Commentator among the Learned writes of the Author upon which he Comments 'T is Averroes speaking of Aristotle He says in his Preface to the Physic of that Philosopher that he was the Inventor of Logie Ethies and Metaphysies and that he brought them to Perfection Complevit says he quia nullus eorum qui seenti sunt eum usque ad hee tempus quod est mille quingentorum annorum quid â—am addidit nee invenies in ejus verbis errorem alicnjus quantitatis Et talem esse virtutem in Individuâ— unâ— miraculâ—sum extrancum existit 〈◊〉 dispositio cum in uno Homine reperiâ—ur dignus est esse divinus magis quam Humâ—nus And in other places he gives him far mâ—re Pompous and Magnificent Praises * Com â— de generatione Animal Laudemus Deum qui separavit bunc virum ab aliis in perfectione appropriavitque ei ultimam dignitatem humanam quam non omnis homo poâ—est in quacunque aetate attingere The same Author also says Comm. l. 1. destruc disp 3. Aristotelis Doctrina est SVMMA VERITAS quoniam â—jus Intellectus fuit Finis Humani Intellectus quare bene dicitur de illo quod ipse fuit creatus datus nobis divina Providentia ut non ignoremus possibilia sciri Was not this a Mad-man for talking at this rate Was not the Dotage of this Author degenerated into Extravagance and Phrenzy The Doctrine of Aristotle is SOVERAIGN TRVTH because no body had Vnderstanding like to his or which came near to his 'T was he who was created by God to teach us what it is possible for us to know 'T is â—e who makes all Men Wise and they are so much the more Learned the deeper they enter into his Thoughts And in another place Aristoteles fuit Princeps per quem persiciuntur omnes sapientes qui fuerunt pâ—st cum licet different â—nter se in intelligendo verba eju in co quod sequitur ex eis Nevertheless the Works of this Author are dispers'd all over Europe as also over Countries far more remote They have been Translated out of Arabic into Hebrew out of Hebrew into Latin and it may be into many other Languages which sufficiently shews the Esteem which the Learned had of him So that we could not have produc'd a more manifest Example than this of the Prejudic'd Opinions of Studious Persons for it shews us that they are not only many times Prejudic'd with an Author but also their Prejudice is communicated to others proportionably to the Esteem which they have in the World So that the false Prâ—isâ—â— which Commentators gives him are the reason that Persons of meaner Parts and less Education who are addicted to Reading become prepossess'd and fall into an infinite number of Errors But here 's another Eample A certain Doctor famous among the Learned Prelectiones 12. in prin Elementor Euclidis who has founded Lectures of Geometry and Astronomy in the University of Oxford begins a Book which he made upon the Eight first Propositions of Euclid with these Words Consilium meum Auditores si vires vaietudo suffecerit explicare definitiones petitiones communes sententias Octo priores Propositiones primi Libri Elementorum caetera post me venientibus relinquere And he concludes thus Exolvi per dei gratiam Domini Auditores promissum liberavi fidem meam explicavi pro modulo meo definitiones petitiones communes sententias octo priores propositiones Elementorum Euclidis Hic annis fessus cyclos artemque repono Succedent in hoc munus alii fortasse magis vegeto corpore vivido ingenio c. Certainly one hour would be enough for a very mean Capacity to learn of himself or with the help of the most ordinary Geometrician the Definitions the Postulates Axioms and the eight first Propositions of Euclid they have hardly need of any Explanation Yet here 's an Author that talks of this Enterprise as if it were extreamly hard and difficult He is afraid lest his strength should fail him si vires valetudo suffecerint He leaves it to his Successors to perfect what he has left undone Caetera post me venientibus relinguere He thanks God for that by his particular favour he has performed what he promis'd Exclvi per dei gratiam premissum liberavi fidem meam explicavi pro modulo meo What The Quadrature of a Circle The Duplication of a Cube This great Man has explain'd pro modulo suo the Definitions Postulates Axioms and the eight first Propositions of the first Book of Euclids Elements It may be that among those that are to succeed him there will be some that will have more health and strength than himself to continue this Noble Work Succedent in hoc munus alii FORTASSE magis vegetes corpore vivido ingenio But as for his part 't is time for him to take his rest his annis fessus cyclos artemque reponit Euclid certainly never thought of being so obscure or of speaking things so extraordinary when he compos'd his Elements that there should be a necessity of making a Book of near three hundred Pages In Quarte to explain his Definitions his Postulates his Axioms and his Eighâ— first Propositions But this Learned Gentle-man well knows how to magnify the Science of Euclid and had Age permitted him and his Strength not fail'd him we should have had by this time twelve or fifteen large Folio's only upon the Elements of Geometry which would have been very useful to those that are desirous to learn that Science and much to the Honour of Euclid These are the odd Designs which false Learning qualifies us for This Man understood the Greek Language for we are beholding to him for a Greek Edition of St. Chrysostome's Works He had also read perhaps the Ancient Geometricians He knew historically their Propositions as well as their Genealogy He had all the same Respect for Antiquity that Men ought to have for Truth And what does this same Qualification of Wit produce A Commentary upon the Definitions Postulates Axioms and the eight first Propositions of Euclid much more difficult to understand and retain I do not say than the Propositions upon which he Comments but than all that Euclid has Writ upon Geometry There are many People whose Vanity causes them to speak Greek and sometimes a Language which they do not understand for Dictionaries as well as Index's and Common Places are a great help to many Authors but there are few Men that caution themselves about heaping up Greek upon a subject where it is little to the purpose to make use of it And this it is which makes me believe 't was a prejudic'd Opinion and an irregular Esteem for Euclid which form'd the design of that Book in the Imagination of its Author Had this Man made as much use of his Reason as of his Memory in a subject where Reason ought to be employ'd
that Belief of the Ancients which cannot be done but by examining the Opinions of several Persons who succeeded each other at different times But in things that depend upon Reason the case is alter'd and there is a necessity for Men to trouble themselves what the Ancients believ'd that we may know what is needful for our selves to believe concerning them Nevertheless I know not through what confusion of the Mind certain People are affrighted if we speak otherwise in Philosophy than Aristotle but are never mov'd if we speak otherwise in Divinity than the Gospel the Fathers and the Councils It seems to me that they who make the loudest noise against the Novelties of Philosophy which ought to be esteem'd are they that favour and defend Innovations in Divinity with the greatest obstinacy and which ought to be detested For 't is not their Language which we blame as being Authorized by Custom tho' altogether unknown to Antiquity but the Errors which they disperse abroad or which they maintain under the Protection of their confus'd and equivocal Terms In Matters of Divinity we shou'd follow Antiquity because we ought to love Truth and because Truth is found in Antiquity 'T is necessary that all Curiosity shou'd cease whence once we have sound out the Truth but in Matters of Philosophy 't is quire the contrary we ought to love Novelty for the same reason that we ought always to love the Truth we must search after it and have an uncessant Curiosity for it If we thought that Aristotle and Plato were Infallible it wou'd be sufficient for us to apply our selves to understand them but Reason will not permit us to believe it for on the contrary it requires that we shou'd believe them more ignorant than the New Philosophers since the World is now grown older by two thousand Years and has more Experience than it had in Aristotle's and Plato's Days as we have already said and because the New Philosophers may not only know all the Truths which the Ancients have left behind them but may likewise discover many others Nevertheless Reason forbids us to believe these New Philosophers upon their own Words rather than the Ancients It requires on the contrary that we should diligently examine their Thoughts and refuse our Assent till it is impossible for us any longer to doubt the certainty of their Truth without being ridiculously prepossed with their great Learning or other Qualities of their Wit CHAP. VII Of the Prejudices of Commentators THis excess of Prejudice appears much more strange in those who Comment upon any Author because they who undertake that Work which seems in it self beneath a Man of Sense imagine that their Authors deserve to be admir'd by all Men. They also look upon themselves as making but one Person with their Author and with this Conceit Self-love most admirably plays it's part They are cunningly profuse in the Praises of their Authors they set them off with the best advantage and heap Honours upon them well knowing that this Honour will reflect upon themselves And this Idea of Grandeur does not only magniâ—ie Aristotle or Plato in the Minds of many Persons but it imprints also a Respect for all those that have Commented upon them And such a one would never have Deify'd his Author but that he imagin'd himself as it were comprehended in the 〈…〉 I do not believe however that all Commentators praise their Authors in hopes of a Return many would abhor it if they consider'd it they Praise them sincerely and don't think they do it in respect to themselves but Self-love does it for them without their perceiving it Men are not sensible of the Heat which is in their Hearts tho' it gives Life and Motion to all the other parts of their Body 't is necessary that they feel it by laying their Hands upon their Breast to be convinc'd of it because that Heat is Natural 'T is the same thing with Vanity 't is so Natural to Man that he is not sensible of it tho' it be that which as I may so say gives Life and Motion to the greatest part of his Thoughts and Designs it does it many times in such a manner as is imperceptible to him A Man must feel handle and search himself to be convinc'd that he is Vain There 's no Man yet has sufficiently been sensible that 't is this Vanity which sets the first Wheel of the greatest part of our Actions a going for tho' Self love indeed knows it well enough yet is that Knowledge to no other end than to conceal it from all Mankind A Commentator then having some Relation and Affinity with the Author upon whom he Comments his Self-love fails not to discover to him the great subjects of Praise in that Author to the end he may reap the benefit of them himself And this is done so dexterously so subtilely and so delicately that it is not to be perceived But this is not a place to discover the Artifices of Self-love Commentators not only Praise their Authors because they are prepossessed with an Esteem for them and because they Honour themselves in Praising them but also because it is the Custom and for that it seems as if there were a necessity of doing it There are some Persons who not having any great value for 〈◊〉 Authors forbeaâ— not however to Comment upon them and that with great Application too because their Employment Chance or their own Capritious Fancy engages them to undertake the Work And these People believe themselves oblig'd to extol after a Hyperbolical manner the Sciences and Authors upon which they Comment tho' the Authors are Impertinent and the Sciences mean and useless And indeed it would be a very ridiculous thing for a Man to Comment upon an Author whom he believes to be Impertinent and seriously to apply himself to write in such a manner as he thought to be of no use He must therefore for his Reputation 's sake praise those Sciences and those Authors altho' both were Contemptible and tho' the fault which he has committed in undertaking an ill Work may be repaired by another fault as bad This is the Reason that Learned Men who Comment upon different Authors frequently contradict themselves For this Reason also it is that almost all Prefaces are scarce ever agreeable to Truth or good Sense If the Comment be upon Aristotle he is the Genius of Nature If they Write upon Plato he is the Divine Plato They never Comment upon the Works of Men without Additions to their Names They are always the Works of Men wholly Divine of Men who are the Admiration of their Age or such as have received from God particular Gifts 'T is the same thing also with the Matter which they treat of 't is always the most Noble the most Sublime and the most useful of all other subjects But that I may not be thought to speak upon my own word see here after what manner a famous
related to Infinity and which includes in it self some great thing its Inconstancy and Agitation ceases for some time for discovering this Object to bear the Character of what the Soul desires it joyns and adheres to it for a long time But this Adhesion or rather this Prejudice of the Mind to examine Subjects that are Infinite or very great is as useless to it as that Levity with which it considers things that are proportion'd to its Capacity it is too weak to finish so difficult an Enterprise and it is vain to force it self to accomplish it The Comprehension of an Infinite Object if I may so say cannot render the Soul Happy it is incapable of it but the Love and Enjoyment of an Infinite Good may do it whereof the Will is capable by the Motion of that Love which God continually impresses upon it After this we must not be surprised at the Ignorance and Blindness of Men since their Mind being subject to the Inconstancy and Levity of their Heart which renders it incapable of considering any thing with a Serious Application it cannot penetrate into any thing which includes some considerable Difficulty For in fine the Attention of the Mind to the Objects of the Mind is the same thing as fixing our Eyes upon the Objects of our Eyes even as a Man who cannot fix his Eyes upon Objects that are about him cannot see clearly enough to distinguish the Differences of their least Parts and to know all the relations these little parts have with each other So a Man who cannot fix the Eyes of his Mind upon things which he would know cannot sufficiently know them to distinguish all their Parts and to know all the Relations which they may have among themselves or to other Subjects However 't is evident That all Knowledge consists only in a clear View of the Relations that things have to one another Therefore when it happens as in difficult Questions that the Mind must see at one view a great Number of Relations which two or more things have amongst themselves it 's evident That if it has not consider'd these things with much Attention and only knows them confusedly it will be impossible for it to perceive distinctly their Relations and consequently to form a solid Judgment of them One of the chief Causes of the Want of Application of Mind to abstracted Truths is III. Our Sensations affect us more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind That we see them at a distance and things which are nearer are continually represented to our Mind a great Attention of Mind approaches if I may so say to the Idea's of Objects with which it is affected But it often happens that when we are Attentive upon Metaphysical Speculations we are diverted from them because some Sensation comes upon the Soul which is nearer to it than those Idea's the least Pain or Pleasure is sufficient to effect this the reason of it is Pain and Pleasure and generally all Sensations are within the Soul it self they modifie and affect it much nearer than the simple Idea's of Objects of Pure Intellection which though present to the Mind do not modifie it Thus the Soul being on the one hand very narrow and on the other not being able to hinder Pain Pleasure and other Sensations See Ch. 7. Second Part of this Book its Capacity is fill'd with them and it cannot at the same time be Sensible of any thing and think freely of other things of which it cannot be Sensible The Buzzing of a Fly or some other little Noise supposing it to be communicated even to the chief part of the Brain so that the Soul perceives it is capable notwithstanding all our Efforts to the contrary of hindering us from considering abstracted and elevated Truths because all abstracted Idea's do not modifie the Soul though all Sensations do IV. What is the Original of the Corruption of Manners 'T is this that causes a Stupidity and Dullness of Mind in respect of the great Truths of Christian Morality hence it is that Men only know them after a Speculative and Unfruitful Manner without the Grace of Jesus Christ All the World knows that there is a God that he must be Ador'd and Worshipped but who is it that Serves and Worships him without Grace which makes us taste a Sweetness and Pleasure in all our Duties There are very few who are not Sensible of the Emptiness and Instability of the Goods of this World and even who are not touch'd with an abstracted yet always with a very certain and evident Conviction that they deserve not our Application and Concern But where are those that Practically Despise these Goods and who are not Anxious and Careful to obtain them 'T is those only who perceive some Bitterness and Disgust in their Enjoyment or else by the Grace of God are made Sensible of Spiritual Good by an inward Delight which God hath joyn'd to them who overcome the Impressions of their Senses and the Efforts of Concupiscence The bare Contemplation of the Mind does not therefore make us ever resist the Efforts of Concupiscence as we ought to do an Internal Motion of the Heart must also second it This Light of the Mind only is as some say a Sufficient Grace which enables us to Condemn our selves and informs us of our Weakness and that we ought to have recourse by Prayer to him who is our Power But this inward Sentiment of Heart is a Lively Grace which operates 't is this which affects and fills us which perswades the Heart and without there is no one can think heartily Nemo est qui cogitet corde All the most constant Truths of Morality lie hid in the Secret Recesses and Windings of the Mind and so long as they stay there are Barren and without any Power since the Soul does not taste them But the Pleasures of the Senses are nearer the Soul and it being impossible that it should not be sensible of and love its * With a Natural Love for one may hate Pleasure with a Hatred of choice Pleasure it 's impossible to be freed from the World †Because a Love of Choice cannot long refrain from conforming to a Natural Love and shake off the Charms of its Senses by its own Power However I do not yet deny that the Righteous whose Heart hath been livelily turn'd towards God by prepossessed Delight cannot without this particular Grace do some deserving Actions aad resist the Motions of Concupiscence there are some that are Generous and Constant in the Law of God by the Power of their Faith by an assiduous Privation of sensible things and by a Contempt and Disgust of all Temptations There are some who act for the most part without tasting preventing and unthought of Pleasure the only Joy which they find in acting Piously is the Pleasure alone they are sensible of and this Pleasure is sufficient to stay them in that Estate and to confirm the
MALEBRANCH's SEARCH AFTER TRUTH OR A Treatise of the Nature OF THE Humane Mind AND Of its Management for avoiding Error in the Sciences VOL. I. Done out of French from the last Edition LONDON Printed for I. Dunton at the Raven in the Poultrey and S. Manship at the Ship in Cornhil 1694. TO THE Marquess of NORMANBY My LORD THis Learned Treatise of the Famous Malebranch begs the Favour of your Lordships Patronage and if any thing could do so would almost deserve it All great Genius's are nearly related to one another at least there is a sort of Sympathy between them and the Wits of France have never fail'd of a kind Reception from those in England which the most Cruel Wars cannot hinder nor does Love to our Country forbid us from doing Justice to theirs The Translation of good French Books into our Tongue is a Reprisal on their Nation who have taken the same way by such Writings as are Famous in Antiquity doing all that was in their Power for an Universal Language perhaps to make way for Universal Empire So that Translation from them again is only a Countermining them and Fencing with them at their own Weapons And this perhaps might succeed as well in our Language as any in Europe since 't is much fuller and stronger and consequently capable of mending an Original and indeed nothing can hinder it but want of Encouragement from Men in Power or Weakness in the Performance For the First there is no one that can justly complain of it who has the Ambition of placing the Name of Normanby before his Writings it gives him a new Soul and he ought neither to think or write meanly when he considers at whose Altars his Labours are offer'd For the Second I have as little to say for it as I could wish our Criticks may have to say against it The Errors that have escap'd the Press in the Original the Difficulty of the Subject the Confinement of Language for fear of spoiling the Philosopher to gratifie the Gentleman my own necessary Avocations and the very little time I did it in cannot promise so correct a Translation as perhaps it otherwise might have been yet I am willing to believe it may in some measure be useful to such as can read it without Prejudice and it being design'd by the Author only for such as are willing to know the Errors of their Senses and Imagination and the Weakness of the Humane Mind in order to discover Truth and Happiness I cannot be very uneasie about anticipating its Fate amongst others especially under your Lordships Protection Indeed I may very well be Ambitious and Proud of such a Protection when the Government begins to be so very Sensible of the Happy Influences of your great Abilities and Interest 'T is a rare Happiness to have Prudence in Council joyn'd with Bravery in Action Nay the same Man may be a Politick-General and Master of much Personal Valour yet be far enough from an Accomplish'd Statesman But to think coolly yet act warmly to seize and improve every Advantage and yet pierce into the Depths of Futurity and disintangle intricate and distant Causes and Effects are only Accomplishments for such a King as ours and such a Minister of State as your Lordship Nor are your great Abilities to serve the Publick Good without particular Instances of your Personal Hazards and Signal Zeal for its Preservation in the late Dutch Wars when your Lordship was pleased to Command the Royal Catherine a Post that was the greatest Evidence of your Lordships Loyalty and Bravery The highest Military and Civil Honours which require great Application hinder not your Lordship from excelling in the less Severe Studies a great Genius will do best upon whatever Employment it fixes it self witness your Lordships Essay on Poetry and that admirable Product of your Youth the Temple of Death with several other Miscellany Pieces of your Lordships which like our great Roscommon's Works have a particular noble Air that is not only the Effect of a great Genius but also of a Genteel and Happy Education and therefore unimitable by our best Wits who can only plead the former Qualification Nor is it any Wonder that so great a Master should Patronize others who have excell'd in the same Divine Art which requires that force of Spirit and fineness of Thought that are necessary to all that even in Prose shall do any thing extraordinary or worthy the Perusal of such Judges as your Lordship this Malebranch is allow'd by all to have in his Native Language and therefore if he gives your Lordship no Entertainment the Defect must be in the Translation not the Original the very Faults of this great Man have something in them extreamly Beautiful and the Jewel is so dazling that the flaws are scarce discern'd The inscribing these Papers to your Lordships most honorable Patronage is the occasion of this Address wherein I have the Honor to testifie both to your Lordship and the World with how profound a Deference and Respect I am My LORD Your Lordships most Humble and most Obedient Servant Richard Sault THE PREFACE THE Mind of Man is by its Nature as it were situated between its Creator and Corporeal Creatures since according to * Nihil est potentius illâ Creaturâ quae mens dicitur rationalis nihil est sublimius Quidquid supra illam est jam Creator est Tr. 23. upon St. John St. Austin there is nothing above it but God alone and nothing below it but Bodies But as the great Elevation it has above all Material things does not hinder it from being united to them and from depending in some measure upon a Portion of Matter so the infinite distance that is between the Sovereign Being and the Mind of Man does not hinder it from being immediately and in a very strict manner united to him This last Vnion raises it above all things it gives it Life Light and all its Felicity and * Quod rationali animâ melius est omnibus consentientibus Deus est Aug. St. Austin speaks of this Vnion in many Passages of his Works as of that which is the most Natural and the most Essential to the Mind On the contrary the Vnion of the Mind with the Body debases Man exceedingly and is the Principal Cause of all our Errors and Miseries I do not wonder that the common sort of Men or that the Heathen Philosophers should only consider in the Soul its Retation and Vnion with the Body without distinguishing its Relation and Vnion with God But I am surprised that Christian Philosophers who should prefer the Mind of God to the Mind of Man Moses to Aristotle St. Austin to some wretched Commentator upon a Heathen Philosopher should look upon the Soul rather as the Form of the Body than as being made after the Image and for the Image of God that is according to * Ad ipsam similitudinem non omnia facta sunt sed
est ut convertatur ad id ex quo est quod aliter formata ac perfecta esse non possit S. de Gen. ad Litt. Ch. 50. St. Austin teaches us in these fine words Eternal Wisdom says he is the Principle of all Creatures that are capable of Intelligence and this Wisdom always remaining the same never ceases to speak to his Creatures in the secret Recesses of their Reason that they may turn towards their Principle because nothing but the sight of the Eternal Wisdom gives a Being to Spirits and can as it were finish them and give them the last Perfection they are capable of * Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit similes ei erimus quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est Joan. Ep. 1. c. 3. v. 2. Corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam Sap. 9.10 When we see God as he is we shall be like him says the Apostle St. John By that Contemplation of Eternal Truth we shall be elevated to that degree of Greatness to which all Spiritual Creatures tend by the necessity of their Nature But while we are on Earth the weight of the Body Stupifies the Mind it removes it continually from the Presence of God or of that Internal Light which Illuminates it it makes continual Efforts to strengthen its Vnion with Sensible Objects and obliges it to represent to it self all things not as they are in themselves but according to the relation they have towards the Preservation of Life * Terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem difficile aestimamus quae in terra sunt quae in prospectu sunt invenimus cum labore Sap. 9.15 The Body says the Wise Man fills the Mind with so great a number of Sensations that it becomes incapable of knowing those things that are but a little conceal'd The sight of the Body dazles and dissipates that of the Mind and it is difficult to perceive Truths clearly by the Eyes of the Soul while we make use of the Eyes of our Body to discover it This shews that it is only by the Attention of the Mind that Truths are discover'd and that all Sciences are Learned for the Attention of the Mind is nothing but its Return and Conversion towards God who is our only Master and who only can teach us Truth by the Manifestation of his Substance as * Deus intelligibilis lux in quo à quo per quem intelligibiliter lucent omnia S. Sol. Insinuavit nobis Christus animam humanam non vegetari non illuminari non beatificari nisi ab ipsa Substantia Dei Aug. in Joan. St. Austin speaks It is plain by all these things that we must continually resist the Effort which the Body makes against the Mind and by degrees accustom our selves to disbelieve the Testimonies of our Senses in respect of all Bodies which are about us and which they always represent to us as worthy our Application and Esteem because we ought never to six upon any thing that is Sensible nor imploy our selves about it 'T is one of the Truths which the Eternal Wisdom seems to have been willing to reveal to us by his Incarnation for after having raised a sensible Body to the highest Dignity that can be apprehended he has shew'd us by the deepest Humiliation of the same Body which was the greatest of all sensible things how much we ought to despise all the Objects of our Senses It is perhaps for the same reason St. Paul said that he knew not Jesus Christ according to the Flesh For it is not the Flesh of Christ we must rest upon it is the Spirit which is conceal'd under that Flesh Caro vas fuit quod habebat attende non quod erat says St. Austin That which is * Illa autoritas Divina dicenda est quae non solum insensibilibus signis transcendit omnem humanam facultatem sed ipsum hominem agens ostendit ei quo usque se propter ipsum depresserit non teneri sensibus quibus videntur illa miranda sed ad intellectum jubet evolare simul demonstrans quanta hic possit cur haec faciat quam parvi pendat Aug. 2. de Ord. 9. Et si cognovimus secundum carnem Christum jam non secundum carnem novimus 2 ad Cor. Tr. in Joan. 27. visible or sensible in Jesus Christ only deserves our Adoration because it is united with the Word which can only be the Object of the Mind It is absolutely necessary for those who aim at Wisdom and Happiness to be fully convinc'd and affected with what I have said It is not enough to believe it upon my word nor to be perswaded of it by the Lustre of a Transitory Light they must know it by many Experiences and many undeniable Demonstrations These things must never be in danger of being effaced out of their Mind they must ever be present to it in all their Studies and other Imployments of their Life Those who will give themselves the Trouble to read the Work with some Application which is here publish'd will if I am not deceiv'd commence such a Disposition of Mind for we have demonstrated in it the different ways wherein our Senses Imagination and Passions are absolutely useless to the discovery of Truth and Good On the contrary that they dazle and seduce us on all occasions and generally that all the Knowledge the Mind receives by the Body or by some inward Motions of the Body are all false and confused in respect of the Objects they represent although they are very useful towards the Preservation of the Body and of the Goods which have relation to the Body Several Errors are engaged in it and particularly those that are most universally receiv'd or that occasion the greatest Disorder of the Mind and we shew that most of them proceed from the Vnion of the Mind with the Body We design in several places to make the Mind sensible of its Servitude and of the Dependance it has on all sensible things that it may awake from its Drowsiness and make some Efforts for its Deliverance We do not only make a bare Exposition of our Errors but also explain the Nature of the Mind We do not for instance insist upon a great Enumeration of all the particular Errors of the Senses or Imagination but upon the Causes of those Errors We shew at once in the Explanation of these Faculties and general Errors to which we are subject an almost infinite Number of those particular Errors into which Men fall Thus the subject of this Work is the whole Mind of Man we consider it in it self in relation to the Body and in relation to God we examine the Nature of all its Faculties and observe the uses we ought to make from hence to avoid Error Lastly We explain most of those things we thought useful to advance in the Knowledge of Man The finest the most agreeable and most necessary Knowledge
