of Truth SIR I Have according to your desire perused that Treatise concerning The Nature of Truth The which how farre it serves to the expounding the 24. Chapter of Math. I examine not One thing that may make it seem somewhat dark is that his Lordship speaking of a matter somewhat unusuall is forced to use such Metaphors for want of native words which may somwhat obscure it And his Lordship was the lesse carefull to avoid it because they being with himselfe of frequent use and sufficiently understood by him to whom hee wrote there was the lesse feare of being not understood or mis-understood And so the lesse need to prevent it by seeking for such words as might better sute with an ordinary Reader Before I proceed to state the Question Whether Truth and the Soule be One It is very requisite to search in what sense his Lordship understands Truth that through the ambiguous sense and divers acceptations of the word we be not confounded in the progresse Truth in Logick is when the Proposition agrees with the Thing and Falsehood when they disagree Truth in Ethicks is when our Words and Actions agree with our Mind and is opposed to a Lye to Hypocrisie And Truth in these acceptations is nothing else but an Agreement or â—onformity of a Type with its Prototype Archetypi Ectypi of a Transcript with its Originall of an Idea or thing representing with that represented Signi Signati Thus in Logick Vox est signum rei or Imago râ—i If therefore we have that expressed in Words to which in the order of Things there is nothing agreeing it is a False Copy or rather no Copy being drawn according to no Pattern If that be which is affirmed to be it is True because they are a Copy or Representation of the Things so being As it is in words so it is also in Apprehensions in conceptibus If our mind conceive a thing to be which is not or to be otherwise then it is this is a False Apprehension because the Idea in our understanding is not a true representation of the Thing In Ethicks our words are to be compared with another Copy because thusâ— they are not the representation of the Things immediately but the representation of our Thoughts or Intentions Therefore if our Words do truly expresse or represent what we Think It is morally True that is it is not a Lye because they agree with this Copy but yet they may be Logically False as not being a true expression of the Thing If the Idea in our apprehension agree with the Things so that we conceive a â—ight of them and our Word be a true representation of this Idea they do truly also represent the Things There is both vâ—ritas Logica and veritas Moralis If wee conceive a right of things and our words expresse otherwise then we think this Proposition is both wayes false for it neither agrees with the thing nor with our judgement But our Judgement is Logically true because the Idea in our mind is a true expression of the thing If we conceive amisse and yet â—ffirm as the thing is if we affirm snow to be white which we conceive to be black our Proposition is Logically true but Morally false and our conceptus is also Logically false If lastly wee conceive amisse and speak otherwise then wee conceive and yet diverse from what wee ought both to think and speak as if we conceive snow to be blâ—â—k and affirm it to be red our Idea or Conceptus is Logically false our Proposition Logically false and Morally false Thus iâ— one intending upon a Signet to grave the Kings Image miâ—â—â—th of the true proportion and with this Signet maketh impression in Wax the wax contâ—â—nes a true representation of the Seale but not the true Image of the King whereas if the Signet had been truly graven and then impression made in the wax the wax had truly represented both the one and the other Thus is it in Morall and Logicall Truth Accordingly one making a Promise with intention to perform it yet afterward breaks it this Promise is Morally true because it is a true representation of his Intentions but it is not Logically true as not being a representation of his future Actions And in his subsequent Actions there is also a kind of Morall falshood because they are not conformable to his promise by which they should bee regulated Or you may say his Promise was Morally a True expression of his Intention but his Intention was Logically False as not agreeing with the Thing because he intended that which was not Futurum Whereas if he had promised with a purpose to breake it his Promise had been Morally False but his Intention Logically True If intending to break it he yet perform it his Intention is Logically false and his Promise Morally false though Logically true And thus Breach of Promise will come under the nature of Injury or Injustice but not under the nature of a Lye except it were made to deceive because it is the true expression of the Intention which is the immediate rule of Veracity or Morall truth Thus Hypocrisie or Dissimulation is a branch of Morall Falsehood because Actio and Gestâ—s are Index animi as well as Words And this I conceive to be the Nature of and Difference between Logicall and Morall Truth There is yet another Truth and you may call it a Physicall Truth â— Formall or Essentiall Truth Thus that which hath the Essentialls of a Man is verè Homo so an Infant is a true Man Thus we say a true Church true Faith true Grace true Gold not counterfeit thus a Syllogisme in a right form is a true Syllogisme though the Propositions be false And the like But mistake me not by Morall Truth or Naturall Truth c. I understand not Truths about Naturall things or Morall things though the words be oft-times so taken For I am not now distributing Truth into its severall Species or severall Parts but am shewing the Ambiguity of the Word and so distinguishing it into its severall Acceptations Thus Morall or Ethicall Truth is that Acceptation of Truth that is usuall in Ethicks Logicall Truth is that Accepâ—ation of â—â—uth which is used in Logick c. But â—â—â—ppâ—â—â— we â—â—â— yâ—t â—â—rre from that Accâ—ptâ—tion of Truth in which â—â—â— Loâ—â— speaketh I will therefore come somewhat neâ—rer â—â—â—â—â— the Logicall and Morallâ—…ptatâ—â—n â—…ptatâ—â—n â—â— Truth we have a Metapâ—ysicall accâ—ptatâ—… â—â—s and Vâ—rum are â—ermini convâ—râ—ibâ—les And Truth is taken in â—â—â—â— such accâ—ptation when it is divided into veriâ—â—s Essendi and Cognoscâ—ndi Veritas Essendâ— or the truth of Being is that per quam res verâ—â—st And thus Ens Verum converâ—untur Quic â—uid est verâ— est For except it have a Reall and True Being and not a Supposed Being it is not â—indâ—â—d a Being but is Suâ—â—osâ—d â—o be Veritas â—ognosceâ—di is that per quam res verâ— Cognoscitur And
