the Understanding dictates to the contrary Whereas the Will doth as often fail in Choosing a wrong object which the Understanding acknowledgeth to be Evill as in Not Choosing a Good Object I answer it is true the Will doth often choose what it ought not And yet I affirm that the Wills Errour is onely Negative and not Positive It is Omissive only in not-obeying some directions of the Understanding I shall make it cleer by an Instance Pleasure and Vertue may be Competitors and Rivalls as it were both courting the Will As in an Act Pleasant but Sinnefull The Understanding proposeth Pleasure as quid bonum 't is Good 't is Desirable It proposeth Vertue as quid melius 'T is Better 't is more desirable Now the Will perhaps follows the first direction it imbraceth Pleasure as being Good and so Desirable for Bonum Jucundum is Desirable as well as Bonum Honestum But the second Precept or Direction rather whereby Vertue is proposed as Better and therefore should countermand the formâ—â— this it hears not it follows not If you say the Understanding doth indeed discover some Good though a lesse Good in the Object yet this is not to be accounted the Understandings Practicall Direction dictamen But that the Understanding having examined the Good and the Evill that is in every Act and comparing them together upon this Comparison as it observes the Good or Evill to be more so it prescribes to Doe or Not to Doe Hâ—â— age or Hoc non age And if the Will doe Act when the Understanding Forbids it must be said to perform a Positive Act without direction I answer I admit not the Understandings dictate to be Imperative but onely Declarative It onely informs This is Good This is Evill but Commands not Doe this or Omit it But the Will upon proposall of Good Embraceth it upon proposall of Evill it Rejects it Yet not so but that by Negligence it may Not-embrace Good and notreject Evill And thus the proposall of Pleasure as Good is as truely declarative as the other and this the Will follows But a further declaration whereby it declares that although Pleasure be Good yet it is Evill to embrace this Good because there is a greater Evill annexed This direction by omission it imbraceth not And this I conceive to be the true nature of the Acts of the Will and Understanding If you would have the Will and the Understanding to be the Same and therefore think these distinctions superfluous understand by the Intellect Anima Intelligens by the Will Anima Volens or Anima quatenus Volens and then you are pleased And thus you see How there may be more Knowledge even of Spirituall and Saving Truths and yet lâ—sse Faith Because there may be â—n Asseâ—t a Beleeving in the Understanding which is Knowledge or Historicall Faith without a Fiduciall Trust a Reliance and resting upon it which is the Justifying Faith or the Justifying Act of Faith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 5. But if you speak of a Knowledge peculiar to Gods children wherof others partake not Such a Knowledge of God wherby no man knows him but he that hath him That Knowledge which is Life everlasting This Knowledge and Faith always go together the more there is of One the more also of the Other A Speculative Knowledge whereby we assent to the Truth reveiled is found even in the Devils and that in as large and ample measure I suppose as in the Saints on Earth For I cannot be perswaded but the Devils 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 being Knowing Spirits doe Know and Assent to the Truth of every Proposition that a Child of God knows But there is an Experimentall Knowledge distinct from the former Knowledge of another nature whereby we Know what we know in another Manner We do not only Know that it is so but we Tast and See it to be so A Blind man Knows perhaps that the Sun shines but he doth not Sâ—â— it I Know that at Midnight the Sunne shines to our Antipodes but I doe not See it shine to them I Know that at such a time there is such an I â—lipse visible to such a part of the World yet doe I not See the Eclipse The Confectioner that provides a Banquet Knows that this or that dish is Sweet but they only Tast the Sweetnesse that eat of it A wicked man may Know that God is good as a blind man knows that the Sun shines by the report of others or as an Astronomer knows of an Eclipse before it come by Calculation or rationall Discourse and Illation â—ut he Sâ—es it noâ— he Tasts it not Now we read of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hâ—b 5. 14. som that have their Senses exercised to discern of good and evill there is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Phil. 1. 9. a kind of spirituall Sense whereby we do 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 superâ—a Sâ—pere Relish those things that are above And where there is this spirituall Tast this Experimentall Knowledge there must needs be Faith also For Truths thus cleerly and Sensibly as it werâ— revâ—iled to the Soul it seems noâ— to be in the power of the Will to reject No more then it is in the power of the Eare not to be pleased with harmonious Musick or in the power of the Palat not to be delighted with the Sweetnesse of a Tast And thus I suppose it may appear How far and From what Ground there may be Knowledge without Faith That God is all mercy and sweetnesse to the Divels is no Article of my faith Those miserable creatures saith he cannot consent to it No more can I And yet I deny not that Mercy and Justice are One thing in God Gods Simple Essence is the same with both yet are not They so properly the same with each other The Torment of the Devils proceeds from that Divine Essence which is Love as likewise the Mercies of Gods Children proceed from that Divine Essence which is Justice for the Justice of God is equally himselfe as is his Love Yet may we not say the Torments of those are an effect of Love no more then that the Mercies of these are the effects of Anger yet Both are the effects of that Simple Essence which is Both. It is a far different thing therefore to say A Loving God doth notwithstanding Punish and to say A Loving God doth therefore Punish Punishment and Revenge are sufficiently consistent with Love but not the immediate effects of Love Thus we say Musicus Aedificat yet not his skill in Musick but his skill in Architecture is exercised in Building The Love of God as likewise his Anger Justice Power c. is I confesse the Divine Essence we allow no Accidents in God at all quicquid est in Deo est Deus But I ask Whether he think this Attribute Love and so of the rest to be an Adequate expression of that whole Essence
wee should make Reason and Faith the Same that there is to make the Faculty and the Habit the Same Reason is a Faculty Faith a Habit Now a Faculty and a Habit I have before sayd not to be res res but res modus Their Physicall Difference therefore I mean if you consider Faith and Reason in the same man is but Modall But it doth not follow from hence That they differ not in Nature For though an Habit have not Entitatem Rei distinct from the Faculty yet it hath Entitatem Modi so that the Habit is not a Faculty neither is the Faculty an Habit. To enquire of a Physicall Identity and of a Metaphysicall or Formall Identity are quaere's farre distinct The Faith of Peter is Really and Physically distinct from the Faith of Paul and yet their Metaphysicall Formall nature is exactly the Same Again all the Modall Beings in the same subject though their Essence and Nature be never so distinct v. g. Duration Augmentation Situation c in the same man be Really the same for neither of them being Modi have any Entitatem Rei beside the Entity of their common Subject and so cannot make a Reall distinction because there is not res res Yet each Modus hath a distinct Formall nature of its own The nature of a Figure is not the nature of a Habit though both in the same Subject But yet though it doe not follow from that Reall Identity between Res Modus that the Nature of Reason and the Nature of Faith be the same Yet if he change but the terms and say in stead of Reason that Knowledge and Faith are the same in nature I will not contend So that he mean Faith as it is an Act or Habit of the Vnderstanding and not of the Will For so Faith is an Assent to a Truth reveiled the same individuall Assent to the same Truth may be both Cognitio Scientiae and Cognitio Fidei I will instance in the Creation of the world By Faith we know that the worlds were made and Assent to it And by naturall Demonstrations it may be proved that the world was made and these also are sufficient to perswade assent Now we from both grounds joyntly assent to this Proposition That the world was made The which Assent in respect of the one Ground propter evidentiam rei is an assent of Science or Naturall Knowledge in regard of the other Ground Propter authoritatem dicentis is an assent of Faith or Supernaturall and reveiled Knowledge The assent of Science and of Faith differ not in their Form but in their Efficient But if he speak of Saving Faith quatenus Salvifica as it doth Save so it is an act of the Will and not of the Understanding and therefore differs from Knowledge But to conclude this If we speak of a Physicall difference or distinction Then all the Modi that belong to the same Thing can admit of no more then a Modall distinction because having no other Entitatem Rei but that of the common Subiect their Entitas Rei must be Common there cannot be Res Res the difference must be either tanquam Res Modus or tanquam Modus Modus And here is no consideration of the Nature of these Modi In distinct Things The Modi are Really distinct and not Modally though these Modi be exactly of the same nature as the Roundnesse of severall Circles For they not having Entitatem Rei besides the Entity of their Subjects their Subjects being really distinct they must be really distinct also Thus in the present case The Faith of Peter is really distinct from the Faith of Paul But Faith in Peter from Reason in Peter is only Modally distinct tanquam Res Modus viz. If you make Reason to be Res or a Faculty Really distinct from the soule and the Habit of Faith in Peter will be distinct from all other Habits in Peter v. g. from the Habit of Knowledge tanquam Modus Modus But if wee speak not of a Physicall but of a Metaphysicall Difference Here it little avails to enquire of their Physicall Difference or Identity For those things that are really distinct as two Souls may yet agree in the same Specificall Nature and those which are not really distinct as severall Modi of the same Thing may have their Formall Specificall differences Again though it be granted that Naturall Knowledge attained by by the use of Reason without a supernaturall Revelation be of the same Nature with Faith Yet doth it not presently follow That their difference is Graduall and the one but a greater Degree of the same Light For Skill in Musick and Skill in Metalls or Mineralls are both Naturall Habits yet the Skill of a Musician and the Skill of a Chymist are not the Same though of the same nature neither yet is their difference Graduall For the one is not the way to attain the other and the other a Perfection of that former And moreover a man may be skilfull in either of them without a knowledge of the other whereas a Greater Degree of Knowledge in the same Kind cannot be without the Lesser That which follows concerning Falling from Grace and the Freedome of the Will as also what proceeds How farre we do acti agere that is How farre and In what manner the First cause doth concurre with the Second in its Operations require a larger discourse for the deciding of them then to be toucht at in transitu and by the way I shall therefore say onely this and so passe them over Liberty and Servitude are opposit and both are Relative terms He that is Free from the Dominion of one Master may be a Servant a Slave to another Thus the Will though it be Free from any Naturall Necessity either from within or without so that it be neither determined by an inward Principle as meer Naturall Agents are neither can have either Compulsion or Necessity imposed upon it by the command of another Creature Yet is it not Free from the Command and Power of God by whose Absolute Decree it is determined We must not so farre affect to be Liberi that we become Sacrilegi we must not vindicate our Liberty by committing Sacriledge exempting our selves from being under the Power of a Deity If I were now to examine the nature of Freedome wherein it consists I might perhaps place it in a Spontaneity that it acts without reluctancy Sponte agit Were it not that even Naturall Agents as a Stone falling have such a free action without Constraint without Reluctancie Or it might be placed perhaps in a Reflection upon its own Act whereby it doth not onely Agere yea and Sponte or volens agere without a Nolition a Renitentia But also Vult agere Whereas a Naturall agent though perhaps Sponte or Volens agit yet you cannot say Vult agere because there is not a Reflection whereby it Willeth its Action That which