Examination that we perceive our selves touch't after the same manner with two things so different For indeed 't is a matter of the greatest Consequence to make Good use of our Liberty by denying always nor Aâ—â—en to things or loving them till we find our selves compell'd thereto by the powerful Voice of the Author of Nature which I before call'd the Reproaches of our Reason and the Regret of our Conscience All the Duties of Spiritual Beings as well of Angels as of Men consists chiefly in this Practice and it may positively be affirm'd that if they carefully use their Liberty and not blindly enslave themselves to Lies and Vanity they are in the way to the greatest perfection that they are capable of provided they suffer not their Understanding to lie idle but carefully and continually excite it to new Knowledge rendring it capable of the greatest Truths by constant meditations upon such Subjects as are worthy their application To perfect our Minds it 's not sufficient to use our Liberty always so as to assent to nothing as some Persons do who pride themselves in knowing nothing but doubting all things nor must we so assent to every thing as many others who fear nothing so much as being ignorant of something and pretend to know all things but we must make a Good use of our Vnderstanding by continual Meditations so that we may have frequent Opportunities of being able to assent to what it proposes without fear of being deceiv'd CHAP. III. I. Answers to some Objections II. Remarks upon what hath been said about the necessity of Evidence IT is not very difficult to divine that the practice of the first Rule which I spoke of in the preceeding Chapter will not please all the World but especially those imaginary Learned who pretend to know all things and yet know nothing at all pleasing themselves in speaking confidently of the most difficult things and who certainly are ignorant of the most easie They will not fail to say with Artistotle that Certainty is only to be found in Mathematicks but in Morality and Physics Probability suffices That Descartes was very much out in treating of Physics as he did of Geometry which was the reason he fail'd in the attempt That 't is impossible for Man to know Nature That it's Springs and Secrets are impenetrable to the Humane Mind and many other fine things which they set off with a great deal of Pomp and Magnificence maintaining it from the Authority of a multitude of Authors and value themselves much upon knowing their Names and being able to cite some Passages from them I would intreat these Gentlemen to talk no more of what they profess they do not know and put a Check to the ridiculous Motions of their Vanity in forbearing to compose such great Volumes upon those Subjects which according to their own Confession they are ignorant of But let these Persons seriously Examine whether it be not absolutely necessary either to be deceiv'd or never to give our entire Consent except to things fully evident Whether Truth does not always accompany Geometry because Geometricians observe this Rule And if the Errors into which some are fallen concerning the Quadrature of the Circle the Duplication of the Cube and some other very difficult Problems proceed not from some Precipitation or Prejudice which made 'em take an appearance of Truth for Truth it self Let 'em consider also on the other hand if Falseness and Confusion does not reign in common Philosophy because Philosophers content themselves with such an easie Probability as is convenient for their Vanity and Interests Do we not find every where an infinite Diversity of Opinions even upon the same Subjects and consequently an Infinity of Errors Yet a great number of Disciples suffer themselves to be seduc'd and blindly submit to the Authority of these Philosophers without even comprehending their Opinions 'T is true there are some who perceive after twenty or thirty years Loss of time that they have learnt nothing in their Lectures but they are asham'd to make a sincere Confession of it They first prove after their own way that no certain Knowledge can be attained and afterwards they acknowledge that they know nothing because they believe they may then safely do it without any Jest upon their Ignorance It would be sufficient matter of Diversion and Laughter to hear them give an account of their fine progress in Learning and to get them in a humour of declaring all the Fatigues they have endur'd to acquire it but altho this Learned and profound Ignorance deserves our Raillery it 's much better to forbear it and to pity those who have thus spent so many years only to Learn this false Proposition I know nothing which is an Enemy to all Science and Truth Since the Rule then which I have establish'd is so necessary in a Search after Truth as we have seen it is so that nothing can be objected against those that propose it Let such as will not take pains to observe it at least not condemn so Illustrious an Author as Monsieur Descartes was because he followed or endeavour'd as near as he could to follow it They would not Consure him so rashly if they knew him nor would they read his Works as Fables and Romances which Men read for their Diversion not Instruction if they throughly consider'd this Author they would still find in themselves some Notions and Principles of Truth that he teaches which would undeceive 'em in spight of the Prejudices of their False Learning That Master which inwardly Dictates to us would have us hear him rather than the Authority of the greatest Philosophers He is pleased when He Instructs provided we apply our selves to what He says 't is by Mieditation and a very exact Attention that we interrogate him and 't is by a certain inward Conviction and the secret Reproaches of those that do not consent to it by which He answers We should so read the Works of Men as not to hope to be instructed by Man but interrogate Him that is the Light of the World so that we may be enlightn'd with the rest of the World if He does not enlighten us after we have Enquir'd of Him no doubt we Enquir'd amiss Whether therefore we read Aristotle or Descartes we must not presently believe either but meditate as they did or ought to have done with all the attention whereof we are capable and afterwards obey the Voice of our Common Master and honestly submit our selves to the inward Convictions and Motions which we feel in Meditation After this we are permitted to Judge for or against Authors And thus having first digested the Principles of Descartes's and Aristotle's Philosophy we may reject the one and approve the other and may be even assur'd that the last shall never explain any Phoenomenon of Nature by his own Principles which have been useless for these Two thousand years although his Philosophy has been Studied by the Learned
in almost all parts of the World and that on the Contrary we may boldly say of the other that he hath penetrated into that which appeared most obscure in the Eyes of Men and hath shew'd 'em a sure way to dâ—â—cover all Truths that a limited Understanding can comprehend But without relying on the Opinion that we may have of these two Philosophers and of all others let us still look upon 'em as Men and let not the Aristotelians be displeased if after having walk'd so many Ages in Darkness without being able to make any further Advancement we are willing to see with our own Eyes and if after having been led like blind Men we now remember that we have Eyes and essay to Conduct our selves Let us then be fully convinc'd of this Rule Never to give an entire assent but to things that are evident This is the most necessary of all Rules in a Search after Truth and let us not admit any thing into our Minds as Truth but what appears with the Evidence that this Rule demands We must be persuaded thereof to lay by our Prejudices and it 's absolutely necessary that we be deliver'd from our Prepossessions to enter into the Knowledge of Truth because the Mind must be Purified before it can be Enlighten'd Sapientia prima est Stulitia caruisse But before we finish this Chapter II. Remarks upon what has been said about the necessity of Evidence we must Remark Three Things The first is that I speak not here of Matters of Faith which admit not the same Evidence as Natural Sciences do because we cannot perceive things but by the Idea's which we have of them for God hath only given us those Idea's which are necessary to conduct us in the Natural Order of Things according to which we are created so that the Mysteries of Faith being of a Supernatural Order we must not be surpriz'd if we have not the same Idea's of them for our Souls are created by Virtue of a General Decree by which we have all the Notions that are necessary for us See the Explanations But the Mysteries of Faith have been establish'd only by the Order of Grace which according to our Ordinary way of Conception is a Decree consequent to that Order of Nature We ought then to distinguish the Mysteries of Faith from Natural Things We must equally submit to Faith and Evidence but in Matters of Faith we must not look for such Evidence as is in Natural Things we must not rely upon the Faith that is upon the Authority of Philosophers In a word to be Faithful we must believe things not comprehended by Reason but to be Philosophers we must take nothing upon Trust 'T is universally agreed upon that there are other Truths besides those of Faith in which it would be unjust to demand incontestible Demonstrations such for Instance as relate to History and other things depending upon Mans Will For there are two sorts of Truth Necessary and Contingent I call them Necessary Truths that are Immutable in their Nature and have been Decreed by the unchangeable Will of God all others are Contingent Truths Mathematicks Physicks Metaphysicks and even a great part of Morality contain Necessary Truths History Grammar particular Laws or Customs and many other things which depend upon the uncertain Will of Man include only Contingent Truths 'T is requir'd then that the Rule which I have before establish'd be exactly observed in a Search after Necessary Truths whose Knowledge may be call'd Science and we must content our selves with the greatest probability of Truth in History which contains the Knowledge of Contingent Things for one may generally call by the name of History the Knowledge of Languages Customs and even that of the Different Opinions of Philosophers when they are only learn'd by Memory without having had any Evidence or Certainty of them The second Thing to be Remark'd is that in Morals Politicks Medicine and in all Practical Sciences we are oblig'd to content our selves with Probabilities not always but for a time not because it satisfies the Mind but because there is a necessity for it and because if we should defer acting till we were fully assur'd of success we should often loose the opportunity But though there 's a necessity of our Acting yet we should doubtfully rely upon the event of these things we execute and endeavour to make such a progress in these Sciences as that we may in our Affairs act with more certainty for this ought to be the ordinary end of the Study and Employ of all Thinking Men. In fine the third Observation is that we must not absolutely despise Probabilities because it ordinarily happens that many of 'em being join'd together can as strongly convince us as the most evident Demonstrations Of this there are infinite Examples in Physick and Morality So that oftentimes 't is of use to collect a sufficient number of them for Matters which can't be otherwise demonstrated I must confess here that the Rule which I have impos'd is very rigorous that many would rather desire not to Reason at all than to Reason upon these Conditions that they will not move very fast under such Incommodious Circumspections yet they must agree with me that they should proceed surely in following this Rule and that hitherto for having made too much haste they have been oblig'd to turn back again and even a great many Men will agree with me that since Monsteur Descartes hath discover'd more Truths in thirty years than all other Philosophers because he submitted to this Law therefore if many Men would Philosophize as he did they might in time know the greatest part of those things which are necessary for as happy a Life as can be had upon an Earth which God hath Cursed CHAP. IV. I. Of the Occasional Causes of Error and that of these there are Five Principal ones II. The General Design of the Whole Work and the Particular Design of the First Book WE have seen that Men are only deceiv'd because they make not that use of their Liberty which they ought to do and because they do not moderate the haste and eagerness of the Will for bare appearances of Truth that Error consists only in a Consent of the Will which is more capacious than the Perception of the Understanding since Men would not be deceiv'd if they only judg'd of what they understand But though properly speaking 't is only an ill Use of Liberty which is the Cause of Error yet it may be said that we have many Faculties which are also the Causes thereof not true Causes but such as may be call'd Occasional ones I. Of the Occasional Causes of these there are Five principal ones All our Modes of Perceiving are so many Occasions of Deceiving us for since our false Judgments include two things the Consent of the Will and the Perception of the Understanding it is very evident that all our Modes of Perception may
distinct from others but also all Objects lying betwixt us and that which we consider When for Example we look upon a distant Steeple we commonly see at the same time many interjacent Fields and Houses and because we judge of the distance of these Fields and Houses and see the Steeple is beyond them we judge also that it is very distant and also greater than if we saw it alone However the Image thereof which is traced at the bottom of our Eye is always of an equal bigness whether there are Fields and Houses betwixt us or not provided we see it at an equal distance which is suppos'd Thus we judge of the bigness of Objects by their imagin'd distance and the Bodies betwixt us and the Object do much assist our Imagination in it even as we judge of Duration or the length of Time after some Action done by the remembrance of a confess'd Series of Things which we have done or of Thoughts which we have successively had after this Action for 't is all these Thoughts and Actions which have succeeded one another that assist our Mind in judging of the length or duration of some Time or rather a confus'd remembrance of all the successive Thoughts about the same thing is nothing else but our Judgment of Duration even as a confus'd sight of the Fields which are betwixt us and the Steeple is the same thing as our Judgment of the distance thereof Hence 't is easie to know the true Reason why the Moon appears greater when it rises than when it is much elevated above the Horizon for when it rises it appears many Leagues distant from us and even beyond the Sensible Horizon or the Earth which terminates our sight whereas we judge it to be but about half a League from us or seven or eight times as high as our Houses when it is most elevated above the Horizon Thus we judge it much greater when it is near the Horizon than when it is very distant from it because we imagine it much more distant from us when it rises than when is it very high It 's true there are a great many Philosophers who attribute what I have said to the Vapours which rise out of the Earth I agree with them that Vapours refracting the Rays of Objects make them appear the greater I know there are more Vapours betwixt us and the Moon when it rises than when it is risen very high and consequently it must appear something greater than if it were always equally distant from us However it cannot be said that this refraction of the Rays of the Moon is the cause of these apparent Changes of its greatness for this refraction hinders not but that the Image which is traced in the bottom of our Eyes at the rising of the Moon is not less than that which is form'd there when it has been risen a considerable time Astronomers which Measure the Diameters of the Planets observe that that of the Moon grows larger in proportion to its distance from the Horizon and consequently in proportion to its appearing less to us so that the Diameter of the Image Painted at the bottom of our Eyes is lesser when we see it greater Indeed when the Moon arises it 's more distant from us by the Semi-diameter of the Earth than when it is perpendicularly over our Head which is the reason that its Diameter is greater than when it arises above the Horizon because then it approaches to us That then which is the cause of our seeing it greater when it rises is not the refraction of its Rays made by the Vapours coming out of the Earth since the Image which is form'd by these Rays is then less but it is the Natural Judgment that we make of its distance because it appears beyond the Earth which we see very distant from us as was explain'd before and I 'm surpriz'd that Philosophers should look upon the reason of this appearance and deceit of our Eyes to be more difficult to find out than the greatest Equations of Algebra This means of Judging of the distance of any Object by the Knowledge of the distance of Things lying betwixt us and it is of great use to us when the other ways which I have spoken of fail us for by this we can Judge that certain Objects are distant from us many Leagues which we cannot by any of the others however if we Examine we shall find many defects in it For first this way serves only to Judge of Objects which are upon the Earth and but very rarely and for the most very unprofitably of Things that are in the Air or in the Heavens Secondly we can't make use of it upon the Earth but in things that are a very few Leagues distant from us And thirdly we must be assur'd that there are betwixt us and the Object neither Vallies Mountains or any such thing which hinders us from making use of this means Lastly I believe there are none who have not had Experience enough in this subject to be perswaded that it is extreamly difficult to make a certain Judgment of the distance of Objects by a sensible view of Things placed betwixt them and the Object But I have enlarg'd too much already upon this head These are the Means by which we Judge of the distance of Objects we have observ'd considerable defects in them and may conclude that the Judgments which are form'd upon them must be very uncertain Hence I can easily show the Truth of the Propositions which I have advanced I have suppos'd the Object at * See the preceding Figure C considerable distant from A then it may by many steps advance towards D or B without my knowing it since I have no certain means to judge of its distance it may even be suppos'd to recede towards D when 't is imagin'd to approach towards B because the Image of the Object is sometimes Painted greater upon the Optic Nerves whether because the Air which is betwixt the Object and the Eye causes a greater refraction one time than another or whether it happens sometimes from the little tremblings of this Nerve or lastly whether the Impression which the imperfect uniting of the Rays upon the Optic Nerve are dispers'd and communicated to the parts which ought not to be affected with them for it may happen from many different Causes Thus the Image of the same Objects being enlarg'd on these occasions inclines the Soul to believe the Object is near Suppose as much be said about the other Propositions Before I conclude this Chapter I must observe that it much concerns us for the preservation of our Life to know well the Motion and Rest of Bodies in proportion to their nearness to us and that it signifies little to have an exact Knowledge of the Truth of these Things when they are remov'd to a great distance from us This will evidently show that what I have advanc'd in general about all the Senses as
distinguishes it from Admiration from Desire and Love from a Square a Circle and Motion in fine he discerns it very different from all things which are not this Pain that he feels Now if he had no knowledge of Pain I wou'd fain know how he can have any certainty that what he feels is none of these things We have some knowledge therefore of what we immediately feel when we see Colours or when we have any other Sensation and even 't is most certain that if we knew it not we cou'd know no sensible Object for 't is evident we cou'd not distinguish Water from Wine if we did not know that the Sensations we have of one of them is different from those we have of the other and so of all things we know by our Senses It is true that if I was pressed and required to explain what Pain Pleasure and Colour is c. I cou'd not do it as it ought to be done by Words but it follows not from thence that if I see Colour or burn my self I do not know at least after some manner what I actually feel Now the reason why all Sensations cannot be well explained by Words as all other things are is III. Objection and Answer because it depends upon the Will of Man to affix the Idea's of Things to such Names as they please they may call Heaven Ouranos Schamajim c. as the Greeks and Hebrews did but even those Men cannot at their pleasure affix their Sensations to Words or even to any other thing they see not Colours altho' they speak of them if they open not their Eyes They relish not Tastes if no change happens in the order of the Fibres of their Tongue or Brain In a word Sensations depend not upon Mans Will and it is only he who hath made them that preserves them in the mutual Correspondence that is between the Modifications of the Soul and those of the Body so that if any one shou'd desire me to represent to him Heat or Colour I cannot find Words for that but I must impress in the Organs of his Senses the Motions to which Nature unites these Sensations I must take him to the Fire and show him some Pictures This is the Reason why 't is impossible to give the Blind the least Knowledge of what we mean by Red Green Yellow c. For since we cannot make our selves be understood when he that hears us has not the same Idea's as we that speak It is manifest that Colours not being united to the sound of Words or to the motion of the Nerve of the Ear but to that of the Optic Nerve they cannot be represented to the Blind since their Optic Nerve cannot be shaken by coloured Objects We have then some Knowledge of our Sensations let us now see from whence it is that we seek yet to know them and believe our selves ignorant thereof this is without doubt the reason The Soul IV. Why it is we imagine we do not know our own Sensations since Original Sin is become as it were Corporeal by its inclination its love for Sensible Things continually diminishes the Union or Relation that it hath to Intelligible Things It is with great disgust that it conceives Things which do not produce some Sensations in it and it immediately ceases to consider them It does all that is in its power to produce some Images in its Brain which represent them and it is so much accustomed to this kind of Conception from our Infancy that it even thinks it cannot know what it cannot imagine Yet there are many things which not being Corporeal cannot be represented to the Mind by Corporeal Images as our Soul with all its Modifications But when our Soul wou'd represent to it self its own Nature and Sensations it does all it can to form a Corporeal Image thereof It seeks it self in all Corporeal Beings and takes it self sometimes for one and sometimes for another one while for Air and then again for Fire or for the Harmony of the parts of its Body Thus being willing to find it self amongst Bodies and imagining its own Modifications which are its Sensations to be the Modifications of Bodies we must not wonder if it Errs and is intirely Ignorant of it self What yet induces it further to be willing to imagine its Sensations is that it Judges them to be in the Objects and that they are even Modifications thereof and consequently that 't is something Corporeal and which can be Imagin'd It Judges therefore that the Nature of its Sensations consists only in the Motion that causes them or in some other Modification of a Body but when it finds that which is different from what it feels which is neither Corporeal nor can be represented by Corporeal Images this embarasses it and makes it believe that it does not know its own Sensations As for those who do not make these vain Efforts See the Explanations of the 7th Chapter of the 2d Part l. 3. to represent the Soul and its Modifications by Corporeal Images and yet are Solicitous to know the Nature of their Sensations they must consider that neither the Soul or its Modifications are to be known by the Idea's taking the word Idea in its true sense as I have determin'd and explain'd it in the Third Book but only by an inward Sensation So that when they desire the Soul and its Sensations to be explain'd by some Idea's they require what is impossible for all Mankind to give them since Man cannot Instruct us in giving us Idea's of Things but only in making us reflect upon those we already have The second Error we are subject to in respect to our Sensations is our attributing them to Objects as has already been explained in the 11th and 12th Chapters The third is V. That we dâ—ceive our selves in believing that all Men have the same Sâ—nsations of the same Objects our Judging that every one has the same Sensations of the same Objects For Example we believe all Mankind that sees the Sky takes it to be Blue and the Fields to be Green and all Visible Objects to be after the same manner as they appear to us and so of all other Sensible Qualities of the rest of our Senses Many persons will wonder that I shou'd bring such things in question as they have thought Indisputable yet I dare affirm they have never had any reason to Judge of them after the manner they have done and altho' I cannot Mathematically demonstrate to them that they are deceived yet I can demonstrate 't is by the greatest Chance in the World if they are not deceived Nay I have sufficient Reasons to be assur'd that they certainly are in an Error To know the Truth of what I advance we must remember what I have already proved viz. that there is a great difference between Sensations and the causes of them for from thence we may Judge that its possible absolutely speaking
is only in God and from God that we can expect Pleasures for which we have so strong so natural and so just an Inclination CHAP. XVIII I. Our Senses deceive us in things which are not Sensible II. An Example drawn from the Conversation of Men. III. We must not confide in Sensible Habits WE have sufficiently explain'd the Errors of our Senses in respect of their Objects as of Light Colours and other Sensible Qualities we must now show how they seduce us about Objects to which they have no relation by obstructing our serious attention and inclining us to Judge of them upon their Testimony This is what deserves very well to be Explain'd Attention and Application of Mind I. That our Senses deceive us in things which are not Sensible to the clear and distinct Idea's we have of Objects is the most necessary thing in the World to know their Nature for as it is impossible to see the Beauty of any Work without opening our Eyes and looking earnestly upon it so the Mind cannot evidently see the greatest part of Things with the Relations they have to one another unless it considers them attentively Now 't is certain that nothing diverts us more from attending the clear and distinct Idea's of our Senses and consequently from removing us farther from the Truth and also deceiving us To apprehend this Truth it 's necessary to know that the three ways of perceiving viz. by the Senses Imaginations and Pure Vnderstanding do not all equally affect the Soul and consequently not afford the same equal attention to every thing it perceives by their means for it is much affected with what touches it much and less with that which touches it little Now that which it perceives by the Senses touches and engages it extreamly but that which it knows by the Imagination affects much less but what the Understanding represents to it I mean what it perceives of it self independent of the Senses and Imagination does very seldom excite it No body can doubt but that the least pain of the Senses is more present to the Mind and renders it more attentive than the Meditation of a thing of much greater consequence The reason of this is that the Senses represent Objects as present but the Imagination as absent Now according to the Laws of Order amongst many Goods or Evils proposed to the Soul those which are present touch and affect the Soul more than all the others which are absent because it 's necessary for the Soul to determine readily upon what is to be done in this occurrence Thus it is much more affected with a little Pricking than with the most elevated Speculations and the Pleasures and Evils of this World make a greater impression upon it than the terrible Pains or infinite Pleasures of Eternity The Senses then extreamly affect the Soul with what they represent to it now as it is limited and cannot clearly conceive many things at a time so it cannot clearly apprehend what the Understanding represents to it at the same time as the Senses offer something to its consideration it then forsakes the clear and distinct Idea's of the Understanding however proper they are to discover the Truth of things as they are in themselves and applies it self only to the confus'd Idea's of the Senses which affect it more and which represent things unto it not as they are in themselves but only according to the Relation they have with its Body If a Man II. An Example drawn from the Conversation of Mâ—n for Example would explain some Truth it 's necessary that he make use of Speech and that he express his internal Motions and Sentiments in sensible Motions and Ways Now the Soul cannot at the same time perceive distinctly many things Thus having always a great attention for what comes by the Senses it very seldom considers the reasons propos'd to it but it is much affected with the sensible Pleasure which depends upon the Measure of Periods upon the Relations of Gestures with Words upon the Beauties of a Face upon the Air and Manner of one that speaks however after it has heard it must Judge this is the Custom Thus its Judgments must be different according to the diversity of Impressions which it shall receive by the Senses If for Example he that speaks delivers himself easily if he keeps an agreeable Measure in his Periods if he has the Air of a Gentleman and a Man of Sense and if he is a Person of Quality if he has a great Retinue if he speaks with Authority and Gravity if others hear him with Respect and Silence if he Converses with Wits of the first Classis in sine if he is happy enough to please and to be esteemed he shall have Reason in whatever he advances his very Dress shall pass for Demonstration But if he is so unhappy as to have the contrary Qualities however concludingly he demonstrates he shall prove nothing at all Let him speak the finest things in the World they shall never be taken notice of the attention of his Auditors being only to that which touches the Senses the disgust they shall entertain to see a Man appear despicably shall wholly take them up and divert that application which is due to his Thoughts his attire shall make its Master and every thing that he says contemptible and his way of speaking being that which is peculiar to a Thoughtful Philosopher shall incline his Auditors to believe that these sublime Truths he treats of being above their ordinary Capacity are only delirious and extravagant Notions These are the Judgments of Men their Eyes and Ears Judge of Truth and not of Reason even in these very things which depend only on Reason because Men are only affected with sensible and agreeable Objects and scarce ever bring with them a strong and serious Attention for the discovery of Truth III. We must not rest upon a sensible and agreeable manner of doing 〈◊〉 thing Nevertheless it is very unjust to Judge of things after that manner and to despise Truth because it wants those Ornaments which please and slatter our Senses Philosophers and discerning Persons should be asham'd to enquire more Industriously into agreeable Matters than into Truth it self and to feed their Mind with the Vanity of Words rather than the Truth of Things 'T is common to the unthinking part of the World to Souls of Flesh and Blood to suffer themselves to be won by the fine Periods Figures and Motions which excite the Passions Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque Inversis quae sub verbis latitantia cernunt Veraque constituunt quae belle tangere possunt Aures lepido quae sunt fucata sonore But Wise men endeavour to Guard themselves against the Malignant Power and prevailing Charms of these sensible Manners of doing things their Senses impose upon them as well as other Mens for indeed they are Men but they generously despise their Testimonies they
imitate the famous Example of the Judges of Areopagus who forbad the Advocates to make use of deceitful Words and Figures and would never hear them but in a dark place lest their agreeable Gestures should perswade them in prejudice of Truth and Justice And lastly that they might apply themselves the better to consider the solidity of their Reasons CHAP. XIX Two other EXAMPLES I. The first of our Errors concerning the Nature of Bodies II. The second of those that relate to the Qualities of these Bodies WE have show'd that there are a great number of Errors whose first Original is owing to the strong application of the Soul for whatever comes by the Senses and the inadvertence for things which the Understanding represents to it We have given an Example of it drawn from the Conversation of Men which is of very great consequence in Morals Here are now others deduc'd from the Nature of Things which its very necessary to observe in Physics One of the principal Errors that respects Physics I. Errors about the Nature of Bodies is that Men imagine a much greater substance in Bodies which fall under the Cognizance of their Senses than others which they perceive not the greatest part of Men believe that there is much more Matter in Gold and Lead than in Air or Water And even Children who only observe by their Senses the effects of Air commonly imagine that there is nothing real in it Gold and Siver are very heavy very hard and sensible Water and Air on the contrary are insensible From thence Men conclude that the first have more reality than the last they judge of the Truth of Things by the sensible Impression which always deceives us and neglect the clear and distinct Idea's of the Mind which never deceive us because what is Sensible affects and touches us more but what is intelligible stupifies us These false Judgments respect the substance of Bodies here 's another which relates to the Qualities of these same Bodies Men frequently Judge II. Errors about their Qualities and Perfection that Objects which excite in them the most agreeable Sensations are the most perfect and pure without knowing in what Perfection and the Purity of Matter consists and even without being concerned about it They say for Example that Dirt is impure and that Water is very clear and pure but Camels who love muddy Waters and those Animals that delight in Dirt are not of their Opinion These are Beasts 't is true but Men that love the Entrails of a Woodcock the Excrements of a Polcat say not that this is impurity altho' they say the same of all other kinds of Animals Lastly Musk and Amber are generally esteemed of all Men tho' they are nothing else but Excrements Certainly Men never Judge of the Perfection of Matter and its Purity but only in relation to their own Senses and thence it happens that the Senses being different in all Men as has been sufficiently explain'd they must judge very differently of the Perfection and Purity of Matter Thus the Books which are daily Compos'd upon the Imaginary Perfections that are attributed to certain Bodies are necessarily fill'd with Errors and variety of strange Fancies since the Reasonings which they contain are grounded only upon the false confus'd and irregular Idea's of our Senses Philosophers must not say that Matter is Pure or Impure they know not what they precisely mean by the Words Pure and Impure they should not speak without knowing what they say I mean without having clear and distinct Idea's which answer to the terms they make use of for if they had join'd clear and distinct Idea's to each of these Words they would see that that which they call Pure would very often be Impure and that which appears to them to be Impure would oftentimes be found very Pure If they would for Example that that Matter should be the most Pure and Perfect whose Parts are most thin and apt for Motion Gold Silver and precious Stones would be very imperfect Bodies Air and Fire contrariwise would be very perfect Flesh beginning to corrupt and smell ill would be tending to Perfection and a noisome Carcass would be more perfect than common flesh But if on the contrary they would have it that the most perfect Bodies are they whose parts were most gross and solid and more unapt for Motion the Earth would be more perfect than Gold and the Air and Fire would be the most imperfect of all Bodies But if they would not affix these clear and distinct Idea's to the terms Pure and Perfect which I have mentioned they are at liberty to substitute others in their room but if they only pretend to define these Words by sensible Notions they will eternally confound all things since they will never fix a signification to the terms which expresses them All Men as I have already prov'd have very different Sensations of the same Objects we must not therefore define Objects by the Sensations which we have of them except we delight in obscurity and confusion But in short I cannot see that there is any Matter not excepting even that which the very Heavens are compos'd of that is more perfect than another All Matter seems only capable of Figure and Motion and 't is the same thing to it to have regular or irregular Figures and Motions Reason does not tell us that the Sun is more Perfect or Luminous than Dirt nor that the Beauties of our Romances and Poets have any advantage over corrupted Carcasses 't is our false and delusive Senses which thus dictate to us Whatever is objected against this all Railleries Exclamations c. will certainly appear ridiculous and cold to any one which shall attentively examine the Reasons that I have brought Those who perceive or only have Sensations believe the Sun full of Light but those who know how to perceive and reason do not believe it provided they use as much Reason as Sensation I am verily perswaded that all those who differ the most as to the Testimony of their Senses would change their Opinion if they would seriously meditate upon what has been said but they love much to indulge the illusions of their Senses they subject themselves a great while to their Prejudices they too much forget their Mind to know that all the Perfections which they seem to see in Bodies are only such in relation to it 'T is not these sort of Men that I speak to I am not concern'd for their Approbation or Esteem they will not hear therefore they cannot Judge it 's enough that Truth is defended and approved by those who seriously endeavour to be deliver'd from the Errors of their Senses and to make a good use of the Light of their Mind 'T is these Persons only would desire to Meditate upon these Thoughts with the greatest attention they are capable of in order to judge of them I leave the Cause to them to condemn or approve it
