These Philosophers make great reckoning of a proof which they use against the Vacuum of the Epicureans They affirm that to suppose a Vacuum is to contradict ones self because say they that a Vacuum if there be one must be extensive in length largeness and depth But supposing it this would be a Body for a Body according to them is nothing else but that which is extended in length largeness and depth So that were it a Body 't would not be a Vacuum To suppose then a Vacuum is to contradict ones own Supposition The Cartesians affirm nothing can oppose this proof yet is it false if Transubstantiation be true For there is according to you in the Eucharist something extensive something that is long large and deep and yet not a Body The Peripatetics says Mr. N. admit not of this proof and it does not oppose the manner in which the Cartesians explain Transubstantiation for you know they will not grant That the Accidents of Bread and Wine subsist without a Subject This is true reply'd I to him But first the existence of Accidents without a Subject is however opposed by a proof which the Cartesians respect as demonstrative And then the manner in which the Cartesians explain what you say God does in the Eucharist ruins the most part of their Physical Demonstrations as others have observed * See the Treatise of the authority of the Senses before me So that you cannot deny but this Doctrine overthrows the certainty of Demonstrations But this ought not much to surprize you seeing your Belief overthrows the chiefest and most unquestionable of all Principles I was about proving this when I was hindred by a Message from a Gentleman I desired Mr. N. to permit me to write an Answer to it who yielding to my request our conversation was by this means interrupted for some short time CONFERENCE V. Wherein is sinally shew'd That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism and absolutely destroys the certainty of first Principles AS soon as I had ended my Answer I rejoyn'd Mr. N. and reassumed our former Discourse You have not forgotten where we left off said I to him presently I had undertook to shew you That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism at its full length and absolutely overthrows the certainty of our Notices I have shew'd it in respect of those which arise from our senses I afterwards justified it on the subject of Demonstrations so that I have only now to shew you That this Doctrine does not spare the clearest and most unquestionable of all the Principles I shall now prove to you That if your Belief takes place the most certain of these Maxims will be found false and consequently the rest which depend thereon and which at most have not more evidence than this first will be doubtful and uncertain This surprises you without doubt and you imagine I undertake a strange task Yet I hope easily to acquit my self of it Only inform me which of those great Truths you may make most account of This has been a matter of some contest replied he to me I was taught in the Colledge that the first and the most certain of all the Principles is this great Maxim That it is impossible the same thing can be and cannot be Or to express it in another manner That it is impossible for two contradictory Propositions to be true at the same time I have been always told this is the first step our mind takes in the search of Truth and at the same time the last thing we find when we search after the foundations of our Perswasions Yet the Cartesians do not grant this * See the Art of Thinking part 4. chap. 5 c. they are agreed indeed that this Maxim is certain and unquestionable for who dares deny it But they affirm 't is of no great use and however not the first of all Principles They prefer this other Maxim before it One may affirm of each thing whatever is contain'd in the distinct Idea we have of it For my part I think it an easy thing to agree them The Cartesians Principle is undoubtedly the first of Affirmatives and the fittest to prove Positive Truths But that of the Schools is the first of the Negatives and the properest to destroy Errors and Falsity I am easily of your mind replied I. But I must add That Transubstantiation do's absolutely overthrow both one and the other of these two Axioms as well as a great many others whose certainty is very near that of theirs Which I shall now prove to you beginning at the Principle of the Cartesians on which I shall not long insist Mr. Rohaut shews in the beginning of his Treatise of Physics * Roh Phys part 1. chap. 7. That 't is impossible to conceive distinctly matter without conceiving 't is extended in length largeness and depth that it is figured and impenetrable I relate not his Words to you you may read them in his Chapter of Matter Yet you do not believe our Saviours Body is impenetrable in the Eucharist You believe 't is there after the manner of Spirits totum in toto totum in qualibet parte For thus has the Council of Trent defined it As to Figure I do not know how it can be given to a Body whose parts are penetrable and enter into one another In sine I do not understand how length can be attributed to it or largeness or depth for what wou'd be the length largeness and depth which wou'd be in it Will it be what it has in its natural Estate Our Senses attest sufficiently the contrary Will it be that of Bread and Wine This cannot be For were this so the Body of Christ might be divided into two halfs into three thirds into four parts c. seeing all these Divisions may be made of the Host Here 's then three things which are clearly comprehended in the Idea a man has of a Body and which yet one cannot affirm of that of Jesus Christ And consequently here are three Proofs of the falsity of the Cartesians great Principle Here 's now a fourth These Philosophers will not deny that that which makes the Essence of each thing is comprehended in the distinct Idea which one has of that thing and that the thing is comprehended in the distinct Idea which we have of that which makes its Essence For example if extension be the Essence of Matter as they pretend they will acknowledg that Extension is comprised in the Idea of Matter and the Matter in the Idea of the Extension and thus as one may affirm of Matter that it is Extensive so one may affirm of that which is Extensive that it is Matter They will as little deny that the Mass or Collection of Modusses is not that which makes the particular Essence of every thing for every Body knows the Aversion they have to substantial Forms so much mention'd in the Colledg By consequence 't will be equally impossible to
most famous Divines acknowledg it we know it essential to all changes to have two different Terms one of which is destroy'd and the other produced and you 'l agree with me herein if you run over all the changes remarkt hitherto whether Substantial or Accidental Natural or Supernatural You 'l see there 's always an Accident if the change be accidental or a Substance if it be substantial which ceases to exist and another Accident or another Substance which begins to exist and takes the place of the Accident or Substance which is destroy'd And consequently if the Bread were chang'd into the Body of Jesus Christ the Body of Christ must necessarily be produced by this change And as it would be produced by it self it would have a real relation to its self contrary to that Maxim which implies That nothing produces it self and That nothing relates to its self In fine Sir this is a constant Maxim and ever suppos'd tho it be never exprest That whatever has all the sensible marks of a thing is that thing That having the essence of it it ought to bear its name Hereon depends the certainty of discerning whether of single things or Species For in fine our judgments cannot pierce into the bottom of things or discover their essence by this sort of knowledg call'd intuitive in the Schools We only know them by the help of the sensible marks which distinguish them So that to overthrow this Maxim is to render the discerning of things absolutely impossible or at least doubtful and uncertain And yet this is the effect of Transubstantiation It places the Body of Christ in the Eucharst under the sensible marks of Bread and Wine where there 's none of these two Substances and you believe our Lords Body exists in a place where it has none of the marks which are wont to make it known and to distinguish it from the rest of things This Sir may suffice to shew you That Transubstantiation absolutely overthrows the certitude of our Notices I believe you perceive That if it subsists the first Principles be false Demonstrations themselves deceive us our Senses are subject to a thousand delusions and in a word we ought to doubt of whatever we have hitherto held for most certain and we have nothing else to do but to plunge our selves into Scepticism which I reckon to be the most deplorable condition in the world seeing 't is the total annihilation of our reason Mr. N. was about answering me but was hindred by the coming in of one of his Friends who had business with him We having been a great while together I laid hold on this occasion to take my leave of him CONFERENCE VI. Wherein the Proofs contained in the foregoing Discourses are defended and the impossibility of using them against the Doctrine of the Trinity is Demonstrated AFTER this last Conversation there past some days before I saw Mr. N. again He came not to me and I was unwilling to force a visit on him but having at length by good hap met with him alone in his usual Walks I joyn'd my self to him We fell at first into several Discourses and at length on Matters of Religion when I made bold to ask him Whether he had thought on what had past in our former Conferences He answer'd That he had in truth ruminated thereon after I had left him but he was resolved to disturb himself no more with those Matters For to what purpose said he unless to