to be this They first set their Reason above all things and then will believe nothing that is above their Reason And if this be not in an unreasonable measure to exalt that Faculty to carry it beyond its due bounds nay to set it no bounds at all but strictly to make it Infinite and so to ascribe to it no less than a Divine Perfection I must profess my despair ever to know what is 8. To be the adequate Measure of all Truth so as to have no one Truth above the comprehension of it is as much as can be said of the Reason and Understanding of God himself His Infinite Understanding is indeed truly and necessarily so and whatever is above his Reason is for that very reason most certainly not true Because he essentially comprehending all that truly is it must necessarily follow that whatever he does not comprehend must be nothing But to say the same of the Reason of a Man or of the Intelligence of the most illuminated Angel would be to confound all distinction between Finite and Infinite God and Creature and to advance the most absurd and withal the most impious and blaspemous Proposition imaginable And yet this is the general Principle upon which the Body of Socinianism turns and by which it would be most directly and most compendiously confuted 9. I shall therefore take hold of it by this handle And since that which is a Principle one way as we argue forwards from the Cause to the Effect may be considered as a Consequence another way as we argue backwards from the Effect to the Cause and since there are these two general ways of Reasoning I shall therefore proceed both these wayes in the management of the present Argument which accordingly shall turn chiefly upon this double Hinge First I shall overturn their Principle I call it theirs because 't is what they must at last necessarily come to by shewing that Humane Reason is not the measure of Truth or that there may be some things True which are above the comprehension of Humane Reason and that therefore a things being above Reason is no concluding Argument of its not being True Secondly I shall argue ab Absurdo by shewing that if a things being above Reason were an Argument of its not being True then it will follow that Humane Reason is the Measure of all Truth which if I bring them to I shall think them reduced to a sufficient Absurdity These I intend as the two great Pillars of this Work which like the sides of an Arch will strengthen and bear up one another that which is liable to exception in the former part being made out in the latter and that which is liable to exception in the latter being made out in the former For if it be questioned in the First Part whether this be indeed their Principle That Humane Reason is the Measure of all Truth that will appear in the Second wherein it will be shewn to follow from their supposition And if it be question'd in the Second Part whether this their Principle be absurd and so whether they are reduced to an Absurdity that will appear in the First wherein this Principle is shewn to be False 10. And when by this Method I have shewn in general both a Priori and a Posteriori that a things being above Humane Reason is of it self no sufficient Argument of its not being true I shall then make application of all to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion which I shall shew may be true notwithstanding their being above Humane Reason and so that their being above it is no just ground to conclude them False and that therefore they ought to be believed notwithstanding their being above our Reason which in this case ought to be no prejudice to our Faith supposing them otherwise sufficiently revealed Which whether they are or no I shall not discuss my design at present not being to enter into the detail of the Controversie to prove the particular Mysteries of the Christian Faith such as the Trinity Incarnation or the like but only to lay a general ground and foundation for the belief of those Articles and to destroy that upon which the Body of Socinianism stands The Great and General Principle of which I take to be That nothing is to be believ'd as reveal'd by God that is above the comprehension of Humane Reason or That a Man is to believe nothing but what he can comprehend Which Principle I hope by the help of God with the utmost Evidence and Demonstration to overthrow And because in order to this I must first give a direct and profess'd Account of Reason and Faith besides what will be said Incidentally and Occasionally of them in the Course of the Treatise whose main design is so to adjust and accommodate the Natures and Properties of these two things together as to shew the Reasonableness of believing the Mysteries of the Christian Religion thereupon it is that I intitle the whole An Account of Reason and Faith in relation to the Mysteries of Christianity This is the Gross of what I design the Particulars of which will be more distinctly laid down and accounted for in the following Chapters CHAP. I. Of Reason 1. AMbiguity of Words being one great occasion of Confusion of Thoughts whoever will Discourse clearly and distinctly of any Subject must in the first place fix and settle the signification of his Terms in case they are Ambiguous that is if one and the same Term be applyed to different Ideas In this case Definition of the Name is to go before the Definition of the Thing between which two I conceive the difference to be this That in a Nominal Definition the word is only determin'd to such a certain Idea whereas in a Real one the Idea it self is opened and explained by some other Ideas that are supposed to be contain'd and involv'd in it Upon which account it is that Nominal Definitions are Arbitrary and therefore incontestable and therefore may be used as Principles in Discourse as they are in Geometry whereas Real Definitions are not Arbitrary but must be conform'd to the Nature of things and so are not to be taken for Principles whose Truth is to be supposed but for disputable Propositions whose Truth is to be proved 2. Reason therefore being an ambiguous word and of various acceptation before I proceed to give an account of the Nature of the thing it will be necessary that I define the Name which will also be the better defined if it be first distinguisht Now all Distinction being a sort of Division in which according to the Rules of Logick the Distribution ought to be into the most general and most immediate Members I shall accordingly distinguish of the several meanings of this word Reason by the same measure as I would divide any whole into its parts 3. I consider therefore that the most general distribution of Reason is into that of the Object and
the importunity of the Men I argue with Which indeed is the present Case since as was intimated in the Beginning the Sentiment of these Men concerning the disbelief of things above Reason resolves at last into this Principle that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth Which therefore both for their Satisfaction and Refutation must be shewn to be False 4. Now when I say that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth my meaning is that it is not that Common Standard whereby Truth in the General is to be Measured so that of every thing it may be safely Concluded that it is either true or not true according as it accords with this Measure as 't is comprehensible or not Comprehensible by Human Reason 'T is true indeed there is a certain Sense in which Human Reason sometimes is and may be truely said to be the Measure of Truth in as much as whatever the Understanding does clearly and distinctly Perceive may be concluded as most certainly true it being impossible that a thing should be otherwise than as we clearly perceive it to be without supposing our Perceptive Faculties to be in themselves Naturally False and without supposing it also necessary that we should fall into Errour even in the right use of these Faculties it being impossible to conceive a More right use of them than to Assent only to what we clearly Perceive which are not only in themselves manifest Absurdities but such also as would necessarily infer the Authour of our Natures to be also the Authour of our Errours and Deceptions It must therefore be admitted by all what the Philosophers of the Cartesian way so earnestly stand and Contend for that Clearness of Perception is the great Rule and Criterion of Truth so far that whatever we do clearly and distinctly perceive to be true is really in it self True But then this is only to be a Partial and inadequate Rule and in some certain limited respect only not absolutely and in general For though I grant that whatever we clearly perceive is true yet I deny that it follows likewise Backwards that whatever is true we do also clearly Perceive and so consequently that whatever we do not clearly Perceive is therefore not True By which it is plain that this Cartesian Maxim must be very much abused to prove that Human Reason is the Common and General Measure of Truth and I dare say the Great Authors of it never intended it to that purpose 5. Reason or Understanding in general may be safely said and must necessarily be allow'd to be the Measure of Truth For Truth in general carries a necessary Relation to understanding in general as fully adequate and commensurate to it So that all Truth is simply and absolutely intelligible the greatest and sublimest Truths as much as the least and meanest those which the Angels study and desire to look into as much as those which employ the narrow Thoughts of the poorest Rustic The Former are in themselves as intelligible as the latter and if not actually so well understood 't is not because of any incapacity in the Objects but by reason of the Disproportion of the Faculties that are Conversant about them But this disproportion must not be Universal nor extend throughout the whole Order of Being For what is intelligible must be so to some Understanding since what no Understanding can Comprehend is the same as not to be intelligible and consequently there must be an Understanding that Comprehends all that is truly intelligible that is all Truth And accordingly it may be truly said of this All-Comprehensive Understanding that it is the Measure of Truth so that whatever this perfect Understanding does not understand is not intelligible and if not intelligible then also not True Besides that it might be further Consider'd were this a proper place for so Abstract and Metaphysical a Speculation that Truth it Self as to the real Nature and Essence of it is one and the same with the Divine Ideas as they are related to one another and does therefore exist Originally and intirely in the Mind of God who is Substantial Truth and accordingly does Comprehend all Truth and so consequently is the Measure of it And because this All-comprehensive Understanding is contain'd within the Extent of Reason or Understanding in General therefore it may be truly said also of Reason or Understanding in General that it is the Measure of Truth it being most certain that what is above all Reason or what no Reason whatsoever can Comprehend is as much above Truth too and cannot possibly be true 6. But though it be thus necessary to allow this of Reason in General the same cannot be allow'd of Human Reason For whatever is the Measure of Truth must be fully adequate and Commensurate to Truth That 's Certain And therefore if Human Reason be the Measure of Truth it must have the same compass and extent with Truth and possess it whole and intire if not Essentially and Substantially as God does yet at least Noetically and by way of Theory so as to be able thoroughly to Perceive and Comprehend all Truth But now that this Qualification cannot possibly agree to Human Reason though it be somewhat unreasonable that I should be put to prove such a Proposition as this I hope fully to demonstrate upon a Double Consideration one taken from the Nature of Human Reason and the other from the Nature of Truth 7. And first to begin with Truth This as the Most thinking and Metaphysical Persons Conceive of it is supposed to consist in the Relations of equality or inequality or Agreement or Disagreement Now we are to Consider that these Relations may be of Three Sorts either such as are between Created Beings or such as are between Intelligible Ideas or such as are between Created Beings and their Ideas And we are also to Consider that there are two General Sorts of Truths extremely different one from another and therefore carefully to be distinguish'd Those that regard only the Abstract Natures of things and their immutable Essences independently on their actual Existence And others again that do regard things that do actually Exist The former of these Constitute that Order of Truths which we call Necessary the latter that which we call Contingent And this double order of Truths results from that threefold Relation before-mention'd From the first and third Relations arise Contingent Truths which are nothing else but the Relations of agreement of disagreement that are either between Created Beings themselves or between Created Beings and their Ideas And these I call Contingent Truths in opposition to those that are Necessary and Eternal partly because these Relations could not begin to exist before those Beings were produced it being impossible that there should be Relations between things that are not and partly because these Relations might not have existed because those Beings might not have been produced And as Contingent Truths arise from the first and third
