which is the only way to perceive their agreement or disagreement And Self evident Principles or Propositions and the use that can be made of them to help us to Certainty are so far from having any opposition to the way of Ideas that neither their Truth can be known nor any Profitable Use with respect to Truth be made of them but by the way of Ideas § VI. The second Charge produced against this Proposition is That it is of dangerous consequence to and inconsistent with the Articles of the Christian Faith This Charge seems to be grounded on the last words of Mr. Lock 's Proposition viz. As expressed in any Proposition Now some Propositions come to us by Divine Revelation and several of these Propositions are such we cannot perceive by comparing the Ideas signify'd by the words of which they consist that they do so agree or disagree as the Propositions do express It follows therefore from Mr. Lock 's Proposition that we cannot be certain of or know the Truth of those Propositions and this is said to be inconsistent with or of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith but I cannot understand for what reason it is said to be so For as the truth of all Propositions come they to us by what way soever consists in what hath been before mentioned so our being certain of or knowing the truth of any Proposition let it come to us by what way soever must consist in that wherein our being certain of or knowing the truth of any Proposition doth consist For the way how a Proposition is brought to us doth not alter its nature consider'd as a Proposition nor the nature of Certainty or Knowledge which are fixed and unchangeable and always the same and therefore cannot make Certainty or Knowledge of its truth to consist in any thing but what Certainty or Knowledge of the truth of a Proposition brought to us some other way doth consist in If it shall now be ask'd Whether seeing there are certain Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation and we cannot perceive that the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas signify'd by the words in those Propositions is such as the Propositions express Mr. Lock 's Proposition is not inconsistent with and of dangerous consequence to those Articles of the Christian Faith I answer That when an account is given of the determined Ideas for which those phrases inconsistent with and of dangerous consequence do stand whether they are used in different senses or both be designed to signify one and the same thing And what that or those precise Ideas are which are meant by them distinct and proper Answers may be given to the Question or Questions propounded If by inconsistent with those Articles is meant inconsistent with the truth of those Articles and so the Question amounts to this Whether that Proposition of Mr. Locks can be true and those Articles true too The Answer is Yes very well for the truth of those Propositions doth not depend on our being certain of or knowing the truth of them If by inconsistent with those Articles be meant that we cannot be certain of or know the truth of those Articles then the Question will be Whether it will not follow from Mr. Lock 's Proposition that we cannot be certain of or know the truth of those Articles To which the Answer is Yes But the Proposition for all that is inconsistent enough with those Articles tho' it cannot conâ—ist well with Peoples pretending to know what God hath set out of their reach and which they cannot attain to know It is no wrong at all to those Articles to say we cannot be certain of or know the truth of them it is a speaking of the truth and an attributing unto them the preâ—eminence which God hath given them If Peâ—sons are resolv'd they will use this phrase inconsistent with Articles of the Christian Faith in this sense there is no help for it yet Mr. Lock 's Proposition will continue true and cannot do any injury to any one Article of the Christian Faith But what will become then may some say of those Articles of the Christian Faith or of those Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation and the truth of which we cannot be certain of or know Answer They will continue just as they are very great even Divine and Incomprehensible Truths and they are to have all the Entertainment given them by us that Divine Revelation designs they should have Whatever Propositions are brought to us by Divine Revelation and proposed to us by it to be the Objects of our Knowledge they are so formed that we may perceive that the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas signified by the words of which they do consist is such as the Propositions express And we have no other way to be certain of or to know the truth of those Propositions but by perceiving that the Ideas do so agree or disagree as the Propositions express But as for those Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelations and are such that we cannot perceive that the Ideas signify'd by the woâ—ds of which they consist have such agreement or disagreement as the Propositions express they are not proposed to us by Divine Revelation to be Objects of our Knowledge but only of our Faith And tho' we do not nor can know or be certain of the truth of these Propositions yet if we do firmly and with full assurance believe them to be true because we have good satisfaction that God hath revealed them and if our belief of their truth hath all that efficacy and influence on us which Divine Revelation requires we do fully answer the design of Divine Revelation with respect to these Articles of the Christian Faith But