to let them alone for some time for to force them to do outwardly what they did not believe their Duty wou'd not be to instruct them since 't is the Mind must be taught and not the Body Qui parcie virgae edit filium suum Pro. 13.24 But if they refuse to do what Reason tells them they ought to do it must never be suffered some sort of severity must rather be used for in such a case according to the Wise man He that spares the Rod hates his Son If Chastisements neither Instruct the Mind nor incline us to love Virtue yet at least in some measure they correct the Body and hinder it from relishing Vice and by consequence prevent it from being a slave to it But what must chiefly be observed is that Punishments fill not the capacity of the Mind as Pleasures do for they are no sooner at an end and we free from the danger of suffering them again but we are easily induced to forget them because then they neither solicit the Imagination nor excite the Passions nor provoke the Concupiscence In fine they leave the Mind wholly at liberty to think on what it pleases so that we may exercise it towards Children to keep them in their Duty or at least in the appearance of it But tho' it is sometimes necessary to deter and punish Children by sensible Chastisements yet it must not from thence be concluded that we ought to perswade them by sensible rewards we must never make use of any thing that very much affects the Senses but when the utmost necessity requires it And there is no need of affecting them with sensible rewards by representing Pleasures to them as the end of their Labours For on the contrary it wou'd corrupt their best Actions and rather incline them to Sensuality than Virtue The Impressions of those Pleasures we have once tasted continue very strongly to affect the Imagination and often revive in us the Idea's of sensible Goods always exciting importunate desires which disturb the peace of the Mind And in short they stir up the Concupiscence upon every occasion and it is as Leaven that corrupts the whole lump But this is not a proper place to explain these things as they ought to be The End of the First Part of the Second Book The Second Part. Of the Imagination CHAP. I. I. Of the Imagination of Women II. Of that of Men III. Of that of Old People WE have given some Idea in the other Paâ—â— of the Physical Causes that occasion the Irregularity of the Imagination of Men. In This we shall endeavour to make some Application of those Causes to the General Errors of the Imagination and we shall likewise Treat of the Causes of those Errors which may be term'd Moral It may be seen by what has been said in the foregoing Chapter that the extream fineness of the Fibres of the Brain is one of the Principal Causes that hinder us from applying our selves with so much thought and study as we ought to the Discovery of Truths that are but a little Mysterious I. This extream smallness of Fibres is usually met with in Women Of the Imagination of Women and thence it is that their Understanding is so great in every thing that strikes the Senses 'T is for Women to determine Faâ—â—â—ons to judge of Language to distinguish Beauty and Genteel Manners In such things as these their Knowledge Capacity and Acuteness surpasses that of Men. Whatever depends upon the Senses is under their Jurisdictition but usually they are unable to dive into Truths that are any thing difficult to be discover'd Whatever is Abstracted to them is incomprehensible They cannot make use of their Imagination to unfold intangl'd and intricate Questions They only consider the outside of things nor has their Imagination either Strength or Extent enough to penetrate to the Bottom or to Compare all the Parts without distracting themselves A Trifle puts them out of the way the least noise affrights 'em the slightest Motion finds 'em work In short the Manner and not the Reality of things is sufficient to fill the whole Capacity of their Mind because the smallest Objects producing violent Motions in the Delicate Fibres of the Brain raise in the Soul those Sentiments which are active and large enough to possess it wholly If it be certain that this delicacie of the Fibres of the Brain is the Principal Cause of these Effects 't is not so sure however that 't is to be met with in all Women but admit it be their Animal Spirits have some times such a proportion with the Fibres of their Brains that there are some Women who have more Solidity of Judgment then some Men. For the strength of Wit consists in a certain Temperament of the grossness and Agitation of the Animal Spirits with the Fibres of the Brain and Women sometimes have this same just and Equal Constitution There are some Women strong and constant others feeble and inconstant There are some Women Learned Courageous and Capable of every Thing On the other side there are some Men unactive and Effeminate uncapable of understanding or doing any Thing In short when we attribute any Defects to this or that Sex to certain Ages or such and such Conditions we mean it with a proviso for the most part supposing always that there is no general Rule without an Exception For it is not to be imagin'd that all Men or all Women of the same Age Country or Family have Brain of the same Constitution 'T is more proper to believe that as we cannot meet with two Faces that resemble each other in every Lineament so we cannot meet with two Imaginations that are absolutely alike and that all Men Women and Children differ one from another in the grosser or more resin'd delicacy of the Fibres of the Brain For as we are not over hastily to suppose an Essential Identity between Things amongst which we see no Difference so neither are we to make Essential Differences where we do not find a Perfect Identity for these are the Errors into which we usually fall That which is then to be said concerning the Fibres of the Brain is this that they are very soft and very small in Children that with Age they harden and get strength that nevertheless they are extreamly small in the generality of Women and in some Men all their Life-time There is nothing more to be determin'd And this may suffice to be said of Women and Children that as they make it not their Business to search after Truth and instruct others so their Errors are not very prejudicial for they are seldom believ'd in those things which they advance Let us therefore speak of Men full grown whose Wit is in its full strength and vigor and who may be thought capable to sind out the Truth and teach it to Others II. The usual time that the Mind and Understanding of Man are in their greatest perfection
Of the Imagination of Men in the prime of their yeaâ— is from Thirty to fifty years At that Age the Fibres of the Brain have generally acquir'd a moderate consistence The Pleasures and Pains of the Senses for the most part make no farther Impression upon 'em so that they need no more then to defend themselves from violent Passions which rarely happen and this they may do provided they carefully avoid all occasions that excite 'em so that the Soul being no longer distracted with such kind of Interruptions may with more ease apply it self to the Contemplation of Truth A Man in such an Estate and who has quitted the prejudices of his Infancy who from his Youth has acquir'd a Promptness to Meditation who not only retains a clear and distinct Notions of the Mind and carefully rejects all the confus'd Idea's of the Senses and who has both leisure and a Wit to meditate such a Man will hardly fall into Errors But 't is not of such a Man that we are now to Discourse 't is of the common sort of Men who for the most part are of another Constitution The Consistence then which we meet with at the years of Discretion in the Fibres of Mens Brains is the cause if it may be so said of the Solidity and Consistence of their Errors 'T is the Seal that Seals their Prejudices and all their false Opinions and shelters 'em from the strength of Reason In a word the more Advantageous this Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain is to Persons well Educated the more Disadvantageous it is to the greatest part of Men since it confirms both the one and the other in their Present Thoughts and Opinions But Men are not only confirm'd in their Errors when they are arriv'd at the Age of Forty or Fifty years they are also more subject to fall into new ones because that believing themselves at that time able to judge of every thing as indeed it would become 'em to be so they decide with presumption and only consult their own Prepossessions for Men never argue upon things but in some relation to those Idea's which are most familiar to ' em When a Chymist would Argue about some Natural Body presently his Three Principles come into his Mind A Peripatic immediately thinks of the four Elements and the four first Qualities another Philosopher refers every thing to other Principles So that nothing can enter into the Mind of Man which is not immediately infected with the Errors to which it is subject or which does not augment the number of its Errors This Consistence of the Fibres of the Brain produces another very bad Effect especially in Persons more advanced in years which is to make 'em uncapable of Meditation They cannot set themselves to the Consideration of those Things which they desire to know and so they can never penetrate into those Truths which are but a little conceal'd They cannot relish the most Rational Sentiments when they are supported by Principles which appear new to them though they are otherwise very intelligent in things of which their years have given 'em great Experience But all that I have here said extends no farther than only to such as have spent their Youth without making use of their Wit or applying themselves to Study To clear these things 't is requisite to know that we cannot learn any thing whatever it be without giving our minds to it and that we cannot be attentive upon any thing if we do not imagine and admit a lively representation of it into the Brains Now that we may imagine Objects 't is necessary that some some part of the Brain give way or that there should be imprinted on it some other Motion that so it may be able to form the Traces which are affix'd to the Idea's that represent those Objects to us so that if the Fibres of the Brain are but a little harden'd they will admit no Inclinations or Motions but what they were formerly accustom'd to Whence it comes to pass that the Soul can never imagin nor consequently be attentive upon what it desires but only upon things that are familiar to it From hence we must conclude that it is of great advantage for a Man to Exercise himself in meâ—it â—ting upon all sorts of Subjects that so he may be able to acquire a Readiness to think upon what he pleases For as we acquire an extraordinary facility to stir our Fingers after various manners and with a swiftness even to wonder by frequent use in playing upon Instruments so the Parts of the Brain the Motion oâ— which is requisite to imagine what we desire do by use and custom acquire a certain easiness and slexibility which is the reason that Things are imagin'd more easily more readily and more distinctly Now the best way to acquire this Habitude which makes the chief distinction betwixt a Wise Man and another Person is to accustom our selves in our youth to search after the truth of such things as are very difficult because at that Age the Fibres are more pliable and apt to give way Nevertheless I do not pretend that this Facility is to be acquir'd by those who are call'd Men of Study yet make it their business only to read without meditating and without searching of themselves the Decision of a Question before they read it in an Author For 't is visible that by that means only a Man acquires a facility to remember things that he has read 'T is every day observable that they who read much can never apply their Minds to new things that are told 'em and that the vanity of their Learning hurrying 'em to judge of those things before they have conceiv'd 'em in their Minds throws 'em into those Errors which other Men avoid But though the want of Application be the principal Cause of their Errors there is one that is peculiar to ' em That in regard they always carry in their Memories an infinite number of confus'd Species they presently choose out some one which they look upon to be the Subject of the Dispute and because the Things that are told 'em do not agree therewith they judge ridiculously that their Opponent is deceiv'd If you make it out to 'em that they themselves are deceiv'd and that they do not so much as understand the State of the Question then they are mad and not able to apprehend what is said to 'em and they still keep stedfast to the first false Species which their Memory presented to ' em If you shew 'em their Mistake too apparently they will start a Second and a Third which they will defend sometimes against all Appearance of Truth nay even against their own Consciences because they have no respect or love for Truth and because they are asham'd to acknowledge that there are some things which others know better than themselves What ever has been said concerning Persons of Forty or Fifty years of Age III.
Brain for that the Soul always represents to her self those things of which she has the largest and deepest Traces To these we may add other Examples more Compos'd A Distemper is a Novelty it makes such Havock as surprizes the World This imprints such deep Traces in the Brain that the Distemper is always present to the Mind Suppose this Disease for Example be call'd the Scurvy all Distempers will be the Scurvy The Scurvy is new therefore all Distempers shall be the Scurvy The Scurvy is attended with several Symptoms many of which are common to other Diseases That 's nothing to the purpose if it happen that the Sick Person has any one of those Symptoms he shall be sick of the Scurvy and they shall not so much as think of other Distempers that are accompanied with the same Symptoms they will expect that all the Accidents that they have known Scorbutic Persons labour under befal them also They shall prescribe the same Remedies and shall wonder why they do not work the same Effects as they have wrought in others An Author applies himself to one sort of Study upon which the Traces of the Subject of his Employment make so deep an Impression and irradiate so vigorously over all the Brain that many times they confound and deface the Traces of such things as are very different one from another There was one for Example who compil'd several Volumes upon the Cross this made him see Crosses where ever he came Nor was it without reason that Father Morin derides him for believing that a Medal represented a Cross when it represented quite another thing And by Vertue of such a sort of Imagination as this it was that Gilbert and several others after they had study'd the Loadstone and admir'd its Properties would needs apply to Magnetick Qualities a great Number of Natural Effects which have not the least Correspondence with them The Examples here cited are sufficient to prove that from this extraordinary easiness of the Imagination to represent to it self the Objects which are most familiar to it and the difficulty which it undergoes to imagine those which are new and unusual it come to pass that Men are always forming Idea's which may be call'd Mix'd and Impure and that the Mind never Judges of things but with reference to it self and its first Thoughts Thus the different Passions of Men their Inclinations their Conditions their Employments their Qualities their Studies in a word all their various Manners of Living producing very great differences in their Idea's And this it is that makes them fall into an Infinite number of Errors of which we shall discourse more at large hereafter This was it that made the Lord Chancellor Bacon utter these Judicious Expressions All Perceptions as well of the Sense as of the Mind are Ex analogia Hominis not ex analogia Vniversi estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inequalis ad radios rerum qui suam naturam naturae rerum immiscet camque destorquet inficit CHAP. III. Of the Mutual Connexion between the Idea's of the Mind and the Traces of the Brain and of the Mutual Connexion between Traces and Traces and between Idea's and Idea's AMong all Material Things there is none more worthy the serious Study of Men than the Structure of their Bodies and the Correspondence between all the Parts that Compose it and of all Spiritual Things there is none of which the Knowledge is more Necessary than that of the Soul and how it is Related indispensably to God and naturally to the Body 'T is not sufficient to perceive or know confusedly that the Traces of the Brain are united one to another and that they are attended by the Motion of the Animal Spirits that the Traces being stirred up in the Brain likewise stir up the Idea's in the Mind and that the Motions excited in the Animal Spirits excite the Passions in the Will 'T is requisite therefore as much as may be to understand distinctly the cause of all those different Unions and chiefly the Effects which they are capable of producing We must understand the cause of them to the end we may attain to the Knowledge of Him who is only able to act within us and to make us Happy or Miserable and it becomes us to understand the Effects because we should know our selves as much as in us lyes and other Men with whom we Converse For then we shall understand the ways and means of Conducting Governing and Preserving our selves in the most Happy and Perfect condition to which it is possible for us to attain according to the Order of Nature and the Rules of the Gospel and we shall be able to live with other Men when we know how to make use of them in our Necessities and assist them in their Miseries I do not pretend to explain in this Chapter a Subject of so vast and so large an Extent Nor do I pretend to it altogether in the whole Work There are many things of which I am Ignorant as yet and which I never hope to understand exactly there are other things which I believe I know but which I cannot for all that Explain For there is no Wit how mean soever it be that by Meditation cannot discover more Truths than the most Eloquent Man in the World can relate I. We are not to imagine Of the Union of the Soul with the Body as the greatest part of Philosophers do that the Soul becomes Corporeal when it is united with the Body and that the Body becomes a Spirit when it is united with the Soul The Soul is not diffus'd into all the Parts of the Body to give it Life and Motion as the Imagination fancies nor does the Body become capable of Sensation by its union with the Soul as our deluding Senses would seem to convince us Every Substance remains what it is and as the Soul is not capable of Extension and Motion neither is the Body capable of Sensation and Inclinations All the Alliance of the Body and Soul which is known to us consists in a Natural and Mutual correspondence of the Thoughts of the Soul with the Traces or Phantoms of the Brain and the Emotions of the Soul with the Motions of the Spirits So soon as the Soul receives some new Idea's it imprints new Traces in the Brain and so soon as the Objects produce new Traces the Soul receives new Idea's Not that it considers those Traces for it has no knowledge of them nor that those Traces include those Idea's because they have no Relation one with another Nor lastly that the Soul receives her Idea's from those Traces for as we shall show in another place it is not to be conceiv'd that the Soul can receive any thing from the Body or that it becomes more Knowing or more Enlightned by adverting to it as the Philosophers pretend who would have it that the Soul should perceive all Things per conversionem ad Phantasmata
by Conversion to the Phantasmes or Traces of the Brain So soon as the Soul would have the Arm to move the Arm is moved tho' it does not so much as know what it ought to do to make it move and so soon as the Animal Spirits are agitated the Soul finds it self mov'd tho' it does not so much as know there are Animal Spirits in the Body When I come to treat of the Passions I shall speak of the Connexion between the Traces of the Brain and the Motions of the Spirits and of that between the Idea's and Emotions of the Soul for that all the Passions depend upon it My business here is only to treat of the affinity between Idea's and Traces and the Connexion of the Traces one with another There are three very considerable Causes of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces Three considerable Causes of the union between the Idea's and Traces the first and most general is the Identity of Time For frequently it suffices that we had certain Thoughts at such time as some new Traces came into our Brain so that those Traces cannot be produced again without renewing the same Thoughts If the Idea of God present it self to my Mind at the same time that my Brain was struck with the sight of these three Characters Iah or with the sound of the Word it self 't is enough if the Traces which those Characters have produc'd be excited to make me think of God And I cannot think of God but there will be produc'd in my Brain some confused Traces of the Characters or Sounds which accompany'd the Thought which I had of God for the Brain being never without Phantasmes there are always such as have some Relation to what we think tho' many times these Phantasmes are very imperfect and very confus'd The second Cause of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces and which always supposes the first is the Will of Man This Will 〈◊〉 necessary that this connexion of the Idea's with the Traces may be regulated and proper for Use For if Men had not Naturally an Inclination to agree between themselves to affix their Idea's to Sensible Signs not only this Connexion of Idea's wou'd be absolutely unprofitable for Society but it would be also very Irregular and Imperfect First because Idea's are never strongly united with the Traces but when the Spirits being agitated they render those Traces deep and durable So that the Spirits being never agitated but by the Passions if Men had no such Union to communicate their Sentiments and participate of those of others 't is evident that the exact Union of their Idea's with certain Traces would be very weak because they do not subject themselves to those Exact and Regular Connexions but to render themselves Intelligible Secondly the Repetition of the Meeting of the same Idea's with the same Traces being necessary to form a Connexion that may be of long continuance since the meeting unless it be accompany'd with a violent Motion of the Animal Spirits suffices not to make strong Connexions 't is clear that if Men should refuse to assent it would be the greatest Chance in the World if the same Traces and Idea's should meet together so that the Will of Man is necessary to regulate the Connexion of the same Idea's with the same Traces tho' this Will of Agreement be not so much an effect of their Choice and Reason as an Impression of the Author of Nature who has made us altogether one for another and with a strong Inclination to unite in Mind as well as in Body The third Cause of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces is the Constant and Immutable Nature or Will of the Creator For example There is a Natural Connexion and which depends not upon our Will between the Traces produc'd by a Tree or Mountain which we behold and the Idea's of a Tree or Mountain between the Traces which the Cries of a Man or Beast that suffer Pain beget in our Brain the Air of one who threatens us or of whom we stand in fear and the Idea's of Grief of Strength or Weakness as also between the Sentiments of Compassion of Fear and Courage which are excitedin us These Natural Bands are the strongest of all they are generally alike in all Men and they are absolutely necessary for the Preservation of Life For which reason it is that they depend not upon our Will for if the Band or Connexion of Idea's with certain Sounds and Characters be but feeble and very different in several Countries 't is because it depends upon the weak and changeable Will of Men. And the reason why it depends upon it is because this Connexion is not absolutely necessary for Life but only for living like Men that are to form among themselves a Rational Society Here we must observe that the Connexion of Idea's that represent to us Spiritual Things and such as are distinct from us with the Traces of our Brain is not nor can be Natural and by consequence it is or may be different in all Men for that it has no other Cause than their Will and the Identity of Time of which I have spoken before On the other side the Connexion of the Idea's of all Material Things with certain particular Traces is Natural and hence there are certain Traces that stir up the same Idea in all Men. For Example there is no question but that all Men have the Idea of a Square upon the sight of a Square because that Connexion is Natural but 't is to be doubted whither all Men have that Idea when they hear the Word Square pronounced because that Connexion is entirely voluntary The same thing may also be thought of all Traces that are tyed to the Idea's of Spiritual Things But because the Traces which have a Natural Connexion with Idea's do affect the Mind and consequently render it attentive the greatest part of Men do easily enough comprehend and retain Sensible Truths that is the mutual Relations that are between Bodies On the other side because the Traces that have no other Connexion with the Idea's then what is voluntary do never vigorously strike the Mind 't is not without a great deal of trouble that all Men Comprehend and with much more difficulty retain abstracted Truths that is the mutual Relations between things that fall not under the Imagination But when these Relations are never so little compounded they appear absolutely Incomprehensible especially to those that are not accustomed to them in regard they have not fortify'd the Connexion of those abstracted Idea's with their Traces by continual Meditation and tho' others have perfectly comprehended them they forget them in a short time because this Connexion is seldom or never so strong as the Natural one It is so true that all the trouble Men have to comprehend and retain Spiritual and Abstracted Things proceeds from the difficulty of fortifying the Connexion of their Idea's
with the Traces of their Brain that when they find a way to explain the Analogies of Spiritual Things by the Relations of Material Things they are easily apprehended and imprinted after such a manner in the Mind that we are not only strongly convinced of them but they are also much more easily retain'd The General Idea which we have given of the Mind in the first Chapter of this Work is perhaps a sufficient Proof of this On the contrary when the Relation between Material things are express'd in such a manner that there is no Connexion requir'd between the Idea's of the Things and the Traces of their Expressions 't is a difficult matter to apprehend them and they are easily forgot For Example They who begin the Study of Algebra or the Analytic Art cannot but with great difficulty apprehend the Algebraic Demonstrations and when they have once understood them they never remember them long because the Squares for Example the Parallelograms Cubes Solids c. being express'd by aa a3 abc c. whose Traces have no Natural Connexion with their Idea's the Mind is not able to six the Idea's of them and examme their Relations But they who begin plain Geometry do presently and clearly conceive the Demonstrations that are explain'd to them provided they distinctly understand the Terms that are made use of because the Idea's of a Square a Circle c. are Naturally ty'd to Traces of the Figures which they see before their Eyes It also frequently happens that the Exposition of the Figure alone which serves for the Demonstration causes them sooner to apprehend it than the Discourses that explain it because the Words not being united to the Idea's but by an Arbitrary Institution they do not excite those Idea's with sufficient quickness and clearness to afford a ready apprehension of their Relations for this is the principal Reason why it is so hard a matter to understand the Sciences It may be observ'd by the By and from what has been already said that those Writers who Coyn a great many new Words and new Figures to explain their Sentiments many times spend their time to little or no benefit they think to render themselves Intelligible when indeed they make themselves Incomprehensible We define all our Terms and Characters say they and others ought to agree to them 'T is true others agree to them in their Will but their Nature is repugnant thereto Their Idea's are not joyn'd to those new Terms because there is requir'd both Use and great Practice for that The Authors perhaps have been accustom'd to that Practice but the Readers have not When a Man goes about to Instruct the Mind 't is requisite to understand it because he ought to follow Nature and not to provoke or hurt it Nevertheless we ought not to condemn the Care that Mathematicians take in defining their Terms for 't is evident they ought to define them to prevent the trouble of Equivocal Words But as much as may be they ought to make use of Terms that are received or whose signification is not very remote from that which they go about to introduce and this is that which Mathematicians do not always observe Nor do we pretend by what we have said to condemn Algebra more especially that which M. Descartes has re-establish'd For tho' the Novelty of a few Expressions in that Science gives the Mind some little trouble at first yet there is so little variety and confusion in the Expressions and the Assistance which the Mind receives by them so far surpasses the difficulty it meets with that we can hardly think it possible to find a better way of expressing his Reasoning or which better suits with the Nature of the Mind so as to carry it farther into the Discovery of unknown Truths The terms of that Science have no share at all in the Capacity of the Mind they do not burthen the Memory they wonderfully abridge all our Idea's and Reasonings and render them in some measure sensible by Practice In short their Benefit is much greater than that of Expressions tho' Natural or of Figures design'd by Triangles Squares and the like which cannot be serviceable to the searching after and unfolding Truths which are but a little Mysterious But let this suffice for the connexion of Idea's with the Traces of the Brain 'T is necessary now to say something of the connexion of the Traces one with another and by consequence of that agreement which is between the Idea's that answer to the Traces This connexion consists in this II. Of the mutual connexion of the Tracâ— that the Traces of the Brain are so well united together that they can no longer be excited but all those that were imprinted at the same time will be also excited For Example when a Man happens to be at some publick Ceremony if he observes all the circumstances of it and all the principal Persons that were present the Time the Place the Day and all other particulars 't will be enough that he remembers the Day or some other circumstance of the Ceremony less remarkable to represent to himself all the rest For this reason it is that when we cannot call to mind the principal Name of a Thing we sufficiently design it by making use of the Name that signifies some circumstance of that Thing As when we cannot call to mind the proper Name of a Church we may make use of another Name which signifies a Thing that has some Relation to it We may say 't is that Church where there was such a Croud where Mr. Preaches or whither we went last Sunday And not being able to remember the proper Name of a Person or it being more convenient to design it after another manner we may denote it by saying such a one that has a Face pitted with the Small-Pox such a tall Man well Proportioned or a little Crook-back'd Man according to the Inclinations we have for the Man tho' he is to blame that makes use of Scornful Expressions Now the Mutual Connexion of the Traces and consequently of the Idea's one with another is not only the foundation of all the Figures of Rhetorick but of an infinite number of other things of greater Impertance as in Morality Politicks and generally in all Sciences which have any Relation to Man and by consequence of many things which we shall treat of in the sequel of this Discourse The cause of this Connexion of several Traces is the Identity of Time when they were imprinted in the Brain for 't is sufficient that several Traces were produc'd at the same time to renew them altogether For the Animal Spirits finding the way of all the Traces open that are made at the same time they continue their way because they pass more easily through it than other parts of the Brain This is the cause of Memory and of the Corporeal Habits which are common to us with Beasts These Connexions of the Traces are not always