have no Ideas but that even where we have Ideas and those very Clear ones too we may be as far from Comprehending a Truth as if we had none merely upon the account of the Dependence which that Truth has upon some other thing whereof we have not at least a just Idea Which single Consideration is enough for ever to spoil Human Reason for setting up for the Measure of Truth even upon the Supposition of its being Finit So very False is that arrogant Assertion of a Modern Philosopher Quaecunque existunt humanae Menti pervestigabilia praeterquam Inâ—initum Whatever is may be thoroughly Comprehended by the Mind of Man except Infinite And again Vnum duntaxat est quod omnem mentis nostrae vim longissime excedit ipsâque suâ Naturâ ut in se est ab eâ Cognosci nequit Inâ—initum puta There is but one only thing that far exceeds the Force and reach of our Mind and that cannot of its own very Nature be known by it as it is in it self namely Infinite What but One thing excepted from the Verge and placed beyond the reach of Human Knowledge 'T is well that One thing is a pretty large one but sure the Authour was ignorant of something else that is Himself or else he could never have advanc'd such a Crude and ill-consider'd a Proposition 33. And thus I have shewn at large in a rational way by arguing a Priori and from the Nature of things that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth and that even upon the most Liberal Supposition of its being Finite And if it be not so supposing Truth to be Finite much less is it supposing it what it has been prov'd to be of an Infinite Nature If upon the Former Supposition it exceeds the Proportion of our Reason certainly upon the latter there will be no Proportion between them But whether our Reason bears no Proportion to Truth or whether it be only Disproportionate to it either way it follows that it cannot be the Measure of it which I cannot but now look upon as a Proposition sufficiently demonstrated And in all this I contend for no more than what is implied in that Common and universally approv'd Maxim even among those of the Rational way that we ought not to deny what is Evident for the sake of what is Obscure or depart from a Truth which we see a Necessity to admit because of some Difficulties attending it which we cannot solve which they say is an Argument only of our Ignorance and not of the Falshood of the thing This indeed is a true Rule and such as must be allow'd to hold good in all our Reasonings let the Matter of them be what it will Only I wish that the Implication of the Rule were as much minded as the Rule it self is generally receiv'd For it plainly implies that there are some things which though plain and certain as to their Existence are yet incomprehensible and inexplicable as to their Manner But then as the Incomprehensibility of the Manner should not make us reject the Truth of the thing when otherwise Evident so neither should the Evidence we have of the Truth of the thing make us disown the Incomprehensibility of the Manner since it is so far from being against the Nature of Truth that it should be incomprehensible that you see we have discover'd even from the Contemplation of its Nature that there are incomprehensible Truths Of which I might now subjoyn some particular Examples but that I should fall very deep into a Common Place being herein prevented by many other Writers particularly by the admirable one of L' Art de Penser to the First Chapter of whose Fourth Book I refer my Reader where he shews by several and some of them uncommon Instances that there are things which the Mind of Man is not capable of Comprehending After which he Concludes with a very grave and useful Reflection which for the great advantage and Pertinency of it to the present Affair though I refer my Reader to the rest of the Chapter I shall here set down The Proâ—it says he that one may draw from these Speculations is not barely to acquire the knowledge of them which of it self is barren enough but it is to learn to know the Bounds of our understanding and to force it to confess that there are things which it cannot Comprehend And therefore it is good to fatigue the mind with these kind of Subtilties the better to tame its Presumption and abate its confidence and daringness in opposing its Feeble Lights against the Mysteries of Religion under the Pretence that it cannot comprehend them For since all the Force of Human Vnderstanding is constrain'd to yield to the least Atom of Matter and to own that it sees Clearly that it is infinitely divisible without being able to Comprehend how this may be Is it not apparently to transgress against Reason to refuse to believe the wonderful effects of the Divine Onnipotence Merely for this Reason that our Vnderstanding cannot Comprehend them Yes without doubt it is as will better appear in the sequel of this Discourse In the mean while before I take leave of the Subject of this Chapter I have a double Remarque to make upon it 34. The First is that since Truth in its full extent is Incomprehensible we should not vainly go about to Comprehend it but be contented to be ignorant in many things And since there are some special Truths in particular that are incomprehensible we should not apply our Thoughts to the Comprehension of all things at a Venture as some who are for understanding every thing but sit down first and Consider whether they are proportionate to our Capacities or No and as far as we can learn to distinguish what Truths may and what may not be Comprehended by us that so we may not lose that Time and Pains in the Contemplation of them which might be profitably imploy'd in the Consideration of other things better suted to our Capacity As a great many do who busie themselves all their Lives long about such things which if they should study to Eternity they would not Comprehend and that indeed because they require an Infinite Capacity to Comprehend them Whereas the shortest Compendium of Study and the best way to abridge the Sciences is to study only what we can Master and what is within the Sphere of our Faculties and never so much as to apply our selves to what we can never Comprehend 35. The other Remarque is that the Conclusion prov'd in this Chapter does very much Fortifie and Confirm that which was undertaken to be made out in the last Concerning the Distinction of Things Above and Things Contrary to Reason For if there are Truths which we cannot Comprehend then it seems what is above our Comprehension may yet be True and if True then to be sure not Contrary to Reason since whatever is Contrary to Reason is no less
Contrary to Truth which though sometimes above Reason is yet never Contrary to it CHAP. V. That therefore a things being Incomprehensible by Reason is of it self no Concluding Argument of its not being True 1. AS there is nothing in Man that deserves his Consideration so Much and Few things without him that deserve it More than that part of him wherein he resembles his Maker so there is Nothing more worthy of his Consideration in that part or that is at least more necessary to be Consider'd by him than the Defects of it without a due regard to which it would not be very safe for him to dwell much upon the Consideration of the other as being apt to seduce him into â— ride and Vanity to blow him up with Self-Conceit and so by an imaginary Greatness to spoil and corrupt that which is Genuine and Natural 2. Now the Defects of our Intellectual part Consider'd in their general Heads are I suppose Sin Ignorance and Errour And though Sin in it self must be allow'd to be of a worse Nature and Consequence than either Ignorance or Errour however some may fancy it a greater Reproach to 'em to have their Intellectuals question'd than their Morals and so upon that score may require more of our Consideration yet upon another account the Defects of the Understanding seem to need it more than those of the Will since we are not only apt to be more proud of our Intellectuals than of our Morals but also to Conceit our selves more Free and Secure from Errour than we are from Sin though Sin in the very Nature and Principle of it implies and supposes Errour 3. Pride the presumed Sin of the Angels is also the most Natural and Hereditary one of Man his dominant and most cleaving Corruption the Vice as I may call it of his Planet and Complexion And that which we are most apt to be proud of is our Vnderstandings the only Faculty in us whose limits we forget In other things we are Sensible not only of the general Bounds of our Nature but also of the particular narrowness of them and accordingly do not attempt any thing very much beyond our Measure but contain our Selves pretty reasonably within Our Line at least are not such Fools as to apply our Strength to Move the Earth out of its place or to set our Mouths to drink up the Sea or to try with our Eyes to look into the Regions beyond the Stars But there is hardly any Distance but to which we fancy our Intellectual Sight will reach scarce any Object too bright too large or too far remov'd for it Strange that when we Consider that in us which makes us Men we should forget that we are so And yet thus it is when we look upon our Understandings 't is with such a Magnifying Glass that it appears in a manner boundless and unlimited to us and we are dazzled with our own Light 4. Not that it is to be presumed that there are any who upon a deliberate Consideration of the Matter have this Form'd and express Thought that their Understandings are Infinite Human Nature seems hardly capable of such Excess But only as the Psalmist says in another Case of some Worldly Men that their Inward Thought is that their houses shall continue for ever Not meaning that any could be so grossely absurd as positively and explicitly to Conceive that their Houses any more than their own Bodies should last always and never decay but only that they had such a kind of a wandring and Confuse Imagination secretly lurking in their Minds and loosely hovering about them so in like manner there are a sort of People who are Parturient and teeming with a kind of Confuse and unform'd Imagination tho' perhaps they never bring it to an express and distinct Thought that their Understandings have no bounds or limits belonging to them tho' they cannot deny but that they have if directly put to the Question 5. Accordingly you shall find those whose Conduct betrays this inward Sentiment who venture at all in their Studies stick at nothing but will undertake to give a Reason for every thing and positively decide whatever Comes in their way without Suspense or Reserve imagining confusely at least they have a Comprehension of all things and that there is nothing too hard or knotty for them nothing but what they either actually do or are capable of Comprehending if they once set themselves to it And from hence they roundly Conclude that whatever they are not able to Comprehend is not true and accordingly deny their Belief to whatever transcends their Comprehension 6. Now I confess there is no fault to be found with the Consequence of these Men nor with their Practice as it relates to that Consequence which are both as far as I can see exceeding right if their Principle be once admitted For if indeed it be really so that Human Reason is adequate and Commensurate to Truth so that there is no Truth but what it is able to Comprehend then it will certainly follow that whatever it cannot Comprehend is not True and there will need no other nor better Argument of the falshood of any thing than the Incomprehensibility of it For their Reasoning resolves into this Form Whatever is true we can Comprehend This we do not Comprehend Therefore this is not true Or thus If whatever is true we can Comprehend then what we cannot Comprehend is not true But whatever is true we can Comprehend Ergo c. Where 't is plain that if the Major of the First or the Minor of the Second Syllogisin wherein the Principle of these Men is Contain'd be allow'd there will be no avoiding the Conclusions of them So that if we admit that Human Reason is Comprehensive of all Truth we are not Consistent with our Selves if we do not also grant that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is a just Warrant to Conclude it not True 7. But then on the other side if this Mighty Principle upon which such a Weight is laid and such great things built be false if Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth as I think is with great Evidence Demonstrated in the last Chapter then is not the Consequence as good this way that therefore a thing 's being Incomprehensible by Reason is no Concluding Argument of it 's not being True For how are we inconsistent with our Selves if granting Human Reason to be Commensurate to Truth we deny that the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be True but only because in denying that we Contradict our Principle or which is all one Suppose the Contradictory Proposition to it to be true viz. that Human Reason is not Commensurate to Truth But now if in saying that the Incomprehensibility of a thing does not argue it not to be true we in the Consequence of what we affirm Suppose that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth then 't is as plain that the
