Truths to consist in the Agreement of those Empty Similitudes till at length as Fancy let loose to fly at its full Random and driven forward with a quick Wit does naturally and genuinly lead they had introduced a kind of Fanaticism into Philosophy built in the main or in great part on a pretended Inward Light by means of those Imaginary and Visionary Ideas From this Introversion upon these unsolid Aiery Bubbles and thence their neglecting the Things themselves and our Solid Natural Notions Mr. Locke was brought to Confound Corporeal and Spiritual Natures and consequently these two being the Adequate Object of all Philosophy all Philosophical Knowledge was rendred impossible And Cartesius left us no means to know whether Man is One Thing made up of Soul and Body or Two Things tack'd together by virtue of some Accident which well consisted with their Substantial Distinction Hence also it came that GOD was brought in at every Hard Pinch to act contrary to what the Natures of Things requir'd without which they could not lay their Principles or make their Scheme cohere that is they would needs make GOD as he is the Author and Orderer of Nature to work either Preternaturally or else Supernaturally which is a plain Contradiction Nay Mr. Locke finding no Fancy in his Imaginative Power that suits with our Notion of Thing would perswade the World that no Man living knows what a Thing or Substance is that is that none knows what the Word Thing means which is so Evident to our Natural Thoughts that it is impossible for the rudest Person in the World to be Ignorant of it In a Word their Fancy so inveigled their Reason that they came to deny Self-evident Truths and held many other Propositions which were absolutely Impossible and Contradictory Wherefore seeing Philosophy reduced to this lamentable Condition and that Solid Rationality and all Truth in Natural Objects were thus in imminent Danger to be over-run and born down by Imaginary Conceits and apprehending that GOD's Providence had fitted and enabled me to redress such great Mischiefs I thought it became me to re-instate Reason in her Soveraignty over Fancy and to assert to her the Rightful Dominion Nature had given her over all our Judgments and Discourses I resolved therefore to disintricate Truth which lay too deep for Superficial Fancy to fathom from all those Labyrinths of Errour I observ'd that Philosophy labour'd and languish'd under many Complicated Distempers all springing from this way of Ideas and that they were grown Epidemical nor could they be cur'd by the Application of Remedies to this or that Particular Part or by confuting this or that Particular Errour Hereupon having found out the true Cause of all these Maladies of Human Understanding I saw it was necessary to Stub up by the Roots that Way it self and by Closâ— and Solid Reasons the most Decisive Weapons in Truâ—â—â— Armory to break in Pieces the brittle Glassy Essences of those Fantastick Apparitions which if a Right Way of Reasoning be settled and understood will disappear and vanish out of the World as their Elder Sisters the Fairies have done in this last Half Century I know my Lord Reformation made by a Single Man tho' but in Philosophy seldom gains Credit to him who attempts it And it must be confess'd that to pretend to reform where there is no Necessity has an Ill Name and is justly held to spring from Policy Interest Pride or some such other Sinister Motive But I am very confident that whoever peruses this Treatise nay but even the Preface will see that the Occasion of this Undertaking was not only Expedient but Cogent Nor can any Man justly tax him of Arrogance or of Usurping a Dictature over other Men's Judgments tho' he opposes Great Multitudes of Speculaters who offers his Reasons to convince theirs To this Necessity now laid open of Reforming Philosophy I shall add another of a much more weighty Concern and which may also rectifie some zealons well-meaning Friends who judging of Things by their own Short Reach think that the Advancing Truth in Philosophy is little better than Time and Labour lost whereas I on the Contrary do really think that the Supplying what the World most wants is the Greatest and most Universal Good I can possibly do This other Necessity then of my rectifying our Modern Philosophy which will make others see how great a Good it is is this Those Truths which are of a higher and more Sacred Nature can never be rightly Explicated nor consequently such Men not valuing Authority be duly recommended to those who Dissent from them unless True Principles of Philosophy be Settled and Unsound ones Confuted For since no Explication of Faith can be made by Faith it self all of them must necessarily be made by our Reason shewing the Conformity they have to our Natural Notions or to such Knowledges as we had from the Things in Nature especially since Dissenters draw their Chief Objections from the Repugnancy of those Points to our Natural Principles 'T is a known Truth that as every Definition must be the Self-same Notion with what is defin'd so must every right Explication too it being in reality nothing but the Unfolding what was before wrapt up Closer Whence follows that when he who has the ill Luck to have taken up False Principles comes to explicate the Trinity the Incarnation the Resurrection or any High Point of Reveal'd Faith his Explication must always be Contrary to True Principles of Nature and perhaps may have twenty real Contradictions in it and so Common Reason as was said telling all Sensible Men that the Explication must be the same Sense with the Point which it Explicates the Tenet of Faith will suffer in the Opinion of Witty Men by such an Untoward and Senseless Explication be Ridiculous to Adversaries and be held perfect Nonsense and Contradiction Whereas if the Philosophy by which those Tenets are Explicated be True and Solid then since both Natural and Reveal'd Truths are Children of the same Father the GOD and Author of All Truth who cannot contradict Himself and therefore those two Sorts of Truths cannot but agree it will follow that the Explication of all Reveal'd Points made according to True Philosophy must needs appear to Intelligent Men to be most Rational and most Consonant and not Contradictory to True Natural Principles Which will Comfort Faith in those who believe already Recommend it to all Ingenuous and Indifferent Seekers help to Convert to Christianity those whose Reason was formerly Dissatisfy'd upon such Sinister Misconceits and Lastly Confound Adversaries by putting them past Opposing it by any Principles of True Philosophy and leave nothing for them to object against it but Idle and Ill-grounded Fancies whose weak Attempts are easily defeated Whence I could heartily wish that were True Philosophy in Fashion all Sects so the State thought fit might have Free Liberty to Print the best Reasons they can muster up against Christianity Resting confident
that in that Happy State of Science or True Learning nothing in the World could gain to Truth a greater Advantage Till that Desirable Time comes all I can do is to declare here publickly that I shall take it for a great Favour if any Learned Socinian Deist or Atheist would please to send me those Reasons they or their Leaders judge of most Weight why they cannot embrace the Doctrine of the Trinity or Christianity which they may do privately and Unnam'd to the Stationer who publishes this Treatise and I do hereby promise them I will give their Objections their Full Force and publish an Answer to them Onely I will expect that their Arguments shall be Intrinsecal ones or drawn from the Opposition such Reveal'd Articles as they mislike are conceiv'd by them to have to some Principles of Logick Physicks or Metaphysicks which are either Self-evident or which they will undertake to reduce to Evidence These onely being such Objections as becomes a Christian Philosopher to speak to For if they be Extrinsecal ones and built on Histories or on Groundless Fancies or if they consist in Glossing Words in whose Sense we are not Agreed it belongs to a Critick or a Historian and is not the Proper Employment of a Philosopher I would not be thought by what is said lately to cast any Reflexions on Cartesius or Mr. Locke whom I join here equally and indifferently as intending any Diskindness to Christianity by their New Methods of Philosophy It appears both by their Writings and by their particular manner of handling their Subjects that they meant ingenuously and sincerely to follow what they conceiv'd to be True Onely I must say of both of them that if their Way of Philosophizing and therefore their Philosophy it self be shewn to be far from True and Solid then in case any Chief Christian Tenet should come to be Explicated by their Ways those Sacred Points themselves must necessarily for the Reason now given receive some Taint and Blemish by such Ill-grounded Explications And the same for the same Reason I must say of School-Philosophy too if it proceeds upon Principles that are not Well-grounded or Solid It remains my Lord to give my Reasons why this Common Duty I here perform to the Learned Part of Mankind who are Candidates of Science comes to be particularly address'd to Your Self Which in short are these I was much in Debt and it was an Honest Man's Part to endeavour to discharge it I ow'd much to Your Lordship's Father of Honourable and Pious Memory who both encourag'd my first Endeavours and favour'd me with a particular Friendship and Correspondence to His Dying-Day And I make account such kind Obligements writ in a Grateful Heart ought to be as Lasting and as Binding as those Obligations drawn on Paper and withal ought to devolve by a Hereditary Right to His Immediate Descendent Your Self I ow'd very much to Your Lordship 's own Person for the Kind Respect with which You have been pleas'd to honour me I ow'd much to all Your Lordship 's Nearest and Noblest Relations both in the Direct and in all the Collateral Lines And lastly since every Man who writes for Truth naturally loves to be Understood I ow'd it to my Self to present this Treatise particularly to Your Lordship than whom I know none of our English Nobility more Acutely Intelligent It is of such a Nature by its laying the Foundation of Philosophy from the deepest Bottom-Principles that to comprehend and penetrate it thorowly there was requir'd a Judgment both Solid and Pointed both which Perfections meet in Your Lordship's Great Genius in a High Perfection The Diligent Printer has overtaken my Lazy Pen and stays for this hasty Scribble which forces me with an Unmannerly Abruptness to write my self My LORD Your Lordship 's Most Sincere Honourer and most humbly devoted Servant J. S. THE PREFACE DIRECTED To those Learned Men of both our Universities who have a Due Regard for TRUTH and a Sincere Desire of KNOWLEDGE Gentlemen 1. AFter I had Publish'd my METHOD to SCIENCE