the world and dispenseth with all sort of persons for the fidelity and obedience they owe to whomsoever it be Sanchez joyns a reason to the example and authority that he may yet more confirm the possession and use of these equivocations f Quorum omnium ea est ratio quiâ—etsi interrogans excladat eo ipso omnem alium modum sciendi responsio ex se id significet id tamen verum est ex formali iniqua interrogant is intentione cui imputari debet repugnantia in ipsis verbis interrogatione Ibid. The reason of all this saith he is because though he who interrogates in this sort reduces his demand to one sole sence excluding all others and that the answer hath in it self a reference unto this sence notwithstanding this is true onely because of the ill intention of him who interrogates to which ought to be imputed the discordance betwixt the Author and the interrogations It suffices not him to justify him who forswears himself before the civil Officers or before a Judge that examines him juridically but he casts this perjury and crime upon the Judge himself He confesses that there is falsity and by consequence perjury in the answer of those who make use of these equivocations in the manner he teaches them to illude the intergatories of a Judge and he notes himself this falsity and perjury though he expresse it modestly enough calling it g Repugnantia in ipsis verbis interrogatione a repugnance and discordance from the answer of the persons that are forsworn and the intergatories which a Judge or other Magistrate puts to him And because he will not have this crime fall on them who commit it by his counsel and his order he casts it upon the Officer or the Judge h Cut imputari debet repugnantiain ipsis verbis interrogatione to whom must be imputed saith he the discordance which is found betwixt the answer and the interrogation Though both the one and the other are in no wise accessory thereto and give onely occasion to commit it by forbidding it expressely and using all the precaution they could to hinder it So that there is nothing to be imputed unto them on this occasion but onely that they desired him to speak sincerely and would hinder him from using equivocations of which this Jesuit believes he hath right to make use And this is that without doubt for which he imputes the malice to the Judge that he would hinder the accused from using his right that he hath and cause him to speak sincerely where he hath right to speak equivocally and by consequence to condemn him of injustice and malice who would hinder him from using this right He then sets the Judge in the place of the malefactor and the malefactor in the place of the Judge making the malefactor Judge of his Judge himself and giving him liberty to judge and condemn him even when he forswears himself in his presence by answering according to his own fancy and not according to the Judges interrogatory and makes him say unto his Judge unawares to him for this is the secret and the retentum of the equivocation which passeth inwardly in his minde i Non ut tu in iniquitate tua rogâ—o sed ut teneris tanquà m Judex interrogare I answer thee not in the manner which thou dost examine me maliciously but in the manner thou oughtest to examine me as a Judge Which he testifies yet more clearly when he saith that all this disguisement deceit and lying of this man who forswears himself k Ex formali iniqua interrogantis intentione cui imputari debet repugnantia in verbis ipsis interrogatione comes from the wicked intention of him that examines him to which ought to be imputed the discordance which is found betwixt the answer and the interrogation But he justifies highly the lyar and the perjurer saying l Utitur jure suo respondendo ad mentem legitimam quae inesse debet Ibid. pag 31. he makes use of his right in answering his Judge following the lawful thought which he ought to have and not following that which he hath maliciously That is to say not onely reforming the Sentence of his Judge but in condemning his judgement his thoughts his proceeding as of a mischievous or ignorant man who knows not how to execute his charge and he doth all this lawfully if we believe Sanchez as having a particular right which this Jesuit hath given them utitur jure suo From these principles and conclusions Sanchez draws this conclusion to establish these equivocations m Quare idem consco ob candem rationem quantumcunque reduplicet inquus interrogator ut juret se nulla aequivecatioâ—e uti absque omni prorsus aequivocatione id intelligere Adhuc enim jurare potest intelligendo ita ut plane debeat loqui explicare vel aliud mente concipendo quo verum id reddatur Ibid. p. 31. For this cause I am always of this judgement for this same reason whatsoever the Judge urgeth who interrogates unjusâ—lyâ— so fareven as to make the examinant swear that he doth not make use of equivocations and that he intends that which he saith without any equivocation For he may also swear understanding secretly that he doth it as far as he is obliged to speak clearly and to expound himself or by forming some other thought which may make his answer true So that what instance soever the Judge can make or other person that examines him and conjures him to speak the truth although