accompanied with the Emotions of the Spirits because all things which we see do not appear to us always either Good or Evil. These Connexions also may alter and break off because not being always requisite for the Preservation of Life they ought not always to be the same But there are Traces in our Brains that are Naturally united one with another as also with certain Emotions of the Spirits because such a Connexion is necessary for the Preservation of Life and their Connexion cannot be broken off or at least not very easily because it 's convenient that it should be always the same For Example the Trace of a Precipice which a Man sees under himself and from which he is in danger of falling or of some great Body which is ready to fall upon us and crush us to Death is Naturally join'd to the Trace which represents Death as also to an Emotion of the Spirits which disposes us to fly or desire an Escape This Connexion of Traces never changes because it is necessary that it should be always the same and it consists in a Disposition of the Fibres of the Brain which we have from our Birth All those Connexions which are not Natural may and ought to be broken because the various Circumstances of Time and Place ought to alter them so that they may be useful to the Preservation of Life 'T is convenient for Example that Partridges should fly from Men with Birding-Pieces in their Hands especially at such times and in such places where Men are accustomed to Hunt after them but it is not necessary that they should fly at other times and in other places Thus for the Preservation of all Creatures 't is necessary that there should be certain Connexions of Traces which may be easily form'd and destroy'd and that there should be others which may not be broken without great difficulty And lastly others which are never to be broken 'T is very useful to enquire carefully into the different Effects which these different Connexions are capable of producing for they are very numerous and of great importance for the Understanding of Man and of all things between him and which there is any Relation We shall find in the sequel of this Discourse that these Things are the Principal Cause of our Errors But 't is time to return to what we promis'd to treat of and to explain the different Changes that befal the Imagination of Men by reason of their various Manner of Living CHAP. IV. I. That Studious Men are the most subject to Error II. The Reasons why they rather choose to follow Authothority than make use of their Judgment THE Differences that are in the various Manners of Mens Living are almost Infinite There are a great Number of different Conditions Employments and Societies These Differences are the reason that almost all Men pursue different Designs and argue upon different Principles It would be very difficult to meet with several Persons who have absolutely the same Prospects in one and the same Community wherein particular Persons ought to be all of the same Spirit and have the same Designs Their different Employs and Conversation do necessarily give a different Turn and Humour in the way of Managing the Execution of those Things in which they agree This shews that it would be an impossible Undertaking to particularize the Moral Causes of Error But besides it would be of no use to do it here 't is our business only to speak of such Manners of Living as betray Men into the greatest Number of Errors and to such as are of the highest Importance When we shall have Explained those we shall have open'd a Way sufficient to enable the Mind to proceed farther and every body may be able to Survey at once and very easily the most bidden Causes of several particular Errors which cannot be explain'd but with a great deal of Time and Labour When the Mind sees clearly it delights it self with pursuing Truth which it does with an inexpressible swiftness I. That Studicus Persons are the mst subject to Error The Employment which seems most necessary to be treated of in this place because it produces the most considerable changes in the Imagination of Men and which lead us most into Error is the Employment of Studious Persons who make more use of their Memory than Wit For Experience always shews us that they who apply themselves most eagerly to the Reading of Books and to Search after Truth are those who have lead us into the greatest number of Errors 'T is the same thing with those that Study as with those that Travel When a Traveller by misfortune has taken the wrong Road the farther he advances the more remote he is from the Place whither he designs to go and the more diligent and hasty he is to arrive to the end of his Journey the more he wanders out of the way In like manner those ardent desires which Men have for Truth cause 'em to precipitate themselves into the Reading of Books where they think to find it or to frame to themselves a Chimerical Systeme of things which they desire to know for which they have a strong fancy and which they endeavour by the vain Efforts of Wit to make others relish to the end they may receive the Honour which is usually due to the Inventors of Systemes Now let us explain these two Defects 'T is a difficult thing to apprehend how it comes to pass that Men of Sense should rather choose to make use of other Persons Judgment in the Search of Truth than of that which God has bestow'd upon ' em Without doubt there is infinitely much more pleasure and honour for a Man to guide himself with his own than other Men's Eyes nor does any Man who has good Eyes ever dream of shutting 'em or of putting 'em out in hopes of one to guide him nevertheless 't is the same thing with the use of Judgment as with the use of the Eyes for as the Judgment is â—â—â—nitely above the Eyes the use of it is accompanied with satisfactions far more solid and which content it after another manner than Light and Colours do the Sight However Men always make use of their own Eyes to be their Guides but they seldom or never make use of their own Judgment to discover the Truth But there are several Causes which contribute to this same Perturbation of the Mind II. Reasons why they rather choose to follow Authority than make use of their own Judgement First the Natural Sloath of Men that will not give themselves the Trouble of Meditation Secondly Their Inability of Meditating into which they are fallen for want of applying themselves to it in their Youth as has been shew'd in the Ninth Chapter In the third place the little Love Men have for Abstracted Truths which are the foundation of every thing that is to be known here below In the fourth place the Satisfaction that Men
receive from the Knowledge of Probabilities which are very agreeable and very sensible because they are built upon Taking Notions In the fifth place that foolish Vanity which makes us covet to be esteem'd Learned For we call those Learned who have Read most The knowledge of Opinions is of more use in Conversation and to be able to puzzle the Minds of the Common Sort than the knowledge of true Philosophy which is attain'd by Meditation In the sixth place because Men without any Reason imagine that the Ancients were more enlightened than we can be and that there is nothing farther for us to Search after but what they have already been successful in finding out In the seventh place a certain false Respect intermix'd with foolish Curiosity causes us more to admire Things that are most remote the most ancient and that come from Countreys unknown and even the most obscure Books Clarus ob obscuram Linguam Lueres Thus was Heraclitus heretofore admir'd for his Obscurity Men enquire for old Medals though all defac'd with Rust and preserve as the Apple of their Eye the Lanthorn or Slipper of some ancient Philosophers though almost eaten up with Worms their Antiquity enhaunces their Price Some apply themselves to Read the Rabbies because they wrote in a strange Language very corrupt and very obscure Men have a high Esteem for Ancient Opinions because Time has remov'd 'em at a great distance from us And doubtless had Nimrod wrote the History of his own Reign all the most refin'd Politicks all the Sciences had been contain'd in it even as there are some who discover that Homer and Virgil had the Knowledge of all the Secrets of Nature Antiquity is to be respected they crie How could Aristotle Plato Epicurus those Great Men be deceiv'd They never consider that Aristotle Plato and Epicurus were Men as we are and of the same Mould and Shape and that now the World is grown Two thousand years older Veritas filia temporis non autheritatis that it has more Experience that it ought to be more enlighten'd and that it is the Age of the World and Experience that enable us to discover the Truth In the Eighth place because that when a new Opinion or an Author of the time is cried up it seems that their Fame ecclipses ours because it shines too near it but they are afraid of no such Injury from the Honour which they pay the Ancients In the Ninth place because Truth and Novelty can never concur together in Matters of Faith For Men not being willing to make a distinction between Truths that depend upon Reason and those that depend upon Tradition never consider that they ought to be apprehended after a very different manner They confound Novelty with Errors and Antiquity with Truth Luther Calvin and others have introduc'd Innovations and have been mistaken therefore Galileo Harvey and Descartes are mistaken in their Discoveries The Impannation of Luther is new and likewise false therefore the Circulation of Harvey is false because it is new For this Reason it is that they indifferently bestow that Odious name of Innovators both upon Hereticks and new Philosophers The Idea's and Words of Truth and Antiquity of Falshood and Novelty have been joined together There 's no remedy the Common sort never separate 'em and Men of Sense find difficulty enough in it In the Tenth place because we live in a Time wherein the Knowledge of the Ancient Opinions is still in vogue and because there are none but those that make use of their Judgment who can by Force of their Reason wrest themselves from the Contagion of Depraved Customs When we are in the Throng and the Croud 't is a hard matter not to give way to the Impetuosity of the Torrent that carries us along with it In the last place because Men act only upon tho score of Interest and this is the Reason that even they who deceive themselves and who perceive the vanity of these sorts of Studies cease not to apply themselves to 'em for all that because Honours Dignities and Benefices are annexed to 'em and for that they are always more capable of 'em who excel in those sorts of Studies than those that are ignorant of ' em All these Reasons in my Opinion sufficiently shews us why Men blindly follow the ancient Opinions as True and why without any Judgment they reject the new ones as False In a word why they make none or very little use of their Judgment There are without question a great number of Reasons more particular which contribute to it but if those which we have produced be but attentively consider'd there will be no cause of surprize to see how some People are prejudic'd with the Authority of the Ancients CHAP. V. Of the Ill Effects that Reading has upon the Imagination THis same False and unworthy Respect which Men have for the Ancients produces a great number of most pernicious Effects which it is convenient to observe The first is that want of using their own Judgment does by little and little really disable Men from making any use of it at all For it is not to be imagin'd that they who grow old over the Volumes of Plato and Aristotle make use of their Judgment they commonly spend so much time in the Reading of those Books only to endeavour to know the Sentiments of their Authors and their principal aim is to know certainly what Opinions they held without ever troubling themselves much whither they be consentaneous to Reason or no as we shall prove in the following Chapter Thus the Science and Philosophy which they learn is properly a Science of Memory and not a Science of Judgment They only understand Histories and Matters of Fact not evident Truths and they are rather Historians than true Philosophers The second Effect which the Reading of the Ancients produces in the Imagination is that it puts a strange confusion into all their Idea's who apply themselves to it There are two different ways to read Authors the one very good and very prositable the other very useless and even dangerous 'T is very profitable to read when we meditate upon what we read When Men endeavour to find out by some effect of their Wit how to resolve the Questions which they meet with in the Titles of the Chapters before they begin to read them When they digest and compare the Idea's of things one with another In a word when they make use of their Reason On the other side there is no Profit in Reading when Men understand not what they read but 't is dangerous for Men to read and conceive what they read when they never examine it sufficiently to make a good Judgment of it especially if they have Memory enough to retain what they have conceiv'd and do not unwarily assent to what they have read and understood The first way enlightens the Mind it fortifies it and enlarges its Capacity The second contracts
or had he had as much Love and Respect for Truth as Veneration for the Author upon whom he Comments 't is very probable that having spent so much time upon so little subject he would have acknowledg'd that the Definitions which Euclid gives of a Plain Angle and Parallel Lines are desective and that they do not sufficiently explain the Nature of them and that the second Preposition is Impertinent since it cannot be prov'd but by the third Postulate which cannot be granted unless you likewise grant the second Proposition For in granting the third Postulate which is On any Centre and at any Distance to describe a Circle they not only grant that one Line equal to the other may be drawn from a Point which Euclid demonstrates by great Circumlocutions in his second Proposition but also that an infinite number of Lines of any length may be drawn from every Point But the Design of the most part of Commentators is not to illustrate their Authors and to enquire after Truth but to shew their Learning and inconsiderately to desend the faults themselves of those upon whom they Comment They speak not so much to be understood themselves or to make their Authors to be understood as to procure Admiration to themselves and them Had not the Person whom we have mention'd stuft his Book with Greek Passages several Names of Authors little known and other Remarks of the same Nature of little use to the Understanding of Common Notions Definitions of Names and Postulates in Geometry who would have read his Book Who would have admir'd him And who would have given the Author of it the Title of a Learned Man or a Man of Sense After what has been said I do not believe it can be doubted that the indiscreet Reading of Authors often prepossesses the Mind Now so soon as the Mind of a Man is prepossess'd he ceases to be owner of what we call Common Sense He can no longer give a found Judgment upon any thing that has Relation to the subject of his Prejudic'd Opinion it infects every thing he thinks on he can apply himself but very little to any thing besides what he is Prejudic'd in favour of Thus a Man that admires Aristotle can never relish any body but Aristotle he Judges of every thing as it relates to Aristotle whatever is contrary to his Philosophy is in his Opinion false he will have always some Passage of Aristotle in his Mouth he will Quote him upon all occasions and upon all sorts of subjects to prove things obscure which no body understands to prove things as clear as day and which are known to every Child i' th' Street 't is all one because that Aristotle is to him what Reason and Evidence are to others In like manner if a Man Dote upon Euclid and Geometry he shall refer to the Lines and Propositions of his Author whatever you say to him He will not talk to ye but his Words shall have some dependence upon his Science The whole shall not be greater than a part only because Euclid says it and he will not be asham'd to Quote him to prove it as I have observ'd But this is much more usual with those who adhere to other Authors than those of Geometry and we frequently find large Greek Hebrew and Arabic Passages in their Books to prove things that are perfectly evident All this befalls them because the Traces which the Objects of their Prejudic'd Opinion have imprinted on the Fibres of their Brains are so deep that they always remain open and for that the Animal Spirits passing continually quite through them will not permit them to close So that the Mind being constrain'd to have always those Thoughts that are annex'd to the Traces she becomes as it were their Slave and is always troubled and disquieted by them when knowing her Errors she endeavours to apply a Remedy to them Thus the Mind is continually in danger of falling into a great number of Errors if she does not always stand upon her Guard and with an unalterable Resolution observe the Rule which we have spoken of at the beginning of this Work that is to say never to assent but to Things that are intirely evident I speak not here of the ill choice of those Studies to which they apply themselves that is a subject to be handled in Eâ—â—â—ics tho' it might be referr'd to what has been said concerning Prejudic'd Opinions For when a Man throws himself desperately upon the study of the Rabbins and other Books in all forts of Languages and consequently the most unprofitable and wastes his whole Life therein he does it doubtless out of a Prejudic'd Opinion and an Imaginary hope of becoming Learned tho' he will never be able to acquire any real Knowledge by this way of Study But because this Application to an unprofitable Study does not so much lead us into Error as it wastes our Time and fills us with a foolish Vanity we shall not here discourse of those who take pains to become Learned in all sorts of mean or unprofitable Sciences whose Number is very great and who for the most part Study with too much Passion CHAP. VIII I. Of the Inventors of New Systems II. The last Error of Studious Persons WE have shew'd the State of the Imagination of Studious Persons who abandon themselves wholly to the Authority of certain Authors There are others who are very much opposite to them These are a sort of Persons that never respect any Authors whatever esteem they have among the Learned If they had a Value for them once they have since chang'd their Minds and now they set up themselves for Authors They would fain become the Inventors of some New Opinion thereby to acquire some Reputation in the World and they assure themselves that if they can but say something that has not been said already they shall not fail of Admirers These sort of Men have usually a strong Imagination the Fibres of their Brain are of such a Nature that they preserve a long time the Traces that are imprinted in them Thus when they have once imagin'd a System that has some Probability 't is impossible to undeceive them of their Error They retain and tenderly preserve all things that may be serviceable in any manner to confirm it On the other side they never take notice of the Objections which are made against it or else they evade them by some frivolous distinction Inwardly they please themselves with the sight of their Work and with the Reputation which they hope to get by it They only apply themselves to consider the Image of Truth which their probable Opinions carry They keep that Image fix'd before their Eyes but they never stedfastly behold those other sides of their Sentiments which would discover the falshood of them Great Endowments are requir'd for the framing of any true System it 's necessary that there be a great vivacity and sharpness besides a certain sublimeness
and extension of Judgment able to survey a great number of things at the same time Men of mean parts with all their vivacity and all their delicacy are too short sighted to see what is necessary for the Composing of a System they stoop at some little difficulties that discourage them or at some glimmerings that dazle them They have not a fight sharp enough to survey the whole Body of a large subject all at a time But let the Extent and Penetration of the Mind be never so great if it be not withal exempt from Passion and Prejudice there is little to be expected from it Prejudices possess one part of the Mind and infect the rest Passions confound the Idea's a thousand ways and represent to us in Objects whatever we desire to find there That Passion also which we have for Truth it self sometimes deceives us when it is too vehement but the desire of appearing Learned is that which drives us farthest off from attaining true Knowledge There is nothing more rate than to meet with Persons capable of making new Systems but it is not so rare a thing to meet with such as have compos'd Systems after their own Fancies There are few People that Study much who argue according to Common Notions there is always some Irregulariâ—y in their Idea's and this sufficiently shews that they rely upon some particular Systems which is not known to us 'T is true that all the Books which they Compose do not make it manifest for when we settle our selves to Write any Book which we design to Publish we take heed as near as is possible of what is to be said and this Attention alone is oft-times sufficient to convince us of our Error Nevertheless we see from time to time some Books which prove sufficiently what we have said for there are Authors who pride themselves in observing at the beginning of their Book that they have invented some new System The Number of Inventors of New Systems is also very much augmented by Prejudices conceiv'd against some Authors for it often happens that because they have not met with any thing true or solid in the Opinions of those Authors which they have read they fall in the first place into a great dislike and scorn of all sorts of Books and afterwards imagine a new Opinion that carries some Probability which they greedily embrace and which becomes more deeply rooted in them in such manner as we have set forth But when this extraordinary Zeal which they have for their Opinion grows cool or the design of transmitting it to the Publick has oblig'd them to examine it more exactly and seriously they discover and quit the falshood but with this condition that they will never embrace any others and will condemn all those who pretend to have discover'd any Truth Therefore the last II. A consiâ—◠〈◊〉 Error of Stadions Persons and most dangerous Error of Studious Persons is this that they believe there is nothing can be certainly known They have read many Books both Ancient and Modern wherein they could not meet with Truth they have had several curious Thoughts which upon a more strict Examination they have found false From whence they conclude that all Men are like them and that if they who believe they have consider'd some Truths would but a little more seriously consider them they would be convinc'd of their Errors as well as themselves This to them is sufficient to condemn 'em without entring into any farther particular Examination since if they did not condemn 'em it would in some measure be an acknowledgment that they had more Wit than themselves which they are not apt to think very probable Therefore they esteem as obstinate all those that hold any thing for certain nor will they by any means hear talk of the Sciences as Evident Truths which are beyond all contradiction but only as Opinions of which it is not convenient to be ignorant However these Persons ought to consider that though they have read a great number of Books yet they have not read all or at least with that attention which is requisite for the right understanding 'em or if they had many curious thoughts which they sound false in the conclusion it does not follow they had all the thoughts they might have had and so it 's possible that others have done better than they For all this it is not necessary that the others should have more Sense than they if that be the business that offends 'em for it 's enough that they were only more Fortunate Nor is there any wrong done 'em by those who profess to know evidently what they are ignorant of since they say at the same time that several Ages have been ignorant of the same Truths not for want of good Wits but because these good Wits did not first light upon them Let 'em not then be offended if others see more clearly than they and speak as they see Let 'em apply their Minds to what is propos'd to 'em if their Wit be more capable of Application after all their Wandrings and let 'em then judge there 's no body will hinder 'em but let 'em be patient and hold their Tongues if they resolve to examine nothing Let 'em consider a little whether the Answer which they usually give to most Questions that are ask'd 'em they know nothing of the maâ—â—â—â— no Body has hithertâ— attain'd it be a Judicious Answerâ— since that when they make that Answer they must believe they know all that other Men know or all that other Men can know For if they had not these thoughts of themselves their Answer were still more impertinent And why do they think it so difficult a thing to confess they know nothing of it when upon certain Occasions they grant that they knew nothing at all And wherefore must they conclude that all other Men are ignorant because they are inwardly convinc'd that they themselves are ignorant There are these three sorts of Persons who apply themselves to Study The first doat to little purpose upon some Author or some false unuseful Science The second are prepossest in their own Fancies The last which partake of the Qualifications of both the former are they who imagine they know all that can be known and who being persuaded that they know nothing of certainty conclude in general that nothing can be evidently known and look upon all things that are propos'd to 'em as meer Opinions 'T is easie to see that all the Defects of these three sorts of Persons depend upon the Properties of the Imagination which we have explain'd in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapters but chiefly in the First that all this befalls 'em only through Prejudices in Opinions that blind their Minds and will not permit 'em to apprehend any other Objects than those of their Prepossessions It may be said that their Prejudices act their Minds as the Ministers of Princes do in reference to
their Masters For as those Persons do as much as in 'em lies never permit any but such as are devoted to their Interests or such as they are no way afraid of to speak to their Masters so the Prejudices of these Men will not permit the Mind to behold with a fixed Eye the Idea's of Objects that are wholly pure and unmix'd but they disguise 'em they cover 'em with their Liveries and present 'em in that manner all masqu'd so that 't is a difficult thing for 'em to undeceive themselves and acknowledge their Errors CHAP. IX I. Of Effeminate Wits II. Of Superficial Wits III. Of Persons of Authority IV. Of those that make Experiments WHat we have said is sufficient in my Opinion to set forth in general what are the Defects of the Imagination in Studious Persons and the Errors to which they are most subject Now in regard there are none but these Persons who trouble themselves with Searching after Truth and because all the rest of Mankind depends upon them for it it might be thought that we should here conclude this Second Part. Nevertheless 't is convenient to say something more concerning the Errors of other Men because it will not be amiss to know what they are Of the Effeminaâ—e Wits Whatever flatters the Senses extreamly affects us and to whatever affects us we apply our selves proportionably to the pleasure we take in it Thus they who give themselves up to all manner of the most sensible and pleasing Divertisements are incapable of penetrating Truths that include any considerable difficulty because the Receptacle of the Mind which is not infinite is wholly taken up with their Pleasures or at least they have a very great share therein The generality of Great Men Courtiers Rich Men young People and they that are call'd by the name of fine Wits being taken up with continual Pastimes and only Studying the Art of flattering their Concupiscence and Voluptuous Appetites by degrees acquire such a Delicacy of Skill in these things or rather such a Softness that they may be often said to be rather Effeminate than fine Wits as they pretend to be For there is a great difference between Fineness and Softness of Wit though they are generally confounded one with another Fine Wits are they who discern by the Conduct of Reason the most minute differences of things who foresee the uncommon and almost imperceptible Effects that depend upon Hidden Causes In short these are they who penetrate into the Subjects which they consider But soft Wits have nothing but a false Delicacy they are neither lively nor pierceing they discern not the Effects from the Causes even of the most gross palpable thing Lastly they neither apprehend nor penetrate into any thing but are extreamly nice as to Manners A Clownish Word the Accent of a particular County a little Grimace provokes 'em more than a torrent of confus'd and frivolous Arguments they cannot know the Defect of Reasoning but are immediately very sensible of a false Measure or an irregular Gesture In short they understand sensible things perfectly because they keep their Senses in continual Exercise but they want the true understanding of things that depend upon Reason because they seldom or never make use of their own Nevertheless these are the Persons who are most esteemed in the World and easily acquire the Reputation of Curious Wits For when a Man speaks with a free and disengag'd Air when his Expressions are pure and well chosen when he makes use of Simile's that flatter the Senses and move the Affections after an imperceptible manner though he utter nothing but trivial things though there be nothing found nothing true in all his fine Words He according to the Common Opinion shall be cried up for a Curious Wit a Refin'd Wit a Polish'd Wit They never perceive that he is only a Soft Effeminate Wit and shines only by false Lights that never enlighten the Mind and that his persuasions prevail only because we have Eyes but not because we have Reason Lastly We do not deny but that all Men are in some measure guilty of this weakness which we have observ'd in some There is not any Man whose Mind is not touch'd by the Impressions of his Senses and Affections and who by consequence is not a little sway'd by outward Formalities and Language As to this all Men differ but in the more or the less But the reason why this defect is attributed to some particularly is this because there are some who acknowledge it to be a fault and strive to reform it Whereas they who have been mentioned by us look upon it as a very advantageous Accomplishment Far from acknowledging this same false Delicacy to be the Effect of an Effeminate Softness and the Original of an Infinite number of the Diseases of the Mind they imagine it to be an Effect and Mark of the Beauty of their Genius To these of whom we have spoken Of Superficial Wits we may join a very great number of Superficial Wits who never dive into any thing and who never apprehend unless it be confusedly the differences of things Not through their own fault as in those before mentioned for their Minds are neither fill'd up nor contracted by their Divertisements only they have naturally Slender Wits However this same Slenderness of Wit proceeds not from the Nature of the Soul as may be well imagin'd but it is caus'd sometimes by the great scarcity or the more than ordinary slowness of the Animal Spirits sometimes through the Inflexibility of the Fibres of the Brain sometimes also through an immoderate abundance of Spirits and Blood or for some other Reason which it is not worth while to examine There are then two sorts of Wits Some readily observe the difference of things and these are True Wits Others imagine and suppose a Resemblance between 'em and these are Superficial Wits The first have a Brain proper to receive clean and distinct Traces of the Objects which they consider and because they are very attentive to the Idea's of the Traces they see those Objects as it were near at hand and nothing escapes ' em But Superficial Wits receive none but feeble or confus'd Traces of their Objects They see 'em only as it were cursorily at a distance and very confusedly so that they seem alike to 'em like the Faces of those which we see afar off because the Mind supposes always Likeness and Equality for the Reasons which I shall give in the Third Book The greatest part of those that speak in Publick all those that are call'd great Talkers and many of those who are fluent of Speech though they speak but little are of this sort For they who meditate seriously and accurately are very rarely known to have a Copious Utterance of their own Meditations Usually they hesitate when they begin to speak because they are somewhat cautious of making use of Terms that excite in others a false Idea being asham'd