which I Dedicated to your selves I came to receive certain Information that very many Students in both the Universities and not a few of those also who were to instruct others did apply themselves to the Way of Ideas in hopes to arrive by that means at Philosophical Knowledge My best Judgment grounded on very Evident Reasons assur'd me that that Method was far from Solid and utterly Unable to give you the True Knowledge of any thing in Nature being it self altogether Groundless and meerly Superficial I saw clearly that to addict your Thoughts to study Similitudes and Resemblances which as will be most evidently demonstrated could not possibly give you any True or Certain Light to know the Things themselves was no better than as it is in the Fable Vitreum vas lambere pultem non attingere It struck me with a very sensible Trouble that the precious Time and Pains of such great Numbers of Men who were the Flower of our Nation who were hereafter to be Guides to others and whose very Profession and State of Life had addicted them wholly to the Pursuit of Knowledge should be imbued with such Principles as render'd the Attainment of it absosolutely Impossible I look'd upon my self as one who having spent near half a Century in Speculative Studies was capable to avert and redress so great a Harm and thence I esteem'd my self bound in Duty to make you aware of the Way you have either chosen or light into for want of a better that you might consider seriously whether you ought not to retrieve your Steps ere you had wander'd too far in a Path which could never bring you to the End you aim'd at This Consideration oblig'd me to strike at the Root and to overthrow the whole Way of proceeding upon Ideas by whomsoever advanced and to demonstrate by many Clear and I hope Unanswerable Arguments and Multitudes of Instances that it was Superficial Fruitless Insignificant and meerly Phantastical 2. When I had near finish'd my METHOD I gave a Cursory Look over Mr. Locke's Essay concerning Humane Understanding and I hap'd to light on some places which gave me a high Esteem for it insomuch that I began to conceive some Hopes that his Ingenious Thoughts might with some few Alterations be reconcil'd to True Philosophy For I was at that time far from intending to make any Reflexions upon it but highly extoll'd it where-ever I came judging of the Whole by the Scantlings I had seen of it as it were accidentally But the last September setting my self to take a nearer and fuller View of the whole Book I quite lost the Hopes I had gladly entertain'd formerly of According it with Philosophical Principles and became much concern'd that so Excellent a Wit should be half lost to the Commonwealth of Learning by lighting unfortunately into such an Unaccountable Method For I saw evidently that besides the Oddness of the Way he took
his Fancy the Vivacity of which was very Extraordinary had in very many Particulars got such an Ascendent over his Reason that as he was Sceptical in divers Things which were Clearest Truths so he seem'd in very many others to be Positive the Contrary to which was plainly Demonstrable and in a manner Self-evident I was heartily sorry I say to see so considerable a Writer whose Comprehensive Genius and Clear Expression would have made Truth Irresistible had he taken her part mis-led so strangely as to take Fancies for Realities and to think that Philosophy which is the Knowledge of Things consisted in a perpetual Contemplation of Empty Ideas or Resemblances 3. This wrought up my Thoughts higher and made me conceive a greater Indignation against this New Way of Philosophizing and that very particularly for his sake tho' I saw the Cartesians as much wanted Rectifying in their Grounds as he or rather more Wherefore to gain such a powerful Assistant over to Truth 's side of which his Sincere Professions of Ingenuity would not let me despair I resolv'd to lay open those Blemishes of Errours I had observ'd in his Essay retaining still a due Esteem for the many Beauties it contain'd For I do assure him my Nature leads me as willingly to acknowledge and give their just Elogiums to his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to discover the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he may have fallen into at unawares as I doubt not but my Readers will see and that tho' I declare Open War against the Way it self I rather incline to Excuse than to Aggravate his Faults or Mistakes Indeed the Duty I ow'd to Truth oblig'd me to note those Latter with such a Distinction as I conceiv'd they did more or less injure that Sacred Concern And I was the more willing to enter the Lists against such a Champion because if I hop'd to gain any Advantage over him I had rather say if I had the good Fortune to win him 't is impossible Truth should ever obtain a more clear Victory For no Man who takes the just Dimensions of Mr. Locke 's Great Wit can think that any thing but the Invincible Force of Truth can soil him 4. I have good Reason to fear that this Declaring against whole Bodies of Ideists at once will be interpreted by some to savour of Singularity It will be deem'd by others a high Imprudence to make such a Bold Breach with a World of Acute Speculaters with whole Sects of Modern Philosophers both in two Neighbouring Nations and in our own Universities and in many Things with most of the School-men too Others will think that I do very unwisely provoke Opposition and by such a brisk Attack in a manner Challenge all those Great Men who are of a contrary Sentiment But what is all this to his purpose who has devoted himself wholly to promote and defend TRUTH and is sure he does upon Solid Reasons judge that to be True which he maintains This Objection seems grounded on this False Maxim which some Men have set up very politickly to establish their own Reputation with the Vulgar as Sacred and Inviolable viz. that The Opinion of a Multitude has the Force of a kind of Authority to bridle the Understandings of Private Men from Setting up a Contrary Doctrine Now whatever some Men may think of this Position I must declare my Sentiment of it that it is the most pernicious Maxim that could be invented to hinder the Progress of Rational Nature in that which should most perfect it that it puts a stop to the farther Use of their Reason in all future Mankind that it makes all Improvement in Knowledge Impossible and utterly obstructs the Advancement of SCIENCE No Reasoners how many or of how Great Name soever they be have any Authority at all but by Virtue of the Reasons they produce whence that Single Man whoever he be that brings better Reasons for the Tenet he advances than all the former World has done for theirs ought to have more of this miscall'd Authority than that whole World of Opposers 5. But this postponing the Consideration of the Multitude of Dissenting Speculaters to Evident Reason is ten times more Justifiable in case that Opposing Party does not so much as pretend to much less produce Self-evident Principles nor Demonstration to Ground or Conclude their Tenets but builds on Voluntary Suppositions and makes use of Wit good Language and other meerly plausible Ways to recommend their Conclusions to the Approbation of their Readers Those who do not so much as pretend to Demonstration and Clear Principles being unable to offer any Thing that is Certain ought not in my Opinion meddle at all with Philosophy nor appear before Learned Men with an Expectation their Doctrine should be Embraced nor can they in reason Assert any thing but only Propose 6. But the main Consideration which takes off all Invidiousness from my Carriage in this Particular is that in this whole Contest between the Ideists and me there is Nothing at all that is Personal 'T is not the Parts or Abilities of the Contenders but their METHOD which is in Dispute The Slowest and Lamest Traveller who can but creep forward in a right Path shall sooner arrive at his Journey 's End than Another whose Legs are nimble and his Pace swift if he takes a wrong Way at his first setting out Rather his greater Strength and Agility do in such a ease enable him only to run more widely astray as the strongest Bow shoots farthest from the Mark if the Shast be wrong levell'd Let the Talent of Wit in the Ideists be Incomparable as doubtless that of Cartesius was to whom I may with Justice join Mr. Locke if the Methods they take be not proper to attain true Science their Errours when they mistake as I am sure they do in their Principles and consequently in most of their Conclusions must be to the same Degree more Enormous as their Fancies are more Ingenious 'T is their METHOD then or their Way of Proceeding and Building upon Ideas which I most blame and oppose Or rather I deplore the Detriment accruing hence to the Learned Part of the World that Men endowed with such an Excellent Genius did unluckily light into such an Indirect and Perplex'd Path seeing what vast Advances Science might have made had such Men taken up Right Principles hit upon the Right Way at first and apply'd their Strong Brains to pursue it 'T is not then their Endowments which come into Competition to which I deferr as much as is possible For I much more admire the Skill of such Architects as can build a Castle in the Air and make it hang there by Geometry as it were than all those common sort of Artists who can raise such a Structure upon Firm Ground 7. What our several Methods are the Title of my Book tells my Reader in short viz. that as I have hinted in my Dedicatory Theirs is to ground all their
