had all Circumstances considered that is rashness or temerity in Judging and when it is on the worst side to condemn any Person it is now usually called rash Censure Of the first of these there is no Degrees or Differences but it is perpetually in all Persons at all times forbidden For if there appear no Reason at all to us why we should judg one or t'other way we are to suspend our Judgment That which is usually exprest by saying we do not know we cannot tell it may or it may not be so indeed if we apprehend the possibility but whether it be or be not we are Ignorant In our Judgments concerning some things we may sometimes follow our Inclinations both without and contrary to some smaller Reasons but then they must be very strong such as are natural and born with us and which we cannot oppress or hinder by our wills though we would and we do not find they proceed from any Insincerity any secret desire or inclination to gratifie any Lust but that we are possest with a serious and upright unmixed desire to know the truth in order to Goodness And this indeed seems to be a sign of great reason for that Judgment viz. Of this inclination being Impressed by God and consequently he being Good that it is true and useful Such are Mens strong inclinations notwithstanding all appearance of reason though but such and and real deceits to the contrary which may be brought by Cavilling men to believe God's Existence his Justice to punish and reward Immortality of Souls distinction of Actions right and wrong universal Goodness our great perfection and ultimate Self-love contrary to the truth of our Senses c. these God hath anticipated us withal But in our Judgments concerning Persons no such inclination is to be followed by no means which notwithstanding is extraordinary frequent but always from some secret passion of hatred displeasure against the Person not for any reason but some bodily temper which is called Antipathy and oft-times past offences c. Of the other viz. Judging without sufficient reason there is variety that which may be sufficient reason to one Man or at one time in one thing may not be to another One Man may be more capable and able to examine a thing further than another and yet both may be ought to pass their Judgment As if one Friend should for very good ends ask the judgment of some other concerning the Qualities or Actions of a third So sometimes the time for Deliberation or Information may be necessarily shorter in one affair than in another and yet the Judgment is then to be passed too and not neglected And so the Judgment concerning one thing of less moment and yet enough to deserve and require our Opinion too may be with less reason or probability than another of greater Importance And here this rash Judgment is not to be allowed on either side as well to the advantage as disadvantage of the Person concerning his good or his ill-qualities or actions We are not to judg Men better than they are as well as not worse and consequently falsly and foolishly admire and approve of what they say or do without reason only because we will and as we say we imagine so not with that sufficient Reason as we ought to have Though the extream of Judging Men rashly better than they are being less frequent or hurtful I suppose the other is here principally intended viz. The Judging Men rashly worse than they are and censuring them This Imperfection very often proceeds from Ultimate and therefore Inordinate Self-pleasing our selves by meer Activity of this kind We must be passing Judgment of every thing we see or that appears to us and as soon and as fast as may be we cannot stay so long as to call to mind or examine Reasons This is too troublesome to most and would spoil the pleasure of it Oft-times Men make it their Diversion but imprudently chosen to be at any rate wantonly Judging and Discoursing of Persons in general Oftentimes also the Cause or Principle is Self-pleasing again by the exercise and sense of our ability and sufficiency of Wit or Understanding we much pleasing our selves that we can observe what others do and judg and discern whether they are good or bad do well or ill especially what the most considerable Men do and here most because it is a sign of a greater Comparative ability that we see Imperfections and Defects even in the Wiser and Better sort of Men which they do not as we think see in themselves The first of these Causes is more ordinary the second in those most often who really are of considerable ability These are more innocent Causes as not arguing so much of Self-Love in opposition to the good of others or to Charity as the other of Malice Hatred Revenge Pride Affectation of Superiority and thence secret Envy which are but too frequent Sect. IV. 4. The Fourth thing forbidden is false Judgment which although it may be more hurtful in effect yet it may be and often is more innocent in the principle or end than the former For a Man may often judg false and out of Charity and Duty too and with as sufficient reason as he could find or observe But yet a Man having first seen he may or ought to pass his Judgment ought to adhibit the greatest care that it be true This is a great instance of Justice which as every Man at all times is bound to so then especially when he undertakes to be a Judg. The most general Instances of rash and false Judgment concerning Persons Qualities and Actions and perhaps which comprehend all others are these 1. When we Judg imperfections defects faults of any kind or sort to be in Men when they are not 2. When we Judg those to be much greater imperfections than indeed they are compared with others we mistake in the quality The first again is First Either when we judg Imperfections to be in Men one or more when either there is none or not so many When we mistake in respect of the Number Secondly When we Judg more of that which is a greater Degree and a greater Constancy of these Imperfections which really are in the Persons to be in the Persons than there is we mistake in the Degree and in the Continuation or Duration And thus on the contrary also we often judg as rashly and falsly of our selves or any we favour or who are Friends to us We judg perfections and good qualities to be in our selves and them and more of these Perfections in number and them to be greater and more of each of them in Degree and Frequency or Constancy than indeed there is when all this is a mistake and oft a silly or wilful one and on the contrary judg ours and our Friends Imperfections and and their degrees of Intention and Frequency fewer and the Imperfections less than indeed they are and
