much concerning the nature of Evill Wherein if I may seem prolix it being but a Digression in this place Yet because I was called to it in the former chapter where his Lordship gave me occasion to handle it I thought it more fit to referre the discussing of it to this place where I meet with more questions of the like nature 2. Now as it is in Good and Evil so also in Truth and Falshood Falshood saith he is a Vanity a Lye a Nothing And why so Because Ens Verum convertuntur and therefore Falsum must be non-Ens To this I say as to the former Truth of Being or Metaphysicall Truth is Positive and of the same extent or latitude with Entity or Being And this Truth I have formerly said to be Cognoscibility making Verum in this Metaphysicall acceptation to be all one with Intelligibile I affirm also that Ens Verum or Intelligibile convertuntur And consequently according to the manner of Being must be the manner of Intellection That which hath a reall Being as Ens Reale may be Known to Be that which hath an apparent or supposed Being may be Supposed to Be. I affirm likewise that Falshood in this sense cannot be understood or that the Soule cannot act upon Metaphysicall Falshood For how can that be Known which is not Cognoscible or Understood which is not Intelligible But When I affirm that Verum and Ens are Convertible I restrain it not to Reall Entity For there may be Esse Cognitum where there is not Esse Reale But I proportion its Cognoscibility to its Being and therefore if it have not a Reall Being but only Imaginary it may be Supposed but cannot be Known to be Neither yet doe I So proportion the reality of Intellection to the reality of the Object as if when there is no Reall Object there could be no Reall Act For it is Cognoscibile that is convertible with Ens and hath its reality proportionable to the reality of Being not Cognosâ—itivum The Understanding whether it Know to be or Suppose to be doth yet Really Act And his Lordship also granteth that when the Understanding doth act Amisse it doth yet Really Act The Opining or Thinking saith he is a good Act. But where the Object is not Reall there the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cognoscâ— cannot be Reall for how can a reall Relation be founded in a Non-Entity Yet the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cognoscere is Reall for the Reality of â—t depends not upon the reality of the Object but upon the reality of the Act. That therefore which is so understood is the Supposed Object of a Reall Act. But now Logicall Truth the Truth of a Proposition which is opposed to Falshood â—o Errour hath nothing to do with the Reality either of the Object or of the Act For a True Proposition may be framed concerning an Imaginary Object as when we affirm a Chimaera to be Ens Rationis or only Imaginary And an Act Metaphysically True a Reall act may be Logically False Logicall Truth and Falshood like as Morall Good and Evill have not an Absolute Being but Relative They consist not in the Being or Not-Being of the Act For when the Understanding doth act Falsly it doth verè Agere though not agere Verè it is verè Actus though not Verus Actus but in the Agreeing or Disagreeing with the Object For when the Intellect doth Understand it frames an Idea a picture or representation of the Thing understood which Picture or Idea is a Reall Picture it hath the Truth of Being whether it have the Truth of Representation or not that is whether it be Like or Unlike whether it Agree or Disagree with the copy or object which it represents A Picture in a Painters Shop is truly a Picture it hath reall Colours and Lineaments But perhaps it is a False Picture it represents not that Visage by which it was drawn When the Understanding conceives an Ens rationis the Idea or Conceptus is not this Imaginary Being for this Conception is as Reall as the Conception of a Reall Ens But the supposed Object of this Conception there being indeed no such thing as this Conceptus doth represent When a Painter describes in a Table some Antick Shapes or strange Chimaera's his Description his Draught is not a Fiction but as Reall as the true Pourtraicture of a living Man But that which by this description is represented that is the Fiction there being no such Antick Forms no such Chimaera's as he expresseth When the Understanding draws a Reall Picture a reall Idea or Conceptus without a Copy without a Pattern it is Ens rationis When indeavouring to imitate a Copy to represent the nature of things the Truth of Being it yet misseth of it not making its Picture agreeable to its Pattern this is a False Apprehension And this is the difference between Ens rationis and Error Intellectûs Both in the mean time being reall Acts. The Logicall Truth and Falshood of a Conception or Proposition are but Relations of Likenesse or Unlikenesse Conformity or Difformity in the Act to its Object and are both founded in the Reality of the Action or its Truth of Being And are both equally Reall equally Positive For Falshood is not a meer not-Conformity or not-expressing of things existent But a Difformity a Crossing or Thwarting of them For else when a man ceaseth to Think or Speak of this or that Truth he there by Erres and Lyes For when he Thinks not at all he cannot think Conformably when he Speaks not at all he cannot speak Conformally either to the Existence of Things or to his own Opinion of them Yea every Proposition every Thought will have so many Falshoods in it as there be other Truths which it doth not expresse For if the not-expressing of a Truth be Falshood then to affirm that the Sunne shines is a Falshood because it doth not expresse the Fires heaâ— or the Charcoals burning And thus that proposition which expresseth not every Truth is a False Proposition yea contains Infinite Falshoods opposite to the Infinit number of True Propositions possible Object If you say to avoid this that it is not the not-expressing of One Truth the not-conformity to One Existence that makes a Proposition False but the not-expressing of Any Truth whereas the Conformity to and the Expressing of any Truth makes the Proposition or Conception True Ans I answer first that this is contrary to the generall Proposition which affirms that Perfectio oritur ex Integris Imperfectio verò ex Particulari defectu Which is applyed to severall kinds of Imperfection That Action is Good whose every Circumstance is rightly ordered That Proposition True whose every Branch doth agree with the Thing c. Wheras One Bad circumstance One false branch makes the Action bad the Proposition False The contrary to which must have been affirmed if the expressing of One Truth make the Proposition True and the
concurrent not-expressing or not-Conformity to All Truths be requisite to make it False 2. Again If there be requisite a not-expressing of Any Truth to make it False then must this and the like propositions be True if I affirm Virgil Homer to be Greek Poets If I affirm a Stone to be a Reasonable Creature For it expresseth One Truth viz that it is a Creature although it be not Reasonable as likewise the One was a Greâ—k Poet though not the other and the not-expressing of a further Truth doth not hinder its expressing of This. Then must that Action be Good whose One Circumstance is Good If the Intention be right though the Formality of the Action be never so unlawfull yet will not the Act be Blamable Logicall Falshood therfore is as positive as Logicall Truth the one consisting in a positive Conformity the other in a positive Difformity to the Things Yea of the two the nature of Truth is rather Negative theÌ„ the nature of Falshood For a not-conformity makes not a Proposition False but the not-difformity makes it True For that is a True proposition that is not Opposite to Any Truth though it do not Expresse All Truths Neither can there be a Medium between Truth and Falshood as there is between Good and Evill For though there may be an Indifferent Action which is neither Good positively nor Evill yet is there not an Indifferent Proposition which is neither True nor False Truth and Falshood in Propositions are opposed as Lawfulnesse and Vnlawfulnesse in Actions whereof Lawfulnesse as I have said is Negative rather then as Good and Evill Laudabile Vituperabile Yet if we desire a Medium I can shew you one But then it must not be Actus but Negatio Actûs And that is in Abstraction when the Understanding conceives of one Thing without considering of another for then it doth neither Affirm nor Deny and so that Conception is thus farre neither True nor False as likewise the Proposition expressing this Thought When I conceive of the Ayr not regarding whether it be Light or Dark of a Man not considering whether he be Learned or Ignorant This Abstracting or considering the Ayr without considering Light in it considering Aristotle to have been a Man not considering withall that he was Learned is neither True nor False According to that Abstrahentis non est Mendacium wheras if I affirm the Ayr in the day time to be without Light or Aristotle