the Profession he made to love and esteem it but tho' he sees Errour and Ignorance and Probable Talking overspread the Face of Philosophy and stifle Truth and Knowledge both he sits still Unconcern'd Now and then indeed there is a Writer who attempts to confute this or that particular Errour some Casual Circumstance addicting him to that Employment But what Man sets himself to lay the Ax at the Root or writes against Uncertain Methods and Groundless Babbling What Man goes about to make Mankind aware of the Mischief that comes to Rational Nature by the Sophisticate Ways of talking prettily neatly and wittily tho' perhaps not a Word Groundedly and Solidly Nay what Man is not well-Appay'd and Pleased with a well-penn'd Piece tho' were the Reason in it sifted to the Bottom perhaps there is not one Evident Ttuth in it to build that Discourse on that is not one Word of Sense in it but only such a way of Plausible Discourse or Language-Learning as may serve equally and indifferently to maintain either side of the Contradiction 11. Lastly which is the Chief Point Who is there that applies himself to find out a CERTAIN METHOD to arrive at Truth and attain Knowledge without which all our Studies are to no purpose Logick is the Proper Art to give us this Method and I see Students do generally make use of any Logician so he but talks dâ—yly of the Operations of the Understanding of Propositions Syllogisms and Demonstration tho' perhaps he gives not one Word of Reason for his Unprov'd Sayings to enlighten the Understanding of the Learner or inform him ex Natura rei whence and why this and the other Rudiment or Rule must be so Such an Author may indeed enable a Learner to say as he says and talk after him in imitation as it were but he can never instruct him to understand what 's True and why it is True or to demonstrate himself which was the main Design of my METHOD 12. But my greatest Complaint against others and my best Excuse for putting my self forwards with such a Confident Ayr is that I see not that any Learned Men do endeavour to make Head against Scepticism which thro' this Universal Connivence or rather Civil and Kind Toleration and in some sort Encouragement creeps by insensible Degrees into even the most Learned Societies infects the best Wits of our Nation threatens to bear down all true Philosophy to extinguish the Natural Light of Men's Understandings and drown their best Faculty Reason in a Deluge of Profound Ignorance For if this Vogue should obtain still in the World to look upon any loose Discourse for brave Sense so it be but sprucely dress'd up in neat Language and Sauc'd with a little Piquancy of brisk Wit and let it pass current for True Learning and Knowledge Scepticism will not only insinuate it self slily into all sorts of Men but be recommended to the World by such an Universal Approbation of well-clad gentile Ignorance Nor does this mischievous Inundation stop its Career in bereaving us of Natural Truths but having once darken'd in us the Knowledge of Nature it disposes Men to doubt of and too often to deny the Existence of the Author of Nature himself who is best made known to Mankind by Science or the Exact Knowledge of his Creatures from which we glean all the Notions and consequently all the Knowledge we by Ordinary Means have or ought to have All these Mischiefs I may add and all Immorality too are owing to the Insensible Growth of this Lethargy of our Understanding SCEPTICISM which benums and chills our Intellectual Faculties with a Cold Despair of ever attaining Evident Knowledge of any thing for which as its Natural Perfection our Soul was fitted and ordain'd I saw this Gloomy Evening overcasting the Clear Sky of Science and drawing on the Cimmerian Night of Dark Ignorance and Black Infidelity and thence it was that to awaken Men's Souls out of this drowzy Sleep and Torpor of their Mind I did so often boldly and fearlessly tho' as I judg'd truly declare and proclaim aloud that Demonstration in Philosophy might be had and that I had actually Demonstrated in such and such Particulars 13. Lastly 'T is for this Reason and to rescue all Sincere Lovers of Truth from this spreading Contagion of Scepticism that with an unusual Boldness I did as was said before attempt to write a Demonstrative Logick to comprehend which whoever shall bestow half that Pains as Men usually do who study the Mathematicks for such Connected Discourses are not to be perused with hopes of profiting by them with a Cursory Application will I am sure be able to set all his Natural Notions in a Right and Distinct Order know how to connect two of them with one another in a Solid Judgment and both of them with a Third to frame a Conclusive Discourse and not only have the True Nature of Demonstration knowingly fix'd in his Mind by comprehending the Reason of it but by having it there he himself will be enabled to work according to that Nature or to Demonstrate himself without Ability to know or do which none ought to pretend to be a Philosopher Lastly To carry this Good Work forward as far as was possible I have here as a Supplement to my METHOD and an Introduction to my Reflexions added Five Preliminary Discourses shewing the true and solid Bottom-Ground on which all Exact Knowledge or Philosophy is built and that the Things themselves and not Ideas Resemblances or Fancies which can never make us know the Things are and must be the only Firm Foundation of Truth and of our Knowledge of all Truths whatsoever 14. I must not pass over another Complaint made of me by some of the Cartesian School viz. That in the Preface to my METHOD I so deeply Censure Malbranche as a Phanatick in Philosophy nay the whole Way it self as disposing to Enthusiasm To the First Part of my Charge I reply That I cited that Author 's own Words which are such strong Proofs of a Fanatick Genius that I cannot believe any Arguments of mine can add Weight to the Full Evidence and Force they carry'd with them to manifest that his Philosophy is built upon Inspiration or as himself expresses it comes to him by Revelation And for my pretending that the whole Cartesian Way of Philosophizing is of the same Leven I can need no other Compurgatour than that French Author who with much Exactness wrote the Life of Cartesius and was his good Friend and Follower The Book is now made English where in the 34th Page he tells us that To get rid of all his Prejudices that is to Unlearn amongst other Things all that the Clear Light of Nature had taught him Cartesius did undergo no less than to UNMAN himself A pretty Self-denying Beginning And Pag. 35 36. that he wearied out his Mind to that Degree in his Enquiry after this Happy Means viz. that his Imagination should represent
to him his Understanding quite naked that his Brain took Fire and he fell into a Spice of Enthusiasm which dispos'd his Mind already quite spent in such a manner that it was fit to receive Impressions of Dreams and Visions Where we see it confess'd that his Method of Unknowing all that Nature had taught him brought him to Enthusiasm and Enthusiasm to Visions and Revelations so that Malbranche did but follow his Masters Example and copy'd his Method The Author proceeds He Cartesius acquaints us that on the 10th of November 1619. laying himself down brimful of Enthusiasm which is little better than stark mad and wholly possess'd with the Thoughts of having found that day the Foundation of that Wonderful Science he had three Dreams presently one after another yet so extraordinary as to make him fancy they were sent him from Above He supposed he discern'd thro' their Shadows the Tracks of the Paths GOD had chalk'd out to him in his Enquiry after Truth And is it not a powerful Motive to make all Wits especially if they be of a Melancholy Temper who are enclin'd to embrace his Doctrine which was first sent from Heaven to gape after Revelations too as well as Malbranche did He goes on But the Divine Spiritual Air which he took a Pride to give to those Dreams was so near a-kin to that Enthusiasm wherewith he believ'd himself to be warmed that a Man would have believ'd he had been a little Crack'd-brain'd And lest any should wrong the Original of his Doctrine or degrade it from the Honour of being given him by Divine Inspiration this Author takes off any unfavourable Conjecture of ours that might make it spring from any Sublunary Cause in these Words One would have believ'd he had drunk a Cup too much that Evening before he went to Bed but he assur'd us he had been very sober all that Day and that Evening too and had not drunk a drop of Wine three Weeks together This looks as if Cartesius himself who so cautiously inform'd him of this afterwards was fond to have it thought that his Doctrine and especially his Method which was the Minerva of which his Brain was then in Labour had been given him from Above by Supernatural means 15. Now Gentlemen I beseech you tell me in good Sober Sadness Can you think GOD ever intended that the onely Method for Men to get Knowledge should be to lose their Wits first in looking after it That to Unman our selves so as to seem Crack'd-Brain'd or Drunk is the Way to become Soberly Rational That to reduce our selves to perfect Ignorance of all that the Goodness of Nature has taught us which is in plain Terms to make an Ass of one's self is the onely Certain Way to become a Philosopher Certainly unless we be all infatuated with Enthusiastick Dreams and Visions made up of Ideas we should rather think that it is a far more Solid and more Natural Way to begin our Quest of Truth from those Knowledges which are Evident and such Grounds as are Magis Nota and thence proceed by our Reason to Minùs Nota than it is to take our Rise from Affected Ignorance and Unknowing again all those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Common Notions which Right Nature had given us to ground all other Knowledges on No wonder then this Freakish Method taken up by Whimsical Fancy had for its Genuin Effect Fantastick Dreams Visionary Madness and Enthusiastick Folly which this Writer of his Life who doubtless was himself a Zealous Cartesian calls here A Happy Means the Foundation of that Wonderful Science the Path Chalk'd out by God and the Descanting on them to be done by A Divine Spiritual Air tho' he confesses at the same time they were Dreams Visions and Fits of Enthusiasm and that they made him that had them seem Crack'd-Brain'd or Drunk All these wild Caprichio's of Cartesius sprung naturally from a Lively and Heighten'd Fancy screw'd up by frequent Sollicitous and Melancholy Thoughtfulness and were the Effects of his Introversion upon his Ideas which is quite Opposite to his Regarding the Things in Nature that are without us Nor do I doubt but that all his Followers did they as they ought imitate their Master and follow his Example in laying aside first all their former Natural Knowledges would also as any Man must who takes that Unnatural Method fall into Fits of Enthusiasm Dreams and Visions and Run Mad for Company For IDEAS which being Similitudes are no more but Fancies Appearances and Representations are consequently far more Proper Materials for Dreams and Visions and such Roving Flights than they are for Science or Solid Philosophy 16. Tho' I forestall what comes hereafter I am tempted to annex here to this Character of the Cartesian Manner of Spirit in Philosophy a short Passage mention'd by Mr. Locke Book 4. Chap. 7. § 17. viz. That he has discours'd with very Rational Men who have actually Deny'd they were Men. Now certainly this is something beyond Enthusiasm and Extravagant even to Madness that any Man should deny himself to be what he is But 't is Prodigious that Mr. Locke should give such Men the Elogium of being very Rational Whence since he cannot but sincerely judge that the Way he proposes and maintains in his Essay is the most Rational of any other we are to conclude that those very Rational Men did follow this Way of his and were great Ideists or else that Mr. Locke judges that those Men who actually deny'd themselves to be Men might for all that according to his Way of Ideas be very Rational notwithstanding 'T is worth our while to observe the Consonant Effect of the Ideal Way in the Followers of Cartesius and Mr. Locke and in some sort in both the Authors of those Philosophical Sects themselves The One UNMANS himself and the Others Deny themselves to be Men and yet are Character'd by Mr. L. to be notwithstanding very Rational Which are so perfectly Parallel that I am at a great Loss which to prefer And now do you think Gentlemen that besides the Regard we owe to Truth out of the Common Love we ought to bear to Mankind and to Rational Nature that it is not high time to look to our Wits and to make head against this Way of Ideas when we find two such Great Men as Cartesius and Mr. Locke thro' this Fantastick Method they had chosen fall into such Incredible Extravagancies as either in a manner to Abdicate by Unmanning one's self or to commend the Abdication of their own Natures at least to think them very Rational that do so 17. Far be it from me to judge that all or most of the Performances of those two admirably-Ingenious Men are of this Extravagant Nature 'T is my sincere Judgment that Few Men write Like them and None Better where their Ill-grounded Methods do not intermingle and pervert their Reason And I freely acknowledge that Mr. Locke 's ESSAY on which I make