of Velleius the Epecurean Lib. 1. de natura Deorum Quod vero sine corpore ullo vult Plato Deum esse ut Graeci dicunt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 id quale esse possit intelligi non potest careat enim sensu careat prudentia careat voluptate necesse est quae omnia Deorum notione comprehendimus i. e. Plato's Opinion That God hath no Body cannot be understood For then He must want Sense Prudence Pleasure which we comprehend in the notion of the Gods And again Quod si Omnium animantium formam vincit Hominis figura Deus autem animans est ea profecto figura est quae Pulcherrima sit Omnium Quoniamque Deos Beatissimos esse constat beatus autem esse sine virtute nemo potest nec Virtus sine ratione constare nec ratio usquam inesse nisi in hominis figurâ hominis esse speciè Deos confitendum est To this purpose That if Humane shape be better than that of any other Animal and God be an Animal then He must needs have the best and the most Beautiful And because God is a most happy Beeing and He cannot be Happy without Virtue nor have Virtue without Reason nor can Reason be any where but in a Humane shape therefore God is of that shape too So Cotta the Academick in his reply to Velleius Homini homine nihil Pulcrius videri blandam enim conciliatricem esse naturam lenam sui i. e. Man indeed thinks nothing more Beautiful than himself so Nature flatters it self Herodotus in his Clio relating that the Persians made no Statues nor Temples nor Altars to their Gods but that they counted them Fools who did so gives this Reason in his Opinion viz. Because they did not think the Gods to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sprung from Men and consequently I suppose not of their shape as the Greeks did Whether this Proneness to judg God like our selves out of Self-love use and custom of conceiving and judging hath been the cause of making Images and corporal Representations of God or something in God by Humane shape among Christians or no Yet I think there is but too much Reason to believe that the judging God like Mens-selves hath been but too much the effect of it especially among the Vulgar I am sure it hath a very great natural tendency thereto And the effect it is probable would have been much more if it had not been hindred by the Christian Doctrine which notwithstanding some have kept those in Ignorance of who have in this respect most need of it and especially by the Admonitions and just reproaches of those whom these Patrons of Images as fastuously as foolishly and falsly call Hereticks A custom and usage so sottish and childish that never any who had their Religion from the True God or who had any notion of His Spiritual and Infinite Nature either among Jews or Heathens pretended any sufficient reason for as the instruction of the Vulgar c. or did not contemn and deride it until some Christians in the times of the greatest Ignorance and Corruption of Manners within some few Hundreds of years introduced it into the Christian Church But to return from this Digression In Opinions and Perswasions Some even of the better natured Persons oft judg that Men cannot be of such a perswasion but out of some ill disposition of Will and such a particular one too viz. Self-interest that is it is for some designed good to themselves besides the being in the Truth so to be perswaded and this because they find themselves inclin'd thereto and if they were of such perswasions it would be from such Causes Not considering want of Information Ineptitude to apprehend things any other way but as they have been accustomed a great usage of themselves so to conceive and judg may be the causes of such really â—alse Opinions of theirs Nor do I see it a thing but very generally to be determined how far a true Lover of the Truth or an Honest-man in this particular may err and mistake Though I think too on the other hand very oft-times other Causes of false perswasions are alledged besides some naughty disposition of Will when it is not so or but in small measure and this alone hath the greatest Influence indeed Sect. XI 3. Too general a belief of every Testimony or Report whether in Talk or Books which proceeds oft-times again from meer actual Ignorance or Non-attention that most Reports are most-what very fallible signs of what 's true and sometimes none at all That there are much better Proofs of things sometimes from contrary Testimonies of better Persons sometimes from other things This proceeds also from love of Activity and Curiosity of Knowing and Judging some-what new and fresh and some-times from the worser Principles so often named All Testimonies are more or less signs of what 's true according as the Persons are more wise and knowing or more veracious willing and careful to say no more than they know Now how many Actions of Persons reported to be done with certain Circumstances and from certain Principles and Reasons by those who neither do nor can know any thing of them Or if they do yet through temerity rashness and precipitancy curiosity suspition envy flattery or some other disposition of Will do so either invent or change by adding or detracting or substituting that sometimes none at all most-what but little rarely very much of what they say is true and to be believed But yet what more ordinary than for Men to believe all without stick or scruple The further too still Reports go through the more Persons they pass they are still the more uncertain because still the more alteration and as it rarely happens for Persons who observe things by their own sense or reason to report them just as they observed them through forgetfulness or rashness Besides that they might not discern some Circumstances So it is as rare and seldom for the same things to be convey'd from any one to another exactly without some alteration I believe that the more Cautious and Wise cannot but have observed that in almost all Reports and Testimonies concerning Persons their Actions Principles Qualities or Tempers either the things are quite false or but some general part of them true The more Cautious and Discreet Honest and lovers of Truth we observe Men to be the more we may in their Reports and Testimonies concerning Persons either on the Good or Bad side defer to them of our Belief and Judgment of the truth of what they say and these in any degree considerable are but too few A good short Memorandum of this particular is that excellent Precept 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Remember to unbelieve or disbelieve i. e. Either to suspend thy Belief or to believe the thing to be false Sect. XII 4. A fourth Cause of our false Judgment on either the Good or Badside is our attention to and taking notice