is not Faith may some say a Reasonable Act Yes But all reasonable Assent is not Certainty or Knowledge My assent to the truth of a Proposition or my believing it to be true is a Reasonable Act not because I am certain or do know that it is true but because my Assent is founded on such Evidence that it is true as is every way sufficient to justifie my Assenting to it There cannot be a more Reasonable Act than to believe the truth of that Proposition which we are on good grounds satisfied is declared to be true by that God who cannot Lye Let any Man produce a Proposition that Divine Revelation hath brought to Light and make it appear to me that it came to Men by Divine Revelation I shall believe it or assent most firmly to the truth of it tho' I cannot know the truth of it and my doing so will be a most Reasonable Act because my assent will be grounded on Divine Testimony But let that Person or any other Persons frame another Proposition in Philosophical Terms concerning the same matter and then pretend that that Proposition declares something more concerning that matter than God hath revealed concerning it
if I cannot perceive that the Ideas signify'd by the words of that Proposition do agree or disagree as the Proposition expresses I cannot be certain or know that the Proposition is true nor will my assenting to the truth of it upon his or their saying it is true be a Reasonable Act. For the Proposition being about a matter out of his or their reach I have not sufficient evidence to assure me that it is true yet notwithstanding the latter Proposition doth consist of different words from the former if it be declared that neither more nor less is meant by these words than is signify'd by those in the other Proposition I can assent to the truth of it and my assent will be a Reasonable Act because tho' they are two distinct Propositions consider'd as to the words yet as to sense they are but one and exactly the same Well but at this rate what becomes of the Certainty of Faith Answer Certainty and Faith are two words which stand for or signifie two distinct Acts of the Mind and they can no more be properly affirmed of one another than those distinct Acts can be said to be one and the same Indeed a Person may use the word Certainty or Knowledge if he please for Assent grounded upon probable Evidence or for Assent founded on Authority or for any other Idea he hath a mind to call by that Name and if he certifies what the Idea is he hath a mind to signifie by that word his Discourse may be Intelligible if he constantly use the word in that sense But if he will oppose another Person who hath declared that he useth the word Certainty and Knowledge strictly taken in the same sense and doth not declare that he takes the word Certainty in another sense his Discourse will unavoidably be very obscure if not perfectly unintelligible For it will be presumed he useth the word in that sense in which the other Person had declared he did use it when all the while he means another thing by it § VII When it is said that Mr. Lock 's Proposition is of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith if something else is signify'd by it than what was meant by the former phrase a distinct Account should be given of what is intended by this phrase If any shall pretend that the true and just consequence of Mr. Lock 's Proposition is this That the Arcles of the Christian Faith are not to be believed the Proposiâ—ion preâ—ended to be deduced is a very wicked Proposition But then it is as plain and certain as any thing can be That it can no way be drawn from Mr. Lock 's Proposition which has no relation at all to any Articles of Faith or Belief eiâ—her Christian or other If Mr. Lock 's Proposition can concern or affect any Christian Articles they must be Articles of Christian Knowledge not of Christian Faith And his Proposition is so far from being of dangerous consequence to Articles of Christian Knowledge that it gives the true Account wherein the knowledge of those Articles doth consist as will most evidently appear when any of those Articles shall be instanced in and considered If it shall be pretended that from Mr. Lock 's Proposition it may be regularly inferred That no Man ought to believe that any Proposition is true but what he can attain to know the truth of and that he ought not to assent to the truth of it till he attains to be certain of or to know the truth of it and that this is what is meant when it is said to be of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith then in the first place it is to be acknowledged that the Proposition intended to be regularly deduced from the other is certainly of most dangerous consequence to those Persons who shall â—ufâ—er themselves to be enslaved by it and this with respect to Articles of the Christian Faith But then in the second place it is great Injustice to charge Mr. Lock 's Proposition with that which can only in Justice be laid to the charge of another Proposition especially to do so before it is proved and made to appear that that dangerous Proposition can regularly be inferred from Mr. Lock 's Proposition which is a point altogether uncapable of being proved for there is no possibility of shewing any connection between them The two Propositions are as far distant from one another as the East is from the West From what hath been already said I think it may with reason enough be concluded that the principal Accusations advanced against Mr. Lock 's Proposition are altogether groundless § VIII Certainty or Knowledge did and will always consist in what Mr. Lock