there says by the Sensible Qualities have any Idea of the Substance of Body more than if we knew nothing at all And the Essences or Entities of Particular Substances as clearest Reason demonstrates are incomparably harder to be known than Substance in the Abstract whence we must consequently know less than nothing of Them if we know nothing at all of the other It being impossible to know what This Thing or This Man is if we be Ignorant what Thing or Man is Nor have we any Innate Ideas as he confesses to make Substance known If then neither Innate nor Acquir'd Ideas can make us know any thing at all of it and we can know nothing but by Ideas 't is plain we cannot know Thing or Substance at all and so we must rest contented with knowing Nothing For Substance being unknown 't is impossible to know any Mode or Accident they being essentially certain Manners how a Thing is and so including Substance and Thing in their Definition Again Mr. L. holds we can frame no Idea of Substance or at most but a most blindly Obscure one and I hold that the Notion of it is most Clear nay the Clearest of any but that of Existence exprest by the word is He thinks that the nature of Accidents is known by themselves tho' the Substance ly in the dark from us And I judge it Demonstrable that as they have no Entity of their own but by means of the Thing Ens or Substance so they can have no Intelligibility which is a Property of Ens of their own but meerly by virtue of the Substance or Thing with which they are Identify'd In a word He thinks Substance is most Unknown and I say 't is self-evidently Known He says it cannot be known Clearly and I say it not only can but must be known clearly nay that nothing else can be known but It or by being It. By this Discourse it appears that this Point being of its own Nature of Universal Concern and therefore drawing Great and most Important Consequences after it which acting here as a Philosopher I do not mention either He or I must be in a most Dangerous Errour Wherefore being perfectly assured that the Method I take will not permit me to erre Enormously and very certain that I follow very faithfully that Method I humbly beg of Mr. Locke by that Candour and Ingenuity of which I doubt not sincerely too he has made so frequent Professions that he would please to apply his Thoughts anew for if Second Thoughts be Better the Last may be Best of all to review his Way of Ideas and comparing it with what I have propos'd and prov'd in my Method to Science my Preliminaries and my several Reflexions on his Essay he would unbyassedly consider whether since he cannot suspect his own Excellent Parts this New Way of Philosophizing be not the Sole Cause of all his Mistakes and misleads him into all these Great Errours to entertain which this Phantastick Method has inveigled his good Reason I have no more to Preface but to beg Pardon for oftentimes repeating the same thing over and over in the ensuing Book Mr. Locke civilly Apologizes for doing the same and my chief Excuse is that being to trace and follow his Discourses I could not well avoid it hoping withall at the same time to clear the Point better either by some New Thought which then occurr'd or by giving a better Turn to my former Arguments Besides I must confess that I did now and then affect these Repetitions to make some Particulars which were of most Weight sink better into the Judgment of my Readers by re-minding them often of such Important Truths I am forced to use the Word Idea often because Mr. Locke with whom I am discoursing does so always tho' generally I join Notions to it But this one Note will keep my true Sentiment from being misunderstood that I allow Ideas or Resemblances in the Fancy or Imagination but I absolutely deny there are any Spiritual Ideas or Similitudes in the Mind on which we ground any Truth or which are the Materials of Knowledge but NOTIONS only or the Things abstractedly or inadequately conceiv'd by the Understanding Your Well-wishing Friend and Faithful Servant J. S. Solid Philosophy ASSERTED Preliminary Discourses Preliminary First Of the Impropriety and Equivocalness of of the word IDEA 1. THE Author of the Essay concerning Human Understanding having sincerely levelled the aim of his Endeavours at the attainment of Truth in Philosophy which can only be had by clearing the way to Science hence this being the sole End we have both of us prefixt to our selves the best Method in common which I can take in my Reflexions on that Learned Treatise is to keep my Eye still directed to that end and to take my measures from the Order and Rapport which our respective Positions or Discourses may be conceived to bear to that best Design 2. This premis'd my first Preliminary Reflexion shall be upon his making use throughout his whole Work of the word IDEAS as the Chief or rather only Materials of which according to him we are to frame immediately all our Knowledges Which being so it follows that if the sense of that word be not it self Clear but Equivocal and if as taken in one Sense it be manifestly nothing at all to Science nor can be any Material of it and as taken in the other it may and must conduce to it nay be the Sole imediate Ground and Origin of all Science I cannot but think that the promiscuous usage of that Word in such Disparate Senses it being of so general Concern and running through that whole Book must necessarily encumber and perplex in a high Measure the way to Scientifical knowledge 3. One of his Secondary Designes was as he expresses himself in his Epistle to the Reader to remove the Rubbish in order to the building up Science and to beat down the Vanity and Ignorance of those who have reduced Philosophy which is nothing but the Knowledge of Things to insignificant School-Terms This is certainly a very necessary and a very laudable Design it being evident to all ingenuous Lovers of Truth that never was there more need of a Reformation than there has been of Philosophy in these last Centuries to second him in which I have not failed on my part to contribute my endeavours Yet notwithstanding I do not think we ought without great and necessary occasion alter those words which have been accepted and used by the Learned World such as it was hitherto Especially such words as are proper and Univocal such I take the word Notion to be much less to substitute another which I must think is less proper and withall highly Equivocal or Ambiguous I mean the word IDEA I know this ingenuous Author apologizes for his frequent using it and I am apt to think he did this out of Civility towards our Modern Philosophers who have brought it
means to dim the Appearance those Objects would otherwise make lest if it be too Lively they should overcome the Motive Force of those Objects which are Spiritual But it is to be noted that the multiplying or frequently repeating those Reflex Impressions are not so necessary to every Person nor always the best For a Wise Judicious Christian who out of a Clear Sight of Spiritual Motives has by a thorow-Penetration of their Excellency and Preferribleness his Speculative Thoughts so Lively that they fix his Interior Practical Judgment to work steadily for the Attainment of Eternal Happiness is a far more Manly and Strong Christian than those who arrive at a high Pitch by the frequent Dints of Praying or other good Exercises almost hourly continued For those Well-knit Thoughts and Rational Judgments are as it were an Impenetrable Phalanx and being Connatural to our Reason no Assault can shock or break their Ranks Yet even in those firmest Souls Christian Discipline and Vigilance must be observ'd lest not having those strong Thoughts or Judgments still in readiness they be surprized by their Ghostly Enemy which I take to have been King David's Case when he first sinn'd 11. Secondly It is seen hence that Man determines himself to Action or is Free For 't is evident both to Reason and Experience that all those Thoughts Discourses Judgments and Affections he had in him before naturally or supernaturally are the Causes of the Determination of his Will Wherefore all these being Modes or Accidents belonging to him and Modes not being Distinct Entities from the Thing to which they belong but the Thing it self or the Man thus modify'd it follows that Man determines himself to Action or is a Free Agent 12. Thirdly Since Man has neither his Being his Powers his Actions nor consequently the Circumstances by which he came to be imbu'd with his good Thoughts from whence he has the Proposals of his true Good and of those incomparable Motives to pursue it from Himself but had all these from the Maker and Orderer of the World And since this Series of Internal and External Causes called in Christian Language God's Grace did produce this Determination of himself 't is manifest that he was Predetermin'd by God the First Cause thus to Determine himself as far as there was Entity or Goodness in his Action 13. Fourthly Since all our Powers are by the Intent of Nature ordain'd to perfect us and that Power called Freedom does not perfect any Man while he determines himself to that which will bring him to Eternal Misery it follows that the more he is Determin'd to Virtue and true Goodness the more Free he is Again Since a Man is Free when he acts according to the true Inclination of his Nature and the true natural Inclination of a Man is to act according to Right Reason that is Virtuously it follows that Freedom is then most truly such and the Man most truly Free when he is Determin'd to Virtuous Actions Whence Irrationality or Sin is by the Holy Ghost called Slavery which is opposite to Freedom From which Slavery the Mercy of God meerly and solely through the Merits of his Son our Redeemer has freed us 