without Learning the proposition is False Falshood and Truth therefore being Relations equally Reall equally Positive the Understanding may be said as well to Act Falshood as to act Truth while it produceth that Absolute Act in which these Relations are founded Otherwise what will be the difference between Ignorance and Errour between Silence and a Lye 3. There is yet another Question to which by his Lorâ— I am invited The same saith he may be said of Pain which he conceiveth cannot act upon the Soule nor the Soule upon it because it is but a bare Privation And therefore subscribes to the Opinion of Dr. TWISSE whom if Anagrams may be credited you may stile WISEST that it is better to be in perpetuall Pain then not to be at all Because if Pain be a bare Privation then is Any Being more desirable then for fear of a Privation a Nothing to become no Being His ground you may easily perceive Because if Misery be but a Privation of Happinesse then is it better to have the Goodnesse of Being without the Goodnesse of Happinesse then to want both the one and the other But I cannot with his Lordship saving always the deserved respect due to that Reverend Divine subscribe to the Opinion of Dr. Twisse in this particular For beside that thus Paena Damni and paena Sensus will be all One I conceive Pain to be as reall as Pleasure Motion hath been accounted by all if I mistake not to be Positive and Rest quies to be only Privative Negatio Motûs Now in my Opinion Ease and Pain or Torment are opposite in the same manner that Rest and Motion And so I conceive Pain or Torment whether you speak of dolor Corporis or dolor Animi the Griefe of mind or bodily Pain to be Reall the Negation whereof is called Ease and its Contrary Pleasure or Delight Neither doth it at all trouble me that Ens Bonum convertuntur that all reall Entity hath a reall Goodnesse or the goodnesse of Being For nothing hinders but that Bonum Metaphysicum may be Malum Physicum that which is Reall may notwithstanding be Inconvenient that which is in se Bonum may not-be Bonum huic whether you speak of bonum Jucundum or bonum Vtile Goodnesse of Being Metaphysicall goodnesse is but a common Subject capable either of Physicall Good or Evill like as the same Reall Action may be Morally Good or Evill And according as the Physicall Good or Evill annexed to Being Metaphysically Good doth exceed so is that Being Desirable or not Desirable Otherwise How could it be better for that man which betrayed our Saviour that he had never been born I urge not the judgement of Sense in this particular because his Lordship appeals from Sense to Reason I shall therefore examine what Reason can alledge why credit should not be given to the judgement of Sense For â—having a Judgement confessed in the Court of Sense I must suppose it to be in force till such time as I see it revoked by Reason And when Reason hath reversed it I will grant the former Sentence to be Voyd Object You will say Being though Miserable hath some Goodnesse whereas Not-Being hath none and therefore Being though with Misery is more desirable Ans I reply Misery hath much Evill not-Being hath none Therfore Misery is more to be Shunned then not to Be. But if this satisfie not I desire to know whether there be not the same strength of Reason in This Argument that is in Theirs viz A Sinfull Act hath in it the Goodnesse of Being and its Sinfullnesse iâ— only a Privation of further Goodnesse the goodnesse of Conformity to Gods Law Therefore it is better to Sinne then not to Act to commit a Sinne then not to commit it For if I Sinne I produce â—ome Good because it is a reall Action and so hath the Goodnesse of Being But in not-acting not-committing I produce no Goodnesse at all Therefore it is better to Sinne then not to Sinne because Acting though Sinfull hath Some good but Not-acting hath None Now if this Argument do not hold good to prove it Better to Sinne be the Sinne as great as can be possible then not to Act not to Sinne Then must I needs think that their Argument being exactly in the same form is of as little force to prove Misery though never so great to be better then not-Being But let us heare his Lordship plead at Reasons Barre for the revoking that Sentence which hath past
of Truth SIR I Have according to your desire perused that Treatise concerning The Nature of Truth The which how farre it serves to the expounding the 24. Chapter of Math. I examine not One thing that may make it seem somewhat dark is that his Lordship speaking of a matter somewhat unusuall is forced to use such Metaphors for want of native words which may somwhat obscure it And his Lordship was the lesse carefull to avoid it because they being with himselfe of frequent use and sufficiently understood by him to whom hee wrote there was the lesse feare of being not understood or mis-understood And so the lesse need to prevent it by seeking for such words as might better sute with an ordinary Reader Before I proceed to state the Question Whether Truth and the Soule be One It is very requisite to search in what sense his Lordship understands Truth that through the ambiguous sense and divers acceptations of the word we be not confounded in the progresse Truth in Logick is when the Proposition agrees with the Thing and Falsehood when they disagree Truth in Ethicks is when our Words and Actions agree with our Mind and is opposed to a Lye to Hypocrisie And Truth in these acceptations is nothing else but an Agreement or â—onformity of a Type with its Prototype Archetypi Ectypi of a Transcript with its Originall of an Idea or thing representing with that represented Signi Signati Thus in Logick Vox est signum rei or Imago râ—i If therefore we have that expressed in Words to which in the order of Things there is nothing agreeing it is a False Copy or rather no Copy being drawn according to no Pattern If that be which is affirmed to be it is True because they are a Copy or Representation of the Things so being As it is in words so it is also in Apprehensions in conceptibus If our mind conceive a thing to be which is not or to be otherwise then it is this is a False Apprehension because the Idea in our understanding is not a true representation of the Thing In Ethicks our words are to be compared with another Copy because thusâ— they are not the representation of the Things immediately but the representation of our Thoughts or Intentions Therefore if our Words do truly expresse or represent what we Think It is morally True that is it is not a Lye because they agree with this Copy but yet they may be Logically False as not being a true expression of the Thing If the Idea in our apprehension agree with the Things so that we conceive a â—ight of them and our Word be a true representation of this Idea they do truly also represent the Things There is both vâ—ritas Logica and veritas Moralis If wee conceive a right of things and our words expresse otherwise then we think this Proposition is both wayes false for it neither agrees with the thing nor with our judgement But our Judgement is Logically true because the Idea in our mind is a true expression of the thing If we conceive amisse and yet â—ffirm as the thing is if we affirm snow to be white which we conceive to be black our Proposition is Logically true but Morally false and our conceptus is also Logically false If lastly wee conceive amisse and speak otherwise then wee conceive and yet diverse from what wee ought both to think and speak as if we conceive snow to be blâ—â—k and affirm it to be red our Idea or Conceptus is Logically false our Proposition Logically false and Morally false Thus iâ— one intending upon a Signet to grave the Kings Image miâ—â—â—th of the true proportion and with this Signet maketh impression in Wax the wax contâ—â—nes a true representation of the Seale but not the true Image of the King whereas if the Signet had been truly graven and then impression made in the wax the wax had truly represented both the one and the other Thus is it in Morall and Logicall Truth Accordingly one making a Promise with intention to perform it yet afterward breaks it this Promise is Morally true because it is a true representation of his Intentions but it is not Logically true as not being a representation of his future Actions And in his subsequent Actions there is also a kind of Morall falshood because they are not conformable to his promise by which they should bee regulated Or you may say his Promise was Morally a True expression of his Intention but his Intention was Logically False as not agreeing with the Thing because he intended that which was not Futurum Whereas if he had promised with a purpose to breake it his Promise had been Morally False but his Intention Logically True If intending to break it he yet perform it his Intention is Logically false and his Promise Morally false though Logically true And thus Breach of Promise will come under the nature of Injury or Injustice but not under the nature of a Lye except it were made to deceive because it is the true expression of