where it lies more conceal'd and which the Logicians for that reason call Exponable which require Exposition or Explanation Those of the first sort may be reduc'd to six Kinds Copulatives Disjunctives Conditinal Causal Relative and Discretive COPVLATIVES We call Copulatives those that include several Subjects or several Attributes join'd together by an Affirmative or Negative Conjunction that is to say And or neither For Neither does the same thing as and in these sorts of Propositions for that neither signifies and with a Negative which falls upon the Verb and not upon the Union of the two words which it joins as if I should say that Knowledg and Riches do not make a Man happy Here I unite Knowledg and Riches affirming of both that they do not make a Man happy in the same manner as if I should have said that Knowledg and Riches render a Man vain-glorious These Propositions may be distinguished into three sorts 1. When they have more Subjects Life and Death are in the power of the Tongue 2. When they have several Predicates Auream quisquis mediocritatem Diliget tutus caret obsoleti Sordibus Tecti caret invidenda Regibus Aula A well Compos'd Mind hopes for good Fortune in bad and fears not bad fortune in Prosperity 3. When they have several Subjects and several Attributes Nor House nor Land not heaps of Brass or Gold From the Sick Lord a Fever can withhold Nor anxious cares repel The truth of these Propositions depends upon the truth of both the two parts Thus if I say that Faith and a good Life are necessary to Salvation this is true because both the one and the other is necessary But should I have said a good Life and Riches are necessary for Salvation this is a false Proposition because Riches are not necessary for Salvation Propositions that are consider'd as Negatives and contradictory in respect of Copulatives and all others compos'd are not all such where Negations occur but only such where the Negation falls upon the Conjunction which happens several ways as by putting the Not at the head of the Proposition Thou dost not love and forsake thy Friend For thus it is that a Proposition is made Contradictory to the Copulative by expressly denying the Conjunction as when we say that it cannot be that a thing should be this and that at the same time That a Man cannot be wise and in love at the same time Amare sapere vix Deo conceditur That Love and Majesty do not accord well together Non bene conveniunt nec in una sede Morantur Majestas Amor. Of Disjunctives Disjunctives are of great use and these are they wherein the disjunctive conjunction or is found Amity either finds friends equal or makes 'em equal A Woman either loves or hates there is no Medium Aut amat aut odit mulier nihil est tertium He that altogether lives in Solitude is either a Beast or an Angel says Aristotle Men are guided either by interest or fear Either the Sun moves about the Earth or the Earth about the Sun Every action proceeds from good or bad judgment The truth of these Propositions depends upon the necessary Opposition of the parts which admits no Medium But as they ought to admit no Medium that they may be necassarily true so that they may be only morally true it suffices that they do not usually admit a Medium And therefore it is absolutely true that an action done with Judgment is either good or bad the Theologians making it manifest that there is nothing in particular that is untrue But when they say that Men never act but by interest or fear this is not absolutely true since there are some who are lead neither by the one or the other of these Passions but meerly upon the consideration of their Duty So that the main truth of this Proposition lies in this that the greatest part of Men are govern'd by these two Affections Propositions contradictory to disjunctives are those where the Truth of the Disjunction is denied Which among the Latins as in all other composed Propositions by putting the Negative at the Head of the Proposition Non omnis actio est bona vel Mala and in English It is not true that every action is good or bad Conditional Conditionals are such as have two parts bound by the condition if of which the first where the condition lies is call'd the Antecedent and the other the Consequent If the Soul be Spiritual is the Antecedent it is immortal is the Consequent This Consequence is sometimes mediate sometimes immediate It is only mediate when there is nothing in the terms that binds both parts together as when I say If the Earth stand still the Sun moves If God be just the wicked shall be punish'd The consequences are very good but they are not immediate for that the parts not having any common term are bound together by something which is not express'd but reserv'd in the mind that the Earth and the Sun being perpetually in different Situations necessarily it follows that the one is moveable and the other immoveable When the consequence is immediate it is usually requisite 1. Either that both parts have the same Subject If Death be a passage to a more happy life it is desirable If you have fail'd to feed the Poor you have kill'd the Poor 2. Or that they have the same Predicate If whatever God inflicts upon us for Tryals sake ought to be dear to us Sickness ought to be dear to us 3. Or that the Attribute of the first be the Subject of the second If Patience be a Vertue Some Vertues are irksome 4. Or lastly that the Subject of the first part be the Attribute of the second which cannot be but when the second part is Negative If all true Christians live according to the Gospel There are no true Christians Here the truth of the Proposition is not regarded but the truth of the Consequence For though the one and the other part be false nevertheless if the consequence of the one in respect of the other be good the Proposition as far as it is conditional is true As If the will of the Creature be able to hinder the accomplishing of Gods will God is not Omnipotent Negative Contradictories are oppos'd to Conditionals when the condition is deny'd which among the Latins is done by prefixing the Negative Non si miserum fortuna Simonem Tinxit vanum etiam mendacemque improbafixtin But in English they are express'd by altho and a Negative If you eat of the forbidden Fruit you shall die Though you eat of the forbidden Fruit you shall not die Or else by It is not True It is not true that you shall die if you eat of the forbidden Fruit. Of Causals Causals are those that contain two Propositions joyn'd together by Conjunctions of the cause because or to the end that Woe to the Rich because they have their folicity in
belongs to Reason to make the choice Who chuse aright are they who are indu'd with an equal poise of Wit such as make a wrong choice are they whose Judgments are deprav'd wherein consists the chiefest and most Important difference between the faculties of the Understanding And therefore it ought to be the most principal Study of a Man to form and shape his Judgment and to render it the most exact that possible may be the main aim to which his utmost diligence ought to tend To this end we must make use of Reason as the Instrument to acquire Knowledg and on the other side we ought to make use of Knowledg to perfect Reason Truth of Understanding being Infinitely of greater value than all speculative Knowledg by means of the most solid and certain Sciences Which ought to be a caution to all men of Prudence not to engage farther in those speculations than while they serve to that end and only to make tryal of those Studies not to employ therein the whole force of their Wit For if the diligence of Men do not tend to this end they will not find the study of the speculative Sciences such as Geometry Astronomy and Physick to be other than a vain amuzement or that they be much more to be valued than the Ignorance of those things which at least has this advantage that it is less troublesome and does not puff Men up with that sottish vanity which they ascribe to themselves from the knowledg of those fruitless and barren Sciences The hidden secrets and misteries of those Arts are not only of little profit but altogether useless if Men consider 'em only in themselves and for themselves For Men were not born to employ their time in measuring Lines in examining the proportion of Angles or considering the different motions of Substance Their Souls are too lofty their Life too short their time too precious to busy themselves about such petty Objects But they are obliged to be just to be upright to be judicious in all their discourses in all their actions and in all affairs which they undertake Which Care and Industry is so much the more necessary by how much this one rare perfection exactness of judgment is to be admired above all others for every where we meet with none but wandring Understandings uncapable of discerning Truth who in all things take a wrong Course who satisfy themselves with corrupted reasons and fain would impose the same upon others who suffer themselves to be led away with the smallest Experiences who are always in excesses and extremities who want sufficient staidness to preserve themselves constant to the Truths which they know