fraudes holy salsehoods and religious untruth stood the Church of Rome c. And he concludes that wee ought to examine whether this policy worke not at least in the beginning till a discovery of their falsehoods is made and the people is undeceived the same effects in a civill State whether there are not such things as fraudes pretended to be Reipublicae salutares Here you have his apostasie you may see how suddainly he hath declined the truth for he is revolted againe into his pretences deceipts and falsehoods And I wish from my very heart that these had no greater influence upon the Actions of this man and such as he is than they have upon the proceedings of Parliament and then I am confident our sad Divisions and distractions would not be long lived I but then the Observator sayes It cannot be by force because they have no army visible A thing is said in law to be done by force not onely when men actually suffer if they make use of their liberty and refuse to satisfie the passion and humours of some but then also when they have just grounds of feare for this workes on the minde as strongly as the other on the body I but with the Authors favour this must be such a feare as may possesse a generous and setled spirit not every idle Phantasme or Chymaera such as they use to bugbearâ—… Children withall It remaines then we examine whether the names of many Gentlemen were not openly read in tumults I marry Sir here is onâ—… of the imaginary Spiriâ—…s that hath thus forced the understanding and reason of these men Doubtlâ—…sse this is not a sufficient ground of feare were it true which I much question to a resolved and setled judgement neither doth the law tâ—…ke hold of any such feare as thiâ—… is I but then he goes on whether that they were not poasted with directions to thâ—…ir perticular lodgings I here you have another of these Hobgoblins and deformed Images more fit to fray children with than men Because if that were true they were directed to their Chambers and never intended as the event cleares it to approach them therefore they complied or were silent and so that faction prevailed I but he goes yet further whether the way to the House were not set with clamarous multitudes that they must passe through the middest of them whilâ—…st they insorme them what is fit to be voted and inquire after their names and what side they take This is like indeed to carry the visage of truth with it May not men who are part of the collective body of the Common-wealth whom the Parliament represents considering that sua res agitur it is their bâ—…sinesse that is there transacted have recourse thi her with a full desire onely to be informed of the proceedings of Parliament and how thingâ—… succeed for their good but they must be branded with those ignominious stiles of unlawfull Assâ—…mblies and clamorous multitudes For their inquiring what their names were and which sâ—…de they tooke certainely 〈◊〉 they may do without 〈◊〉 and that can be no cause to make me dread a man because he knowes my name No nor his being privy to my actions nei 〈◊〉 if I am conscious to my self that they are such as are just and honourable â—…nd for their informing of them of what was fit to be voted that is as like to be true as that they shoâ—…ld vote what they had informed them For the other two of absence and accident he sayes they may be reduced to this I t is no wondâ—…r many stay away since they must be absent even whilest thâ—…y are there If their wills were absent by being a verse from the publique good whose fault was it that they stood Cyphers better in such case their rome than their company The Parliament requests of the King that all great Officers of State by whom pâ—…blique affaires shâ—…ll be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…e chosen by 〈◊〉 or nomination of the great Counsell Could the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for him c. if all Parliaments were not taken as deadly enemies to 〈◊〉 Is that the â—…eason why each man preserves his owne right bâ—…cause he takes all the rest of mankinde for deadly enemies No but had I not a strong 〈◊〉 of such mens faith and loyaltie I should not upon just occasion 〈◊〉 to intrust my right with them I but can he with honour 〈◊〉 himselfe unfit to manage that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the law hath commuted to him 〈◊〉 not a disavowing of his owne ability to be ruled by the 〈◊〉 of his great Counsell the Parliament one may manâ—…ge a trust well and yet no dishoâ—…â—…hat a whole Kingdom may doâ—… it better With equall reason sayes he they may challenge to themselves the 〈◊〉 of all Bishops 〈◊〉 Sherâ—…ffes 〈◊〉 c. and dispose of all the preserments of England For thâ—… Bishops thouâ—…h our sad experience at this day doth informe us that they have been very bad yet we shall not speak of what necessity it might be that they likewise should be nominated by the great counsell for that it is boubtfull whether ever they shall come in nomination again For the Ministers likewise I shall leave them to the choyce and free elections of their Patrons But now for the Sheriffes Justices and other inferiour Officers of the law I must 〈◊〉 I much wonder how those can be brought within the ranke and order of great officers of State neither can there be the like reason possibly rendred for the nominating of these as for the other for though they may be corrupt in their way yet