hinders me from placing it in this is Because I allow not any reflex act of Willing in God besides that direct act of Working who is yet a most Free Agent For beside other reasons that if need were might be produced it stands not with Gods Simplicity to admit distinct acts in God whereof one should be the Object of another Now what strength there is in this to hinder the placing of Freedome in this Reflex act I propose to be considered rather then Affirm But I rather place the nature of the Wills Liberty in a Freedome from Servitude that it is not under the command of any Creature or a Naturall Determination of its own And therfore though it be free from such servitude as a Naturall agent or such as may be Forced is subject to yet it is not free from Gods Command Nor perhaps from the dictate of Reason neither Or if it be yet is not this its Freedome but its Weaknesse And this is not far distant from the received opinion which makes it consist in Indifferentiâ For the Will can agere vel non agere notwithstanding anything to the contrary from the Creature but it cannot agere vel non agere notwithstanding the Decree of God and therfore is not Free from that Determination And whereas other things are from God determined mediante causa secundâ the Will is Immediately determined a causa primâ And therefore what he cites out of Rutterfort That granting all things to be under an absolute Decree it is fond to aske Whether the Free Creature remain indifferent to doe or not to doe I willingly assent unto But you must consider withall that This Freedome neither the Angels have nor had Adam in his Innocencie And therefore when Divines tell us that by the Fall we have lost our Liberty or Freedome of Will in Spirituall things which yet we retain in Morall and Civill Actions I desire that they would more punctually set down What the Liberty is which we retain in Naturall things but want in Spirituall What Liberty that is which the Angels have and Man once had but hath now lost And not speak of such a Liberty as neither Man or Angel ever had nor is it possible for any Creature to have Nay not for God himselfe For God having once decreed cannot with his Truth revoke it nor is indifferent to execute it or not But as They say of Jupiter which make Him to be the Author of their Stoicall unavoidable Fate understanding it cum grano salis He once Commanded and ever after Obeyed There follows in the next place an Objection How it comes to passe if Faith and Knowledge be One that some who have more Knowledge have lesse Faith I need not recite his Lordships Answer I will only propose my own If there be meant a Physicall Identity whereby two Modi of the same Thing doe subsist by the subsistence of their common Subject it is not hard to determine For two Modifications of the same Thing may yet be independent of each other And therefore it is not requisite they should be both in the same measure or degree 2. If by Knowledge be meant an assent to Naturall truths and by Faith an assent to Supernaturall truths neither is here any difficulty For the Knowledge of one thing is not inconsistent with the Ignorance of another thing 3. â—f Knowledge and Faith be considered in relation to the same Object Spirituall truths or Saving truth and Faith be taken for an Intellectuall assent to them Then is it not true that there is in any if you speak adidâ—m more Knowledge and lesse Faith what any Knows to be Thus he cannot Beleeve to be Otherwise For the Understanding is not a Free faculty that it can either Accept or Reject a reveiled Truth 4. If by Faith be meant not an Assent in the Vnderstanding to the Truth Known but a Consent in the Will an imbracing of it which is the Iustifying act of Faith Neither is this difficulty much greater then the former For the too too frequent sinnes even in Gods children against light makes it over manifest That the Action of the Will doth not always follow the Knowledge of the Understanding And yet if this too cleare experience be not able to prove it but that you still lay all the blame upon the Understanding as not being cleare enough in its Apprehensions or not sufficiently Peremptory in its Dictates and so excuse the Will of all Remissenesse I demand then what disability there is in the Will of Man since the fall more then in the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven I cannot think but that the Image of God by the Fall is defaced in the Will as well as in the Understanding and yet if the Will doe never disobey the Light of Reason which is its sole immediate Guide I see not wherein this disability doth appear I grant that the Will doth always Follow the Understanding that is it never goes before it or without it it goes never but where the Understanding hath led the way in discovering some Good more or lesse something Desirable For the Will is Caeca potentia and Knows of nothing desirable but what the Understanding discovers And Knowing nothing can Desire nothing Ignoti nulla Cupido But yet I grant not that Proposition in this sense The will Allwayes follows the Understanding that is It never stays behind For to Omit what the Understanding commands requires not a discovery of some other Good but only an Impotency a Backwardnesse or Remisnesse to doe its Duty To goe without direction requires a Positive Cause because it is a Positive Act But Not to goe when it is directed may proceed from a Negative Cause Negatio Causae because it is a Negative Act or a Not-doing A lame man doth not runne when he knows that he ought to runne yet here is no need of a Positive Cause to stay him but his Impotency a Negative cause sufficeth And thus farre do I admit that distinction of Libertas Contrarietatis and Libertas Contradictionis though in that way in which it is ordinarily made use of I doe wholly reject it There is not in the Will an Indifferency to choose Good or to choose Evill neither yet to Choose good or Reject good velle nolle both which they call Libertas Contrietatis For the Understanding doth not shew any Amiablenesse or Lovelynesse in Evill nor any Odiousnesse in Good quatenus sic and therefore the Will cannot Desire Evill nor Reject Good Nolle or Velle non For Bonitas is Objectum formale Appetitûs and Malum is the formall Object of Nolition Now the Soule cannot velle quatenus bonum that in which no Good is apprehended nor nolle quatenus malum that is velle ut non sit that wherein it apprehends no Evill But for the other kinde of Indifferency which they call Libertas Contradictionis to Will good or Not Will it to Nill Evill or Not to Nill it
TRUTH TRIED OR Animadversions On a Treatise published by the Right Honorable ROBERT Lord BROOK ENTITVLED The Nature of Truth Its Vnion and Vnity with the Soule Which saith he is One in its Essence Faculties Acts One with Truth By I. W. LONDON Printed by Richard Bishop for SAMUEL GELLIBRAND at the Signe of the Brazen Serpent in Pauls Church-yard 1643. To the Right Honourable ROBERT Lord BROOK My Noble Lord YOur Lordship being pleased to doe the World that honour to impart to it somewhat of Yours and therefore Honourable it was My Happinesse amongst the rest to be an Object of that Favour And yet my Vnhappinesse so farre as not in all things to fall in with your Lordship Like a Mariner at Sea descrying within kenne a faire Vessell under Saâ—le promising a rich Lading makes up to her and understanding whence she is and whether she is bound desires to view her Fraught but comming so neere as to goe aboard falls foule of her as they speak and is entangled and perhaps may both have work enough to get cleare The â—â—ire Vessell I had in view was your Lordships Treatise now under Saile when made publique which however directed to a Private Port or Sinus a Friends Bosome yet passes the Ocean to arrive at it your Lordships Name enforms me Whence it is and withall promises a Rich Fraught which the Bill of Lading tells me What it is The Nature of Truth and blame me not if I were ambitious to see it that I might adore it If by mischance I be entangled I hope your Lordships hand will help me to get cleare Our first fathers which had never seene Fire before while every one was catching at that which shone so Bright no marvell if he that first meddled with it Burnt his Fingers The Beauty of Truth is likewise Bright and Glorious so Glorious that some have found her Dazle their Eyes he might have said Others have Burnt their Fingers And I perhaps am one of them Truth is a Glorious Object a fit Object only for a Noble Hand Yet Sutor sometimes though he presume not to Better Apelles Picture may yet find fault with the Shooe and that without blame while he goe not ultra crepidam Your Lordship sometimes in this Divine Treatise for fear of Dazling our Eyes hath left us in a Want of Light Naked Truth which your Lordship had the happinesse to Behold is proposed to us Cloathed and Guilded rather then Painted in a most curious Dresse indeed yet such as hides the Body the Beauty whereof being so well worth beholding we had rather have seene her as your Lordship did without her gowne without her crowne the better to have discerned her true Proportion Rhetoricall Embelishments being the same sometimes in a Philosophicall Discourse that varnish on a faire Picture which helps to set it off but withall hides it and presents it more Glossy but lesse Distinct For what the Orator useth to Illustrate that the Philosopher finds to Obscure And thus much perhaps if no more may be gained by the ensuing discourse that your Lordship taking occasion from thence may afford more Light to that which divers desire better to understand and Vnmask so Faire a Face At least those who have once seene her Naked may take the paines to Vndresse her And perhaps having taken a second view through this a more thick Perspective of not so high raised a Fancy may give us a more Distinct Delineation of what its owne Dazling Brightnesse presented at first more confused I hope I shall need no large Apology to obtaine Acceptance at least a Pardon from so Noble a Lord to whom I am told nothing can be more gratefull and who promiseth the fairest answer if I Accept the Challenge which it 's like your Lordship would Performe if at least Encounters of another nature would give way to those of the Penne. If I be demanded therefore of what I doe Why at all I reply Because in your Lordships name invited If why so late I have nothing to reply but this Qui serò dat diu noluit What was at first in a few dayes written to a private Friend having lien so long in your Lordships hands is a sufficient testimony that I made no haste to publish it I have but one request to make and kisse your Lordships hand that you would vouchsafe if I have done well to Accept if otherwise to Pardon Your Lordships most humble Servant IOHN WALLIS To the Worshipfull and my Worthy Friend Henry Darley Esquire Worthy Sir THe Sad news of so Unhappy a Losse as his Lordships Death forceth me to give an account of what might else seeme a Soloecisme The book was newly finished in the presse before his Lordships death and expected only to be first presented to his Noble Hands before it was presented to the World to whome it was then a going when that unhappy news stopped it and some copies were gone abroad I have suppressed it since to adde that which you see adjoyned in testimony of mine own sadnesse for so great a Losse Which yet cannot be so fully expressed by a private penne as by the common Tears of all those to whome Religion is deare A sad losse it was had it been in the Best times to loose so many excellent Accomplishments in one Noble Breast but Now most Unhappy when there is so much work and so few hands in which I am confident None was guided by a more single Eye with lesse Obliquity to collaterall aimes Vnhappy then was that accident that deprived us of one so well worthy to live Vnhappy hand by one sad stroke who shot Religion Learning Piety what not Sir The Treatise penned long since at your request had once passed in another Character through Yours to his Lordships Hand not then intended to be made publique nor directed to any other then your own eye what entertainment it then found such Candour and Noblenesse dwelt in that Breast You know as well as I And now being oft solicited as well by you as others It was a second time Advancing ambitious again to be made happy by the same Hand and indeed I had been extreamly injurious to His Candour if I should have seemed to decline His Eye and present it to another who taking liberty sometime to dissent from Others did with the same freedome allow others to dissent from Him willing to accept of any Assistance in the search of Truth but being there prevented it is fain to Retreat and fall back to the same hand where it first lodged as being next after his Lordship due to you from Your humble Servant J. W. March 11. 1642 THE CONTENTS of the ensuing Chapters The Preface DIvers acceptations of Truth pag. 1. Logicall and Morall Truth their nature and difference ibid Whether breach of Promise be formally a Ly. 3. Metaphysical Truth 4. Veritas Essendi Cognoscendi or Cognoscibility ibid None of these are Truth or Light as here taken 5.
