly Objection VII 'T is enough that Faith be as Certain as that the Sun will rise to morrow that America will not be drown'd as that there was a Henry the Eighth c. which are onely Morally Certain and enough for humane action since they exclude Actual Doubt or leave no suspicion of doubt behind them which as Mr. Stilling fleet tells us App. p. 76. is the highest actual Certainty which the mind of any reasonable man can desire In the same manner as it is Certainty enough for me to use my house that I am morally certain it will not fall on my head though I have no Absolute Security but it may And this kind of Certainty seems more suitable to Mankind being more easily penetrable by the Generality than the other rigorous and over-straining Certainty which seems more fit and proper for the higher sort of Speculaters than for a world of men which comprehends capacities of all degrees and sorts and the greatest part of them perhaps of little Learning Answer The Objecter must prove that all those Instances are only-Morally-Certain or Possible to be False e're he alleadge them for such That of Henry the Eighth which does indeed oblige the understanding to belief I affirm to be Practically Self evident and demonstrable and so Impossible to be False As for the rest they are utterly unfit to parallel Faith's Certitude being all of material things whose very Essence is to be mutable whereas Points of Faith being Truths and in matters not subject to Contingency are essentially incapable of being otherwise than they are that is still Truths So that far easier is it that all material nature should undergo all the Changes imaginable than that any such Truth can not be it self or the Principles on which 'c is built in us desist to be True or Conclusive In particular I would askâ— whether it be enough for Faith to be as Certain to us Christians as it was to those immediately before the Flood that the whole world should not be drown'd which exceeds the case of America's possible destruction or as it was to those after the Flood that the Sun should never stand still or go back or lastly as it is that a house of whose Firmness none had actual doubt should fall If so then the Standing of the Sun in Ioshuah's time and it's Retrogradation in Ezekiah's show the unparallelness of these Instances You 'l say these were both miraculous But this alters not the case first because it was never heard nor can it be held by any sober man that even Miracle can make such Truths Falshoods or those Motives which are of their own nature able to conclude the Truth of any such Points Inconclusive or Invalid Next because if the Motives to Faith and so Faith it self are Possible to be false for any thing we know 't is Impossible to give a satisfactory Answer to a Deist demanding how in case they should prove indeed False we can be assur'd Gods Goodness to Mankind will not step in even miraculously to discover the vanity of so universal an Illusion and the Abuse of Falshoods so absurdly imposing upon the world as to obtain the highest repute of Sacred and Divine Truths Concerning the last Instance of the Moral Certainty of a houses standing which hath been objected to me by learned Protestants as sufficient to make me act as steadily and heartily as if I had a Demonstration that it would not possibly fall besides the General Answer that Points of Faith are Truths which renders the case unparallel I reply that the two houses the one in Holborn the other in Kings Street which of late years a third in Cock Lane which of late days fell when