that is a prejudice only to some particular interests no danger to the publike The truth of it is this Kingdome hath and doth still suffer under the heaâ—… pressures of ill 〈◊〉 and Officers of Staâ—…e who instead of defending and propagating the good of the publike have and do most vilely and traiterously-corrode and gnaw out the very bowels of it Was not then their reqâ—…st and proposall very reasonable and safe both for King and people that they might nominate such of that known and publike trust and confidence who by their sedulous care honest and direct counsell and which is above all by their true and unfained zeale and affection to the common wealth might prevent the like distractions and miseries for the future But to passe this had his 〈◊〉 beene graciously pleased for to hearken and comply with this advise of the Parliament the greater had been his honour in that certaine pledge of continued happinesse and security to hâ—…s people If the King 〈◊〉 such a man Treasurer or Keeper out of his owne good liking only or upon recommendation of such a 〈◊〉 here 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 of no power but if it be upon the recommendation of the whole Kingdome in Parliament who in all probability can judge better and are more concerned this is an emptying himselfe of Majestie and 〈◊〉 himselfe of
hath a right of dissenting Confest out Author thinks hee hath here got a great advantage of us out of our owne confession why was it ever denyed that the Kings consent wâ—…s not necessary to the making of new lawes or to the altering or 〈◊〉 of the old Nay hath it not beâ—…ne agreed that his assent is so essentially necessary in such cases that if he will dissent as hee may nothing can be donâ—… without him why then a fortiori he shall have a nâ—…gative power where the alteration of thâ—… forme of Government is propoundâ—…d But he must understand that this doth no-way derogate or detract from the right of the Parliament in declaring the common law of the land in certaine cases before them without his Majesties consent for that that is a power incident to this great Court as well as others inferiour and in such case the King hath no negative voyce â—…xcept both King and people Heâ—…e saith hee a power is given to the people collectively beyond the Lords Câ—…mmons and King If ever he make good this collection out of the Observators words I le râ—…nounce my understanding All that he 〈◊〉 to intimate unto us is but this that the changing of the auncient established forme of our Government is Casus omissus out of their Commission and therefore not to be accompliâ—…ed by them without the consent of both King and people 〈◊〉 doth not say that the Collective body may doe it without the consent of the 〈◊〉 Lords and Commons This happily might be a predominant power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 consent is necessary for the introducting of a new frame of Government Now how this should be a transferring of a power to the people collectively beyond the Lords Câ—…mmons and king I must confesse I apprehend not therefore the construction is either very forraigne or my capacitie extreame dull If the King be an affecter of true liberty he hath in Parliament a power as â—…xtensive as ever the Roman Dictators was for the preventing of publike dâ—…resses He saith that though the Romanes could not indure a King yet in effect they had the same thing for in any immiâ—…nt dangers necessitie of State forced them to chuse a Dictator which as he sayes had absolute power over them and to submit to his Authority which relieved them in their greatest extremities Hence he saith we may make the truest judgement what forme of Government the wisest Romanes esteemed most convenient And concludes that since they preferred the unbounded power of one to a popular sway we have no reason to change the much more happy temper of this Government c. May all the blessings of Heaven and Earth-inrich and incompasse his Royall Scepter May he for ever enjoy the utmost limit of his just and legall power And may this happy glo rious succesefull and never sufficiently to be encomiasted Government continue without the least interruption amongst us untill time hath spent its last period and brought a dissolution and finall conclusion on all things And I take him to be no true and faithfull member of the Common Wealth that will not say Amen If the Counsell of the Parliament were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Court were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation If the Councell of the Court were directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Parliament were evidently consonant thereunto there needed no such contestation That the Parliament and Court should be at varience t is no news there hath beene alwayes a secret enmity and antipathy bâ—…twixt them The Court never well digesting the happinesse and freedome os 〈◊〉 people nor they the oppression and publique disservice of the Court the one still contending for an absolutenesse of 〈◊〉 the other for the maintenance and desending of their liberty But I nâ—…ver heard before that the Counsell or advise of the Court was opposed to that of the Parliament or could any way ballance with that doubâ—…lesse they are not equâ—…ll competitors the Parliament represâ—…nt the publique and those counsellors themselves onely the one studies to augment the Common