as adhering thereto rather by hazard then sound and judicious choice or else quite contrary continue so obstinately fix'd in their opinions that they will not so much as listen to those that could undeceive them who boldly decide and determine Arguments which they neither know nor understand and which were never yet understood by any other who make no difference at all between Speaking and Speaking or only judg of the truth of things by the tone of the Voice he that talks smoothly and gravely speaks reason he that cannot readily explain himself and seems to be in a heat must be in the wrong and more then this they know not Which is the reason that there are no absurdities how insupportable soever which do not find their Champions He that has a design to deceive the World shall not fail of Persons as ready to be gull'd and the most ridiculous Fopperies shall meet with Understandings proportionate to their Folly And indeed we ought not to wonder at any thing while we find so many People infatuated with the Fooleries of judicial Astrology and persons of gravity so seriously handling that Subject There is a certain Constellation in the Firmament which some men have been pleas'd to call a Ballance as like a Ballance as a Wind-Mill and all one This Ballance they cry is an Emblem of Justice and all that are born under that constellation shall be upright and just There are three other Signs in the Zodiac which they call the one a Ram the other a Bull the third a Goat and which they might as well have call'd an Elephant a Crocodile or a Rhinoceros Now the Ram the Bull and the Goat are Beasts that chew the Cud and therefore they that take Physick when the Moon is in any of these Constellations shall be in danger to vomit it up again These are strange extravagancies yet as extravagant as they are there are persons that utter 'em abroad for sound ware and others that as easily believe ' em This falshood of the Understanding is not only the Cause of those Errors that are intermix'd in the Sciences but of the greatest part of those faults and Crimes that are committed in Civil Life and Conversation of unjust Quarrels of ill grounded Law-suits of rash advice and of Enterprizes ill contriv'd and worse mannag'd There are few of these miscarriages that have not their source from some Errour or Defect of Judgment 〈◊〉 that there is no Defect which it more concerns a man to Correct in himself then this But as this amendment is greatly to be desir'd and wish'd for so is it equally as difficult to maintain seeing it depends much upon that measure of Intelligence which we bring into the World at our Birth For common Sence is no such Vulgar Quality as men take it to be There are an infinite company of dull and stupid Heads which are not to be reform'd by Instruction but by restraining 'em within those bounds which are proper for their Capacity and hindring 'em from medling with those things of which they are uncapable Nevertheless 't is very true that the greatest part of the fallacious Judgments among men proceed not from this Principle as being rather caus'd by the precipitation of the Brain and through defect of Consideration from whence it comes to pass that they judge rashly of what they only know obscurely and confus'dly The little regard and love of Truth in Men is the reason that they take so little pains the cheifest part of their time to distinguish what is true from what is false They admit into their Breasts all sorts of Discourses and Tenents rather choosing to suppose them to be true then to examine ' em If they understand them not they are willing to believe that others do And thus they load their memories with an infinite number of falsities and afterward argue upon those Principles never considering what they say or what they think Vanity and Presumption also contribute very much to this Miscarriage They think it a shame to doubt and not to know and they rather chuse to talk and determine at a venture then to acknowledge their not being sufficiently inform'd to judge aright Alass we are full of Ignorance and Errour and yet it is the most difficult labour in the World to draw
from the lips of Men such a Confession as this I am deceiv'd I am at a stand though so just and so conformable to their Natural Condition Others there are on the other side who not having wit enough to know that there are a thousand things full of obscurity and uncertainty and yet out of another sort of vanity desirous to let the World see that they are not sway'd by Popular Credulity take a pride in maintaining that there is nothing at all certain Thus they discharge themselves of the trouble of examination and misguided by this evil Principle they question the most constant Truths even of Religion it self This is the Source of Pyrrhonism which is another extravagance of human Wit which though it appears quite contrary to the rashness of those that decide and determine all things flows nevertheless from the same Spring that is to say want of Consideration For as the one will not take the pains to find out Errour the other will not be at the trouble to face Truth with that stedfastness which is requisite for convincement The least glimmering suffices to make the one believe notorious falshoods and to the other is a sufficient satisfaction to make 'em question the greatest certainties But as well in the one as the other it is only want of Industry that produces such different effects True Reason places all things in their proper station She causes us to scruple all things that are doubtful to reject what is false and ingeniously to acknowledge what is clear and evident without contenting our selves with vain Arguments of the Pyrrhonians which do no way destroy the rational assurance we have of things certain not in the very judgments of those that propose ' em No man ever seriously doubted whether there were a World a Sun and a Moon or whether the whole were bigger then it's part Men may outwardly say with their Lips that they doubt such a thing but they can never affirm it in their hearts Therefore Pyrrhonism cannot be call'd a Sect of People that are perswaded of what they aver but a Sect of Liars So frequently do they contradict one another in discoursing of their Opinions their hearts not being able to accord with their Tongues as we may find in Montaigne who has endeavour'd to restore that Sect to this Latter Age. For after he has affirm'd that the Academic's differ'd from the Pyrrhonians he declares himself for the Pyrrhonians in these words The Opinion of the Pyrrhonians saith he is more bold and altogether much more probable Whence it appears that there are some things more probable then others Nor does he speak this to maintain a piece of suttlety they are words that escap'd him before he was aware and that proceeded from the bottom of Nature which the falshood of Opinion cannot stifle But the mischief is that in things that are not so subject to Sence these Persons that place their whole delight in doubting all things will not permit their Wit to apply it self to what might confirm their Judgments or if they do 't is very slightly by which means they fall into a voluntary suspence and wavering in matters of Religion as being pleas'd with that state of Darkness which they procure to themselves and more convenient to allay the stings and reproaches of their Conscience and give the free Reins to their passions Seeing then that these irregularities of the Understanding which appear so opposite while the one gives easie beleif to what is obscure and uncertain the other still questions what is clear and evident have yet the same Source that is to say want of attentive Study to discern the Truth the Remedy is visible since there is but one way to guard our selves from those miscarriages by rectifying our Judgments and our thoughts with mature and studious deliberation Which is the only thing absolutely necessary to defend a man from surprises For as to what the Academics affirm'd that it is impossible to find out the Truth unless we had the marks of it as it would be impossible to know a Runagate Slave if met by chance unless his peculiar marks were known it is a meer frivolous peice of suttlety For as we need no other marks to distinguish Light from Darkness but the Light it self so neither do we need any other marks to distinguish Truth then the brightness of the Evidence which surrounds it and subdues and convinces the Understanding maugre all opposition So that all the Arguments of these Philosophers are not able to prevent the Soul from surrendring her self to Truth when fully penetrated by it's peircing rays then they are able to hinder the Eyes from seeing when open and that they are peirc'd by the light of the Sun But because the Understanding suffers it self to be sometimes abus'd by false Appearances for want of necessary consideration and because it has not attain'd to a knowledge of things by long and difficult examination most certainly it would be of great advantage to find out Rules for the improvement of the Search of Truth that so it might become more easie and more surely effectual nor is it impossible but that such Rules might