The Object not Identically the same with the Faculty ibid By Truth or Light is meant the Light of Reason 7. 9. 27. 63. Chap. 1. A double Notion of Truth 8. His first Position that Truth in the first Notion is the Understanding in its Essence the Argument because both a Ray of Divinity cousidered 9. Chap. 2. A second Argument from the three Requisites to every Being a Fountain imparting a Chanel receiving and Waâ—ers imparted considered and Where wee may find these in the Vnderstanding if a Faculty 12. Whence Ignorance and Errour in the Vnderstanding 13. Reason and the Vnderstanding ratio facultas ratiocinandâ— all one 1â— The efficient of Accidents 14. What is the Recipient of Truth 15. How Reason in the â—nderstanding â—an make the Soule Ratiâ—nal and give it an Essentiall Difference from the Irrationall ib. Whether the Qualities be Formae â—ementorum 17. The Efficient or Fountain whence Reason comes to the Soule Internall Externall from the Soule it selfe from the Parent from God 18. Whether the Recipient of Truth must be Truth 21. Whether Light passe from the Vnderstanding to the Soule from the Vnderstanding to the Will and how the Soule acts by its Faculties 22. Chap 3. How these are found if the Understanding be Truth 24. How every thing is its own Recipient ibid To receive a Being and to receive a Forme Do Esse do Habere differ ibid Chap. 4. Whether the Vnderstanding-Faculty may not be the Recipient of Truth 26. Chap. 5. A second Assertion or the first improved that both Truth and the Vnderstanding be the same also with the Soule considered 27. Chap. 6. A Corollary that All things are this One Truth considered 28. Whether a consequent of the former Assertions ibid Whether true in it selfe viz. whether all things One 32. 5. Whether Physically Integrally Specifically one Thing one Whole of one Kind 32. How all from one Fountain 34. Simplicity in God hinders not Variety in the Creatures 28. 34 Vnity in God equivalent to an infinite Variety ibid Whether the Divine Attributes be distinct ratione ratiocinatâ— 35. Whether all Beings be Homogeneall of the same specificall nature only gradually distinct 36. How all received in the same manner 37. Whether Number be Reall ibid Chap. 7. A farther Corollary that Unity is the Essence of all things considered 38. Whether Vnity be the Essence of God ibid Whether Infinitenesse or Vnity in God be first 39. Whether Vnity be the Essence of Created Beings ibid How the Commandements are comprised in Love and Morall Vertues concatenate in Prudence ibid Whether Quantity may be divided in semper divisibilia 40. Vnity as opposed to Multitude is purely Negative 43. Yet not Imaginary 44. Negatio realis negatio rationis ibid Ens Rationis Negatio rationis 45. Chap. 8. The nature of Habits A third Assertion that Habits also are the same with the Soules Essence considered 46. Faculties and Habits how they differ and how distinct from the Soule ibid Habits Infused and Acquisite 47. Plato's Reminiscentia and Aristotles Rasa Tabula compared 49. Whether former acts do help subsequent acts or only Seeme to doe ibid Whether Reason and Faith differ only in degrees 51. The Liberty of the Will wherein it consists 53. 55. Why some of more Knowledge have lesse Faith 54. Whether the Will always follow the Vnderstanding and how 55. Libertas Contrarietatis Contradictionis 56 It is no perfection to the Will to be able to disobey Reason ib. How all sinfull acts may be called Omissive 58. The Vnderstandings dictates are Declarative not Imperative 59. Speculative experimental Knowledge 60 This latter the Will cannot reject ibid. Whether God be all Mercy to the Divels 6â— How Mercy and Iustice are One in God ibid. Chap. 9. How Knowledge and Affection differ 62. Whether Knowledge extinguish Affection ibid. Why some of lesse knowledge have larger affections ibid. How far we may admit Reason the Vnderstanding the Soule its Habits and Actions to be the same 63. Chap. 10. A fourth Assertion that the Operations are the Soules Essence considered 64. How the Soule is Actus 64. Severall acceptions of Actus 65. An materia individuetur a formâ 66. Whether the Act or the Power be first in order dignity and nature 67. How Omnis virtus consist it in actione ibid. The difference between actus primus secundus ibid. Chap. 11. An Objection against his last Assertion Whether the actions being divers there be not so many soules considered and Whether Time and Pâ—ace be onely imaginary 69. Distinction of Operations proceeds not from Time and place ibid. Whether all the Soules Actions be One 70 How all things are present to â—od 71 How permanency in God may consist with succession in the creature 72 Whether Good and Evill may be in the same act 72 Whether contradictions may be conscistent ibid. Whether Copernicus opinion be confused by sense 73 Chap. 12. Another Objection against the same Assertion concerning Falshood in the Soules Operations Whether it cease to be when it ceaseth to act Truth considered 75 Whether it cease to be when it ceaseth to act ibid. Whether succession of moments be onely imaginary ibid. Whether all acts be the same 76 Whether it cease to be when it acts Falshood 78 Whether the reality of the Object be requisite to make the act reall ibid. Distinction of Metaphysicall Goodnesse and Truth from Morall and Logicall Goodnesse and Truth 79 Whether Evill be meerly privative ibid. Whether any individuall action be indifferent 82 Whether Falshood be meerly privative 83 How Ens Verum convertuntur ibid. The difference between Ensrationis and Error intellectus 84 Whether Pain be meerly privative 86 Whether better to be miserable then not to Be. ibid. Whether God be the author of Falshood or Evill 88 Relations how produced ibid. Chap. 13. Corollaries or generall Consequents from his whole Assertion That all things are One Truth Whether usefull in Practicalls 89 Chap. 14. Whether Knowledge and Sciences receive benefit from this Assertion 91 Curiosity in searching blamed 92 Chap. 15. Whether confusion in the knowledge of Causes be redressed by this Unity 92. Chap. 16. Whether divisions in other parts of Learning be redressed by it 93. Wherein the nature of Faith consists 94 And Bellarmines Dilemma avoided 95 Whether Faith save onely declarative ibid. Whether we be saved even in the Execution of the Decree without Faith ibid. Scientia simplicis intelligentiae and scientia Visionis 96. Whether God Will doe what ever he Can doe ibid. Chap. 17. Of curiosity in the search of causes with a close of all 97 The Post-script A Breviate of the whole Discourse 100 ERRATA PAg. â—9 l. 6 read â—iâ—t l. 11. r. first pag 48. l. 36. r. produced p. 90. l. 37. r. and â—ood p. 117. l. 38. r. contrariè sinâ—ulares verò contradictoriè p. 11â— l. 19. r revera singulares TRUTH TRIED OR Animadversions on a Treatise entituled The Nature
of Truth SIR I Have according to your desire perused that Treatise concerning The Nature of Truth The which how farre it serves to the expounding the 24. Chapter of Math. I examine not One thing that may make it seem somewhat dark is that his Lordship speaking of a matter somewhat unusuall is forced to use such Metaphors for want of native words which may somwhat obscure it And his Lordship was the lesse carefull to avoid it because they being with himselfe of frequent use and sufficiently understood by him to whom hee wrote there was the lesse feare of being not understood or mis-understood And so the lesse need to prevent it by seeking for such words as might better sute with an ordinary Reader Before I proceed to state the Question Whether Truth and the Soule be One It is very requisite to search in what sense his Lordship understands Truth that through the ambiguous sense and divers acceptations of the word we be not confounded in the progresse Truth in Logick is when the Proposition agrees with the Thing and Falsehood when they disagree Truth in Ethicks is when our Words and Actions agree with our Mind and is opposed to a Lye to Hypocrisie And Truth in these acceptations is nothing else but an Agreement or â—onformity of a Type with its Prototype Archetypi Ectypi of a Transcript with its Originall of an Idea or thing representing with that represented Signi Signati Thus in Logick Vox est signum rei or Imago râ—i If therefore we have that expressed in Words to which in the order of Things there is nothing agreeing it is a False Copy or rather no Copy being drawn according to no Pattern If that be which is affirmed to be it is True because they are a Copy or Representation of the Things so being As it is in words so it is also in Apprehensions in conceptibus If our mind conceive a thing to be which is not or to be otherwise then it is this is a False Apprehension because the Idea in our understanding is not a true representation of the Thing In Ethicks our words are to be compared with another Copy because thusâ— they are not the representation of the Things immediately but the representation of our Thoughts or Intentions Therefore if our Words do truly expresse or represent what we Think It is morally True that is it is not a Lye because they agree with this Copy but yet they may be Logically False as not being a true expression of the Thing If the Idea in our apprehension agree with the Things so that we conceive a â—ight of them and our Word be a true representation of this Idea they do truly also represent the Things There is both vâ—ritas Logica and veritas Moralis If wee conceive a right of things and our words expresse otherwise then we think this Proposition is both wayes false for it neither agrees with the thing nor with our judgement But our Judgement is Logically true because the Idea in our mind is a true expression of the thing If we conceive amisse and yet â—ffirm as the thing is if we affirm snow to be white which we conceive to be black our Proposition is Logically true but Morally false and our conceptus is also Logically false If lastly wee conceive amisse and speak otherwise then wee conceive and yet diverse from what wee ought both to think and speak as if we conceive snow to be blâ—â—k and affirm it to be red our Idea or Conceptus is Logically false our Proposition Logically false and Morally false Thus iâ— one intending upon a Signet to grave the Kings Image miâ—â—â—th of the true proportion and with this Signet maketh impression in Wax the wax contâ—â—nes a true representation of the Seale but not the true Image of the King whereas if the Signet had been truly graven and then impression made in the wax the wax had truly represented both the one and the other Thus is it in Morall and Logicall Truth Accordingly one making a Promise with intention to perform it yet afterward breaks it this Promise is Morally true because it is a true representation of his Intentions but it is not Logically true as not being a representation of his future Actions And in his subsequent Actions there is also a kind of Morall falshood because they are not conformable to his promise by which they should bee regulated Or you may say his Promise was Morally a True expression of his Intention but his Intention was Logically False as not agreeing with the Thing because he intended that which was not Futurum Whereas if he had promised with a purpose to breake it his Promise had been Morally False but his Intention Logically True If intending to break it he yet perform it his Intention is Logically false and his Promise Morally false though Logically true And thus Breach of Promise will come under the nature of Injury or Injustice but not under the nature of a Lye except it were made to deceive because it is the true expression of the Intention which is the immediate rule of Veracity or Morall truth Thus Hypocrisie or Dissimulation is a branch of Morall Falsehood because Actio and Gestâ—s are Index animi as well as Words And this I conceive to be the Nature of and Difference between Logicall and Morall Truth There is yet another Truth and you may call it a Physicall Truth â— Formall or Essentiall Truth Thus that which hath the Essentialls of a Man is verè Homo so an Infant is a true Man Thus we say a true Church true Faith true Grace true Gold not counterfeit thus a Syllogisme in a right form is a true Syllogisme though the Propositions be false And the like But mistake me not by Morall Truth or Naturall Truth c. I understand not Truths about Naturall things or Morall things though the words be oft-times so taken For I am not now distributing Truth into its severall Species or severall Parts but am shewing the Ambiguity of the Word and so distinguishing it into its severall Acceptations Thus Morall or Ethicall Truth is that Acceptation of Truth that is usuall in Ethicks Logicall Truth is that Accepâ—ation of â—â—uth which is used in Logick c. But â—â—â—ppâ—â—â— we â—â—â— yâ—t â—â—rre from that Accâ—ptâ—tion of Truth in which â—â—â— Loâ—â— speaketh I will therefore come somewhat neâ—rer â—â—â—â—â— the Logicall and Morallâ—…ptatâ—â—n â—…ptatâ—â—n â—â— Truth we have a Metapâ—ysicall accâ—ptatâ—… â—â—s and Vâ—rum are â—ermini convâ—râ—ibâ—les And Truth is taken in â—â—â—â— such accâ—ptation when it is divided into veriâ—â—s Essendi and Cognoscâ—ndi Veritas Essendâ— or the truth of Being is that per quam res verâ—â—st And thus Ens Verum converâ—untur Quic â—uid est verâ— est For except it have a Reall and True Being and not a Supposed Being it is not â—indâ—â—d a Being but is Suâ—â—osâ—d â—o be Veritas â—ognosceâ—di is that per quam res verâ— Cognoscitur And