the Intention which is the immediate rule of Veracity or Morall truth Thus Hypocrisie or Dissimulation is a branch of Morall Falsehood because Actio and Gestâ—s are Index animi as well as Words And this I conceive to be the Nature of and Difference between Logicall and Morall Truth There is yet another Truth and you may call it a Physicall Truth â— Formall or Essentiall Truth Thus that which hath the Essentialls of a Man is verè Homo so an Infant is a true Man Thus we say a true Church true Faith true Grace true Gold not counterfeit thus a Syllogisme in a right form is a true Syllogisme though the Propositions be false And the like But mistake me not by Morall Truth or Naturall Truth c. I understand not Truths about Naturall things or Morall things though the words be oft-times so taken For I am not now distributing Truth into its severall Species or severall Parts but am shewing the Ambiguity of the Word and so distinguishing it into its severall Acceptations Thus Morall or Ethicall Truth is that Acceptation of Truth that is usuall in Ethicks Logicall Truth is that Accepâ—ation of â—â—uth which is used in Logick c. But â—â—â—ppâ—â—â— we â—â—â— yâ—t â—â—rre from that Accâ—ptâ—tion of Truth in which â—â—â— Loâ—â— speaketh I will therefore come somewhat neâ—rer â—â—â—â—â— the Logicall and Morallâ—…ptatâ—â—n â—…ptatâ—â—n â—â— Truth we have a Metapâ—ysicall accâ—ptatâ—… â—â—s and Vâ—rum are â—ermini convâ—râ—ibâ—les And Truth is taken in â—â—â—â— such accâ—ptation when it is divided into veriâ—â—s Essendi and Cognoscâ—ndi Veritas Essendâ— or the truth of Being is that per quam res verâ—â—st And thus Ens Verum converâ—untur Quic â—uid est verâ— est For except it have a Reall and True Being and not a Supposed Being it is not â—indâ—â—d a Being but is Suâ—â—osâ—d â—o be Veritas â—ognosceâ—di is that per quam res verâ— Cognoscitur And
danger imminent by the Hand it endeavours to divert it And yet there is no Messenger dispatcht between to inform the Hand what the Eye hath seen notwithstanding that the Hand and the Eye are Really distinct yea Locally distant As for mine own Opinion I could easily grant The distinction of the Faculties from the Soule and among themselves to be neither Reall nor a parte rei And concerning the first I am sufficiently confident But for the second whether the Distinction be Modall i. à parte Rei or meerly Rationall rationis ratiâ—cinaâ—â— I do yet desire a convincing Demonstration to determine CHAP. III. The same Argument further prosecuted and examined in this and the ensuing Chapters IN the next Chapter he shewes That if we make the Vnderstanding and Truth to be One which I suppose will be easily granted there being but few or none which make the Soule the Understanding and Reason that is Truth to be Three distinct things then will it be easie to find these three Requisites For thus Light or Truth is Dispensed By the Father of Light and hath for its Recipient the whole Reasonable creature consisting of Body and Soule All which I admit as likewise will those that be his greatest adversaries onely with this Proviso That he make the entire Reasonable creature to be subjectum Denominationis and not subjectum Inhaesionis to Reason or Truth Next he spends some time to clear this How the whole Reasonable Creature can be said to be the Recipient which labour in my judgement might have been spared For I cannot see any reason to fear but that it will as easily be granted that the Reasonable Creature may be the Subject of Reason as that the Ayr illuminate is the subject of Light without any fear of Identity in the Thing Received with the Recipient But it seems his Lordship speaks of another kind of Recipiency beside the Recipiency of a Subject Such a kind of Recipiency as where the Recipiens and Receptum be the same No Being saith he but it is the thing Receiving and Received For consider any Individuall Being you please Vegetative or Rationall or what you will Who is it that entertaineth this Being but the Being it selfe which is entertained Who is it that receiveth from the Womb of Eternity that reasonable creature but the creature received You may distinguish them thus The Recipiency of a Being and the Recipiency of a Form And so the Fountain or Efficient dat Esse and dat Habere In the first kind of Giving and Receiving the Recipient and the thing Received must of necessity be the same Thus the Efficient or Producer of Light dat Lucido ESSE Lucidum dat Luci Esse Lucem not dat Lucido esse Lucem But in the second it is otherwise not dat Lucido HABERE Lucidum nor Luci HABERE Lucem but Lucido Habere Lucem Thus the Efficient or Fountain of Reason dat Rationalâ— Esse Rationalem Habere Rationem But how his Marginall note stands good viz. That in all things the Agent and the Patient must be One because The thing Receiving and Received are One I cannot conceive For thus he makes God and the Reasonable creature to be One For if I mistake noâ— the Fountain or Efficient is the Agent and the Recipient the Patient And indeed he must of necessity admit this distinction of Recipiency For otherwise his Fundamentall Axiom would have failed For if we allow no Recipiency but the Recipiency of a Subject whereby it receives or entertains a Form It will not be Universallâ— true That to the constitution of every Being there must be the three Requisites formerly mentioned For Substantiae non sunt in subjecte Compleat Substances are not communicated or imparted To a Subject Receiving aâ—d so would want a Recipient but are onely made to Be and to be the Subject Receiving other things But â— desire his Lordship to consider Whether admitting such a Reception wherein every thing is its own Recipient he do not lay open so wide a gap that his adversaries may make an Escape and Himselfe break that Net wherein his Adversary should have been taken Whether in answering an Objection he doe not overthrow his principall Argument For how easie is it to say That Truth though it be neither Soule Intellect nor Reason Yet it is a Faculty or what you will Proceeding from God and its own Recipient And so though they imagine an hundred Faculties in the Soule one dependent upon another yet they shall never be put to a straight to find either a Fountain or a Recipient For God of necessity must be the Fountain of all Being whatsoever either mediatè or immediatè And that Being whatsoever it is shall be its own Recipient Therfore the Soule in this sense hath not the Body for its Recipient neither did God communicate or bestow a living Soule upon Adam's earthly Body when he breathed into it the breath of Life But he gave To the Soule to Be a Soul Neither is the Soule a Recipient to the Understanding Nor It to Reason noâ— any of these to Truth if they be distinct things But each of these their own Recipient Neither lastly is the entire Reasonable Creature a Recipient of Truth or Reason as he would have it But Truth is its own Recipient And then must he hold his hand from Concluding as he doth in the Close of this Chapter That the totum existens consisting of Matter and Form the Reasonable creature is the Recipient of this Truth Except he will say Veritas est Animal rationale Animal rationale est Veritas But how the Ignorance of this Point should give the ground to that Question whether the Soule or the Body be Contentum which he admonisheth us of I cannot see For though it be granted that Every thing be its own Contentum yet this difficulty remaineth as firm as before For Is not Water its own Contentum Is not the Vessell also its own Contentum Yet he will not deny but that in another sense the Water is contained in the Vessell nor can he say That the Vessell is contained in the Water So though the Soule and Body be either of them their own Contentum and Recipient quia datur Animae ut sit Aniâ—a datur Corpori ut sit Corpus Yet that the one may not be Locuâ— and the other Locatum one the Subject and the other an Adjunct which is the meaning of that Question will not from hence appear CHAP. IV. Whether the Vnderstanding faculty may not be the Recipient of Truth IN the 4. Chapter he proceeds further to shew That the Vnderstanding cannot â—â— this Recipient And if he speak of such a Recipiency as where the Recipient and the Receptum be the same his Adversaries that say Truth and the Understanding to be distinct will contend for this as well as He For neither will They say datur Intellectuâ— se esse Rationem nor datur Rationi ut sit Intellectus But if