wealth the other their owne wherefore he is perfidious to himselfe and treacherous to hâ—…s countrey that can be so transported with words as to renounce the Parliament for my part I shall lay it down as one of the Articles of my beleife that the Counsell of â—…he Court is directly opposite to common understanding and good conscience and the Councell of the Parliament evidently consonant thereunto good cause then of contestation in defence of 〈◊〉 publike The Observator having laid it downe as a ground that 〈◊〉 câ—…nnot reasonably be supposed the greatest counsell of the Kingdome should not giâ—… the most faithfull advise adds thereâ—…ore Princes if they may not be lead by their owne opinions rather than by the sacred and awefull counsells of whole Nations unreasonably complaine they are denied liberty of conscience and 〈◊〉 out of their owne undeâ—…standings I appeale to any mans judgment whether any thing can be â—…ged for the authority of a Lay councell that it 〈◊〉 to inâ—…orce a submission of judgment and a performance of duties arising from trust agreable thereâ—…o which may not with at least equall advantages be pressed for the same binding power in councels Eccleciasticall And yet theâ—…e he saith it would go hard but a man would find some answer as easily he mighâ—… wherby to iustifie his liberty of dissenting in some things which he saies we may with very little alâ—…eraton apply to civill counsells I confeâ—…e this is a point more 〈◊〉 to be 〈◊〉 by a Divine than a Lawyer but t is 〈◊〉 frequent with me to trespasse upon another mans profession 〈◊〉 give me â—…ave a little that our Author may not passe uâ—…nswered to speake my 〈◊〉 in this perticular Now with the favour of the Author if my 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 me not there is a wide 〈◊〉 as to our case betweâ—…ne lay and 〈◊〉 Counsells For I take this for a â—…rtaine and cleare truth in dâ—…vinity 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 counsell whatsoever be it of never so great ability or eminency 〈◊〉 oblige the conscience of a man by their dicisions or determinations for thâ—…t the conscience of a man is if I may so speake out of their jurisdiction t is God alone that hath power over that Besides he that opposes the dictates of conscience sins against God The Apostle in the 14. to the Rom. Shewing how men ought not to contemn or condemn one another for things indifferent sayes in the 5. verse one man esteemeth one day above another another estâ—…emeth every day alike let every man be fully perswaded in his owne minde By this t is manifest I ought not to be guided by the conscience of other men Againe ver. 14 there is nothing saith he uncleane of it selfe but â—…o 〈◊〉 that
esteemeth any thing to be uncleane to him it is uncleane by this likewise it is cleare that what my conscience perswâ—…des mee is unlawfâ—…ll be the judgement of other men what it will ought not to be inforced upon mee Againe the last verse He that doubteth is damned if he eate because he eateth not of faith for whatsoever is not of faith is finne So that for my part I take it as an unquestionable â—…ruth that no Ecclesiasticall authority whatsoever hath power over a mans conscience though it be but in things indifferent But now on the other side I take it to be as evident and as 〈◊〉 an assertion that any Lay counsell may in 〈◊〉 meerely civill or morall no way reflecting upon the word of God oblige the conscience which indeed is but the bare opinion and judgement of a man by their conclusions and determinations and in such ease t is no sin for a man to oppose his owne reason by submission to the judgement of oâ—…hers And if this were not a truth Justice would be but slow payed and the law as various as the severall dispositions of men and every man would have power to infringe the law upon every 〈◊〉 of opposition to conscience 〈◊〉 but the Author goes on and tells us that though amongst probable Aâ—…guments that drawne 〈◊〉 the Authority of wise men carry with it greatest weight yet it must give place to a greater reasoâ—… T is â—…rue where the greater or better reason is evident but 〈◊〉 are not bound to renounce our owne understanding and to believe that to be the better reason which you affirme to be so The Parliament must in strength of probability give the better reason and when you can prove the contrary which as yet you fall much short of then shall we be of your beliefe untill then you must give us leave to retaine our owne Now to every man belongs a judgement of 〈◊〉 which must decide for what concernes his perticular duty T is true where he is sole Arbiter and where it coâ—…cernes his owne particular onely but where the publique is interested there it is otherwise So hee â—…aith in the Kings case The Votes which carry in them the authority of of both Houses shall beare great sway and is it be in things extreamely dubious they may turne the Scales of the other â—…ide This truth if firmely stood to as it ought would suddainely perâ—…d this sad contestation But alas how quickly t is broken For he saith if greater reason seeme to contradict them his Majesty will not hoodwinke his understanding and blindly â—…ollow whether they please to lead him he will walke by the greater light greater reason very much that the reason of the Court should preponderate that of the Parliament For example he saâ—…h 〈◊〉 Majestie perceiving how much his people may