that is Reason is the Vnderstanding And this Argument will hold good if we grant the Soule to be the immediate worker in rationall Operations without an intervenient Facultie But otherwise those that are of the contrary Opinion would deny or distinguish the Major and say That this divine Ray this Image of God consists not wholly in the Understanding by it selfe but in the Soule or Understanding accompanied with its severall Faculties and â—perations And indeed it cannot be denyed but that the Operations of the Soule do containe part of this Divine Image â—s well as the Soule in its Essence and yet They are the Soules immediate Progeny and are not immediately produced by God Now what others admit concerning the Operations They will aâ—â—â—rm concerning the Faculties That they are but parcels of this Ray or Divine Image That they are but lesser Rivulets derived from the greater stream or branches annexed to it Now from hence That the Soule in its Essence together with the severall Faculties and Operations wherewith it is endowed doth make up the chiefest part of Gods Image in Man to prove That every part of this Image are the same with each other and so the Faculties to be the same with the Soule is that which they will not allow And to presume or take for granted That this Image of God consists but in One single Ray iâ— but petere principium it being no lesse hard to prove then that the Faculties and the Soule are One That Truth or Reason is One and the Sâ—â—e with the Understanding or Reasonable Soule They would say rather That the Soule is One of those Braâ—â—heâ— which issuing from the same Root of Being in God from whence all other Created Beings doe arise divides it selfe into severall Twigs And we have no way to convince them of falshood in this particular till we have first proved the Soule and its Faculties to be one Simple oâ— Single Essence The prosecution or explication of his Lorâ— Argument doth no way oppose this acceptation of Truth which I have given but confirms it which if I rightly understand it may be thus explained That Truth Reason is Light none will dâ—ny by Light understand that internall Principle whereby the Soule can See oâ— Know which is so called by a Metaphor drawn from the Innate light we call it potentia visiva whereby the Eye is enabled to See That Light this power or principle of Knowing or Reasoning iâ— a reasonable creature iâ— the Foâ—ntaiâ— of Life iâ— maâ—â—fâ—sâ— by Life understand the Life of the Soule if I may so speak That which specificates the rationall Soule and makes i◠〈…〉 For â—â—â—â—â—â—â— of a reasonable Soul that which makes it to be Reasonable is Light that principle whereby it knowâ— and understands And therefore when the Soule informeth or giveth life to Animal rationale making it Rationall it inableth the Creature to work according to that Light according to this principle of Knowing that is It inableth the Reasonable Creature to Know or Understand c. Thus whilst Life that which makes a reasonable creature to be Reasonable and Light this power of Knowing is Truth or Reason And Truth or Reason is Conformity to God or Gods Image in us And the Vnderstanding also as we yet discourse of it is this Light this principle of Reasoning to the Soule The Vnderstanding and Truth or Reason can be but One. The whole Argument iâ— briefly thus the Image of God in us is our Understanding and this Image or divine Radius consists in Reason which he calls Truth therefore Truth or Reason is our Understanding His minor that this Ray or Beam of Divinity in us is Truth or Reason is thus proved Because Reason in us is â— derivative Beam a sparkling of that primitive Light or Wisdome which is in God And so That which enlightens us and inables us to Know or Understand according to our measure that which furnisheth Vs with Knowledge is a representation of Gods Sapience or Wisdome whereby He is said to Know Now that Truth or Reason which is all one is this derivative Beam of Light wherby we are able to Know and That this ability to Know or Understand is that which makes uâ— to be Reasonable is manifest Wherefore he concludes That whilst â—ur Life or Rationality consists in Light that is in an Ability to know and understand and this Ability consists in Truth or Reason which is a conformity to God as being a Stream issuing from his Ocean of Wisdom And whilst as Reason is this abilitâ— of knowing so the Vnderstanding also is this Light this Ability or power of Knowing The Vnderstanding and Truth that is Reason must be all One. Those who deny his Conclusion would answer That both Reason and the Vnderstanding doe inable the Soule to Know or Understand but in a severall way as distinct principles and therefore are not the same The one Instrumentally or Ministerially The other by using this as its Minister Thus Fire by its Heat burns a Stone by its Heavinesse descends Glasse by its Lâ—vity or smoothnesse reâ—â—ecteth and the like If you say the Weight of the Stone or Smoothnesse of the Glasse are not Things distinct from the Stone and Glasse but rather Modifications of these Things I contend not For neither doe I hold the Understanding or any other of the Soules Faculties to be a Thing distinct from the Soule but at the most only an accidentall Modification of it not Really distinct from it Yea rather That it is the Soule it self quatenus intelligens as the Power of God is God himself quatenus potens admitting no other but a distinction of Reason CHAP. II. A second Argument from the three Requisites to every Being examined IN the second Chapter he proposeth first the Opinion of those that stile the Understanding a Faculty whereby the Soule receiveth or entertaineth Truth and Acteth accordingly But here his Lordship if I mistake not varieth from his former acceptation of Truth Comparing it not to the Innate Light or power of Seeing in the Eye but to the Advenient Light which streames to it through the Ayr bringing with it the Idea or visible Species of the Object seen For soon after he calls it those sweet beams of Light which beat upon us continually which cannot be meant of any innate Light but of an advenient Light And thus I see no inconvenience at all to say That the Soule or Understanding by its Innate Light of Reason which whether you say to be distinct from the Soule or not it is not much materiall doth daily receive or entertain new Truths or new Representations of that Truth of Being which is really existent in Things either by a reiterate actuall understanding of those things which it had formerly understood or by a new apprehension of somwhat whereof before it was ignorant Like as the Eye by its innate Power of Seeing discerns new Species conveyed to it by advenient Light either from
Objects formerly seen or now first represented Next he lays down three Requisites to the constitution of every Being A Fountaine commuâ—icating a Channell entertaining and Waters imparted Conferenâ— Collatum Recipiens And he asks Where we shall find these three if the Vnderstanding be a Faculty I answer If you speak of Advenient light last mentioned which is a Representative Truth or an Idea of that Râ—all Truth which is in the Things Known I say the Reall Truth or Veritas Essâ—ndi sends forth this Representative Truth or Idea which is conveyed by a Deferent Light either of Discourse or Information or the like till it come to the Vnderstanding where it is received and entertained by the Innate Light or Truth of Reason Like as the Inherent light of Colour in the Object sends forth a Representative light of visible Species which is conveyed by a Deferent light in the Ayr till it come to the Eye where it is entertained by the Innate light which is the faculty of Seeing And as the Remotenesse or Obscurity of the Object the Darknesse of the Medium or the Weaknesse of the Faculty may hinder Sight so that we see not at all or not perfectly In like manner the Distance of the Object as in things quite out of our reach or the Obscurity of them which send forth no Species or manifestation of their essence towards us our imperfect Discourse or insufficient Information which is as a dark Medium and lastly the weaknesse of our Apprehension doe cause Ignorance in the Understanding which is