he speak of the Reâ—ipiency of a Subject I see not from what hath yet been said why the Understanding if distinct may not be the Subject of Reason why they may not say Datur Intellectui Habere Rationem Since it is granted in Logiâ—k That one Accident may be the immediate Subject though not the Vltimate Subject of another And so if any will have the Soul the Intellect and Truth or Reason to be tria distincta They must say The Intellect is the immediate Subject of Reason and the Soule the Vltimate And then call the Understanding either a Quality a Faculty or Virtus quâ it is no great matter we will not contend with his Lordship for the name For Virtus quâ iâ— but a Faculty and a Faculty or poâ—â—â—tia naturalis is the second species of Quality CHAP. V. Whether the Soule and Truth in the Soule be one THe like Answer must be given to that in the 5. Chapter Whether the Soule without an intervenient Faculty may not be the Recipient of Truth For we cannot say Datur Animae ut sit Veritas except we agree to make the Soule and Reason one But we may say Datur Animae ut sit Subjectum veritatis or Subjectum Rationis though we â—old them distinct As may appeare at large by what I have said upon the second Chapter That which is further added in this Chapter whether as a Suâ—sive to inforce this or as a New Argument viz. That our Soule resembles God who is Vnus simplex actus and therefore it selfe must be simple in its Operations and we must not expect first an Essence and then a Faculty whereby it worketh c. may as well be urged to prove That our Soule and Body are the same because Man was made after Gods Image who is â—nus simplex not consisting of Parts Or if you instance particularly in the Soule It may as well follow That we know not one thing successively After another nor discursively By another but by One entire Act like God because the Soule bears the Image of God and Vnitas which I grant not is formalis ratio Dei That which is lastly added concerning a Resemblance of the Trinity in Truth thus understood Is no way peculiar to this acceptation of Truth But holds as well in every degree of Being whatsoever All Entity or Being As it lieth involved in the Originall Fountain of Being which is Gods Essence may represent patrem intelligentem As it descends from above filium intellectum As it is received in the Creature and maketh it to Be spiritum dilectum And thus I have surveyed his Lordships reasons to prove the Soule and Truth to be One Understanding by Truth or Light the Light of Reason which is the Originall or actus â—rimus from whence Rationall Operations doe proceed And therefore must needs be the first of those Nations of Truth laid down in his first Chapter And that it cannot be any other acceptation of Truth that is here meant is very apparent If we look upon the other acceptations of Truth which we shall find to be no way consonant either with his Method or his Arguments For if you consider of Truth understood or the Idea of Truth entertained in the Mind by actuall Apprehension This will have no Being either in the Understanding or elsewhere till such time as the Understanding it selfe frames this Conceptus But as yeâ— we have nothing to doe with the Operations of the â—â—tellect For he proceeds not to consider the Operations or Effects of the Reasonable Soule till he come to the 10. Chapter But with something anteâ—â—dent them which is the Fountain from whence these Operations doe proceed which can be no other but Reason Yea himselfe affirms it in this 5. Chapter pag. 23. And likewise that acceptation of Truth for the Truth either of Being or of Cognoscibility in the Object hath no conjunction with the Understanding till it be actually understood And even Then we cannot make it to be One with the Understanding except we make those things to be One which have neither coexistence of Place nor coexistence of Time For those things may be understood which were many thousand Yeares past and many thousand Miles distant CHAP. VI. Whether all things bee this one Truth IN the next place he proceeds to a Consequent or Corollary arising out of his former Thesis viz. That All things are this One Truth I confesse I was at a stand a great while and could not imagine any shew of Consequence between these propositions If Truth or Reason be the same with the Soule or Vnderstanding then is it also the same with All things else Why so This Argument saith he will presse all things that are This Argument which Argument Doth he mean that argument which was last propounded towards the end of the fifth chapter That because God is one simple act therefore not only the Soule and its Faculties must be One but even All Creatures must be One because there is in All somewhat of Gods Image whose Essence is Vnity If this be his Argument I shall content my self with a bare deniall of the Consequence till I see some shew of proofe For That Unity is Gods Essence is in my judgement grossely false Or were it true yet That because God is One therefore the Creatures must also All be One hath no strength For this Vnity in God is equivalent to an infinite Multiplicity And That One simple Efficient may not produce distinct Effects seems to me a Paradox Or is it his second Argument propounded in the second chapter and prosecuted in those that follow That to the constitution of every Creature there must be a Being communicated a Fountain from whence and a Recipient to which the which Recipient must be the same with the Being received From hence perhaps he might prove That every thing is the same with its own Being But That very thing should be the same with each other or the same with reason or the understanding follows not Is it then his first Argument propounded towards the end of the first chapter Which perhaps his Lordship lookes at as the principall Argument and at all that follows only as a Prosecution of that Though his Marginall notes and the Titles of Chapters which I question whether or noe they be of his Lordships doing point out to us distinct Arguments in the beginning of the second and in the end of the fifth chapter The Argument was this The Vnderstanding is nothing but a Ray of the Divine Nature c. And is not Truth the same which I understood as you may see thus The Understanding is Gods Image in Man And this Image consists in Truth or the Light of Reason therefore Truth or Reason is the Understanding And thus the Syllogisme will be true in the first figure if you transpose the Premises and convert the Conclusion Or thus The Image of God in Man is the Understanding And
this Image is Truth therefore some Truth is the Understanding And thus it will be true in the third figure And beside these two forms â— see not how that Argument can be reduced to a true Syllogisme Now chuse you which form you please yet how â—â— should follow from hence That All things else are this One Truth I do not yet perceive It may be his Lordship would have his Argument thus ordered in the second figure The Understanding is a Ray of Divinity And Truth also is a Ray of Divinity therefore Truth is the Understanding or Truth and the Understanding are One And if this be the form of his argument I will easily grant that it presseth all things that are as much as this For is not this Syllogisme in the same form The blessed Angels are Spirituall Substances And the damned Spirits are Spirituall substances Therefore the damned Spirits are blessed Angels and the blessed Angels damned Spirits Then which Consequent scarce any thing could be lesse probable And thus indeed he may prove all things that are to be One Truth one Understanding yea one Stone or what you will For take any two Beings whatsoever and they will both be sound to be Rays of Divinity because both proceed from the â—ame Originall and Fountain of Being in the Divine Essence and therefore according to this Argument they will be both One But his Argument thus ordered will prove but a plaine Fallacy offending against the Laws of the second figure wherein no affirmative proposition can be concluded The most that he can prove from hence will be this That there is some common Praedicate which may be affirmed of Both and so That there is some General Nature in which they both agree And this I am confident there is none will ever deny that grants but this proposition Quicquid est est Eâ—s That All Beings whatsoever agree in the generall nature of a Being For then they may all be the Subjects of the common Praediate Ens. But this is farre enough from proving All things to be One and the Same For to assume That whatsoever things agree in a Vniversall Nature are also the same Numericall and Individuall Existence is such a proposition as Logick will not admit of Yea though his Argument should proceed thus The Specificall Essence of the Understanding consists in this that it is a Ray of the Divine Nature And the Specificall Essence as well of Truth as of all Beings whatsoever is the Same viz. That it is a Ray of the Divine Nature And therefore all things whatsoever agree in the same specificall Essence And consequently all things whatsoever having the same specificall Essence with each other must also be One and the Same with each other I say though his Argument proceeded thus yet would it little availe to prove All things to be One and the same For besides that the Specificall Essence of the Understanding and so of other things consisteth not in being a Ray of Divinity Besides this I say although they had all the same Specificall Essence Yet doth it not follow that they must be all One and the Same For are there not many Individualls under the same Species whereof One is not the Other