Christian Prudence OR Directions FOR THE Guidance and Conduct of our Selves In the Case of Judging one another Being several Discourses on MATTH 7. 1. Judge not that you be not judged By G. Bright late Dean of St. Asaph Rector of Loughborough and Chaplain in Ordinary to His Majesty LONDON Printed for Matt. Wotton at the Three Daggers in Fleet-street and G. Conyers at the Ring in Little Britain Price 1s 6d 1699. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cum Charitate prudenâ—â—â— London Printed for Iohn Wright P Holmes sclp The PREFACE Good Reader THe Reason in very short why this small Treatise is Published is because it was judged that there would likely some more Good come of it than of not doing it and this again because the Matter therein contained was thought true and in some considerable degree useful and profitable and not yet either so particularly or in such Method and Manner discoursed by any other as to render this Discourse superfluous The first of these is but too little regarded especially in Practical Matters where Men attending principally to the Practice of them do less mind the precise and exact Truth and therefore whether they are not as commonly they are too unlimitedly and generally affirmed Besides Men commonly receive Practical things and what is taught concerning their Duty with more general Veneration which makes them more easily and presently to attribute to them the perfection of Truth or to judg them true Men are apt too to suspect themselves of some unwillingness to do and consequently to know their duty when they question and examine whether it be truly so or no and that this sticking and doubting proceeds from thence which indeed is too often true whence it comes to pass that Men are generally more careless and secure concerning the truth of these Matters when they deliver them and many hurtful mistakes are conveyed with some profitable truths As for the profitableness of the Argument and what is discoursed thereupon I know it will be variously judged according to Mens various inclinations or informations Men judg things profitable either because they will it pleaseth them to judg so or because they see and perceive them to be so that is because they perceive and apprehend the good effects thereof the one commonly is called the Judgment of affection because our inclinations are usually from Affection the other the judgment of Reason both may be in several nay in the same Men various enough The first is the most inconstant and diverse but the second is so too according to Mens various informations or apprehensions from Reason or Experience one Man may have observed and remembred many excellent effects or uses of any certain thing another very few or none or bad ones only whence one judgeth it very profitable another very little so or not at all or bad and hurtful and yet both may judg prudently and truly if it be only of what appears to them I leave every one freely to their own Reason and Observation in this particular only I suggest that they would not exclude their future information that they would not judg only according to what they have heretofore but also according to what they may hereafter observe themselves or learn from others The miscarriages in judging one another are so universal among the common sort of Christians and so frequent and little regarded even in wiser and better disposed and yet so very mischievous as may be partly understood from one part of this Discourse that it is to be presumed the mischievous effects thereof have not been hitherto so much taken notice of and resented as they seem to have deserved in compare with other Matters We see Men every day eagerly and fiercely and even to Persecution to contend concerning the usefulness and truth of their knowledg and judgment in other Opinions Religious Secular Divine and Humane which would put very knowing but unprejudiced Men to much study to find out any good use or effect thereof more than oft-times the pleasure of meer knowing some-what though very useless confusedly or only conceited some great matter by them when in the mean time they are utterly careless of their knowledg and judgment of one another whence it is manifest they are presently affected with mutual esteem and love or with contempt and hatred are Friends or Enemies and consequently effectually disposed to be negligent of at least or to do good or mischief to one another and consequently to hinder or help what they are good for in the World and who knows where the Good or Evil may stop I hope it will not be the less useful and truly valuable for being that which is truly Moral Knowledg For that being only the knowledg of our Manners that is the habitual inclination of our Wills Choices and active Faculties what should be perpetually their ultimate Object or their End which can be but one viz. The greatest perfection and happiness of the whole Universe known to us taking in God himself what the intermediate ones or means in what degree they are to be proportioned The Knowledg of the one true and right end and just measure of all our habitual Inclinations and Actions I say Moral Knowledg being this it is manifest there is no other Knowledge we are capable of comparable for its good use and effect and consequently much to be valued separated there-from or considered not subservient or instrumental thereto For by it alone we are directed to the obtainment of that perfection by which we tend to do any good to others or which keeps from doing any harm the fruit or good effect of other Knowledg considered alone is chiefly the pleasure and delight immediately arising to the Mind and is confined within our selves Good Morality in this sense is the greatest perfection our Natures are capable of being nothing but the universal right determination of our Wills and Choices to the best and most excellent end viz. The greatest Perfection and Happiness of the whole Universe taking in God himself It is nothing but Universal Goodness it tends to an infinite good without our selves and therefore no wonder that the possession and exercise of it in sincerity and vigour fills the Soul with the greatest delight and satisfaction All other things in the World may be used well or ill and seem to be equally capable of both and therefore indifferent this only cannot be the cause of any thing but good in the World nor can it be conceived that any thing else should render us capable of reward from God that is of any Happiness or Perfection but at least a Will to do all the Good with it that it is usable for For why should we have either if we do no Good or do Mischief therewith But if this Morality be the most excellent thing we are capable of Then sure is its Knowledg Some have valued and prized Knowledg by other Characters than Usefulness and good Effects such as