Perception More intire for here again we have the prospect lying altogether before us in its full and whole extent whereas in the other it opens gradually and successively the Light stealing in upon us more and more as we go further and further as it does upon Men that travel toward the East To which may be further added that Intuitive Knowledge supposes and proceeds from perfection of the Understanding whose Perceptive Faculty is hereby argued to be very bright and clear For it must be a very clear Perception to perceive the Relations of Ideas by the very Ideas themselves Whereas Demonstrative Knowledge and the necesslty of Reasoning in order to it is founded upon the narrowness of our Intellectual Capacities which not being able to perceive the Truth or Falshood of a Proposition by the single collation of the two Ideas that compose it are fain to make use of a third as a common measure between them and so from the consideration of something more clear and better known to proceed in the search of what is more obscure and less known Accordingly we attribute the way of Intuition to the most Perfect Beings God and Angels Though as to Angels I make no great doubt but that in the Consideration of very compounded Questions and such as include a multiplicity of Relations they are fain to use Reasoning as well as we as in the more simple ones we use Intuition as well as they though perhaps after a much more perfect manner and by such compendious and facilitating Rules as we know nothing of And as they may be supposed when they do reason to reason better and more expeditely than we so with equal probability it may be presumed considering the great disproportion of Natures and States between us that they use Intuition in very many things wherein we are forc'd to have recourse to Reasoning 21. Hereafter indeed when as the Scripture tells us all that is imperfect about us shall be done away and we shall be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not only like but equal to the Angels we shall be able to see 't is to be hoped by Intuition too and that many things which we here not only were ignorant of but thought impossible things that were not only above our Reason but as we thought contrary to it We shall not only be able to reason better than we do now but shall in most things not stand in need of any Reasoning at all but shall with one simple View glance over and through the Relations of Ideas and so have an intire prospect of the fair Field of Truth But at present we must travel it over and that with many a weary step there being but very few things that we know by Intuition no more than just to give us a taste of the great Priviledge of Heaven and to incourage both our Desires and our Hopes of that perfect State when we shall be so far from needing any Logic to direct us in our reasoning that we shall have in comparison but little need or use even of Reason it self But in this present state of our Nonage and Infirmity our Necessity of it is very great For our Intuition is so short-sighted and reaches so very little a way that as if we knew no more than what we can by this Means attain to the Compass of our Knowledge would be so very Scanty that we should not have near light enough to direct us in our journey through the World So if we would Know more and see to a further distance from us we must assist our Feeble Eye by the Advantage of a Glass Now Reason is this Glass Naturally indeed a very good Prospective but which Logic and especially Algebra has improved into a Telescope But yet still 't is but an Artificial way of seeing and all Art supposes and argues a Defect in Nature And though it be a great help yet we know 't is no very great Commendation to a man's eye-sight to see with Spectacles 22. And why then are we Proud And why proud of that which should rather deject us and make us Humble of our Imperfections and our Defects Our Natural Reason is a Mark of our Limitation as Creatures and our Artificial one of our Infirmity as Men and both together give us but little Light and help us to see but a very little way off and that after the most imperfect and defective Manner such as upbraids our Ignorance at the very same time that it increases our Knowledge our Reason not so much inlightning as betraying the Darkness of our Understandings Some few things indeed we know as Angels do by Intuition or else we could not so much as reason like Men but still the main Fund of our Knowledge lies in the Rational and Demonstrative kind and we are fain to use Clues and Chains to Conduct our Thoughts through the infinite Mazes and Labyrinths of Truth to proceed in a Train from one thing to another to walk step by step and feel out our way with wariness and Caution like Men that go in the Dark And such indeed is our state in this Body and in this World 'T is now a kind of Night with us as having for the Most part only the Lesser Light Reason for our Difection As for the Greater Intâ—ition we have little more of that than of the refracted Beams of the Sun a little before its rising and after its setting enough to make a Twilight a Mixture of Light and Darkness but such a Mixture as is very unequal Darkness making the far greater part of the Composition And is not this Consideration sufficient if there were nothing else to take down our Pride and inspire us with a Sentiment of the profoundest Humility and Self-dejection If not let us Consider that even this Lesser Light that is to govern our present Night and Darkness does oftentimes fail us and suffer an Eclipse Let us Consider that we have a darker side yet and are subject to a Much lower Dispensation There being many things and those of the highest Nature and greatest importance wherein our Reason is utterly at a loss and cannot help us out and with respect to which being destitute of Sight we must be Content to walk altogether by Faith Concerning which in the following Chapter CHAP. II. Of Faith 1. FAith is a Term of great Ambiguity as well as Reason but not to insist upon the several Acceptations of it as it is used either in Divine or in Humane Writings I shall only define in what sense I here take it and then proceed to such Considerations upon it as may serve to lay open its Nature so far as is requisite to the Present Design 2. I do not take Faith here for the Object of Faith but for the Act or Habit of Faith and that not Ethically consider'd as it denotes the Moral Vertues of Veracity Fidelity Honesty and the like but Logically as it signifies a certain Assent Judgement or
upon the internal Light and Evidence of the thing but upon Authority and so agree in the general Nature of 〈◊〉 only as the Authority differ 〈…〉 Faith also varies and Human Authority differing from Divine just as much as Fallible differs from Infallible the same in proportion will also 〈…〉 between Human and Divine â—aith That is the former will always be a Fallible and the latter an Infallible Assent 8. Human Faith though sometimes as actually undeceiv'd as Divine is yet always liable to Error and Deception and so doubtful hazardous and uncertain even when actually true like a Conclusion drawn from uncertain Premisses in which respect it resembles Opinion and that so much that some have confounded it with it though I think illogically enough since though there be a like uncertainty in both Assents yet they differ extremely in their Formal Motives one being grounded upon Reason and the other upon Authority And the Distinction of these Assents is not taken from the degree of Certainty wherein they agree but from the Quality of the Motive wherein they differ However tho' this makes a great difference in Notion it makes None in the Affairs of Civil Life and the Faith of him that believes the Testimony of a Man will as to all real intents and purposes go for no more than his Opinion And that because though different Assents as to the Formality of their Motives they are yet Much at one rate for Certainty being both Fallible in their Grounds and so subject to Error and Deception 9. But the Case is quite otherwise as to Divine Faith whose Foundation stands too sure not only to be overturn'd but even so much as shaken This Faith is strictly and Absolutely infallible not subject to the least Error or Possibility of Erring as having the very Ground and Pillar of Truth it self the Omniscience and Veracity of God for its Security than which there neither Needs nor Can be Greater 'T is Most Certain that God is both Actively and Passively Infallible his Omniscience will not suffer him to be deceiv'd himself and his infinite Veracity and Truth will not suffer him to deceive us And therefore he that builds his Faith upon his Authority goes upon the Most sure Grounds and cannot possibly Err in his Assent And as he is secure from Error so he is also from all just reason of Scruple or Fear and leaning upon a firm and indefectible Support may stay and repose himself upon it with full Acquiescence So that there is all the Certainty that can be in this Faith both Objective and Subjective that of the Thing and that of the Person The thing assented to is most undoubtedly true in it self and he that assents to it may be most firmly assured and perswaded of the Truth of it in his own Mind and among all Temptations to Doubt and Distrust may with great Triumph and Confidence say with the Apostle I know whom I have believ'd 10. It was observ'd a little before of Humane Faith that it resembles Opinion in as much as they are both dubious and uncertain Assents as proceeding upon grounds of like uncertainty though otherwise of different Natures Now as this Faith resembles Opinion so in like manner it may be observ'd of Divine Faith that it resembles Science or rather that Second Assent for so I am forc'd to call it for want of a better Name which we lately discours'd of and plac'd between Opinion and Faith The Comparison here bears the same proportion as to Certainty as it did in the other Case as to uncertainty Divine Faith has all the Certainty that is possible and therefore to be sure as much as Science or that Second Assent can have There is as much Certainty in the thing assented to and there may be as much Assurance and firmness of Perswasion in the Assent it self or in other words what a man believes upon the Authority of God is in it self as certain as what he knows and he may also be as Certain of it For he that assents to a thing upon full evidence can but assent fully and perfectly without suspense or hesitation and so also can he that assents to a thing upon Divine Authority only His Ground is every whit as Firm and Sure as the others and why then should the Measure of his Assurance be less It cannot possibly be if he Knows and Considers upon what Ground he stands So that thus far both in regard of the Certainty of the Object and the Firmness of the Perswasion Divine Faith may be justly placed upon a level with the Most Evident Assent whatever 11. Nor I suppose will this be thought an undue Elevation of Divine Faith On the Contrary I expect to be Complain'd of for setting the Dignity of it at too low a Pitch by those who say that Divine Faith is Firmer than Science But 't is for want of the Latter that these Men so excessively exâ—ol the Former I call it excessively because 't is what strictly and exactly speaking cannot be For what I Perceive or Know is even by that very supposition unquestionably true or else I cannot be said to Know it and what I believe upon the highest Authority can be no more To say therefore that Faith is Firmer than Science is like saying that one streight Line is streighter than another But perhaps their Meaning only is that 't is safer relying upon the Autâ—ority of God than upon our own Rational Faculties which indeed is right and I heartily wish all Men were convinc'd of it For though what I do actually and really Know be to the full as true and certain as what I Believe and I can no more be out in one than in the other yet it is More Certain in the general that God cannot deceive me than that my Reason cannot be deceiv'd Not that what I assent to by Divine Faith can have a greater Objective Certainty than what I clearly and distinctly Perceive or Know but only that there is a Possibility not to say Danger of my taking that for a clear and distinct Perception which â—ndeed is Not so and so though I cannot be deceiv'd in what I do truly know yet I may be deceiv'd in thinking that I know when I do not So that Divine Faith though not more Certain than Knowledge it self is yet of greater Certainty than our Knowing Faculties and generally speaking the Believer goes upon surer grounds than the Man of Reason and Demonstration Because his Reason may possibly lead him into Error whereas the Other 's Authority cannot And when they are both in the right yet still there will be this difference between them that his Reason is only not Deceiv'd whereas the Other 's Faith is Infallible 12. And thus far we have taken a view of the more bright and perfect side of Divine Faith I mean that of its Firmness and Certainty in respect of which it stands upon a just level with Science But it has