answerable to not-seeing in the Eye Again as in Ignorance so in Errour A reflection of a false Light upon the Object casting a false seeming colour which may be mistaken for the true colour of it an indisposed Medium as when we see through Red glasse c. and a distempered Organ by reason of some vitious humours accidentall in the Eye c. may cause a mistake and Errour in Sight So here when there is a False Light upon the Object as when we conceive that to be the effect of one thing which indeed proceeds from some other cause fallacia non causae pro causâ or the like a false Discourse or Inference or a false Relation which is as a stained Medium or a distempered Vnderstanding by reason of Passion of lâ—sa Phantasia or the like may cause an Erroneous Judgement apprehending things to be otherwise then indeâ—d they are And thus I have shewed not onely those three requisites which his Lordship requires but some others besides them supposing in the mean time the Vnderstanding to be a Faculty and taking Truth for those sweet Bâ—ams of Light which beat upon us Advenient Light If you take Truth for Reason and withall suppose Reason to be distinct from the Vnderstanding and â—t also from the Soule You may say The Understanding is the Recipâ—ent Reason the thing Received in it and that Then and from Those when and from whence it received its Essence to which Reason is a connaâ—e and appendent Faculty That is either from God by immediate Creation which many think or from the Parents by Propagation which others â—old But I suppose there be few or none that hold Reason to be distinct from the Vnderstanding and That also from the Soule For when they speak of Reason as a faculty of the Understanding by Vnderstanding they mean the Soule it selfe quatenus intelligens being considered aâ— the Subject of Reason And when they speak of the Vnderstandingâ—â— â—â— a faculty whereby the Soule is able to conceive and judge of Truth Then they take the Vnderstanding to be the same with Reason I should rather say That Reason and the Vnderstanding as it denotes a Faculty are two words Synonima denoting the same Faculty or Power of Knowing and Judging Which Faculty I would not grant to be another Thing from the Soule-Knowing or the Soule-Understanding but a Modus As neither doe I allow to Any Naturall-Power or Faculty which they make the second Species of Quality any other Being then the Being of a Modus and not the being of â— Thing And thus we may safely say the Soule receives the Faculty of Reason or Understanding Thence from whence it receives its Being as a Stone receives its Heavinesse from that which Produceth it That which gave it to Bee gave it to be Thus. Sometimes indeed Accidents are not received from that which produceth the Substance but from some other Efficient as the Smoothnesse of Marble proceeds not from the Producer but from the Polisher And yet I hold not the Smoothnesse to be One Thing and the Marble to be another Thing but the Marble to be a Thing and the Smoothnesse to be Modus And thus it must be granted in Acquiâ—â—te Habits where the Giver and Receiver are the Same and the Thing Received Modally but not really distinct from either But for Faculties or Naturall-Powers If you look for an Externall Efficient or Giver it will be the same that produceth the Substance But if you be contented with an Efficient per Emanationem Thus they are said to flow or arise from the Form or Substance And then the Giver and Receiver is the Same for the Form which iâ— the Subject Receiving is also per emanationâ—m Effectiva from whence it ariseth as an Essentiall Consequent and if you say the Faculty Received is not so much as Modally distinguisht from it but onely ratione 〈…〉 I contend not But so much distinction at least I suppose we must allow it Having thus answered his Lordships Qu re I proceed to answer his Objections If the Vnderstanding saith he be the Recipient then the Light of Reason which differenceth us from the Vegetative and Sensitive creatures lieth in the Vnderstanding and not in the Soul And so the Soul is either not enlightened at all but only a Theca to the Intellect or else there be two Enlightened rationall Beings in â—â—â— Reasonable creature For answer First I suppose as I said before that there are few if any that will affirm the Soul the Understanding and Reason to be Three things But they will either say Reason Is the Understanding and not in the Understanding or else Reason is in the Understanding which Understanding is the Soul considered only under this Notion quatenus Intelligens as it is the Subject of Reason And thus the difficulty appears not For the Light which differenceth us from Unreasonable creatures whether you call it Reason or call it the Understanding is seated in the Soule and so denominates it Intelligent or Vnderstanding But secondly we want not a Recipient for Truth though the Soul be not it It may be the Understanding Yet thirdly though the Soul be not the Immediate Subject it may yet be the Vltimate which is more then a Theca Object But you will reply However it be so that wee make this Light to be inherent in the Soul yet it is not sufficient to make an Essentiall difference
between the Reasonable and Unreasonable Soul For though Reason be in the Soul except it also Be the Soul it makes the difference but Accidentall For thus the Reasonable and Unreasonable Soul will not differ in their Essence but only in their Adjuncts Answ To this I answer First this is a new difficulty not arising out of his Lordships argument For though this Light of Reason be an Accident yet this hinders not but that there may be his three Requisites For an Accident may be truly received in the Subject from the Producer And yet secondly This though a Faculty of the Soul and not the Soul it self makes notwithstanding a Noble difference between a Rationall and Irrationall Soul so that the Soul loseth not its dignity neither becomes a bare Theca to the Understanding or Reason And is suâ—â—iciently dignified to have such a Divine faculty in it and of it by which it produceth it operations which the Irrationall Soul hath noâ— We account those Sâ—ones precious that have in them some rare Vertues And why not the Soul indued with so Divine a Faculty Especially which is the third thing I reply since it is so in the Soule that is also of the Soul The Honey which Samson found in the dead Lions carkasâ— proceeded not from it but was only accidentally or casually in it A Knife touched with a Loadstone will take up a Needle or the like but this attractive Vertue is not from It self but from the Loadstone And you may call the Knife if you please a Theca or Receptacle of this Vertue and say it hath no other then a Relative Excellencie as it is the Receptacle of an Excellent Vertue though indeed to be the Subject of Inhesion is more then a Theca or a bare Receptacle But in the Loadstone it is otherwise For there the Attractive Vertue is not onely in it but of it or from it selfe It is so received in it that it â—â—owes from it it is sui partus Thus in the Soule though Reason be a Faculty of the Soul yet is it such a Faculty as floweth from it and so the Soule not only its Receptacle but also its Originall Thus is Light In the Sunne and From the Sunne it is not received aliunde And it is a Reall Excellencie in the Sunne and not onely Relative to be the Author and Originall of that which enlightens the whole World And it is a Reall Excellencie