he oblige him to promise and even make him to swear that he will answer sincerely and not make use of any equivocation notwithstanding after his promise and after his oath he may yet delude the Judge and him that examines him and answer by equivocation even then when he promiseth and sweareth that he will not make use thereof n Intelligendo ita ut plaene debeat loqui explicare Vel aliud mente concipicendo quo vtrum id reddatur understanding always that he speaks and answers him as he ought that is according to the right he thinks he hath if he know no other occasion or if there come in his mind no other sence to which he may secretly referre his words to give them some colour and some appearance of truth His reason is the self-same which he hath already made often use of o Quia cum non teneatur ad formalem interrogantis mentem respondere sed ad debitam illa responsio juxta debitam ejus mentem vera est Ibid. pag. 31. because he is not obliged to answer to the intention and the thoughts which he hath who examines him but to that which he ought to have his answer is true following this intention and this thought which he ought to have This man doth not say that which he thinks also he answers not that which
assumpta admittere sicut non solum potest assumere naturam omni sensu externo privatam sed etiam talem sensuum privationem in assumpta jam natura admittere Ibid. n. 130. That there is nothing this way that can hinder the Word from taking the nature of a fool or after he hath taken our nature to suffer it to fall into folly as he cannot only take a nature deprived of all outward senses but also suffer it to fall into this privation after he hath assumed it He is not content only to say that the eternal Word might suffer under folly but he saith also that he might have assumed it voluntarily as he assumed humane nature That is that this proposition the impiety and blasphemy whereof is horrible only to be thought might have been true God is a fool and that with a voluntary folly which is accounted the worst of all He ought to have considered that folly is a disorder of the body and the Soul and of the highest part of the Soul which is Reason and that all disorder is inconsistent with the Wisdom of God as well as sin is inconsistent with it because it is a voluntary disorder and a true folly according to Scripture and if the reason of Jesus Christ had been disorderly it is manifest that his Will might have been so too and that as his Will could not be so by sin which is the folly of the Will neither could his reason be so by folly which is as we may say the sin of the Understanding as some Philosophers esteem Errour is yet a greater evil than folly because folly takes away reason but errour is the cause it is ill used Now it were better to be wholly deprived of any thing then to abuse it as it were better not to have wit then to abuse it in deceiving not to have strength then to abuse it in committing violences and murthers and yet Amicus forbears not to maintain with others that Jesus Christ was capable of erring and that he might erre in deed For the explication of this opinion he distinguisheth two sorts of errours whereof one respects the things we are obliged to know and which he calls Error pravae dispositionis because it includes a wicked disposition from whence it proceeds as from its cause the other respects such things as we are not obliged to know which consists in a simple privation of knowledge error simplicis negationis He saith 2 De secunda non est dubium quin potuerit esse in Christo Nam sicut potuit Verbum assumere naturam irrationalem incapacem omnis scientiae ita rationalem omni scientia spoliatam tam actuali quam habituali Amicus tom 6. disp 24. sect 4 n. 114. p. 359. of this second sort of error that there is no doubt but it might be in Jesus Christ For as the Word might have taken the nature of a beast incapable of all sort of rational wisdom and knowledge so it might in like manner have taken a reasonable nature destitute of all wisdom and knowledge as well actual as habitual He is not content only to maintain a proposition so strange and impious but he would also have it pass as undubitable as if it were not lawful only to doubt of it non est dubium But behold his blindness we need only consider what he saith of the other species of errour which consists in being ignorant of that which is our duty or to have an apprehension of it contrary unto truth He dares not absolutely affirm that this sort of errour might have been in Jesus Christ he contents himself to relate the opinion of Vasquez and some others 3 Tantum de prima est controversia Prima sententia affirmans potuisse de potentia absoluta talem errorem esse in Christo est Vasquez disput 60. c. Ibid. Who hold saith he that this sort of errour might have been absolutely in Jesus Christ and this opinion is that of Vasquez Certainly he doth great wrong to doubt of this sort of errour after he had said that we may not doubt of the other For if it be certain as he pretends that the eternal Word might have taken a reasonable nature destitute of all kind of knowledge and wisdom actual and habitual it follows manifestly that he might have taken it destitute of all that knowledge of things