14. Fifthly We Experience that the Lively Proposal of Temporal and Eternal Goods when it arrives to that pitch that there is hic nunc such a Plenitude ex parte Subjecti of such Objects or Motives that it hinders the Co-appearance Co-existence and much more the Competition of the Contrary Motives does always carry the Will or the Man along with it For the Object of the Will being an Appearing Good and no other Good in that Juncture at least Considerably appearing because the Mind is full of the other it follows that the Inclination of the Will to Good in Common which Man is naturally determin'd to must needs carry the Soul no other as was said then Appearing Whence Mr. Locke's Position that Uneasiness alone is present and his Deduction thence that therefore nothing but Uneasiness determines the Will to act is shewn to be Groundless For an Appearing Good cannot but be always Present to the Soul otherwise it could not appear or be an Appearing Good 15. Sixthly Hence wrong Judgments arise either thro' Want of Information as when Men are not imbu'd with sufficient Knowledge of Eternal Goods or else thro' Want of Consideration whence by not perfectly weighing and comparing both they come to prefer Temporal Goods before Eternal ones 16. Lastly 't is to be noted that Sin does not always spring from False Speculative Judgments but from their being Disproportionate For 't is a Truth that Temporal Goods are in some sort Agreeable to us nor would they hurt us for loving them as far as they merit to be lov'd provided we did but love Eternal Goods as much as they deserve to be loved too Sin therefore is hence occasion'd that thro' too close and frequent a Converse with them we too much conceit and make vast Judgments of these Temporal Goods in proportion of what we make of Eternal ones And were not this so no Sin would remain in a bad Soul when separate or in a Devil nor consequently the proper Punishment of Sin Damnation because they know all Truths Speculatively Wherefore their Inordinate Practical Judgments in which Sin consists springs hence that they do not conceit or as we say lay to heart the Goodness of True Felicity because they over-conceit or make too-too-great Judgments of the Goodness found in some False Last End which they had chosen Yet these Disproportionate Judgments tho' Speculatively True are apt to beget wrong Practical Judgments and wrong Discourses or Paralogisms in the Soul of a Sinner to the prejudice of his Reason as has been shown in my METHOD Book 3 Less 10. § 18. 17. Mr. Locke's Discourse about Uneasiness lies so cross to some part of this Doctrine that it obliges me to examin it He endeavours to shew that Uneasiness alone and not Good or the Greater Good determines the Will to Act. His Position tho' new and Paradoxical is very plausible and taking it in one Sense viz. that there is always some Uneasiness when the Will is Alter'd in order to Action has much Truth in it and it seems to have much Weight also by his pursuing it so ingeniously Yet there is something wanting to render his Discourse Conclusive For 18. First If we look into Grounds and Principles they will tell us that 't is the Object of any Power which actuates or determines it and the Object of the Will cannot be Uneasiness All Uneasiness being evidently a Consequence following either from the not yet attaining the Good we desire and hope for or from the Fear of Losing it And if we should ask whether Uneasiness does affect the Will otherwise than sub ratione mali or because it is a Harm to the Man and Ease otherwise affect it than sub ratione Boni that
or Natures of Thing or of such a Thing and both the first of them and also all the rest are nothing but the Thing diversly Consider'd The Conceptions or Notions of the Modes or Accidents are innumerable but there is only One which is the Conception of Thing it self which we find to be this that 't is Capable to be or exist and this Notion or which is the same the Object thus consider'd we call Ens Res Substance or Thing The other Notions we have of it such as are Big Qualify'd Related c. have neither Being nor any Order to Being in their signification or peculiar Notion as had the other Wherefore since Nature tells us that we must first conceive the Thing to be ere we can conceive it to be after such and such a manner nor can the Mode or Manner be apprehended to be of its single self capable to be otherwise than as it is annext to what 's Capable to be by its self or by its own peculiar Nature that is as it is identify'd with it therefore no Mode or Accident can exist by Virtue of its own Idea or Notion but in Virtue of the Notion of Thing or Substance with which therefore tho' formally Different they are all materially Identify'd Or thus more briefly Had not the Thing somewhat in it which grounds this true Conception of it that 't is Capable to be none of the Accidents they all wanting in their Notion any Order to Being could be conceiv'd to be at all And this in Literal Truth is the great Mystery of those Positions about which Disputants in the Schools blinded with their own ill-understood Metaphors have so long like Andabatae fought in the dark about such Questions as these viz. Whether the Essence of the Accidents is their Inexistence or Inherence in the Substance Whether the Substance supports them in Being Is their Substratum or the Subject in which those Accidental Forms do Inhere Then in pursuance of their Fanciful Metaphor some of them begin to cast about how those Forms are United to the Subject or Substance or come to be received in it in order to which and that nothing may be wanting to do the work thorowly they coyn a new connecting little Entity call'd an Union to soder them together and so instead of making it One Entity they very wisely make Three All which Conceits if we look narrowly into them have at the bottom this mistake that all our several Conceptions have so many distinct Entities in the Thing corresponding to them Which vast Errour both perverts all true Philosophy and is against a First Principle in Metaphysicks by making Unum to be Divisum in se or One Entity to be Many Now if these Modes be Things or to speak more properly if the Notion of every manner of a Thing be the formal Notion of the Thing it self or of what 's Capable of Existing first the Nature of Modes is destroy'd for they will be no longer the How but the What and the Nature or Notion of Substance or Ens is lost too for if all the Modes are Distinct Entities or Capable of Existing they must all be Substances which blends all the Notions Mankind has or can have on the perfect Distinction of which all Science is grounded in a perfect Confusion and consequently reduces all our Knowledge to a Chaos of Ignorance 8 But I wonder most how this Learned Man can think none knows what Extension is We cannot open our Eyes but they inform us that the Air and other Bodies which which we see are not cramp'd into an Indivisible but are vastly Expanded or which is the same Extended May we not as well say we may see Light and yet have no Notion of it And does not himself make Extension to be one of his Simple Ideas the Knowledge of which goes along with all the Knowledges we have of Bodies and withall resembles the Thing For what thinks he serves an Idea but to make Men Know by it what it represents or consequently an Idea of Extension but to make us know Extension Perhaps he may think we cannot know it because we cannot define or explicate it but in Words Equivalent to it But first this Objection has no Ground because all Definitions and Explications in the World are the same Sense with the Notion they Define and Explicate and were it not so they would be no Definitions nor Explications of that Notion for they do no more but give us all the Parts of the Entire Notion and all the Parts are the same as the Whole Next how does it follow that because we cannot explicate it we do not know it Whereas the direct contrary follows in our present Case For the commonest Notions can the worst be defin'd because they least need it being Self-known or Self-evident Not all the Wit of Man can Define and Explicate what it is to be and yet all Mankind knows it perfectly or else it is impossible they not knowing what the Copula means should know the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition whatever Thirdly He seems to think that as some of the School-men do imagin Contradictory Positions may follow out of the Notion of Extension else why should he imagin the Difficulties concerning it are Inextricable Which I must declare against as the the worst piece of Scepticism next to the denying all First Principles For if Contradictory Positions may follow out of any Notion taken from the Thing then that Notion and consequently the Thing it self would not have any Metaphysical Verity in it but be purely Chimerical Add that the learned Thomas Albius in his Excellent Preface before the Latin Edition of Sir Kenelm Digby's Treatise of Bodies has clearly solv'd those Imaginary Contradictions 9. To shew the Difficulty of Knowing Extension he objects that no Reason can be given for the Cohesion of the Parts of Extended Matter If he means that we can give no. Physical Reason for it or such an one as fetch'd from the Qualities or Operations of Bodies I grant it for all those Qualities and Operations are Subsequent to the Notion of Extension and Grounded on it But if he thinks there cannot be a far Better and Clearer Reason given from the Supream Science Metaphysicks I deny it I explain my self All Positions that concern the Essences of Things or Modes either do belong to the Object of Metaphysicks so that whoever makes the Natures or Essences of any of these not to be what they are is most clearly convinced by his violating that Metaphysical First Principle A Thing is what it is to maintain a clear Contradiction If then Divisibility be the Essence of Quantity and Divisibility signifies Unity of the Potential Parts of Quantity and Continuity as making those Parts formally Indivisas in se be evidently the Unity proper to those Parts it follows that Quantity being the Common Affection of Body does formally and as necessarily make its whole Subject that is