declares it doth consist and the way to attain Certainty was always by comparing Ideas What measures of knowing soever those have who speak most slightingly of the way of Ideas all their knowledge is owing to it how little soever they are aware of it or how strongly soever they are inclined to attribute it to something else There were Persons in all Ages who attained to certain measures of knowledge and were never able to declare distinctly and fully how they came by their Knowledge They generally stopped in their Accounts at the Artificial Methods whereby they were assisted in comparing of Ideas tho' they took no notice of that which was the true and natural way by which they perceived their agreement or disagreement and obtained knowledge Mr. Lock is the first Person I have heard of who hath observed and acquainted the World in what Knowledge or Certainty doth consist By which discovery he hath done Mankind so great a kindness in directing Men plainly to the most certain easie â—and speedy way to attain Knowledge so far as they are capable of it And how to bound their Enquiries so as not to spend their Labours in fruitless Endeavours to know what is out of Humane reach and what they can never attain to certainty in that Men will never be able to pay him thanks enough for the good Offices he hath done to the World nor to testifie sufficient Praises unto God for the Light and Favour he hath reached forth and imparted unto Mankind by him § IX The second passage which hath been thought faulty in Mr. Lock ' s Essay of Humane Understanding is this We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking but possibly shall never be able tâ— know whether any meer Material Being thinks oâ— no it being impossible for us by the contemplation of our own Ideas without Revelation to discover whether Omnspotency has not given to some Systemâ— of Matter fitly disposed a Power to perceive anâ— think or else joyned and fixed to Matter so disposed a thinking immaterial Substance It being in respecâ— of our Notions not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can if he pleases superadd to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking than that he should
SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE Principal Objections AND ARGUMENTS Which have been Publish'd against Mr. Lock 's Essay OF HUMANE UNDERSTANDING By SAMVEL BOLD Rector of Steeple Dorset Re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus Cic. de Fin. l. 3. LONDON Printed for A. and I. Churchill at the Black Swan in Pater-Noster-Row 1699. SOME CONSIDERATIONS On the Principal Objections and Arguments Which have been Publish'd against Mr. Lock 's Essay of Humane Vnderstanding § I. IT is no Disparagement I conceive to any Book nor an Attributing more to Mr. Lock 's Essay of Humane Understanding than it most justly deserves to say That Essay is a Book the best Adapted of any I know to serve the Interest of Truth Natural Moral and Divine And that it is the most Worthy most Noble and best Book I ever read excepting those which were writ by Persons Divinely inspir'd This excellent Treatise having been published several Years and received through all the Learned World with very great Approbation by those who understood English a mighty Out cry was at last all on the sudden raised against it here at Home There was no doubt some reason or other why so many hands should be employed just at the same time to Attack and Batter this Essay tho' what was the weighty consideration which put them all in motion may perhaps continue a long time a Secret Several Persons have discovered their Inclination to find fault with this Treatise by nibbling at several passages in it which it appears they did not understand and concerning which they have been at a loss how to express themselves Intelligibly Some have spoken handsomly of the Author others have treated that Incomparable Gentleman with a rudeness peculiar to some who make a Profession of the Christian Religion and seem to pride themselves in being of the Clergy of the Church of England But whatever Reputation may accrue to them on either of those accounts their Conduct doth not contribute any thing to the Honour either of the one or of the other § II. The principal Passages in this excellent Treatise which have been insisted on as faulty are these two First Certainty of Knowledge is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Proposition This saith Mr. Lock we usually call Knowing or being certain of the Truth of any Proposition Essay of Humane Understanding B. 4. c. 6. § 3. Secondly We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking but possibly shall never be able to know whether any meer natural Being thinks or no it being impossible for us by the contemplation of our own Ideas without Revelation to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed a power to perceive and think or else joined and fixed to Matter so disposed a thinking immaterial Substance It being in respect of our Notions not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can if he pleases super-add to our Idea of Matter a faculty of thinking than that he should super-add to it another substance with a faculty of thinking since we know not wherein thinking consists nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power which cannot be in any created Being but meerly by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator Essay c. B. 4. c. 3. § 6. To which I will add the better to shew Mr. Lock ' s sense the following words which he immediately subjoyns on this occasion which