which every reasonable nature is obliged to know as of the knowledge of God and of the first principles of Reason since this sort of errour is necessarily contained in the other Which follows also clearly from the other opinion of the same Jesuit that Jesus Christ might have taken on him the nature of a fool For folly is not only an ignorance of principal duties but of all truths also according to the very definition of the Philosophers who say that it is a general blindness of mind in all things mentis ad omnia caecitas So that if Jesus Christ might have been a fool in humane nature he might have been generally ignorant of all the duties of humane and reasonable Nature and of all the principles of Reason And Amicus shews himself as weak a Logician as Christian in doubting of this last Article after he had said that we might not doubt of that general Maxime whereunto it is inseparably and visibly annexed One of the Reasons of the Jesuits who teach that Jesus Christ was capable of that errour which hath respect unto his duty which they call an Errour of a depraved disposition error pravae dispositionis and which is not only a simple ignorance and simple privation of light but an opposition to the truth and an apprehension contrary to its Rules and Laws is That Jesus Christ might according to them have taken the nature of an Ass as they express it in these very words 1 Foruit Verbum assumere stoliditatem naturae asininae ergo errorem naturae humanae Amicus ib. n. 116. The Word might have taken upon him the sottish and blackish disposition of the nature of an Ass and by consequent he might have taken the errour of humane nature Which can serve for no other thing then to make this opinion more incredible whether we regard the impiety of these strange words Potuit Verbum assumere stoliditatem naturae asininae or we regard the consequence which is ridiculous Ergo errorem naturae humanae For the blockish disposition of an Ass is not an ignorance of his duty because it hinders not an Ass to know and perceive all that which he ought to know and perceive according to his nature and much less is it an apprehension opposed unto truth which the nature of an Ass is uncapable to know And so though it were true that Jesus Christ might have been united to the nature of an Ass it would not have followed that he might have been united to a reasonable nature ingaged in errour and in errour contrary
and to indispose him towards that sickness whereof he dyed But nothing touched him more to the quick than the corruption which the Jesuits had introduced into the Morality of the Church He was a mortal enemy to their compliances and he could not bear with their presumption which bent them to consult no other in their Divinity than their own proper light He declared against their loosness in all the Ecclesiastick Conferences whereunto he was invited and he gave himself up particularly in the Sermons and Instructions which he made in the Churches to fortifie the Faithful against their pernicious Maxims His Discourses made so much deeper impression upon their Spirits because they were sustained by his own examples and the truths of Christianity were no less visible in his manners than they were intelligible in his words He handled all sorts of matters with such exactness and solidity as if he had employed all his life only in study of some one of them alone and it might be perceived that he studied in all his Discourses only to clear the understanding to touch hearts and heal diseases and not to puzzle the mind please the ears and flatter the diseased But the love which he had for the purity of Christian Morals was too great for to suffer him to rest so contented He believed that to heal well the mischiefs which the Jesuits had done the Church it was necessary to have a perfect knowledge thereof and to imitate Physitians who addict themselves to know the bottom of diseases before they apply themselves to any remedy He gave himself for this cause to read the Books of these Fathers and to extract out of them the principal Errours of which he hath composed this Book which we now publish but at length he could not but sink under so painful and afflicting a labour His patience found it self exhausted The grief he had to see the Morality of Jesus Christ so horribly disfigured seized his heart and cast him into such a languor as dryed him up by little and little and ravished him away from the Church after he had received with great resentments of Piety and Religion all the Sacraments at the hands of his upper Pastor I will not take in hand to give here an Idea of the design which this excellent Man hath had in this Work of the order which he hath observed of the reasons which he hath had to undertake it and of those in particular which have engaged him to cope with the Doctrine of the Jesuits because he hath himself given satisfaction in all these points in his Preface I shall only answer here to those who have wished that he had not discovered the Errours which are represented in this Work without refuting them by the true Principles of Christian Morality which are Scripture and Tradition They avow that this had been advantagious to the Church and it was the very design of the Author But