be found out For since that Men are frequently deceiv'd in their judgments and sometimes again as rightly understand when they argue one while ill another while well and after they have argu'd ill are capable to see their Errour 't is but observing by reflecting upon their own thoughts what method they follow'd when they argu'd well and what was the cause of their mistake when they happen'd to be deceiv'd and by vertue of those reflexions to frame Rules to themselves whereby to avoid being surpriz'd for the future This is properly that which the Philosophers undertake and which they make such magnificent promises to perform And therefore if we may believe 'em they furnish us in that sort of Learning which they design to this purpose calling it by the name of Logic with a Light sufficient to dissipate all those Clouds that dark'n our Understanding They correct all the Errours of our thoughts and give us such infallible Rules that we cannot miss the Truth and so necessary withal that without 'em it is impossible to know any thing of certainty These are the Applauses which they themselves give their own precepts But if we consider what we find by experience concerning the use which these Philosophers have made of those Rules as well in Logic as in other parts of Philosophy we may have sufficient cause to mistrust the verity of their Promises But because it is not just to reject whatever is beneficial in Logic because of the ill use that is made of it and for that it is not probable that so many great Wits who have so sedulously studied the Rules of Reasoning could find out nothing that was solid and material and lastly for that custom has introduc'd a kind of necessity for us to have at least a rough knowledg of
Logic we thought it might in some measure contribute to the publick advantage to draw from thence whatever it contain'd most serviceable to rectifie our judgments And this is cheifly the design of this Treatise together with some new Reflections that came into our thoughts while the Pen was in our hands and which indeed make up the greatest and most considerable part of the whole For we find that the ordinary Philosophers had no other intention then to set down the Rules of good and bad Arguments Now though it cannot be said that these Rules are altogether useless since many times they serve to discover the fraud of intricate and puzling Arguments and to dispose our thoughts to argue and refel in a more convincing manner nevertheless we are not to believe that this benefit extends very far the greatest part of the Errors of men not consisting in their suffering themselves to be deluded by ill Consequences but in permiting themselves to be sway'd by false judgments from whence false Consequences are drawn And this is that for which they who have hitherto treated of Logic have found but little remedy and which is therefore the subject of the new Reflections so frequent in this Treatise Nevertheless we are oblig'd to acknowledge that these Reflections which we call new because they are not to be found in Common Logics are not all the Author 's own but that we have borrow'd some from the Writings of a famous Philosopher of this Age wherein appears as much perspicuity and curiosity of Wit as there does confusion in others Some few other Reflections we have also drawn from a small Manuscript of the deceas'd Monsieur Paschal entitl'd The Soul of Geometry and this is that which we have made use of in the Ninth Chapter of the first part of the Difference between the Definitions of Name and the Definitions of Thing and the five Rules which are explain'd in the fourth Part more largely handl'd there then in this Treatise As to what we have taken out of the ordinary Logic Books our following observations declare In the first place we had a design to bring into this Treatise all that was really beneficial in others as the Rules of Figures the Divisions of Terms and Ideas with some reflections upon the Propositions other things we thought of little use as the Categories or Predicaments and Places but because they were short easie and common we did not think fit to omit 'em with a caution however what judgment to make of 'em to the end they might not be thought more useful then indeed they are We were more doubtful what to do with certain other Things sufficiently knotty but of little profit as the Conversion of Propositions the Demonstration of the Rules of Figures but at length we resolv'd not to leave 'em out the difficulty it self not being altogether useless For true it is that when it does not terminate in the knowledg of any Truth we may have reason to say Stultum est difficiles habere nugas 'T is a foolish thing to labour in difficult trifles Yet are they not altogether to be avoided when they lead us to something of Truth since it may prove to a mans advantage to exercise himself in the understanding of Truths that are intricate There are some stomacks that only digest light and delicate Dyet and there are some Wits that cannot apply themselves to the study of other then easie Truths array'd in the Ornaments of Eloquence Both the one and the other is a niceness not to be commended or rather a real Weakness For a man must endeavour to enable himself to discover Truth when it is most conceal'd and envelopp'd and to respect her in what shape soever she appears For if a man be not able to surmount that niceness and distaste which is easily conceiv'd of things that appear a little suttle and Scholastic he does but thereby contract and shrivel up his Understanding and render himself uncapable to apprehend any more then what is to be known by a long series of several Propositions So that when one Truth depends upon three or four Principles which he must necessarily consider and study all at one time he is amaz'd and foil'd and many times depriv'd of the knowledg of several things highly advantageous which is a fault of great consequence The capacity of Man's Understanding shrinks or dilates it self according to use and custom and therefore for the enlarging of the Intellect the Mathematicks and all difficult Studies chiefly conduce for they cause an expansion of thoughts and exercise 'em in diligence and embolden 'em in a steddy confidence to stick to what they know These are the reasons that induc'd us not to omit those thornie Subjects and to discourse of 'em as nicely as any other treatise of Logic. They who think 'em tedious may forbear to read 'em and indeed we have already given 'em that caution at the beginning that they may have no reason to complain since it is at their own choice to read or let 'em alone Nor did we think it necessary to mind the disgust of some persons that abhor certain terms of Art fram'd only to retain more easily the several figures of Argumentation as if they were some Charms in Magic and frequently spend their insipid jests upon Baroco and Baralipton as being too Pedantical for we look'd upon their Puns to be more Pedantical then the words for there is nothing ridiculous in the Terms provided they be not ador'd for too great Misteries for it would be very absurd indeed for a Man that was going to dispute to admonish his opponent before-hand that he intended to dispute in Baroco or Felapton Men sometimes make an ill use of that reproach of Pedantry and sometimes fall into it themselves while they lay it upon others Pedantry is a Vice of the Mind not of the Profession for there are Pedants in all habits of all conditions and all qualities To utter Law and mean things in bombast expressions to bring in Greek and Latin by head and shoulders to be in a pelting chafe about the order of the Attick Months the habits of the Macedonians or such like frivolous disputes outragiously to abuse another that is not of his opinion about a passage in Seutonius or about the Etimologie of a word as if his Religion and his Country lay at Stake to endeavour to raise all the World against a Man as a disturber of the peace of Christendom that has not a venerable opinion of Cicero as Julius Scaliger has endeavour'd to do against Erasmus to interest himself for the reputation of an antient Philosopher as if he were one of his nearest Relations this is properly that which entitles a Man to Pedantry But to make use of a term of Art ingeniously found out for the ease of the Memory may be easily allow'd without any such reproach It remains that we should give a reason for omitting so many questions as are found