though upon a different Medium at the same time For as I said before 't is not the Nature of the thing but the Quality of the Medium that specifies Faith and tho' the same thing cannot have two Natures or be in it self at once evident and not evident yet why may it not sustain two different Relations or be consider'd in two different Mediums so as to be said to be known when perceiv'd by its Evidence and to be believ'd when assented to upon Authority Which certainly may be done as fully and with as little regard to its evidence as if there were no evidence in the thing at all So that the Evidence of the thing does not hinder the Belief of it supposing the Belief not to proceed upon that Evidence but upon its own proper Medium Authority 20. But to use a way of Arguing less Abstract though it may be with some more pressing and convincing Suppose God should reveal to me a Geometrical Truth as that two Triangles having the same Base and being within the same Parallels are equal and I who at first receiv'd it upon his bare Authority should come afterwards to be able to demonstrate it my self upon the known Principles of Art who that well considers the Natures of these things would say that my Science evacâ—â—ted my Faith and that I ceas'd to be a Believer assoon as I became a Mathematician For though I am now supposed to Know what before I only Believ'd yet why should this Knowledge destroy my Faith since I may still have as much regard for the Authority of God and as little to the Evidence of the thing as I had before the Demonstration and would still be ready to assent to it though there were no evidence to be produced for it only upon the Ground of Divine Authority And to use another Sensible though not so Artificial way of arguing I would fain know whether any one of those who are of the Contrary Sentiment would refuse a Demonstrative Account of a Reveal'd Truth suppose the Creation of the World merely for fear of injuring or destroying his Faith which yet he were bound in Conscience to do if Knowledge and Faith were so exclusive of each other and inevidence and Obscurity were so absolutely of the Essence of Faith as some pretend For then it would not be lawful to acquire the Natural Knowledge of any reveal'd Truth because 't is unlawful to destroy one's Faith and every Believer would have just reason to fear all further Light and Information about what he believes which yet I think would be acknowledg'd by all an extravagant Scruple such as can hardly enter much less stay long in any Considering head And is withal Contrary to a plain Exhortation of the Apostle who bids us add to our Faith Knowledge 21. When therefore the Matter of Faith as it is taken for the Truth of the Proposition Believ'd is charged with Obscurity and Faith it self upon that account is said as it commonly is to be of inevident things the Meaning ought not to be of an Absolute but of a Relative inevidence Not that what is Believ'd is so all over dark and obscure that it cannot while Believ'd absolutely be known but only that it cannot under that Formality and so far as it is Believ'd being necessarily in that respect inevident how bright or clear soever it may be in other respects That is in other words though the thing Believ'd absolutely consider'd may be Evident yet it is not so as Believ'd or in relation to Faith because that has no regard to the Evidence how bright soever it may shine but proceeds wholy upon another Argument between which and the Evidence of the thing there is not the least Affinity or Communication The short is the Object of Faith simply and absolutely speaking may admit of Evidence but then though it be never so evident and demonstrable in it self yet as Believ'd it is always Obscure Faith having no regard to the proper light and Evidence of the thing but only to the Testimony of the Revealer whose bare Authority is the only Motive that determines her Assent and the only Ground upon which she lays the whole weight of it though the Truth of the thing in it self absolutely Consider'd may also stand upon other Foundations be rationally accounted for by Arguments from within and so be seen by its own Light But let the Light shine never so bright upon the Object from other sides Faith lets in none nor has any regard to that which she finds there but connives at it and walks as I may say with her eyes shut contenting her self with the certainty of Revelation and leaving to Science if there be any the Evidence of the thing So that the Object is always dark to her how clear and bright soever it may be in it self or appear when absolutely consider'd to a Philosophic Eye In which respect it falls very short of the Perfection of Science though in respect of Firmness and Certainty it be equal to it as was said before All which is briefly couch'd in that excellent Account of Faith given by the Author to the Hebrews when he says that it is the Substance of things hoped for and the Argument of things not seen Where by Substance and Argument he equals it with Science in regard of the Firmness and Certainty of the Assent but by saying that 't is of things not seen he makes it vail and stoop to it in point of Evidence in which respect indeed Faith as Firm and as Certain as it is is as much inferiour to Science as Darkness is to Light 22. To gather up then what has been here discours'd at large concerning the inevidence of Faith into one view When we say that Faith is an inevident Assent we are not to understand this inevidence of the formal Reason of Faith but of the Matter of it And when we say that the Matter of it is inevident we should not intend by it that it is wholy and all over without Evidence but only that it has none from within or from the intrinsic Nature of the thing And when we say that the Matter of Faith is inevident from within this again is not to be intended of the simple Meaning of the Proposition but of the Truth of it And when we say that the Truth of it is inevident this again lastly is not to be understood as if it were always and necessarily so in its own Absolute Nature but only so far forth as it is Believ'd or as 't is consider'd under the formality of an Object of Faith Or in other words the inevidence of the Matter of Faith in respect of the Truth of the Article is not an Absolute but a Relative inevidence Not that the Matter of Faith is Never Absolutely and in the Nature of the thing inevident for it may be so too as will be seen afterwards but only that it is not necessarily so there
because he is infallible Infallibility then is the proper ground of Implicit Faith and accordingly the Church of Rome assuming to her self the Character of Infallible does upon that Supposition rightly require it I say upon that supposition for she is right enough in her Consequence supposing her Principle to be true But the truth of it is that is Most Extravagant and such as carries in it such matchless Arrogance and Presumption as befits only him who as God sitteth in the temple of God shewing himself that he is God For God only is Infallible and therefore he only has right to require Implicit Faith And to him indeed it is due from every one of his Creatures in the highest Measure imaginable as is also Implicit Obedience upon the same Ground Of both which we have a signal Example in Abraham who when he was call'd by God to go out into a place which he should after receive for an Inheritance is said by Faith to have Obey'd and to have gone out not knowing whither he went 26. But now what can be more dark and inevident than this Implicit Faith It s Formal Reason indeed is sufficiently clear and it resolves at last into a Ground highly Rational and so may be said in that respect to be the highest Reason For certainly nothing can be more Reasonable than to believe whatever God who is Infallible reveals There is therefore no Darkness on this Side Nay even the Light it self does not shine more Clear But as for the Matter of it if I may call it so where nothing distinctly is believ'd that is sure as dark and obscure as can well be conceiv'd so dark as even to be Invisible For a Man to believe at large without any restriction or limitation whatever God shall propose to him let it be what it will not Knowing what that is like Abraham's going not knowing whither he went is such a dark and obscure act of Faith as has nothing clear in it but the Humility and Devotion of him who so believes This is a Faith Worthy of God as well as peculiar to him and 't is the great inevidence and obscurity of it that makes it so For so far is the Matter of it from having any Evidence in it that it is not so much as Evident what the Matter of it is Here then is the very Blackness of Darkness and he that has this infolded Faith as every true Believer has and can thus trust God in the Dark where he sees nothing but only the general Reason of his so doing is not likely in any of the more explicit instances of it to plead the inevidence of the Article to excuse his Infidelity or to deny his Faith to an otherwise sufficiently clear Revelation merely because it is above his shallow Reason 27. Upon what has been hitherto discours'd it will not be difficult to give in few words a Satisfactory Resolution of a Celebrated Question which among the Schoolmen has made a great many and that is whether Faith belongs to the Vnderstanding or to the Will It is plain by the Measures already laid down that it belongs to the Latter For Faith as all acknowledge is an Assent and Assent is a Species of Judgement and Judgement as has been shewn already is an act of the Will not of the Understanding whose only Operation is Perception and consequently Faith is an act of the Will consenting to imbracing acquiescing and reposing it self in what the Understanding represents as proposed and reveal'd by God And indeed unless Judgment and consequently Faith did belong to the Will as their proper and immediate Principle 't is impossible to Conceive how a Man should be blame-worthy for any of his Opinions or how he should stand accountable either for Error on the one hand or for Infidelity and Heresy on the other For if Faith be an act of the Understanding then since the only Operation of the Understanding is Perception the greatest Fault of an Infidel or a Heretic will be Non-Perception which indeed is not Error but Ignorance whereas Infidelity and Heresie are always supposed to include Error and to be also the worst of Errors And this Non-perception is only a Negation and such as resolves into want of Parts which is not a Moral but a Natural defect whereas Infidelity and Heresie as indeed all that is Faulty are understood to be Privations and Defects of a Moral Nature But then to make them so they must be voluntary nothing being faulty but what is so that is again they must be Wilful that is they must be acts of the Will and Consequently Faith which is the Habit whereof those Sins are Privations must also belong to the same Principle or else in short there would be neither Vertue in having it nor Vice in being without it And accordingly our Saviour in upbraiding the Iews with Infidelity does all along not only by Confequence but directly and expresly Charge it upon their Wills Ye will not come to me that ye may have Life 28. And thus I have gone thorough what I intended and what indeed is of greatest Consideration upon this Subject of Faith In the account of which if I differ from any Authors of the better Character that have either professedly or occasionally written upon it particularly Baronius and Dr. Pearson 't is not that I love to lay aside great Authorities or affect to be by my self but because I follow the best Light of my Understanding write with Freedom and Ingenuity what I think and endeavour to represent things as they are without having regard to Authority any further than I think it joyn'd with Truth and Reason Which shall also be my Rule in what remains of this Treatise In the Mean time what has been hitherto discours'd concerning Reason and Faith may serve as a good Preparation in order to an Account of the Great Question Concerning the Belief of things above Reason But before we enter upon any thing of that Nature 't is fit the Distinction of Above Reason and Contrary to Reason be Consider'd and rightly Stated which is the task allotted for the next Chapter CHAP. III. The Distinction of things Contrary to Reason and above Reason Consider'd 1. THere are some Distinctions in the World that are without a Difference though Difference be the Ground of all Distinction and this by some is pretended to be of that Number who will have the Parts of it to be Coincident and that Contrary to Reason and above Reason signifie in reality alike and are but different Expressions for one and the same thing And though they may be reasonably suspected to do this to serve the interest of a Cause for whose advantage it would be to have this Distinction taken away yet they have the Confidence to Charge the same upon those that hold it pretending that it is only a dextrous Shift and Evasion invented by Subtile Men as an Expedient to relieve the Distress of