in the Soule and more then the Excellencie of a Theca to have from it selfe from its owne Essence such a Faculty whereby it is able to Know and Understand But you will say still However Reason may thus dignifie and distinguish it from Irrationall Beings Yet this is but an Accidentall Dignity an Accidentall Distinction noâ— Essentiall as consisting in that which is in the Soule but distinct from it Therefore Fourthly Reason in the Soule is not onely an Accidentall but an Essentiall Perfection an Essentiall Consequent flowing immediately from the Essence of the Soul as an inseparable endowment And so may make an Essentiall difference it is Essentiall to the Soule that Reason should arise from it And thus that which is distinct from a thing may yet be Essentiall to it viz. Essentiale Consequens though not Essentiale Constituens But fifthly which I conceive to be of the greatest force though Reason or the Understanding as a Faculty be only Essentiale Consequens and so in its Formality makes onely an Externall difference aposteriori Yet it points out unto us an Essentiale Constituens an Essentiall Ingredient as I may so call it from whence this Consequent doth arise Which is somwhat in the Essence of the Soule Whereof we can take no other notice then from its Operations And this Answer holds good though you suppose Reason to be distinct from the Understanding and Both from the Soule For so that Essence from whence the Understanding flows together with its Immediate and Remote Issue viz. Reason and its Operations will make this Essentiall Difference between the Rationall and Irrationall Soul Thus they say primâ— Qualitates are not Formae Elementorum but That from whence these first Qualities do Essentially flow And though the Qualities make but an Accidentall difference between them yet the Substantiall Forms from whence the Qualities do arise make an Essentiall difference So here The Rationall Soule is such a Substance as is able to give rise to such Faculties which the Irrationall Soule is not If you ask What this Substantiall Form is You know the ordinary answer Dic formam lapidiâ— eris mihi magnus Apollo It is a hard thing by his own confession to find out the Form of any Being much more to discover the Being of a Form pag. 32. Tell me the Being of Any thing and I will tell you the Being of This. If I ask What the Soule is which to be we are sure You will say perhaps a Spirituall Substance And that is all you can say for the Essence of it But if I ask what it is To be Spirituall what To be a Substance I suppose you cannot tell me otherwise then by Negations or Effects And thus they will do in the Elementall Forms They are not these Qualities but something from whence they arise And so for the substance of the Soule It is not these Faculties but the Originall of them If you will say There is no such Something as this substantiall Form of the Elements because we cannot tell you what this Something is To omit that by the same reason you might banish all Being because none can tell you what Being is For if you say and that is all you can say that Being is a Ray communicated from the Originall Entity in God This tells us at the most but whence it is not what it is I say If you deny that there be any other Forms of the Elements beside their Qualities whereby they differ one from another Then need we look no further For then these Faculties though but Accidents may be sufficient to make an Essentiall difference in the Rationall Soule from the Irrationall But further If you can perswade them that the Essence or Form of the Elements and their Accidents or Prime Qualities are the same I doubt not but then they will as easily grant the Soul and its Faculties to be the same also And thus I have answered according to their opinion that hold the Soul and its Faculties distinct And have shewed that we are not so farre to seek for a Recipient of Reason or Truth as his Lordship might imagine And indeed there is nothing more difficult in this particular then in all Accidents whatsoever their Subject is their Recipient and so is the Subject of Truth or Reason It s Recipient But there is another kind of Recipiency which I shall touch in the next Chapter which if I mistake not will cut the sinews of this Argument and leave it of no force But in the mean time having
mediante animâ rather then by himself immediately together with it he might do either But in generall By what means soever saith he Truth or Reason be convâ—yed if the Vnderstanding do at all receive Truth then it is Truth For God doth not communicate Light but to Light If he mean God gives Lucem non nisi Lucido or Lumen non nisi Luminoso I grant it saking the words iâ— sensu composito but not insensu diviso And so God gives not Animam nisi Animato nor Rationem nisi Rationali That is God gives not Light but to that which is Light â— Lucide or Illuminate viz. when that Light is bestowed But in sâ—nsu diviso That this was before Lucid it is not to be admitted Light communicated to the Ayr makes it Illuminate but finds it not so God inspires not a Soule but into a Living-creature And so breathing into Adam the breath of Life he made him a Living-creature but found him his body Inanimate a â—ump of Earth So here God gives not the Light of Reason but to that which is Light or Inlightned viz. Then Inlightned when this Light of Reason is bestowed But if by this God gives not Light but to Light he means Lucem non dat nisi Luci or Lumen non nisi Lumini I cannot admit it either in sensu composito or in diviso When the Sunne imparts Light Lumen to the Ayr the Ayr is Illuminate or Enlightned But that the Ayr is Lumen I must never grant till we cease to hold Lumen non est Corpus So if God communicate to the Soule or Understanding the Light of Reason the Soule or Understanding becomes thereby Illuminate or Enlightned with Reason But that the Soule or Understanding is this Light this Reason follows no more then if you would say That Water is Heat when it grows Hot The Ayr is Light Lumen when it is Enlightned A Body becomes a Colour when it is Coloured Any Substance whatsoever is metamorphised into an Accident when as a Subject it Receives that Accident or That the Body of Adam formed out of the Dust was made a Soule when it received a Soule inspired That which is annexed as a proof Because Quicquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis together with the illustrations following proves no more but this Whatsoever is conferred is no further forth conferred then as the Subject is capable of and actually doth receive it And this we grant That the Soule or Understanding upon which the Light of Reason is conferred is a fit Subject to receive or entertaine Reason and is actually indued with Reason And so I admit that which he cites of Dr. Twisse Neither a quality permanent nor an act immanent unlesse they be made INHERENT IN the Soule observe the phrase and the latter also produced by it can be said to be given to the Soule Hee saith It is Inherent in the Soule not that it is the Soule Lastly How passeth saith he this Light from the Vnderstanding to the Soule there being as vast a distance between It and the Soule as between It and the will supposing them distinct Faculties whence grow those inextricable disputes How the Will is made to Understand what the Understanding judgeth fit to be Willed But here his Lordship varies somewhat the state of the Question in altering the acceptation