For finding the Reputation of great Men not free from noted slips we are incited by Care and Industry to preserve our selves from the like surprizes Moreover seeing every Man is bound to make what he writes as profitable as may be therefore of set purpose those examples of Errors are to be produc'd of which it most imports us not to be Ignorant For it would be an endless toil to remember all the dreams and trifles of Flud Vanhelmont and Paracelsus And therefore it is better to search examples in famous Authors whose Errors it may be worth while to understand Now all this is to be found in Aristotle to a Hair's Breadth For nothing can so effectually perswade a Man to avoid a fault as to shew that such a Man as he stumbled at the same Block And his Philosophy is become so famous through the vast number of deserving Persons that have embrac'd it that there is all the reason in the World his defects should be expos'd Which being so we thought it would be worth while for the Reader to take a review of the maxims of the Peripatetic Philosophy yet because it is never good to be deluded those Maxims are so propos'd that what they are may be easily known as having cursorily mark'd out the defects for farther detection of their fallacies Which we have not done to lessen the Reputation of Aristotle but rather to do him honour as much as may be done by those that differ in opinion from him And 't is visible in other places that the points which are tax'd of errors are of no great Importance nor shake the foundations of his Philosophy which we had no Intention to assail But if we make no mention of those things wherein Aristotle has excell'd in several of his Books the reason was this because the series of the discourse did not afford an opportunity so to do which however we would willingly and gladly have done if occasion had offer'd nor had Aristotle wanted his due applause who beyond all controversy was a person of a capacious and searching Genius upon which he relying has link'd together long Chains of consequences in such matters upon which he discours'd and therefore he has been very prosperous in what he has written in the second Book of his Rhetorick concerning the Passions Egregious also are his notions and observations which he has delivered in his Politicks his Ethics his Problems and his History of Animals and as confus'd as his Analtics are yet we must confess that almost all we know concerning the Rules of Logic is taken from thence so that there is not any Author from whom we have borrowed more then from Aristotle in this Logic as one to whom the Body of the precepts belong True it is that the most imperfect of his Works seems to be his Phisicks as being also that which for a long time has been condemn'd and forbidden by the Church as a Learned Person has made appear in a Treatise written to that purpose though the principal fault of it was not that it was false but that it was too true and taught nothing but such things as could not be conceal'd from our Knowledg For whoever doubted but that all things were composed of matter and a certain form of matter Whether matter being to put on form did not want it before that is to say whether it did not suffer Privation Or whoever question'd those other principles of his Metaphisicks wherein we are taught that all things depend upon form that bare matter is void of action that there are place motion faculties and qualities But after all this we do not seem to have learnt any thing new or are we more able to give a reason of any of Natures Effects But if there be any persons a many there are who believe it a Crime to dissent from Aristotle it will be no difficult thing to make it appear how far remote from Reason such a vain assertion is For if we are oblig'd to reverence the memory of some Philosophers that is only for two Reasons either out of a prospect of the truth to which they have adher'd or for the Reputation which they have acquir'd among the Learned For the sake of Truth we reverence 'em when they keep close to it but truth does not require that we should honour falshood in whomsoever it appears As for the consent of Men in the approbation of a Philosopher certain it is that 't is a good reason for giving respect nor can it be denied but very imprudently without great weariness And the reason is because in contradicting the generality we may be justly suspected of Presumption as believing our selves more clear-sighted then so many others But when the learned World is divided in their opinions as to the worth of an Author and that Persons of Reputation appear on both sides we are not then oblig'd to that Reservedness and we may freely declare what we approve and what we dislike in those Writings about which the Learned are divided For then we do not oppose our Sentiments against the Sense of the Author and his Abetters but side with those that maintain the contrary Party And now behold the true Condition of Aristotle at this day His Philosophy has experienc'd both Fortunes somtimes exploded and condemn'd by all otherwhile receiv'd and applauded by all at this day it is reduc'd into a middle Condition between the two Extreams In France Flanders England Germany and Holland they write frequently for and against Aristotle's Philosophy The Parisian Conferences as well as their Writings are divided into two parts nor does any one complain of this open War declar'd against him The most famous Professors no longer condemn themselves to that slavery of blindly receiving and maintaining whatever they find in his Books and some of his Opinions are utterly exterminated for what Physician will now maintain that the Nerves proceed from the Heart as Aristotle believ'd since Anatomy clearly demonstrates now that they derive ther Original from the Brain Whence proceeded that saying of St. Austin Qui ex puncto cerebri quasi Centro omnes Sensus diffudit Who diffus'd all the Senses from the point and as it were the Center of the Brain And what Philosopher dares be so obstinate as to affirm that the swiftness of ponderous things descending encreases proportionably to the proportion of their weight When any Man may end this dispute by letting two ponderous Bodies never so unequal in proportion fall from a high place at what time he shall find very little difference in the swiftness of their Motion All things violent are of short Continuance and all extreams are violent 'T is very hard measure to proscribe all Aristotle's opinions as formerly has been done On the other side it is an unreasonable Servitude for a Man to pledg his assent to all he has written and to allow only him for the standard of Philosophy as afterwards they went about to do Men
cannot long endure such a Tyranny but by degrees they will recover the Possession of their rational liberty which consists in approving what they judg to be true and rejecting that which they judg to be false For it does not seem contrary to Reason that Reason should submit to Authority in Sciences which treating of things above Reason are bound to follow another Light which is that of Divine Authority But in Sciences that depend upon the support of Reason Reason acts well and by her own Precepts when she decrees that there is no Obedience to be given to the Authority of Philosophers against Reason This is the Rule which we have follow'd in discoursing the Opinions of the Philosophers as well antient as modern we have sought for Truth in both neither espousing the quarrel of any Sect nor bidding battle to any So that all that is to be concluded when we reject the Opinion of Aristotle or any other is only this that in such a point we disscent from not that we do not consent in others much less that we have any aversion against 'em or seek to degrade or lessen their worth And this modest Procedure of ours we hope will be approv'd by all just Judges and that they will acknowledg that there is nothing in the whole world but a sincere desire to contribute to the Publick Good as far as lyes in the Power of a Treatise of this nature without Passion or Hatred against any Person Living LOGIC OR THE ART OF THINKING LOGIC is the Art of well using Reason in the knowledge of Things for the instruction as well of a mans self as of others This Art is deriv'd from the Reflexions which men have made upon the four Principal Operations of the mind Apprehension Judgment Discourse and Disposition We call Apprehension the simple Contemplation of Things that present themselves to the Mind as when we consider the Sun the Earth a Tree Rotundity a Square Cogitation Entity pronouncing nothing expresly concerning 'em and the form under which we consider 'em is call'd an Idea We call Judgment that Action of the Mind by which assembling together several Ideas we either deny or affirm this to be That Thus considering the Idea of the Earth and the Idea of Round we affirm or deny the Earth to be round Discourse we call that Operation of the Mind by which out of several Judgments we frame another Thus when we have judg'd that true Vertue ought to be referr'd to God but that the Pagans did not refer it to God from thence we infer that the Vertue of the Heathen's was not true We call Disposition that Action of the Mind by which we range various Ideas Judgments and Ratiocinations upon one and the same Subject in that Order which is most proper for it's Explanation and this by another Name we call Method These Operations proceed meerly from Nature and that sometimes more perfectly from those that are altogether ignorant of Logic then from others that have learn't it So that it is not the business of this Art to find out the way to perform these Operations for that we have from Nature alone that has given us the use of Reason but rather to make certain Animadversions upon those things which Nature her self operates in us which may be of a threefold use to us First we are thereby assur'd