Doth not the Soule of Peter and the Soule of Judas agree in all the â—ame Specificall and Essentiall Praedicates whilst notwithstanding it may be truly said that the Soule of Peter is not the Soule of Judas and again that the Soule of Judas is not the soule of Peter What Essentiall difference is there beeween water in the Baltick Sea and that in the Mediterranâ—an â—ince they are both but Integrall Parts of the same Homogeneall Ocean Yet how true it is withall That the Baltick Sea is not the Mediterranean Sea and That the Water which is now in the Baltick is distinct from that which at the same time is in the Mediterranean Sea Two drops of Water taken out of the same spoonfull be they in their Essentialls never so Consonant in their Accidents never so Like Yet we may truly say This is not the Other nor the Other This. How then can it follow That Truth is One with the Understanding and That All things are this One Truth Because all Being is but a Ray of Divinity It follows indeed That if all Things have the same Specificall Essence then are they all Things of the same nature but that they are all the Same Thing it follows not Thus much therefore I suppose will be granted him by all That All things are of the Same at least Genericall nature because all things have a Being And When he hath proved their Specificall essence to be the same It will be granted also That they are all Things of the same Specificall nature and if you will That All Being falls under the same Praedicament Though yet a Predicamentall distinction be not always a Reall distinction no not a parâ—e rei But is this all he seeks to prove I supposed he had laboured to shew That the Light of Truth or Reason was not onely of the same nature with the Understanding but That it was the Vnderstanding Otherwise he proves lesse then his greatest Adversaries would have granted him For those that contend for the greatest Distinction between the Soule and its Faculties doe not yet maintain a more Reall or Physicall distinction between them then is between One Soule and another which yet agree in the same Essentiall Praedicates And if you allow them the same distance between the Soul and the Understanding which is between the Soule and a Stone yea between two Soules They will tell you it is more then they desire For they will grant that the Soule with all its Faculties and the Body with all its Members do constitute the same Suppositum which is a more Physicall a more Reall Union then is between two Soules though agreeing in every Essentiall Praedicate But if I mistake not that which he was about to prove was not that the Understanding is of the same Nature with Truth but that it is Truth His supposition in the first words of the â— Chap is If the Intellect the Soul Light and Truth are all but One c. Not A like or of the same nature And p. 22. If you make the Vnderstanding the Soule Light Truth One then are you delivered out of these streights c. And pag. 10. If the Vnderstanding be enricht with Truth then is it it selfe that Truth that Light Thus he frequently calls them One and the same Now To be â—â— selfe that Truth and To be of the same nature with Truth is far different And if he prove no other but a Logicall Union That Truth and the Understanding are of the same Genericall or Specificall nature we may yâ—t safely deny a Physicall or Reall Union or Identity and say Truth is not the Vnderstanding nor is the Understanding Truth though of the same nature with Truth as well as say This drop
all this hinders not but that Vnity and all other Negations may have a kind of Reality as it is opposed to a Fiction And therfore the Ayr â—â— really Dark God is really Vnicus and not onely supposed so to be And yet Darknesse and Unity are not in themselves Reall but Negative term I purposely passe over severall particulars as well in this Chapter as in others which his Lordship lights upon by the way to avoid tediousnesse and look principally at those things to which his Lordships aim doth especially tend CHAP. VIII The Nature of Habits Whether they be one with Truth or the Soules Essence IN the eighth Chapter he speaks somewhat concerning the nature of Habits And this is to be adjoyned to the end of the 5. Chapter the 6. and 7. Chapters wherein he inferres a Corollary concerning the Essence of All things That it is One That it is Vnity being inserted as a Parenthesis He had in the fifth Chapter affirmed That the Soul is nothing but Truth Yet saith he while I affirm that the Soule is nothing but this Truth I doe not refuse the doctrine of Habits either Infused or Acquisite But before I proceed It is not amisse to give notice of a different acceptation of Truth here from that before He spake before of the Truth or Light of Reason which he contended to be One with the Soul and not a distinct Faculty This Light was an Innate or Connate Light which hath its Originall and its Period with the Soule For when the Soule begins the Light of Reason begins and this Light of Reason is no sooner extinct then when the Soule shall cease to be But the Light of Habituall Knowledge whether Infused or Acquisite is not an Innate Light but an Advenient Light subsequent to the Soules first Existence and really separable from it Yet may it be Antecedent to another degree of Advenient Light viz. Actuall Knowledge which may proceed from Habituall This Advenient Light of Habituall knowledge differs from Innate Light of Reason as a Habit in the first species of Quality from Naturalis potentia or a Faculty in the second species And so howsoever it may be true That a Faculty or Naturall Power may be so farre the Same with the Soule as that it differ only ratione ratiocinatâ Yet in a Habit we must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei For where there may be a Reall Separation and not onely Mentall there must needs be granted a Distinction in re Now that in all Habits there may be a reall Separation is apparent For though it may be some Habits acquired or infused cannot be lost when they are once had as Grace c. yet before the acquisition or infusion of such Habits the Soule was actually without them Indeed it is true That these Habits cannot subsist without the Soule and therefore they may not be imagined to be Really distinct as res res yet because the Soule may exist without these therefore they must have a Modall distinction in re as res modus Thus the Roundnesse of a piece of Coyn though when it is it is the same Thing with the Silver not being a Thing added but only a Modification a moulding or fashioning of the Former thing yet must it be Distinct from the essence of the Silver though not a Thing distinct Otherwise when this Silver looseth its Roundnesse it should loose its Essence and become somwhat else whereas the Silver in this form is not really distinct from it selfe in another forme but the same Metall the same Silver There being then this difference between a Habite and a Faculty Though Reason should be One with the soule without so much as a Modall distinction yet follows it not that a Habit hath the same Reall Identity but that it may be distinguished ex parte rei Habits he distinguisheth into Infused and Acquisite When the soul saith he by vertue of its Being is cleare in such a Truth it is said to be an Infused habit when by frequent action such a Truth is Connaturall to the Soule it may be stiled an Habit Acquisite though c. Whether or no this be the genuine distinction between an Acquisite and Infused Habit it is not materiall strictly to examine If the soule by its Essence be cleare in such a Truth that is be ready to act according to such a Truth I should call this a Faculty or Naturall power rather then an Habit. Thus Gravity in a Stone whereby it is naturally prone to descend I should not call an Habit but a Faculty Though Heavinesse in another relation be neither a Faculty nor an Habit but qualitas Patibilis And so perhaps may Knowledge as it is an accidentall Form informing the soule be referred to the same species of Quality though it can hardly be called by that Name For a Habit quatenus sic is so called not with any relation to the Subject but in relation to Acts which slow from it or are produced by it This Pronenesse or Aptnesse for operation which is in any thing immediatly from its Essence is a naturall Power or Faculty And a Habit is a further Readinesse and Pliablenesse or Facility of working according to this Faculty A Habit therefore alwayes presupposeth a Faculty as being but a Facilitation of it And when as by Reason a man hath an Ability to understand by Habituall Knowledge he hath a Readinesse to understand Now this Readinesse or Facility if it proceed from Often Acting so that from the iterating of former Acts it becomes more prone either to continue or repeate those Acts It is an Acquisite Habit Somewhat of this may be seene in Naturall things A Wheele being once in motion it will by a smaller force be Continued then at first Begun yea for a while persist without help If this Facility proceed from some Accidentall Form produced in it by an Externall Agent it is an Infused Habit The difference between an Infused and an Acquisit being no other but only in respect of the Efficient Thus the Knowledge of divers Tongues and the Ability to speak them which was in some of the Apostles by immediate Infusion was an Infused Habit whereas in others as in Paul it was Acquisite differing from the other not in Form but in the Efficient A Habit therefore whether Infused or Acquisite being but a Facilitation of the Faculty cannot be a Thing distinct from that Faculty but only a Modus of it which hath not in it selfe a Positive Absolute Being of its own but is a Modification of another Being And its Physicall Being Existentia Rei must be the same with the Being of that which is thus Modificated For it is not ipsum Existens but Modus Existendi And this Manner of Existing hath not an Existence of its own distinct from the Existence of that which doth exist in this manner Yet its Formall and Metaphysicall Being is distinct Yea and its Physicall Existence such