this hinders not but that his labour although separated from the more large Refutation may have also its utility For they who are acquainted with the Affairs of the Church understand that it is no new thing simply to set down the Errours which the Corrupters of Faith and Manners have attempted to introduce into the Church without undertaking to combate them by long Reasoning and that S. Epiphanius as also S. Austin observed Historics narratione commemorans omnia nulla disputatione adversus falsitatem pro veritate decertans S. August de Hares hath only represented by way of History the pernicious Opinions of the greater part of Hereticks without taking in hand to refute them in particular rehearsing all things with an Historical Narration but not contending for the truth against falshood by any disputation I know well that there is cause to believe by that which S. Austin adds presently after that he had only an Abridgment of the Books of S. Epiphanius But I know also that if this Saint had seen them all entire he would still have discoursed after the same manner and that this Judgment may very justly be passed on them for that of eighty different Sects of which Epiphanius hath undertaken to report the Errours he only tracks the foot as I may say of them one by one and refutes in the manner of a Divine only four or five contenting himself in a few words and as it were on his way passing by them to shew the absurdity of the Conceits of those Hereticks and how far they were distanced from the truth See how he interprets himself in his Preface concerning the manner in which he had designed to handle these things In which truly this one thing we shall perform that we shall oppose against them as much as in us lies in a few words as it were an Antidote whereby we may expel their poysons and by Gods help may free any one who either wilfully or unawares happens to fall into these Heretical opinions as it were into the poyson of some Serpents In quo quidem hoc unum praestâ—bimus ut adversus illa quitquid in nobis situm erit paucis uno atque altero verbo velut antidotum apponamus quo illorum venens propulsemus secundum Deum quemlibet qui vel sponte vel invitus in haeretica illa dogmata velut serpentum virus inciderit si quidem velit ipse liberare possimus This is the same thing which the Author of this Book of Morals which is now made publick hath given us to see therein with a marvellous address and vivacity of Spirit For though he undertake not to refute these Errours of the Jesuits but only to discover them he does notwithstanding discover them without making their excesses to appear most plainly and the opposition also which they have to the truth and sound doctrine So that according to the progress by which we advance in reading this Book we find our selves insensibly convinced of the falsities of all the Maxims which are therein related and our minds filled with the opposite truths and our hearts piously animated against these so horrible corruptions and edified by the violence which we observe this Author hath done upon himself for to moderate his zeal and to keep himself back from refuting opinions so contrary to the common sense of the Faith For unto such evils deep sighs and groans are more agreeable than long discourses Cum talibuâ— malis magis prolixi gemitus fletus quam prolixi libri debeantur S. Aug. Epist 122. Indeed the arguings of the Jesuits which he relates and whereof they make use to authorize their monstrous opinions are so evidently contrary to the Principles and Maxims of the Gospel and to the light of Nature the abuse to which they put the words of Scripture and the Fathers is so visible and so gross and there needs so little discerning to see that they take them in a sense contrary to what they do indeed contain that these Authors
them or if they quit them being forced thereunto by the publick Complaints and Censures it is only in appearance and for a time and they afterwards resume their very same opinions and maintain and publish them as before as one may see in the Books of the English Jesuits of Sanctarel of Bauny of Celot and of Posa and of divers others who having been censured by the Church they have disavowed and suppressed them for a season but have shortly after produced them with the same opinions which had been condemned in them and with the approbation of the Superiors of their Company They have also established upon the same foundation the insupportable confidence which they have had unto this present to handle the Cases of Conscience and to govern Souls not only in an imperious manner but in a kind of Tyranny and to pass over all the primitive and true Laws of Christian Morality and Discipline that they may regulate all things according to their own proper reason and sense and sometimes against their own proper thoughts by their will only regarding nothing but their own interest and the satisfaction of the world whom they endeavour to please by conducting them rather according to their desires than according to the Rules of Truth and for their Salvation It is by this confidence joyned to so great complacency that they labour to introduce themselves in the world more than all others who hold their Maxims and endeavour to get