that we make a right use of our Reason For the Consideration of Rules begets in us a more fervent Application and attentive Industry of the Mind The Second is that thereby we more easily detect and explain the Errours and Defects which we meet within the Operations of the Mind For oftentimes it falls out that we discover by the meer Light of Nature the faults of Ratiocination yet are not able to give a reason why it is false Thus they who know not what belongs to Painting may take exceptions at the defects of a Picture tho' they are not able to tell the reason why they find fault The third is that we are brought to a more accurate knowledge of the nature of our Understanding by these Reflections upon the Operations of the Mind Which if we look no farther then meer Speculation is to be preferr'd before the knowledge of all Corporeal Things which are infinitely below Spiritual Considerations Now supposing those things which we revolve in our Minds in reference to our own Thoughts were only done with respect to our selves it would suffice to consider 'em in themselves not cloath'd with words or any other signs but in regard we cannot manifest our thoughts to others but by the benefit of exterior Marks and for that this Custom is so prevalent that when we meditate alone the Things themselves do not present themselves to our Thoughts but in the cloathing of those words by which we express 'em to others it is necessary for Logic to consider Ideas joyn'd to words and words joyn'd to Ideas And thus by what we have said it follows that Logic may be divided into four Parts according to the several Reflections which we make upon the four Operations of the Mind FIRST PART Containing Reflections upon Ideas or upon the first Operation of the Mind which is call'd Apprehension SINCE we cannot have any knowledge of what is without us but by the assistance of Ideas which are within us what we shall discourse of Ideas may be thought perhaps to be the most important Part of Logic as being the foundation of all the rest We may reduce these Reflections to five Heads according to the five ways of considering Ideas 1. According to their Nature and Original 2. According to the Principal difference of the Objects which they present 3. According to their being single or compound where we shall treat of Abstractions and Precisions of the Intellect 4. According to their Extent or Restriction that is to say their Universality Particularity or Singularity 5. According as they are clear and obscure distinct or confus'd CHAP. I. Of Ideas according to their Nature and Original THE word Idea is of the number of those words which are so clear that they need not to be explain'd by any other there being no other more clear and simple So that all that can be done in this case to avoid errour and mistake is to observe the false notions and interpretations that may be attributed to this word while some make use of it only to signifie that manner of conceiving which is perform'd by the application of the Mind to those Forms that are depainted in our Fancies and is call'd Imagination For as St. Austin observes Man ever since his fall has been so accustom'd to contemplate Corporeal Things the forms of which enter through our Sences into our Brains that the most part believe they cannot apprehend a thing when they cannot imagine it that is contemplate it as a Thing Corporeal As if Man had no other way to think or apprehend Whereas no man can make a Reflection
to these Such an opinion that was maintain'd by such an Author is false The opinion that our Soul is Compos'd of Atoms which was taught by Lucretius is false So that these kinds of Judgments always enclose two Affirmations when they are not distinctly express'd The one Primary which relates to the Truth it self which is that it is a great error to believe that our Soul is compos'd of Atoms the other Incident which refers only to the Historical part that this error was generally taught by Lucretius CHAP. V. Of the falshood that occurs in Complex Terms and Incident Propositions WHAT we have already said may serve in answer to one celebrated Question how to know whether there be no falshood but in Propositions and whether there be none in Ideas and simple Terms I speak of falshood rather then of Truth for there is a truth in things that is certain which is their Conformity to the Will of God whether Men think of 'em or not but there can be no falshood of things but as they relate to the understanding of Man or any other understanding subject to errors which judges falsly that a thing is that which it is not The Question is whether this falshood is only to be met in Propositions and Judgments The usual answer is no which is true in one sence however that hinders not but that there may be falshood not in single Ideas but in complex Terms For it is sufficient that something may be judg'd or affirm'd in them either expresly or virtually Which will be more plain if we consider particularly two sorts of complex Terms the one of which the Pronoun is explicative the other of which it is determinative In the first sort of Complex Terms we are not to wonder if we find any falshood For the attribute of the Incident Proposition is affirm'd by the Subject to which the Pronoun relates As in Alexander who is the Son of Philip I affirm though incidently the Son of Philip of Alexander and by consequence there is a falshood in it if it he not so But here we are to make two or three remarks of moment 1. That the fasilty of an Incident Proposition does not blemish the truth of the Principal Proposition For example Alexander who was the Son of Philip overcame the Persians This proposition ought to pass for true though Alexander were not the Son of Philip because the affirmation of the principal Proposition falls only upon Alexander and what is incidently added does not hinder but that Alexander might vanquish the Persians Nevertheless if the attribute of the principal proposition had relation to the incident proposition as if I should say Alexander the Son of Philip was Amintas 's Grandchild Then would it only be that the falshood of the incident proposition would render the principal proposition false 2. Titles that are given to certain Dignities may be given to all that possess that Dignity though what is signify'd by the Title do not at all agree with ' em Thus because the Titles of Holy and Thrice Holy was formerly given to all Bishops we find that the Catholic Bishops at the conference of Carthage did not scruple to give that Title to the Donatist Bishops the most Holy Petelian said it though they knew well that there could be no true Holiness in a Heretic Bishop We find also that St. Paul gives the title of best and most excellent to Festus Governour of Judea because it was the Title usually given to the Chief Governours 3. But it is not so when a Person is the Author of a Title which he gives to another and which he gives according to his own and not the opinion of others or according to popular error for then we may impute to himself the falshood of such proposition Thus when a Man says Aristotle who is the Prince of Philosophers or simply The Prince of Philosophers believ'd that the Original of the Nerves was in the Heart we have no reason to tell him this is false because Aristotle was not the best of Philosophers for it is enough that he has follow'd in this the common opinion though it were false But if a Man should say That Gassendus who is the most Learned of Philosophers believ'd that there was a Vacuum in nature we may with reason dispute the Title which he would give Gassendus and make him responsible for the falshood couch'd in that incident proposition A Man may be also accus'd of Falshood who gives to the same person a Title which is not suitable to him yet not be blam'd for giving him another Title which is less true and less agreeable For example Pope John the XII was neither Holy nor Chast nor Pious As Baronius acknowledges for tho' they who call'd him most Holy could not be tax'd of falshood yet they who call'd him most Chast and Pious were very great Liars though they did it by Incident Propositions as if they had said John the XII the most Chast Pope decree'd such a thing This is what I had to say concerning incident Propositions where the Pronouns Who or Which are explicative as to those other where the Pronouns are determinative as Men who are Pious Kings who love their Subjects certain it is they are not liable to falshood because the predicate of the Incident Proposition is not affirm'd of the Subject to which the Pronoun relates For example should it be said That such Judges as do nothing for favour or reward are worthy of applause it is not therefore affirm'd that there are any such Judges who are so upright Nevertheless I believe there is always in these Propositions a tacit and virtual Affirmation not of the actual Congruity of the Predicate with the Subject to which the Pronoun relates but of the possible Congruity And if there be any deceit in this we may rationally conclude there is a falshood in the Incident Propositions As if it had been said Souls that are square are more solid than those which are round here the Idea's of Square and Round being Incompatible with the Idea of a Soul taken for the principle of Thought I judg that those Incident Propositions ought to pass for false And hence it may be said that the greatest part of our errors proceed For having the Idea of a thing we frequently join to it another incompatible Idea and by that means attribute to the same Idea that which is not suitable to it Thus finding in our selves two Ideas one of the thinking Substance another of the extended Substance it frequently happens that when we consider our Soul which is the thinking Substance we insensibly intermix something of the Idea of the extended Substance as when we imagine that the Soul fills up a space like the Body and that it could not be at all if it were no where which are not Properties that belong to a Body Whence arose that Impious error of the Mortality of the Soul We may read an