hinders me from placing it in this is Because I allow not any reflex act of Willing in God besides that direct act of Working who is yet a most Free Agent For beside other reasons that if need were might be produced it stands not with Gods Simplicity to admit distinct acts in God whereof one should be the Object of another Now what strength there is in this to hinder the placing of Freedome in this Reflex act I propose to be considered rather then Affirm But I rather place the nature of the Wills Liberty in a Freedome from Servitude that it is not under the command of any Creature or a Naturall Determination of its own And therfore though it be free from such servitude as a Naturall agent or such as may be Forced is subject to yet it is not free from Gods Command Nor perhaps from the dictate of Reason neither Or if it be yet is not this its Freedome but its Weaknesse And this is not far distant from the received opinion which makes it consist in Indifferentiâ For the Will can agere vel non agere notwithstanding anything to the contrary from the Creature but it cannot agere vel non agere notwithstanding the Decree of God and therfore is not Free from that Determination And whereas other things are from God determined mediante causa secundâ the Will is Immediately determined a causa primâ And therefore what he cites out of Rutterfort That granting all things to be under an absolute Decree it is fond to aske Whether the Free Creature remain indifferent to doe or not to doe I willingly assent unto But you must consider withall that This Freedome neither the Angels have nor had Adam in his Innocencie And therefore when Divines tell us that by the Fall we have lost our Liberty or Freedome of Will in Spirituall things which yet we retain in Morall and Civill Actions I desire that they would more punctually set down What the Liberty is which we retain in Naturall things but want in Spirituall What Liberty that is which the Angels have and Man once had but hath now lost And not speak of such a Liberty as neither Man or Angel ever had nor is it possible for any Creature to have Nay not for God himselfe For God having once decreed cannot with his Truth revoke it nor is indifferent to execute it or not But as They say of Jupiter which make Him to be the Author of their Stoicall unavoidable Fate understanding it cum grano salis He once Commanded and ever after Obeyed There follows in the next place an Objection How it comes to passe if Faith and Knowledge be One that some who have more Knowledge have lesse Faith I need not recite his Lordships Answer I will only propose my own If there be meant a Physicall Identity whereby two Modi of the same Thing doe subsist by the subsistence of their common Subject it is not hard to determine For two Modifications of the same Thing may yet be independent of each other And therefore it is not requisite they should be both in the same measure or degree 2. If by Knowledge be meant an assent to Naturall truths and by Faith an assent to Supernaturall truths neither is here any difficulty For the Knowledge of one thing is not inconsistent with the Ignorance of another thing 3. â—f Knowledge and Faith be considered in relation to the same Object Spirituall truths or Saving truth and Faith be taken for an Intellectuall assent to them Then is it not true that there is in any if you speak adidâ—m more Knowledge and lesse Faith what any Knows to be Thus he cannot Beleeve to be Otherwise For the Understanding is not a Free faculty that it can either Accept or Reject a reveiled Truth 4. If by Faith be meant not an Assent in the Vnderstanding to the Truth Known but a Consent in the Will an imbracing of it which is the Iustifying act of Faith Neither is this difficulty much greater then the former For the too too frequent sinnes even in Gods children against light makes it over manifest That the Action of the Will doth not always follow the Knowledge of the Understanding And yet if this too cleare experience be not able to prove it but that you still lay all the blame upon the Understanding as not being cleare enough in its Apprehensions or not sufficiently Peremptory in its Dictates and so excuse the Will of all Remissenesse I demand then what disability there is in the Will of Man since the fall more then in the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven I cannot think but that the Image of God by the Fall is defaced in the Will as well as in the Understanding and yet if the Will doe never disobey the Light of Reason which is its sole immediate Guide I see not wherein this disability doth appear I grant that the Will doth always Follow the Understanding that is it never goes before it or without it it goes never but where the Understanding hath led the way in discovering some Good more or lesse something Desirable For the Will is Caeca potentia and Knows of nothing desirable but what the Understanding discovers And Knowing nothing can Desire nothing Ignoti nulla Cupido But yet I grant not that Proposition in this sense The will Allwayes follows the Understanding that is It never stays behind For to Omit what the Understanding commands requires not a discovery of some other Good but only an Impotency a Backwardnesse or Remisnesse to doe its Duty To goe without direction requires a Positive Cause because it is a Positive Act But Not to goe when it is directed may proceed from a Negative Cause Negatio Causae because it is a Negative Act or a Not-doing A lame man doth not runne when he knows that he ought to runne yet here is no need of a Positive Cause to stay him but his Impotency a Negative cause sufficeth And thus farre do I admit that distinction of Libertas Contrarietatis and Libertas Contradictionis though in that way in which it is ordinarily made use of I doe wholly reject it There is not in the Will an Indifferency to choose Good or to choose Evill neither yet to Choose good or Reject good velle nolle both which they call Libertas Contrietatis For the Understanding doth not shew any Amiablenesse or Lovelynesse in Evill nor any Odiousnesse in Good quatenus sic and therefore the Will cannot Desire Evill nor Reject Good Nolle or Velle non For Bonitas is Objectum formale Appetitûs and Malum is the formall Object of Nolition Now the Soule cannot velle quatenus bonum that in which no Good is apprehended nor nolle quatenus malum that is velle ut non sit that wherein it apprehends no Evill But for the other kinde of Indifferency which they call Libertas Contradictionis to Will good or Not Will it to Nill Evill or Not to Nill it
Dignity and Nature But under his Lordships favour I conceive that the Act is first neither in Order in Dignity nor in Nature The Cause is before the Effect in Excellency because Causa aequivoca est Nobilior Effecto for nothing can produce an Effect more noble then it selfe 2 In Nature Causa est prior Effecto For that is defined to be Naturâ prius A quâ— non redit essendi consequutio Now I demand Whether of these two may be without the Other The Act or the Power And 3 in Order For he speaks I suppose either of the Order of Production or the Order of Intention If he speak of the first The Order of Production is Ordo naturae Generantis and so that which is first in Nature must be also first in Order If he speak of the Order of Intention then the End if it be the Sole end may seem to be preferred before the means But this is a Morall Excellency and a Morall Order not a Naturall or Physicall Excellency such as we are now speaking of But I demand withall Whether Action be the sole End of the Soule that is Whether the Soule in its Essence might not be produced either for its Own Excellency or for the Excellency of some Other end beside the Excellency of its Operation or Actus Secundus And if so then can it not be concluded That even its Morall Excellency in genere Finis is inferiour to the Excellency of its Operation But his Lordship admits not at all of this distinction between actus primus and actus secundus so as that actus primus