credit with all persons great and small who finding their Divinity favourable to their interest and their passions do easily follow their advice and their conduct And so they easily diffuse every where the venom of their pernicious Doctrine which brings loosness and corruption into all sorts of conditions as we shall make it evidently appear at the end of this Extract These reasons have obliged me to take the Jesuits Morals for my Subject in this Book rather than those of others who are in the same opinions considering that they are the first Masters of this new Science that they surpass others in number of Writers as well as they believe themselves to surpass them in knowledge that they are the Inventors of many Opinions and those the most pernicious that they are all of a piece and agree together to sustain them that they are most obstinate in defending them even then when they are condemned that they are most advenurous and most insinuating to diffuse them unto the world and most complacent to cause them to be received So that I believe I shall combate all the corruption which Novelty hath introduced into Christian Morality by fastning upon the Divinity of the Jesuits since it is all inclosed therein as in the fountain from whence it diffuseth it self into the Spirits of other new Casuists who imitate them and into the consciences of the people of the world who follow them because of the facility of their conduct who permit them every thing that they will and sometimes more than they durst hope for The Order of the Matters of this Book I Distribute all this Book into three Books In the first I will handle the Principles of Sin to make appear that the Jesuits do establish and nourish them In the second I will speak of the Remedies of Sin to shew that they abolish or alter them In the third I will examine the particular Duties of every Profession and the Sins which they do ordinarily commit to shew that they excuse and favour these last and dispense with the first by abolishing and obscuring them in such manner that they appear not at all The first Book shall have two Parts The first shall be of the Interior Principles of Sin and the other of the Exterior I will divide every Part into so many Chapters as there are Principles of Sin which I shall take notice of And when the abundance of matter or the diversity of questions shall require it I shall divide also the Chapters into Articles the Articles into Points and the Points into Paragraphs I shall keep the same order in the other Books THE CONTENTS THE FIRST BOOK Of the Internal and External Principles of Sin The First Part. Of the Internal Principles of Sin CHapter I. Of Lust in General Pag. 1 Article I. Of Hatred That the Divinity of the Jesuits maintains aversions against our Neighbour that it allows us to wish and do him hurt and even to kill him though it be for temporal concerns and also when we are assured that by killing him we damn him Bauny Escobar Emanuel Sa Molina Amicus Lessius Pag. 2 Article II. Of Pride That the Jesuits cherish pride and vain-glory in all sorts of persons even in the most holy actions and that according to their Divinity it is almost impossible to sin mortally by pride or vain-glory Filliutius Escobar Sa Sanchez Pag. 7 Article III. Of fleshly Pleasure and Uncleanness Pag. 11. I. Point Of dishonest Discourses Looks and Touches Filliutius Escobar ib. II. Point Of the Servants and Mediators of unchast Commerce as are they who bear Messages or Letters and make appointments with Whores and who lodge or protect them Sanchez Hurtado Molina Escobar Pag. 15 III. Point Of dishonest thoughts and desires of Fornication Adultery and other such like sins and of the pleasure that may be taken therein Sa Sanchez Filliutius Layman Azor. Pag. 22 Article IV. Of Gluttony The Opinions of the Jesuits concerning the excess of Eating and Drinking and the bad effects which arise therefrom Escobar Sa Azor Sanchez Pag. 26 The Sum Of the foregoing Article Pag. 30 Article V. Of Covetousness I. Point That the Jesuits authorize all sorts of ways to get wealth and dispense with restitution of what is procured by the most unjust and infamous ways Escobar Filliutius Lessius Layman Sanchez Pag. 31 II. Point Divers motives and particular expedients to dispense with restitution though a man be obliged thereto Escobar Lessius Pag. 35 Article VI. Of Unfaithfulness Pag. 38 I. Point Of divers sorts of Vnfaithfulness and of Deceit which may be committed in things by altering them selling them by false weights and measures and taking those which are anothers without his privity Escobar Lessius Amicus Filliutius Tambourin Sa Dicastillus Pag. 39 II. Point Of Infidelity in Promises and Oaths Pag. 46 Section I. Several ways of mocking God and Men without punishment and without sin according to the Jesuits in promising that which they never intend to do and not doing that which they have promised although they are obliged thereto by Vow and by Oath Filliutius Sanchez Tambourin Sa Escobar ibid. Section II. The contrivance of the Jesuits to elude Vows made unto God Promises and Oaths made to a Confessor and to lye and deceive even in Confession Escobar Sa Sanchez Filliutius Pag. 52 III. Point Of Unfaithfulness in Conversation and common Discourse Pag. 54 Section I. An expedient which the Jesuits give for to deceive the World and to