excellent discourse of St. Austin upon this Subject in his tenth Book of the Trinity where he shews that there is nothing so easy as to know the nature of our Soul But that which confounds men is this that being desirous to know it they are not satisfied with what they know without any great trouble that is to say that it is a Substance that thinks desires doubts and knows but they add to what it is what it is not fancying the Soul under some of those Phantosms under which they were wont to conceive Corporeal things On the other side when we consider Bodies we have much adoe to abstain from intermixing something of the Idea of the Substance that thinks hence we affirm that heavy things tend to the Center of Plants that they seek for proper nourishment of Crisis's in Diseases that it is nature that goes about to discharge it self of what is baneful and a thousand other Whimseys More especially in our Bodies that Nature has an Inclination to do this or that when we are assur'd that we have no such desire nor ever had any such thought and that it is ridiculous to imagine that there is within us any other thing then our selves that knows what is good or hurtful for us that desires the one and eschews the other I believe moreover that we are to attribute to these incompatible Ideas all those murmurings of Men against the Deities for it would be impossible to murmur against God if we conceiv'd him aright as he is altogether Wise Omnipotent and all Goodness But the Ungodly considering him as Omnipotent and the Sovereign Lord of all the World attribute to him all the misfortunes that befall 'em wherein they are not deceiv'd but because at the same time they apprehend him to be cruel and unjust which is incompatible with his goodness they impiously inveigh against him as the Author of the miseries which they suffer CHAP. VI. Of Complex Propositions according to Affirmation and Negation of one sort of those kinds of Propositions which the Philosophers call Modal BEsides those Propositions where the Subject or Attribute is a Term Complex there are also others that are Complex because there are Terms or incident Propositions which only regard the form of the Proposition that is the Affirmation or Negation which is express'd by the Verb as if I should say I affirm that the Earth is round Here I affirm is only an incident Proposition which ought to make a part of something in the principal Proposition Nevertheless it is visible that it makes no part either of the Subject or of the Attribute for they suffer no alteration as being understood as entirely as if I should simply aver the Earth is round So that the incident Proposition falls only upon the Affirmation which is express'd in two manners the one most commonly by the Verb Est the Earth is round and the other expresly by the Verb I maintain So when they say I deny it it is true it is not true Or when they add in one Proposition that which supports the Truth as when I say The Reasons of Astronomy convince us that the Sun is much bigger then the Earth For the first part is only a support of the Argument Nevertheless it is of great Moment to know that there are a sort of these Propositions which are Ambiguous and which may be taken differently according to the design of the Propounder As when I say all Philosophers assure us that heavy things fall of themselves Now if it be my Intention to shew that heavy things fall down of themselves the first part of this Proposition will be only Incident and will only support the affirmation of the latter part But if I intend to report this opinion of the Philosophers without approving it then the first part will be the principal Proposition and the last will only be a part of the Attribute For so I affirm not only that heavy things fall of themselves but that all Philosophers assert it And it is easily seen that these two ways of changing the proposition alter it in manner that it becomes two different Propositions and different in Sence But it is easy to judg by the Consequence in which of the two Senses the Propositions are to be taken For Example the Proposition being laid down I should add But Stones are heavy therefore they fall down of themselves would be plain that I had taken the first Sence and that the first part was only Incident On the other side if I should conclude thus Now this is an Error and by consequence an Error may be taught by the Philosophers then it would be manifest that I had taken the Proposition in the second Sence that is that the first part will be the principal Proposition and the second part only the predicate As for Complex Propositions where the Complexity falls upon the verb and not upon the Subject nor the Predicate Philosophers have particularly taken notice of those that are called Modal because the Affirmation or Negation is modified by one of the four Modes Possible Contingent Impossible Necessary And because every Mode may be affirm'd or denied as it is possible it is not possible and in both manners be join'd with the Affirmative or Negative Proposition every Mode may have four Propositions and the four together sixteen which are denoted by these four words PVRPVREA ILIACE AMABIMVS EDENTVLI of which this is the Mistery Every Syllable marks one of the four Modes 1. Possible 2. Contingent 3. Impossible 4. Necessary And the Vowels in every Syllable which are A. E. I. or U. denotes whether the Mode be affirm'd or denied and whether the Proposition which they call the Thing said ought to be denied or affirm'd in this manner A. The Affirmation of the Mode and the Affirmation of the Proposition E. The Affirmation of the Mode and denial of the Proposition I. The denial of the Mode and Affirmation of the Proposition U. The denial of the Mode and denial of the Negation It would be lost time to produce Examples which are easily found out We are only to observe that PVRPVREA answers to the A of Propositions Incomplex ILIACE to the E. AMABIMVS to the I. EDENTVLI to the U. So that if we intend the Example should be true having chosen a Subject we must take for Purpurea an Attribute that may be universally affirm'd For Iliace one that may be universally denied For Amabimus one that may be affirm'd particularly and for Edentili one that may be denied particularly But whatever Predicate we take this is always certain that all the four Propositions of the same word have always the same Sence so that one being true all the rest are true CHAP. VII Of several sorts of Compos'd Propositions WE have already said that compos'd Propositions have either a double Subject or a double Predicate Now of these there are two sorts One where the Composition is expresly mark'd the rest
false tho we may oppose certain Instances wherein they may stray from the Truth but to be satisfy'd if they may be extended from others beyond their just limits that they ought not to be taken too rigorously according to the Letter 2. OBSERVATION There are some Propositions that ought to pass for Metaphysically Universal tho they may admit of Exceptions that is when those Exceptions are exotic and such as according to common use are not comprehended in those Universal Terms As when I say All Men have two Arms. This Proposition ought to pass for true according to ordinary use And it would be but mere brangling to oppose against it that there have been Monsters who were Men though they had four Arms. It being plain that there was nothing intended concerning Monsters in these general Propositions and that the only meaning of the Assertion was that according to the order of Nature all Men had two Arms. In like manner it may be said that all Men make use of words to express their thoughts but that all Men do not make use of writing Nor would it be a rational Objection to contradict the truth of the Proposition by instancing dumb People because it is evident though the sence be not express'd in words that it was not meant of such as had a natural impediment to make use of sounds either clude it will not be amiss to speak of another sort of Knowledge which ofttimes is no less certain nor less evident in its manner then that which we draw from Authority For there are two general ways by which we know a Thing to be true The first is the knowledge