that Supposition there would have been no Motion For Motion of Material Entities is perform'd by the Intervening of the Parts of the one between the Parts of the other and so Dividing it which is impossible unless the one had been Rarer or more yielding the other Denser or less yielding But this once settled 't is evident from the very Terms that there are Proper Causes both on the Agent 's and Patient's Side for the one's Dividing and the other's being Divided For the Rare being more Divisible than the Dense 't is demonstrable that the Dense being impell'd against the Rare by Motion which comes from a Superior Agent the Rare being more Divisible will give way and be divided by the Dense which is clearly impossible in the Corpuscularian Hypothesis which puts all Parts of their Matter to be equally Rare or Dense or rather as the Cartesians do neither Rare nor Dense all Qualities according to them being made by mingling their three Elements which Elements are themselves made by and presuppose the Motion of their First Matter Whereas yet it is impossible to conceive but those Parts of that Matter must be either Rare or else Dense at least to some Degree And as denying the Rarity and Density in the First Bodies does by making Motion impossible put the Course of Nature out of Frame both in its Beginning and Progress so it utterly destroys all Demonstration in Physicks which is grounded on Mediums from Proper Causes and Proper Effects 16. Passing over many Immediate Steps which shew how those Four Principal Qualities Heat Cold Moisture and Driness are made of Rarity and Density acted upon by the common Causes in Nature we come to shew how these two Primary Qualities do constitute many Secondary ones and how these last are refunded into the other as their Proper Causes and therefore are Demonstrable by them as by their Proper Mediums A few Instances may serve as Hints to explicate others That great Pellucidity in the Air is necessarily and properly refunded into its extream Divisibility or Rarity by which it becomes easily penetrable in all its Parts by those Spicula Ignea the Rays of the Sun and Opacity for the same Reason is the Proper Effect of Density which hinders its Subject from being penetrated or Divided by them whence also it is a Proper Cause of Repelling or Reflecting them Again Who sees not that Liquidity which makes its Subject easily yielding to be flatted evenly as we see in Ponds or driven to run into Cavities by the common Motion of Gravitation is a proper Effect of Rarity as Consistency is of Density Spissitude is a Constipation of Dense Parts or the Want of Pores to admit the Ingress of other Bodies Grossitude is clearly nothing but Density in a bigger Quantity of its Parts Friability is refunded into great Dense Parts and very large Rare ones Whence those Rare Parts which were they less would better cement those Parts together being now very large and withal very Divisible are easily divided and consequently the Body is soon shatter'd As we find in Dry Clods out of which while they were yet Wet Dirt those Parts which were Watry being drawn by Heat large Cavities are left which the Air now possesses On the other side Ductility and Malleability are the Effects of the very smallest Rare Parts finely compacted with the minutest Dense ones Those Small Dense Parts so closely woven and in a manner Contiguous keep the Rare from evaporating and the Rare by being such and interwoven with the Dense all over make the Compound yield to Expansion without Breaking being very small are not easily separable and yet tho' rarify'd farther by the subtilest Agent Fire they render it Fusible 17. Were these Principles which I rawly and briefly touch on here pursu'd by Learned Men with Immediate Consequences which true Logick assisting is far from impossible the Nature of those first-mixt Qualities and by their means of many others would not be very hard to explicate But if Men are resolv'd to neglect all Natural Principles and the Intrinsecal Constitution of the First Bodies in Nature and will needs run upon nothing but Mathematical Notions which pre-suppose those Principles nor could be found in Nature unless the other be first admitted or Division made Possible for neither Parts nor consequently Figures of Parts could be made without Division nor Division unless some Bodies were naturally apt to divide others to be divided that is unless some were Rare others Dense or if instead of demonstrating their Natural Principles by the Superiour Science they will needs have recourse to Voluntary Suppositions and violate the Nature of Causality and of the Deity it self by making him whose Proper Effect he being Essentially Self-existence is to give Existence or create to be the Proper and Immediate Cause of Motion and go about to prove Ignotum per Ignotissimum by supposing as they sometimes do that God wills this or that which is for the Interest of their Tenet and too hard to prove If I say Men are resolv'd to follow such Untoward Methods 't is no Wonder Science does not advance but the World is detain'd in Ignorance of many things which otherwise it might know Did Learned Men set themselves to carry forwards the Grounds of Nature in Euclides Physicus where they will find Demonstrations enow to farther Conclusions with the same Zeal as they do the Mathematicks I doubt not but the Evident Truths which would by Degrees disclose themselves would both encourage and enable them to make a farther Progress in Knowledge nor would the Science of Second Qualities about which Physical Demonstrations ought in great part be employ'd be held so Desperate But to leave these Discourses and apply my self to Mr. L. I cannot but wonder that amongst all his Ideas of Qualities he not so much as once mentions as far as I remember those two Chiefest ones of Rarity and Density tho' nothing is more obvious in the whole Course of Nature than these are Which with many other Reasons makes me think he had not seen or at least well weigh'd the true Aristotelian System which he might have seen in Sir Kenelm Digby's Treatise of Bodies and its Latin Preface as also in Institutiones Peripateticae but took it as represented by the Modern Schools For my self I must declare I verily judge that the Grounds I here insist on are the only true ones that a Natural Philosopher can have that they are Demonstrable and I do offer my self to maintain them to be such if it shall please any Learned Objector to attempt to show these Principles Faulty or that we build on any Supposition at all and not on what 's either Self-evident or easily and immediately Reducible to Self-evidence Which I believe no other Sect of Philosophers did ever so much as pretend to 18. To come to those Qualities which are the Formal Object of our Senses called by Mr. Locke Secondary Qualities I
warily Indeed if the Definition of Man viz. Rational Animal be questionable we shall as I said above be at a great Loss to know our own Kind which would be but a melancholy Business And if we forego our Principles distinguishing between Corporeal and Spiritual Natures we may perhaps grow in time no wiser than the Common People amongst the Portugueses in Brazil who conceit the Apes and Monkies there have as much Wit as themselves have and could speak well enough too if they would but that out of a deep Reach of Policy they counterfeit themselves dumb and not to understand the Language lest they should be forced to work Corollary I. From this Discourse and the Evident Grounds of it all possibility of Vacuum is clearly confuted For if the Idea or Notion of Space be only an Inadequate Conception of Body whence 't is evidently taken or Body conceived according to such a Mode of it then to put Space without Body or where there is no Body is a perfect Contradiction Corallery II. Hence also tho' the Cartesians could demonstrate there are Innate Ideas which I judge impossible yet unless they declare and prove by their Principles that those Ideas are the things themselves in our Understanding and not Resemblances onely the same Arguments I have used against others will have equal or rather a far greater Force against them and conclude that they cannot by their Principles have Knowledge of any Thing but that they know Nothing And how they should pretend they are the Things themselves if they do not so much as allow them to be taken from the Things is altogether Inconceivable 11. Concerning Truth in General of which Mr. Locke treats in his 5th Chapter no more can be said speaking of Natural Truths but that it is the Things Existing such in our Minds as they exist in themselves For this put our Minds will be conformable to the Things whose Metaphysical Verity fixes them to be what they are or if we speak of them as affected with any Mode as they are Whence our Judgments concerning them being thus grounded cannot but be True What Mr. L.'s Joining or Separating of Signs c. has to do with Truth is beyond my Skill to comprehend for Signs are no more Truth than the Bush at the Door is the Wine in the Cellar I have demonstrated over and over that Ideas which he makes here one sort of Signs and are meer Similitudes can never give us Knowledge of Things much less can Truth which is the Object of Knowledge consist in conjoining or separating them and least of all can Truth consist in the Joining or Separating the other sorts of Signs viz. of Words without the Ideas or Notions for thus consider'd they are no more but Sounds or Characters To discourse this Point from its Fundamental Ground and declare it Literally The Metaphysical Verity of the Thing which put into a Proposition predicates the whole Thing or Mode of it self and affirms that the Thing is what it is gives us our First Truths or First Principles And all other Truths consists in this that Inadequate or Partial Notions or Conceptions of the Thing either as to what is Intrinsecal or Extrinsecal to it are predicated either of the Thing as in it self that is according to the Line of Substance which are call'd Essential Predicates as when we say Petrus est Animal or as it is affected with some Mode consistent in the same Subject as when we say Petrus est Albus Pater Locatus Galeatus Album est Dulce c. and it is impossible there can be any more sorts of Formal Truths but these two For all Predication is made by some kind of Identification as is plainly signify'd by the Copula is and there cannot possibly be any other sorts of Identification but either in the whole or not in the whole that is in part or according to Partial Conceptions of the same Thing nor can there be any Identification at all of Ideas Mr. Locke confessing that each of them is what it self is and no other 12. I take it to be a strange kind of Catechresis to make two sorts of Truth Montal and Verbal and we may with as good Sense say that a Tavern has two sorts of Wine one in the Cellar the other in the Bush at the Door for Words are good for nothing in the World but meerly and purely to Signifie So that when we say a Man speaks True the Sense of those Words can be only This that the Proposition he speaks does signifie such a Thought or Judgment in his Mind as is really Conformable to the Thing he thought or spoke of And I wonder this Great Man can imagin that in our more Complex Ideas we put the Name for the Idea it self for then that Name would signifie Nothing at all if neither the Thing nor the Idea be signified by it as he seems to hold Again Words differ from meer Sounds in this that they have some Sense or Meaning in them and Meanings are the very Notions we have in our Minds Wherefore the Parts of this Distinction