mediante animâ rather then by himself immediately together with it he might do either But in generall By what means soever saith he Truth or Reason be convâ—yed if the Vnderstanding do at all receive Truth then it is Truth For God doth not communicate Light but to Light If he mean God gives Lucem non nisi Lucido or Lumen non nisi Luminoso I grant it saking the words iâ— sensu composito but not insensu diviso And so God gives not Animam nisi Animato nor Rationem nisi Rationali That is God gives not Light but to that which is Light â— Lucide or Illuminate viz. when that Light is bestowed But in sâ—nsu diviso That this was before Lucid it is not to be admitted Light communicated to the Ayr makes it Illuminate but finds it not so God inspires not a Soule but into a Living-creature And so breathing into Adam the breath of Life he made him a Living-creature but found him his body Inanimate a â—ump of Earth So here God gives not the Light of Reason but to that which is Light or Inlightned viz. Then Inlightned when this Light of Reason is bestowed But if by this God gives not Light but to Light he means Lucem non dat nisi Luci or Lumen non nisi Lumini I cannot admit it either in sensu composito or in diviso When the Sunne imparts Light Lumen to the Ayr the Ayr is Illuminate or Enlightned But that the Ayr is Lumen I must never grant till we cease to hold Lumen non est Corpus So if God communicate to the Soule or Understanding the Light of Reason the Soule or Understanding becomes thereby Illuminate or Enlightned with Reason But that the Soule or Understanding is this Light this Reason follows no more then if you would say That Water is Heat when it grows Hot The Ayr is Light Lumen when it is Enlightned A Body becomes a Colour when it is Coloured Any Substance whatsoever is metamorphised into an Accident when as a Subject it Receives that Accident or That the Body of Adam formed out of the Dust was made a Soule when it received a Soule inspired That which is annexed as a proof Because Quicquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis together with the illustrations following proves no more but this Whatsoever is conferred is no further forth conferred then as the Subject is capable of and actually doth receive it And this we grant That the Soule or Understanding upon which the Light of Reason is conferred is a fit Subject to receive or entertaine Reason and is actually indued with Reason And so I admit that which he cites of Dr. Twisse Neither a quality permanent nor an act immanent unlesse they be made INHERENT IN the Soule observe the phrase and the latter also produced by it can be said to be given to the Soule Hee saith It is Inherent in the Soule not that it is the Soule Lastly How passeth saith he this Light from the Vnderstanding to the Soule there being as vast a distance between It and the Soule as between It and the will supposing them distinct Faculties whence grow those inextricable disputes How the Will is made to Understand what the Understanding judgeth fit to be Willed But here his Lordship varies somewhat the state of the Question in altering the acceptation of the word Truth from truth understanding to truth understood and instead of innate truth of Reason speaks of the advenient truth which is a Conceptus or Idea framed to represent the truth of Being in the Object For we cannot conceive Reason which is now looked upon as a permanent Faculty to be transient from one subject to another But Truth Vnderstood how it may be conveyed from the Understanding to the Soul I shall Then perhaps better tell when he shews me How the Visible Species are conveyed from the Organ to the Soul or Faculty seeing That the Organ receives species he will not deny for else the Soul might as well see when the Eye is out That the Soul also by the Organ doth apprehend these Species must likewise bee yeelded else why should not the Eye of a dead man see That the Soule and the Organ are distinct must needs be granted for we see them really separated by death whereas nothing can be separated from it selfe And when I am informed How the Soule and the Organ being distinct are conjoyned in Seeing I shall better be able to resolve How the Soule and the Faculty though distinct may joyntly Vnderstand Till then it might suffice in generall to say That As by the Organ the Soule Sâ—â—th so by Reason or the Understanding-faculty the Soule Knows and Understandeth only allowing such disproportion as must be allowed between a Materiall and Immateriall instrument And it seems to be no more vast distance between a Faculty and the Soule then is between an Organ and the Soule So that if by Visible Species in the Organ the Soule may see why not by Intellectuall Species in the Understanding though a Faculty may the Soule Vnderstand But because I love not to answer a difficulty only by opposing another you may resolve it thus We are not to conceive there is any such vast Gulfe between the Soule and the Understanding though a Faculty as that Truth should need a Ferry-boat to waâ—t it over For as the Eye doth not first see and then Inform the Soule or Visive Faculty what it hath seene but the Organ and the Faculty joyntly concurre to the Act of Seeing So neither doth the Understanding first Receive and Entertain Truth and afterward inform the Soule what it hath Understood But the Soule with and by this Faculty of Reason or Understanding doth Know and Understand Both concurring to the same Act. Thus a Stone by its Heavinesse descends Fire by its Heat warms by its Light shines Glasse by its Smoothnesse reflects light a Knife by a communicated Faculty from the Magnet draws iron And yet in some of these at least you must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei There is indeed sometimes a Reflex act of the Soule whereby it Knows what is Vnderstood But we must not think that it is an act of the Soules Essence surveying or taking account of the Vnderstanding Faculty what it hath done But the Soule by this understanding Faculty reflects upon a former Act which It selfe by the same Faculty had formerly performed The Gulfe is likewise fordable between the Vnderstanding and the Will though they be distinct faculties Not as if the Will by an act of Knowledge should Understand what the Intellect doth dictate But the Soule which by its faculty of Understanding Knows doth by its Willing faculty Command and by its Loco-motive Execute So that neither the Will Knows what the Vnderstanding Judgeth nor the Inferiour Faculties what the Will Commands But the Soule by severall Faculties executes severall Functions Thus when the Soule by the Eye discovers a
he speak of the Reâ—ipiency of a Subject I see not from what hath yet been said why the Understanding if distinct may not be the Subject of Reason why they may not say Datur Intellectui Habere Rationem Since it is granted in Logiâ—k That one Accident may be the immediate Subject though not the Vltimate Subject of another And so if any will have the Soul the Intellect and Truth or Reason to be tria distincta They must say The Intellect is the immediate Subject of Reason and the Soule the Vltimate And then call the Understanding either a Quality a Faculty or Virtus quâ it is no great matter we will not contend with his Lordship for the name For Virtus quâ iâ— but a Faculty and a Faculty or poâ—â—â—tia naturalis is the second species of Quality CHAP. V. Whether the Soule and Truth in the Soule be one THe like Answer must be given to that in the 5. Chapter Whether the Soule without an intervenient Faculty may not be the Recipient of Truth For we cannot say Datur Animae ut sit Veritas except we agree to make the Soule and Reason one But we may say Datur Animae ut sit Subjectum veritatis or Subjectum Rationis though we â—old them distinct As may appeare at large by what I have said upon the second Chapter That which is further added in this Chapter whether as a Suâ—sive to inforce this or as a New Argument viz. That our Soule resembles God who is Vnus simplex actus and therefore it selfe must be simple in its Operations and we must not expect first an Essence and then a Faculty whereby it worketh c. may as well be urged to prove That our Soule and Body are the same because Man was made after Gods Image who is â—nus simplex not consisting of Parts Or if you instance particularly in the Soule It may as well follow That we know not one thing successively After another nor discursively By another but by One entire Act like God because the Soule bears the Image of God and Vnitas which I grant not is formalis ratio Dei That which is lastly added concerning a Resemblance of the Trinity in Truth thus understood Is no way peculiar to this acceptation of Truth But holds as well in every degree of Being whatsoever All Entity or Being As it lieth involved in the Originall Fountain of Being which is Gods Essence may represent patrem intelligentem As it descends from above filium intellectum As it is received in the Creature and maketh it to Be spiritum dilectum And thus I have surveyed his Lordships reasons to prove the Soule and Truth to be One Understanding by Truth or Light the Light of Reason which is the Originall or actus â—rimus from whence Rationall Operations doe proceed And therefore must needs be the first of those Nations of Truth laid down in his first Chapter And that it cannot be any other acceptation of Truth that is here meant is very apparent If we look upon the other acceptations of Truth which we shall find to be no way consonant either with his Method or his Arguments For if you consider of Truth understood or the Idea of Truth entertained in the Mind by actuall Apprehension This will have no Being either in the Understanding or elsewhere till such time as the Understanding it selfe frames this Conceptus But as yeâ— we have nothing to doe with the Operations of the â—â—tellect For he proceeds not to consider the Operations or Effects of the Reasonable Soule till he come to the 10. Chapter But with something anteâ—â—dent them which is the Fountain from whence these Operations doe proceed which can be no other but Reason Yea himselfe affirms it in this 5. Chapter pag. 23. And likewise that acceptation of Truth for the Truth either of Being or of Cognoscibility in the Object hath no conjunction with the Understanding till it be actually understood And even Then we cannot make it to be One with the Understanding except we make those things to be One which have neither coexistence of Place nor coexistence of Time For those things may be understood which were many thousand Yeares past and many thousand Miles distant CHAP. VI. Whether all things bee this one Truth IN the next place he proceeds to a Consequent or Corollary arising out of