shake a mans faith and discompose his mind For I am so perswaded of the truth of Transubstantiation and I find it has such strong tyes with the Principles of Christianity that I do not at all doubt but it makes up a part of this holy Religion So that your reasons tending only to shew me that if Transubstantiation be a Doctrine of Christianity we are to blame in being Christians I not doubting of the first must insensibly doubt of the second Wherefore I had rather once for all to banish these thoughts out of my head and remain in the state wherein I have hitherto lived than to run the risk of turning Libertin which is the thing in the world I most hate In effect continued he without giving me time to answer If your way of arguing be good I could make use of it against the Mystery of the Trinity and easily direct your proofs against this Capital Truth and that with the same success as you have done against Transubstantiation Take for example the most specious Objection of the Arrians and Socinians They affirm this great Mystery absolutely ruins one of the most certain Principles of Sciences What we believe reduces it self to two Heads First That the Persons of the Trinity are really distinct from one another the Father is not the Son and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son. The other That neither of these Persons is really distinguisht from the Divine Essence which they possess That the Father is God the Son God and the Holy Ghost God and what is more That the Father Son and Holy Ghost are but one God possessing only one Divinity so that the Divinity of the Father is the same with that of the Son and that of the Father and the Son is not different from that of the Holy Ghost Pray Sir now inform me how to accord all this with the principle which passes for unquestionable in Metaphysics to wit That if two Subjects be not distinct from a third they cannot be distinguisht between themselves How can this principle subsist if it be true that the Divine Persons which are most distinct in themselves are not at all from the Essence which is common to them what can you say in this Demonstration When two Subjects do not really differ from a third They differ not really from one another The Persons of the Trinity differ not really from the Divine Essence which they possess Then they differ not really from one another You will grant me that this is a Physical Demonstration and otherwise evident than those call'd Moral May I not then apply to the Trinity the first proof you have used against Transubstantiation and say That if this Mystery made part of the Christian Religion the Objections the Insidels bring to oppose it would have more force than the proofs which establish the Divinity of it seeing these proofs have only a Moral evidence and the Objections which might be brought against them have all the evidence term'd Physical I say the same thing of your second proof I need only change therein two words and instead of Sense and Transubstantiation say Reason and the Trinity I need only say If the Mystery of the Trinity be true our Reason deceives us in the judgment she makes of it in thinking to see clearly and distinctly That the persons of the Divinity are not different from one another If our Reason deceives us in this it may as well deceive us in all other
the Witness I must acknowledg to you there 's no more in all this but an Humane Faith Opinion and Probability and I must moreover acknowledg that this is not a sufficient Foundation for Divine Faith. But it oft happens That besides this Persuasion which we have of ther Probity and Sincerity of the Witness or from other Reasons which we have to believe his Veracity even these Reasons may be so strong as to drive away all Doubts and inspire us with an entire certainty For Example You and I have never been at Rome we cannot know there 's a City bears that Name but from the Testimony of those that have seen it Yet this Testimony is so circumstanc'd that a Man must be a Fool or believe others are such to reject it In effect there are so many People which assure us of it those that affirm it have so little interest to deceive us we see so many things happen which shew that all the World is persuaded of it That there are few Truths we less doubt of than this And this is that we call Moral Certitude which excludes all Doubt and which according to Mr. Huet is no less than that of Metaphysical or Mathematical Demonstrations And this comes very near what one may say of the Testimony of those who witness the Matters of Fact above mentioned This Testimony was not given by one or two Persons but by several at divers times and in different places All these Witnesses may have been perfectly instructed in the Facts which they attest seeing they might have seen them with their own Eyes They had no worldly Interest in saying what they did It was on the contrary much their interest to conceal or deny it A thousand such-like Circumstances do shew that they spake what they thought all which added together will not permit a Man to doubt of the truth of their Testimony So that we have something more than a bare Opinion for we have a perfect Certitude By what I can perceive said I you are not of the Humour of a great number of your Divines who seem to delight themselves in extenuating the force nad clearness of these Proofs You know there are some (d) Durand in 3 dist 24. quest 3. who affirm they are only probalbe Others assure us (e) Du Val in 22. pag. 41. That their Evidence is not so great but that there are other things which have as full conviction and yet are false Some say they be obscure Reasons and which do not convince the Mind that they constrain not an assent and therefore the Will must determine the Mind which these Arguments leave at full liberty I do not only said he to me not approve all this but I do not think 't is sufferable You are in the right said I and I am glad to find you of this Opinion Not but that what your Divines affirm gives me great advantage against your Proofs But besides that I can acquit my self without them I am far from preferring so small an Interest to that of the Glory of Christianity which partly consists in the force and validity of the Arguguments which establish the Divinity of it Let us then esteem these Reasons more than probable and as having that degree of evidence which begets a moral Certainty excluding all doubtfulness and which perswadeth not only that the Matter is as we believe it but moreover that it cannot be otherwise and that 't is morally impossible it should not be This being supposed do you believe these Proofs have the highest degree of this Evidence I in effect suppose That the moral Evidence consists not in an indivisible Point It receives several degrees yea insinite ones It arises from the concourse of Circumstances which give weight to the Testimony on which it is grounded and as these Circumstnaces may be compacted and diversified into a thousand different shapes there may be in them a thousand different degrees of this Evidence So that though it be morally evident there be two Cities in Italy one of which is called Rome and the other Viterbe yet we are more certain of the existence of the first than of that of the second because we have more Relations of the one than of the other It 's morally evident that Alexander Cesar and Henry IV have been than that the first conquer'd Darius and the second the Gauls and that the third dissipated the League Yet we are more certain of the latter of these Facts than of the second and of the second more than of the first Believe then that the Facts whence are drawn the Proofs of Christianity are as evident as that there is a City called Rome First of all said he to me I think we are not obliged to make the same judgment of all these Facts some of them being more evident than others and consequently one cannot say of all of them without exception that they are as unquestionable as the Existence of Rome but yet I think we may say it of some of them Supposing said I one might say it of all of them You will at least grant that is as much as can be said of them and that it is more evident that whatever you have offered is true than it is That there 's in Italy a City known under the name of Rome This is said he a thing which I am far from denying and which no Body ever did or will deny There is even one of our Divines who has said the same in so many words (g) Martinon de side Disp 10. Sect. 8. Num. 60. and I am perswaded that all the rest would have said the same had they the occasion Let me said I offer you another Question and then I will conclude Do you think that the highest degree of moral Evidence is higher than the highest degree of the Evidence of Sense Do you believe for Example that 't is more evident to you and I that there 's a City called Rome than 't is at present evident to us that it's day I am far from thinking so repli'd he The moral Evidence is grounded on the certainty of Sense and if our Senses may deceive us the moral Evidence is a mere Chimera How for Example can I know there is such a Town called Rome if those who have seen it and on whose Word I rely may be deceived themselves It must then be granted That the moral Evidence is never greater than that of Sense I add 't is far less the Reason is That if we will build on the Deposition of a Witness we should not only be sure he knows what he says we should also know that he says what he thinks and disguises not his Sentiments Seeing then we are never so sure of what others think as of what we think our selves so we are never so certain that others have seen what they affirm as we are certain we see what we behold It 's then plain That I am more assured of