suster under arâ—… power is resolved never to make use of it and thâ—…nks it lesse fitting any other should I would to God hâ—…s Majestic had never been wrought upon by his evill Counsell to break his resolution Is it not an arbitrary way of rule for to takâ—… away mens property without their consâ—…nt And is iâ—… not arbitrary for the King to preâ—…e his owne single exâ—…udiciall judgement before that of his Parliaments But it is told him now the use of it will bee for their good by reason of appâ—…ent imminent dangers Hath the Author thus informed his Majestie certainly never any one else did it were happy both for King and people that it were no more practised by tâ—…e Court than it is by the Parliamenâ—… Concerning the Action at Hull the Observator agreeth to take possâ—…ssion of the Kings Towne and shuâ—… the gates against hâ—…m is treason if circumstances doe not vary the nature of the act as in this case he sayes thâ—…y doe for the first thing to be lookt on is that the King was meerely dâ—…ed enâ—…ance for that time his generall right was not denyed If then a subject take up 〈◊〉 against his Soveraigne in a tâ—…mporall warre it must not come 〈◊〉 the compasse of 〈◊〉 No whether it be temporary or coâ—…nuing so he hath the same Commission to justifie his action And he may legâ—…lly possesse 〈◊〉 of the Kings 〈◊〉 and maintaine them against him so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath no 〈◊〉 in them T is not his confessing that he hath no right for that all thâ—… world can judge of but his doing no wrong that excuses him No deâ—…ing language was given If a man take away my puâ—…se shall he be acquitted from â—…elony because he did not give mee ill language too Inventio tua nomen imponit operi 〈◊〉 t is the invention as we say in law that denominates the action And therefore though I cannot acquit him of felony that shall take away your purse and in exchange give you only good words yet if he shall rescue your purse out of the hands of Robbers or take it from your ownâ—… person being in danger for its better security and shall againe faithfully â—…ore it when you have liberty to enjoy your owne if he be felon 〈◊〉 dye for him No act of violence was used This he may say who hath picked anothers pocket but it is no sufficient plea against the Law Yes if he can shew a lawfull commission for it 〈◊〉 he used no violence though the King for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 together did stand within Musket sâ—…t c. It is no argument of innocence that he had 〈◊〉 to be more highly guilty and abstained T is true had he beene guilty at all The King used termes of desyance c. and this makes the Act mâ—…ely desensive or rather passive If this were true there was never any warre but defensive For those who by some great injustice oâ—…ed provoke a nation to right it sâ—…e fight aswell to maintaine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as what they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tâ—… 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that offer any injustice or wrong though they take up aâ—…mes to secure themselves 〈◊〉 on the offensive pâ—…t nâ—…t the defensive But this rests to prove in our case How 〈◊〉 should 〈◊〉 to the King any grounds to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Yorke many men wonâ—… or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 seeme the same 〈◊〉 to the King as if he had beene pursued to the gates 〈◊〉 â—…ke Certainly it was a 〈◊〉 ground not only to raise a guard for his safety but an Armie to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aâ—…d to right his 〈◊〉 A 〈◊〉 for his safety why Sir 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 did not advance towards York nor ever〈◊〉 â—…sed it An army to punish thâ—…t hâ—…gh indignity Very just it should be sâ—… had there beene 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to right his 〈◊〉 veâ—…y reasonable had his Maâ—…esty been any way dishonoured 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Townesmen out of their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 be a 〈◊〉 who acts only by their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
as now or an unexpected interposing providence as in case of the Gunpowder ploâ—… may prevent the blow shall we therefore conclude it was never oflâ—…red It would more abundantly have satisfied me if I had beene frighted with secret plots and 〈◊〉 designes Douâ—…tlesse those whome apparent and visible dangers will not frighten secret and concealed cannot The King might have prevented the same repulse by sendâ—…ng of a messenger before hand That is if he had not come to gâ—…t in he had not bâ—…ene shut out if he would have stayed away he would not have denyed hâ—…m entrance A very apt conclusion and it had bâ—…ene happy his Majestie had found so good advise as to have saved hiâ—… labour Or by comming without any such considerable forces Let his forces be great he was not to give law to his Prince No nor any privie Counsell to the Parliamâ—…nt Bâ—…t nâ—…ither is it likely â—…ee would have â—…ave admitted him then for you 〈◊〉 a litâ—…le above 〈◊〉 offered to enter with twenâ—…y Horse only unarmed Whether his Maâ—…esty mâ—…de any such profer or no I know not nor is iâ—… materiall for t was not the paucitie of number th t could excuse his breach of trust The Scots in England tooke Newcastle but by private authority