of the word Truth from truth understanding to truth understood and instead of innate truth of Reason speaks of the advenient truth which is a Conceptus or Idea framed to represent the truth of Being in the Object For we cannot conceive Reason which is now looked upon as a permanent Faculty to be transient from one subject to another But Truth Vnderstood how it may be conveyed from the Understanding to the Soul I shall Then perhaps better tell when he shews me How the Visible Species are conveyed from the Organ to the Soul or Faculty seeing That the Organ receives species he will not deny for else the Soul might as well see when the Eye is out That the Soul also by the Organ doth apprehend these Species must likewise bee yeelded else why should not the Eye of a dead man see That the Soule and the Organ are distinct must needs be granted for we see them really separated by death whereas nothing can be separated from it selfe And when I am informed How the Soule and the Organ being distinct are conjoyned in Seeing I shall better be able to resolve How the Soule and the Faculty though distinct may joyntly Vnderstand Till then it might suffice in generall to say That As by the Organ the Soule Sâ—â—th so by Reason or the Understanding-faculty the Soule Knows and Understandeth only allowing such disproportion as must be allowed between a Materiall and Immateriall instrument And it seems to be no more vast distance between a Faculty and the Soule then is between an Organ and the Soule So that if by Visible Species in the Organ the Soule may see why not by Intellectuall Species in the Understanding though a Faculty may the Soule Vnderstand But because I love not to answer a difficulty only by opposing another you may resolve it thus We are not to conceive there is any such vast Gulfe between the Soule and the Understanding though a Faculty as that Truth should need a Ferry-boat to waâ—t it over For as the Eye doth not first see and then Inform the Soule or Visive Faculty what it hath seene but the Organ and the Faculty joyntly concurre to the Act of Seeing So neither doth the Understanding first Receive and Entertain Truth and afterward inform the Soule what it hath Understood But the Soule with and by this Faculty of Reason or Understanding doth Know and Understand Both concurring to the same Act. Thus a Stone by its Heavinesse descends Fire by its Heat warms by its Light shines Glasse by its Smoothnesse reflects light a Knife by a communicated Faculty from the Magnet draws iron And yet in some of these at least you must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei There is indeed sometimes a Reflex act of the Soule whereby it Knows what is Vnderstood But we must not think that it is an act of the Soules Essence surveying or taking account of the Vnderstanding Faculty what it hath done But the Soule by this understanding Faculty reflects upon a former Act which It selfe by the same Faculty had formerly performed The Gulfe is likewise fordable between the Vnderstanding and the Will though they be distinct faculties Not as if the Will by an act of Knowledge should Understand what the Intellect doth dictate But the Soule which by its faculty of Understanding Knows doth by its Willing faculty Command and by its Loco-motive Execute So that neither the Will Knows what the Vnderstanding Judgeth nor the Inferiour Faculties what the Will Commands But the Soule by severall Faculties executes severall Functions Thus when the Soule by the Eye discovers a
this Image is Truth therefore some Truth is the Understanding And thus it will be true in the third figure And beside these two forms â— see not how that Argument can be reduced to a true Syllogisme Now chuse you which form you please yet how â—â— should follow from hence That All things else are this One Truth I do not yet perceive It may be his Lordship would have his Argument thus ordered in the second figure The Understanding is a Ray of Divinity And Truth also is a Ray of Divinity therefore Truth is the Understanding or Truth and the Understanding are One And if this be the form of his argument I will easily grant that it presseth all things that are as much as this For is not this Syllogisme in the same form The blessed Angels are Spirituall Substances And the damned Spirits are Spirituall substances Therefore the damned Spirits are blessed Angels and the blessed Angels damned Spirits Then which Consequent scarce any thing could be lesse probable And thus indeed he may prove all things that are to be One Truth one Understanding yea one Stone or what you will For take any two Beings whatsoever and they will both be sound to be Rays of Divinity because both proceed from the â—ame Originall and Fountain of Being in the Divine Essence and therefore according to this Argument they will be both One But his Argument thus ordered will prove but a plaine Fallacy offending against the Laws of the second figure wherein no affirmative proposition can be concluded The most that he can prove from hence will be this That there is some common Praedicate which may be affirmed of Both and so That there is some General Nature in which they both agree And this I am confident there is none will ever deny that grants but this proposition Quicquid est est Eâ—s That All Beings whatsoever agree in the generall nature of a Being For then they may all be the Subjects of the common Praediate Ens. But this is farre enough from proving All things to be One and the Same For to assume That whatsoever things agree in a Vniversall Nature are also the same Numericall and Individuall Existence is such a proposition as Logick will not admit of Yea though his Argument should proceed thus The Specificall Essence of the Understanding consists in this that it is a Ray of the Divine Nature And the Specificall Essence as well of Truth as of all Beings whatsoever is the Same viz. That it is a Ray of the Divine Nature And therefore all things whatsoever agree in the same specificall Essence And consequently all things whatsoever having the same specificall Essence with each other must also be One and the Same with each other I say though his Argument proceeded thus yet would it little availe to prove All things to be One and the same For besides that the Specificall Essence of the Understanding and so of other things consisteth not in being a Ray of Divinity Besides this I say although they had all the same Specificall Essence Yet doth it not follow that they must be all One and the Same For are there not many Individualls under the same Species whereof One is not the Other Doth not the Soule of Peter and the Soule of Judas agree in all the â—ame Specificall and Essentiall Praedicates whilst notwithstanding it may be truly said that the Soule of Peter is not the Soule of Judas and again that the Soule of Judas is not the soule of Peter What Essentiall difference is there beeween water in the Baltick Sea and that in the Mediterranâ—an â—ince they are both but Integrall Parts of the same Homogeneall Ocean Yet how true it is withall That the Baltick Sea is not the Mediterranean Sea and That the Water which is now in the Baltick is distinct from that which at the same time is in the Mediterranean Sea Two drops of Water taken out of the same spoonfull be they in their Essentialls never so Consonant in their Accidents never so Like Yet we may truly say This is not the Other nor the Other This. How then can it follow That