his former Thesis viz. That All things are this One Truth I confesse I was at a stand a great while and could not imagine any shew of Consequence between these propositions If Truth or Reason be the same with the Soule or Vnderstanding then is it also the same with All things else Why so This Argument saith he will presse all things that are This Argument which Argument Doth he mean that argument which was last propounded towards the end of the fifth chapter That because God is one simple act therefore not only the Soule and its Faculties must be One but even All Creatures must be One because there is in All somewhat of Gods Image whose Essence is Vnity If this be his Argument I shall content my self with a bare deniall of the Consequence till I see some shew of proofe For That Unity is Gods Essence is in my judgement grossely false Or were it true yet That because God is One therefore the Creatures must also All be One hath no strength For this Vnity in God is equivalent to an infinite Multiplicity And That One simple Efficient may not produce distinct Effects seems to me a Paradox Or is it his second Argument propounded in the second chapter and prosecuted in those that follow That to the constitution of every Creature there must be a Being communicated a Fountain from whence and a Recipient to which the which Recipient must be the same with the Being received From hence perhaps he might prove That every thing is the same with its own Being But That very thing should be the same with each other or the same with reason or the understanding follows not Is it then his first Argument propounded towards the end of the first chapter Which perhaps his Lordship lookes at as the principall Argument and at all that follows only as a Prosecution of that Though his Marginall notes and the Titles of Chapters which I question whether or noe they be of his Lordships doing point out to us distinct Arguments in the beginning of the second and in the end of the fifth chapter The Argument was this The Vnderstanding is nothing but a Ray of the Divine Nature c. And is not Truth the same which I understood as you may see thus The Understanding is Gods Image in Man And this Image consists in Truth or the Light of Reason therefore Truth or Reason is the Understanding And thus the Syllogisme will be true in the first figure if you transpose the Premises and convert the Conclusion Or thus The Image of God in Man is the Understanding And
as it is capable of that is Existentia Modi for not being Res but Modus rei we must not expect that it should have any Existence of its own besides the Existence of a Modus and this Existentia Modi is the actuall Modificating of the Thing Existing after this Manner The which Existence though it be not Existentia Rei yet it is a Reall Existence existentia in re and not Mentall For the thing existent is not only supposed to exist in this manner but indeed doth so thus ordered thus modificated and therefore that Modus doth actually really modificate and is not only supposed so to doe But if you will not admit with Scotus of any Modus entis as a Medium between Ens Non-ens Res et Nihil a Thing and Nothing you must then say it is Res for Nothing I am sure it cannot be For doubtlesse there is some difference more then Imaginary between Knowledge and Ignorance between a Square stone and a Round stone between Silver Stamped and the same Smooth and Plain This difference I should call Modall accounting the Roundnesse c. not Res but Modus Rei affirming that when Wax c. is put out of one form or fashion into another thereis no new Thing propounded but that which before was is now otherwise ordered And thus it is most true which his Lordship speaks That Habituall Knowledge is nothing but Light more or lesse glorious It is Reason cleared It 's only Facultas facilitata or facultatis Facilitas And to this Facility or Readinesse to operate I cannot allow a Physicall existence of its own as neither to any Habit whatsoever as being but Modi and not Entia It 's not a Being but a Manner of Being not Ens but aliquid Entis And I should easily be perswaded to grant the same concerning all Accidents whatsoever which have long since been called Entis Entia And however an Accident hath been accounted to be Res and so to have Existentiam Rei yet not Subsistentiam Rei Though it have an Existence of its own yet its Subsistence is no other but Subsistentia Subjecti Yet I cannot with his Lordship subscribe to the Platonists to make Knowledge nothing but a Remembrance As if there were naturally in our Understanding the Pictures or Pourtraictures of all Truths but so obscured and covered as it were with dust that these glorious Colours doe not appear till such time as they be rubbed and washed over anew I approve rather of Aristotle's Rasa Tabula then Plato's Reminiscentia making the Understanding of it selfe to have no such Idea or Picture at all but capable of all Or thus I know not how it can be better expressed The Understanding is not as a Table wherein the Kings Picture is pourtrayed in lively colours but hanging in the dark it appears not that there are any such Lineaments till it be Enlightened with the Sunne and then it presents us with a Fair Description But rather as a Glasse which is able to Receive and Reflect whatsoever Colours fall upon it though before it had none of them For I demand What Principle is there implanted in nature to enform me Whether there ever were such a City as Troy Whether it were so destroyed Whether this or that were Plato's or Aristotle's Opinion What Principle to enform that it rained yesterday is faire to day Certainly matters of Fact have not such Idea's implanted in Nature for then might they by Discourse be known to have been or not to have been without the help either of Sense or Information And if Historicall Knowledge may be acquired without any fore-implanted Idea's of those Truths so known why also may not Discursive Truth be also Known without a Reminiscentia or a Review of Forgotten oâ— Obscure Principles Next he tells us That wee may Seem by frequent actings to help the Soule and so to create Acquisite Habits whereas indeed it is not so but all Actings are only new Discoveries But how this can stand with his former doctrine of Reminiscentia I doe not see For this takes away not only Plato's Reminiscentia but all Remembrance whatsoever If all Actings be new Discoveries How and When can wee be said to Remember But is it soe doe Former Actings no way help our Subsequent Acts Iâ— so how can a Learned Schollar be said to Know more then an Ignorant Peasant For the one is as capable of a new discovery as the other iâ— his former acts make no preparation or fitnesse for future acts How comes it to passe that Learned men shall apprehend those Truths at the first relation which another cannot without much adoe be brought to conceive Nay why should an Artist be more skilfull in his Trade then another Why may not an Infant new born plead his cause as well as the best experienced Lawyer Certainly if former acts doe not indeed produce an Habituall Knowledge but only seem to doe in the one which is not in the other the one may as well act as the other for there is the same Reasonable Soule in a Child which is in him afterwards The difference surely must proceed from hence That the Former Actings have produced a Facility and Readinesse for Future Acts that so what was before more Difficult becomes now Facile Nay more That which before was utterly Impossible becoms now both Feaziâ—le and Easie All the most refined Wits in the world joyning their acutest Discoveries their strongest Iudgements together are not able without the help of Historicall Relation ever to know such a thing as the Destruction of Troy Yet when this or the like hath been either Seen by our selves or Related to us it is then easie to tell afterwards what wee have seen what we have heard without a second view or a new relation Now if the former Actings do noâ— way prepare for a future Act why might not the First discovery have been made by our own light of Reason without an Externall supply from our Senses or from Information as well as the Second Philosophers saith he affirm this boldly of the Vnreasonable Creature â—teributing it to an Instinct or new Influence Why then may we not concludâ— the same of Man That Philosophers attribute much to Instinct in Unreasonable Creatures I grant But that by an Instinct they meant a new Influence I was not aware Certainly Memory hath been accounted one of the Sensus â—ntâ—rni and soe belonging to the Sensitive Soule and therefore not to be denied to Brutes And doubtlesse daily experiments put it out of question That Brute Creatures make use of Memory and by former acts are fitted for following acts not doing all from a new Instinct I am called in the next place to search out the difference between Reason and Faith They differ saith he only in Degrees not in Nature For if Soule Vnderstanding Habits be all the same then neither doe Reason and Faith differ I grant that there is the same ground why
That it hears no Noise for how can it since there is none But it doth not say There is no Motion These Witnesses therefore can testifie nothing in this cause Except we should suborn them and put that into their Mouths which is not within their Knowledge Or falsify the Records by supposing them to say That which they say not CHAP. XII Concerning Falshood in the Soules operations Whether it cease to Bee when it câ—aseth to Act Truth IN the twelfth Chapter he comes to another Objection If Actings of Truth be Truth that is if Rationall Operations be the Soule the Soules Essence then when the Soule Acteth not Truth it ceaseth to Bee and so when it entertaineth or pronounceth a False Position the Soule is no more it selfe This Objection I conceive to have two branches For the Soule may cease to act Truth either by Not acting at all or by acting Falsly For whether it act Not or act Falsly it ceaseth to act Truth and therefore if acting of Truth be its Essence it ceaseth to Bee His first Answer may be equally applied to both That granting the Soule when it acts upon Falshood to be as when it acteth not and so is not Yet shall we advance nothing till we prove the Succession of Moments to be Reall and not Imaginary Where he presupposeth that when it Acteth not then it Is not and though the same be granted in a False acting yet neither That nor This will prove of any force since Succession of Moments is onely Imaginary The ground of this Reply I conceive to be this If there be not any Reall Succession If there be no prius and posterius Indeed but be onely supposed so to be by our Imagination Then any One Act of the Soule is able to give it a co-existence to all Eternity according to what he affirmed in the former Chapter For of this One Act being Reall it cannot be affirmed That it Was but Is not or it Is but hath not-been but if it at all Be it must Be alwayes Because if Succession be onely Imaginary then to Be and to Have been is all one then there was not a time when it Was not neither will there be a time when it Shall Not be But if the Issue of the Question depend upon this Whether Succession be Reall or Imaginary I doubt not but this might be soon decided Therefore First I ask Whether there be not the same reason for Succession in Time that is for Extension in Place Whether there may be Pars extra Partem Punctum extra Punctum though not Momentum extra Momentum or there be the same reason of Both and Both be Imaginary If there be in Both the same reason which I suppose he he will affirm Then must every Being have a Coexistence to all Places as well as a Coexistence to all Times It must have an Vbiquity as well as a Perpetuity Then is it in vain to dispute Whether Christs Body be Really present in the Sacrament Whether Peter were ever at Rome c. If every Body every Thing be every where For if difference of Place be nothing then that which hath a reall existence in any place hath a reall existence in all places because This place and all other places have only an Imaginary Difference and are indeed all