should be the Being or Substance and actus secundus the Product But why They forget saith he that Omnis Virtus consistit in Actione Nay we Forget it not but we Deny it For if you speak of Morall Virtue est virtus tacuisse c. but To hold ones peace is no Action If he speak of Physicall Virtue or Excellency of naturall Perfection then doe I deny that all Naturall Excâ—llency consists in Action for the Essence it selfe is Bonum Physicum But if he speak of Physicall Efficiency then I grant that Virtus Efficientis or Efficientis Efficientia consistit in Actione The Efficacy or Efficiency of a Thing consists in its Operation But what then May not an Essence Be without Action because it cannot Act without Action Must its Essence be Action because its Efficacy is Action In ordinary Philosophy operatio Sequitur esse Operation Proceeds from the Essence and not Constitutes it But saith he What is this their Actus primus What is the Form of it I have said It s Own Essence It is It selfe its Own Form and the Form or Essence of the Soule We must not enquire for the Essence of an Essence nor for the Essence of a thing out of It selfe What is with them the Form of a Reasonable Soule Is it not Reason Yes it is And this Reason iâ— not Potentia Ratiocinandi But Ratio he meaneth I suppose Ratiocinatio rather then Ratio for Ratio and Potentia ratiocinandi are all one For if you distinguish between the Act and the Power the Act must ever be first in Order Dignity and Nature But this I grant not So then what is the Form of this primus Actus is it not some Act Yes but not an Action or Operation If it be then must it exist else you allow it but a bare Notionall Being And if it exist muâ—t it not be that which you call actus secundus I answer It is Actus aliquid actu but not an Action It Exists also and yet is not Actus Secundus but the Form from whence actus secundus flows He proceeds If it be not an Act or action then is it nothing else but a Power or Faculty depending upon somewhat else viz upon the Soule and if this be the nature of the First what shall the second Being which is its Effect and so Lower be but a Notion Yet he said even now that the Act is before the Power in Order Dignity and Nature and yet the Act is the Power'â— Effect How then â—oth he now affirm that the Effect is somewhat Lower then the First Being I answer It is not an Action neither yet is it a Distinct dependent Faculty if we make the Soule and the Faculâ—y to be the same but the Souls Essence But yet though we should admit Reason to be a distinct Faculâ—y as sâ—me doe and so not to be the Soules actus primus but actus afficiens Yet doth it not follow that the Operation must be onely a Notion Heavinesse is not the Stones Essence but an Accidentall Form a Power or Faculty of Gravitation yet is not its Descension onely Imaginary but Reall Heat in water is not its Essence but a separablâ— Accident yet its Calefaction it Heating or Scalding is not meerly Notionall but Reall So might it be here there may be notwithstanding this Argument a Faculty or Accidentall Form in the Soule which may be an Actus Primus in respect of its Operations though noâ— actus primoprimuâ— which is the Soules â—ssence from whence those Operations or Actus Secundi may proceed which yeâ— might be Reall and not Imaginary â—â— he had as he speaks set that distinction of Substance and Accident which he seems to challenge as an aged Imposture upon the Rack I would willingly have examined its forc'd confession â—â— the mean time I see not from what ground â—e can strongly conclude That this Activity as he speaks this Actus primus consists in Action or That It and actus secundus are the sâ—me and both One with Truth You will ask me What distinction therefore will I allow between actus primus and secundus between the Agent and its Action I answer The One is Res the Other is Modus and so the distinction is Modall Neither more nor lesse distinction will I admit of And so doing I dissent not from the Opinion of others For as I remember Suarez not to instance in others makes Action to be a Modus And though he make a Transient Action to be Modus Patientis in which I assent not to him yet an Immanent Act such as are Rationall Operations is with Him Modus Agentis CHAP. XI Whether Time and Place be onely Imaginary IN the next Chapter we are called to consider of the nature of Time and Place which his Lordship occasionally falls upon by reason of an Obiection That lays so strong a siege to his Opinion that I doubt hiâ— Lordships Answer will hardly raise it It ariseth from hence There aâ—e in the Soule various Operations and Workings distinct in Time and distinct in Place which Distinction though it may have an externall denomination in respect of Time and Place yet ariseth not from thence but is Internall or Intrinsecall to the Operations themseâ—ves This Operation is not the Other and the Other is not This. And thiâ— distinction would remain though the distinct Operations
whether Appearing and not-Appearing be a Reall or onely Imaginary difference If a Reall difference then will there be somewhat Reall Then which is not Now and consequently all Reality will not be Simultaneous there will be somewhat Reall afterwards which before was not If Appearing be onely Imaginary what shall I have to help my knowledge Then which I have not Now Ans 2. If you say Things Future are both now Present we Know them so to be but do not Seem to know them or Seem not to Know them Repl. Then I reply as before If we Shall Seem to know them we Doe Seem to know them because Then and Now are all one So that if Succession of Time be only Imaginary Then do we already know whatsoever we shall know whereas Christ himselfe Increased in wisdom Luk. 2. And the Fore-Knowledge of things to come would not be such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as might distinguish between the True and False Gods And thus if I mistake not I have sufficiently shewed though much more might have been added that there is a Reall Succession a Reall Priority of Duration and not onely Imaginary And therefore notwithstanding his first answer the Soule must really cease to Be when it ceaseth to Work or to work Truth if these Workings of truth be the Soules Essence And the soule must be during that Cessation or Errour as truly Non Ens as before its first Production for the precedent and subsequent workings cannot Then give it an Existence as not Then being His second answer to the Objection propounded in the beginning of this Chapter toucheth not at all the first Branch of it wherein it is objected That if particular Actings of Truth be Truth or the Soules Essence How is it that the Understanding should not cease to Be when it ceaseth to Work for this in his first Answer he seemed to grant But it is applyed to the second Branch of it viz. That If particular Actings of Truth be Truth or the Soules Essence then the Soule entertaining a False position should be no more it selfe To which he answers By denying that the Soule doth at all act upon Falshood and that upon this ground Because Falshood is not a Reall Being upon which the Soule can work For its nature being Privative and no Reall Being how can the Soule or Truth work upon Nothing I might answer here That it is not requisite to the Soules Act that its Object should have a Reall being As appears by the Soules apprehending Ens rationis which Apprehension is a positive Act and yet hath no Reall Object For the Object of Intellection is not Reale but Cognoscibile And therefore That Falshood wanteth a reall being is not inough to shew that the Understanding cannot work upon it And this in effect he granteth soon after For it being Objected that the Soule while it pronounceth a False position doth Really act verè agere He replyes That there are in this Action two things a Thinking and a So-thinking To think is a positive Action a good Action But the formalis ratio of So-thinking lyeth in Thinking an Errour which is Nothing and so a Not-thinking When mistaking a man catcheth at a shadow In catching he doth truly Act But to Catch a Shaddow is to catch nothing Now to catch nothing and not to catch to act nothing and not to act is all one So to Think is Reall but to Think Amisse is Nothing and all one with Not-thinking He grants therefore that the Soule pronouncing or Understanding a False position or thinking Amisse doth really Think really Act Now I ask while it doth really Think What doth it think What doth it Act or Vpon what rather Certainly it must either be Falshood or Noâ—hing For what else it should be neither doth his Lordship shew nor can I imagine If it Act upon Falshood the false position then may Falshood be the Object of a Reall act If it act upon Nothing then what hinders but that Falshood although it be Nothing may yet be the Object of this Act Object But he will say If the Soule do act upon Falshood then must it become Falshood that is a Vanity a Ly a Nothing For I conceive â—aith he the Agent it selfe together with the Subject acted upon the Object to be One in