those who have thought fit to excepâ— against what he says here have thought fit always to omit how fairly I will not say Mr. Lock ' s following words are For I see no contradiction in it that the first Eternal thinking Being or Omnipotent Spirit should if he pleased give to certain Systems of created senseless Matter put together as he thinks fit some degrees of sense perception and thought tho' as I think I have proved lib. 4. c. 10. it is no less than a contradiction to suppose Matter which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought should be that Eternal first thinking Being § III. Against the first passage viz. Certainty of Knowledge is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Proposition There are two Charges exhibited First That the Proposiâ—ion is not true In consequence of which the way of Ideas is condemned as no way at all to Certainty or Knowledge and in opposition to the way of Ideas we are told That to argue or make Inferences from Maxims is the way to Knowledge or Certainty Secondly That the Proposition is inconsistent with and of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith § IV. First It is said that the Proposition is not true Now in oâ—der to make a right determination whether the Proposition be true or no it may be â—it to consider in what the Truth of a Proposition doth consist For I suppose it will be allowed that our being certain of or knowing the Truth of a Proposition doth consist in our perceiving that wherein the truth of the Pâ—oposition doâ—h consist otherwise we may know or be certain that a Proposition is true tho' it be not tâ—ue which carries such a sound with it I conceive few will be ambitious to grant it whatever way they take to attain to Certainty The truth of a Proposition consists in words being so put together in the Proposition as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas they stand for as really it is This Mr. Lock calls Certainty of Truth just before those words in his Book which are pretended to be faâ—lty This passage I take for granted will be permitted to pass for true not only because no objâ—ction hath been started against it after so strict a scrutiny to find out something from whence a colour might be taken to give the Book an ill Name but because otherwise it must be owned that a Proposition may be true tho' it is not true or tho' the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas signified by the terms which make up the Proposition is not such as the Proposiâ—ion doth express And if the truth of a Proposition doth consist in what hath been related it is most evident that our being certain of or knowing the truth of a Proposition must consist in our perceiving that the Ideas for which the words which make up the Proposition or of which the Proposition doth consist do stand do so agree or disagâ—ee as the Proposition doth express For there is no way by which we can attain to be certain or to know that the Ideas do so agree or disagree as the Proposition doth declare they do but by perceiving that they do so agree or disagree unless certainty or knowledge of the truth of Propositions may be had without perception or without perceiving the truth of what is expressed And if it may be had without perceving
the truth of what is expressed perception is of so little moment or use to certainty or knowledge that those who can digest that Notion may easily be of the opinion That Matter considered meerly as an extended bulky figur'd Substance may be certain of or know the truth of Propositions tho' it cannot think or perceive This I suppose may suffice to manifest that Mr. Lock 's Proposition is true and consequently that the way of Ideas is a sure and indeed the only way to Cerâ—ainty or Knowledge so far as Men are capable of attaining to know the truth of Propositions Yet because another way to Certainty or Knowledge is proposed in opposition to the way of Ideas viz. The way of Maxims or of Arguing and making or drawing Inferences from Maxims I will briefly consider that way and what opposition it hath to the way of Ideas But several Propositions commonly reputed and looked on as Maxims being not true unless taken in a very limited sense I will change the term Maxims and place Self-evident Propositions in its room Now Self evident Propositions have this in common with other Propositions That they consist of Words which stand for Ideas And there is no way by which a Person can be certain or know the truth of a Proposition we call Self-evident but by perceiving that the Ideas signified by the words of which the Proposition doth consist have such a connection or agreement or repugnancy or disagreement as the Proposition doth express for tho' the Proposition be such that no other Idea is needful or can be made use of to help any Man to a certainty or knowledge that the Proposition is true because the Ideas signified by the words have by an immediate comparison of them a visible agreement or disagreement yet no Person can be certain or can know that the Proposition is true who does not perceive that the Ideas signified by the terms of which the Proposition doth consist do so agree or disagree as the Proposition doth express Nor can it be said to be a Self-evident Proposition to him who doth not perceive that the Ideas do so agree or disagree as the Proposition declares they do And if there can be no way by which Persons can attain to be certain of the truth of those Propositions we call Self-evident but this of perceiving the agreement or disagreement of Ideas as expressed in them the only way by