to the Wise Men of this World to Dispute the holy Truths of the Christian Religion The greatest part of Mankind are so negligent and void of Reason that they make no distinction between the Word of God and that of Men when they are joined together so that they fall into Error while they approve both and into Impiety while they despise both indifferently Nor is it a difficult thing to see the Cause of these last Errors They proceed from the Connexion of Idea's explain'd in the Eleventh Chapter nor is it necessary to insist any farther upon the Explanation of 'em here However it seems worth our while to say something of Chymists Of those that make Experiments and generally of all those that spend their time in making Experiments They are People that Search after Truth and their Opinions are usually follow'd without any Examination Therefore their Errors are so much the more dangerous because they are imparted to others with so much the more ease 'T is better without question to Study Nature than Books Visible and sensible Experiments are certainly much more evident Proofs than the Arguments of Men. Nor are they to be blam'd who being engag'd by their Profession in the Study of Natural Philosophy endeavour to improve their Skill by continual Experiments provided they apply their Labours to the Improvement of the most necessary Sciences Therefore Experimental Philosophy is not to be found fault with nor they who make it their practise but only their Defects The first is that they are seldom guided in making their Experiments by the Light of Reason but by Chance From whence it comes to pass that they become but little more Learned or Knowing after they have spent much time and Money The second is because they are more Sedulous in Curious and Extraordinary Experiments than such as are most common and familiar Nevertheless the most Common Experiments are the most Simple and therefore they ought first of all to apply themselves to those before they settle to such as are more compounded and which depend upon a greater number of Causes The third is because they prosecute those Experiments that bring in Profit and neglect those that serve to illuminate the Mind The fourth is because they do not accurately enough observe all the particular Circumstances of Time Place and Quality of the Drugs which they make use of though the least of these Circumstances is sufficient to frustrate the Effect which they desire For it is to be observ'd that all the Terms of which the Physicians make use of are Equivocal For Example Wine has as many various significations as there are varieties of Soil different Seasons different Manners of making Wine and different Manners of preserving it so that in general we may say that there are not two Tuns of Wine altogether alike Therefore when a Physician in order to the making such an Experiment says take Wine no body knows but very confusedly what he means Therefore there is very great Caution to be us'd in Experiments nor ought they to attempt Compounded ones till they know the Reason of the more Simple and Common The fifth arises from hence that too many Consequences are drawn from one Experiment Whereas on the contrary we want several Experiments to infer one true Conclusion Lastly the greatest part of Physicians and Chymists consider only the Particular Effects of Nature they never return to the first Notions of Things that compose Bodies Nevertheless 't is most certain that no Man can clearly and distinctly understand the particular Phenomena of Natural Philosophy unless he be Master of the more General Principles and unless he also know something in Metaphysics In a word they often want Courage and Constancy they are terrified and tired with the Labour and Expence There are many other Defects in the Persons before mentioned but it is not our business here to enlarge The Causes of these Defects are little Application and the Properties of the Imagination explain'd in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapter and because we never judge otherwise of the difference and alterations of Bodies than by the Apprehensions we have of 'em as has been said in the First Book The Third Part. Of the contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations CHAP. I. I. Of our Inclination to imitate others in all things which is the Original of the Communication of Errors that depend upon the Power of Imagination II. Two Principal Causes that increase this Inclination III. What a Strong Imagination is IV. That there are several sorts of it Of Mad Men and of such who have a Strong Imagination according to the Sense which is here meant V. Two considerable Defects of those that have a Strong Imagination VI. Of the Power they have to Perswade and Impose HAving Explain'd the Nature of Imagination the Defects to which it is subject and how our own Imagination leads us into Error there nothing more remains for us to Discourse of in this Second Book but of the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations and that is of the Prevailing Power which some Men have to engage others in their Errors Strong Imaginations are extreamly Contagious they prevail over those that are weak they make 'em stoop to their own Laws and imprint upon 'em their own Characters Therefore because Men that have particular Idea's and a Strong and Vigorous Imagination most commonly exceed the Bounds of Reason there are few more General Causes of Error than this pernicious Communication of the Imagination For the better understanding what this Contagion is and how it is transmitted from one to another we must consider that all Men have need of one another and that they are made to compose among themselves several Bodies of which the Parts should have a mutual Correspondence one with another for the upholding of which Union it is that God has commanded 'em to be Charitable one toward another but because Self-Love might by little and little extinguish Charity and by that means dissolve the Bond of Civil Society the Almighty judg'd it convenient that Men should be united together by Natural Ties which might subsist when Charity fail'd and which might defend it against the Efforts of Self-Love These Natural Ties which are common to us with Beasts consist in a certain Disposition of the Brain with which all Men are endued to imitate those with whom they Converse to make the same Judgments which they do and to be subject to the same Passions of the Mind to which they are subject And this same Disposition usually unites Men together much more close and firmly than Charity grounded upon Reason which sort of Charity is very rare Unless a Man be endu'd with this same Disposition of the Brain to partake of our Sentiments and our Passions he is incapable of his own Nature to unite himself with us and compose one Body He is like those Stones of an irregular form for which there is no room in a Building because
they cannot be joined to the rest Oderunt hilarem tristes tristemque jocosi Sedatum celeres agilem gnavumque remissi It requires a larger Portion of Vertue than Men are aware of not to break with those that no way sympathize with our Passions but whose Sentiments are in all things contrary to ours Nor is it altogether without Reason For when a Man has good cause to be Sad or Joyful 't is in some measure an Affront not to correspond with him in his Sentiments If he be Sad 't is not proper to appear before him with a brisk and jolly Air which argues Gladness and which strongly imprints the Motions of it in his Imagination for this is to put him out of that Condition which is most convenient and pleasing to him Sadness being the most delightful of all the Passions to a Man in Misery All Men therefore have a certain Disposition of the Brain Two Principal Causes that increase our Inclination to imitate one another which naturally inclines 'em to be affected after the same manner as some of those with whom they Converse Now there are two Principal Causes that foment and increase this Disposition the first is in the Soul the second in the Body The first consists in the Natural Propensity of Men to Grandeur and Advancement This Propensity it is which imperceptibly excites us to imitate Persons of Quality in their manner of Speaking Walking Dress and Outward Air. This is the Original of New Modes of the Instability of living Languages and of certain general Corruptions of Manners This is the chief Origine of all Extravagant and Fantastick Novelties which are not supported by Reason but Human Fancy and Pleasure The other Cause which much incline to imitate others and which we ought chiefly to Discourse of here consists in a certain Impression which Persons of a Strong Imagination make upon Feeble Minds and upon Tender and Delicate Brains What a Strong Imagination is I understand by a Strong and Vigorous Imagination that Constitution of the Brain which makes it capable of Traces extreamly deep and fill the Receptacle of the Mind in such a manner that it cannot attend to other things than such as the Images themselves represent to it There are two sorts of Persons who have a Strong Imagination in this Sense Two sorts of it The first receive these deep Traces by an Unvoluntary and Irregular Impression of the Animal Spirits and the others of whom we intend principally to Discourse here receive 'em from a certain Disposition which is observ'd in the Substance of the Brains 'T is visible that the first are absolute Mad Men seeing they are constrain'd by the Natural Connexion which is between their Idea's and their Traces to think upon things not thought of by others with whom they Converse which renders 'em incapable of speaking to the purpose and answering directly to Questions that are ask'd ' em There are an infinite number of this sort of People who only differ in the more or the less and it may be said that all such as are agitated with some violent Passion are of their number since at the time of their Emotion the Animal Spirits so forcibly imprint the Traces and Images of their Passion that they are incapable of thinking upon any thing else But 't is to be observ'd that all these sort of Persons are not capable of corrupting the Imagination of any Man let his Mind be never so weak and his Brain never so soft and delicate and this for two Reasons The first Because they are not able to answer conformably to the Idea's of others they can perswade 'em to nothing And secondly Because the Disturbance of their Mind being altogether manifest whatever they say is hearken'd to with contempt Nevertheless 't is true that Passionate Persons put us into Passions and make Impressions in our Imagination like those with which they themselves are affected But in regard their Transports are manifestly visible we resist those Impressions and get rid of 'em soon after They rub out of themselves when they are not fomented by the Cause that produc'd 'em that is to say when the Transported Persons are departed out of our presence and when the sensible sight of the Characters which Passion form'd in the Countenance produces no farther Alteration in the Fibres of our Brain nor any Agitation in our Animal Spirits I only Examine here that sort of Strong and Vigorous Imagination which consists in a Disposition of the Brain proper to receive very deep Traces of more feeble and less active Objects 'T is no defect to have a Brain proper for a Strong Imagination of Things and for the Reception of the most distinct and lively Images of the most inconsiderable Objects provided that the Mind be always Mistress of the Imagination that these Images be imprinted by her Orders and that they may be defac'd when she pleases for hence arises sagacity and strength of Wit But when the Imagination over-rules the Soul and these Traces form themselves by the Disposition of the Brain and by the Activity of the Objects and Spirits without expecting the Orders of the Will this is a most Mischievous Vice and a kind of Madness We shall therefore endeavour to set forth the Character of those who have a Strong Imagination of this sort To that purpose it behoves us to remember that the Receptacle of the Mind is confin'd to narrow limits 2. That it is fill'd with no Object more easily than with the Sensations of the Mind and generally with the Perceptions of Objects that affect us very much 3. That the deep Traces of the Brain are always accompanied with Sensations or other Perceptions that vigorously affect us For thereby 't is easie to know the Genuine Characters of their Wit who have a Strong Imagination The first is Two considerable Defects in those who have a Strong Imagination that these Persons are not capable of giving a sound Judgment of things that are a little difficult and perplext because the Receptacle of the Mind being fill'd with Idea's that are by Nature connex'd with those very deep Traces they have not the Liberty to think of several things at the same time But in Compound Questions 't is requisite that the Mind should survey with one quick and suddain motion the Idea's of many things and discover at one single view the Correspondencies and Connexions that are necessary for the resolving of those Questions All Men know by their own Experience that they are not capable of applying themselves to the Search of any Truth at such time as they are afflicted with any violent Pain because then there are in the Brain those deep Traces which take up the Capacity of the Mind Thus those Persons of whom we speak having deeper Traces of the same Objects as we suppose they cannot have so great an Extension of Mind nor comprehend so many things together as the others The first Defect of
the meanest Member of the Body which they constitute No wonder then if those Men that praise and extol themselves above others looking upon the rest as the meanest Members of the Society and considering themselves the chiefest and most Honourable incur the Hatred of all Men instead of procuring their Love and Esteem Therefore 't is a Vanity an Indiscreet and Ridiculous Vanity for Montagne continually to speak in Praise of himself and it is a Vanity still more extravagant in the same Author to describe his own Faults For if you observe it you shall find that he only discovers those Vices which through the Corruption of the Age Men pride themselves in being guilty of that he willingly ascribes to himself those that he thinks will procure him the Honour of a good Wit and the Air of a Gentleman And all this that by a seeming ingenuous Confession of his Vices he may gain the more easie Belief when he flies out into his own Praises L. 3. c. 13. And therefore he might justly say That Self-Praise and Self-Scorn arose from the same Air of Arrogance This is always a certain Sign that a Man is puff'd up with a high Conceit of himself and in my Opinion Montagne seems more Haughty and Vain when he displays his Vices than when he cries up his Vertues for who would bear with such an unsanctified Pride that glories in those Vices which should rather be an occasion of Humility I should less impatiently brook a Man who is asham'd to confess his faults than another who is not afraid to make open proclamation of ' em And in my Opinion there is no Man but ought to have a just dildain of that over free and unchristian-like way wherein Montagne displays his Vices But let us examine the other Qualities of his Mind If we may believe Montagne upon his own Word L. 2. c. 1â— a little thing will persuade as L. 1 c. 24. that he was a Man of no Retention that his Memory was capable of nothing unfaithful and creacherous L. 2. c. 17. but that he wanted neither Sense nor Judgment Nevertheless if we may believe the Portraiture of his own Wit I mean his own Book we must be of another Opinion I cannot receive a Command says he without my Pocket-Book or if I have any Discourse to remember if it be very long I am reduc'd to that miserable necessity to learn by Heart Verbatim what I have to say otherwise both behaviour and assurance would fail me as being afraid lest my Memory shou'd fail me A Man that can get by Heart a long Discourse Word for Word and to a tittle that he may the better be enabled to compose his outward Gesture and for the emboldning his Delivery does he seem to want rather Memory than Judgment Or may a Man believe Mentagne when he says this of himself I am forc'd to call my Servants by the Names of their Employments or of the Countreys where they were born for I can hardly remember their Proper Names and if I should live long I question whether I should remember my own Name Can a Lord of a small Village have such a Croud of Servants that he cannot remember their Names and yet get by Heart a long Oration A Man L. 12. c. 17. who was born and bred in the Country among Peasants and Hinds who has his Head and Hands full of Family Cares and Business and who confesses that 't is his Opinion that we ought not to neglect these things which lie under our Feet whatever we have in our Hands nor what is of most concernment to us for the Necessities of Life L. 12. c. 17. Can he I say forget the Names of his Domestick Servants Can he be ignorant as he says himself of the greatest part of the Coyns of the difference of one Grain from another either growing or in the Barn unless they be such as he sees every day or such things as every Child knows as the use of Leaven in making Bread or why People Tun up their Wine and yet have a Memory stuff'd with the Names and Principles of the Ancient Philosophers the Idea's of Plato Epicurus 's Atomes Leucippus and Democratus 's Vacuum Thales 's Water Anaxiamander 's Infinite Nature Diogenes 's Air L. 2. c. 12. Pythagoras 's Numbers and Symmetry Parmenides 's Infinity Musclus 's Vnit Apollodorus 's Water and Fire Anaxagoras 's Similar Parts Empedocles 's Sympathy and Antipathy Heraclitus 's Fire c. Can a Man that within the space of three or four Pages cites above Fifty Names of several Authors with their different Opinions who has fill'd his whole Work with Fragments of Histories and indigested Apothegms who says that History and Poetry are his Diversion in Books L. 1. c. 25. who contradicts himself every moment and in the same Chapter even in things which he pretends to have the most certain knowledge of as the Endowments of his Mind and Affections Is it for such a Man I say to boast a Judgment superior to his Memory Let us confess then that Montagne excell'd in Forgetfulness since he assures us that he wishes we had the same Opinion of him more especially since it is no way repugnant to Truth But we are unwilling to believe him upon his Word or by the Applauses which he bestows upon himself that he was a Man of Great Judgment and extraordinary Sagacity of Mind For being led by such a prejudic'd Opinion we might too easily assent to those false and dangerous Opinions which he obtrudes upon the World with an Impious Confidence and Boldness which only stupifies and dazles weak Minds Another thing for which Montagne is in the second place so highly commended is that he had a perfect knowledge of the Mind of Man that he penetrated into the most hidden Recesses of it the Nature and Properties the Strength and Weakness of it and in a Word that knew all that could be known of it Let us now see whether he merits these Elogies and whence it comes to pass that they are so liberally bestow'd upon him They who have read Montagne well know that he affected to be thought a Pyrrhonian and that he took a pride in doubting of every thing L. 1. c. 12. The Belief of Certainty says he is a Certain Testimony of Extream Folly and Vncertainty nor are there any greater Fools or less Philosophers than the Philodoxes of Plato On the other side he bestows such large Encomiums upon the Pryhonians in the same Chapter that 't is impossible to question but that he was one of the same Sect. 'T was necessary in his time for one that would be accounted an able and accomplish'd Man to doubt of every thing And the Title of a great Wit of which he was ambitious engag'd him farther in those his Opinions Supposing him therefore to be an Academic also we might at once convince him to be one of the most ignorant
things which they cannot comprehend for they are at least convinc'd of the weakness of their Mind It is good says a very Judicious Author thus to fatigue the Mind with these * The Art of thinking kind of Subtilties to tame its Presumption and abate its Arrogance in opposing its little Light to the mysteries of Religion which it cannot comprehend For since all the Vigour of Mans Mind is constrained to submit to the least Atom of Matter and to confess that it sees clearly that it is infinitely Divisible without being able to comprehend how it may be done Is not this to Sin against evident Reason to refuse an Assent to the marvellous Effects of Divine Omnipotence which is incomprehensible in it self for this reason because our Mind cannot comprehend them The most pernicious Effect of Ignorance III. And chiefly of Heresies or rather inadvertency wherein the weakness and limitation of Mans Mind is Notorious and consequently of his incapacity to comprehend whatever relates to infinity is Heresie These present times gives more instances than the former of a great number of Men who are the Authors of a particular Theology which is only founded upon their own Mind and the Natural Weakness of Reason they will not believe what they cannot comprehend The Socinians cannot comprehend the Mysteries of the Trinity nor of the Incarnation This is sufficient for them not to believe them and to Censure others with a fierce and libertine Air that do believe them as Men born for Slavery A Man who is convinced in himself that he is free if he troubles his Head very much in endeavouring to reconcile the Knowledge of God and his Decrees with that Liberty Such a Man I say is very likely to fall into their Error who believe that Men are not free For on the one hand being unable to conceive how the Providence of God can consist with the Liberty of Man and on the other a respect for Religion will hinder him from denying a Providence he will believe himself constrain'd to Abridge their Liberty not sufficiently reflecting upon the Weakness of his own Mind he will imagine that he can penetrate into the means that God has to reconcile his Detrees with our Liberty But they are not only Hereticks which are not attentive enough to consider the Weakness of their Mind and which take too great a liberty of judging things out of their Jurisdiction almost all Men have this defect particularly some Divines of these last Ages for some of them do so often make use of their Humane Reasonings to prove or explain Mysteries which surpass Reason although they may do it out of a good design and to defend Religion against Hereticks that they often give occasion to the same Hereticks to persist obstinately in their Errors and to treat of Mysheries of Faith as Human Opinions The Motions of the Mind and the Subtilties of the Schools are improper to inform Men of their Weakness and to inspire them with a Spirit of Humility which is so necessary in the Mysteries of Religion But all these Human and Subtle Reasonings may on the contrary stir up their secret Pride and incline them to make an ill use of their Judgment and so to form a Religion agreeable to their own Capacity We do not see Hereticks submit themselves to Philosophick Arguments or that the reading of Scholastick Books purely does inform them or condemn their Errors But on the contrary they continually take occasion from the weakness of some Scholastick Reasonings to Ridicule the most sacred Mysteries of our Religion which indeed are not establish'd upon all these Human Reasonings and Explanations but only upon the Authority of the written Word of God Indeed Human Reason does not teach us that there is one God in three Persons â—or how can it be that the mind of Man is free although God knew from Eternity all that Man would do The Reasons that are brought to prove and explain these things are such only as prove them to those which will admit them without examining them but which often seem extravagant to those who will oppose them denying the foundation of these Mysteries It may be said on the contrary that the Objections which are form'd against the principal Articles of our Faith and especially against the Mystery of the Trinity are so strong that its impossible to give clear and evident Solutions of them and which do not in the least shock our weak Reason because indeed these Mysteries are incomprehensible 'T is a better way to Convert Hereticks not to accustom them to make use of their Reason by proposing to them such uncertain Arguments as are drawn from Philosophy because the Truths in which we should instruct them do not depend upon Reason nor is it always necessary to make use of these Reasonings in Truth that may be prov'd by Reason as well as by Tradition as the Immortality of the Soul Original Sin the necessity of Grace the disorder of Nature and some others for fear lest their Mind having once tasted the Evidence of Reason in these Questions should not afterwards be content to submit to those that cannot otherwise be proved but by Tradition We must on the contrary oblige them to distrust their own Mind by shewing them its weakness limitation and disproportion to mysterious Truths and when the Pride of their Spirit shall be abated they will be more easily brought over to Reveal'd Religion by shewing to them its Authority and explaining the Tradition of all Ages if they are capable of it But if Men continually divert themselves from seeing the weakness and limitation of their Mind an indiscreet presumption will lift them up a deceitful Light will dazle them and the Love of Glory will blind them Thus Hereticks will be Eternally Hereticks Philosophers opinionative and prejudic'd and there will never be any end of Disputation so long as we shall be willing to Dispute with them CHAP. III. I. That Philosophers dissipate their Mind by applying it to Subjects which include too many Relations and which depend upon too many things without keeping any Order in their Studies II. An Example drawn from Aristotle III. That Geometricians on the contrary proceed well in an Enquiry after Truth especially those who make use of Algebra IV. That their method increases the power of the Mind and that Aristotle 's Logick weakens it V. Another defect of studious Persons MEN do not only fall into a great number of Errors I. Philosâ—phers want Order in their Studies because they prosecute such Questions as relate to infinity their Mind being finite but also because they advert to those that have much Extension their Mind being very narrow We have said already that a piece of Wax is incapable of receiving many different and distinct Figures at the same time and thus the Mind is incapable of receiving many distinct Idea's that is of perceiving many things and very distinctly at the same time whence it
's easie to conclude that we must not at first apply our selves to an Enquiry into hidden Truths whose knowledge depends upon too many things and whereof some are not familiar enough to us For we ought to Study methodically and make use of what we know distinctly to apprehend what we know not or what we know but confusedly However the greatest part of those who Study do not take this Course they make no Essay upon their own Strength they consult not themselves to know what they are capable of 'T is a secret Vanity and an irregular desire of knowing and not Reason which rules their Studies They begin inconsiderately to enquire into the most secret and impenetrable Truths and to resolve Questions which depend upon so great number of Relations that the most quick and penetrating Mind cannot discover them with any absolute certainty but after many Ages and almost an infinity of Experiments There are a great number of Questions of this Nature in Physicks and Morality All Sciences of Bodies and their Qualities as of Animals Plants Metals and of their respective Qualities are Sciences which can never be sufficiently evident nor certain especially if they be not manag'd after another Method than heretofore or if we begin not by the most Simple and least compounded Sciences upon which they depend But studious Persons will not give themselves the trouble of Philosophizing in Order they do not agree upon the Certainty of Physical Principles they know not the Nature of Bodies in General nor their Qualities but confess it themselves However they imagin they can give a reason why for Example the Hairs of Old Men wax White and yet their Teeth grow Black which depends upon so many Causes that it 's impossible to give any certain reason for it To know this it 's necessary to understand in what consists the Whiteness of Hairs in particular the Humours with which they are nourished the Philtres through which these Humours pass the Conformation and the Root of the Hairs or the Skin through which they pass and the difference of all these things in a Young and an Old Man which it 's absolutely impossible or at least very difficult to know Aristotle II. An example of want of Order in Aristotle for example hath pretended to know the Cause of this Whiteness which happens to Old Mens Hairs he hath given many reasons in different places of his Books But because he is the Genius of Nature he stays not there he enquires deeper He hath discover'd that the Cause which makes Old Mens Hairs White was the same which made some Persons and some Horses have one Eye Blew and the other of another Colour These are his words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This is sufficiently Surprising Book V. De Gener. Anim. C. 1. but there is nothing hid from this great Man and he gives reasons of so great a Number of things in almost all places of his Physicks which the sharpest Persons of this Age believe Impenetrable that it was deservedly said of him That God gave him to us that we might be Ignorant of nothing that was to be known Aristotelis Doctrina est Summa Veritas quoniam ejus intellectus fuit finis Humani Intellectus Quare bene dicitur de illo quod ipse fuit creatus datus nobis Divina Providentia ut non ignoremus possibilia Sciri Averroes ought to have added That Divine Providence gave us Aristotle to teach us what was impossible to be known For it 's true that this Philosopher does not only teach us things which may be known but if since he must be believ'd upon his word his Doctrine be the Soveraign Truth Summa Veritas he also teaches us those things which are impossible to be known Certainly one must have much Faith thus to believe Aristotle when he gives us only Logical Reasons and only explains the Effects of Nature by the Confus'd Notions of the Senses especially since he boldly decides Questions which will never be resolv'd by other Men. Thus Aristotle takes a particular Care to inform us that we must believe him upon his word for 't is an incontestable Axiom with this Author that the Disciple must believe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is true that Disciples are sometimes oblig'd to believe their Master but their Faith ought to be extended only to Experiments and Matter of Fact for if they intend to become true Philosophers they must examine the Reasons of their Masters and then receive them only when they discover the Evidence of them by their own Judgment But to be a Peripatetick it is absolutely necessary to believe and to retain and the same Disposition of Mind ought to be had at the reading of that Philosophy as at the reading of an History for if any one takes the Liberty of making use of his Judgment and Reason he must not expect ever to be a great Philosopher 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the reason why Aristetle and many other Philosophers have pretended to know what can never be known is That they have never known the difference betwixt Knowing and Knowing betwixt having a certain and evident Knowledge and having but a probable one And the reason why they never understood this difference is That the Subjects to which they applied themselves being beyond the perfect reach of their Mind they saw but a part of them without being able to comprehend them all together which indeed is enough to discover many Probabilities but not to discover Truth evidently Besides they seeking after Science meerly out of Vanity and probabilities being more apt to gain the Esteem of Men than Truth it self because they are more proportionated to the common reach of the Mind they have neglected to seek after necessary Means to increase the Capacity of the Mind and to give it more Extension than it has so that they have not been able to penetrate the bottom of Truths that are but a little hidden Geometricians have well known how little Extension the Mind has Geometricians behave themselves well in their Search after Truth at least they behaved themselves in their Studies after such way as shews they know it perfectly especially those that have made use of Algebra which Vieta and Descartes have renewed and improv'd in this Age. What I say appears from this That those Persons have not undertaken the Resolution of very compound Difficulties before they knew clearly the more Simple on which they depend They did not apply themselves to the Consideration of Lines as Conick Sections until they were Masters of common Geometry But that which is particular to Algebraists IV. Their Method inlarges the Capacity of the Mind that of Aristotle contractsit is That they see their Mind cannot be at the same time applied to many Figures they cannot imagine Solicts that have more than three Dimensions although it 's often necessary to conceive they may have more they make use of Common and very