when all that we can enjoy here is Finite The greatest part of the Uneasiness the Melancholy the Disconsolateness the Aridity that accompanies Human Life will be found if traced to the Original to proceed from hence viz. from the little proportion that is between our Capacities and our Gratifications between what is desired and what is enjoy'd And this Desire of an Infinite Good will be a far greater Punishment to us Hereafter when the Activity of our Faculties shall be more invigorated and inlarg'd if we have not then an Infinite Good to enjoy â—Twill be at least the worst ingredient of Hell and Damnation if not all that is to be understood by it And yet we are still to Consider that our Will is Inâ—â—nite only Ex parte Objecti because it desires an Infinite Good and not Ex parte Actûs because it desires it infinitely or with an unlimited Force and Activity For 't is impossible that a Finite Nature should have any Power or Force in it that is strictly infinite or that any such Act or Operation should proceed from it But then what would the Affliction be if the Act were Infinite as well as the Object and we were to aspire after an Infinite Good with an Infinite Desire What Conception can Frame a just Idea of the Misery of such a State And can it be much less for an Infinite Intelligence to have only a Finite Intelligible for its Object But there is Nothing Painful or Afflictive in the Condition of the Supremely and Completely Blessed And therefore we must Conclude that as the Infinite Will of God has a Good fully Commensurate and Adequate to its unlimited Activity whereon it may Center and Repose its Weight so the Infinite Understanding of God has also an Infinite Intelligible for its Object And since the Formal Object of Understanding in General and Consequently of the Divine is Truth as that of the Will is Good hence it follows again that Truth must needs be of an Infinite Nature 17. And do we not find it so when we Convert our selves to it by Study and Meditation When we apply our Minds to the Contemplation of Truth and set our selves to muse and think do we not find that we launch forth into a vast intelligible Sea that has neither Bottom nor Shore And the more we think and the more we Meditate are we not still more and more convinc'd of this and do we not discover the further we go in our Intellectual Progress that there still lies more and more beyond us so that the more we advance in the Knowledge of Truth the more we inlarge Our Idea of it as the greatest Travellers think most Magnificently of the World Do we not find as in a Spatious Campaigne so in the immense Field of Truth that our Eye wearies and our Sight loses it self in the boundless Prospect and that besides the clear view which we have of a few things at a little distance from us there lie all round us vast Tracts unmeasurably diffused whereof we have only Confuse and indistinct Images like the Faint Blew of the far distant Hills Are not the Relations and Combinations of things with one another Infinite and should but one link in this Endless Chain be alter'd would not innumerable Alterations ensue upon it Should but One Proposition that is False be supposed True or One that is True be supposed False what Understanding but the Divine could go on with the Train of New Consequences that would result from such a Supposition I say New Consequences For we are to consider that besides the Absolute Systeme of Truth which contains the Relations of Ideas with their settled Coherencies and Dependencies one upon another according as they really stand in their Natural Order there is a Secondary Systeme of Truth which I may call Hypothetical that results from any supposed Change made in the Absolute Systeme whence will still arise new and new Consequences even to Infinity But not to consider Hypothetical Truth can the Bounds of that which is Absolute be ever fix'd or its Stock ever Exhausted Does it not after all the Study that has been employ'd about it and the Numberless Number of Volumns that have been written upon it furnish perpetual matter for our Contemplation and is it not a Subject for everlasting Thoughts and Considerations Has it not been the great Research of the Thoughtful and Inquisitive for many Ages and yet does not every Age refine upon its Predecessour and produce New Discoveries Are not the Sciences continually improved and yet are there not still Depths in every Science which no Line of Thought can ever Fathom What a vast Fecundity is there in some plain simple Propositions nay who can number the Conclusions that may be drawn from any one Principle Take the most simple Figure in Geometry and where is the Mathematician who after a Thousand Years Study can reckon up all the Properties that may be affirm'd of it both as Absolutely Consider'd and as it stands in relation to other Figures And what then shall we think of the whole Science in all its Branches and Dependencies Particularly of Algebra the Main Ocean of this Bottomless Sea And what shall we say of Metaphysick's another unmeasurable Abysse and what of the endless Circle of Truth if not the same which one of Iob's Friends says of God Canst thou by searching â—ind out Truth Canst thou find her out unto Perfection It is as high as Heaven what canst thou do deeper than Hell what canst thou know The Measure thereof is longer than the Earth and broader than the Sea And that because they after all are Finite whereas this is truly and strictly Infinite Which by the way sufficiently proves a God and that this God is Truth whose Eternal and Glorious Majesty be Blessed for Ever 18. But then let us Consider if Truth be indeed as you see of an Infinite Nature then to prove that Human Reason is not fully adequate to it does not intirely possess it nor all over and wholly comprehend it and consequently cannot be the Measure of it there will be no need of laying open the great Weakness and Deficiency of our Understanding I need not represent the Imperfection of its Light nor the Shortness of its Views nor the Slenderness of its Attainments nor the very Narrow Extent of its Knowledge nor the very little Progress it is able to make in the Contemplation and Comprehension of Truth That there are a great many things whereof we have no Ideas for which we need go no further for an Instance than our own Souls and that even where we have Ideas of things we cannot always discern the Relations and Connexions that are between them and that either for want of sufficient Clearness in the Ideas themselves to have their Relations perceived immediately without comparing them with other mediate Ideas or else for want of such due and proper Mediums wherewith to compare them and
that therefore the extent of our Knowledge is not only vastly exceeded by the Natures of things but also very Considerably even by our own Ideas there being many things whereof we have Ideas and sometimes very clear ones too and yet which we know no more how to reason upon or discourse of intelligibly or with any Certainty than we do of those things whereof we have no Ideas at all being for Example no more able to tell what proportion such a Circle bears to such a Square though we have clear Ideas of both than we are to tell what proportion there is between Angels and our own Souls things whereof we have no Ideas A very remarkable Instance of the Shortness and Contractedness of our Understandings which it seems are not only destitute of the Ideas of many things and Consequently of the knowledge of them it being impossible that the extent of our knowledge should exceed that of our Ideas but are also Blind to those very Ideas which they have and cannot see even when they have the advantage of the Light But I say I need not present my Reader with a Night-piece of Human Reason describe great Blindness and gross Darkness how ignorant she is when she does not adventure to judge and how Erroneous when she does stumbling and falling as is usual in the dark out of one mistake into another out of one Errour into another either by imâ—racing false Principles or by drawing wrong Conclusions from true ones so that Ignorance seems her safest Retreat and to suspend her best Wisdom These I say and such other of our intellectual Infirmities I need not insist upon or make any advantage of it being sufficient to conclude the Point in hand that Human Reason in its largest Capacity and Extent and with all the advantages of both Nature and Artificial improvement is after all but a Finite thing and that to be sure the most Zealous of its Votaries and Advocates must confess that it is since 't is impossible that what has Bounds should be able totally and adequately to Comprehend what has None or that Finite should be the Measure of Infinite 19. I know but of one thing that can with any Pertinency be replied to this Argument and that is that though Human Reason as Finite be not able to comprehend all Truth as being Infinite yet however there may perhaps be no one Truth in Particular but what when presented to it may be comprehended by it and so Human Reason may be rightly said to be Adequate and Commensurate to Truth as Distributively though not as Collectively consider'd But to this I have several things to return First of all I say that such is the reciprocal dependence and concatenation of Truth that the want of a thorough and intire Comprehension of all Truth in its widest and most diffused Extent must needs very much Eclipse the view and darken the Perception of any one Solitary Truth in particular so that however we may have some tolerable Perception of it and such as we may call Clear in Comparison of some other Truths which we do not see so clearly yet it cannot be near so clear and Distinct a Perception as that Infinite Being has of it who sees not only the Truth it self but also the Manifold Relation Connexion and Combination that it has with all other Truths The difference between these two ways of Perception being of a like Nature with that which is between seeing a Proposition as it stands singly by it self and seeing the same Proposition with all its Relations and Dependencies and in conjunction with the whole Context and Coherence of the Discourse whereof it is a Part. I say again Secondly that though we may have a competent Perception of some plain and simple Truths without pursuing them thorough all the Relations and Dependencies that they have with other Truths since otherwise as I have hinted already we should be able to understand nothing and every thing would be above Reason yet however we do not know but that there may be some Truths of such a Nature as not to be understood without the adequate Comprehension of those Relations and Dependencies which since we have not we do not nor can ever know but that there may be some Truths that are so above us as to be out of our Reach and to lie beyond all possibility of Comprehension and consequently that Human Reason is not adequate and commensurate to Truth even Distributively consider'd I say we do not know and 't is impossible we should ever know but that thus it may be For how should we be able to know it or upon what shall we ground this our Knowledge It must be either upon the Natural Force and Penetration of our Understandings or upon our Actual Views and Perceptions or upon the Nature of Truth it self As for the Capacity of our Understandings though we do not know the precise and exact Bounds and Limits of it yet we know in the general that it is Finite and has its fix'd and determinate Measure which it would strive in vain to exceed As for the Nature of Truth that we both experiment and from the foregoing Considerations must of necessity conclude to be Infinite And what Ground of Assurance can we have from either or both of these which are apt rather to lay a Foundation of Diffidence and Distrust And then as for our actual Views and Perceptions though we should suppose them to have been hitherto never so clear and distinct never so numerous and extensive and never so fortunate and successful so that our Victorious Understandings never yet met with a Baffle nor sounded a retreat from a too difficult and impregnable Theory suppose in one word that we never yet applied our minds to the consideration of any one Truth but what we fully comprehended and were perfect Masters of which yet he must be a very Presumptuous or a very little experienc'd Thinker that shall affirm of himself how notwithstanding do we know considering the Finiteness of our Intellect and the Infiniteness of Truth but that there may be Other Truths of a Nature so far above us and so disproportionate to us as not possibly to be Comprehended by us For we cannot argue here from the past Successes and Atchievements of our Understandings to the Future or because there has been nothing hitherto proposed to us but what we Comprehended that therefore there can be nothing proposed but what we can Comprehend If we conclude thus we forget the vast disproportion between Truth and Human Reason that the one is Finite and the other Infinite the due and attentive Consideration of which would convince us that tho' we have thought never so much and never so well and comprehended never so many Truths yet for ought we know there may be Truths which our intellectual Sight though aided with all the advantages of Art that may help the Mind as much as a Telescope does the Eye
Idea of Extension or that Perfection in God which vertually eminently and modo intelligibili answers to Extension and is therefore frequently called by Mr. Malebranch L' ètendue intelligibl◠is of the Substance of God not as it is in it self simply and absolutely but only as far forth as it is representative of Matter or Body and imitable or participable by it according to those Limitations and Imperfections which belong to that kind of Being and which are represented by this its Idea I know not whether I express my self to the Conception of every Reader but I am sufficiently Clear and Intelligible to my self and whoever is not much wanting either in Metaphysics or in Attention cannot I think well miss my Meaning 23 Now the use that I make of this Speculation to the present purpose is this Those Ideas which are of the Essence of God only as that Divine Essence according to some certain Limitations and inadequate Considerations of it is representative of Creatures must be consider'd by us as of a Finite Nature Because however truly Divine and of the Essence of God yet not as it is absolutely and simply in it self but only as it is in relation to Creatures that is as partially and inadequately consider'd according to certain Abstractions and Limitations of Entity and Perfection such as the things whereof they are Ideas do require And accordingly such Ideas are ordinarily said not to be the Ideas of God who is Infinite for they do not represent him though Essential to him but to be the Ideas of Creatures who are Finite They are indeed Divine Ideas because Essential to God but they are not Ideas of God because they are of the Divine Essence only as it relates to Creatures and is representative of them Of Creatures therefore they are the Ideas and God in seeing them is not properly said to see himself though they are of himself but to see Creatures because though they are of his Divine Essence yet 't is only according to such Precisions Limitations and Inadequations of it as to be expressive and representative of their Finite Perfections As therefore the Realities which these Ideas represent are Finite so these Ideas must be conceiv'd by us as Finite too it being impossible that Infinite consider'd as Infinite should be representative of what is Finite And as these Ideas are Finite