effect these People agreeing in nothing and it being in the mean time imimpossible to reason without laying down something it 's clear there 's no reasoning against them without granting what 's in question which is one of the greatest saults a Man that argues can fall into It 's then impossible fairly to deny what I said when I affirm'd That Transubstantiation opens a door to Scepticism and puts men into a necessity of denying every thing What I said at first is a small matter that it makes void Mr. Huet's proofs it spares none overthrowing generally and without exception whatever establishes the truth of Christian Religion So that if I justifie this as I am perswaded I easily can I shall be sorry to add any thing to the proof which this alone surnishes me with In effect those who shall be capable of digesting this may digest every thing I believe you are in the right said Mr. N. and I do acknowledg if you can convince me Transubstantiation draws along with it Scepticism you will make me suspect it In effect I conceive nothing more dangerous nor at the same time so ridiculous as Scepticism and you can never speak any thing too bad of it which I will not subscribe to But I do not much fear your proving what you talk of And I for my part said I do not doubt but I shall do it Shall I not do it if I convince you that in admitting Transubstantiation one is engaged not to rely on any evidence be it of what kind it will. For in short Sir you know the whole dispute with the Sceptics is to know Whether there be any thing certain The Sceptics absolutely deny this We as to our parts affirm That as there are things doubtful and uncertain so there are some we are sure of and which one may and ought to believe and when we be asked what those things be we answer they are precisely those which are evident Because that in effect according to us the evidence of a thing is the foundation of its certainty and infallible mark of its truth The Sceptics on the contrary say that evidence and falsity have nothing inconsistent that they may be found together and therefore to conclude a thing to be true because of its being evident is ill reasoning and an exposing of ones self to manifest danger of being deceiv'd So that the whole amounts to this Whether one may or ought to rely on the evidence of a thing as an infallible mark of truth For if we cannot the Sceptics have reason and we can offer nothing against them And consequently if I shew you that in granting Transubstantiation there is no evidence of whatever rank it may be which does not consist very well with error and falsity Now shall I not hereby shew you that this Doctrine draws after it the whole train of Sceptical doubts I suppose then a man must be a perfect Sceptic or none at all For the mitigations which some would introduce be absolutely ridiculous For in fine we must assure our selves of whatever is evident or assure our selves of nothing seeing we cannot assure our selves of any thing but on the account of its evidence And consequently if evidence be the lawful ground of certitude we must be sure of whatever is evident and put away all Scepticism without reserve On the contrary if the evidence of a thing be not sufficient to produce a certainty of it we can be sure of nothing we must be perfect Sceptics and never believe or do any thing So that all those who are not perfect and compleat Sceptics are not Sceptics at all seeing they part with the fundamental maxim of their ridiculous System I agree with you in all this says Mr. N. and will acquit you of your promise if you show me that Transubstantiation separates Evidence from Truth This is no hard matter to do reply'd I for in effect I know but two sorts of evidences the one which strikes the senses the other which is perceiv'd by the mind I have shew'd you that if Transubstantiation takes place the first is a most unfaithful Note of the Truth I have shew'd you that amongst this great multitude of things which strike the senses there is not perhaps one which they do more distinctly perceive than the matter of the Eucharist I have shew'd you that 't is an object which shews it self not only to one or two of our senses as most of those things do which make us apprehend them but generally and without exception all those which God has given us I have shew'd you That they all unanimously do depose that 't is Bread and Wine and that whatever precaution they use to hinder themselves from being deceived they all find the same thing and never change their language This then being a thing which you do believe to be false and in effect it cannot be true if your Transubstantiation be receiv'd you see my only task is to convince you That according to your Principles this first kind of evidence may lead us into error I am not agreed in that reply'd he For tho our senses may deceive us in the Eucharist they deceive us only in respect of the substance therein contained but will make us faithful reports on the accidents And you know our Divines and Philosophers confine the certainty of the senses to the bare accidents By which means there lyes open a large field for these saculties to exercise their functions in without running a risk of being mistaken This field said I to him is not so vast as it appears to you Your Authors and especially Bellarmin * Bell de Euch. lib. 3. cap. 24. do not pretend the senses have certainty in respect of all sorts of accidents without exception They count two different ranks the one which are only perceiv'd by one sense as Colours by the Sight Sounds by the Ear Scents by the Smell The others which are perceiv'd by more than one sense as Greatness Scituation Figure Motion They call the first proper Objects and the second common ones They add that the report of our senses is not certain but only in respect of their proper Objects but as to the common ones they may easily be déceived Here 's then the certainty of the Senses reduced to half the size you gave it But this is not all for Bellarmin stops not here He moreover distinguishes the judgments we may make on the proper Objects of our Senses in Generals and in Particulars For example when we see a Colour we may say first in general of it This is a colour not a scent or savour We may say likewise in particular This is such a colour 't is white or red not green or black He tells us the Senses are not certain but in the first of these judgments they often deceiving us in the second See Sir whereunto this Doctrine reduces the certainty of the Senses For my part I could like as
true nor yet whatever is opposed against them is false but that all the Objections brought against them include some Proposition which is not evident and which consequently may be deni'd Is not this to say our Reason cannot prove demonstratively the falsity of our Mysteries Does not this absolutely overthrow your Objection You will have the Arians and Socinians Objections to pass for a convincing Demonstration Yet your Divines affirm it 's impossible to make Demonstrations against the Truths of Faith. You say 't is impossible to answer any thing to this But your Divines affirm to you That this Objection and the rest like it do necessarily include something which may be deni'd and is not evident They pass further They say one may demonstrate this very thing Which is to say one may demonstrate That it is not possible to offer Demonstrations against us Which is what we may easily justifie by another consideration Which is to the end an Argument may pass for Demonstrative every term about it must be perfectly understood whereby there may arise a clear and distinct Idea in the mind of what it expresseth And therefore Geometricians use such clear terms in their Demonstrations that it is impossible but they must be understood or if any one offers it self clouded with the least obscurity they immediately carefully explain it And therefore they make no Demonstration but what is preceded by a great number of Definitions which explain the terms But how can this be in a Mystery so little known as that of the Trinity For who can pretend to have distinct Idea's either of the Divine Essence and its Unity or of the Persons which possess it and of their distinction When we are askt says St. Augustin * Aug. de Trin. lib. 5. cap. 9. what the three are the mind of man finds it self extream shallow and cannot express it self Yet it is said there are Three Persons not as if we cou'd define'em but we rather say so that we may not say nothing And in another place * Idem lib. 7. cap. 4. When 't is demanded of us what the Three are we set our selves on seeking some general or particular term because the excellency of Divine things is beyond the strength of our expressions For there 's more truth in what we think than in what we say of God and more in reality than in thought I say the same thing of other terms used on this great Subject They raise in our minds only confused and muddy Ideas How then will these afford us Demonstrations What do you answer then directly to my Objection says Mr. N. What do you your self answer reply'd I. For in fine considering what I have said you see our interest is the same In effect it must be said we have no rational Argument to offer against the Arians or Socinians This last refuge seems to me intollerable and I shou'd as soon say they have the Reason on their side and we are possess'd with absurd prejudices We must then say these peoples Objections may be solidly answer'd and do you think Sir none of your Divines not to speak now of ours have not done it Were this the case this truth must have been very unfortunate to have met with no Defender for so many ages able to repel the attacks of its adversaries Moreover I do not see how you can extol so much as you commonly do the learning wisdom yea and Infallibility of your Church seeing it seems she has nothing but blind Answers and vain Tergiversations to refute these Erroneous persons Objections For my part I am of a very different opinion and believe your Schoolmen have solidly answer'd this Objection First you know That several of 'em have