of his would be coincident because all Verbal Truths were the Expression proper would necessarily be Mental ones and Mr. Locke seems to say the same § 8. where he makes those Truths which are barely Nominal to be Chimerical I grant too that Truths may be distinguish'd according to their several Subjects into Moral Physical Metaphysical c. But I must severely reflect on his describing Moral Truths § 11. to be the Speaking Things according to the Perswasion of our own Minds tho' the Proposition we speak does not agree to the Reality of Things For since it is most Evidently known that the Perswasions of Men's Minds not onely may but do frequently contradict one another by this Definition of Moral Truth both Sides of the Contradiction may be True which destroys Truth by confounding it with Falshood and makes the Art of Distinguishing ridiculous by making Truth a Genus to some sort of Falshood or not-not-Truth to be one kind of Truth 'T is a very dangerous thing in Philosophy to bring Distinctions unless each Member of the Notion divided includes the Notion of the Genus They were invented for clearing Truth but if ill made or ill-manag'd nothing in the World breeds greater Error and Confusion Corruptio optimi pessima REFLEXION Nineteenth ON The 6th 7th and 8th CHAPTERS 1. BY what has been deliver'd in my foregoing Reflexion my Notes upon his 6th Chapter Of Universal Propositions their Truth and Certainty will be easily understood But I am to premise First That the Question is not here what proves the Truth of such Propositions which is the work of Logick but whether there can be any Truth in them or Certainty of them at all or no. Secondly That the Formal Truth of Propositions can onely be in the Mind or that Mental Propositions onely are capable of Truth or Falslhood
nothing Like them in the Thing But tell him it cannot be deny'd but that they are Something and not meerly Nothing in regard we experience we have them and that Every Thing must necessarily be what it is which is one of the Maxims excepted against he will be put to a Stand and Nonpluss'd For what can he say The Identity of the Thing with it self whether it be a Substance or an Accident cannot be deny'd nor can he deny that the same is the same with it self which is another Maxim for the Word Thing signifies a Supream Generical Notion and the Word Same is a Transcendent which are both of them Clear because the Latter has no kind of Composition in it the Other as little as is possible So that he cannot begin to shuffle here or press to know the meaning of the Terms as he did when they were Particulars the Universal Terms being far Clearer than those Particulars are 6. Hence another Usefulness of Self-evident Maxims is discover'd which is not to deduce Conclusions from them as from Premisses as Mr. L. seems to apprehend but to reduce Inferior Truths which are less Clear to them That this can be done and how it is done I have shewn in my Method And Mr. Locke's Concession here § 11. that They are of great Use in Disputes to stop the Mouths of Wranglers abets and confirms my late Discourses For Whence could they have this strange Virtue to stop the Mouths of such Unreasonable Men but because their Evidence is Greater than any others or than Particular Self-evident Propositions are Otherwise why could not these do it as well as General Maxims Now if this be so why cannot they satisfie and instruct Rational Men and conduce to quiet and fix their Judgment as well as to Nonplus Wranglers 'T is the Nature of Evidence to enlighten and instruct Men of Sense and more Proper to it than to amuse and surprize Sophisters Let any Learned Man reflect on all the Maxims in Euclid's Elements in Euclides Physicus and Metaphysicus or any other Author who pretends to Reasoning with Exact Closeness and he will easily see for what they are Useful and How Nay even Mr. L.'s Identicals Yellow is Yellow and not Blue are useful in their Kind tho' Mr. Locke does omit to shew they are so And this Identical Yellow is Yellow tho' it do not influence other Particulars as General Maxims do for which Reason it does not absolutely deserve the Name of a Principle yet both It and such other Particular Identicals is a kind of Principle to all that is or can be discoursed about that Particular Colour For if any part of that Discourse makes Yellow not to be Yellow or which is all one violates that Proposition Yellow is Yellow 't is concluded to be most evidently False or if it agrees with it to be True He seems to mislike the Procedure by Praecognita and Praeconcessa whereas his Acute Wit will find upon Reflexion that it is impossible we can make an Ordinary much less any Speculative Discourse but the Discoursers must agree in something that is either Foreknown or at least Foregranted for if the two Disputants disagree in all their Principles and Grounds and one of them still denies All the other affirms 't is impossible they should Discourse together at all 7. But passing by all that is said I alledge farther that not to speak of others these two Maxims so much excepted against What it is and 'T is impossible the same Thing should be and not be at once are of such most Necessary and Universal Usefulness that without them we could neither judge discourse nor act Indeed these Maxims lie retruse in the most Inmost Recesses of our Judging or Intellective Power and make not their Appearance in Formal Propositions but only when we have occasion to produce them tho' they are still there all the while and guide all our Thoughts steadily nay all our Actions too In the same manner as when a Musician plays a careless Voluntary upon a Harpsichord he guides himself all along by the Rules of Musick lodg'd in his Mind tho' they being now familiar to him he is not so Sensible of those Rules as he was when he first learn'd them To apprehend more clearly the Usefulness of these two Principles let us suppose a Man quite Devested of them and to have neither of them in his Judgment and then reflect what he is good for All our Judgments being made by the Copula is in case he have not this First Principle in his Understanding he might take is for is not or else indifferently for one and the other too which besides the perverting his Judgment quite would make him utterly unfit for the Conversation of Mankind Again 't is impossible such a Man should have any Truth at all in his Mind which is the Natural Perfection of Human Understanding but wanting a steady Ground to fix his Judgment he might think all things to be Chimerical embrace every Fancy and adhere to any Contradiction 8. To come to the Usefulness of other General Maxims we may reflect how Mankind do naturally guide their Actions by them A Country Butcher loses his Knife and looks all about for it in which case 't is usual for such Fellows to say as the Motive of his continuing to seek it I am sure it must be somewhere or other By which rude Saying 'tis evident that he guides himself all the while by this foreknown General Maxim Every particular Body in the World must be in some place For had he not had the Knowledge of this Maxim before-hand that is did he think it were possible it should be no where or in no place he would never have taken such Pains to look for it We may observe Hundreds of such Natural Maxims as this in the Vulgar guiding their Actions and Sayings and perhaps it would not be unworthy Speculaters to observe their Behaviour and Words which proceed from Uncorrupted Nature and retrieve the Genuin Principles and Maxims that naturally produced them To apply this The same we may gather from our Speculative Thoughts and that the same passes in us naturally as does in the Vulgar Our First Principles lie habitually laid up in the Closet of our Minds and govern all our Thoughts as occasion presents and tho' we do not put them into Formal Propositions till the Circumstance invites yet they influence all we do or say or think as was instanced lately in the unshaken and unalterable Sense of the Copula is which verifies all our Propositions 9. In a Word it were easie to shew that this unadvised Degrading of General Maxims making them in a manner Useless for Knowledge does destroy all Grounds which either are such Maxims or at least have no force but by virtue of those Maxims express'd or imply'd unless we will pretend those are Grounds in any Science that want Proof there which makes them
above of the Word Ideas that we can build no Degree of Certainty nor Improvement of Knowledge upon it especially since Mr. Locke himself according to his usual Candour and Modesty declares here he does but think it true But which is the hardest Case of all to embrace this Principle we must be oblig'd to quit all our Self-evident Maxims as of little Use upon which our selves and all the Learned part of the World have proceeded hitherto 12. 'T is a great Truth that it is a right Method of advancing Knowledge to Consider our Abstract Notions But if these be not the Things nor as Mr. Locke's Complex Ideas are so much as like them I see not but that let us Consider them as much as we will we shall be never the nearer attaining any Real Knowledge by such a Consideration I add that it is also as necessary to find out Middle Terms that are Proper without which no Science can be had of any New Conclusion nor consequently can we without this advance one Step in Exact Knowledge 'T is a certain Truth also that Morality is capable of Demonstration tho' I do not remember that any Author but Mr. Locke and my self have been so bold as openly to profess it The Current of Slight Speculaters having long endeavour'd to make it pass for a kind of Maxim that there is no perfect Certainty to be had but only in Lines and Numbers Whereas the Principles of Morality are as Evident and the Notions belonging to such Subjects as Clear as those in Natural Philosophy perhaps Clearer as this worthy Author has shewn most manifestly 'T is also True that Knowledge may be better'd by Experience But if he means Scientifical Knowledge which is the Effect of Demonstration I must deny it unless Common Principles of Nature do guide Experience and give it Light of the True and Proper Causes of what Experience inform'd our Senses for without their Assistance as I have shewn in the Preface to my my Method Experimental Knowledge can never produce any one Scientifical Conclusion I add that True Science would be a Thousand times more advanc'd did Learned Men bend their Endeavours to begin with the Primary Affections of Body and thence proceed gradually to Secondary or more Compounded ones For this Method would furnish Studious Men with good Store of Proper Middle Terms to deduce their Demonstrations Lastly 'T is true that we must beware of Hypotheses and Wrong Principles But where shall we find any Sect. of Philosophers who for want of Exact Skill in Logick and Metaphysicks are not forc'd to build upon Hypotheses and those generally