so are they also by Consequence so Proportionate and of a Measure so adjusted to Finite Understandings as to be Intelligible by them and within the Possibility of their Comprehension which must also in like manner be concluded of all those Truths which are Consubstantial to them And accordingly the Experiment answers the Theory We find that not only contingent Truths that regard only the Actualities and Existencies of Things such as matters of Fact Human Events c. but even a great many of those which are Ideal and Necessary and concern only the Abstract Reasons and Essences of Things independently on their Actual Existence are Comprehensible by us as in Metaphysics and Geometry in the Contemplation of which Sciences we meet with a great many things which we well understand and whereof we have Clear Ideas and Conceptions 24. But now it is not thus with the Ideas of the first Order nor with their Truths Though those Divine Ideas which appertain to the Essence of God only as representative of Creatures be both Finite and Comprehensible by limited Understandings which indeed otherwise would not be capable of any Science yet these Absolute Ideas which I now speak of are neither Finite nor Comprehensible For these Ideas are of the very Essence and Substance of God as it is in it self purely and separately consider'd according to its simple and absolute Nature and not as it is in relation to Creatures or as representative of any Reality out of it self And accordingly God in contemplating these Ideas of his may be truly and strictly said to contemplate himself and we also in the Contemplation of them do as really contemplate God and that because they are of his Divine Essence simply and absolutely consider'd as it is in it self and not as it is in reference to any thing besides or out of it self These Ideas therefore are strictly Infinite because the Divine Essence as it is in it self simply and absolutely consider'd is so and consequently Incomprehensible by any Finite and consequently by Human Understanding God only can Comprehend these Ideas and that because he only can Comprehend himself Human Reason indeed has Light enough to discover that there are such Ideas and Perfections in God and is withal able to discern enough of them to raise her greatest Wonder and Devotion and to make her despise all other Intelligible Objects in comparison of these Infinite Grandeurs and the Angelic Spirits that wait about the Throne of his Majesty and stand in a better Light are able to see yet more of them but neither the one nor the other can Comprehend them fully any more than they can God himself and that because they are God So that though the other Ideas are Finite and Comprehensible these are truly Infinite and Incomprehensible And of this we have sufficient Evidence in the Instances above proposed of each The Idea of Extension is very Clear and Intelligible to our Minds as Finite and as Narrowly bounded as they are We have a very distinct View of it we Perceive it we Comprehend it Among all Intelligible Objects there is none that is more clear nor whereof we have a more adequate and exact Notion And upon this is founded all that peculiar Clearness Evidence and Certainty that is in the Geometric Sciences which alone have the happiness to be free from Disputes and without Contestation to find that Truth which the others seek after and that for no other Reason but because we have so clear and distinct a Notion of its general Subject Extension But now as to the Divine Immensity so far are we from having a Clear Conception of that that no sooner do we set our selves to contemplate this vast Idea but we enter into Clouds and Darkness or rather into such an over-shining and insupportable Light as dazzles and blinds our Eyes yea hurts and pains them till they can no longer indure to gaze but are forc'd to refresh themselves either by letting down their wearied Lids suspense of Thought or by turning their view upon less glorious Objects In the Meditation of the other Idea we are like Men that wade in a River where we both see and feel the Bottom and go on for a pretty way together smoothly and without much difficulty only now and then meeting with an intangling Weed that lets and incumbers our progress But in the Contemplation of the Infinite Idea of the Divine Immensity we are like men that commit themselves to the Main Sea at the very first Plunge out of our depth and ready to be overwhelm'd swallow'd up and lost in an Abyss
Supposition of Reason's not being the Measure of Truth will also Oblige us to say that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of it 's not being True Whereby it is plain that the Consequence is every whit as good thus Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument that it is not True as thus Human Reason is the Measure of Truth therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument that it is not True The only Reason why he that denies this latter Consequence upon the Supposition or Concession of this latter Principle is inconsistent with himself being this because in denying the latter Consequence he Supposes the Former Principle which Principle therefore must as much inter the Consequence that Supposed it viz. That a things being Incomprehensible by Reason is no Warrant to Conclude that it is not true 8. And because this Principle that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth has been already proved at large I look upon the grounds of this Consequence as already laid and therefore to shew the Connexion that is between the one and the other besides what I have even now said to that purpose need only add this further Remarque That since Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth or since there are Incomprehensible Truths then it seems the Incomprehensibility of a thing and the Truth of a thing may Consist together or in other words the same thing may be at once True and Incomprehensible But now there cannot be in the whole Compass of Reasoning a more certain or more evident Maxim than this That that which is when a thing is or would be supposing it were is no Argument that it is not As for Instance Suppose it should be Objected against the Copernican Hypothesis of the Motion of the Earth that it is repugnant to Sense since we see the Sun and the Stars Rise and Set and Move round about us It is thought a sufficient Answer to this to say That supposing the Earth and not the Sun did really Move these Appearances would yet be the same as they are now since Sailing as we do between the Sun and the Stars as a late Writer expresses it not the Ship in which we are but the Bodies which surround us would seem to Move And 't is most Certain that if supposing the Earth did really Move the Motion would yet seem to be in the Sun and Stars then the seeming Motion of those Bodies is no Argument that the Earth does not Move 9. Why just so it is in the present Case when 't is Objected against the Truth of a thing that 't is Incomprehensible by Human Reason 't is a sufficient Answer to say that this argues nothing since if the thing were true it might yet be Incomprehensible And 't is most certain that if supposing a thing to be True it might yet be Incomprehensible then the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no good Objection against the Truth of it And therefore since we have proved that there are Incomprehensible Truths and Consequently that the Truth of a thing and the Incomprehensibility of the same thing may Consist together we may now with all Rational assurance Conclude that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument that it is not True any more than the seeming Motion of the Sun is an Argument against the real one of the Earth since the Former would be even Supposing the Truth of the Latter And both by Vertue of this most Evident and incontestable Principle That what may Consist with the Truth of any thing can be no good Argument that it is not True 10. And indeed when it shall be Consider'd how many things surpass our Conception when we are Children which yet we are able well to Comprehend when we are Men how many things again are beyond the Ken of Ignorant and Illiterate Men which yet are very Intelligible and Shine forth with full Light to the Men of Art and Learning and how many things again even among the Learned are now discover'd and well understood by the help of Algebra which were Mysteries to former Ages and are still beyond even the Imagination of those who have not that Noble and Wonderful Key of Knowledge When again it shall be further Consider'd how many of those things which we cannot even with the Assistance of that Commanding Key unlock in this state of Mortality we may yet have a clear view of in that of Separation when deliver'd from the Burthen of our Flesh and that many of those things which are too high for us then may yet be of a level with the Understanding of Angels and that what is above their Capacity may yet be most clearly and distinctly perceiv'd by the Infinitely penetrating and All-Comprehensive Intellect of God I say he that shall but seriously enter into this single Reflection must needs discover himself much wanting in that Stock of Sense and Reason he pretends to if he still continue to Measure the Possibilities of things by their Proportionableness to his Understanding or Conclude any thing False or Impossible when he has no better Reason for it but only because he cannot Comprehend it CHAP. VI. That if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true Human Reason would then be the Measure of Truth 1. AS there is Nothing more Common than for people to hold Certain Principles that have an inseparable Connexion with very bad Consequences and yet not professedly to hold those Consequences because either they do not attend to them or are not sensible that they do indeed follow from such Principles whereof we have two very pregnant Instances in the Maintainers of the Predestinarian and Soliâ—idian Systemes so on the other hand and for the same Reason there are those who take up and with great Fixedness adhere to certain Consequences without Professedly holding those Principles from which they truly flow and to which if traced to the Head they will infallibly lead them 2. Of this we have a very particular Instance where I confess one would not expect to find it in those of the Socinian Perswasion The Reason these Men of Reason give why they will not believe the Mysteries of the Christian Faith is because they are above their Reason they cannot Comprehend them Whereby they plainly imply that they will believe Nothing but what they can Comprehend or that Nothing is to be believ'd that is Incomprehensible which is also a common Maxim among them who accordingly make Above Reason and Contrary to Reason to be one and the same thing And whereas 't is only the untruth of a thing that can make it unfit to be the Object of Faith in saying they will not believe what they cannot Comprehend they do as good as say that what they cannot Comprehend is not True and so that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is a just warrant to conclude it
False And all this they own and expresly declare if not in these very terms yet at least in such as are equivalent to them as is too Notorious and well known to need any Citations for the proof of it But now though they do thus professâ—dly own that the Incomprehensibility of a thing by Reason is an Argument of its not being true yet that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth or that all Truth is Comprehensible by it are as I take it Propositions which they do not openly and professedly avow For as I noted in the Introduction 't is such an Odious and Arrogant Assertion that they cannot with any Face of Modesty or common Decency make a plain and direct Profession of it though at the same time 't is most Certain that this is the true Principle of that Consequence which they do professedly hold viz. that the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be true and that this Consequence does as necessarily lead back to that Principle 3. For as if Human Reason be the Measure of Truth it follows in the descendintg line as a direct Consequence that the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be true so it follows as well Backwards per viam ascensûs that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing argues it not to be True then Human Reason is the Measure of Truth Since if it were not the Incomprehensibility of a thing as is shewn in the Preceding Chapter would then not argue it not to be True If therefore it does 't is plain that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth Which Principle whoever disowns ought also to renounce the other Proposition viz. That the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument of its untruth which if yet he will imbrace notwithstanding 't is plain he holds the Consequence without its Principle and has indeed no Reason for what he Affirms 4. For as he who granting Human Reason to be the Measure of Truth denies yet that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument of its not being true is therefore inconsistent with himself because in so doing he supposes the Contradictory to what he had before granted viz. that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth So he that Affirms that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is an Argument of its not being True and yet denies that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth is also as inconsistent with himself because in so doing the supposes the Contradictory to his own Assertion and does in effect say that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not an Argument