deni'd this Philosophical Maxim which implies That two Subjects cannot be distinguisht from one another when they are not so by a third You know there are several considerable instances offer'd as is that of length largeness and depth which are very different from one another altho they all differ not from extension Whereunto we may add that of the Modusses which are not distinct from the things they modify altho distinguish'd from one another As for instance when I shut my hand I give it a quite different manner of being from that it has when open and stretched out Of necessity these two manners of being must be different from one another seeing it 's not only easie to separate them and to make 'em subsist one without another but it 's impossible to make 'em subsist together being opposite and inconsistent Yet 't is commonly held That the Modusses be not really distinguishable from the things they modifie I say the same thing of the actions of the Soul there are some of 'em inconsistent For example to judg a proposition is true and to judg that it 's false To will and not to will the same Object To love and hate the same person The same soul does this at several times And consequently does very different acts Yet these acts tho different from one another do not really differ from the substance of the soul but are only mere modifications of it One may then deny your Maxim or restrain it and bring exceptions against it You know your Divines have made several and shew'd That either of 'em secures the Mystery before us I suppose you do not expect I shou'd recite them seeing you may find 'em in Father Vincent's Logick in George Rhodes Theology and in several other of your Authors Were there not any thing in all this which satisfy'd me I shou'd not be much perplex'd about it I shou'd content my self with what I now told you That all the Objections which can be made against the Mystery of the Trinity consist of several improper and obscure terms and such as are incapable of causing distinct Idea's of what is pretended to be signifi'd by ' em To shew then That this Doctrine does not include Contradictions as you wou'd insinuate by the Objection I examin consider the main or bottom of this great Mystery what makes for and against it we shou'd conceive in a just and precise manner what 's therein inconsistent and see clearly these inconsistencies and oppositions But we being far from such a knowledg of this great Truth it 's then clear no one can shew it includes any thing contradictory But it 's not the same with Transubstantiation What you say of that includes a great number of palpable and manifest Contradictions and shocks directly all the notices of Sense and Reason So that you cannot make too much hast to retrench it from the body of Christian Religion and remove it out of a place which it so ill supplies A body wou'd think answer'd he to hear you speak That we might form Christian Religion to our minds and as soon as a Doctrine is not to our fancy we may put it our of our Creed This without doubt wou'd be very agreeable But Sir in excluding Transubstantiation from the number of the Articles of Faith will you thereby blot it out of Holy Writ wherein the Divine Spirit has inserted it in such clear and full terms You know Heaven Earth shall sooner pass away than the least iota of this holy Word Never fear repli'd I my blotting it out It never was there And this I wou'd now make apparent to you did I not fear we have walkt and talk'd so long that both your legs and ears are tired FINIS
our Senses which is the Foundation of the strongest Proofs of Christianity IT 's not many days since I came to Mr. N. and found him in his Study having his Eyes fix'd on a Book with the reading of which he seem'd to be so taken up as made me think I should do him wrong to interrupt him Intending therefore to withdraw without his seeing me I could not do it without some small disturbance which made him turn his Head towards the place where I was and hastily arise towards me You shall not be gone said he for I prize your Company at another rate than thus to lose it The loss repli'd I would rather be mine and I am afraid lest I should deprive you of the pleasure of some delightful reading as knowing by experience how vexatious it is to be disturb'd at such a time What you say answered he after he had made me sit down is very true I am not a little pleas'd with reading good Books and I doubt not but this which lies before me is of that number But you have wherewith to make me amends for this Interruption for I doubt not but before we part you will increase the Pleasure which this reading afforded me and approving this Book as I dare say you will you 'l not a little confirm me in the good Opinion I have of it and make me read it henceforward with greater earnestness Your esteem of the Book repli'd I is enough to gain my approbation I am not wont to make Appeals from your Judgment having been always so pleas'd in following it that 't is now become a kind of Law which I never violate But perhaps I never saw this Book That can't be answer'd he this Book has been too famous for you not to see it especially considering it's some Years since 't was publish'd In a word 't is the Book which the Ingenious Mr. Huet has written to establish the Truth of Christian Religion (a) P. Dan. Huetii demonstratio Evangelica I do not repent said I of my engagement to approve of it for I have read it with great delight not to mention the Style which is delicate and want's no Ornaments I sind it replenish'd with judicious Observations and such as lie out of the common Road full of great sense and plainness In short 't is a Work worthy its Author who hold's a considerable Place amongst Learned Men. I have only one thing to say against the Book and that with regret because I know you will not herein agree with me Let 's hear it however said he It is repli'd I That this Book was made by one of your Party If that be all the fault answer'd he I am much mistaken if Mr. Huet ever corrects it You may judg what you please of it replied I my Opinion is That this is a capital Fault and spoil's the whole Work. For whereas this would have been an excellent Piece had it been wrote by a Protestant coming from a Person of your Communion it loses all its Force and Conviction and overthrows its own Arguments and should it fall into the hands of a knowing Infidel he could with one word answer it This is very surprising says Mr. N. and you must be a very great Bigot in your Religion to offer such a strange and incredible Paradox Has your Belief the priviledg of making bad Arguments good Ones and is ours so unhappy as to corrupt the best Things and change Demonstrations into Sophisms as oft as they pass through our hands There may be repli'd I some Truth in what you now say and I give an Instance of this from one of your Authors (b) Education of a Prince who shews That the greatest part of Seneca's Maxims are false and ridiculous in the Writings of That Philosopher whereas they would be very proper and excellent in the Writings of a Christian The same may I say of Mr. Huet and the rest of your Authors who undertake this Subject The best Proofs become Paralogisms in their Writings and 't is by passing over into ours that they resume their strength and due efficacy And this is one of the Effects which your Transubstantiation operates destroying the most convincing Arguments you can offer the Infidels and giving them an infallible means to defend themselves and right to maintain That if these Proofs be good Transubstantiation is not a part of the Christian Religion or if Transubstantiation be a part of the Christian Religion these Proofs he of no validity It 's certian if they be Men endued with sense they will lay hold of the first of these Propositions In effect it 's apparent That Mr. Huet's Proof are valid and good in themselves whereas 't is not certain That Transubstantiation is one of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches not to say that it ought to be taken for granted that it is not one of them It is so strange and offensive and so little agrees with the whole Body of reveal'd Truths either in general or particular that a Man needs only the use of his Senses free from all prejudices to perceive That this comes not from the same Spring and that the Author of Christianity is a very different Person from the Author of Transubstantiation Such Infidels then that are discerning Men will separate what 's offered to them jointly They will embrace Christianity and reject Transubstantiation They will receive this Holy Religion as coming from the Spirit of God and put from them your Doctrine as a humane Invention However 't is not long of you That they cast not themselves into the other aforementioned extremity I mean the persuading themselves that the Proofs of the Christian Religion be invalid Yet you are for persuading them not only That Transubstantiation is one of the Doctrines which the Gospel teaches but moreover one of its principal ones one of the most essential Points of Christian Religion and that which can be least spared And consequently if these Infidels be simple enough to believe this and after such an Error have any reason left they will only make use of it to perswade themselves That that Religion which teaches such an incredible Doctrine could not have been revealed by the Spirit of Truth and that the Proofs which were made use of to establish the Divinity of it are of no validity I am so strongly possessed with the belief of Transubstantiation said Mr. N. That I believe no Objections in the World are capable to make me doubt one minute of the truth of it Yet I must acknowledg 't would be a terrible Temptation to me could you convince me of what you say It does so highly concern us That the Proofs of Christianity be valid That there are few Things but what ought to be sacrific'd to so great an Interest and I know no greater prejudice against a Doctrine than to shew that it weakens these Proofs and gives advantage to such dangerous Adversaries as those are against whom we