Familiar Letters to express and abridge their Idea's Thus the mind not being embarrassed nor imploy'd upon any Representation which it would be oblig'd to make upon many Figures and Lines it may perceive at one view all that it is capable of seeing otherwise And thus the Mind can penetrate deeper and extend it self much farther when its Capacity is well manag'd The Art of rendring the Mind more penetrating and Extensive consists as we have elsewhere explain'd in a good Management of its Powers and Capacity not in imploying it to no purpose upon things which are not necessary to discover the Truth it seeks after which ought to be well observ'd Book VI. The Second Part of Method For this only shows that common Logicks are fitter to lessen the Capacity of the Mind than to inlarge it because it is evident That if in a Search after any Truth we use the Rules they prescribe us the Capacity of the Mind is divided so that it will be unfit to be attentive and to apprehend all the Extension of the Subject it examines It is therefore sufficiently evident from what I have said That the greatest part of Men make but little Reflection upon the Nature of the Mind whilst they apply themselves to a Search after Truth for indeed they have never been well convinc'd of its little Extension and the necessity there is of well managing and enlarging it And this is one of the most considerable Causes of their Errors and from hence it is that they have so unhappily perfected their Studies But we do not pretend that there were ever any Men which were not conscious of their own Limitation and their little Capacity and Extension of Mind all the World confesses it but the Generality of them only know it confusedly and confess it only with their Mouths The Method they take in their Study gives the Lye to their Confession since they act as if they truly thought their Mind bad no Limits and they would penetrate into things that depend upon a great many Causes whereof generally they do not know one There is also another Defect which is very common in these Studious Men V. Another Defect in Studious Men. which is the applying themselves to too many Sciences at once and if they Study but six Hours in a day they will sometimes study six different things 'T is plain this Defect proceeds from the same Cause as the rest that I have before mention'd For 't is very probable that if those that study after this manner know certainly that it was not agreeable to the Capacity of their Minds and that it was more likely to fill them with Errors and Confusion than with true Science they would not suffer themselves to be hurried away by the irregular Motions of their Passions and Vanity for indeed that is not the way to satisfie the Mind since 't is not the proper Means to know any thing CHAP. IV. I. The Mind cannot long apply it self to any Object which neither relates to it self nor to Infinity II. The Inconstancy and consequently the Error of the Will proceeds from this Defect of Application III. Our Sensations affect us more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind IV. What is the Original Cause of the Corruption of Manners V. And the Ignorance of the Generality of Mankind THE Mind of Man is not only subject to Error because it is Finite or more limited than the Objects they consider as has been explained in the two precedent Chapters but also because it is Inconstant and has no Firmness in whatsoever it does and cannot keep it self fix'd long enough upon any Subject to examine it entirely To conceive the Cause of this Inconstancy and Levity of our Minds it is necessary to know that its Action is directed by the Will which applies it to such Objects as it loves and is of it self continually Inconstant and unsettled of which this is the Cause We cannot doubt but God is the Author of all things that he hath made them for himself and has inclined the Heart of Man towards him by a Natural and Invincible Impression that he continually imprints upon him God cannot Will the Existence of any Mind which cannot love him or which should love him less than any other Good if any other besides himself could be found because he cannot Will that any Mind should not love that which is most Amiable or love it more than that which is less Amiable Thus it is requisite that a Natural Love should carry us to God since it comes from him and that there is nothing that can stop the Motions of it only God himself who imprinted them Every bodies Will therefore necessarily follows the Motions of this Love The Righteous and Wicked the Happy and the Damned Love God with this Love for the Natural Love which we have for God being the same thing as the Natural Inclination that carries us to Good in General to the Infinite and Soveraign Good it is evident that all Minds Love God with this Love since he only is the Universal Infinite and Soveraign Good For indeed all Spirits and even the Devils have an Ardent Desire to be Happy and to possess the Chief Good And they desire it without Choice without Deliberation without Liberty and by a Necessity of their Nature Being therefore made for God for an Infinite Good for a Good which comprehends all others in it our Hearts can never be satisfied but by the Possession of this Good Thus our Will always labouring under an eager Thirst always agitated with Desires Anxieties II. The Inconstancy of the Will Causes the Defect of our Application and consequently causes our Error and full of Inquietudes for the Good that it does not possess cannot without much Pain suffer the Mind for any time to stop at abstracted Truths which affect it not and which it judges uncapable of making it Happy Thus she Incessantly pushes it forward to search after other Objects and when in this Agitation which the Will communicates to it it meets with any Object that has the Appearance of a Good I mean such as makes the Soul Sensible of any Pleasure or inward Satisfaction at its approach then this Thirst is excited anew these Desires these wishes and these Ardours take new Life and the Mind being oblig'd to obey them engages it self only to that Object which causes or seems to cause them to draw it nearer to the Soul which tasts it and feeds on it for some time But the Emptiness of Creatures cannot fill the Infinite Capacity of Man's Mind these little Pleasures irritate its Thirst rather than allay it and give the Soul a vain sort of a Hope of being satisfied in the Multiplicity of the Pleasures of this Life which also produces an Inconstancy and an inconceivable Levity in the Mind which was to discover to it all these Goods It 's true that when the Mind accidentally meets with any Object which is
that External Objects emit the Species or Images which represent them And 't is only upon this Foundation that they multiply their Faculties and defend their active intellect So that this Foundation having no Solidity as shall soon be shewn it will be unnecessary to spend any time to overturn the Superstructure We are assur'd then that it is improbable that Objects should emit their Images or Species which represent them for these reasons 1. From the impenetrability of Objects All Objects as the Sun Stars and all such as are near the Eyes cannot emit Species which are different from their respective Natures Wherefore Philosophers commonly say that these Species are Gross and Material in which they differ from express'd Species which are Spiritualised These impress'd Species of Objects then are little Bodies they cannot therefore be penetrated nor all the Spaces which are betwixt the Earth and the Heaven which must be full of them Whence it 's easie to conclude they must be bruis'd and broken in moving every way and thus they cannot render Objects visible Moreover one may see from the same place or point a great number of Objects in the Heavens and on the Earth therefore the Species of these Objects can be reduc'd into a Point But they are impenetrable since they are extended Therefore c. But one may not only see a multitude of very great and vast Objects There is no Point in all the great Spaces of the World from whence we cannot discover an almost infinite number of Objects and even Objects as large as the Sun Moon and the Heavens there is therefore no Point in all the World where the Species of all these things ought not to meet which is against all appearance of Truth The Second Reason is taken from the Change which happens in the Species Such as would know how all impressions of Visible Objects however epposite may be communicatedwithout being weaken'd may read Monsicur Descartes his Dioptricks it 's evident that the nearer any Object is the greater its Species ought to be since we see the Object 's greater But what is yet more difficult to conceive according to their Opinion is That if we look upon this Object with a Telescope or a Microscope the Species immediately becomes Six Hundred times as great as it was before for 't is yet more difficultly conceiv'd from what Parts it can grow so great in an instant The Third Reason is when we look upon a perfect Cube all the Species of its Sides are unequal nevertheless we see all the Sides equally Square So when we consider Ellipses and Parallelograms in a Picture which cannot but emit like Species yet we see Circles and Squares This manifestly shews that it is not necessary that the Object beheld should emit Species like it self that it may be seen In fine it cannot be conceiv'd how it can be that a Body which does not sensibly diminish should always emit Species on every Side which should continually fill all the great Spaces about it and that with an inconceivable swiftness For an Object that was hidden in that Instant that it discovers it self may be seen many Millions of Leagues on all Sides and what appears yet more strange is that Bodies in great Motion as Air and some others have not that power of pushing outwards these Images which resemble them as the more gross and quiescent Bodies such as the Earth Stones and generally all hard Bodies have But I shall not stay any longer to enumerate all the contrary Reasons to their Opinion there would be no end a very ordinary Judgment would raise innumerable Objections Those that we have brought are sufficient though they were not so necessary after what has been said upon the Subject of the First Book where the Errors of the Senses were explain'd But there are so great a number of Philosophers wedded to this Opinion that we believe it will be necessary to say something to encline them to reflect upon their own Thoughts CHAP. III. That the Soul has no power of producing Idea's The Cause of Mens Error in reference to this Subject THe Second Opinion is that of those who believe our Souls have any power of producing the Idea's of such things as they will think upon and they are excited to produce them by the Impressions which Objects make upon Bodies although these Impressions are not Images like the Objects which cause them they believe that 't is in this that Man is made after the Image of God and participates of his Power That even as God Created all things out of nothing and can reduce them to nothing again and then Create them anew so Man can Create and Annihilate the Idea's of all things as he pleases But there is great Reasons to distrust all these Opinions which extol a Man these are the Common Thoughts which arise from a vain and proud Original and which the Father of Light hath not inspir'd This participation of the power of God which Men boast of having to represent Objects and of doing many other particular actions is a participation which seems to relate to something of independance as independance is commonly explain'd it is also a Chimerical Participation which Mens Ignorance and Vanity make them to imagine They depend much more than they think upon the Goodness and Mercy of God But this is not a place to explain these things It 's enough if we endeavour to shew that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of things which they perceive No one can doubt that Idea's are real Beings since they have real Properties since they differ from one another and represent all different things Nor can we reasonably doubt that they are Spiritual and very different from the Bodies which they represent But it seems reasonable to doubt whether Idea's by whose means we see Bodies are not more Noble than the Bodies themselves for indeed the Intelligible World must be more perfect than the Material and Earthly as we shall see hereafter Thus when we affirm that we have the Power of Forming such Idea's as we please we shall be in danger of perswading our selves to make more Noble and Perfect Beings than the World which God hath Created However some do not reflect upon it because they imagin that an Idea is Nothing since it is not to be felt or else if they look upon it as a Being 't is a very mean contemptible one because they imagin it to be annihilated as soon as it is no longer present to the Mind But supposing it true that Idea's were only little contemptible Beings yet they are Beings and Spiritual Ones and Men not having the power of Believing it follows that they cannot produce them for the production of Idea's after the manner before explain'd is a true Creation and although Men endeavour to palliate and mollifie the hardness of this Opinion by saying that the production of Idea's presupposes something else but Creation
Creatures but all Creatures only subsist by him The last Proof which perhaps will be a Demonstration to those that are used to abstracted Arguments is this It is impossible that God should have any other principal End of his Actions but himself It is a Notion that is common to all Men that are capable of any Reflection and Holy Writ does not allow us to doubt but that God has made every thing for himself Therefore it is necessary that not only our Natural Love I mean the Motion he produces in our Mind should tend towards him But moreover That the Knowledge and the Light which he bestows upon it should make us know any thing that is in him for whatever comes from God can only be for God Should God Create a Spirit and give it for an Idea or for the immediate Object of its knowledge the Sun In my Opinion God would Create that Spirit and the Idea of that Spirit for the Sun and not for him God cannot therefore Create a Spirit to know his Works unless that Spirit sees God in some measure by beholding his Works So that we may say that unless we do see God in some measure we should see nothing In like manner unless we do Love God I mean unless God did continually Imprint in us the Love of Good in general we should Love nothing For that Love being our Will we can Love nothing nor Will any thing without him since we cannot Love particular Goods without determining towards those Goods the motion of Love which God gives us towards him So that as we Love nothing but by the necessary Love we have for God so we see nothing but by the Natural Knowledge we have of God And all the particular Idea's we have of Creatures are only Limitations of the Idea of the Creator as all the Motions of the Will for the Creatures are only determinations of the motion for the Creator I believe there are no Divines but what will grant that the Impious Love God with that Natural Love I speak of And St. Austin and some other Fathers affirm as an undeniable thing That the Impious behold in God the Rule of Manners and Eternal Truths So that the Opinion I explain ought not to trouble any Body Thus St. Austin speaks L. 14. de Trin. c. 3. Ab illa incommutabili luce veritatis etiam impius dum ab ea avertitur quodammodo tangitur Hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant aeternitatem multa rectè riprehendunt rectéque laudant in hominum moribus Quibus ea tandem regulis judicant nisi in quibus vident quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat etiam si nec ipsi eodem modo vivant Vbi autem eas vident Neque enim in sua natura Nam cùm procul dubio mente ista videantur corumque mentes constet esse mutabiles has vero regula◠immutabiles videat quisquis in eis hoc videre potuerit ubinam ergo sunt istae regulae Scriptae nisi in libro lucis illius quae veritas dicitur unde lex omnis justa describitur inqua videt quid operandum sit etiam qui operatur injustitiam ipse est qui ab illa luce avertitur à qua tamen tangitur There are many passages in St. Austin like unto this by which he proves that we see God even in this Life by the knowledge we have of Eternal Truths Truth is uncreated Immutable Immense Eternal above all things It is true by it self It derives its Perfection from nothing It makes Creatures more perfect and all Spirits naturally endeavour to know it Nothing but God can have all those Perfections Therefore Truth is God We see some of those Immutable Eternal Truths Therefore we see God These are St. Austin's Reasons ours differ a little from them and we are unwilling to use the Authority of so great a Man unjustly to second our Sentiment We believe that Truths even those that are Eternal as that twice two are four are not so much as absolute Beings So far are we from believing that they are in God For it is visible that that Truth only consists in a relation of Equality which is between twice Two and Four Therefore we do not say that we see God in seeing Truths as St. Austin says but in seeing the Idea's of those Truths For Idea's are real but the Equality between the Idea's which is Truth has no reality When for example Men say that the Cloth they measure contains Three Yards the Cloth and the Yards are real But the Equality between Three Yards and the Cloth is not a real Being it is only a relation that is between the Three Yards and the Cloth When we say that twice Two are Four the Idea's of the Numbers are real but the Equality there is between them is only a Relation Thus according to our Sentiment we see God when we see Eternal Truths not that those Eternal Truths are God but because the Idea's on which those Truths depend are in God perhaps St. Austin understood it so We also believe that we know in God Changeable and Corrubtible things although St. Austin only speaks of Immutable and Incorruptible things because it is not necessary for that to place any Imperfection in God since it suffices as we have already said that God should shew us what there is in him that has a Relation to these things But though I say we see in God the things that are Material and Sensible it must be observ'd that I do not say we have a Sensation of them in God but only that it is from God who Acts in us for God Knows sensible things but he does not Feel them When we perceive any thing that is sensible Sensation and pure Idea is in our Perception Sensation is a Modification of our Soul and it is God that Causes it in us And he may Cause it though he has it not because he sees in the Idea he has of our Soul that it is capable of it As for the Idea which is joyn'd to Sensation it is in God we see it because it is his pleasure to discover it to us And God joins Sensation to the Idea when Objects are present to the end that we may believe them as they are and that we may have such Sensations and Passions as we ought to have in relation to them Lastly We believe that all Spirits see the Eternal Laws as well as other things in God but with some difference They know the Eternal Order and Eternal Truths and even the Beings which God has made according to those Truths or according to the Order by the Union which those Spirits have necessarily with the Word or Wisdom of God which directs them as we have shewn But 't is by the Impression they receive continually from the Will of God which inclines them to him and endeavours as it were to render their Will absolutely like unto his that they know
they do not pretend to Judge of them It is no defect in a limited Mind not to know certain things it is only a defect to pretend to Judge of them Ignorance is a necessary Evil but we may and ought to avoid Error Therefore I do not condemn Men for being Ignorant of many things but only for giving rash Judgments about those things When things have a great relation to us are sensible V That our Ignorance is exceeding great in respect of abstracted things or such as have but little relation to us and fall easily within the Compass of our Imagination we may say that the Mind applies it self to them and may have some knowledge of them For when we know that things have a relation to us we think upon them with some Inclination and when we find that they concern us we apply our selves to them with pleasure So that we should be more Learned than we are in many things if the uneasiness and tossing of our Will did not Disturb and Fatigue our Attention continually But when things are abstract and not very sensible it is difficult to attain any certain knowledge of them Not that abstracted things are very intricate but because the Attention and Sight of the Mind begins and Ends commonly with the sensible Prospect of Objects for we seldom think on any thing but what we see and feel and only as long as we see and feel it It is most certain that if the Mind could easily apply it self to clear and distinct Idea's without being any-wise byass'd by Opinion and if the uneasiness of the Will did not continually disturb its Application we should meet no great difficulties in many Natural Questions which we look upon as not to be Explain'd and we might easily be deliver'd of our Ignorance and Errors in relation to them For Example It is an undeniable Truth to any Man of Sense that Creation and Annihilation are things which surpass the common force of Nature Therefore if Men did remain Attentive to that pure Notion of the Mind and Reason they would not so easily admit the Creation and Annihilation of an infinite Number of New Beings as of Substantial Forms real Qualities and Faculties They would look into the distinct Idea's we have of Extension Figure and Motion for the reason of Natural Effects which is not always so difficult as People imagin all things in Nature are so connected together and prove each other The Effects of Fire as those of Canon and of Mines are very Surprising and their cause not very well known Nevertheless if Men instead of relying on the Impressions of their Senses and on some false or deceitful Experiments did firmly fix on that bare Notion of the Mind alone That it is not possible for a Body that is very little agitated to produce a violent Motion since it can communicate no more moving Power than it has its self it would be easie from that alone to conclude that there is a Subtle and Invisible Matter that it is very much agitated and dispers'd int h all Bodies and several other like things which would teach us the Nature of Fire and also be of great use to us to discover other Truths yet more conceal'd For since Canons and Mines have such great Motions and all the Visible Bodies about them are not in a sufficient Agitation to produce them it is a certain proof that there are other Invisible and Insensible Bodies which have at least as much Agitation as the Canon Ball But with being very Subtle and Thin may alone freely pass and without breaking through the Pores of the Canon before it is Fir'd that is as Monsieur Descartes has explain'd it more at large before their having surrounded the hard and gross parts of the Salt-petre of which the Powder is Compos'd But when the Fire is put to it that is when those subtle and extreamly agitated Particles have surrounded the gross and solid Parts of the Salt-petre and have thus Communicated their very strong and violent Motion to them then all does Burst of necessity because the Pores of the Canon which left an open passage on all sides for the subtle Parts before mention'd while they were alone are not large enough to make way for the gross Parts of the Salt-petre and some others of which the Powder is Compos'd when they have receiv'd into themselves the Agitation of the Subtle Parts which surrounds them For as the Water of Rivers which flows under Bridges does not shake them by reason of the smallness of its Particles Thus the very subtle and very thin Matter I have mention'd passes continually through the Pores of all Bodies without making any sensible Alterations in them But then likewise as the said River is capable of breaking down a Bridge when carrying along with it some great Flakes of Ice or some other more solid Bodies by forcing them against it with its own Motion so subtle Matter is capable of producing the surprising Effects we see in Canons and in Mines when having communicated to the Parts of the Powder which Float in the midst of it its Motion which is infinitely more Violent and more Rapid than that of Rivers and Torrents the said Parts of the Powder cannot freely pass through the Pores of the Bodies which enclose them by reason they are too gross so that they violently break them to force them a free Passage But Men do not easily apprehend those subtle small Particles which they repute Chimera's because they do not see them Contemplatio ferè definit cum aspectu says Bacon The greater part even of Philosophers invent some New Entity rather than not to talk upon those matters which they are Ignorant of And if any Body objects against their false and incomprehensible Suppositions that Fire must needs be compos'd of Parts that are in very great Agitation since it produces such Violent Motions and that a thing cannot Communicate that which it has not which is undoubtedly a most clear and most solid Objection They confound all by some frivolous Imaginary distinction as that of Equivocal and Univocal Causes in order to seem to say something though in reality they say nothing For it is a general Notion among Men of Sense and Learning that there can be no real Equivocal Cause in Nature and that it has been invented meerly by the Ignorance of Men. Therefore Men must apply themselves more to the consideration of clear and distinct Notions if they have a mind to understand Nature They must check and stop the Inconstancy and Levity of their Will a little if they design to penetrate deeply into things for their Mind will ever be weak superficial and discursive while their Will remains Light Inconstant and Roving It is true it requires some Fatigue and Men must constrain themselves to become Attentive and to search into the bottom of things for there is nothing to be got without pains It is shameful for Men of Sense and
Libertines and of Hereticks proceeds from their doubting of the Truth of the Decisions of the Church because they are not Evident and they hope that the Truths of Faith may be demonstrated Now their Love for Novelty is Irregular since that possessing the Truth in the Faith of the Church they ought not to seek farther Besides the Truths of Faith being far above the reach of their Understanding they would not be able to discover them supposing that according to their False Opinion the Church were guilty of Error But if there are many who deceive themselves in refusing to submit to the Authority of the Church there are as many who are deceiv'd in submitting to the Authority of Men. We must submit to the Authority of the Church because it can never submit Blindly to the Authority of Men because they are always liable to Mistakes What the Church teaches us is Infinitely above the reach of Reason What Men teach us is submitted to our Reason So that as it is a Crime and an Insupportable Vanity to endeavour to find out the Truth in Matters of Faith by our Reason without regarding the Authority of the Church So it is a great Indiscretion and a despicable poorness of Spirit to rely blindly on the Authority of Men in Things which relate to Reason Nevertheless most of those that are esteem'd Learned Men in the World have only acquir'd that Reputation by knowing the Opinions of Aristotle of Plato of Epicurus and of some other Philosophers by Heart by submitting blindly to their Sentiments and by defending them with Obstinacy In order to obtain the Reputation of Learning in the Universities it is sufficient to be acquainted with the Sentiments of some Philosopher Provided they will Swear In Verba Magistri they soon become Doctors Most Communities stick to a peculiar Doctrine which the Members are not allow'd to deviate from What is True in some is often False in others They are sometimes Proud of defending the Doctrine of their Order against Reason and Experience and they think themselves oblig'd to wrest the Truth or their Authors to reconcile them This produces a World of Frivolous Distinctions which are so many by ways that lead Infallibly to Error If any Truth is discover'd even in our days Aristotle must have seen it or if Aristotle be against it the Discovery must be False Some make that Philosopher speak one way others another for all those who pretend to Learning make him speak their Language He is made the Author of all sorts of Impertinencies and few Discoveries are made which are not found Enigmatically in some corner or other of his Books In a word he is ever contradicting himself if not in his Works yet at least in the Mouths of those that teach him For though Philosophers protest and even pretend to teach his Doctrine it is difficult to meet two that agree about his Sentiments For indeed Aristotle's Books are so Obscure and fill'd with such rambling general Terms that one may with some Appearance of Truth impute to him the Opinions of those that are most opposite to his It is easie to make him say whatever one has a mind to in some of his Works because he hardly says any thing in them though he makes a great deal of Noise as Children suppose the Sounds of the Bells to say what they please because they make a great deal of Noise and say nothing I must confess that it seems very Rational to fix and to stop the Mind on some particular Opinions to hinder it from running out into Extravagancies But what then Must it needs be done by Falshood and Error Or rather can any one believe that Error can fix the Mind Let Men examine how difficult it is to find Persons of Sense pleased with the reading of Aristotle and that can perswade themselves they have acquir'd any true Science even after having grown old on his Books and it will appear plainly that nothing but Truth and Evidence can fix the Agitations of the Mind and that Disputes Aversions Errors and even Heresies are entertain'd and encourag'd by an Ill Manner of Study Truth consists in Individuality it is not capable of Variety and nothing besides it can reconcile Peoples Minds Falshood and Error only serve to divide and agitate them I do not question but there are some who do verily believe that he they call the Prince of Philosophers is no-wise in an Error and that Real and Solid Philosophy are only to be found in his Works There are some who fancy that though it is Two thousand Years since Aristotle wrote no body has yet been able to discover that he was guilty of any Error and consequently being in some respects Infallible they may boldly follow him and quote him as such But I do not think it worth my while to answer such Persons because their Ignorance is so gross that it only deserves Contempt I only desire them to tell me whether Aristotle or any of his Disciples have ever deduced any Truths from the Principles of Natural Philosophy which may be called his or if they or any of them have done it themselves let them declare it let them explain it and let them prove it and we do engage our selves never more to speak of Aristotle without an Elogy we will no longer say that his Principles are Useless since they have served to prove one Truth but there is no reason to expect it They were long since challeng'd to do it and particularly by Monsieur Descartes in his Metaphysical Meditations about Forty Years ago even with a Promise to demonstrate the Falsity of that Pretended Truth And there is no great likelihood to believe that any body will ever presume to do what Monsieur Descartes greatest Enemies and the most Zealous Defenders of Aristotle's Philosophy have not hitherto dar'd to undertake Therefore I hope I may presume to say that it is a strange Blindness Poorness of Mind and Stupidity of Spirit thus to submit to the Authority of Aristotle of Plato or of any other Philosopher whatever That People lose their time in reading them when their only Design is to get their Opinions by Heart and those that teach them make their Disciples lose theirs likewise Therefore give me leave to say with St. Austin * Quis tam Stulte curiosus est qui filium suum mittat in Scholam ut quid Magister cogitet discat Aug. de Magistro That those are Foolishly Curious who send their Sons to the College in order to learn the Sentiments of their Master That Philosophers cannot instruct us by their own Authority and if they pretend to do it they are Unjust That it is a kind of Folly and Impiety to Swear their Defence Solemnly And finally those Injustly confine Truth who out of Interest oppose the new Opinions of Philosophy which may be True to preserve those which are sufficiently known to be False or Useless CHAP. IV. A Continuation of the
things which are absolutely necessary to be known to have some Justness and Penetration of Mind And we may say That if a Stupid Ignorant Man is Infinitely above Matter because he knows that he is which Matter does not know those who know Man are far above Stupid Ignorant Persons by reason that they know what they are which the others do not know But the Knowledge of Man is not only Valuable because it raises us above others it is much more so because it humbles us before God That Knowledge makes us perfectly Sensible of the Dependence we have on him in all things and even in our most common Actions It plainly discovers the Corruption of our Nature It disposes us to apply our selves to him who alone can cure us to rely wholly on him and not to trust or rely on our selves And thus it gives many Dispositions of Mind which are very proper to submit our selves to the Grace of the Gospel We ought at least to have a Superficial Tincture and a general Knowledge of the Mathematicks and of Nature We ought to learn those Sciences in our Youth they disingage the Mind from Sensible Things and hinder it from becoming Weak and Effeminate They are useful enough in Life they incline us towards God the Knowledge of Nature does it of it self and that of the Mathematicks by the Disgust it Inspires in us of the False Impressions of our Senses Virtuous Persons must not despise those Sciences nor look upon them as Uncertain and Useless unless they are certain that they have studied them enough to judge Solidly of them There are many others which they may boldly Despise Let them Condemn the Poets to the Flames Heathen Philosophers Rabbies some Historians and a great Number of Authors which make the Pride and Knowledge of some of the Learned we shall be little troubled at it But let them not Condemn the Knowledge of Nature as being contrary to Religion since Nature being regulated by the Will of God the true Knowledge of Nature teaches us how to admire the Power Grandeur and Wisdom of God For it seems that God has form'd the Universe in order that we should Study it and that by that Study we should learn to Know and to Respect the Author of it So that those who Condemn the Study of Nature seem to oppose the Will of God unless they pretend that Sin has rendred Man Incapable of that Study It is also Vain for them to tell us That the Knowledge of Men only serves to make them Proud and Vain because those who have the Reputation of having a perfect Knowledge of Man though they often know him Ill are commonly Intolerably Proud For it is evident That no Man can know himself well without being Sensible of his Weakness and Miseries Neither are they Persons of a real and solid Piety that usually condemn what they do not understand III. Of the false Judgments of the Superstitious and Hypocrites but rather Superstitious and Hypocrites The Superstitious out of a servile Fear and through a baseness and weakness of Mind are startled at the sight of a lively penetrating Wit Do but for Example give them Natural Reasons for Thunder and for its Effects and they look upon you strait as an Atheist But the Hypocrites out of a Hellish Malice transform themselves into Angels of Light They make use of the appearances of holy Truths which are reverenc'd by all the World to oppose Truths which are but little known and little valu'd out of private Interest They Combat Truth with the Image of Truth and often in their Hearts Laugh at what all the World Respects they establish in the Opinion of Men a Reputation which is so much the more solid and to be fear'd as the thing they abuse is the more Sacred Therefore those Persons are the strongest and most formidable Enemies of Truth Indeed they are pretty rare but a small number of them is capable of doing a great deal of harm The appearance of Truth and of Virtue often does more mischief than Truth and Virtue do good for one cunning Hypocrite is capable to overthrow what several truly Wise and Virtuous Persons have rais'd with a great deal of Pain and Labour Monsieur Descartes for instance has demonstratively prov'd the Existence of a God the Immortality of our Souls several other Metaphysical Questions a great number of Physical Ones and this Age is infinitely oblig'd to him for the Truths he has discover'd Yet here starts up an * Voetius inconsiderable Man a hot and vehement Exclaimer respected by some People for the Zeal he expresses for their Religion He Writes Injurious Books against him and accuses him of the highest Crimes Descartes is a Catholick he has studied under the Jesuits he has often mention'd them with Reverence That is sufficient for that malicious Man to perswade People that are Enemies to our Religion and easily mov'd in matters so Nice as those of Religion that he is an Emissary of the Jesuits and has dangerous Designs Because the least appearances of Truth upon matters of Faith have more Force upon Peoples Minds than real and effective Truths of Physical or Meraphysical things have which are little valu'd Monsieur Descartes has written about the Existence of God That is matter enough for that Calumniator to exercise his false Zeal upon and to oppose all the Truths his Enemy defends He accuses him of being an Atheist and of teaching Atheism cunningly and secretly like that infamous Atheist call'd Vanino who was Burnt at Thoulouse who Cloak'd his Malice and Impiety by Writing for the Existence of a God for one of the Reasons urg'd by him to prove his Enemy an Atheist is That he did Write against Atheists as Vanino did in order to cover his Impiety Thus it is easie for a Man to oppress Truth when he is seconded by the appearances of Truth and has acquir'd a great Ascendent over weak Minds Truth delights in Mildness and in Peace and as strong as it is it yields sometimes to the Pride and Haughtiness of Falshoods which Dresses and Arms it self with her Appearances Truth is very sensible that Error can never harm it and if it remains sometimes as if it were prescrib'd and in Obscurity it is only to wait for more favourable occasions to show its self for at last it appears for the most part stronger and brighter than ever in the very place where it is oppress'd I do not wonder that an Enemy of Monsieur Descartes that a Man of a different Religion from his that an Ambitious Man who design'd to rise upon the Ruins of Persons that are above him that a Railer without Judgment that Voetius should speak with Contempt of what he neither did nor could understand But I am surpris'd to find that Persons who are neither Enemies to Monsieur Descartes nor to his Religion should entertain Sentiments of Aversion and Contempt against him upon the account of the Calumnies