vain glory is no more then a venial sin But to Preach and to say Masse principally for the glory of this World is to sacrifice the Body of Jesus Christ to vanity to the World and to the Devil who is the Prince of the World and the Father of pride and vanity and this is no great matter according to the Divinity of the Jesuites this is at most but a venial sin non excedit culpam venialem Sanchez discovers in a few words the foundation of this Doctrine establishing for his first conclusion that e Si jactantia vana gloria de aliquo bone fit est sola oulpa venialis Sanch. loco citato if boasting and vain glory have for its object any good it is onely a venial sin That is to say that one may vaunt and glory as much as one will of things which are good in themselves and advantagious without committing a great sin Escobar flies higher than Sanchez For he doth not onely free them from mortall sin who glory in the good qualities which they have or which they think they have but those also who would make men believe that they have such as they have not and who go about to establish their honour and reputation amongst men by a false appearance of Sanctity which they affect and counterfeit on this design For after he hath given this definition of hypocrisie f Hypocrisis est manifestatio propriae excellentiae per facta ficta falsa Poâ—ro hypocrisis semper est peccatum quia mendacium semper perniciosum est mortale quidem erit si intus vult esse malus foris tantùm bonus apparere veniale autem si aliqua praestet exterius ut sanctus appareat Escobat tr 2 Exam. â— n. 11. p. 291. It is a manifestation of ones proper excellence by fained and deceitful actions he adds This is always a sin because a lye is alway prejudicial and this sin is mortal when one would be wicked within and appear good without but it is onely a venial sin if one do onely something before men to appear Holy He proceeds yet farther and saith in the same place n. 9. that one may without fear of mortal sin boast of evil and glory in the greatest crimes of the World whether one have or indeed have not committed them a Perrocum quis se jactat flagitium grave gessisse si non adsit scandali occasio aut facti veâ— conficti operis non admiscetur complacentia vel faciendi voluntas veniale est Ibid. n. 9. p. 291. When saith he a man boasteth himself to have committed some enormous crime provided that he doth this without scandal and without compleasance in this action true or fained and without desire to commit it it is but a venial sin That is to say that if a man onely vaunt himself of a crime it is but a light fault and that he ought onely to take heed to avoid scandal modó non adsit scandali occasio So that if a man who doth glory in the most enormous crimes have but onely the discretion not to speak thereof before persons who may thereby be scandalized he may vaunt thereof freely before debauched people who will onely laugh and take pleasure thereat He speaks in the same same manner of novelties and of those who invent new fashions and new opinions that they may as well content their own curiosity and vanity as that of others whom he also exempts from mortal sin For having proposed this question b Quidnam inventio novitatum Est manifestatio prepriae excellentiae per facta quaedam puta novas opiniones novas vestes exponere Quae quidem inventio nisi aliunde gravius vittetur ex se venialis tantùm culpa est quia communiter ejusmodi inventione quis solummodo geslit aliorum laudem comparare Escobar ibid. n. 10. What is it that is called invention of novelties He answers It is a demonstration of ones own excellence by certain actions as in inventing new opinions or new sorts of Garments This invention of novelties is of it self but a venial sin if there occur no other circumstance which may render it more criminal His reason is Because commonly the Authors of these novelties do look after nothing but the estimation and praises of the World Provided then that a man set his soul and heart onely on the desire of worldly honour and glory this desire is either not evil at all or it is but a small fault according to these Divines and what ever one doth or saith for this end well or ill with truth or falsehood he shall not lose the grace of God nor fall short of Salvation If this be no heynous fault to boast himself even of crimes to invent novel opinions to counterfeit actions of piety and vertue to gain honour in the world it must needs be that neither is it a great fault to desire honour even with a desire irregular and vitious For this cause Escobar concludes well according to his own principles in that place where after he hath given us this definition of that haughtinesse of mind which they commonly call Pride c Superbia est appetitus propriae celfitudinis perverse voluntarius Escobar Tr. 2 Exam. 2. n. 4. p. 290. Pride is no other thing then an irregular desire of ones own greatness he makes this question d Quandonam appetitus ille graviter vulnerat conscientiam Quando cum Dâ—i contemptu copulatur Ibid. n. 5. When is it that this desire doth notably hurt conscience And he answers When it is joyned with