which we can attain to know the truth of other Propositions must be that of comparing Ideas that being the only way whereby we can attain to perceive their agreement or disagreement § V. A Person 's being certain of the truth of a Proposition we call Self-evident doth not make him know the truth of another Proposition It may be a great help to his attaining to know the truth of other Propositions but it will not contribute any other way to his being certain of the truth of other Propositions than as it helps him to perceive that the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas signified by the words which make up those Propositions is such as the Propositions express He that knows the truth of a Self-evident Proposition may by the help of that Proposition easily attain to be certain of the truth of another Proposition which hath an immediate connection with it but his knowledge of the truth of the latter Proposition will consist in his perceiving that the Ideas signified by the words of which it consists have such agreement or disagreement as the Proposition doth express For if he does not perceive that he cannot be certain that the Proposition is true tho' he is most certain that the former Proposition is true If the Proposition he would know the truth of be somewhat remote from the Self evident Proposition by the means of which he may attain to know the truth of it he must make use of intermediate Ideas And wheâ—her the process be from the Proposition to be proved to the Self-evident Proposition or from the Self-evident Propositiâ—n to that he would know the truth of all the intermediate Ideas must have a Self-evident agreement or disagreement with one another throughout the whole train of the Argumentation And this agreement or disagreement must all along in every step be perceived or ceâ—tainty of the truth of the Proposition to be proved cannot be obtained If any one of the intermediate Ideas have not a Self-evident agreement or disagreement with those next unto it or if it have such agreement or disagâ—eement with them but the Person who would know the truth of the Proposition doth not perceive it his knowledge will unavoidably stop there and cannot possibly proceed any furâ—her any more than the parts of a Chain can hang together when one of the Links is broken and lost or than a Person can from One make up the Numâ—er Five and yet leave oâ—t either 2. 3. or 4. This I take to be demonstratively certain unless Certainty or Knowledge may be had without Perception Perhaps it will be pretended that we come to Certainty or Knowledge not by perceiving the agreement or disagreement of Ideas but by Inferring or making Rational Deductions from known Self-evident Principles or Propositions To this I answer That he who doth Rationally infer any thing or makes a Rational Deduction does not do it that by that means he may attain to Certainty or Knowledge but that he may assist and help others to that Knowledge or Certainty he hath already obtained by laying before them in a train of Proposiâ—ions the connection of all the intermediate Iâ—eas whereby the first and the last are tied together For a Person to make a deduction Rationally doth suppose his being Certain or Knowing or perceiving that what he deduces hath such an agreement or disagreement with the Propositions from which he doâ—h deduce it as his Inference doth express If a Man will infer and make deductions Rationally he must antecedently perceive the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas about which he is concerned otherwise he can have no reason to make Deductions And if he does make Deductions and they prove to be Rational it is meerly by chance that they do so and he cannot be properly said to have made them Rationally If a Man will infer and make Deductions at all Adventures before he can be certain that his Inferences are true he must examine them and compare the Ideas in the Proprositions from which he hath deduced them He cannot be certain that his Inferences consider'd barely as Propositions are true any other way than by perceiving that the Ideas signified by the words of which they consist do so agree or disagree as those Propositions express He cannot be certain that they are true consider'd as Inferences any â—â—her way than by perceiving the agreemenâ— or disagreement they have with the Proposiâ—ions from which they were deduced Inferring and making Deductions seems not to me to be the only way to Certainty but comparing Ideas
superadd to it another Subâ—stance with a faculty of Thinking since we know not wherein Thinking consists nor to what sort oâ— Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give thaâ— power which cannot be in any created Being buâ— meerly by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator c. Essay of Humane Understanding B. 4. c. 3. § 6. Against this passage two things are offered First It is suggested that it is not consistent with the Souls Immoâ—tality or at least takes off very much from the evidence of its Immortality Secondly It is pretended that from the Nature of Matter it may be proved to be false § X. First It is suggested that what Mr. Lock hath here said is not consistent with the Souls Immortality or at least takes off very much from the evidence of its Immortality for if what Mr. Lock doth say be true it cannot be Demonstratively proved that the Soul is not Material And if the Soul be nothing but a Material Substance it must be made up as others are of the cohesion of solid and separable parts how minute and invisible soever they be and must be dissolved