which we have by our selves whether we have attain'd it by Observation or Ratiocination whether by our Sences or by our Reason which may be generally term'd Reason in regard the Sences themselves depend upon the judgment of Reason or Knowledge the word being here more generally taken than in the Schools for all manner of knowledge of an object drawn from the same object The other way is the Authority of Persons worthy of credit who assure us that a thing is so Tho of our selves we know nothing of it Which is call'd Faith or Belief according to the words of St. Austin for what we know we owe to reason for what we believe to Authority But as this Authority may be of two sorts either from God or Men so there are two sorts of Faith Divine and Human. Divine Faith cannot be Subject to error because that God can neither deceive us nor be deceiv'd Human Faith is of its self subject to error for all Men are Lyars according to Scripture And because it may happen that he who shall assure us of the certainty of a thing may be deceiv'd himself Nevertheless as we have already observ'd there are some things which we know not but by a Human Faith which nevertheless we ought to believe for as certain and unquestionable as if they were Mathematically demonstrated As that which is known by the constant relation of so many Persons that it is morally impossible they should ever have conspir'd to affirm the same things if they were not true For example Men have been naturally most averse from conceiving any Antipodes nevertheless though we never were in those places and know nothing of any Antipodes but by human Faith he must be a Fool that does not believe ' em And he must be out of his wits who questions whether ever there were any such Persons as Caesar Pompey Cicero or Virgil or whether they were not feigned Names as Amadis de Gaul True it is that it is a difficult thing to know when Human Faith has attain'd to this same assurance and this is that which leads Men astray into two such opposite Deviations So that some believe too slightly upon the least report Others ridiculously make use of all the force of their wit to annul the belief of things attested by the greatest authority when it thwarts the prejudice of their understanding And therefore certain Limits are to be assign'd which Faith must exceed to obtain this assurance and others beyond which there is nothing but uncertainty leaving in the middle a certain space where we shall meet with certainty or uncertainty as we approach nearer to the one or the other of these Bounds Now then if we do but compare the two general ways by which we believe a thing to be true Reason and Faith certain it is that Faith always supposes some Reason For as St. Austin says in his 122. Epistle and in several other places we could never bring our selves to believe that which is above our reason if reason it self had not perswaded us that there are some things which we do well to believe tho' we are not capable to apprehend 'em Which is principally true in respect of Divine Faith For true Reason teaches us that God being truth it self he cannot deceive us in what he reveals to us concerning his Nature and his Mysteries whence it appears that though we are oblig'd to captivate our Understanding in obedience to Faith as saith St. Paul yet we do it neither blindly nor unreasonably which is the original of all false Religions but with a knowledg of the Cause and for that it is but a reasonable Act to Captivate our selves to the Authority of God when he has given us sufficient Proofs such as are his Miracles and other Prodigious Accidents which oblige us to believe that he himself has discovered to Men the Truths which we are to believe As certain it is in the second Place that divine Faith ought to have a greater Power over our Understanding then our own Reason And that upon this Dictate of Reason it self that the more certain is to be prefer'd before the less certain and that is more certain which God assures us to be true then that which Reason perswades us when it is more contrary to the Nature of God to deceive us then the nature of our own Reason to be deceiv'd CHAP. XIII Certain Rules for the guidance of Reason the belief of Events that depend upon Human Faith THE most customary use of sound Judgment and that faculty of the Soul by which we discern Truth from falshood is not employ'd in speculative Sciences about which so few Persons are oblig'd to spend their time and yet there is no occasion wherein it is more frequently to be made use of and where it s more necessary then in that Judgment which we ought to make of what passes every day among Men. I do not speak of judging whether an Action be good or bad worthy of applause or reproof for that belongs to the regulation of Morallity but of judging of the Truth or Falshood of human Events which may only be referr'd to Logic whether we consider 'em as past as when we only endeavour to know whether we ought to believe 'em or not or whether we consider 'em as being to come
as when we fear or hope they will come to pass which regulates our hopes and our fears Certain it is that some Reflexions may be made upon this Subject which perhaps may not be altogether unprofitable or rather may be of great use for the avoiding of certain Errors into which most People fall because they do not sufficiently study the Rules of Reason The first Reflexion is that there is a vast difference to be made between two sorts of Truths the one that only relates to the nature of things and their Immutable Essences abstracted from their existence the other that relates to things existent that relate to human and contingent events which may or may not come to pass when we speak of the future and may probably never have been when we talk of what is past I speak this with reference to their next causes making an abstraction of their Immutable order in Divine Providence because on the one side it does not hinder Contingence and on the other side being unknown to us it contributes nothing to make us believe the things themselves Now as all things are requisite in truths of the first sort there is nothing sure which is not Universally true and so we must conclude that a thing is false if it be false in any case But if we think to make use of the same Rules in human Events we shall always judg falsly and make a thousand false Arguments For these Events being naturally contingent it would be ridiculous to seek out in them for a necessary Truth And so that person would be altogether void of Reason who would believe nothing of such things unless it were made out to him that it was absolutely necessary they should be so Now would he less deviate from Reason that would require me to believe any particular Event suppose it were the Conversion of the King of China to the Christian Religion upon this only ground because it is not Impossible to be so For seeing that another who should assure me to the contrary may make use of the same Reason it is clear that that reason alone cannot determine me to believe the one rather then the other We must therefore lay it down for a certain and unquestionable Maxim upon this occasion that the Possibillity alone of an Event is not a sufficient reason to make me believe it and that I may have reason also to believe a thing tho I judg it not impossible but that the contrary may have come to pass So that of the Two Events I may rationally believe the one and not the other tho I believe 'em both possible How then shall we resolve to believe the one rather than the other if we judg 'em both possible Observe the following Rule To judge of the Truth of an Event and to perswade my self into a Resolution to believe or not to believe a thing it must not be consider'd nakedly and in it self like a Proposition in Geometry but all the circumstances that accompany it as well internal as external are to be weigh'd with the same consideration I call Internal Circumstances such as belong to the Fact it self and external those that relate to the Persons whose Testimonies induce us believe it This being done if all the Circumstances are such that it never or very rarely happens that the same Circumstances are accompany'd with Falshood Our Understanding naturally carrys to believe the thing to be true and there is a reason for so doing especially in the Conduct of the Actions of our Life that never requires a greater assurance than a moral Certainty and which is satisfy'd upon most occasions with a great Probability But on the other side if these Circumstances are such as are frequently accompany'd with Falshood Reason requires us to suspend our Belief or that we should look upon as false what is told us when we see no likelyhood that it should be true tho we do not find any absolute Impossibility For Example we demand whether the History of the Baptism of Constantine by Silvester be true or false Baronius believes it true but Cardinal Perron Bishop Spondanus Petavius Morinus and the most eminent of the Roman Church believe it false Now if we insist upon the sole Possibility we have no reason to reject Baronius For his opinion contains nothing absolutely impossible and to