Truth is One with the Understanding and That All things are this One Truth Because all Being is but a Ray of Divinity It follows indeed That if all Things have the same Specificall Essence then are they all Things of the same nature but that they are all the Same Thing it follows not Thus much therefore I suppose will be granted him by all That All things are of the Same at least Genericall nature because all things have a Being And When he hath proved their Specificall essence to be the same It will be granted also That they are all Things of the same Specificall nature and if you will That All Being falls under the same Praedicament Though yet a Predicamentall distinction be not always a Reall distinction no not a parâ—e rei But is this all he seeks to prove I supposed he had laboured to shew That the Light of Truth or Reason was not onely of the same nature with the Understanding but That it was the Vnderstanding Otherwise he proves lesse then his greatest Adversaries would have granted him For those that contend for the greatest Distinction between the Soule and its Faculties doe not yet maintain a more Reall or Physicall distinction between them then is between One Soule and another which yet agree in the same Essentiall Praedicates And if you allow them the same distance between the Soul and the Understanding which is between the Soule and a Stone yea between two Soules They will tell you it is more then they desire For they will grant that the Soule with all its Faculties and the Body with all its Members do constitute the same Suppositum which is a more Physicall a more Reall Union then is between two Soules though agreeing in every Essentiall Praedicate But if I mistake not that which he was about to prove was not that the Understanding is of the same Nature with Truth but that it is Truth His supposition in the first words of the â— Chap is If the Intellect the Soul Light and Truth are all but One c. Not A like or of the same nature And p. 22. If you make the Vnderstanding the Soule Light Truth One then are you delivered out of these streights c. And pag. 10. If the Vnderstanding be enricht with Truth then is it it selfe that Truth that Light Thus he frequently calls them One and the same Now To be â—â— selfe that Truth and To be of the same nature with Truth is far different And if he prove no other but a Logicall Union That Truth and the Understanding are of the same Genericall or Specificall nature we may yâ—t safely deny a Physicall or Reall Union or Identity and say Truth is not the Vnderstanding nor is the Understanding Truth though of the same nature with Truth as well as say This drop
all this hinders not but that Vnity and all other Negations may have a kind of Reality as it is opposed to a Fiction And therfore the Ayr â—â— really Dark God is really Vnicus and not onely supposed so to be And yet Darknesse and Unity are not in themselves Reall but Negative term I purposely passe over severall particulars as well in this Chapter as in others which his Lordship lights upon by the way to avoid tediousnesse and look principally at those things to which his Lordships aim doth especially tend CHAP. VIII The Nature of Habits Whether they be one with Truth or the Soules Essence IN the eighth Chapter he speaks somewhat concerning the nature of Habits And this is to be adjoyned to the end of the 5. Chapter the 6. and 7. Chapters wherein he inferres a Corollary concerning the Essence of All things That it is One That it is Vnity being inserted as a Parenthesis He had in the fifth Chapter affirmed That the Soul is nothing but Truth Yet saith he while I affirm that the Soule is nothing but this Truth I doe not refuse the doctrine of Habits either Infused or Acquisite But before I proceed It is not amisse to give notice of a different acceptation of Truth here from that before He spake before of the Truth or Light of Reason which he contended to be One with the Soul and not a distinct Faculty This Light was an Innate or Connate Light which hath its Originall and its Period with the Soule For when the Soule begins the Light of Reason begins and this Light of Reason is no sooner extinct then when the Soule shall cease to be But the Light of Habituall Knowledge whether Infused or Acquisite is not an Innate Light but an Advenient Light subsequent to the Soules first Existence and really separable from it Yet may it be Antecedent to another degree of Advenient Light viz. Actuall Knowledge which may proceed from Habituall This Advenient Light of Habituall knowledge differs from Innate Light of Reason as a Habit in the first species of Quality from Naturalis potentia or a Faculty in the second species And so howsoever it may be true That a Faculty or Naturall Power may be so farre the Same with the Soule as that it differ only ratione ratiocinatâ Yet in a Habit we must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei For where there may be a Reall Separation and not onely Mentall there must needs be granted a Distinction in re Now that in all Habits there may be a reall Separation is apparent For though it may be some Habits acquired or infused cannot be lost when they are once had as Grace c. yet before the acquisition or infusion of such Habits the Soule was actually without them Indeed it is true That these Habits cannot subsist without the Soule and therefore they may not be imagined to be Really distinct as res res yet because the Soule may exist without these therefore they must have a Modall distinction in re as res modus Thus the Roundnesse of a piece of Coyn though when it is it is the same Thing with the Silver not being a Thing added but only a Modification a moulding or fashioning of the Former thing yet must it be Distinct from the essence of the Silver though not a Thing distinct Otherwise when this Silver looseth its Roundnesse it should loose its Essence and become somwhat else whereas the Silver in this form is not really distinct from it selfe in another forme but the same Metall the same Silver There being then this difference between a Habite and a Faculty Though Reason should be One with the soule without so much as a Modall distinction yet follows it not that a Habit hath the same Reall Identity but that it may be distinguished ex parte rei Habits he distinguisheth into Infused and Acquisite When the soul saith he by vertue of its Being is cleare in such a Truth it is said to be an Infused habit when by frequent action such a Truth is Connaturall to the Soule it may be stiled an Habit Acquisite though c. Whether or no this be the genuine distinction between an Acquisite and Infused Habit it is not materiall strictly to examine If the soule by its Essence be cleare in such a Truth that is be ready to act according to such a Truth I should call this a Faculty or Naturall power rather then an Habit. Thus Gravity in a Stone whereby it is naturally prone to descend I should not call an Habit but a Faculty Though Heavinesse in another relation be neither a Faculty nor an Habit but qualitas Patibilis And so perhaps may Knowledge as it is an accidentall Form informing the soule be referred to the same species of Quality though it can hardly be called by that Name For a Habit quatenus sic is so called not with any relation to the Subject but in relation to Acts which slow from it or are produced by it This Pronenesse or Aptnesse for operation which is in any thing immediatly from its Essence is a naturall