one Secondly If one action give the Soule a Coexistence to all â—ternity then what doth the Second and Subsequent Acts produce do they give it a new Being a new Eternity Answ You will say I suppose that there is not a Second Act an Other Act but all Acts are One Act And this One act which appears to our imagination to be First and Second c. gives the Soule One Essence One Eternity Repl. If so then what is the difference between an Act of Sinning and a Course of Sinning What is the difference between the Once committing of a sinful Act and the Oft Reiterating of it Between Davids One Act of Adultery and the lascivious persons Constant Practise Why are we exhorted to Cease from evill if every Act be Eternall and whatsoever succeeds can be but the Same He that stole let him steal no more To what end serves this counsell if there be no other Act feazible but what Is already and That to remain for ever Answ 2. If you would say That the same Act is again Reiterated Rep. I ask if the Iteration be somwhat more then the first Commission If not then to commit it Once and to Iterate it often is all One If it be somwhat more then is it either a Reall addition or Imaginary If Imaginary then are we where we were before If it be Reall then why may there not be a reall act distinct from the former as well as a reall Commission of the Same act distinct from the former Thus you see if Time be Nothing If Succession be only Imaginary then is it all one to commit Many sinnes and to commit One Sinne. Thirdly if Succession and Difference of Moments be onely Imaginary if all Duration be Eternall all Simultaneous Then what is the difference between the long life of the Aged and the few days of him that dyâ—th in his Youth For the Reall Existence of One as well as the Other is equally Eternall Since the Length and the Shortnesse of Time is but Imaginary all Duration being indeed Simultaneous Thus the youngest Child if he do but Think so hath lived as long as the most Aged Again 4. If Succession and Difference of Time be only imaginary Then why do I not Nâ—w know that which I shall know To morrow What hinders but that every man should be praescius futuri I shall Know it to Morrow because I shall See it but why should I not Now both Know it and See it as well as to Morrow since it is Now as really present as it will be Then Why do we dispute concerning matters of Fact as whether Peter were at Rome and the like Can we not see whether he be there or not For if he were there then he Is there since Then and Now are all one And if he Be there why do not I see him there For I am as really there as he is For if I be any where then am I There since There and Here are al one Time and Place making only an Imaginary and not Reall difference Ans If you say Things that seem to be Future are even Now as really Present as they shall be Hereafter but they appear not to be present and therefore are not now Known and Seen like Colours in the dark But when they shall receive a new Luster they shall both Appear to be and be Seen to be Rep. I reply If they shall appear then they Doe appear because Then and Now are all one Again If there be Apparet and Apparuit why not Est and Erit If there be a prius and posterius in Appearing why not in Being Or 3 I ask
whether Appearing and not-Appearing be a Reall or onely Imaginary difference If a Reall difference then will there be somewhat Reall Then which is not Now and consequently all Reality will not be Simultaneous there will be somewhat Reall afterwards which before was not If Appearing be onely Imaginary what shall I have to help my knowledge Then which I have not Now Ans 2. If you say Things Future are both now Present we Know them so to be but do not Seem to know them or Seem not to Know them Repl. Then I reply as before If we Shall Seem to know them we Doe Seem to know them because Then and Now are all one So that if Succession of Time be only Imaginary Then do we already know whatsoever we shall know whereas Christ himselfe Increased in wisdom Luk. 2. And the Fore-Knowledge of things to come would not be such a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as might distinguish between the True and False Gods And thus if I mistake not I have sufficiently shewed though much more might have been added that there is a Reall Succession a Reall Priority of Duration and not onely Imaginary And therefore notwithstanding his first answer the Soule must really cease to Be when it ceaseth to Work or to work Truth if these Workings of truth be the Soules Essence And the soule must be during that Cessation or Errour as truly Non Ens as before its first Production for the precedent and subsequent workings cannot Then give it an Existence as not Then being His second answer to the Objection propounded in the beginning of this Chapter toucheth not at all the first Branch of it wherein it is objected That if particular Actings of Truth be Truth or the Soules Essence How is it that the Understanding should not cease to Be when it ceaseth to Work for this in his first Answer he seemed to grant But it is applyed to the second Branch of it viz. That If particular Actings of Truth be Truth or the Soules Essence then the Soule entertaining a False position should be no more it selfe To which he answers By denying that the Soule doth at all act upon Falshood and that upon this ground Because Falshood is not a Reall Being upon which the Soule can work For its nature being Privative and no Reall Being how can the Soule or Truth work upon Nothing I might answer here That it is not requisite to the Soules Act that its Object should have a Reall being As appears by the Soules apprehending Ens rationis which Apprehension is a positive Act and yet hath no Reall Object For the Object of Intellection is not Reale but Cognoscibile And therefore That Falshood wanteth a reall being is not inough to shew that the Understanding cannot work upon it And this in effect he granteth soon after For it being Objected that the Soule while it pronounceth a False position doth Really act verè agere He replyes That there are in this Action two things a Thinking and a So-thinking To think is a positive Action a good Action But the formalis ratio of So-thinking lyeth in Thinking an Errour which is Nothing and so a Not-thinking When mistaking a man catcheth at a shadow In catching he doth truly Act But to Catch a Shaddow is to catch nothing Now to catch nothing and not to catch to act nothing and not to act is all one So to Think is Reall but to Think Amisse is Nothing and all one with Not-thinking He grants therefore that the Soule pronouncing or Understanding a False position or thinking Amisse doth really Think really Act Now I ask while it doth really Think What doth it think What doth it Act or Vpon what rather Certainly it must either be Falshood or Noâ—hing For what else it should be neither doth his Lordship shew nor can I imagine If it Act upon Falshood the false position then may Falshood be the Object of a Reall act If it act upon Nothing then what hinders but that Falshood although it be Nothing may yet be the Object of this Act Object But he will say If the Soule do act upon Falshood then must it become Falshood that is a Vanity a Ly a Nothing For I conceive â—aith he the Agent it selfe together with the Subject acted upon the Object to be One in the Act. Ansâ— But this supposition must I deny For if so Then when the Soule acteth upon God by Knowing Loving c then doth it become God And if so why doth his Lordship at the end of his Preamble blame those for mounting too high who confounding the Creator with the Creature make her to be God But for the better clearing of this whole discourse concerning Falshood and Errour in the Souls working I shall desire you to take notice of a Distinction which all Know and yet but few Think of when they have occasion to use it The non attendency whereof hath produced much Obscurity much Errour and inextricable perplexities concerning this and the like Subjects It is to distinguish between Verum Metaphysicum and Verum Logicum between Bonum Metaphysicum and Bonum Morale To distinguish I say Metaphysicall Truth and Goodnesse from Morall and Logicall Goodnesse and Truth To distinguish the Truth of Being from the Truth of a Proposition the Goodnesse of Being from the Goodnesse of an Action Now this being premised let us examine the truth of some Tenents which are allmost generally received by all 1 The nature of Evill say they is Privative not Positive Evill is Nothing And why Because Ens Bonum convertuntur and therefore Malum must needs be Non-Ens now Non-Ens is Nothing Be it so Evill is Nothing But what Evill do they mean Evill in Metaphysicks or Evill in Ethicks Goodnesse in Metaphysicks is no other thâ—n Entity for none ever acknowledged a greater distinction between Ens Bonum then a distinction of Reason and therefore Malum in Metaphysicks must be Non Ens. But will they say that Morall Evill is so too If they do then must they say also that bonum Morale is convertible with Ens otherwise their Argument will not hold that All Being is Honesty or Morall Goodnesse and all Morall Goodnesse is Being or Entity I ask therefore whether morall Goodnesse or Honesty â—e the Essence the Entity of a Stone If not then is not every Being Bonum Morale I ask again Whether Silence be not Morally Good at such a time as when a man ought to hold his peace Yet to â— Silent or not to speak hath no Metaphysicall goodnesse no goodnesse of Being for it is a meeâ— Negation There may be therefore Morall goodnesse where there is no Metaphysicall goodnesse no positive Being and there may be Metaphysicall goodnesse goodnesse of Being without Morall goodnesse or Goodnesse of Honesty Now if Malum Metaphysicum a Negation a Non-Ens may be Bonum Morale what shall be the Malum Morale opposite to this Bonum shall that be also a Non-Enâ—â— If it
much concerning the nature of Evill Wherein if I may seem prolix it being but a Digression in this place Yet because I was called to it in the former chapter where his Lordship gave me occasion to handle it I thought it more fit to referre the discussing of it to this place where I meet with more questions of the like nature 2. Now as it is in Good and Evil so also in Truth and Falshood Falshood saith he is a Vanity a Lye a Nothing And why so Because Ens Verum convertuntur and therefore Falsum must be non-Ens To this I say as to the former Truth of Being or Metaphysicall Truth is Positive and of the same extent or latitude with Entity or Being And this Truth I have formerly said to be Cognoscibility making Verum in this Metaphysicall acceptation to be all one with Intelligibile I affirm also that Ens Verum or Intelligibile convertuntur And consequently according to the manner of Being must be the manner of Intellection That which hath a reall Being as Ens Reale may be Known to Be that which hath an apparent or supposed Being may be Supposed to Be. I affirm likewise that Falshood in this sense cannot be understood or that the Soule cannot act upon Metaphysicall Falshood For how can that be Known which is not Cognoscible or Understood which is not Intelligible But When I affirm that Verum and Ens are Convertible I restrain it not to Reall Entity For there may be Esse Cognitum where there is not Esse Reale But I proportion its Cognoscibility to its Being and therefore if it have not a Reall Being but only Imaginary it may be Supposed but cannot be Known to be Neither yet doe I So proportion the reality of Intellection to the reality of the Object as if when there is no Reall Object there could be no Reall Act For it is Cognoscibile that is convertible with Ens and hath its reality proportionable to the reality of Being not Cognosâ—itivum The Understanding whether it Know to be or Suppose to be doth yet Really Act And his Lordship also granteth that when the Understanding doth act Amisse it doth yet Really Act The Opining or Thinking saith he is a good Act. But where the Object is not Reall there the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cognoscâ— cannot be Reall for how can a reall