is its being by Revelation or inspired And therefore have thought every Truth and the least revealed to be of greater concernment or worth more than the greatest known by reason or natural Light especially if not revealed too not attending that the Reason of Revelation is not only the utility of a truth though there is always sufficient but the difficulty of its being otherwise known Much more might have been suggested in so considerable a Matter But this is enough if not too much in this place Lastly As for this Discourse's not being superfluous I should be glad to be mistaken and that this Argument hath been so Handled and Treated of already as to render this useless I shall give thee no further trouble Good Reader but only desire that thou wouldst read this Treatise if thou thinkest fit to read at all with the same design it was Composed viz. Of Guidance and Conduct of our selves in this particular and consequently that it might contribute some-thing to the increase of universal Charity Justice and Wisdom in the World The Contents CHAP. I. § I. THe several senses of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to Judg. p. 7 8. § II. That in the general sense of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to Judg two parts may be observed 1. The inward action of Mind 2. The signification of the Action p. 11 12. CHAP. II. What Judgments may be thought forbidden by our Saviour both Principally and Secondarily or Occasionally are reckoned up which are six p. 13 14. § I. The first prohibited Judgment too great a proneness to pass our Judgments concerning Persons in any respect at all p. 15. § II. The second is too great a proneness to pass judgment on the worst side p. 19 20. § III. The third is rash Judgment without any reason or without sufficient reason p. 23 24 c. § IV. The fourth is false Judgment p. 29. § V. The fifth thing forbidden is too great a proneness to declare and signifie our Judgment p. 34. § VI. The sixth and principal is the undue end of Judging viz. Vltimately to please ones self Selfishness Self-love and this by Malice Hatred Pride Affectation of Superiority Revenge Envy Flattery by Anger Fear Busie-bodiness Curiosity p. 37 38. CHAP. III. What Judgments are not forbidden § I. 1. In general not a Judging out of Charity p. 39. § II. 2. In general not when there are and appear more good Effects thereof than of the Omission p. 40. § III. 3. Many particular Cases are instanced in for example to our Prudence in which it is not prohibited in general to observe and pass Judgment concerning others Qualities and Actions p. 42 43. § IV. 4. It is not prohibited universally to pass Judgment on the worst side p. 45. § V. 5. It is not universally forbidden to declare our Judgment and that on the worst side p. 46. CHAP. IV. Contains some Causes of these forbidden Judgments § I. The Causes of too much proneness to Judg in general of which the first Idleness p. 49. § II. The second love of Activity of doing somewhat p 52. § III. The third is Curiosity or of knowing somewhat p. 54. § IV. The fourth a Self-pleasing in our Ability or reputed Ability to judg p. 56. § V. Causes of too great proneness to judg on the worst side of which the first is meer Ignorance p. 57. § VI. The second ill dispositions of Will as 1. Hatred 2. Revenge 3. Pride 4. More particularly Affectation of Superiority in any thing 5. Envy 6. Contempt 7. Flattery p. 59. § VII That the Causes of rash Judgment are the same with those of the two former p. 68. § VIII That the Causes of false Judgment concerning Persons are defect in our understanding in our Will p. 69. § IX The first Cause reducible to one of those two is Ignorance p. 70. § X. The second an Opinion or Judgment too unlimited that all Men are like our selves Some instances hereof This extended to God himself that it hath been the Cause of making God in Humane Shape and that the representing God or any thing in him by Humane Shâ—pe is likewise the Cause of such an Opinion concerning God p. 76 c. § XI The thâ—rd is too general a belief of Testimony or Report p. 85. § XII The fourth Cause is an observing only what is good or what is bad in a Person and not observing both p. 88. § XIII A fifth is a want of a prevalent love of Truth p. 92 93. § XIV A sixth is our Passions the instances thereof That Passions determine our Judgments three ways among others 1. By bringing to mind only those things which are true indeed but serve to maintain or encrease them but keeping out those which tend to abate them so that they never appear 2. By thrusting into our Minds more than is true of that which maintains them 3. By thrusting out those things which may be suggested and true but yet serve to extinguish them or by causing a Man not to attend thereto or the Evidence that is in them or by confounding the attention or perception on purpose that it might not see the most necessary truth which it cannot deny if it did see p. 97 98 c. § 15. A seventh Cause of false Judgment either on the good or bad part is all Appetites whatsoever besides those of Truth and Vniversal Justice of which one more useful Instance p. 106. § 16. The Causes of too great a proneness to declare our Judgments much the same with what have been mentioned viz. Idleness Self-pleasing by Activity Curiosity Conceit of ability and sufficiency to judg by fancied Reputation there for by Hatred Revenge Pride Affectation of Superiority Envy Contempt Anger Flattery p. 110. § 17. The Causes of the last prohibited Judgment out of such bad Principles as are above-named the Corruption of our Natures improved by Custome and wilful ill Vsage of our selves p. 111. CHAP. V. Treats of the mischievous Consequences or Effects of these prohibited Judgments § I. The ill Effects of too great a proneness to judg others in general are 1. Too great a neglect of our own Affairs and principally our Manners in which we are principally to employ our selves For 1. We cannot so well know that in another Man concerning which we pass judgment as what is in our selves And 2. We can make more certain effectual use of our Judgment and Observation of our selves p. 112 113 c. A 2d ill Effect of too great proneness to judg in general is an Vsurpation of anothers right or Tyranny p. 118 119 § II. The ill Consequences of too great proneness to judg on the worst side are 1. False Judgment 2. Vnjust Contempt 3. oft-times unjust Suspition in others of the Judgment coming from the worst Principles whence 4. Contempt Hatred Revenge in the Persons judged against the Person judging p. 122 123. § III. The ill Consequences of rash Judgment