speak absolutely it is also possible that Eusebius who affirms the contrary affirm'd an untruth in favour of the Arrians and that the Fathers that follow'd him were deceiv'd by his Testimony But if we make use of the Rule already laid down which is to consider what are the Circumstances both of the one and the other Baptism of Constantine and which are those that carry the greatest marks of Truth we shall find 'em to be the latter For on the one side there is no great reason to rely upon the Testimony of a Writer as fabulous as the Author of the Acts of Sylvester who is the only person of Antiquity who has spoken of Constantin's being baptiz'd at Rome And on the other side there is no liklihood that a Person so Serious and Learned as Eusebius should presume to report an untruth relating to a thing so remarkable as the Baptism of the first Emperor that restor'd the Church to her Liberty and which ought to have been spread over all the World at the same time that he wrote which was not above four or five Hundred years after the Death of the said Emperor Nevertheless there is an Exception to this Rule by which we ought to be satisfied with possibillity or likelihood That is when an action which is otherwise sufficiently attested is contradicted by Incongruities and apparent contrarieties with other Histories For then it suffices that the Solutions brought to enervate these Repugnancies be possible and probable and it would be unreasonable to require other positive Proofs for that the Act it self being sufficiently prov'd it is not equitable to require that we should prove all the Circumstances in the same manner Otherwise we might call in question a thousand most certain Histories which we cannot make agree with others of less Authority but by Conjectures which it is impossible to prove positively For example we cannot bring to an agreement what is deliver'd in the Kings and Chronicles concerning the years of the Reigns of several of the Kings of Juda and Israel but by assigning to some of the Kings two beginnings of their Reigns the one during the Life of the Reigning Prince and the other after the decease of their Parents Now if it be ask'd what Proof we have that such a Prince raign'd for some time with his Father we must confess there is none Positive But it suffices that it is a thing Possible and which has often come to pass at other times to make it Lawful for us to suppose it as a Cicumstance necessary to reconcile Histories otherwise certain And therefore there is nothing more ridiculous
in the Golden Legend or the Metaphrast In regard those Books are so full of Fables that there is nothing to be credited upon their Authority As Cardinal Bellarmin has made no scruple to confess of the last But I affirm that every Man of Sence bating his Piety ought to acknowledge for true the Miracles which St Austin recites in his Confessions and his Book de Civitate Dei some of which he saw and others of which he was inform'd by the Persons themselves in whose sight they were wrought As of the Blind Man cur'd at Milan before all the People by touching the Relics of St. Gervace and Protasius which he reports in his Confession and of which he speaks in the 22d Book de Civitate Dei cap. 8. A certain Miracle was wrought at Milan when we were there when a Blind Man was restor'd to his sight which could not be unknown to Thousands For it is a large City and there was then the Emperor and the thing was done before a vast Multitude of People crowding to the Bodies of the Martyrs St. Gervase and Protasius Of a Woman cur'd in Africa by Flowrs that had touch'd the Relics of St. Stephen as he testifies in the same Book Of a Lady of Quality cur'd of a Cancer by the sign of the Cross which she caus'd to be made upon the Soar by one that was newly Baptiz'd according to a Revelation which she had had Of a Child that dy'd unbaptiz'd whose restoration to Life the Mother obtain'd by her prayers to St. Peter in the strength of her Faith invoking him in these words Holy Martyr restore me my Son thou knowest I ask his Life for no other reason but because he should not be eternally separated from God Now if these things may be suppos'd to have happen'd as they are related there is no rational Person but must acknowledge these things to be the Finger of God So that all their Incredulity could do would be to doubt of the Testimony of St. Austin and to believe him a falsifyer of the Truth to gain a Veneration of the Christian Religion among the Pagans Which is that which they have no colour to imagine First because it is not likely that a Person of his judgment would have told an untruth in things so public wherein he might have been convinc'd of falshood by infinite Numbers of Testimonies which would have redounded to the Ignominy of the Christian Religion Secondly because there was never any Person more a profess'd Enemy of Falshood then this Holy Man especially in matters of Religion having made it the work of entire Treatises to prove that it is not only unlawful to tell a lie but a thing so detestable that it is not to be made use of though for the Conversion of Men to the Christian Faith I have the more enlarg'd my self upon this remarkable example of the judgment that is to be made of the Truth of Actions to serve as a Rule upon the like occasions because we most commonly deviate in those things For every one thinks that it is sufficient for the decision of these to make a common Place which for the most part is only compos'd of Maxims which not only are not Universally True but not so much as probable when they are joyn'd with the particular Circumstances of Actions that fall under Examination And therefore Circumstances are to be compar'd and consider'd together not consider'd a part For it often happens that an Act which is not very probable in one Circumstance ought to be esteem'd and taken for certain according to other Circumstances And on the other side an Action which appears to us true according to one Circumstance which is usually joyn'd with truth ought to be deem'd false according to other weakning Circumstances as we shall make out in the following Chapter CHAP. XV. Other Remarks upon the same Subject of the Beleif of Events THere is yet one other Remark of great Moment to make upon the Belief of Events Which is that among those Circumstances which we ought to consider that we may know whether credit be to be given to the Fact or no there are some which we may call common Circumstances because they frequently occur and are far oftner joyn'd to Truth then Falshood and then if they be not Counter-ballanc'd by other particular Circumstances that ruin the motives of belief drawn from common Circumstances we have reason to believe those events if not to be certain yet at least to be probable which probability is sufficient when we are bound to pronounce our opinion in such cases For as we ought to be satisfy'd with a moral assurance in things not capable of Metaphysical certainty so when we cannot obtain a full moral assurance the best we can do when we are to resolve is to embrace the most probable for it would be contrary to reason to embrace the least probable But if on the other side these common Circumstances which would have induc'd us to believe a thing be joyn'd with other particular Circumstances that ruin the motives of belief drawn from common Circumstances or be such as are rarely found without falsehood we are not then any longer to believe that event But either we remain in suspence if the particular Circumstances enfeeble the weight of common Circumstances or we believe the action to be false if the Circumstances are such as are usually the marks of Falshood For example it is a common Circumstance for many Contracts to be sign'd by two public Notaries that is by two public Persons whose chiefest Interest it is to be just and true in their employments because not only their Conscience and Reputation but their Lives and Estates lie at Stake This consideration alone is sufficient if we know no other particularities of the contract to make us believe that the Contract is not Antidated Not but that it might be so but because it is certain that of a Thousand Contracts Nine Hundred Ninety Nine are not So that it is infinitely more probable that this contract is one of the Nine Hundred Ninety Nine then the only Antidated Contract of a Thousand So that if withal the integrity of the Notary that sign'd it be known to me I shall most certainly believe that there is no foul play in the Writing But if to this common Circumstance of being sign'd by two Notaries there are joyn'd other particular Circumstances as that the Notaries are Persons of no Conscience or Reputation so that they might be instrumental in falsifying the deed yet shall not this make me conclude that the deed is antidated But if besides all these I can discover other proofs of the Antidate either by Witnesses or convincing Arguments as the inability of the Person to lend Twenty Thousand Crowns at a time when it shall be demonstrable that he had not a Hundred in cash I will then resolve to beleive the contract to be falsify'd and it were unreasonable for any Person to