False ones too but our Anti-Ideists whom I take to be true Followers of Aristotle in his main Principles and the only true Understanders of his Doctrine It being indeed scarce possible that those who are not well qualify'd with those two Sciences should be capable to Comprehend his True Sense 13. Mr. Locke judges that a Man may pore long enough on those Maxims us'd by Euclid without seeing one jot the more of Mathematical Truths Self-evident Truths need not be por'd upon at all nor were they ever meant for the attaining New Knowledges by poring on those Propositions singly consider'd Yet these Maxims must be pre-supposed to be True and admitted or the Arguments would very often want their best Cement that gives them an evident and necessary Coherence They are prefix'd by Euclid at first both because they may often come in play afterwards as also because it would throw off the Tenour of the Discourse to mention them still expresly every time there needs Recourse to them Whence it was judg'd fit by him and others like him to premise them at first and then refer to them Let Men but observe how and in what Occasions Euclid makes use of them and it will then be best seen what they are good for But if they are good for nothing at all I am sure it must be concluded that both Euclid himself and such Writers and Users of Maxims were all of them a Company of vain idle Fops to amuse their Readers by proposing so solemnly such Ridiculous Trifles and dubbing those Insignificant Baubles with the Honourable Titles of Maxims and Principles To fix which Dis-repute upon him and his Imitaters will I doubt much Scandalize every True Member of the Commonwealth of Learning REFLEXION 21th ON The Fourteenth Fifteenth and Sixteenth CHAPTERS 1. I Am sorry I must declare that in Mr. Locke's 14th Chapter which treats Of Judgment there is scarce one Line that I can yield to I discourse thus Judgment does most evidently import the Fixure of our Understanding in its Assent to the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition For to say I judge a thing to be so is the same as to say I am fully and firmly persuaded it is so Now this Fixure of the Mind may arise from two Causes Reason and Passion Under the Word Reason taken at large I comprehend all kind of Evident Knowledge whatever that can belong to a Rational Creature To Passion belongs all Precipitancy of Assent from what Motive or Cause soever it springs The Former makes us adhere to what we judge upon such Motives as by their Evidence do determine the Understanding to Assent and fix it in that Assent which Motives therefore can be only such as are purely Intellectual or such as by our Proceeding upon them we see clearly the Thing must be so or not so as we apprehend The Later springs from the Will corrupted and byassed by some Interest or Pleasure which inveigles our Understanding to adhere to it as a Truth because the Will would have it so Again there are two sorts of Objects Man as having two Natures in him may be employ'd about viz. Outward Action and Inward Assent The former does generally concern the External Conveniences or Necessities of our Temporal Life here the Later the Interiour and Natural Perfection of our Soul which is the Adhering to Truth and rejecting of Errour In the Former of these we can have no Clear Evidence or very seldom both because Outward Actions are employ'd about Particulars of which we can have no Science as also because those Particulars about which we are to Act are surrounded with almost Innumerable Circumstances which we cannot Comprehend and way-laid by the Undiscoverable Ambushes of Fortune so that we can seldom or never with absolute Certainty know whether they may or may not prove Successful Notwithstanding which Dangers when there is Necessity or great Conveniency to Act Outwardly we may without disparaging our Reason fall to acting upon a Probability the Necessity obliging us to do so and the Impossibility of perfect Assurance acquitting us of Imprudence But of Assenting or of Judging Inwardly that a Proposition is True or False there can be no Necessity unless Evidence forces us to it in regard God's Goodness has furnish'd us with a Faculty of Suspending our Judgment in such Cases lest we
he has not so much as touch'd upon one main Cause of Errour which has an unhappy Influence even upon some Wise and Good Men and oft proves Prejudicial to their best Concerns I mean the Assenting absolutely upon very high Probabilities or as Mr. Locke expresses it as firmly as if they were infallibly demonstrated We are indeed more often deceiv'd by Assenting on slight Probabilities but we are far more grosly deceiv'd when a very High and very Likely Probability fails us Whence in such occasions Men use to say Who could ever have thought or imagin'd it or I was never so abominably deceiv'd in my Life I will explain my self by one Signal Instance shewing how dangerous it is to yield up our Reason by Assenting Absolutely upon very Great Likelihoods and even the Highest Probabilities Which Discourse may I hope edifie some and thence convince others that such an Assent is Irrational 14. A Man who is at this Instant in perfect Health is apt to assent absolutely that he shall not die suddenly of an Apoplexy before Morning that a Tile shall not fall from a House and kill him when he walks the Streets that his House shall not fall on his Head and crush him that a Drunken or Quarrelsom Ruffian shall not without Provocation run him thorow that a Bit of Meat a Crum or a Bone shall not choak him or any such sudden Disaster befall him that Day and 't is very highly Probable they will not Now the greatest Concern we can have in this World is to die well prepared for the other Put case then a Man of a Loose Life such Men being most apt to presume and lull themselves in a blind Security assents firmly and absolutely upon such a high Probability that he shall not be taken off suddenly but shall have Time to die Penitent haps to be surpriz'd by some such unlucky Accident without having any Leisure to repent the case of his Soul is very desperate Now 't is evident that that this Eternal Loss of Happiness lights to such Men thro' their acting contrary to their Reason and their Assenting and Relying firmly upon the Frail Assurance of a Probability For had they used their Reason right it would have naturally suggested to them these Thoughts I can see no Bottom nor Foundation for Assenting so fully that I shall not die very shortly or suddenly How many Men who thought themselves as secure as I do now have notwithstanding been taken away in an Instant Every Man living is liable to these and a Thousand other Unforeknowable Mischances Nor have I any kind of Privilege above others nor know I any reason why those Sinister Chances that happen'd to other Men may not as well be my Lot This plain and obvious Discourse join'd with the Infinite Concern of the Thing might have conduced to make those carelesly secure Men rectifie their Wanderings and endeavour to keep a good Conscience lest they should be suddenly Arrested by Death with their Debts uncancell'd Which good Thoughts and Motives they had wanted had they assented upon a high Probability that they should not die suddenly as firmly as tho' the Thing were infallibly demonstrated This Infallible and Irrational Security I say would in all likelihood have made such weak Souls run on in Sin defer the Amendments of their Lives and put it off with a dangerous presuming on Death-bed Repentance Hence I infer two Things one that our Position that we ought not to assent upon a high Probability but to retain some Degree of Suspence is a Great and very Important Truth since it has so great an Influence not to speak of our many other Concerns upon the best and most Important Part of Christian Morality Errour does not use to be so favourable to Goodness and Piety no more than Ignorance is the Mother of Devotion whereas Truth reduced to Practice is ever the Genuin Parent of Virtue The other that to Judge or Assent without Knowledge springs from our Weakness or else from Passion and that Judgment taken in this Sense is not as Mr. Locke affirms the Gift of God 15. He proceeds to the Reasons why Men take wrong measures of Probability and so come to assent wrong or Err. But it appears evidently from what 's said or rather indeed it is evident out of the very Terms that all Errour or Wrong Assent does onely Spring from Assenting at all upon Probable Motives For did they Assent onely upon Evidence it is Impossible they should ever erre since Evidence for an Errour is in it self impossible Or did they suspend their Assent or not Assent when the Thing is but Probable 't is again impossible they should Err for it is impossible they should Err or Assent wrong when they do not Assent at all Whence follows that excepting Invincible Ignorance which concerns not our Point in hand all Wrong Assent or Errour springs from our Assenting upon Probability The Reasons he assigns why Men take wrong Measures of Probabilities serve better to shew why Men do not assent upon Evidence viz. Doubtful and False Principles Receiv'd Hypotheses Predominant Passions and Authority by which last I suppose he means such Authority as may deceive us All these are so many Remora's to the Advancement of Science and Motes in our Intellectual Eye hindring it from seeing Evident Truth Yet none of them but has some kind of Probability as the World goes or at least will furnish Men with probable Arguments For a very slight Thing serves to make a Thing Probable So that the Upshot is that the Chief and most Effectual Way for Men to avoid Wrong Assents or Errours is to instruct them in the Way how to conclude evidently which is the sole End and Aim of my Method to Science and particularly of that part of it which treats of the Self-evident Conclusiveness of Syllogisms in which no Man can possibly be deceiv'd For this shews that the Inference or Consequence of the Conclusion when the Medium is Proper is as Certain as Self-Evidence can make it and that Common Mediums such as all Probable ones are can never Conclude and therefore such Conclusions cannot be assented to or held True without wronging our Reason Whence follows that the Way to avoid Wrong Assent is to exclude Probability from having any Title at all to our Assent it being highly and manifestly Irrational for any to judge a Proposition not at all Demonstrated or shewn to be True should be assented to as firmly as if it were infallibly demonstrated For this is directly to judge a Thing to be such as it is not which is a manifest Errour or Untruth Nor matters it what most People do out of Weakness Man's true Nature which is Rational is to be rated according to the Conformity we ought to conceive it had from the Idea of it in the Divine Understanding its true Essence where none can doubt but it was Perfect till it came to be slubber'd and sully'd by the