when Life is ended And it takes off very much from the evidence of Immortality if it depend wholly upon God's giving that which of its own nature it is not capable of Answ. 1. The Immortality of the Soul doth not depend on our knowing or perceiving by demonstrative proof in the way of Reason that it is Immaterial nor doth our having a Rational Perswasion that the Soul is Immortal depend on our knowing that it is Immaterial § XI Mr. Lock doth not say that the Soul is Material He owns that we have the highest degree of probability that it is Immaterial but that we cannot attain to demonstrative Certainty or Knowledge by comparing the Ideas of Matter and Thinking that the Soul is an Immaterial Substance tho' we may this way know that it is a Spiritual Substance What Mr. Lock saith is this We cannot by the contemplation of our own Ideas without Revelation discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed a power to perceive and think or that we cannot demonstrativelâ— prove by meer Principles of Reason or Philosophy either the Materiality or Immateriality of the Soul but that the point is above our Reason and what we cannot be fully assured of but by Divine Revelation For this his Assertion he hath produced some Reasons which havâ— not been proved to be invalid or weak by any of those Authors I have seen who have declared their dislike of this Assertion And if the Reasons he hath given for his Assertion cannot be refuted but are solid and unanswerable it will not be easie to prove that his Assertion may justly be blamed To prove Mr. Lock 's Proposition false either the Materiality or Immateriality of the Soul should be demonstratively proved for he denies that either of them can be demonstratively proved The surest way to prove the falseness of a Proposition which denies that a thing can be demonstrated is to demonstrate that thing I know an Attempt hath been made by one who condemns the way of Ideas as no way at all to Certainty to demonstrate that Matter cannot Think or that God cannot superadd to any System of Matter a Power of Thinking which demonstration is manag'd in the way of Ideas But tho' what is offer'd there for demonstration would sufficiently prove that Solidity is not a Power of Thinking if that needed proof yet I think it doth not afford any sort of evidence that Omnipotency cannot superadd both Solidity and a power of Thinking to one and the same Substance which was the point to be demonstrated Besides the way of Ideas being condemned as no way at all to Certainty those who are of that mind cannot with any reason pretend that what hath been offered for a demonstration of this point is â—eally a demonstration of it For if they can think it to be a Demonstration of the point they cannot avoid being obliged to renounce their other thought and think the quite contrary whether they may judge it proper and convenient to acknowledge the same openly or no. If what hath been offered for a Demonstration of this point be really a Demonstration of it the way of Ideas is undoubtedly a way to Certainty yea and a way to Certainty about a point which I am inclined to think cannot be demonstrated any other way § XII 3. If the Soul were nothing but a material Substance what follows those words in the objection might perhaps pass with some for a plain Truth but for my part I cannot comprehend how any thing that hath life should be nothing but a material Substance for Life is no part of nor hath any necessary connection with the Idea signified by these words Material Substance Nor do I perceive any necessity that a Material Substance endued with Life must lose its Life because by some Accident or within a certain period the gross and sensible parts of it must fall off from those more fine and insensible parts which God hath ordered to be the Seat of Life And those who think they can prove demonstratively that the Soul is a created Immaterial Substance must take heed of affirming that the Soul is nothing but a created Immaterial Substance lest that Assertion prove of dangerous consequence to and inconsistent with the Articles of the Châ—istian Faiâ—h for if the Soul be nothing but a created Immaterial Substance it is not a Spiritual or Thinking Substance for the power of Thinking is a power which God superadds to our Idea whether of Material or created Immaterial Substance and which neither the one nor the other can have but meerly by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator as Mr. Lock most Judiciously and Piously observes But Mr. Lock doth not any where say That the Soul is nothing but a Material Substance or that we cannot know by contemplating our Ideas that the Soul is nothing but a Material Substance Indeed Mr. Lock hath these words We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking but possibly shall never be able to know whether any Material Being thinks or no. From these words Any meer Material Being some may perhaps in their haste have taken occasion to think that Mr. Lock 's Notion was that for ought we could know the Soul might be nothing but a Material Substance To rectifie which mistake I think it may be sufficient to note that meer Material in Mr. Lock 's Sense is not oppos'd to a power of Thinking which we cannot know but God may supperadd to our Idea of Matter but to an Immaterial Substance considered as joyned to a Material Being § XIII 4. It is not very easie to comprehend what is meant by these words It takes off very much from the evidence of Immortality if it depend wholly upon God's giving that which of its own nature it is not capable of For no