them hold (i) Greg. de Val. Tom. 3. Disp 1. Quest 1. Punct 1. §. 7. Coninte de actib sup disp 13. dub 1. Maerat de fid disp 16. Sect. 3 Goner de fid disp 1. art 8. Rhod. de fid quest 2. Sect. 4. §. 2. That the first Act of Divine Faith is always preceded by a Judgment morally evident which shew's That what one is going to believe is worthy to be believed They affirm That without this Judgment Faith can never be form'd in the Soul. They say moreover That this Judgment is only grounded on what they call Reasons of Belief or Motives of Credibility which are at bottom the Proofs of Christianity They say That the Infidel weighing these Reasons and finding them good and solid he concludes that the Doctrine which they maintain ought to be received I now ask you How the Infidel can form this inward Judgment and pronounce that Christian Religion deserves to be received in the time wherein he sees that the Reasons which induce him to embrace it are opposed by other Reasons stronger and clearer I demand of you if in case this can be Whether such a Judgment would not be apparently false For how in effect can one say a thing is worthy to be believed when one has more reason to think it salfe than to believe it's true Do we call such a thing credible Is' t not rather incredible I might drive on these Consequences father I could shew you that Transubstantiation hath other Consequences which are no less vexatious But this not appearing necessary I shall content my self at this time with asking you Whether these three Consequences which I have taken from your Belief are not very terrible and whether it be not better to renounce the Doctrine which draws them oafter it than to admit them Yet they be necessary and you must receive them unless you 'l deny some of the Propositions which you have granted me Neither will this much help you because that in effect whatever you have granted me is most certain and when you would have this brought into question I 'le not fear the making you grant it again there being nothing in all this but what is highly evident What you now said to me at length answer'd Mr. N. is plausible enough and I must confess I did not believe your Cause could be pleaded so strongly And yet I am perswaded that this is not solid and I hope to answer all you have said when I have thought more of it Pray let me sleep upon it and I 'le give you an account to morrow morning of what has come into my mind I was far from denying so reasonable a request I only told him before I went away That if this Proof appear'd to him stronger than those we are wont to use in this matter this only arose from a certain Air of Novelty which might be in the manner of proposing it and that in the main the common Proofs are no less convincing than those and if they did not appear so this only proceeded from our being insensibly accustomed to believe them false there having been a thousand things invented to clude the force of them It being long since said I that they have been opposed against you your Doctors therefore have left no Stone unturn'd to lessen the value of them To this end they have sorg'd a thousand Distinctions sought a thousand Subterfuges and have wanted no Artifice nor Colour to make them pass in the World. And therefore when we offer them against you we find you always ready to slight them It would have been the same with what I just now offer'd you had you foreseen the course of my Objections and you would have taken care not to say several things with which your Books are full and which should be henceforward left out unless you are minded to shew the World how you condemn your own Principles I hereupon took my leave of him and withdrew praying God from the bottom of my Heart to bless my Endeavours and so to prosper this Seed which was sown as it were unawares that it might one day bring forth Fruit to his Glory CONFERENCE II. The Second Proof That Transubstantiation discrediting the Testimony of our Senses does absolutely overthrow the principal Reasons which confirm the Truth of Christian Religion WHEN I parted from Mr. N. there was no mention made of the Place where we were to meet which made me believe knowing his obliging temper he would come the next day to me But being unwilling he should give himself that trouble I was resolved to prevent him by being with him first He told me he was troubled he could not be as diligent as I was for immediately after I had left him a Business came upon him of great Importance which had employed his Thoughts to that very time but having ended that Affair he hoped he should now have an opportunity of acquitting himself of the Engagement he was in Will you said I to him let me impart to you another Thought which has great conformity with that which was the Subject of our Yesterday's Discourse By which means you may examine both these Arguments at a time and perhaps the one will hinder you from stopping at things which will appear to you proper to get rid of the other I am of your mind said he but I desire you would propose this second Proof all at once For in sine there 's oft more artifice than sincerity in discovering what one has to say by pieces He that answers and knows not where his Adversary will lead him takes many times fruitless Precautions and sometimes neglects necessary Ones He le ts pass certain things which strike deepest and amuses himself with others which are of no effect And therefore I think it best That the Respondent should see at once the Difficulty proposed to him and know at first what he is to take care of and therefore I pray you henceforward to deal in this manner with me What you say would be necessary repli'd I had you an Adversary who sought only to surprize and who more regarded Victory than Truth But I must tell you plainly this Artifice appears so inconsiderable and unworthy of an honest Man especially of a Christian that I cannot but be troubled at your suspicion Pray therefore believe this is not my intention for if I have followed in our preceding Discourse such a method as you do not like 't was because I thought it the fittest to lead those insensibly to the Truth who are farthest from it You know the greatest Men among the Ancients have been of this Sentiment and that it was perticularly the Method of Socrates and his famous Disciple Plato Yet seeing you will have me take another course I shall reduce my second Argument to three Propositions all three being so evidently certain that I cannot see how they can be overthrown The first is That if Transubstantiation takes place our
Senses are deceived in taking for Bread and Wine what is not so The second is That if our Senses may be mistaken in the Eucharist they may be as well mistaken in every thing else so that their Depositions have nothing certain The third is That if our Senses may be mistaken in the discovery of their Objects be they what they will The Proofs of Christian Religion are of no value The better to comprehend the Force of this Argument I believe 't will not be amiss to pass over it again and carefully to examine its Propositions The first appears to me very evident for I have always taken Error to be the persuading of a Man's self That a thing is what it is not or to judg that it is not what it is This being granted it cannot be denied but that our Senses do deceive us in the Eucharist if they attempt the perswading us That it is any other thing than what it is Yet this they do if Transubstantiation takes place For in fine if this Doctrine were true the Eucharist would not be Bread and Wine but our Saviour's proper Body and Blood. And yet our Senses attest the contrary they all unanimously say with one Voice that it is not our Lord's Body and Blood but Bread and Wine To prove what I say Shew the Eucharist to an Infidel who has no knowledg of your Mystery and ask him what it is He 'l answer without hesitation 't is Bread and Wine Ask a Child the same question he will return you the same answer In fine offer it to a Brute and he will do what he is wont when ordinary Bread and Wine is set before him Now what is the common light to this Infidel this Child and brute Beast nothing else but that of Sense whereupon it cannot be denied but our senses tell us that the Eucharist is Bread and Wine and it appears impossible to affirm that it is not so without giving the lye to these Faculties This will appear more clearly if you please to consider That the Faculty which tells us that the Eucharist is Bread and Wine is the same which makes us discern other Objects and makes us say of each of them This is such a thing Who will deny that 't is by means of the Senses we discover what is present to us In effect those who have lost the use of their Senses do discern nothing and those who are not absolutely deprived of these Faculties yet have them weak'ned through defect of the Organs are easily mistaken Lead a blind Man within some paces of a Statue and ask him what that is which stands before him He will answer you he do's not know offer the same question to another that is not quite blind but yet has bad Eyes He 'l tel you perhaps 't is a Man. Whereas on the contrary a Man whose sight is good will tell you presently 't is a Statue Is it not plain then That 't is the Sight which discerns this Object When then we see the Eucharist and we touch and taste it we say it's Bread and Wine it 's clear we say it from the relation of our Eyes our Hands and our Mouths And consequently if it be found that 't is not Bread and Wine it cannot be denied but that 't is our Senses which have cheated and deceived us It is not worth the while to set upon the proving of a thing which your Divines willingly grant One might produce some hundred's of places in