yet there wâ—…re other qualifications in that act sufficient to purge it of Treason The king and Parliament deserved so much respect from you as not to have instanced so frequently in their Act you might well let that passe in silence which they have buried in an act of Oâ—…livion T is no wrong either to King or Parliament for a man to say that is no treason which they have adjudged not to be so Neither is that act of theirs so to be buriâ—…d in utter silence as not to acquit and discharge us if we can plead the same innocency Then the Observator instances at large in the example of â—…dward the second misted by 〈◊〉 It doth not â—…llow because one king hath hearkned to evill Counsâ—…ll therefore all must be denyed the liberty to hearken to good That is true but it doth clearely demonstrate thus much that oâ—…hers may be misled as well as he and when a Parliament shall declare as now that the King is misled by evill Counsell t is not your bâ—…re 〈◊〉 that can make good the contrary 〈◊〉 pâ—…tie was but of inconsiderable fortunes He will get no advantage by putting mens estates into the scales and ballancing their râ—…putations What odds may be gained in point of estate I know not though I am 〈◊〉 there will be nothing lost But without controversie their reputations cannot be very good whose cause and counsell is so bad An Aristocracy in Parliament cannot be erected withâ—…ut some meanes and what this meanes shall be is yet to us altogether inscrutable Certainly he is quicker sighted than not to perceive what is so obvious deny the King a negative and the thing is done Had the Parliament as in truth they never did denyed the King a negative yet the Author who pretends to be so quick sighted would find it a matter of greater weight and difficulty than to be so easie compassed and effected The power of the Parliaments is but derivative and depending upon publike consent and how publike consent should be gained for the erection of a new unlawfull odious tyranny a mongst us is not disceâ—…able It is not thought this was the intent of those that intrusted them but it may be the abuse of power if the Kings authority be once swallowed up in theirs for though their power depend upon a publike consent in the election yet not so after they are met together If the power of Parliament be meerely derivative as it cannot bee denyed and that not absolute and illimitâ—…d but qualified and circumscribed as it must bee agreed why then the consequence is very just that where they doe exceed that power this doth not â—…gage the consent and obedience of the people why then without â—…e shall allow that the peoples vote and consent may be had which is so far from improbable that it is almost impossible we may here judge what an idle fancie and vaine dreame this is of their labouring to introduct an Aristocracy He sayes that He believes they would not be able to goe through in that new way But yet they must needs have a great party considering their severall relations and the advantage they have in advancing the interests whether religious or civill of some which may be able to doe them service and this would create division in the Kingdome Our Author must vent his contumacious and opprobrious conceipts against the Parliament though they be a contradiction to his owne reason What are their severall relations compared with the publike or what advantage can thâ—…r power of preferment yeeld them since but few can attaine to that in the ingaging of a whole Kingdome to erect so unlawfull and oidous a tyranny His Majesty expresses his indignation that they should dare to tell their King they may without want of modesty or duty depose him To which the Observator answers This cannot bee collected from these words That if they should make the highest presidents of other Parliaments their patterne there would be no cause to complaine of want of modestie and duty because sayes he it may justly be denyed that free Parliaments did ever truly consent to the deposing of any king of England What was there asfirmed of Parliaments had none of his present restriction of free in it What though it had not any candid and ingenious reader would supply it by a faire intendment we ought not to stand upon our captions with the Parliament whose words and actions ought if we will be guided by the rule of law to receive the most honourable and favourable construction of us Whâ—…refore we ought not so critically and unjustly to imagine when they doe generally mention the highest presidents of other Parliaments that they doe include forced parliaments because as they well know these are not presidents for free Parliaments to bee guided by And doe they not by their Declaration dated the second of November 1642. which I make no question the Author had a view of before the publishing of his booke say that in that Declaration to which this objection refers they delivered that they did never so much as suffer this to enter into their thoughts And further that some presidents were such as that they ought not to be rules for them to follow which very reasonably and probably might intend those of deposing Kings How dare then the Author though not expresly yet tacitly accuse the Parliament of being guilty of the maintaining that position contrary to their owne publike profession and vindication But I passe itover and leave him to his just censure He sayes that the King is offended