contempt of God And that he may leave no doubt nor difficulty in this so nice a point he adds also by way of demand e Exprime quandonam superbia cum Dei contemptu admissceatur Ibid. n. 6. Expresse your self that we may know when this contempt is contained in Pride And as if he had a design to satisfie the desire or rather the passion of the ambitious and settle their consciences in quiet he declares that there is no contempt of God and by consequence no mortal sin in the most vehement passion that a man can have for his own excellence and for worldly glory except onely in these cases First f Quando quod à Deo habet à seipso habere existimat Aut vult ab aliis tanquam à seipso bona habens existimari Aut vellet à seipso non à Deo bona sua possidere Aut dolet quod bujusmodi bona à Deo non à seipso receperit Aut cum quis existimat quidem se bona habere à Deo sed non gratis ei obvenisse verum ex justitia sibi debita propter jejunia eleëmosynas c. Escobar ibid. n. 6. p. 290. When he thinks to have of himself that which he receives from God Secondly When he would have others think that he hath those good things from himself Thirdly
in these dishonest looks leaves every one to his own judgement and to his own conscience to do that which he pleaseth qua in re o uisque satisfaciat suae conscientiae in the same manner Escobar leaves every one to his liberty in particular to follow his own sense in a matter so dangerous and to rule himself by his complexion and age consulatur cujusque complexio aetas There is nothing that carries men more strongly to impâ—rity then Stage-plays and particularly those which represent dishonest things For in other sensual objects and divertisements there are but one or two senses commonly that are satisfied but in Stage-plays all the senses in a manner are affected are almost all engaged in impurity by sensible images and representations which hath obliged the Saints to condemn them so often and to turn men away from them as one of the most dreadful inventions of the Devil and most capable to destroy souls For this cause Escobar speaks according to the truth where he saith a Râ—praesentantes comedias res turpes conti nentes vel eo modo ut ad venerem excitent ut plurimum mortaliter peccant Escobar tr 1 Exam. 8 c. 1. n. 3. p. 138. They who act Comedies wherein dishonest things are contained or represented in such manner as ordinarily to excite impurity sin mortally But if the Comedians finde this proposition at first sight to be rigorous I am assured that they will receive it without much trouble when they shall understand that which follows For after he had condemned of mortal sin those who act Comedies he adds that b Porro audientes obserentiam ob abquem bonum sinem non peccant ob curiositatem aut levitatem venialiter delinquunt Ibid. p. 3. p. 13â—9 those that go thither to learn something or for any other good end sin not at all and if they go thither of curiosity or lightness they sin onely venially These Stage-players will easily satisfie themselves by this last proposition seeing it destroys the former and shews clear enough that their Profession is in effect good ar at least indifferent for there is no appearance that one can be a partaker in an other mans sin or be present voluntarily without cause by lightnesse or onely to please his curiosity at a wicked action and an exercise which of it self is a mortal sin and draws on to sin being St. Paul doth testifie that not onely they who do evil are worthy of death but they also who consent thereto that is to say those who approve it by their actions by their words by their presence and even by their silence So that if they who act Stage-plays sin mortally as Escobar saith in his first proposition it follows according to St. Paul that those who go to bear them expressely upon lightness and curiosity make themselves partakers of their sin And if on the contrary they who go to them sin not at all or sin venially as the same Escobar saith though they go thither through lightness and more curiosity it will follow that they who act the Comedies do not sin at all neither or sin but venially contrary to what Escobar affirms in his first proposition and against the judgement of all the Saints Filliutius in the place which I have cited speaks of Stage-playes almost like Escobar c Si ob solam curiosiatem audiantur vel delectationem representationis non rerum representatarum alioquin non sit probabile pericu'um lapsus in mortale non excedit veniale Filliutiu mor. tom 2. Tr. 30. v. 10. n. 212. If one goes thither saith he only for curiositie or for the pleasure he takes in beholding good Actors and not of the things which they represent this is but a venial sinne provided that he come not thereby in apparent danger of falling into mortal sin And to shew that he esteems this venial sin to be a very small one and that commonly there is even none at all in attending on these filthy and dishonest Stage-playes he permits this to the Ecclesiastiques d Non etiam Clerici peccant sublato scandalo quod sere non intercedit ex Sanchez quia srequentissime intersunt Ibid. The Ecclesiastiques themselves saith he sin not in going to a Stage-play provided that it be without scandal which hardly happens at all saith