the Act. Ansâ— But this supposition must I deny For if so Then when the Soule acteth upon God by Knowing Loving c then doth it become God And if so why doth his Lordship at the end of his Preamble blame those for mounting too high who confounding the Creator with the Creature make her to be God But for the better clearing of this whole discourse concerning Falshood and Errour in the Souls working I shall desire you to take notice of a Distinction which all Know and yet but few Think of when they have occasion to use it The non attendency whereof hath produced much Obscurity much Errour and inextricable perplexities concerning this and the like Subjects It is to distinguish between Verum Metaphysicum and Verum Logicum between Bonum Metaphysicum and Bonum Morale To distinguish I say Metaphysicall Truth and Goodnesse from Morall and Logicall Goodnesse and Truth To distinguish the Truth of Being from the Truth of a Proposition the Goodnesse of Being from the Goodnesse of an Action Now this being premised let us examine the truth of some Tenents which are allmost generally received by all 1 The nature of Evill say they is Privative not Positive Evill is Nothing And why Because Ens Bonum convertuntur and therefore Malum must needs be Non-Ens now Non-Ens is Nothing Be it so Evill is Nothing But what Evill do they mean Evill in Metaphysicks or Evill in Ethicks Goodnesse in Metaphysicks is no other thâ—n Entity for none ever acknowledged a greater distinction between Ens Bonum then a distinction of Reason and therefore Malum in Metaphysicks must be Non Ens. But will they say that Morall Evill is so too If they do then must they say also that bonum Morale is convertible with Ens otherwise their Argument will not hold that All Being is Honesty or Morall Goodnesse and all Morall Goodnesse is Being or Entity I ask therefore whether morall Goodnesse or Honesty â—e the Essence the Entity of a Stone If not then is not every Being Bonum Morale I ask again Whether Silence be not Morally Good at such a time as when a man ought to hold his peace Yet to â— Silent or not to speak hath no Metaphysicall goodnesse no goodnesse of Being for it is a meeâ— Negation There may be therefore Morall goodnesse where there is no Metaphysicall goodnesse no positive Being and there may be Metaphysicall goodnesse goodnesse of Being without Morall goodnesse or Goodnesse of Honesty Now if Malum Metaphysicum a Negation a Non-Ens may be Bonum Morale what shall be the Malum Morale opposite to this Bonum shall that be also a Non-Enâ—â— If it
in Man is that Ray of the Divine Nature enlivening the Creature or making it Rationall whereby it is conformed to the Creator who is the Primitive Light or Fountain of Knowledge Now that which doth thus enform Animal Rationale enlivening it or making it Rationall is Reason And therefore Reason which he calls Truth is the same with the Understanding But this if I mistake not none will deny for Reason and the Understanding-faculty are all one Ratio and facuitas Ratiocinandi is the same 'T is true they say sometimes that Reason is in the Understanding or that the Understanding is indued with Reason But then by Vnderstanding they doe not mean the Understanding-Faculty but the Soule it selfe quatenus intelligens And so this proposition Intellectus est Subjectum Rationis is the same with this Anima intelligens est Subjectum Intellectûs Anima Intellectus and Ratio are not Three Arg. 2. Chap. 2 3 4. His second Argument to prove it is drawn from hence That there is required to the constitution of every Being an Essence received a Fountain imparting and a Channel receiving The which Channel or Recipient must be the same with the Essence received because every thing is the Recipient of its own Essence nothing can receive the Essence of a Stone but by being a Stone for to be Stone and to have the Essence of a Stone is all one Therefore the Understanding being the Recipient of Truth must needs be Truth that is Reason Propositio 2. Chap. 5. Which Truth or Reason Whether it be in the Understanding or be the Understanding yet it cannot make the Soule to be Rationall unlesse it be also in the Soule For how can Reason make the Soule Reasonable if it be not in â—t but in somewhat else And if it be in the Soule then must iâ— be the Soule Because to be in the Soule and to be the Soule iâ— all one every thing being its own Recipienâ— Thus Truth or Light of Reason will be the same with the Understanding And both That and This the same with the Soule But I hope his Lordship will not deny but that there is another kind of Receiving beside that Receiving that he speaks of They tell us in Logick of â—cto modi habendi and there are as many manners of Receiving as there are of Having To receive the Essence of a Man and to be a Man is all one To have the Essence of Money and to be Money is all one But yet I hope a Man may receive Money without being coined and made Money To receive the Essence of Water and to be made Water to receive the Essence of a Vessell and to be a Vessell is all one yet a Vessell may contein Water without being made Water Thus a Substance may receive an Accident a Subject may receive a Form without being made that Accident that Form Thus datur Animae esse Animam datur Rationi esse Rationem each being its own Recipient But withall datur Animae Habere Rationem though the Soule be not Reason nor Reason in this sense its own Recipient If there be any strength in this Argument it lies in this That if Reason or Truth be only in the Soule as an Accident and not the Soules Essence then it cannot make an Essentiall Difference between the Rationall and Irrationall Soule And to this we must answer if we maintain Reason and the rest of the Faculties to be distinct from â—he Soul That it is not the Faculties it is not Reason that makes the Essentiall Difference but the Substance or Essence of the Soule from whence these Faculties proceed as Essentiall Consequents Like as it is not Heat and Cold and the rest of the primae Qualitates which make the Essentiall difference between one Element and another but that Essence or Form from whence these Qualities doe proceed Corollarium 1. Chap. 6. From hence he proceeds to a further Corollary That not only the Soule but All things else are also the same with Truth But why so Because every thing is its own Recipient If it be it doth not follow that every thing is the Recipient of Truth If every thing be the Recipient of its own Essence must therfore this Essence needs be Truth If his Lordship had well considered that Truth as he hath formerly spoken of it is but the same with that which others call Reason he would scarce have made this Consequence unlesse he could think to perswade us that all things whatsoever are Reasonable Creatures There is therefore too great an hiatus to make this proposition a Corollary of the former But indeed his Lordship is by this time fallen off from his former acceptation of Truth For having as he supposeth proved Reason to be the Soules Essence the Soules Entity he begins to take that word which formerly signified Reason to signify Entity or Being So that Truth now must be the same with Entitas And the Emphasis of this last assertion lies in this not that the Essence of all things is Truth or Entity for that were no great news but that the Essence of all things is this One Truth meaning that all Entity is Homogeneall and of the same nature He was proving before that Truth or Reason was the same thing with the Soule He hence infers not that all things are the same thing for I cannot understand him to speak so harshly as that one drop of water were the same drop with another drop of water though Homogeneall that the Soule of Peter is the Soule of Judas though of the same Species but that they are alike things or things of the same nature The Consequence that all things must be of the same Species because the Soule and its Faculties are the same Thing will not hold The thing it selfe hath only this ground so farre as I can discover Because all Being proceeding from God who is in his actions Uniform must therfore be Alike For the same Agent acting in the same Manner cannot but produce like Effects But this Uniformity in God ' is Equivalent to an infinite Variety and God can by one act in it selfe simple produce effects variously distinct And if his Lordship grant that this Uniformity hinders not but that God may produce various Shapes I see not why he may not produce various Species Corollarium 2. Chap. 7. But from hence he draws a further consequent He is not contented to say that the nature of all things is One but that it is Vnity And heer is as great an hiatus as the former The Essence of all Soules is One and the same but that this One Essence is Unity I have not formerly heard nor doe yet beleeve And I am so farre from thinking that Vnity is the Essence of All things that I esteeme it selfe to be Nothing Unity is but a Negative term a Negation Vnus indeed as it is opposite to Nullus is positive and is the same with Nonnullus or Aliquis But Vnus