Manners and Instructors and Teachers of good Manners and to Friends whose care and industry for the good of those whom they thus judg it will excite to those that would free themselves from too partial an admiration of Persons to those who have a mind and design to be more accurately good in things of more great and publick Concernment and in many other Circumstances which every ones private prudence must determine Much less still is the contrary commanded or indulged viz. To judg that good and laudable which is bad and to be condemned to judg falsly on the best and favourable side for to judg falsly is ever forbidden and to judg according to Truth when we do judg is always commanded and enjoyned We are not neither to think well of all Persons and all in Persons to praise speak well of all things We may and ought when Charity and Prudence are the reasons of our using our Judgments to think of things as they are to think that bad or faulty which is so as near as we can be informed and to say so too as it follows in the next particular Sect. V. Fifthly Nor in the next place is it here universally forbidden to declare and make known our Judgments and that on the worst side But there are many Circumstances in which it is of much better effect so to do Sometimes to reprove always with Charity and Discretion to be sure the Guilty or Faulty and to let him know our Opinion concerning any Actions or Temper or Quality in him may be of excellent use and be a means to amend the Persons and to prevent the like for the future Sometimes to admonish others lest they imitate or do the like we may make known our Judgment to them especially when the faulty Person is Incorrigible or to prevent some fraud or hurt or mischief that otherwise might be done by one to another We are not always to hold our Tongue nor conceal all signs of our Opinions be Meal-mouth'd for fear of displeasure or the like causes which as it may be in the effect very mischievous so it proceeds usually from Treachery or Cowardize Much less still is it commanded or permitted here to signifie a contrary Judgment to what we really have in our Breasts to speak or otherwise so to behave our selves as if we thought well of approved and liked that which we do not To do this out of the self-end of preventing any evil or procuring any good from a Person is called Flattery We are not to say That evil is good or darkness light We are not either for fear or favour to Commend and Praise what in our Judgment and Conscience we condemn But when we think our selves obliged to declare and make known our Opinion and Judgment concerning any Person or Actions it must always be with Truth although it be to disapprove or condemn But then to be sure let this be always done with a sincere inward Charity and all the just signs of it and of freedom from any Self-design and especially that which is in such a case most ordinary and suspected viz. from Pride and Imperiousness and therefore with Modesty with great Discretion and Prudence that is a discerning and fore-seeing when it may and when it may not be of good use and effect to do or not do it Of which hereafter under another Head Here is to be noted that as these Actions of Judgment are not prohibited so not all Inclinations thereto CHAP. IV. We proceed to the Fourth General Head viz. Sect. I. TO Instance in some of the Causes of these prohibited Judgments here those especially which are more Proper Immediate Frequent and most in our own power to prevent We must run them over again And First Of too much Proneness to judg in general the Causes some of them may be 1. Too much Idleness By which I mean not a Man's doing nothing for that cannot be every Body is always employ'd his Thoughts are always taken up about somewhat but a Man 's not having any destined or set-purposed-Employment which one should always chuse as that in which he can best serve God and the World do most good in his Generation A neither designing nor purposing to pursue always or at least but when any extraordinary occasion happens any particular nor his General calling as is usually distinguished neither that which he with some others employ themselves about nor that which all Men should such as Reflection upon ones own Actions the end design the event or effect of them the having respect to the pleasing of God and doing good some way or other to our Neighbour to the Publick and the performance of some general Duties to God and our Neighbour which all are constantly obliged to perform Men's not having I say constantly such designed purposed and set-employment gives their Mind leave le ts them at liberty to wander about any where to be employed about any thing that shall from any cause be thrust upon them or shall occur Now this is far more usually others Persons and Actions than themselves partly because they are far more the object of our External Senses which affect Men generally more strongly and frequently than any thing from within themselves and then what we have proposed or objected to us we naturally and laudably are prone to be judging somewhat or other concerning them or appertaining to them But Men that have any set constant Calling to employ themselves in and besides perform their general Duties to God their Neighbour and themselves are not so much at leasure to mind and attend to what others are and do and consequently to judg Just for Example as Idle wandring Beggars who as we say are never out of their way and have no certainly designed Place or Business turn to every By-House to see who dwells there They look upon observe talk to or talk of every Passenger they meet when the Man that hath some designed Affair or Business with certain time and place in his Journey hardly observes or minds or but very little and passingly the Company upon the Rode nor any way diverts or stops himself Such was the fault of the younger Widdows which Saint Paul bids Timothy to advise They learnt to be Idle wandring about from House to House and then They were Tatlers and Busiebodies speaking things which they ought not 1 Tim. 5. 13. This is a privative Cause Sect. II. Secondly The Love of Activity meerly ultimately to no better end but only to please themselves therein Themselves are too little a Sphere there is more variety of things to be observed and judged in all others who they know than only in themselves whence they do it with greater life and vigour Men think it a dull thing and that 's their only reason to mind principally themselves and things appertaining to them and it may be the same things too for the most part to live in a round not always but so much