of its not being True as most Certainly it would not be in case Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth as the foregoing Chapter has sufficiently shewn The short is if the Not being of A proves that C is not then the being of C proves that A is since if it were not according to the First Supposition C could not be And so here if Reason's not being the Measure of Truth proves that the Incomprehensibility of a thing is not an Argument of its not being True then if the Incomprehensibility of a thing be an Argument of it 's not being True 't is plain that Reason is the Measure of Truth since if it were not then according to the first Supposition the Incomprehensibility of a thing would not be an Argument of its not being True 5. For how I pray comes the Incomprehensibility of a thing to conclude the untruth of it I cannot Comprehend such a thing therefore it is not True where 's the Consequence By what Logic does this Latter Proposition follow from the Former why we have here the Minor Proposition and the Conclusion and to make a Complete Argument of it we must add another thus If it were true I should Comprehend it but I do not Comprehend it therefore it is not true Whereby it appears to the eye that my not being able to Comprehend a thing is no otherwise an Argument of the â—â—truth of it than as it is first preâ—â—pposed that if it were true I should 〈◊〉 â—ble to Comprehend it Which again resolving into this Absolute â—â—â—â—osition that I am able to Comprehend all Truth it plainly follows that if my inability to Comprehend a thing be an Argument that it is not true then I am able to Comprehend all Truth and that my Reason is the Measure and Final Standard of it 6. I Conclude therefore that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of it 's not being true then Human Reason will be the Measure of Truth and that they that hold the Former ought also if they will be Consistent with themselves to admit the Latter But because this is a False Principle that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth therefore I Conclude again that the Consequence that Resolves into this Principle is also False since we may as well Conclude a Consequence to be False because it leads back to a False Principle as a Principle to be False because it is productive of a bad Consequence Which still further Confirms and Establishes the Conclusion of the last Chapter viz. That the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of its untruth which you see is now proved both Backwards and Forwards and so made impregnable on all sides We have proved it Forwards by shewing the Falseness of that Principle that Human Reason is the Measure of Truth and by thence arguing the said Conclusion and we have also proved it Backwards by shewing that the Contrary Supposition Resolves into that False and already Confused Principle And I do not see how any Conclusion can be better proved CHAP. VII That therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no just Objection against the Belief of it With an Account of the Cartesian Maxim that we are to Assent only to what is Clear and Evident 1. T Is a Wonderful thing to Consider the Caprice of Human Nature by what unaccountable Springs it's Movements are ordered and how odly and unsteddily Men act and manage themselves even in the same Circumstances and in Relation to the same Objects Sometimes the Obscurity and Mysteriousness of a thing shall be a Motive of Credibility and recommend it the rather to their Belief Thus you shall have a great many reject that Philosophy as idle and Chimerical which undertakes to explain the Effects of Nature by insensible Particles their different Bigness Figure Contexture Local Motion Rest c. Merely because this is a plain Simple and Intelligible Account such as they can easily and well Conceive The very easiness and clearness wherewith they Conceive these Principles is Made an Objection against them though indeed it be a good Presumption for them and for that very Reason they will not believe them to be the true Principles of Nature whose Effects they fancy must be Resovled into Causes more hidden and Abstruse And accordingly they find in themselves a greater inclination to lend attention to
much Heathenized Religion of some Christians may also very deservedly retire behind the Curtain and decline coming to the Light for fear the Absurdities and Monstrous Inconsistencies of it should be laid open But certainly there is not any thing neither Doctrine nor Precept in that true Religion that is reveal'd by God in Evangelical Christianity that need fly the Light of Reason or refuse to be tried by it Christian Religion is all over a Reasonable Service and the Author of it is too reasonable a Master to impose any other or to require as his Vicar does that Men should follow him blindfold and pull out their eyes to become his Disciples No he that Miraculously gave Sight to so many has no need of nor pleasure in the Blind nor has his Divine Religion any occasion for such Judges or Professors For it is the Religion of the Eternal and uncreated Wisdom the Divine Word the true Light of the World and the Universal Reason of all Spirits and 't is impossible that he should reveal any thing that Contradicts the Measures of sound Discourse or the immutable Laws of Truth as indeed it is that any Divine Revelation should be truly Opposite to Right Reason hower it may sometimes be Above it or that any thing should be Theologically true which is Philosophically False as some with great profoundness are pleas'd to distinguish For the Light of Reason is as truly from God as the Light of Revelation is and therefore though the latter of these Lights may exceed and out-shine the former it can never be Contrary to it God as the Soveraign Truth cannot reveal any thing against Reason and as the Soveraign Goodness he cannot require us to believe any such thing Nay to descend some degrees below this he cannot require us to believe not only what is against Reason but even what is without it For to believe any thing without Reason is an unreasonable Act and 't is impossible that God should ever require an unreasonable act especially from a Reasonable Creature 5. We therefore not only acknowledge the use of Reason in Religion but also that 't is in Religion that 't is chiefly to be used so far are we from denying the Use of it there And it is a little unfairly done of our Adversaries so much to insinuate the Contrary as they do For I cannot take it for less than such an Insinuation when they are arguing with us against the Belief of the Christian Mysteries to run out as they usually do into Harangues and Flourishes whereof by the way I know none more guilty than the Author of Christianity not Mysterious about the Reasonableness of the Christian Religion and the Rational Nature of Faith what a Reasonable Act the One is and what a Reasonable Service the Other is c. as if we were against the Use of Reason in Religion or were for a Blind Groundless and Unaccountable Faith or if because we hold the Belief of things above Reason therefore we are for having no Reason for our Belief This I say is an unfair Insinuation and such as argues some want either of Judgment or Sincerity I don't know which in those that suggest it For they seem plainly by running so much upon this Vein to imply as if it were part of the Question between us whether there be any Use of Reason in Religion or whether Faith is to be Founded upon Reason or No. But Now this is no part of the Controversie that lies between us we acknowledge the Use of Reason in Religion as well as they and are as little for a Senseless and Irrational Faith as they can be This therefore being Common to us both is no part of the Question and they do ill to insinuate that it is by so many Popular Declamatory Strains upon the Reasonableness of Religion and in particular of Faith whereas they do or should know that the thing in Question between us is not whether there be any Use of Reason to be made in Believing but only what it is or wherein the true Use of it does Consist 6. Now this we may determine in a few words having already laid the grounds of it For since the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument against the Truth of it nor Consequently against the Belief of it as is shewn in the three foregoing Chapters it is plain that the proper Office and Business of a Believers Reason is to Examin and Inquire Not whether the thing proposed be Comprehensible or not but only whether it be Reveal'd by God or No since if it be the Incomprehensibleness of it will be no Objection against it That therefore ought to be no part of its Questistion or Deliberation because indeed it is not to the purpose to Consider whether such a thing be when if it were it would be no just Objection The only Considerable thing then here is whether such a Proposition be indeed from God and has him for its Author or no. And here Reason is to clear her Eyes put the Matter in the best Light call in all the Assistance that may be had both from the Heart and the Head and determine of the thing with all the Judgement and all the Sincerity that she can But as to the Comprehensibility or Incomprehensibility of the Article this is quite besides the Question and ought therefore to be no part of her scruting or debate since if it were never so much above her Comprehension it would be never the less proper Object for her Belief 7. The Sum is the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument against the Belief of it therefore in the believing of a thing the proper work of my Reason is not to Consider whether it be incomprehensible But when a thing is proposed to me as from God all that my Reason has to do in this Case is Seriously Soberly Diligently Impartially and I add Humbly to Examine whether it comes with the true Credentials of his Authority and has him for its real Author or no. This is all that Reason has to do in this Matter and when she has done this she is to rise from the Seat of Judgement and resign it to Faith which either gives or refuses her Assent Not as the thing proposed is Comprehensible or not Comprehensible but as 't is either Revealâ—d or not Reveal'd CHAP. IX An Application of the foregoing Considerations to the Mysteries of Christianity 1. HAving thus raised the Shell of our Building to its due â—itch we have now only to Roof it by making a Short Application of the Principles laid down and setâ—led in the Former Chapters to the Mysteries of the Christian Religion against the Truth and Belief of which it plainly appears from the Preceding Considerations that there lies now no Reasonable Objection For if Human Reason be not the Measure of Truth and if therefore the Incomprehensibility of a â—hing to Human Reason be no Argument of its 〈◊〉 being True
nor Consequently against its being Believ'd and if the only Use and Imployment of Reason in Believing be to Consider not the Internal Evidence of the thing whether the Article be Comprehensible or no but whether it be truly reveal'd by God I say if these things are so as we have abundantly prov'd them to be then from these Premises the Clear and undeniable Consequence is that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just reason why they should not be Believ'd and so thaâ— we may Believe them though we should suppose them what yet some deny to be Incomprehensible 2. Nay so far is the Incomprehensible Sublimity of these Mysteries from being a sufficient Objection against the Belief of them that Accidentally and indirectly it may be improved into a Considerable Argument for them and such as may serve to recommend them to our Faith inasmuch as it is a very strong Presumption that they are of no Human Origin but have God for their Authour it being reasonable to suppose that what does so very much transcend the Capacity of Man to Comprehend does no less exceed his Ability to invent And accordingly the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries for which some will have them to be false is made use of by a very Rational Authour as an Argument of their Truth And it may be worth while to let the Reader see how he Manages it in relation to One of the Most Sublime of them The more Obscure are our Mysteries Strange Paradox the more Credible they now appear to me Yes I find even in the Obscurity of our Mysteries receiv'd as they are by so many different Nations an invincible Proof of their Truth How for instance shall we accord the Vnity with the Trinity the Society of three different Persons in the perfect Simplicity of the Divine Nature This without doubt is Incomprehensiblâ— but not Incredible It is indeed above us but let us Consider a little and we shall believe it at least if we wâ—ll be of the same Religion with the Apostles For supposing they had not known this ineffable Mystery or that they had not taught it to their Successours I maintain that it is not Possible that a Sentiment so extraordinary should find in the Minds of Men such an Vniversal Belief as is given to it in the whole Church and among so many different Nations The More this Adorable Mystery appears Monstrous suffer the Expression of the Enemies of our Faith the More it Shocks Human Reason the More the Imagination Mutinies against it the more Obscure Incomprehensibâ—â— and Impenetrable it is the less Credible is it that it should Naturally insiâ—â—ate it self into the Minds and 〈◊〉 of all Christians of so many and so distant Countries Never do the same Errours spread universally especially such sort of Errours which so strangely offend the Imagination which have nothing sensible in them and which seem to Contradict the most Simple and Common Notions If Iesus â—hrist did not Watch over