they have read in Books written by the Enemies of his Person and of his Religion The Book written by that Heretick intitled Desperata causa Papatus sufficiently shews his Impudence his Ignorance and his Passion and his desire to appear Zealous in order thereby to acquire some Reputation among those of his Party Therefore he is not a Man to be credited upon his Word For as there is no reason to believe all the Fables he has Collected in that Book against our Religion so neither is there any to Credit the Injurious Accusations he has invented against his Enemy Rational Men will not suffer themselves to be perswaded that Monsieur Descartes is a dangerous Man because they have read 〈◊〉 in some Book or other or because they have been 〈◊〉 so by Persons whose Piety they have a Respect for It is not lawful to believe Men upon their bâ—re Word when they accuse others of the most Enormous Crimes It is not a sufficient proof to believe a thing because we hear it affirm'd by a Man who speaks with Zeal and Gravity For it is impossible for any Person to relate Falsities and Foolish Stories in the same manner as he would relate good things particularly if he has suffer'd himself to be impos'd upon out of Simplicity and Weakness It is easie to discover the Truth or Falsity of the Accusations that are form'd against Descartes his Writings are Extant and easie to be understood by those that are capable of Attention Therefore I would advise People to Read his Works in order to get better Proofs against him than bare Report and I do not question but after they have read and examin'd them they will no longer Accuse him of Atheism and that on the contrary they will pay him the Respect that is due to a Man who has plainly and evidently demonstrated not only the Existence of a God and the Immortality of the Soul but also a World of other Truths which were unknown until his time CHAP. VII Of the desire of Science and of the Judgments of pretenders to Learning THe Mind of Man has without doubt very little Capacity and Extent and yet he desires to know every thing All Human Sciences cannot satifie his Desires and yet his Capacity is so confin'd that he cannot perfectly apprehend any one particular Science He is in a continual Agitation and desires always to know whether he be in hopes of finding what he looks for as we have said in the preceding Chapter or whether he perswades himself that his Soul and Mind are extended by the vain possession of some extraordinary Knowledge The unruly desire of Happiness and Grandeur makes him study all manner of Sciences hoping to find his Felicity in the Science of Morality and looking for this false Greatness in speculative Sciences What is the reason that some Persons spend all their Life in reading of Rabbi's and other Books Written in Foreign Obscure and Corrupted Languages and by Authors without Judgment and Knowledge But that they perswade themselves that when they are skill'd in the Oriental Languages they are greater and higher than those who are Ignorant of them And what is it that can encourage them in their ingrateful painful useless Labour unless it be the Hope of some Preferment and the Prospect of some new Grandeur Indeed they are look'd upon as extraordinary Men they are Complimented upon their profound Learning People are better pleas'd to hear them than others And though it may be said that they are commonly the least Judicious if it were only for employing all their Life in a very useless Study which can neither make them Wiser nor Happier Nevertheless most People fancy that they have a great deal more Sense and Judgment than others And as they are more Larn'd in the Etymology of Words they also fancy that they are Learn'd in the Nature of Things The same reason induces Astronomers to spend all their Time and Estate to get an exact Knowledge of Things which are not only useless but also impossible to know They endeavour to find an exact Regularity in the Course of the Planets which is not in Nature and to Form Astronomical Schemes to foretel Effects of which they do not know the Causes They have made the Selenography or Geography of the Moon as if People design'd to Travel thither They have already divided it among those that are Famous in Astronomy There are few of them that have not already some Province or other in that Country as a Recompence for their great Labour and I question whether they are not Proud of having been in Favour with him that has so magnificently distributed those Kingdoms among them What is the reason that Rational Men apply themselves so much to this Science and yet remain in gross Errors in respect to Truths which they ought to know unless they Fancy thas it is a great thing to know what passes in the Heavens The knowledge of the Vast Things that passes above seems to them more Noble Greater and more worthy of their great Wit than the knowledge of Vile Abjects Corruptible Things as Sublunary Bodies are in their Opinion The Nobleness of a Science is deriv'd from the Nobleness of its Objects It is a great Principle Therefore the knowledge of the Motion of unalterable and incorruptible Bodies is the highest and most sublime of all Sciences And for that reason it appears to them worthy of the Greatness and Excellency of their Mind Thus Men suffer themselves to be blinded by a false Idea of Grandeur which pleases and moves them As soon as their Imagination is struck by it they fall down before that Phantasm they Reverence it it destroys and blinds their Reason which should be the Judge of it Men seem to Dream when they Judge of the Objects of their Passions to have no Eyes and to want Common Sense For in fine where lies the Excellency of the knowledge of the Motions of the Planets and have we not a sufficient knowledge of it already since we know how to regulate our Months and our Years What does it concern us to know whether Saturn is surrounded by a Ring or by a great number of little Moons and why should we Dispute about it Why should any one be proud of having foretold the greatness of an Eclipse which perhaps he has hit better upon than another because he has had more Luck There are persons appointed by the King's Order to observe the Stars let us rely upon their Observations They may reasonably apply themselves to it for they do it out of Duty It is their business They do it with Success for they employ all their Time about it with Art Application and all the Exactness imaginable They want nothing in order to succeed in it Therefore we ought to be fully satisfy'd upon a matter which concerns us so little when they impart their Discoveries to us Anatomy is a very good Study since it is a thing of
are more Common and more Intelligible and Books of Astrology of the Caballa and of Magick than good Books as if they were not Sensible that Reading being the same thing as Conversation they should endeavour to show that they have taken care to read good Books and such as are most Intelligible and not such as are bad and Obscure For as it would argue a Depravation of Mind to be fond of Conversing commonly with Men we do not understand without an Interpreter when it is in our Power to inform our selves otherwise of what we desire to know So it is Ridiculous to read only such Books as cannot be understood without a Dictionary when the same things may be learn'd in those that are more Intelligible And as it is a Sign of Madness to affect the Company and Conversation of Impious Persons so it is the Character of a corrupted Heart to delight in the reading of ill Books But it is an Extravagant piece of Pride to be willing to perswade that one has read even those that one has not read which nevertheless is pretty frequent For there are Persons that are but Thirty Years of Age that quote more Ill Books in their Works than they could have read in several Ages and yet they will perswade others they have read them with great Exactness But most of the Books of certain Learned Men are only compil'd by dint of Dictionaries and they have hardly read any thing beyond the Contents of the Books they quote or some Common Places collected out of different Authors I dare not particularly enlarge upon those things nor give Examples of them for fear of offending Persons so Haughty and so Splenatick as those Pretenders to Learning are for there is no Delight in being abus'd in Greek and Arabick Moreover It is not very Material in order to render what I say the more Sensible to give particular Proofs of it Men being naturally enough inclin'd to find Fault with the Conduct of others and to apply what has been said In the mean time let them please themselves with that vain Phantasm of Grandeur and let them give each other the Applauses which we refuse to give them We have perhaps already disturb'd them too much in an Injoyment which seems so Sweet and so Delightful to them CHAP. IX How the Inclination we have for Honours and Riches leads us to Error HOnours and Riches as well as Virtue and Sciences which we have been speaking of are the Principal things that raise us above other Men for our Being seems to Agrandize and become Independent by the Possession of these Advantages So that the Love we bear our selves carrying it self naturally to Honours and Riches we may affirm at least that all People have some Inclination towards them Let us explain in few words how these Inclinations hinder us from finding out Truth and engage us into Falsehood and Error We have shown in divers Places that a great deal of Time Pains Assiduity and Industry of Mind are required to discover Truths that are compos'd and surrounded with Difficulties and which depend on many Principles From thence it is easie to conclude That Publick Persons who have great Imployments great Estates to govern and great Affairs to manage and who much Covet Honours and Riches are not very fit to Search after these Truths and that they often are guilty of Error in relation to Things that are not easily known when they set up for Judges of them 1. Because they have but very little Time to imploy in Search of Truth 2. That commonly they do not delight in it 3. Since they are not very capable of Attention because the Capacity of their Mind is divided by the multitude of the Idea's of such things as they desire and to which they are oblig'd to apply themselves 4. Because they think they know every thing and are not easily perswaded that their Inferiours can have a greater share of Reason than they have for though they are willing to learn some things of them they are unwilling to be instructed by them in solid and necessary Truths They fly out into a Passion when any Body contradicts and undeceives them 5. Since all their Imaginations are commonly applauded though never so false and opposite to Common Sense and that Men Laugh at those that are not of their Opinion though they maintain undeniable Truths The sordid Flatteries of those that are about them confirm them in their Errors and in the false Esteem they have of themselves and so encourages them to judge boldly of all things 6. Because they seldom fix on any but sensible Notions which are fitter for Common Conversations and to preserve the Esteem of Men than the pure Idea's of the Mind which serve to discover Truth 7. Since those who aspire to any Dignity endeavour as much as they can to suit themselves to the Capacity of others because nothing Excites the Envy and Aversion of Men so much as too uncommon Sentiments It is very difficult for those whose Mind and Heart is taken up with the Thoughts and Desires of making their Fortune to discover difficult Truths and when they do find out any they often abandon them out of Interest because the Defence of those Truths does not suit with their Ambition Men must often Wink at Injustice to become Magistrates a solid and uncommon Piety often hinders a Man from obtaining the Goods of Fortune and the generous Love of Truth often deprives Men of the Pulpit where Truth ought to be Taught All these Reasons joyn'd together make Men that are much above others by their Dignities Nobility and Riches or such who only think of rising and making their Fortune very liable to Error and little capable of discovering hidden Truths For among those things that are necessary to avoid Error in Questions that are somewhat difficult there are two principal ones that are not commonly met with in the persons we are speaking of viz. Attention of Mind to Penetrate into the Bottom of Things and Wisdom enough not to Judge of them Rashly Even those that are chosen to Teach others and whose Business it is to Inform themselves in order to instruct those that are committed to their Care commonly become liable to Error as soon as they become Publick Persons Either because that having very little time they are incapable of Attention and applying themselves to things which require a great deal of time or because that being earnestly desirous to appear great Scholars they boldly decide all things without the least Consideration and will hardly suffer any Body to Oppose and to Instruct them CHAP. X. Of the Love of Pleasure in relation to Morality I. We must shun Pleasure though it make us Happy II. It must not incline us to the Love of Sensible Delights WE have spoken in the three preceding Chapters of the Inclination we have towards the preservation of our Being and how it occasions our falling into many Errors We will
we Love him because we know that he is Amiable And that Love is worthy of us because that being Reasonable we ought to Love that which Reason informs us to be worthy of our Love But we Love Sensible Things by a Love that is unworthy of us and which they are also unworthy of For being Reasonable we Love them without any Reason to Love them since we do not clearly know that they are Lovely and on the contrary we know they are not so But Pleasures Seduce us and make us Love them the Blind and Irregular Love of Pleasure being the real Cause of those False Judgments of Men in Subjects of Morality CHAP. XI Of the Love of Pleasure in relation to Speculative Sciences I. How it hinders us from discovering Truth II. Some Examples THE Inclination we have for Sensible Pleasures being disorder'd is not only the Source of the Dangerous Errors we fall into in cases of Morality and the general Causes of the Depravation of our Manners it is also one of the Principal Causes of the Disorder of our Reason and it engages us Insensibly into very gross Errors but less dangerous upon Subjects that are meerly Speculative because the said Inclination hinders us from having a sufficient Attention for things that do not affect us to apprehend them and to judge well of them We have already spoken in several places of the Difficulty Men find in applying themselves to Subjects that are a little uncommon because the Matter we treated of then requir'd it We spoke of it towards the end of the first Book in showing that the Sensible Idea's affecting the Soul more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind it often applied it self more to the Manner than the Thing it self We spoke of it in the Second because in treating of the Delicacy of the Fibers of the Brain we show'd whence the Softness of certain Effeminate Minds did proceed Finally We spoke of it in the Third in mentioning of the Attention of the Mind when we were about proving that our Soul had but little Attention to Things that were meerly Speculative but a great deal more to such as affect it and make it Sensible of Pleasure or Grief Our Errors have commonly several Causes which contribute all to their Rise So that we must not imagine that it is for want of Order that we sometimes repeat almost the same things and that we impute several Causes to the same Errors it is because there are really many I speak still of occasional Causes for we have often declar'd that there are no other Real and True but the ill use of our Liberty which we do not always make use of so much as we might as we have explain'd at the beginning of this Work No body ought to blame us if in order to make Men plainly conceive how for Example the Sensible Manner in which things are cover'd does Surprise and makes us liable to fall into Error we have been oblig'd to say before-hand in the other Books that we had an Inclination for Pleasures which seems necessary to be repeated in this which treats of Natural Inclinations and the same of some other things in other places All the Harm it will occasion is that there will be no necessity to say many things here which we should have been oblig'd to explain if it had not been done elsewhere All things that are in Man are so dependant on one another that we find our selves often overwhelm'd under the number of things we are to treat of at one and the same time to explain perfectly what we conceive We are sometimes necessitated not to divide things that are joyn'd by Nature one to another and to proceed contrary to the order we had prescrib'd when that order occasions nothing but Confusion as it happens of necessity on some occasions Yet for all this it is impossible to give others an Idea of all we think of All that we can commonly pretend to is to put others in a way to discover with Pleasure and Ease what we have discover'd with great Labour and Pains And whereas it is Impossible to discover any thing without Attention we must particularly study the Means to make others Attentive 'T is what we have endeavour'd to do though we acknowledge we have perform'd it weakly and we own our Faults the more willingly to the end that the said Confession may excite those who shall read this to render themselves Attentive of their own accord in order to remedy the same and to penetrate to the bottom of these Subjects which without doubt deserve to be well consider'd The Errors into which the Inclination we have for Pleasure and generally for all things that affect us engage us are Infinite because the said Inclination dissipates the Sight of the Mind and it applies it continually on the confus'd Idea's of the Senses and the Imagination and it inclines us to judge of all things rashly by the bare relation they have to us I. How it hinders us from discovering Truth We never see Truth until we see things as they are and we never see them as they are unless we see them in him that contains them after an Intelligible manner When we see things our selves we only see them very Imperfectly or rather we only see our own Sentiments and not the Things we are desirous to see and which we falsely imagine we do see It requires a great deal of Application to see things as they are in themselves because it is now impossible for Man to unite himself to God without Pain and Labour To see things in our selves requires no Application on our part since we feel what touches us even against our Will Naturally we find no anticipating Pleasure in the Union we have with God the pure Idea's of things do not move us Therefore the Inclination we have for Pleasure does neither apply nor unite us to God on the contrary it weans and removes us from him For that Inclination induces us continually to consider things by their Sensible Idea's because those False and Impure Idea's affect us The Love of Pleasure and the actual Injoyment of Pleasure which revives and increases our Love for it removes us continually from Truth to cast us into Error Therefore those that are desirous to draw near to Truth to be guided by its Light must begin by laying aside Pleasure They must carefully avoid whatever affects and agreeably divides the Mind for the Senses and Passions must be silenc'd in order to hear the Word of Truth it being necessary to withdraw our Affections from the World and to condemn all Sensible Things as well for the Perfection of the Mind as for the Conversion of the Heart When our Pleasures are great when our Sentiments are lively we are not capable of the plainest Truths and we do not so much as grant common Notions unless they contain something that is Sensible When our Pleasures or other Sensations are moderate we
can discover some plain easie Truths But if it were possible for us wholly to lay aside Pleasures and Sensations we should be capable of discovering with ease the most conceal'd Truths and the most difficult that are known For the more we remove from that which is not God the nearer we draw to God himself we avoid Error and we discover Truth But since the Fall since the unruly Love of anticipating Pleasures which rules predominantly the Mind is become so weak that it can penetrate into nothing and so Material and Dependant on the Senses that it cannot reach difficult things which do not affect it It does not even perceive common Notions and often concludes for want of Attention that they are False and Obscure It cannot distinguish the Truth of things from their Usefulness the relation they have among one another from the relation they have to us and it often believes that those are the Truest that are the most Useful the most Agreeable and that affect it most In fine That Inclination Infects and Confounds all the Perceptions we have of Objects and consequently all the Judgments we make of them Here are some Examples It is a common Notion that Virtue is preferable to Vice that it is better to be Chaste II. Some Examples than Intemperate and Voluptuous But our Inclination for Pleasure confounds that Idea to that degree on some occasions that we have but a glimpse of it left and it is impossible to draw the Consequences from thence which are necessary for the Conduct of Life The Soul is so taken up with the Pleasures it hopes for that it supposes them Innocent and aims at nothing but the Means to enjoy them Every body knows that it is better to be Just than Rich That Justice exalts a Man more than the Possession of the most Sumptuous Buildings which often serve less to discover the Grandeur of the Owner than the Greatness of his Injustices and Crimes But the Pleasure which Inadvertent People receive in the Vain Ostentation of their False Grandeur sufficiently fills up the small Capacity of their Mind to conceal and obscure so evident a Truth from them They foolishly imagine that they are great Men because they have great Houses Specious Algebra is certainly the finest I mean the most Fruitful and most Certain of all Sciences without it the Mind has neither Penetration nor Extent and with it it is capable of knowing almost every thing that can be known with Certainty and Evidence As Imperfect as that Science has been it has made all those Famous that have learn'd it and that have known how to Practice it They have thereby discover'd Truths which seem'd almost Incomprehensible to other Men. It is so well proportion'd to Humane Minds that without distracting their Capacity with useless things in what they seek after it conducts them Infallibly to what they aim at In a word It is an Universal Science and as it were the Key of all other Sciences yet as valuable as it is in it self it has nothing in it that is taking in order to Charm Men by this reason only that it is not Sensible It has been buried absolutely in Forgetfulness for several Ages There are at this very time many Men who do not know the name of it and among a Thousand Persons you will hardly meet one or two who understand any thing in it The most Learned that have reviv'd it in our days have not carried it very far and have not handled it with that Order and Clearness it deserves Being Men as well as others they have at last been disgusted with those pure Truths which are not attended by Sensible Pleasure and the Disquietness of their Will being Corrupted by Sin the Inconstancy of their Mind which depends on the Agitation and Circulation of the Blood has not allow'd them to consider any longer those Great those Vast and those Plentiful Truths which are the Immutable and Universal Rules of all Transitory and particular Truths that may be known with Exactness Metaphysics is also an abstracted Scieâ—â—â— which does not affect the Senses the Study theâ— of afford the Soul no manner of Pleasure for which reasoâ— the said Science is very much neglected and 〈◊〉 often meet Men that are so Stupid as boldly to dâ—â— common Notions There are some that deny 〈◊〉 one may or ought to affirm a thing is by what is included in the clear and distinct Idea one has of it That Nothing has no Proprieties That a thing cannot be reduc'd to nothing without Miracle That no body can move it self by its own Force That an Active Body can communicate no more Motion to any Body it encounters than it has of it self and the like They have never consider'd those Axioms with Stediness and Clearness enough to discover the Truth of them distinctly and they have sometimes made Experiments which have falsely convinc'd them that some of those Axioms were not true They have seen on some occasions that two Visible Bodies meeting each other ceas'd both to move after the Blow They have seen in others that the Bodies which were hit had more Motion than the Visible Bodies that did hit them And this Sensible Sight of some Experiments whose reasons they see not makes them decide things against certain Principles which pass for common Notions in the Minds of all those that are capable of any Attention Ought they not to consider that Motions may be communicated from Visible Bodies to Invisible ones when the Bodies that are in motion meet or from the Invisible to the Visible on other occasions When a Body is Suspended by a Cord the Knife wherewith that Cord is cut does not give the Motion to that Body it is an Invisible Matter that does it When a Coal of Fire is flung into a heap of Gun-powder it is not the motion of the Coal but an invisible Matter which scatters all the parts of that Powder and which gives it a motion capable of blowing up a House There are a Thousand ways by which invisible Matter communicates its Motion to gross visible Bodies At least it is not evident that it cannot be done as it is evident that the moving force of Bodies can neither be increas'd nor diminish'd by the usual force of Nature So Men see that the Wood that is slung into the Fire ceases to be what it is and that all the Sensible Qualities they observe in it dissipate themselves and from thence they think they are in the right to conclude that it is possible for a thing to return to its former nothing They do no longer see the Wood and they only see a few Ashes which succeed it and from thence they judge that the major part of the Wood ceases to be as if the Wood could not be reduâ—◠〈◊〉 invisible parts At least it is not so evident that this 〈…〉 that the force which gives a being to all things is not subject to change and that
by the ordinary force of Nature what is cannot be reduced to nothing as what is not cannot begin to be But few Men know what it is to look within themselves there to hear the Voice of Truth according to which they ought to judge of all things their Eyes regulate their Decisions They judge according to what they feel and not according to what they conceive for they feel with Pleasure and conceive with Pain Ask all Men in the World Whether one may affirm without fear of being deceiv'd that the whole is greater than a part and I am confident that there is not one but will answer immediately as he ought to do Ask them in the next place Whether we may likewise without fear of being deceiv'd affirm of a thing that which we conceive clearly to be included within the Idea which represents it and you will find that few will grant it without Hesitation that more will deny it and that the major part of them will not know what to answer Yet this Metaphysical Axiom That we may affirm of a thing which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which represents it is more evident than this Axiom That the whole is greater than its part because this last Axiom is not an Axiom but only a Conclusion in respect to the first One may prove that the whole is greater than part by this first Axiom but this first can be proved by no other It is absolutely the first and the Foundation of all clear and evident Knowledge Why then does no body hesitate upon the Conclusion and yet many question the Principle from which it is deriv'd unless it be because the Idea's of the whole and of part are Sensible and that our Eyes inform us that the whole is larger than part of it and that our Eyes do not see the Truth of the first Axiom of all Sciences As there is nothing in this Axiom that naturally fixes or applies the Mind we must be willing to consider it constantly and willingly in order to make an evident Discovery of the Truth thereof But Men seldom think on Objects which do not affect their Senses and when they do it has no Prevalency with them For to continue our said Example they think it evident that the whole is greater than its part that a Mountain of Marble is possible and that a Mountain without a Vale is impossible and that it is not equally evident that there is a God Nevertheless we may say that the Evidence is equal in all those Propositions since they are all equally distant from the first Principle This is the first Principle We must attribute that to a thing which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which represents it We clearly conceive that there is more Extent in the Idea we have of the whole than in the Idea we have of its part That a possible Existence is contain'd in the Idea of a Mountain of Marble the Impossible Existence in the Idea of a Mountain without a Vale and the necessary Existence in the Idea we have of God I mean of an Infinitely perfect Being Therefore the whole is larger than part of it Therefore a Mountain of Marble may be Existent Therefore a Mountain without a Vale cannot be Existent Therefore God or an Infinitely Perfect Being does necessarily Exist It is visible that these Conclusions are equally distant from the first Principle of all Sciences They are then equally evident in themselves It is then as evident that God does Exist as that the whole is greater than its part But whereas the Idea's of Infinite of Perfections of necessary Existence are not Sensible like the Idea's of the whole and of its part Men fancy they do not perceive what they are not sensible of and though these Conclusions are equally Evident in themselves they are not however equally receiv'd There are Men who endeavour to perswade us that they have no Idea of an infinitely perfect Being But I do not know what induces them to answer positively when they are ask'd whether an infinitely perfect Being is Round or Square or something like it For they ought to answer that they know nothing of it if it be true that they have no Idea of it There are others who grant that those Reason well who conclude that God is not an Impossible Being from this that we see the Idea of God includes no Contradiction or an impossible Existence and they will not allow us to conclude in the same manner that God Exists necessarily from this that we conceive a necessary Existence in the Idea we have of him Finally There are others who pretend that this proof of the Existence of God is a Sophism and that the Argument only concludes supposing it is true that God Exists as if it were not prov'd This is our proof We ought to attribute that to a thing which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which represents it This is the general Principle of all Sciences Necessary Existence is included in the Idea which represents a Being infinitely Perfect they grant it And Consequently we must say that the infinitely perfect Being Exists Yes say they supposing that he Exists But let us make such an Answer to such an Argument to the End that the World may Judge of the Solidity of their Answer Here is an Argument like it We ought to attribute that to a thing which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which represents it That is the Principle We clearly conceive four Angles included in the Idea which represents a Square or we conceive clearly that possible Existence is included in the Idea of a Marble Tower Therefore a Square has Four Angles Therefore a Marble Tower is possible I say those Conclusions are true supposing that the Square has Four Angles just as they answer that God Exists supposing he does Exist That is to say in a word The Conclusions of those Demonstrations are true supposing they are true I own that if I should make such an Argument as this we must attribute that to a thing which we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which represents it for we clearly conceive the necessary Existance included in the Idea of a Body infinitely Perfect consequently a Body infinitely Perfect Exists It is true I say that should I make such an Argument People would be in the right to answer that it would not conclude the Actual Existence of a Body infinitely Perfect but only supposing that there were such a Body it would have its Existence in it self The reason of it is that the Idea of a Body infinitely Perfect is a Fiction of the Mind or a Compounded Idea which consequently may be False or Contradictory as indeed it is For we cannot clearly conceive a Body infinitely Perfect since a particular Finite Being as a Body is cannot be conceiv'd to be Universal and Infinite But the Idea of God or of