as is for most Men most expedient And then when Men do observe or take notice of others Persons qualities and actions they will be passing Judgment because there is more of Action than in suspending doubting or meerly observing That seems to be a slow dull thing too in compare with a Mans briskly and smartly and uninterruptedly passing Judgment Besides that suspending doubting being Ignorant argue an imperfection and this fault may have the name of Busibodiness viz. When out of love of being Busie meerly to be always doing somewhat and that with vigour and smartness Men employ their Thoughts in Observing and Judging other Mens either Qualities or Actions Not out of any Neighbourly or Charitable Principle not because they see a great deal of good they may do by it and therefore would do it accordingly that is not out of Reason Prudence Charity Men oft-times Bussle and are Busie in the World and they know no other Reason but that they love to be so and nothing more often occurs about which they may be so than what other Men are or do Sect. III. Thirdly The third cause is sometimes Curiosity that is a Mans pleasing himself meerly and ultimately in knowing something he did not know before and being very much conceited of himself there for not directing his knowledg to those things which are most profitable which he can make best use of do most good withal nor attending to them Hence it comes to pass that Men are not content to mind and know themselves or their own minds if it was less difficult than it is nor yet things more nearly Relating to themselves which is more easie But they are also more inquisitive into and desirous to know the Affairs of others what they are and do and observe them and consequently to pass Judgment of them which is a sign to them but oft a very false one that they do know Because we use to do so and should do so viz. Pass Judgment only of things we do know If we should not pass Judgment but doubt or suspend we should seem to our selves to be Ignorant which we would not do because we will ultimately and please our selves not to be so To doubt or to suspend ones Judgment because one does not know is but very rare and in few Tempers but it should be always and is to be preferred before Knowledg because it is a better thing a greater excellency to withhold a Mans Judgment where there is no Reason seen where one doth not know or see the Connexion of what he affirms and does the Truth it self than it is to know the Truth it self The one is but a perfection of our Understanding t'other a great virtue of our Wills and we shall be the wiser the more we thus judg and accordingly behave our selves I say rather to say and think we do not know when we indeed do not then to know though never so certainly Sect. IV. Fourthly A fourth cause may be an Instance or Branch of Pride that is to please our selves too much meerly either that we have or are reputed to have an ability and sufficiency to understand and direct others and their affairs too better than they themselves can When 't is only so conceitedly by us and we know not others Circumstances or were we in them we would do the like or worse or if we had this ability perhaps we had better be without it whilst it makes us less able to understand and direct our selves by using our minds to Wander abroad and to attend to others and depriving us of the opportunities of Self-reflection It is very often seen that those who are extraordinary forward not out of some sence of Duty to give Counsel Advice or Judgment of other Mens Concerns are very negligent and careless and unapt to follow the very same when it is as useful and profitable for themselves Sect. V. Secondly For some of the Causes of too great a Proneness to judg on the worst side whether truly or falsly but not therefore or because they are true or false in our selves they are all either Ignorance or some Ill-disposition of Will 1. Ignorance viz. Of the bad effects or consequences of this our too great Proneness which Ignorance may proceed from Ill-dispositions of Will either on set purpose or designed then when we judg and we wilfully shut our Eyes and do not attend to what might better inform us or it may be contracted before But it may proceed too sometimes even from Love and Charity So we see sometimes Persons much desirous of their Relations or others Good and Well-fare very apt always to suspect the worse of them and to observe their Beginning bad Inclinations and to think them so but not so much to take notice of the contrary good ones in them and this partly that they might timely prevent any evil that may happen to them thereby And so may it be in publick Affairs and of very great and universal Concernment especially and yet soon out of our power nay so we see it in our selves sometimes Some Men being too apt to look upon their Faults and Imperfections and to magnifie them and to take no notice of what 's good in themselves and consequently to judg falsly concerning themselves on the worst side Though this is but rare in compare with the other extream and proceeds from an imprudent and ignorant love not attending that they ought and may do themselves as much good by their being pleased with and encouraged by and thankful for the good they have as by being afraid of removing and preventing any evil fallen upon them or that may fall upon them and not considering still that it 's best be sure all things considered to judg always according to Reason and Truth not to trouble and perplex our selves with vain fears and endeavours and for other good effects thereof Sect. VI. Sixthly But I doubt the far more usual Causes of too great Proneness to judg on the worst side are ill-dispositions of Will in general Self-love and Self-pleasing ultimately in various Instances such as are more particularly Self-pleasing by 1. Hatred of or Malice an habitual Hatred against any Person in general Than which there is nothing in the World more detestable because the most Mischievous and it is the greatest degeneracy from the most opposite and contrary to the most excellent perfection in the World which is Goodness and is usually attributed to the Devil that is the worst of Beings This is when a Man pleaseth himself ultimately in doing mischief to in vexing and hurting another Man other Persons It is easie to see how this disposeth a Man to the greatest readiness to judg any thing bad in the Person to whom he is thus affected For if we thus please our selves in doing Mischief we shall endeavour that we may still please our selves so to do and that we may so do we 'll represent Persons as bad as we can as