their Works where they affirm what I say (a) See the Treatise of the Authority of the Senses Chap. 6. They maintain that the Fathers (b) Bell. de Euch. lib. 3. cap. 24. have strictly charged their People not to trust their Senses in this occasion extreamly blaming those who suffer themselves to be guided by these Faculties in a matter wherein according to them we should follow no other Light than that of Faith and Revelation They pretend nothing do's more enhance the merit of this Faith Than her raising her self above the Senses and perswading her self of the contrary of what these Faculties do witness to us I doe not doubt Sir but you have observ'd all this in the reading of your Authors It 's true answer'd he and I will not contest with you about this first Proposition But I will not grant you the second For in fine what necessity is there that the Senses deceiving us in this Object they cannot faithfully instruct us in any other Is it not very likely that this is a single Error and without any consequence May they not deceive us in this occasion and in some others without extending this to all In effect the greatest Lyars do sometimes tell true and perhaps there is not one amongst this sort of People but speaks more Truth than Lies Why may we not then say the same thing of our Senses You have not well comprehended my meaning rerepli'd I for I did not say That if our Senses be deceived in the Eucharist they must necessarily be deceived in every thing else But only that they may be so that the thing is not impossible and we shall never be certain of the contrary unless we know it by some other way This is all I say and I hope to shew you in what follows that I need no more In the mean time my Proposition thus exprest is undenyable In effect he that deceives once may deceive always and 't is sufficient a Witness be once detected of Falsity to be suspected all his Life Thus the Senses according to you making untrue reports on the Eucharist we may as well suspect them to do the same on other things This is clear but to make it more unquestionable be pleased to consider That if the Senses do once deceive their relation is no longer a certain Mark and an unquestionable Proof of Truth For how can we look on that to be a certain Mark of Truth which is sometimes joyn'd with Error And consequently To have no other Foundation for ones Perwasions than the relations of our Senses this would be to rest on uncertain and doubtful Marks and to expose ones self to the greatest likelihood of being deceived To say the same thing in another manner let me Sir ask you Whether the bare relation of our Senses without any other Succours be a sufficient Motive to persuade us what they attest or not If it be 't is not possible our Senses can once deceive us for if they should we should have a sufficient Motive to persuade us of a thing which is false which we must be far from saying For were this so we should be bound to deceive our selves and this Error would not only be excusable but necessary there would be an Obligation of falling into it and 't would be a fault if we did not But this is intollerably absurd Now if the Testimony of our Senses be not a sufficient Foundation whereon to ground a solid
the Functions of the natural Faculty which discovers to us the difference of Substances If I do this Sir will you not be satisfied I shall be fully so answered he and I promise you that if you prove it me clearly I shall not trouble my self nor you with a Reply I can easily do it said I For is it not true that when any one would make us conceive a moral Certainty in the highest Point of its Perfection the commonest Examples which are produced are those of the Existence of the City of Rome to those who have never been there that of the Pope Grand Signior or Emperor to those that have never feen them and as to the past that of Alexander the Great Cesar Pompey and other Hero's of Antiquity Scarcely any Author that treats of this Suject but alledges one or the other of these Instances Yet the City of Rome is a Substance or to speak more exactly an heap of Substances of several kinds Alexander Caesar Pompey and all the rest of the ancient Hero's were something more than Accidents And consequently had not God given us a Faculty capable of discerning the Substances with certainty there would be no assurance from the Testimony of those who have seen this and instead of a moral Certainty the greatest which can be imagin'd we should only have a slight Opinion and without Foundation Is it not true Sir that we are morally assured there was heretofore at Rhodes a great Colossus of Brass that there was a stately Temple at Ephesus consecrated to Diana and at Rome another dedicated to Jupiter Have we not the like certainty that there are still Pyramids of Stone in Egypt of excessive heights that there 's a Mount in Sicily which vomits Fire that there are Elephants in the Indies Lions in Africk Crocodiles in the Nile Yet this Colossus these Temples Pyramids Mountain Lions and Crocodils what are these but Substances whose Existence is not known to us but by the Testimony of those who have seen them with their own Eyes or to say nothing which may move you who perceived them by means of the Faculty which God has given us to know these kind of Objects But not to go so far I now shew'd you that the Truth of the Facts whence are taken the Proofs which establish the Divinity of the Christian Religion and even of the Jewish depends on the faithfulness of the Report which this natural Faculty has made of several Substances and that if this Faculty may be herein mistaken these Proofs are in no wise convincing It being then certain that we are morally assured of the Truth of these Facts it cannot be denied we have a moral Certainty of several Substances and that those who were inform'd of them by themselves have a greater certainty than we Can you Sir now doubt I have not made good my word Will you not grant me that the discerning of Substances whatever the Faculty is whereby this is done is attended with a greater certainty that the moral one Thus this Faculty telling me the Eucharist is Bread and Wine and telling it me with all the force and constancy it is able is it not apparent there 's a clearness in its Evidence far greater than that in the Proofs of Christianity Do's not my Proof then return with its full strength and convictions May I not always say That Transubstantiation is opposed with greater strength of Argument than the Christian Religion is defended with We are agreed that the Proofs for Christianity have only a moral Evidence and I now shewed you That that which perswades us the Eucharist is Bread and Wine is far more certain than what is morally so Can you after this deny that there is not greater certainty in what combats Transubstantiation than in what establishes the Truth of Christian Religion Can you deny that that which is more than sufficient to establish the Truth of Christian Religion discharged of Transubstantiation is too weak to maintain it granting Transubstantiation to be one of the Doctrines which she requires to be believed You see then Sir the fruitlessness of your Answer you see it lets my two Proofs subsist in their full strength you see that whether it be the Senses or Reason which make us know and discern the Substances we have still cause to believe the Eucharist is Bread and Wine and that this Perswasion cannot be rendred doubtful and uncertain without shaking the whole Foundation of Christianity and without giving the Infidels an infallible means of triumphing over this Holy Religion Mr. N. was about forming an Answer when he was hindred by the arrival of one of my Friends who came from a long Voyage and whose return was a surprize to me I was much joyed to see him But Mr. N. to whom he was a Stranger took hence an occasion to be gone without informing me of his thoughts on what I told him CONFERENCE IV. The Third Proof That Transubstantiation establishes Scepticism in its full perfection and especially destroys the certainty of Demonstration I Was very desirous to know what effect my last conference had on Mr. N. I was moreover willing to shew him my third Proof Whereupon I went to his House where he received me with his usual civility and our Discourse having insensibly led us to Matters of Religion I took the liberty to ask him Whether he had throughly considered what had past in our foregoing Debates He hereupon ingenuously acknowledg'd He could find no means to defend against my Instances the Answer he had made me nor how to offer me better Yet he added he was so perswaded of the truth of his Belief That he would rather yield up to me Mr. Huet's Proofs than to imagin the whole Church could be deceived in so important a Matter as that of the Sacrament In effect said he to me What hurt can there be in saying this Author has ill defended a good Cause and made use of false reasonings for the maintaining of the Truth What do you say Sir said I you ask me What hurt there can be in what you say I affirm to you that nothing can be worse For Sir I would not have you mistaken Mr. Huet's Proofs are not of his invention he only digested them into order strengthened and illustrated them with curious Remarks and pressing Considerations and as to the main of them he has taken them out of Authors that have wrote on that Subject before him and indeed he has also commendably taken them from the discourses of the Prophets and the Son of God himself and his Apostles Christ himself is the first that has used these Proofs He several times alledg'd the Predictions of the Prophets and as oft did cite his Miracles He alledg'd his Resurrection and these were his strongest Arms his greatest Arguments He made use of them to stop the mouths of the Scribes and Pharisees whom he look'd upon as his profest Enemies He used them to perswade the multitudes