his Church the Number of the 〈…〉 would quickly exceed that of 〈◊〉 â—â—â—hodox Christians For 〈…〉 in the Sentimen◠〈…〉 that does not 〈…〉 the Mind And 〈…〉 that 〈…〉 to our Vnderstandings may establish themselves in time But that a Truth so Sublime so far removed from Sense so Cross to Human Reason so Contrary in short to all Nature as is this great Mystery of our Faith that a Truth I say of this Character should spread it self Vniversally and Triumph over all Nations where the Apostles had Preach'd the Gospel supposing that these First Preachers of our Faith had neither known any thing nor â—aid any thing of this Mystery this Certainly is what cannot be Conceiv'd by any one that has never so little knowledge of Human Nature That there should be Heretics that should oppose a Doctrine so Sublime is nothing strange nor am I surprized at it On the Contrary I should be very much if never any body had opposed it This Truth wanted but little of being quite oppress'd 'T is very possible For 't will be always reckon'd a Commendable Vndertaking to attaque that which seems to Clash with Reason But that at length the Mystery of the Trinity should prevail and should establish it self Vniversally wherever the Religion of Iesus Christ was receiv'd without its being known and taught by the Apostles without an Authority and a Force Divine there needs methinks but an Ordinary Measure of good Sense to acknowledge that nothing in the World is less Probable For it is not in the least likely that a Doctrine so Divine so above Reason so remov'd from whatever may strike the Imagination and the Senses should Naturally Come into the Thought of Man 3. You see here how this Excellent Person strikes Light out of Darkness by improving even the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries into an Argument for the Truth and Credibility of them and so turning the Artillery of our Adversaries against themselves This indeed is a bold Atchievement anâ— as Fortunate a one too for I think there is a great deal of Force and Weight in his Reasoning But I need not push the Matter so far nor follow so home into the Enemies Camp as to plant their own Cannon against them 'T is sufficient to the design of the present undertaking and as much as I am led to by the Principles before Establish'd to Conclude that the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no Argument against them This therefore I insist upon and if my Reason mightily deceive me not dare ingage finally to stand to For if as it has been shewn the Incomprehensibility of a thing in general be no Conclusive Argument against either the Truth or the Credibility of it then since Negative Propositions do separate the Attribut from the Subject according to all the Extent which the Subject has in the Proposition what Consequence can be more Clear than that the Incomprehensibility of our Mysteries is no Argument against the Belief of them I Conclude therefore that it is None and that they ought never the less to be believ'd for their being Incomprehensible supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd 4. Whether they are so or no is besides my Undertaking at present to examin nor need I ingage my Pen in this Question since the Affirmative side of it is so Obvious to every Eye that can but read the Bible and has been withal so abundantly and convincingly made good by those abler hands which have gone into the Detail of the Controversie and undertaken the particular defence of the Christian Mysteries This part of the Argument therefore being so well discharged already I shall Concern my self no further with it than only in Consequence and Pursuance of the Former Principles to bestow upon it this one single Necessary Remarque viz. That as the Incomprehensibility of the Christian Mysteries is no just Objection against the Belief of them supposing them otherwise sufficiently Reveal'd so neither is it a just Objection
against their being so Reveal'd supposing the plain obvious and literal Construction of the Words does naturally and directly lead to such a Sense And that it does so is not I think offer'd to be denied and the thing it self is plain enough to extort an acknowledgement but then 't is pretended that there is a Necessity of having recourse to a different Construction and to understand the words in another Sense because of the unconceivableness and incomprehensibleness of that which their proper and Grammatical Scheme does Exhibit But by the Tenour of this whole Discourse it evidently appears that there is no such Necessity since to admit an incomprehensible Sense has nothing absurd or inconvenient in it and that because the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of the Untruth of it From whence it plainly follows that 't is no more an Objection against its being Reveal'd than 't is an Objection against the Belief of it supposing it were Reveal'd there being nothing but the untruth of a thing that can be a reasonable Obstruction against either 5. We are therefore to take the Words of Scripture according to their proper and most Natural Sense and not seek out for Forc'd and Strain'd Interpretations upon the account of the Incomprehensibility of that which is apparently Genuin and Natural And if the Revelation be otherwise plain and such as we would accept of in another Case and about matters which we can well Comprehend we ought not to think it the less so because the Sense of it so understood is such as we cannot reconcile to our Apprehensions and Conceptions of things For notwithstanding that it may be true since by this time we may be sufficiently satisfied that there are many Incomprehensible Truths The Incomprehensibility of a thing is therefore no Argument against its being Reveal'd any more than 't is against the Belief of it supposing it were Which opens an immediate Entrance to the Christians Mysteries which I doubt not would be thought sufficiently Reveal'd were it not for the incomprehensibility of them the only Objection that can be pretended against their Revelation 6. I have hitherto argued upon the Supposition that the Mysteries of Christianity those Doctrines I mean that are so call'd are above Reason and such as do transcend our Comprehension and have shewn that even upon that Supposition there is no reasonable Objection against the Belief of them that they are never the less Believable for their being Incomprehensible But what if I should recall this Concession and put our Adversaries to the proof that they are indeed above Human Reason and Comprehension They cannot be ignorant that there are those that Contend they are not and with great shew of reason offer to prove it by endeavouring to render a Conceivable and Intelligible Account of them If these Men should be in the right which I do not think necessary at present to inquire into it would be a further Advantage to our Cause and such as though I do not now insist upon it I need not lose the Benefit of But if it should prove that they are not in the right the Cause of our Christian Mysteries is not much Concern'd in the loss of that Pillar but can support it self well enough without it as having another that is sufficient to bear its weight since though we should suppose these Sacred Doctrines to be never so Incomprehensible to our Reason it does by no Consequence follow as from the Argument of this whole Discourse is apparent that therefore they may not be due Objects of our Faith 7. Should any one now be so fond of Objection as to draw one against the Mysteries of Christianity from the use of the Word Mystery in Scripture which knows no other Mysteries but such as before the Revelation of them were undiscover'd not Considering whether they were in themselves Conceivable or no I must tell him that I do not know that ever I met in any Controversie with a less pertinent Objection as much as it is made of by a late Bold Writer who heaps together a great many Texts to shew the signification of the Word Mystery in the New Testament that it signifies not things in themselves inconceivable but only such as were not known before they were Reveal'd Well be it so as this Gentleman pretends though I believe upon Examination it would appear otherwise yet what is this to the purpose For do we Dispute about Names or Things The Question is not whether the Scripture expresses inconceivable things by the Name of Mysteries but whether there be not things in Scripture above our Conception call them by what Name you will and if there be whether their being so above our Conception be an Argument why they should not be Believ'd Now to these inconceivable things it has been the Common Use of Church-Writers to apply the Name of Mysteries which if the thing be granted he must be a great Lover of Cavil and Wrangle that will Contend about it But the Learned Bishop of Worcester has already prevented me in the Consideration of this Objection for which reason together with the Frivolousness of it I shall pursue it no further CHAP. X. The Conclusion of the whole with an Address to the Socinians 1. AND thus I have led my Reader through a long Course of Various Reasoning and perhaps as far as he is willing to follow me though I hope his Journey has not been without some Pleasure that may deceive and some Profit that may in part reward the Labour of it I have shewn him what Reason is and what Faith is that so he may see from the Absolute Natures of each what Habitude and Relation they have to one another and how the Darkness and Obscurity of the Latter may Consist with the Light and Evidence of the Former I have also Consider'd the Distinction of things Above Reason and things Contrary to Reason and shewn it to be real and well-grounded and to have all that is requisite to a good Distinction And for the further Confirmation of it I have also shewn that Human Reason is not the Measure of Truth From which Great Principle which I was the more willing to discourse at large and thoroughly to settle and establish because of its Moment and Consequence to the Concern in hand I have deduced that weighty Inference that therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Concluding Argument of its not being true which Consequence for the greater Security of it because it is so Considerable in the present Controversie I have also proved Backwards by shewing that if the Incomprehensibility of a thing were an Argument of its not being true then Human Reason contrary to what was before demonstrated would be the Measure of Truth Whence I infer again ex Absurdo that therefore the Incomprehensibility of a thing is no Argument of its not being true From this last Consequence I infer another of no less Moment and
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Test of Truth the very Proposition almost in Terms of my Fourth Chapter or to be opposed to the Accounts receiv'd from profane Antiquity much less to the inspired writings For notwithstanding that several particulars relating to the eldest Condition of the VVorld and its great Catastrophe's examine'd and compared with so much Philosophy as was till lately known were plainly unaccountable and naturally speaking impossible yet we see now Nature is more fully more certainly and more substantially understood that the same things approve themselves to be plain easie and rational 'T is therefore Folly in the highest degree to reject the Truth or Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures because we cannot give our Minds particular satisfaction as to the Manner may or even possibility of some things therein asserted Since we have seen so many of those things which seem'd the most incredible in the whole Bible and gave the greatest Scruple and Scandal to Philosophic Minds so fully and particularly attested and next to demonstrated from Certain Principles of Astronomy and natural Knowledge 't is but reasonable to expect in due time a like Solution of the other Difficulties 'T is but just sure to depend upon the Veracity of those Holy VVriters in other Assertions whose Fidelity is so intirely establish'd in these hitherto equally unaccountable ones The obvious plain or literal Sense of the Sacred Scriptures ought not without great reason to be eluded or laid aside Several of those very places which seem'd very much to require the same hitherto appearing now to the Minutest Circumstances true and rational according to the strictest and most literal Interpretation of them VVe may be under an Obligation to believe such things on the Authority of the Holy Scriptures as are properly Mysteries that is though not really Contradictory yet plainly unaccountable to our present degree of Knowledge and Reason Thus the Sacred Histories of the Original Constitution and great Catastrophe's of the VVorld have been in the past Ages the Objects of the Faith of Iews and Christians though the Divine Providence had not afforded so much light as that they could otherwise Satisfie themselves in the Credibility of them till the new improvements in Philosophy And this is but just and Reasonable For sure the Ignorance or Incapacity of the Creature does by no Means afford sufficient ground for Incredulity or justifie Men in their rejecting Divine Revelation and impeaching the Veracity or Providence of the Creator With which weighty and to the present purpose very pertinent words of this worthy Author I Seal up my own and leave them both to the Consideration of the Reader FINIS Corrections PAge 176. line 22. after describe read its p. 250. l. 11. r. confuted p. 206. l. 17. after Perfections r. are as p. 273. l. 1. r. proceeds p. 287. l. 12. for as his Vicar does r. whatever his Vicar may do p. 289. l. 23. after or r. as p. 292. l. 9. r. 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