is not effectual For it is not every degree of love to the Truth that will secure a Man from false Judgments of things and here of Persons But it must be a greater degree of Love thereto than to the thing which at any particular time may be a temptation to the contrary And if we would be always secure we must have a stronger Affection thereto than to any other Object which may occur in our Lives more than to the favour or good-will of the Greatest or Best more than to Mischievousness Superiority either in Reputation for or Possession of any Good thing more than to Power or Greatness more than to Gain or Riches finally any other good Advantage or Interest We must look upon our uprightness or truth of our Judgments or Opinions as a far greater proper Good a richer and more excellent Possession than all these whereby we do more Good than by all these without it And consequently be more shamed and afraid to be Erroneous and live in Falshood and a Lye than any other evil or hurtful thing to us except Vice and Sin We must in a general sense Buy the Truth and sell it not That is prefer it before all other things that are inconsistent with it and cause us to part with it also Wisdom Instruction and Understanding the means to obtain it Prov. 23. 23. If we do not do thus if we be not thus tempered and disposed if we do not judg this a greater good we shall have our Judgments affected strengthened bent and determined by our love to other things in all Matters where there is not apparent demonstration but only high degrees of Probability as it is almost in all affairs of Humane life Nay even in these a Man may wilfully blind and confound himself or divert his attention and if not make himself judg false yet at least hinder himself from clearly seeing and judging truly and make himself doubt as it were saying when a thing cannot be denied Truly I do not know or the like and in such a manner shuffle and contrive to bring himself at least to suspension and doubt and confusion Every Man hath some degree of love to Truth naturally some more some less more than sometimes to more sometimes fewer other things and accordingly they are more likely more often to judg truly But it is and must be a greater degree than to all other things universally and constantly that will always secure from all prejudices of his will Sect. XIV 6. The sixth Cause I shall name is our Passions both those of the Concupiscible and Irascible appetite as they are usually called Or more plainly those that have good and those that have evil for their immediate Object Such as are the simple ones of Love Hatred Joy and Grief and Desire And others compounded of these as Revenge Anger Hope Fear c. These all in every Case cause us to judg to the advantage and in favour of themselves that is so as they may be preserved and maintained the Instances of which are every-where and innumerable Thus for Example Love causeth us to attribute to the Object beloved things that are lovely whereby the Passion is maintained or encreased and hatred on the contrary to attribute or ascribe or adjudg to the Object hated those things that are hateful and evil for its own preservation or encrease whereby it is kept up or augmented and made more keen and fierce And all this without any regard to the truth or falshood of what is judged So likewise what we desire we will think it is good Positively or Privatively In desire properly so called or where the good we desire is a possession of some good thing we most readily judg the good thing a great Good and consequently its Possession In Anger and Revenge where the good thing desired is a removal of some evil or grievous thing to us by doing evil to it which obtains in Inanimate things but principally to Persons we are extraordinarily prone and forc'd to judg this removal a greater good and in order thereto the evil to be removed a mighty evil And therefore more particularly in Persons to whom we are thus affected or passionated we judg many kinds and degrees of evil or bad things to be in them many or all perhaps more than indeed there are which are seldome but very confusedly apprehended and signified usually by some name to which our passions of Anger Hatred or the like have been joyned as that of some Sect or Party whereby still these our Passions are gratified that is supported maintained nay augmented and boyled up to the greatest degree of Agitation and Violence And those Mens judgments thus from Passions whereby they are maintained and increased though they may happen to be true yet it appears by Experience that they are more generally false Their happening to be true sometimes makes Men oft-times justifie and think well of such passionate Judgments whereas the truth was not at all seen by them nor was it the Reason or Cause therefore of their Judgments These Passions thus byass and warp and determine our Judgments three Ways among others 1. By bringing to mind and furnishing our Invention only with those things which maintain or increase them and which are true and keeping out the contrary hindring those from appearing which may abate or extinguish them which are as true too We all may have often observed how much we have presently to say for a Person whom we love how plentifully and readily our Invention is furnished What long Orations we can make in his behalf and praise How many excellent Qualities and in what great Degree appear to us in him and we attribute to him All which grant to be true But we have nothing to say against him nothing to his disadvantage nothing that is bad imperfect or faulty in him appears or comes to our mind when as much might as truly there have been said too And so on the contrary the worse or at least the more frequent extream in a Person whom we hate are revengefully and wrathfully affected to with whom we are angry Then how many Faults in him or Imperfections crow'd presently into our Minds All his past bad Actions and Qualities remembred his present observed nay his future too foretold and altogether flie about immediately in our Fancies and we could give a Catalogue sometimes of many hours long and make large Declamations against him the Man hath been this and that and t'other all which we 'll grant to be true too But then how barren are our Inventions for him we have nothing or very little to say to commend him This would be a very dry Theme for us We remember or take notice of nothing considerable in him Whereas it may be here is as much and as true to be said by any other Person who is Calm and Reasonable not thus possessed by these Passions against him nay and we our selves can do