Relation be founded in a Non-Entity Yet the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Cognoscere is Reall for the Reality of â—t depends not upon the reality of the Object but upon the reality of the Act. That therefore which is so understood is the Supposed Object of a Reall Act. But now Logicall Truth the Truth of a Proposition which is opposed to Falshood â—o Errour hath nothing to do with the Reality either of the Object or of the Act For a True Proposition may be framed concerning an Imaginary Object as when we affirm a Chimaera to be Ens Rationis or only Imaginary And an Act Metaphysically True a Reall act may be Logically False Logicall Truth and Falshood like as Morall Good and Evill have not an Absolute Being but Relative They consist not in the Being or Not-Being of the Act For when the Understanding doth act Falsly it doth verè Agere though not agere Verè it is verè Actus though not Verus Actus but in the Agreeing or Disagreeing with the Object For when the Intellect doth Understand it frames an Idea a picture or representation of the Thing understood which Picture or Idea is a Reall Picture it hath the Truth of Being whether it have the Truth of Representation or not that is whether it be Like or Unlike whether it Agree or Disagree with the copy or object which it represents A Picture in a Painters Shop is truly a Picture it hath reall Colours and Lineaments But perhaps it is a False Picture it represents not that Visage by which it was drawn When the Understanding conceives an Ens rationis the Idea or Conceptus is not this Imaginary Being for this Conception is as Reall as the Conception of a Reall Ens But the supposed Object of this Conception there being indeed no such thing as this Conceptus doth represent When a Painter describes in a Table some Antick Shapes or strange Chimaera's his Description his Draught is not a Fiction but as Reall as the true Pourtraicture of a living Man But that which by this description is represented that is the Fiction there being no such Antick Forms no such Chimaera's as he expresseth When the Understanding draws a Reall Picture a reall Idea or Conceptus without a Copy without a Pattern it is Ens rationis When indeavouring to imitate a Copy to represent the nature of things the Truth of Being it yet misseth of it not making its Picture agreeable to its Pattern this is a False Apprehension And this is the difference between Ens rationis and Error Intellectûs Both in the mean time being reall Acts. The Logicall Truth and Falshood of a Conception or Proposition are but Relations of Likenesse or Unlikenesse Conformity or Difformity in the Act to its Object and are both founded in the Reality of the Action or its Truth of Being And are both equally Reall equally Positive For Falshood is not a meer not-Conformity or not-expressing of things existent But a Difformity a Crossing or Thwarting of them For else when a man ceaseth to Think or Speak of this or that Truth he there by Erres and Lyes For when he Thinks not at all he cannot think Conformably when he Speaks not at all he cannot speak Conformally either to the Existence of Things or to his own Opinion of them Yea every Proposition every Thought will have so many Falshoods in it as there be other Truths which it doth not expresse For if the not-expressing of a Truth be Falshood then to affirm that the Sunne shines is a Falshood because it doth not expresse the Fires heaâ— or the Charcoals burning And thus that proposition which expresseth not every Truth is a False Proposition yea contains Infinite Falshoods opposite to the Infinit number of True Propositions possible Object If you say to avoid this that it is not the not-expressing of One Truth the not-conformity to One Existence that makes a Proposition False but the not-expressing of Any Truth whereas the Conformity to and the Expressing of any Truth makes the Proposition or Conception True Ans I answer first that this is contrary to the generall Proposition which affirms that Perfectio oritur ex Integris Imperfectio verò ex Particulari defectu Which is applyed to severall kinds of Imperfection That Action is Good whose every Circumstance is rightly ordered That Proposition True whose every Branch doth agree with the Thing c. Wheras One Bad circumstance One false branch makes the Action bad the Proposition False The contrary to which must have been affirmed if the expressing of One Truth make the Proposition True and the
concurrent not-expressing or not-Conformity to All Truths be requisite to make it False 2. Again If there be requisite a not-expressing of Any Truth to make it False then must this and the like propositions be True if I affirm Virgil Homer to be Greek Poets If I affirm a Stone to be a Reasonable Creature For it expresseth One Truth viz that it is a Creature although it be not Reasonable as likewise the One was a Greâ—k Poet though not the other and the not-expressing of a further Truth doth not hinder its expressing of This. Then must that Action be Good whose One Circumstance is Good If the Intention be right though the Formality of the Action be never so unlawfull yet will not the Act be Blamable Logicall Falshood therfore is as positive as Logicall Truth the one consisting in a positive Conformity the other in a positive Difformity to the Things Yea of the two the nature of Truth is rather Negative theÌ„ the nature of Falshood For a not-conformity makes not a Proposition False but the not-difformity makes it True For that is a True proposition that is not Opposite to Any Truth though it do not Expresse All Truths Neither can there be a Medium between Truth and Falshood as there is between Good and Evill For though there may be an Indifferent Action which is neither Good positively nor Evill yet is there not an Indifferent Proposition which is neither True nor False Truth and Falshood in Propositions are opposed as Lawfulnesse and Vnlawfulnesse in Actions whereof Lawfulnesse as I have said is Negative rather then as Good and Evill Laudabile Vituperabile Yet if we desire a Medium I can shew you one But then it must not be Actus but Negatio Actûs And that is in Abstraction when the Understanding conceives of one Thing without considering of another for then it doth neither Affirm nor Deny and so that Conception is thus farre neither True nor False as likewise the Proposition expressing this Thought When I conceive of the Ayr not regarding whether it be Light or Dark of a Man not considering whether he be Learned or Ignorant This Abstracting or considering the Ayr without considering Light in it considering Aristotle to have been a Man not considering withall that he was Learned is neither True nor False According to that Abstrahentis non est Mendacium wheras if I affirm the Ayr in the day time to be without Light or Aristotle without Learning the proposition is False Falshood and Truth therefore being Relations equally Reall equally Positive the Understanding may be said as well to Act Falshood as to act Truth while it produceth that Absolute Act in which these Relations are founded Otherwise what will be the difference between Ignorance and Errour between Silence and a Lye 3. There is yet another Question to which by his Lorâ— I am invited The same saith he may be said of Pain which he conceiveth cannot act upon the Soule nor the Soule upon it because it is but a bare Privation And therefore subscribes to the Opinion of Dr. TWISSE whom if Anagrams may be credited you may stile WISEST that it is better to be in perpetuall Pain then not to be at all Because if Pain be a bare Privation then is Any Being more desirable then for fear of a Privation a Nothing to become no Being His ground you may easily perceive Because if Misery be but a Privation of Happinesse then is it better to have the Goodnesse of Being without the Goodnesse of Happinesse then to want both the one and the other But I cannot with his Lordship saving always the deserved respect due to that Reverend Divine subscribe to the Opinion of Dr. Twisse in this particular For beside that thus Paena Damni and paena Sensus will be all One I conceive Pain to be as reall as Pleasure Motion hath been accounted by all if I mistake not to be Positive and Rest quies to be only Privative Negatio Motûs Now in my Opinion Ease and Pain or Torment are opposite in the same manner that Rest and Motion And so I conceive Pain or Torment whether you speak of dolor Corporis or dolor Animi the Griefe of mind or bodily Pain to be Reall the Negation whereof is called Ease and its Contrary Pleasure or Delight Neither doth it at all trouble me that Ens Bonum convertuntur that all reall Entity hath a reall Goodnesse or the goodnesse of Being For nothing hinders but that Bonum Metaphysicum may be Malum Physicum that which is Reall may notwithstanding be Inconvenient that which is in se Bonum may not-be Bonum huic whether you speak of bonum Jucundum or bonum Vtile Goodnesse of Being Metaphysicall goodnesse is but a common Subject capable either of Physicall Good or Evill like as the same Reall Action may be Morally Good or Evill And according as the Physicall Good or Evill annexed to Being Metaphysically Good doth exceed so is that Being Desirable or not Desirable Otherwise How could it be better for that man which betrayed our Saviour that he had never been born I urge not the judgement of Sense in this particular because his Lordship appeals from Sense to Reason I shall therefore examine what Reason can alledge why credit should not be given to the judgement of Sense For â—having a Judgement confessed in the Court of Sense I must suppose it to be in force till such time as I see it revoked by Reason And when Reason hath reversed it I will grant the former Sentence to be Voyd Object You will say Being though Miserable hath some Goodnesse whereas Not-Being hath none and therefore Being though with Misery is more desirable Ans I reply Misery hath much Evill not-Being hath none Therfore Misery is more to be Shunned then not to Be. But if this satisfie not I desire to know whether there be not the same strength of Reason in This Argument that is in Theirs viz A Sinfull Act hath in it the Goodnesse of Being and its Sinfullnesse iâ— only a Privation of further Goodnesse the goodnesse of Conformity to Gods Law Therefore it is better to Sinne then not to Act to commit a Sinne then not to commit it For if I Sinne I produce â—ome Good because it is a reall Action and so hath the Goodnesse of Being But in not-acting not-committing I produce no Goodnesse at all Therefore it is better to Sinne then not to Sinne because Acting though Sinfull hath Some good but Not-acting hath None Now if this Argument do not hold good to prove it Better to Sinne be the Sinne as great as can be possible then not to Act not to Sinne Then must I needs think that their Argument being exactly in the same form is of as little force to prove Misery though never so great to be better then not-Being But let us heare his Lordship plead at Reasons Barre for the revoking that Sentence which hath past