Power or Faculty And a Habit is a further Readinesse and Pliablenesse or Facility of working according to this Faculty A Habit therefore alwayes presupposeth a Faculty as being but a Facilitation of it And when as by Reason a man hath an Ability to understand by Habituall Knowledge he hath a Readinesse to understand Now this Readinesse or Facility if it proceed from Often Acting so that from the iterating of former Acts it becomes more prone either to continue or repeate those Acts It is an Acquisite Habit Somewhat of this may be seene in Naturall things A Wheele being once in motion it will by a smaller force be Continued then at first Begun yea for a while persist without help If this Facility proceed from some Accidentall Form produced in it by an Externall Agent it is an Infused Habit The difference between an Infused and an Acquisit being no other but only in respect of the Efficient Thus the Knowledge of divers Tongues and the Ability to speak them which was in some of the Apostles by immediate Infusion was an Infused Habit whereas in others as in Paul it was Acquisite differing from the other not in Form but in the Efficient A Habit therefore whether Infused or Acquisite being but a Facilitation of the Faculty cannot be a Thing distinct from that Faculty but only a Modus of it which hath not in it selfe a Positive Absolute Being of its own but is a Modification of another Being And its Physicall Being Existentia Rei must be the same with the Being of that which is thus Modificated For it is not ipsum Existens but Modus Existendi And this Manner of Existing hath not an Existence of its own distinct from the Existence of that which doth exist in this manner Yet its Formall and Metaphysicall Being is distinct Yea and its Physicall Existence such
concurrent not-expressing or not-Conformity to All Truths be requisite to make it False 2. Again If there be requisite a not-expressing of Any Truth to make it False then must this and the like propositions be True if I affirm Virgil Homer to be Greek Poets If I affirm a Stone to be a Reasonable Creature For it expresseth One Truth viz that it is a Creature although it be not Reasonable as likewise the One was a Greâ—k Poet though not the other and the not-expressing of a further Truth doth not hinder its expressing of This. Then must that Action be Good whose One Circumstance is Good If the Intention be right though the Formality of the Action be never so unlawfull yet will not the Act be Blamable Logicall Falshood therfore is as positive as Logicall Truth the one consisting in a positive Conformity the other in a positive Difformity to the Things Yea of the two the nature of Truth is rather Negative theÌ„ the nature of Falshood For a not-conformity makes not a Proposition False but the not-difformity makes it True For that is a True proposition that is not Opposite to Any Truth though it do not Expresse All Truths Neither can there be a Medium between Truth and Falshood as there is between Good and Evill For though there may be an Indifferent Action which is neither Good positively nor Evill yet is there not an Indifferent Proposition which is neither True nor False Truth and Falshood in Propositions are opposed as Lawfulnesse and Vnlawfulnesse in Actions whereof Lawfulnesse as I have said is Negative rather then as Good and Evill Laudabile Vituperabile Yet if we desire a Medium I can shew you one But then it must not be Actus but Negatio Actûs And that is in Abstraction when the Understanding conceives of one Thing without considering of another for then it doth neither Affirm nor Deny and so that Conception is thus farre neither True nor False as likewise the Proposition expressing this Thought When I conceive of the Ayr not regarding whether it be Light or Dark of a Man not considering whether he be Learned or Ignorant This Abstracting or considering the Ayr without considering Light in it considering Aristotle to have been a Man not considering withall that he was Learned is neither True nor False According to that Abstrahentis non est Mendacium wheras if I affirm the Ayr in the day time to be without Light or Aristotle without Learning the proposition is False Falshood and Truth therefore being Relations equally Reall equally Positive the Understanding may be said as well to Act Falshood as to act Truth while it produceth that Absolute Act in which these Relations are founded Otherwise what will be the difference between Ignorance and Errour between Silence and a Lye 3. There is yet another Question to which by his Lorâ— I am invited The same saith he may be said of Pain which he conceiveth cannot act upon the Soule nor the Soule upon it because it is but a bare Privation And therefore subscribes to the Opinion of Dr. TWISSE whom if Anagrams may be credited you may stile WISEST that it is better to be in perpetuall Pain then not to be at all Because if Pain be a bare Privation then is Any Being more desirable then for fear of a Privation a Nothing to become no Being His ground you may easily perceive Because if Misery be but a Privation of Happinesse then is it better to have the Goodnesse of Being without the Goodnesse of Happinesse then to want both the one and the other But I cannot with his Lordship saving always the deserved respect due to that Reverend Divine subscribe to the Opinion of Dr. Twisse in this particular For beside that thus Paena Damni and paena Sensus will be all One I conceive Pain to be as reall as Pleasure Motion hath been accounted by all if I mistake not to be Positive and Rest quies to be only Privative Negatio Motûs Now in my Opinion Ease and Pain or Torment are opposite in the same manner that Rest and Motion And so I conceive Pain or Torment whether you speak of dolor Corporis or dolor Animi the Griefe of mind or bodily Pain to be Reall the Negation whereof is called Ease and its Contrary Pleasure or Delight Neither doth it at all trouble me that Ens Bonum convertuntur that all reall Entity hath a reall Goodnesse or the goodnesse of Being For nothing hinders but that Bonum Metaphysicum may be Malum Physicum that which is Reall may notwithstanding be Inconvenient that which is in se Bonum may not-be Bonum huic whether you speak of bonum Jucundum or bonum Vtile Goodnesse of Being Metaphysicall goodnesse is but a common Subject capable either of Physicall Good or Evill like as the same Reall Action may be Morally Good or Evill And according as the Physicall Good or Evill annexed to Being Metaphysically Good doth exceed so is that Being Desirable or not Desirable Otherwise How could it be better for that man which betrayed our Saviour that he had never been born I urge not the judgement of Sense in this particular because his Lordship appeals from Sense to Reason I shall therefore examine what Reason can alledge why credit should not be given to the judgement of Sense For â—having a Judgement confessed in the Court of Sense I must suppose it to be in force till such time as I see it revoked by Reason And when Reason hath reversed it I will grant the former Sentence to be Voyd Object You will say Being though Miserable hath some Goodnesse whereas Not-Being hath none and therefore Being though with Misery is more desirable Ans I reply Misery hath much Evill not-Being hath none Therfore Misery is more to be Shunned then not to Be. But if this satisfie not I desire to know whether there be not the same strength of Reason in This Argument that is in Theirs viz A Sinfull Act hath in it the Goodnesse of Being and its Sinfullnesse iâ— only a Privation of further Goodnesse the goodnesse of Conformity to Gods Law Therefore it is better to Sinne then not to Act to commit a Sinne then not to commit it For if I Sinne I produce â—ome Good because it is a reall Action and so hath the Goodnesse of Being But in not-acting not-committing I produce no Goodnesse at all Therefore it is better to Sinne then not to Sinne because Acting though Sinfull hath Some good but Not-acting hath None Now if this Argument do not hold good to prove it Better to Sinne be the Sinne as great as can be possible then not to Act not to Sinne Then must I needs think that their Argument being exactly in the same form is of as little force to prove Misery though never so great to be better then not-Being But let us heare his Lordship plead at Reasons Barre for the revoking that Sentence which hath past