a general Being of an unlimited Being of an infinite Being is not a Fiction of the Mind It is not a Compounded Idea which includes any Contradiction nothing can be plainer though it Comprehends all that is and whatever may be Now that plain and natural Idea of Being or Infinity includes a necessary Existence for it is evident that Being I do not say such a Being has Existence in it self and that Being cannot actually not be Being since it is impossible and contradictory that Real Being should be without an Existence It may chance that Bodies may not be because Bodies are such Beings as participate of Being and depend on it But unlimited Being is necessary it is Independent it derives what it is from it self All that is proceeds from it If there is any thing it is since all proceeds from it But though there were nothing in particular it would be because it is of it self and we cannot conceive it clearly as not Being unless we look upon it as Being in particular or like such a Being and that we thus consider all other Idea's besides that of Being For those that do not see that God is commonly do not consider Being but such a Being and consequently a Being that may be and may not be Moreover that we may yet more distinctly apprehend this proof of the Existence of God and answer some Objections that might be made more clearly we must remember that when we see a Creature we do not see it in it self nor by it self for we only see it as it has been prov'd in the Third Book by the sight of some Perfections that are in God which represent it Thus we may see the Essence of that Creature without seeing its Existence we may see in God that which represents it without its Existing Therefore necessary Existence is not included in the Idea which represents it it not being necessary that it should be to the End it may be seen But the Case is very different in the insinitely perfect Being It can only be seen in it self for nothing that is Finite can represent Infinity So that we cannot see God unless he Exists It is impossible to see the Essence of a Being infinitely Perfect without seeing the Existence of it We cannot see it barely as a possible Being Nothing Comprehends it and if we think on it it must be But it is useless to propose these kind of Demonstrations to the common sort of Mankind These Demonstrations may be call'd Personal by reason that they do not generally convince all Men. We must use more sensible ones in order to Convince them and indeed they are not wanting For no Truth has more Proofs than that of the Existence of God This was only urg'd to shew that refin'd Truths making hardly any Impressions on our Senses are taken for Illusions and Chimera's whereas when gross palpable Truths affect the Senses forcing the Soul to consider them we are easily perswaded that they have a great deal of reality for since the Fall they make strong Impressions on our Mind 'T is for the same reason that there is no prospect to hope that the common part of Mankind will ever submit to this Demonstration to prove that Animals are not sensible viz. that being Innocent which all the World grants and I suppose it if they were capable of Sensation it would happen that under a God infinitely Just and Almighty an Innocent should suffer Grief which is a pain and the punishment of Sin Men are commonly incapable of seeing the Evidence of this Axiom Sub justo Deo quisquam nisi mereatur miser esse non potest which St. Austin makes use of with a great deal of Reason against Julian to prove Original Sin and the Corruption of our Nature They Fancy that there is neither Force nor Solidity in this Axiom and in some others which prove that Beasts are not sensible because as we have already said those Axioms are refin'd and include nothing that is sensible or palpable or make any Impression upon our Senses The sensible Actions and Motions of Beasts towards the preservation of that Life are Reasons which though only probable affect us more and which consequently incline us much more powerfully to believe that they are sensible of Pain or Grief when they cry out being struck â—â—an that refin'd Reason of the pure Mind though most certain and evident in it self For it is certain that most Men have no other reason to believe that Animals have Souls I speak according to the Common Opinion which is that the Chicken is form'd from the Egg tho perhaps it only receives its Nutriment from it but the sensible Sight of all what Beasts do for the preservation of their Life That is apparent enough from this that most People do not imagin there is a Soul in an Egg although the Transformation of an Egg into a Chicken is infinitely more difficult than the bare preservation of the Chicken when it is absolutely form'd For as more Ingenuity is requi d to make a Watch out of a piece of Iron than to make it go when it is finish'd it would be more reasonable to admit a Soul in an Egg in order to Form a Chicken than to make that Chicken live when it is perfectly Form'd But Men do not see the admirable manner how a Chicken is Form'd as they always sensibly see in what manner they seek for those things that are necessary for their preservation Therefore they are not inclin'd to believe that there are Souls in Eggs by some sensible Impression of necessary Motions to Transform Eggs into Chickens but they allow Animals Souls by reason of the sensible Impression of the External Actions of those Animals for preservation of their Life although the reason I have here alledg'd is stronger to give Souls to Eggs than to Chickens The second Reason which is that Matter is incapable of feeling and of desiring is certainly demonstrative against those who say that Animals are sensible notwithstanding their Soul is Corporeal But Men will Eternally Confound and Intangle those Reasons rather than own a thing contrary to Proofs that are not only probable but very sensible and feeling And there is no way to convince them absolutely but in opposing sensible proofs to their sensible proofs and in shewing them visibly that all the parts of Animals are only Machinal and that they may move without a Soul by the meer Impression of Objects and by their peculiar Constitution as Monsieur Descartes has begun to do it in his Treatise of Man For all the most certain and evident reasons of the Understanding alone will never perswade them the contrary of the obscure Proofs they have by the Senses And we only expose our selves to the Laughter of Persons of a superficial Understanding that are not capable of much Attention when we undertake to convince them by Reasons above the common Level that Animals have no Feeling Therefore it behoves
and in Truth and to whom they Sacrifice themselves But whereas the True God threatens them in the Secret of their Consciences with an Eternity of Torments to punish the Excess of their Ingratitude yet they will not quit their Idolatry they bethink themselves of performing some good Works externally They Fast like others they give Alms they say Prayers they continue for some time in the like Exercises and whereas they are troublesom to those that want Charity they leave them commonly to imbrace certain little Practices or easie Devotions which agreeing with Self-Love necessarily and insensibly overthrows all the Morals of Jesus Christ They are Faithful Earnest and Zealous Defenders of those Humane Traditions which Ignorant Persons perswade them to be very Useful and such things as the Idea of Eternity that frightens them does continually represent they eagerly defend as absolutely necessary for their Salvation It is not so with the Just They hear the Threatnings of their God as well as the Impious but the confused Noise of their Passions does not hinder them from hearkning to his Counsels The false Rays of Humane Tradition do not blind them so far as to make them Insensible of the Light of Truth They put their Confidence in the Promises of Jesus Christ and they follow his Councils for they know that the Promises of Men are as Vain as their Counsels Nevertheless we may say That that Fear which the Idea of Eternity creates in their Mind produces sometimes so great a Disorder in their Imagination that they dare not absolutely Condemn those Humane Traditions and that sometimes they approve them by their Example because they have some Appearance of Wisdom in their Superstition and in their False Humility like those Pharisaical Traditions mentioned by St. Paul Col. 2.22 23. But that which is particularly worthy of Consideration and which does not so much relate to the Corruption of Manners as to the Disorder of the Mind is That the Fear we have before mentioned extends to the Faith as well as the Zeal of those that are affected with it even to Things that are False and Unworthy the Holiness of our Religion There are many People who do believe and that with an Obstinate Faith That the Earth is Immovable in the Center of the World That Animals are Sensible of real Pain That there are Forms or Accidents really distinct from Matter And a World of the like False or Uncertain Opinions because they fancy that they should oppose the Faith in denying it They are frighten'd by the Expressions of the Holy Bible which speaks to our Capacity and consequently makes use of the common Manner of Speaking without any Design to Instruct us in Natural Philosophy They do not only believe what the Spirit of God will teach them but also all the Opinions of the Jews They do not see for Example that Joshua speaks before his Soldiers as Copernicus himself Galileus and Descartes would speak to the Vulgar part of Mankind and that though he had been of the Opinion of these last Philosophers he would not have commanded the Earth to stand still because he could not have made his Army Sensible by unintelligible words of the Miracle which God perform'd for his People Those who are of Opinion that the Sun is Immovable nevertheless tell their Servants their Friends and even those that are of their Opinion that the Sun Rises or Sets They always speak like other Men when their Principal Design is not to Philosophise Did Joshua perfectly understand Astronomy or if he did did his Souldiers understand it Or if both he and his Souldiers were skill'd in it can any body think that they design'd to Philosophise while they only thought of Fighting Therefore Joshua spoke as he ought to do although both he and his Souldiers had believ'd what the most Eminent Astronomers believe at this time Nevertheless those words of that great Captain Sun stand thou still upon Gibeon and what is said afterwards that the Sun stood still according to his Command perswade many People that the Opinion of the Motion of the Earth is not only a dangerous Opinion but that it is also absolutely Heretical and not to be maintain'd They have heard that some Pious Persons for whom we ought to have a great deal of Respect and Deference condemn'd that Opinion They have a confused Knowledge of something that happen'd upon that Subject to a Famous Astronomer of our Age and that seems sufficient for them to believe Obstinately that Faith extends even to that Opinion A certain confus'd Sentiment excited and entertain'd by a Motion of Fear which they hardly perceive makes them harbour Diffidences against those that follow Reason in things which relate to Reason They look upon them as Hereticks They are Uneasie and Troubled whenever they hear them speak and their Secret Apprehensions create in their Minds the same Respect and the same Submission for their own vulgar Opinions and for many other Notions of Philosophy as for Truths which are the Objects of Faith CHAP. XIII I. Of the Third Natural Inclination which is the Friendship we have for other Men. II. It Induces us to approve our Friends Thoughts and to deceive them by False Praises OF all our Inclinations taken in General and in the Sense I have explain'd it in the first Chapter there only remains that which we have for those we Live with and for all the Objects that are about us of which I shall hardly say any thing because that relates more to Morality and Policy than to our Subject As that Inclination is always joyn'd with the Passions it would perhaps be sitter to speak of it in the following Book But Order is not of so much Consequence in that Point In order rightly to apprehend the Causes and Effects of that Natural Inclination I. Of the Third Natural Inclination which is the Friendship we have for other Men. it is fit to know that God Loves all his Works and that he Unites them strictly one to another for their Mutual Preservation For continually loving the Works he produces since they are produc'd by his Love he also continually Imprints in our Hearts a Love for his Works since he continually produces a Love in our Hearts like unto his And to the end the Natural Love we have for our selves may not Annihilate it self and overmuch weaken that which we have for the Things that are not in us And on the contrary That those two Loves which God puts in us may maintain and strengthen each other he has united us in such a manner to all things that are about us and particularly with the Beings of the same Species with us that their Sufferings Afflict us Naturally their Joy Rejoyces us and their Grandeur their Fall their Diminution seems to Augment or to diminish our own Being The new Dignities of our Relations and Friends the new Acquisitions of those that have most relation to us the Conquests and Victories
acceptation and in relation to us The Difference consists in this Goodness concerns and affects us but Truth affects us not for Truth consists only in the relation that two or more things have between themselves but Goodness consists in the relation of Agreeableness that things have with us Hence there 's but one Action of the Will in respect of Truth which is its Acquiescence or Assent to the Representation of the relation that is between things But in respect of Goodness there are two its Acquiescence or Assent to the relation of Agreement that things have with us and its Love or Motion towards such a thing which actions are very different altho' they are ordinarily confounded for there 's much difference betwixt simply acquiescing in and being carry'd by Love to what the Mind represents since Men often acquiesce in things which they could wish were not and which they do Now if we consider well of things we shall plainly perceive that 't is the Will always that assents not to things unless they be disagreeable to it but to the Representation of things and the Reason why the Will acquiesces in things which are in their utmost Evidence is as we have already said because there is not in those things any Relation which ought to have been consider'd that the Understanding hath not perceiv'd So that it is as it were necessary for the Will to leave off Debating and unprofitably Fatiguing it self and rest in full Assurance that it is not deceiv'd since there 's nothing yet farther upon which it can exercise its Understanding We must chiefly remark that in the State we now are we have only an imperfect Knowledge of things and by consequence 't is absolutely necessary that we have this Liberty of Indifference by which we may forbear giving our Assent To see the Necessity of it we must consider that we are carry'd by our Natural Inclinations towards Truth and Goodness so that the Will inclining it self only to such things as the Mind has some knowledge of it must carry it self to that which has the appearance of Truth and Goodness but because every thing which has the appearance of Goodness is not always what it appears to be its evident that if the Will were not free and if it were infallibly and necessarily carry'd to every thing that has these appearances of Goodness and Truth it would very often be deceiv'd whence it seems we might conclude that the Author of its Being was also the Author of its Wandrings and Errors God has then given us Liberty III. Of the Use that we must make of Liberty that we may never be deceiv'd that we might keep our selves from being deceiv'd and from all the Evils which are the effect of our Errors by never yielding a full Assent to appearances of Truth but only to Truth it self that is in continually applying the Mind and commanding it to Examine till it has clear'd and resolv'd every thing that was to be Examin'd For Truth is scarce ever without Evidence and Evidence consists only in a clear and distinct view of all the Parts and Relations of the Object which are necessary to give an assur'd Judgment The Use then that we must make of our Liberty is TO USE IT AS MUCH AS WE CAN that is Never to consent to any thing whatever till we are compell'd to it as it were by the inward Reproaches of our Reason To submit to false Appearances of Truth is to enslave our selves against the Will of God but to submit our selves fairly to the secret Reproaches of our Reason which follow our not assenting to Evidence this is to obey the Voice of Eternal Truth Here are then the two establish'd Rules which I spoke of which are very necessary in all Speculative and Moral Sciences and which we ought to look upon as the Foundation of all Humane Sciences The first General Rules to avoid Sin which relates to Sciences is this Never to give an entire assent but to Propositions that appear so evidently true that we can't refuse them without feeling an inward regret and secret reproaches of our Reason that is without we knew clearly that we should make an ill use of our Liberty if we would not assent or would extend our Power to things over which we have none The second which respects Morality is this Never to love any Good absolutely if we can without remorse forbear Whence it follows that we ought to love nothing absolutely and without relation to any thing else but God for 't is he only from the Love of whom we can't abstain without this sort of Remorse that is without an evident knowledge of our doing ill supposing him known by Reason and Revelation But we must observe here Necessary reflections upon these General Rules that when those things that we perceive do appear very probable to us we find our selves extreamly inclin'd to believe them nay we are uneasie when we are not perswaded of them so that if we are not very cautious we are in much danger of assenting to them and consequently of deceiving our selves for 't is a great chance that Truth is exactly like to Probability Hence it is that I have expressly laid down in these Rules that we must consent to nothing but what we see evidently unless we should make an ill use of our Liberty if we did not consent Now altho' we perceive our selves extreamly inclin'd to assent to an appearance of Truth yet if we take care to examine whether we evidently see our selves oblig'd to consent thereto we shall find the contrary for if appearance of Truth is grounded upon the Impression of our Senses I say an appearance of Truth falsely so called then we shall be strongly inclin'd to comply therewith not perceiving any other Cause than some Passion or General Affection that we have for that which pleases the Senses as will fully appear hereafter But if an appearance of Truth arises from some Conformity with Truth as commonly all probable Knowledge taken in a certain sense is true then if we reflect upon our selves we shall perceive that we are inclin'd to two things viz. to Believe and to Examine yet farther but we shall never find our selves so much perswaded as to think we do ill if we do not absolutely assent Now these two Inclinations which we find in us in reference to Probabilities are very good for we can and must assent to apparent Truths so far as they bear the Image of Truth however we must not yet intirely assent according to the Rule before laid down but thorowly examine the Object that we may have a perfect knowledge of its Nature truly distinguish between Truth and Falshood and afterwards intirely submit if Evidence compells us thereto We ought much to accustom our selves to distinguish between Truth and appearance of Truth by an inward Examination of our selves as I have already said for 't is for want of this sort of
its Extension and by little and little renders it both weak obscure and confus'd Now the greatest part of those who boast of knowing the Opinions of others never Study but after the second Manner and so the more Reading they have the more their Judgment becomes Feeble and Confus'd The Reason is because the Traces of their Brains are confounded one with another being very numerous and because Reason has not digested 'em in order which hinders the Mind from imagining and representing clearly to it self the Things which it stands in need of When the Mind goes about to open certain Traces meeting with others more familiar it never seeks another Passage For the Capaciousness of the Brain not being Infinite 't is impossible but the great number of Traces form'd irregularly must interfere one with another and cause a Confusion among the Idea's 'T is for this very Reason that Persons that have great Memories are incapable of judging such things as require much attention But that which is chiefly to be observed is this that the Knowledge they acquire who Read without Meditation are only to retain the Opinions of others In a word that all Sciences that depend upon the Memory are properly these kinds of Knowledge that puff Men up because they make a great noise and infuse a World of Vanity into those that possess them Thus they who are learned after that manner being usually full of Pride and Presumption pretend they have a Right to Judge of every thing tho' they are very uncapable which causes them to fall into a great number of Errors But this false Knowledge does more mischief still for these Persons fall not alone into Error they draw along with them almost all the Minds of the Vulgar sort and a very great Number of young People who believe all their Decisions as so many Articles of Faith These falsely Learned having often prevail'd over them with the weight of their profound Learning and having deafned them as well with extraordinary Opinions as with the Names of ancient and unknown Authors have gain'd so powerful an Authority over them that they respect and admire as Oracles whatever they utter and no less unadvisedly embrace all their Sentiments Persons also much much Ingenious and more Judicious who had never known them before or could not be inform'd by others what they are hearing them talk at such a rate and with so haughty so imperious and grave an Air would have much ado to refrain their respect and esteem for what they say because it is a difficult thing to forbear paying somewhat to Air and Deportment For as it often happens that a Man who is fierce and daring abuses others who are stronger but more prudent and moderate than himself so they who maintain Things which are neither true nor probable put their Adversaries to Silence by speaking after an imperious haughty and grave manner which surprizes them Now these People of whom we speak have a high Conceit of themselves and despise other Men as being fortify'd with a certain Air of Pride intermix'd with Gravity and a Counterfeit Modesty which prepossesses and wins those that hear them For it is to be observ'd that all the different Airs of Persons of different Conditions are only the Natural consequences of that Esteem which every Man has of himself in reference to others as it is easie to perceive if we never so little consider it Thus the Air of Fierceness and Brutality is that of a Man that magnifies himself and little values the Merit of others The Modest Air is that of a Man who has a low Conceit of himself a high Esteem for others The Grave Air is that of a Man who has a high Conceit of himself and greatly Ambitious of others Esteem And the Simple Air is that of one who has no great Conceit either of himself or of any body else So that all the different Airs which are almost Infinite are only the Effects which the different Degrees of Esteem that Men have of themselves or of those with whom they Converse naturally produce in our looks and over all the Exterior parts of our Bodies We have in the Fourth Chapter explain'd the Correspondence between the Nerves that raise the Passions within us and those which demonstrate them outwardly by the Air which they Imprint upon the Face CHAP. VI. That Studious Persons are usually prejudic'd in favour of some Author so that their Principal Aim is to know what he believ'd without minding what he ought to believe THere is another fault of great consequence whereinto great Students usually fall which is That they Dote upon some certain Author If there be any thing true and good in the Book they cry it up even to excess every thing is true the whole is good every thing in it is to be admir'd They please themselves with admiring what they understand not and they would have all the World admire it as well as themselves They assume Honour to themselves from the Praises which they give to those obscure Authors because thereby they perswade others that they understand them perfectly well and this affords them no small occasion of Vanity They value themselves above other Men because they believe they understand a Piece of Impertinency in an Old Author or in a Man that perhaps never understood himself How many Learned Men have Sweated to Illustrate some obscure Passages of the Ancient Philosophers and Poets and how many great Wits are there who make it their whole delight to Criticize upon a Word or the Sentiment of an Author But 't is convenient to bring some Instance for what I alledge The Question concerning the Immortality of the Soul is without all doubt a Question of great Importance The Philosophers are not to be blam'd for using all their endeavours to resolve it and tho' they compile large Volumes to prove tho' weakly enough a Truth that may be demonstrated in a few Words or in a few Pages at most yet they are excusable But who can refrain from laughing to see them put themselves to such a World of Trouble to decide what Aristotle thought of it 'T is in my Opinion a thing of little benefit to those that live now to know whether there were ever such a Man who was call'd Aristotle whether that Man ever wrote those Books which go under his Name whether he meant such or such a thing in such a part of his Works it can neither make a Man more Wise or more Happy But 't is of great Importance to know whether what he has said be true or false in it self 'T is to no purpose then to know what Aristotle believ'd touching the Immortality of the Soul tho' it be of great moment to know that the Soul is Immortal However we are not afraid to assert that several Learned Men have put themselves to more trouble to know the Opinion of Aristotle upon this subject than the Truth of the Thing in it self
since there are some who have compos'd whole Folio's on purpose to unfold what that Philosopher believ'd of it but never did so much to know what he ought to have believ'd of it But tho' so great a number of People have tir'd their Brains to resolve what was Aristotle's Opinion they labour'd all to no purpose since they cannot as yet agree about this trifling Question which shews that the Followers of Aristotle are very Unfortunate to have a Man so obscure to enlighten them and who himself affected obscurity as he testifies in a Letter which he wrote to Alexander The Opinion then of Aristotle touching the Immortality of the Soul has been at several times a very great Question and very considerable among Studious Persons but because it may not be thought that I talk at Random and without any Foundation I am oblig'd to recite in this place a passage out of La Cerda somewhat long and somewhat tedious wherein that Author has heap'd together as many different Authorities upon that subject as upon a Question of great moment His words are these that follow upon the second Chapter of Tertullian de Resurrectione Carnis Quaestio haec in scholis utrimque validis suspicionibus agitatur num animam immortalem mortalemve fecerit Aristoteles Et quidem Philosophi haud ignobiles asseveraverunt Aristotelem posuisse nostros animos ab interitu alienos Hi sunt è Graecis Latinis interpretibus Ammonius uterque Olympiodorus Philoponus Simplicius Avicenna uti memorat Mirandula l. 4. de examine vanitatis Cap. 9. Theodorus Metochytes Themistius S. Thomas 2. contra gentes cap. 79. Phys lect 12. praeterea 12. Metap lect 3. quodlib 10. qu. 5. art 1. Albertus tract 2. de anima cap. 20. Tract 3. cap. 13. Aegidius lib. 3. de anima ad cap. 4. Durandus in 2. dist 18. qu. 3. Ferrarius loco citato contra gentes late Eugubinus l. 9. de perenni Philosophia cap. 18. quod pluris est discipulus Aristotelis Theophrastus magistri mentem ore calamo novisse peritus qui poterat In contrariam factionem abiere nonnulli Patres nec infirmi Philosophi Justinus in sua Parainesi Origenes in 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ut fertur Nazianz. in disp contra Eunom Nyssenus l. 2. de anima cap. 4. Theodoretus de curandis Graecorum affectibus l. 3. Galenus in historia Philosophicâ Pomponatius l. de immortalitate animae Simon Portius l. de mente humana Caietanus 3. de anima cap. 2. In eum sensum ut caducum animum nostrum putaret Aristoteles sunt partim adducti ab Alexandro Aphodis auditore qui sic solitus erat interpretari Aristotelicam mentem quamvis Eugubinus cap. 21. 22. eum excuset Et quidem unde collegisse videtur Alexander mortalitatem nempe ex 12. Metaph. inde S. Thomas Theodorus Metochytes immortalitatem collegerunt Porro Tertullianum neutram hanc opinionem amplexum credo sed putasse in hac parte ambiguum Aristotelem Itaque ita citat illum pro utraque Nam cum hic adscribat Aristoteli mortalitatem animae tamen l. de anima c. 6. pro contrario opinione immortalitatis citat Eadem mente fuit Plutarchus pro utraque opinione advocans eundem Philosophum in l. 5. de placitis Philosop Nam cap. 1. mortalitatem tribuit cap. 25. immortalitatem Ex Scholasticis etiam qui in neutram partem Aristotelem constantem judicant sed dubium ancipitem sunt Scotus in 4. dist 43. qu. 2. art 2. Harveus quodlib 1. qu. 11. 1. senten dist 1. qu. 1. Niphus in Opusculo de immortalitate animae cap. 1. recentes alii interpretes quam mediam existimationem credo veriorem sed scholii lex vetat ut autoritatum pondere librato illud suadeam We give ye all these Citations for true upon the Credit of the Commentator believing it would be loss of time to justifie them and because we have not all the Books from whence they were Extracted Nor do we add any new ones because we do not envy him the Honour of having well collected them and for that it would be still more loss of time had we a desire to do it tho' we should only for that purpose turn over the Indices of the Commentators upon Aristotle We see then by this passage of La Cerda that Studious Men who pass for able Scholars have put themselves to the Trouble to know what Aristotle believ'd of the Immortality of the Soul and that there were some of them that never scrupled to Write Books on purpose upon this subject among whom was Pomponatius For the principal Aim of that Author in his Book is to shew that Aristotle believ'd the Soul to be Mortal And perhaps there are some People who do not only enquire what Aristotle believ'd upon this subject but also look upon it as a Question of great Importance to know whether for Example Tertullian Plutarch or others believ'd or not that the Opinion of Aristotle was that the Soul was Mortal as we have great reason to believe of La Cerda himself if we consider the last part of the Passage which we have cited viz. Porro Tertullianum c. If it be not very Profitable to know what Aristotle thought concerning the Immortality of the Soul nor what Tertullian and Plutarch thought what Aristotle believ'd however the main of the Question about the Immortality or Mortality of the Soul is at least a Truth very necessary to be known But there are an infinite number of things the knowledge of which is very unnecessary and of which by consequence 't is to yet less purpose to know what the Ancients thought of them Nevertheless they put themselves to a World of trouble to guess at the Sentiments of Philosophers upon subjects of the like Nature We meet with Books full of these Inquisitions and these are the Trisles that have rais'd so many Wars among the Learned These vain and impertinent Questions these frivolous Genealogies of unprofitable Opinions are the Important subjects of the Criticisms of the Learned They imagine themselves the Absolute Masters of the Genealogical History of substantial Forms and the World is Ingrateful if it does not acknowledge their Merit How do these things display the Weakness and Vanity of Human Wit When Reason does not that regulates our Studies our Studies not only grow incapable of perfecting Reason but even darken corrupt and absolutely pervert it But 't is necessary here to observe that in Questions concerning Faith they are no way to blame who search what St. Austin for Example or any other Fathers of the Church have believ'd concerning those things as neither are they who enquire whither St. Austin believ'd what they believ'd who preceded him because we cannot attain to Matters of Faith but by Tradition Reason not being able to discover them The most Ancient Belief being the most true 't is requisite to know what was