in the Court of Sense Reason telleth us saith he that Paine must be Somthing or Nothing If Nothing then it is but a Privation â—f Something then must it be Good or Evill If Good it cannot hurt us If Evill it is either a Nominall Evill or Reall If Named an Evill and is not it will not be disputed but if it be a Reall Evill then is it Nothing for Evill is only a Privation of Good I answer to this discourse That Paine is Somthing It is Evill It is a Reall Evill Malum Physicum And this Reall Evill is also Posiâ—ve and not a bare Privation of Good For I conceive not a Stone to be in Pain though it have not Pleasure bonum Jucundum nor to be Greived though it do not Rejoyce There is one great rubbe that yet remains against what I have said concerning these three last mentioned Questions which I have referred to the End that so once mentioning might suffice without particular repetition in the discussing of each Question And it is this If Falshood and Evill whether Morall or Physicall have a Being if it be Reall then must we with the Manichees make two Sources of Being or else God must be the Author of it which none will affirm For answer to this I intend not ex professo to handle at large that question Whether and In what Sense God may be called the Author of Sinne of Evill of Falshood For if I durst to encounter that difficulty which hath troubled able Divines yet would it be too tedious to insert here especially when I have allready transgrest with over much prolixity Only thus All Relations you know have their Originall not from any peculiar Act whereby they are produced distinct from that Act by which is produced that in which they are grounded But arise and flow from that Absolute Being upon which they depend per nudam Resultaâ—tiam by a Resultation from it without a new intermediate Act. The Father doth not by One act beget his Sonne and by Another act He or his Sonne produce Filiation But the terminirelationis being once produced the Relation doth unavoidably follow Two white things being produced it is impossible etiam per divinam potentiam but that they must in this be Like Now Falshood and Truth Good and Evill being as I have said Relations and consequently having no other Production but their Resultance from their Foundation I leave it to others to judge How farre God doth concurre with the operation of the Creature in producing that Act which is Good or Evill True or False and How farre the Efficient of this Act may be affirmed the Cause of that Relation which doth result from it CHAP. XIII The Consequents of this Assertion that All things are one Truth Whether usefull in Practicalls I Have now done with his Lordships Thesis layd downe in the full extent in the severall branches of it The Chapters ensuing are but a declaration of the Consequents the Vsefullnesse of this Position Which saith he if we consider viz. That all things are but one Emanation from divine power It would make our lives more cheerfull more Christian both in the Practicall and Theoreticall part That all things are but one Emanation if he speak of unum per aggregationem I grant and so I suppose will all else God alone hath his Being of Himselfe and gives Being to all his Creatures 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And whatsoever Being they have it is only a communication of that Being which he hath in him selfe But that the Parts of this One Aggregatum are not Really distinct from each other hath not yet been so clearly proved as to convince mee His Arguments if they prove any thing will prove That God cannot produce Creatures really distinct For if it be enough to prove All things that now are to be really the same Because the Fountain of them all is God the thing Communicated their own Essence and the Recipient Themselves because the Essence produced receiveth of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Esse Then is it impossible for God to produce any thing that shall not be the same with these For whatsoever can be possibly produced If God be the Author of it Then must Hee be the Fountain and It selfe the Recipient receiving from God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Esse This being premised I ask Whether this One Emanation which his Lordship seeks to establish be Really distinct from God or no If not then must not his Lordship blame those that confound the Creator with thâ— Creature making It to be God But if this one Emanation be distinct Really If this Fountain have sent forth One Stream really distinct from it selfe What hinders but that it may send forth More Streams Hath God like Isaack but One Blessing Or Can he produce more but Will not If he Can then is it Possible that Two Emanations Two Creatures may be really distinct though receiving their Essence from the same Fountain And if Any Creatures may be possibly distinct from other Why not These Creatures that now are there being no more to be alledged for their Vnity then for the Unity of all Possible Gods 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Power also and the Emanation of it is So Uniform as that it is equivalent to an Infinite Variety He proceeds to this purpose In the Practick part of our Lives saith he If we knew that all things were One with what Cheerfullnesse what Courage should we undertake any Action any Difficulty Knowing The distinction of Misery and Happynesse to have no Being but in the Brain That Misery is Nothing and cannot hurt us That every thing is Good and Good to mee Because I and It are Beings and so Good And these two Goods falling under no other difference but of Degrees Good and Good must needs agree that which is Good is Good to Mee Yea how void of Envy at anothers good and of thoughts of Revenging Injuries Since I have a Propriety a Possession of that which is Anothers hee and I being One Injuries are Nothing and cannot hurt Good things though anothers doe serve me That all things are one That the difference between Happinesse and Misery is only in the Brain That Misery That Injuries are Nothing and cannot hurt That whatsoever is Good must be Good to Mee and which is the ground of it That Good and Good Ens Ens admit of no difference but of Degrees I have allready denied I will only adde That by this discourse you prove the Devills as happy as the blessed Angels And if it be a Good Consequent of this Position That it will make us noâ— be afraid of Misery and Danger I am sure it is as Bad a Consequent That it will make us not afraid of Sinning The Devills are Beings and therefore Good Every thing that is is Good and Good to them For both They and It being Good and admitting of no difference but of Degrees Good and Good cannot but
or Vnicus as it is opposed to Multitude and so we now take it is Negative Else where is the fault in this Syllogisme Quod est in Angliâ est in Europâ Sed Rex Vnicus est in Angliâ Ergo Rex Vnicus veltantùm Vnus est in Europâ Propositio 3. Chap. 8. 9 He returns next to his former discourse And what he had said of the Light of Reason he saith also of the Light of Knowledge both Habituall and Actuall Hee allows not that Habits either Infused or Acquisite are any thing new brought into the Soule but only former principles enlightened And therefore rejecting Aristotle's rasatabula he imbraceth Plato's Reminiscentia Which may be thus expressed He supposeth the Soule to be as a Table wherein be many rare lineaments and lively colours described but hanging in the dark they appeare not till such time as they be illustrated by some advenient Light which Light doth not bring with it any new colours or more lineaments but only illustrateth those that were formerly there but appeared not Whereas Aristotle rightly supposeth it as a Table prepared void of any yet capable of all Or rather as a Glasse which having of it selfe none of those Colours is yet fit to receive and reflect all those Rays or visible Species which from the adjacent Objects fall upon it And indeed as for Historicall Knowledge I suppose his Lordship himselfe if he well consider of it will not affirm that to have any Idea's originally in the Soule It being utterly impossible by discourse to find out a by-past History without Historicall Relation And if there may be new Idea's of Historicall truths imprinted in the Soule which were not there before why not also of Discuâ—sive Knowledge But his Lordship stays not here dissenting from us in the Nature of Habits whether they be new Idea's or the illustration of former Idea's but in effect he takes away all Habits wholly Telling us that we Seem only by frequent acts to help the Soule and create new Habits but that indeed all actings are but new discoveries Now this is not to establish Plato's Reminiscentia but to take away all Memory whatsoever How can we be said to remember how is one said to be learned another ignorant what is the benefit of study and of experience if former acts doe not at all help future acts but only seem so to doe How comes it to passe that wee are able out of our own memories to furnish our selves with Historicall truths formerly heard or read without a second relation which at the first wee could not doe if our former acts doe not at all help latter acts but all things be new discoveries Proposition 4. Chap. 10. And what hath been said of Naturall and Habituall light of Reason and Habituall Knowledge he now affirms of Actuall Knowledge The severall Operations of the Soule in apprehensions affirmations negations c. the severall Actings of Truth are also the Souls Essence And why but because the Soule is Actus primus and therefore its Essence must be Action This Action likewise must Exist which what else can it be but Rationall workings and so the same with Actus Secundus But his Lordship is much mistaken to think that actus primus is Latine for Action Actus is of as large an extent as Potentia Now there is potentia ad Esse and potentia ad Formam as well as potentia ad Operari When Ens in potentiâ becoms Ens Actu when that which was possible is actually produced it s own Essence oâ— Being is that Actus which makes it Ens Actu which was before Ens in Potentiâ and this we call actus Entitativus and it is better translated Actuality then either Action or Activity Again the Matter is capable of this or that Form which we call potentia ad Formam substantialem whereby it is potentiâ tale in genere substantiâ— as materia putris is in potentiâ ad formam vermis Now when this Form whereof it is capable is actually introduced that which was before potentià tale becoms now actu tale in genere substantiae and this Form is called actus Substantialis but not Actio Substantialis or actus primus and thus the Soule is Actus Again a Substance of this or that Species constituted by this or that form is capable of this or that Accident and is therefore potentiâ talis accidentaliter or in potentiâ ad hanc formam acâ—identalem as Water is potentiâ calida when Heat is produced it becoms Actu calida and the Heat is this Actus whereby it is actu talis and it is actus primus accidentalis though perhaps some would call it actus secundus Yet none call it Actio This actus acciden alis or forma accidentalis if it be Operative stands in a double relation to its Subject and so it is actus informans and to its Operation and so it is actus operativus but not Operatio and belongs either to the first or the second species of Quality it is either a Habit or a Faculty this if you please you may call Activity though not Action Now a Subject indued with this actus operativus is in potentiâ ad operandum When this power is reduced into act it is actu operans and this actus whereby it doth actu operari is properly Actus secundus Actio or Operatio and belongs to the Praedicament of Action But such an Actus the Soule is not and therefore its Operations cannot be its Essence Objectio 1. Chap. 11. But now least by making the Soules Operations to be the Soules Essence he should make so many Soules as there be Acts which is indeed a good Consequence he is put upon another invention to make all these operations to be but One the second action is but the same with the former So that with him one sinfull Act is all one with a continued Course of sinning And therefore tells us that actions performed in distinct Times and Places are not therefore distinct actions because Time and Place are Nothing but meerly imaginary But this pâ—aister is not large enough to cover the sore For it is true indeed different actions may receive an externall denomination from difference in Time and Place but they receive not their difference from hence but from themselves Time and Place can neither make different things to be the same nor the same to be different A man is the same to day that he was yesterday the same at London that he was at York yet both Time and Place be different Againe two Angels being at the same time coexistent in the same place are not therefore the same Angel So that whether time and place be any thing or nothing yet this Man is not the other Man this Action is not the other Action But if difference of Time and Place be only imaginary then why do we deny to the Papists that Christs Body is corporeally present in the