it when we are out of that Passion when the Man is not altered except it be in that one particular for which we are angry with him he is the same still he is no better nor worse when we are and when we are not so affected to him 't is we only alter and change And so in particular Actions how easily can we by how many Arguments commend justifie or excuse any Action of our Friends and with as many discommend or aggravate that of our conceited Adversary whom we are in hatred with or bear grudge against or are wrathful and angry with Hence therefore we give false Judgments concerning Persons qualities or actions judging them much better or worse than they are we having only Arguments and Proofs on one side brought to our Mind by our passions and those on the other kept out by them Which is like as if corrupted or bribed Officers should permit no Witnesses to come into or appear in the presence of the Judg but those that shall serve for that side or the Cause that they are bribed for And yet often our Mind and Reason the Judg not attending and taking notice of this Bribery and Partiality of these Officers the Passions though it might and should may think it very truly judged at least as it ought according to the Evidence that it had and set down and be content and think all was well done and truly they were very honest and sincere in their Judgments This is one of the most slie and close Cheats and Tricks we by our Passions put upon our Reasons The more had we need here to be cautious and now more especially when the Deceit and Cozenage is discovered And both on this and the two following as well as other accounts it is a special Maxim of Wisdom not to trust those Judgments where Passions have gone before Reason But do one of these three things Either 1. Be calm and and have no Passions at all Or 2. If thou wilt for Invention-sake have any then passionate thy self equally on both sides Or 3. Raise up in thy self a greater and commanding passion for Truth which will make all the Evidence and Proof thou hast in thy keeping appear equally on all sides But here I may prevent what is to be said in another Head 2. And very briefly Our Passions cause us to judg in favour of themselves bringing into our Minds what is true on one side and keeping back what is so on the other but also by thrusting into them more than is true And therefore we observe in our Friends and in our Enemies that is to whom we are so more virtues or faults fine or foul things and more of them too than any Body else not alike prejudiced can see or than indeed there are And 3. When things on both sides do come to our Minds as especially when suggested by another who would discourse or defend the Person we are passionated for or against I say when this is by thrusting them on one side away again or turning a Man from them or causing one wilfully not to attend to them or if that cannot be not to the Proof and Evidence that is in them nay not to be able it confounding and agitating our Minds and drawing their force another way And so it is by every days Experience observed that he that is under the passions of Hatred and Anger against any thing or Person will not attend to what can be said or proposed in their Commendations or Defence nor will nor can oft-times apprehend the Proof or Consequence thereof So on the other hand Timidity or Fear or Scruple to judg amiss concerning Persons especially on the bad side may cause many not to judg according to the best probability that doth appear to them without any prejudice from any Person or ill disposition of Will But this is an effect of Passions more visible and more to be observed by the Person himself mis-judging than the former and therefore in that respect more easie to be prevented And here we see manifestly one of the principal mischiefs of Passions as there are also very good use of them and how much therefore it concerns us to govern them well Sect. XV. 7. Another Cause of false Judgment either on the good or bad part may be all Appetites whatsoever besides those which have Truth and universal Justice for their Objects By which Justice I mean nothing else but such a love of and desire to do Good to each particular as is most consistent with or productive or effective of the greatest Good of the whole that always with regard to measured and moderated by this I say all Appetites besides those not only those which cause it on the bad side as Malice Pride Envy Revenge which two last seem mixed of the two former and others which have been formerly mention'd but those also which cause it on the favourable side as in Flattery when a Man by passing his Judgment before another concerning himself or his Friend desires to please him and to gain his good opinion and favour nay partial and imprudent Charity it self may be the Cause As when a Man having no Self-end more than the pleasure of the Action in giving his Judgment concerning a Person to whom he hath a strong inclination to do good but without that due actual heed to or fore-sight of the Hurt or Evil that may come of this his Beneficence to him or to others else-where or at some other time that is partially or imprudently judgeth him more deserving than in truth he is To give particular Instances of false Judgments from these Causes would be endless only one may be observed for Example which is frequent and of consequence Contradicting the Judgment of others passing Judgments contrary to those of others and oft-times the more by how much the Number or Reputation of those others are the greater When we see one praised or dispraised by them contrariwise to dispraise or praise either in general or quoting particulars and multiplying and magnifying of them Generally this is out of Pride that we might Equalize or be Superiour to others in our Invention or Discretion or Honesty the Abilities which fit us for Judging that we might not at least seem to our selves or others to be inferiour in those Qualities that others might not seem as if they were only able and fit to do it In all which there is affectation of Superiority Vain-glory and Ostentation Envy which are several Branches of Pride And this we see not only among the Vulgar and in ordinary Conversation but among the Learned who often when any Author is generally commended and it may be too much set themselves to multiply and magnifie his Faults and Defects but to diminish his commendable Qualities by concealing or extenuating them And on the contrary when an Author is now out-done and thought to be much exceeded by another and therefore comparatively undervalued they endeavour to