things if it may deceive us in all things the proofs of Christianity are of no validity Even your third proof cannot escape the being appli'd to the Mystery of the Trinity In effect its observable That the Maxim I now alledg'd to you is not only a Metaphysical principle but the foundation of all affirmatory Syllogisms which prove one cannot joyn two terms by the affirmation but by shewing one may joyn them both to a third term'd a mean. By consequence if this Maxim be false as it must of necessity be if the Mystery of the Trinity be true we must no longer think of arguing but yield up the certainty of this sort of knowledg to the Sceptics And here 's Sir the natural use of your Method if it be follow'd we must retrench from our Religion whatever our reason will not suffer and as soon as ever she shall see any opposition to arise between her Maxims and our Mysteries we have no other party to betake our selves to but that of disowning these Mysteries and rejecting them as so many Errors Thus Faith shall depend on our Capricio and we shall henceforward believe not what it shall please God to reveal to us but whatever it shall please us to imagin Would you have me to take this course or to become an Arian or Socinian and do you think we ought to yield up every Article of our Faith as soon as ever we shall find any repugnance in them to the deceitful Maxims of our wretched reason which oftner serves to lead us out than in the way and to blind us than to enlighten us Far am I repli'd I from this and tho I am perswaded of the innocency of my Method I should be the first to condemn it did I believe 't would produce such pernicious effects But it s certainly an offering of great violence to make it serve for the drawing from it such dangerous Conclusions Pray let me justifie it and for this purpose give me your attention for some minutes It 's first very strange you should reject Arguments wherein you cannot remark the least defect They consist of sundry Propositions amongst which there 's not one but what is not only true but moreover evident Moreover they be strictly alli'd and their Conclusions are drawn in the most natural manner in the world Ought they then to be rejected on vain suspicions and uncertain apprehensions Is not this proceeding injurious to faith For what would she be might her Doctrines be combated by Reasons which suffer no reply and from which there 's no defence but by saying We wont examine them Is not this formally to accuse her That she will not endure the light Should all the world follow your example what shall we answer to the Libertins of the Age how would they triumph over our Religion Moreover let me entreat you to consider there 's great difference between your two first proofs and my two first yours are drawn from Reason and mine from Sense You say 't is evident to Reason there are three Essences in the Trinity or that there 's only one Person Whereas I say it 's evident not only to Reason but to Sense That the Eucharist is Bread and Wine What matter is it said Mr. N. that the Evidence which you oppose to that of the Proofs of Christianity is that which is perceiv'd by Reason or that which strikes the Senses seeing the first is no less than the second or to speak better seeing that is far greater than this It 's of great concern answer'd I and that on divers accounts First because the Supposition you make is not certain You suppose That the certainty of the acts of reason such as that is which springs from Demonstration is greater than that which arises from the report of the Senses I confess this is the Cartesians opinion But you know the Gassendists hold the contrary These last which are certainly not to be contemn'd hold there 's no greater certainty than that of the Senses They tell us They are the Senses which perswade us of the truth of the first Principles and that we know not for example The whole is greater than a part but by observing in all the Objects which have struck our Senses that the part was always lesser than the whole They are not only the Gassendists which are of this opinion The Vulgar and generally all those who are not Philosophers are herein of their opinion and if you will have them comprehend there are certain things of which they ought to be more strongly perswaded than of what they see they will presently believe you are not in earnest with them This appears considerable to me for you know neither Faith nor Salvation are the portion only of Philosophers the ordinary people having as great a right to them as the most Learned So that my Proofs have this advantage That they be convincing according to the Hypothesis of all the world whereas yours suppose things which few know and concerning which all those who are capacitated to judg are not agreed Especially the first of yours supposes a thing which Mr. Huet opposes with all his strength * Huetii Demonst Evang. pag. 3 4. That Physical Demonstrations have greater evidence and certitude than Moral ones He affirms on the contrary That Moral Demonstrations are the most convincing of all and that neither Physics nor Metaphysics nor Geometry has one to be parallel'd with them whether in general with those which perswade us of most matters of fact or in particular with those which he makes use of to establish the truth of Christian Religion He hereupon sufficiently enlarges himself and I doubt not but you have remarkt that place as well as I. I may then deny your Supposition which if I should I shall have very able persons for my Abettors But I 'le grant what you say to be true and suppose all the world of your opinion I know another way to solve your Objection which is Sir That should I agree with you That considering things in general the evidence of Reason is greater than that which offers it self to the Senses this will not hinder me from maintaining That in particularising things we shall find incomparably fewer things evident to Reason than of such as are perceived by the Senses In effect how few are the Truths which are perceiv'd by reason alone * Dogmatists such as maintain against the Sceptics the certainty of Sciences wherein not only the Sceptics but the Dogmatists do agree Scarcely is there one which has not been debated Pro Con. It 's not the same of those which are perceiv'd by the Senses For excepting the Sceptics whom you cannot bring in against the Senses seeing they are as bad friends to Reason Scarce will you find one who will not allow what the Senses discover to us at least in gross and popular Objects if I may say so and which are the only ones we now speak of
Consult all the Sects of the Philosophers all the people in the Universe to know whether it be now day or whether an Horse be greater than an Ant you will find I do not say not a Sect or Nation but not any one particular person that denies this The light of Sense has moreover this advantage over that of Reason that it 's less liable to be disordered by prejudices Prejudices make people doubt who are strongly possessed by them of Truths which a free Reason and a disengaged mind clearly perceives What is there for example which my reason perceives more distinctly than the impossibility of a Body's being in two places without division Yet your Reason imagines to see the contrary Whence comes this but from the prejudice wherewith one of us is possess'd But 't is not the same with the Senses There 's no prejudice which hinders them from seeing Objects such as they are which we must always understand of the most apparent and grossest Objects There are two sorts of clearness says an Author much esteem'd among you * Lawful Prejudices chap. 14. the one so lively and piercing that it 's impossible for men not to see it and which is such as cannot be darkned by any cloud of Prejudices or Passions whereby it shews it self uniformly to all men of this kind adds he are things exposed to the Senses In a word It 's a thousand times easier to deceive our Reason than our Senses There 's no truth so certain which a Sophister will not render doubtful by his Subtilties and Artifices Even the most learned People are sometimes deceived and we have seen but too many Examples of this in all Ages But deceive my Senses if you can on Objects as familiar as those we now spake of Go and inform any one That the food he commonly uses is not Bread and Beer The evidence of Sense then has great advantages over that which is perceiv'd only by Reason whence appears the Possibility of my Proofs being good and your two first objections being not so Nay the thing is not only possible but true and I hope to convince you of it with little trouble Whatever you have hitherto said to me turns on these two Suppositions The first That Reason sees evidently on one hand the truth of this maxim of the Philosophers That when two Subjects be not distinct from a third they are not so from one another The second That there 's more evidence in this than there is in the Reasons which establish the Truth of Christian Religion But I first affirm to you It 's impossible these two Suppositions can be true And if they were the Arians and Socinians wou'd have good grounds to deny the Mystery of the Trinity For first if our Reason evidently saw the Truth of the Maxim you bring against me we must necessarily say one of these two things Either that in effect this Maxim is true or that Evidence is not a certain mark of Truth Here 's no medium You must of necessity take one of these sides The second differs in nothing from Scepticism you must therefore take the first It must be said that according to you the Maxim of the Philosophers is true That 's my thought says Mr. N. Are you of the same mind repli'd I on the subject of the Opposition which you think you evidently see between this Maxim and the Mystery of the Trinity Do you think this to be a true and real Opposition Or do you believe it to be false altho you evidently see it Should I say it 's false answer'd he