in Man is that Ray of the Divine Nature enlivening the Creature or making it Rationall whereby it is conformed to the Creator who is the Primitive Light or Fountain of Knowledge Now that which doth thus enform Animal Rationale enlivening it or making it Rationall is Reason And therefore Reason which he calls Truth is the same with the Understanding But this if I mistake not none will deny for Reason and the Understanding-faculty are all one Ratio and facuitas Ratiocinandi is the same 'T is true they say sometimes that Reason is in the Understanding or that the Understanding is indued with Reason But then by Vnderstanding they doe not mean the Understanding-Faculty but the Soule it selfe quatenus intelligens And so this proposition Intellectus est Subjectum Rationis is the same with this Anima intelligens est Subjectum Intellectûs Anima Intellectus and Ratio are not Three Arg. 2. Chap. 2 3 4. His second Argument to prove it is drawn from hence That there is required to the constitution of every Being an Essence received a Fountain imparting and a Channel receiving The which Channel or Recipient must be the same with the Essence received because every thing is the Recipient of its own Essence nothing can receive the Essence of a Stone but by being a Stone for to be Stone and to have the Essence of a Stone is all one Therefore the Understanding being the Recipient of Truth must needs be Truth that is Reason Propositio 2. Chap. 5. Which Truth or Reason Whether it be in the Understanding or be the Understanding yet it cannot make the Soule to be Rationall unlesse it be also in the Soule For how can Reason make the Soule Reasonable if it be not in â—t but in somewhat else And if it be in the Soule then must iâ— be the Soule Because to be in the Soule and to be the Soule iâ— all one every thing being its own Recipienâ— Thus Truth or Light of Reason will be the same with the Understanding And both That and This the same with the Soule But I hope his Lordship will not deny but that there is another kind of Receiving beside that Receiving that he speaks of They tell us in Logick of â—cto modi habendi and there are as many manners of Receiving as there are of Having To receive the Essence of a Man and to be a Man is all one To have the Essence of Money and to be Money is all one But yet I hope a Man may receive Money without being coined and made Money To receive the Essence of Water and to be made Water to receive the Essence of a Vessell and to be a Vessell is all one yet a Vessell may contein Water without being made Water Thus a Substance may receive an Accident a Subject may receive a Form without being made that Accident that Form Thus datur Animae esse Animam datur Rationi esse Rationem each being its own Recipient But withall datur Animae Habere Rationem though the Soule be not Reason nor Reason in this sense its own Recipient If there be any strength in this Argument it lies in this That if Reason or Truth be only in the Soule as an Accident and not the Soules Essence then it cannot make an Essentiall Difference between the Rationall and Irrationall Soule And to this we must answer if we maintain Reason and the rest of the Faculties to be distinct from â—he Soul That it is not the Faculties it is not Reason that makes the Essentiall Difference but the Substance or Essence of the Soule from whence these Faculties proceed as Essentiall Consequents Like as it is not Heat and Cold and the rest of the primae Qualitates which make the Essentiall difference between one Element and another but that Essence or Form from whence these Qualities doe proceed Corollarium 1. Chap. 6. From hence he proceeds to a further Corollary That not only the Soule but All things else are also the same with Truth But why so Because every thing is its own Recipient If it be it doth not follow that every thing is the Recipient of Truth If every thing be the Recipient of its own Essence must therfore this Essence needs be Truth If his Lordship had well considered that Truth as he hath formerly spoken of it is but the same with that which others call Reason he would scarce have made this Consequence unlesse he could think to perswade us that all things whatsoever are Reasonable Creatures There is therefore too great an hiatus to make this proposition a Corollary of the former But indeed his Lordship is by this time fallen off from his former acceptation of Truth For having as he supposeth proved Reason to be the Soules Essence the Soules Entity he begins to take that word which formerly signified Reason to signify Entity or Being So that Truth now must be the same with Entitas And the Emphasis of this last assertion lies in this not that the Essence of all things is Truth or Entity for that were no great news but that the Essence of all things is this One Truth meaning that all Entity is Homogeneall and of the same nature He was proving before that Truth or Reason was the same thing with the Soule He hence infers not that all things are the same thing for I cannot understand him to speak so harshly as that one drop of water were the same drop with another drop of water though Homogeneall that the Soule of Peter is the Soule of Judas though of the same Species but that they are alike things or things of the same nature The Consequence that all things must be of the same Species because the Soule and its Faculties are the same Thing will not hold The thing it selfe hath only this ground so farre as I can discover Because all Being proceeding from God who is in his actions Uniform must therfore be Alike For the same Agent acting in the same Manner cannot but produce like Effects But this Uniformity in God ' is Equivalent to an infinite Variety and God can by one act in it selfe simple produce effects variously distinct And if his Lordship grant that this Uniformity hinders not but that God may produce various Shapes I see not why he may not produce various Species Corollarium 2. Chap. 7. But from hence he draws a further consequent He is not contented to say that the nature of all things is One but that it is Vnity And heer is as great an hiatus as the former The Essence of all Soules is One and the same but that this One Essence is Unity I have not formerly heard nor doe yet beleeve And I am so farre from thinking that Vnity is the Essence of All things that I esteeme it selfe to be Nothing Unity is but a Negative term a Negation Vnus indeed as it is opposite to Nullus is positive and is the same with Nonnullus or Aliquis But Vnus