you wou'd make me the same Objection you have already made you will tell me there may be error in things most evident seeing I might evidently see Opposition where there is none and that thus Evidence wou'd not be the mark of Truth and consequently That the Sceptics wou'd have Reason to doubt of every thing To avoid such dangerous Extremities I had rather tell you that this Opposition is as true as 't is evident You believe then said I to him that effectively and in the Truth of the thing the Mystery of the Trinity is directly against an unquestionable Maxim. You believe there 's a real Contradiction between these two things and that 't is impossible to make them agree This is certainly true answer'd he Then said I the Sceptics must have good grounds seeing Contradiction is not the note of Falsity What is there more unquestionable than this Maxim That if a Proposition be true that which contradicts it must necessarily be false Is not this the Foundation of certainty You now see Sir on what precipices you cast your selves and what are the unavoidable Consequences of your Suppositions Hence you see the necessity of acknowledging there are some false and that in effect if the Philosophers Maxim be true it 's not contrary to the Mystery of the Trinity or if there be any Opposition between this Mystery and this Maxim we must not conclude the Maxim to be false seeing it's impossible the Mystery shou'd be so But this is not all I wish you wou'd explain your self on Mr. Huets Sentiment I lately mention'd to you Which Demonstrations do you believe most certain Physical or Moral ones Or to speak more precisely wherein think you lies most certainty and evidence in the Demonstration you brought against me in the name or the Socinians and Arians or in those Mr. Huet makes use of to prove the Truth of the Christian Religion Take which side you will you cannot escape me If you say the advantage lies on the side of Mr. Huets Proofs you deliver up to me your Objection In this Supposition right Reason will have us believe the Trinity notwithstanding the difficulties therein seeing nothing's more conformable to her Maxims than always to prefer that which is more evident before that which is less But if you say on the contrary That the Arians and Socinians Objection has more strength than Mr. Huets Proofs You hereby acknowledg That the Doctrine of the Trinity is contrary to good Sence and ought therefore to be rejected whether by retrenching of it from the number of the Doctrines which Christianity teaches supposing it can be separated from it or by rejecting the whole of Christianity supposing this Doctrine be inseparable from the rest In effect were these Proofs and this Objection of an equal force they wou'd bring the mind into suspence whence right Reason cou'd not draw it out She wou'd not know on which side to determine her self and finding at bottom of this Religion things which will appear to her evidently false She wou'd carry us as far off from it as She wou'd bring us near it in making us comprehend the force of the Proofs which authorize it Moreover making two contrary Judgments on the Subject of Religion one that it is true because the Proofs produced in its favour are good the other that it is false because it teaches
Absurdities She must therefore be deceived in the one or the other of these Judgments and thus neither the one nor the other of these wou'd be certain How wou'd it be then supposing all the advantage lay on one side as it wou'd plainly if what might be offered against Christianity has more evidence and certainty than what is used to establish the Divinity of it where shall we find that in this Supposition we must prefer what is less certain before what is more And who thinks if a man does this he deserves to be eternally miserable How then says Mr. N. Shall Reason prescribe us what we are to believe Shall she become the Rule yea and Judg of our Faith And do we not know that the truths of Christianity are infinitely above the Comprehension of human Reason You confound abundance of things which you shou'd distinguish repli'd I. First there 's a great deal of difference between discovering to us what we must believe as revealed of God and what we must reject as invented by Men. The first of these Duties contains two parts In effect One may make two sorts of enquiry after what one is to believe First In examining the Doctrine offered us and comparing it with the Maxims of Reason just as we do when we wou'd determine our selves on a question of Philosophy The second in examining purely whether this Doctrine has been revealed by God either by enquiring wherher it makes a part of a Religion supposed Divine or by enquiring whether the Religion of which we do not doubt but this Doctrine makes up a part has been revealed of God. It 's certain it cannot be expected from Reason to enquire in this first manner what we ought to believe and this for two Considerations First whatever attempts she may make she will never get the mastery the clearest wit and most piercing judgment not being in a capacity of raising it self of it self to the discovery of these sublime Truths which Faith comprehends And shou'd Reason discover some one the perswasion she could give us of it would not be a Divine Faith. It would be perhaps a Science an Opinion according as the proofs whereon this is grounded are probable or demonstrative But this wou'd never be a Divine Faith it being not possible for Divine Faith to have any other foundation than the authority of God. When we wou'd know whether a Doctrine makes part of a Religion of whose Divinity we are otherwise satisfied as when we wou'd enquire whether Christianity teaches Transubstantiation or the Real Presence this is certainly to be examin'd by Reason For how can we know this if we have lost our Reason Yet in this enquiry she does not so much keep the quality of a Rule as that of an Organ I would say we make this enquiry by means of this faculty call'd Reason yet this faculty does not then consult its own proper light and does not compare the Doctrine offered with its Notions She only compares it with the Rule which God has given her the Scripture alone according to us and the Scripture Tradition and Councils according to you It 's not the same when the question is to know whether a Religion be Divine for example when one deliberates whether one shall be a Christian Pagan or Mahometan In this enquiry Reason alone must be our guide and the best method it can take is to examine which of these different Religions which challenges our preference has the most visible Characters of Divinity which is it which appears most likely to have been revealed from God and which on the contrary is that which we have cause to think is a humane invention As to the rejecting of a Doctrine we have several different means If it be not conformable to the Rule we ought not to receive it we ought to refuse believing it with a Divine Faith. If it be contrary to the Rule we ought to do more we ought positively to reject it and believe it to be false In a word if our Senses or Reason expresly attest this Doctrine is not true we ought to perswade our selves not only that it is not true but that it has never been revealed of God. This last duty draws its Original from two different springs The first is the force of this great Maxim which is the foundation of Divine Faith to wit That whatever God has said is true Hence properly comes the obligation which we have to believe whatever God has revealed to us In effect why should we not believe it seeing its equally impossible that God shou'd be deceiv'd himself judging things to be what they are not as that he shou'd deceive others by telling them they be not what he knows they are And this is the true foundation of Divine Faith and the original of that right which our Reason has not to believe what is evidently false Divine Faith does thus Reason Whatever God has reveal'd is true God has reveal'd such and such a Doctrine Then this or that Doctrine is true Reason says for her part Whatever God has revealed is true Such or such a Doctrine is not true Therefore 't was not revealed by God. Shou'd it happen as you suppose that God shou'd reveal a Doctrine which appeared plainly false to Reason we shou'd find our selves in a dreadful difficulty or rather in the condition which Divines call a state of perplexity and which wou'd bring along with it shou'd it ever happen an absolute impossibility of knowing what we ought to do On one hand we should be bound to believe this Doctrine on the supposition God had revealed it and on the other we shou'd perswade our selves that God would not have revealed it because it appears evidently false and consequently is not to be believed So that were it only to hinder this from hapning we shou'd believe that God never reveals any thing which is apparently false to Reason at least to Reason rectifi'd and which uses all necessary precautions not to be deceiv'd for 't is of that alone whereof I speak Moreover were it possible for God to reveal a Doctrine evidently false evidence would be no longer the infallible note of Truth seeing in this supposition the evidence wou'd accompany this act of our Reason which wou'd judg this Doctrine to be false and which wou'd be false it self seeing this Doctrine being reveal'd of God wou'd hereby be necessarily true So that we ought no longer to reckon on the evidence of things and the Sceptics wou'd have Reason to doubt of every thing You see then Sir That this right of our Reason has most solid foundations And it is certain that it has been ever acknowledged and that all sorts of Authors both Ancient and Modern have always believed they might justly conclude a Doctrine was not revealed from God when they saw it contrary to the purest notices of Reason And thus on one hand the Fathers have done who wrote against the Pagans and Hereticks