Sanchez because they go thither very frequently He saith that Ecclesiastiques sin not in going to Stage-playes provided they can go thither without scandal and at the same time he declares that there is no scandal therein because they go thither very frequently It is true and we see it too well at this day that the greatest crimes cause no horror nor offend the world but only when they are not common as soon as they become so they cease to cause horror and daunt no more the spirits of men and often times they passe even for innocent actions For what concerns dishonest touches Escobar saith generally that they are permitted betwixt persons espoused and relates this as the opinion of Sanchez and many others e Sanchez alu multi affirmant licere si absit pollutionis consensus in rem illicitam periculum Escobar tr 1. Exam. 8. n. 74. d. 149. sect 3. Sanchâ—… saith he and many others assure us that they are permitted provided that no danger of falling into pollution come thereby nor of giving consent unto any unlawfull thing He also makes Sanchez speak more boldly in this point citing him again the second time f Sanchez citatus ait licere oscula tactuâ— externos etiam si secutura pollutio praevideatur dummodo adsit justa causa sponso scilicet ad vitandum inurbanitatis seu austeritatis not am Ibid. n. 74. Sanchez whom I have already cited saith that kisses and touches of the body are permitted to persons betrothed though they foresee that pollution will follow thereon provided the man be moved to it by some just reason as namely that he may not appear to be of an ill humour or too austere It is better according to Sanchez and Escobar to give a mans self up to impurity and unnatural excesse than to passe for an uncivil person before men or women Filliutius reports it as an opinion of the same Sanchez g Non esse mortale nec saepe veniale exosculari molles infamium carnes Filliutius moral tom 2. tract 30. c. 9 n. 171. p. 321. that it is no mortal fin nor commonly a venial one to kisse the tender and delicate flesh of children h Etiamsi fiant ob solam delectationem naturaliter consequentem crunt ad summum peccata venialia Ibid. n. 176. And speaking of touches and kisses which are given for pleasure only he saith that they can be but venial sins and besides he testifies that he could hardly condemn them of venial sin Erunt ad summum peccata venialia And a little after having made this question i
least reason sufficeth to make use of them and that when they are made use of even without reason and without necessity there is in a manner no sin in them or that it is but very little Sanchez expounding the opinion of Soto who holds that one may make use of equivocations in sport or drollery saith that it is true provided that no oath be added there unto o Dum Sotus de Secreto memb 3. q. 3 in fine it non esse culpam amphibologiis uti joco in ridiculis intelligo quando absque juramento id sieret Sanch. op mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 22. p. 27. When Soto holds saith he that it is no sin to make use of equivocations in making merry and drolling this he understands to be when it is done without swearing But it suffices not this professor of equivocations to say that there is no sin in taking this divertisement he will have it also to be honest and therefore it is sufficient to make an equivocation honest to take divertisement therein p Tunc enim honestus ille ludus recreationis pustae causa exercitus honestum redderet amphibologiae usum Ibid. For then saith he this honest sport and recreation renders the equivocation honest q At si juramentum adesset est manifesta culpa propter vanam indiscretam divini nominis usurpationem at solum esset venialis Ibid. But if it happen that one swear in this recreation with or without design when one swears by the name of God there may well be some fault in it as he avers but he pretends its but small and venial But if one swears not at all above all not by the name of God he maintains that this honest sport and recreation makes the equivocation honest He had already said the same thing more at large before p. 25.4 where after he had established this rule r Possunt absque mendacio usurpari etsi verba ex sua significatione ambigua non siat nec cum sensum habeant c. Ibid. That one may without lying make use of words which in themselves are not ambiguous and which have not the sense which he takes them in c. He adds in the following number Å¿ Possunt quoque absque mendacio ea verba usurpari etiamsi ex sua significatione non sint ambigua nec cum sensum admittant ex se nec ex circumstantiis occurrentibus sed tantum eum sensum reddant ex aliquo additomenio proferentis retento quodcunque illud fit ut si qnis vel solus vel coram aliis sive interrogatus sive propria sponte sive recreationis gratia sive quocunque alio fine juret se non fecisse aliquid quod revera fecit intelligendo intra se aliquid altud quod non fecit vel etiam diem ab eo in quo fecit vel quodcunque aliud additamentum revera non mentitur nec perjurus est sed tantum non diceret unam veritatem determinatam quam audientas concipiunt ac verba illa ex se significant sed altam veritatem disparatam Ibid. num 15. That one may make use of such words though they be not ambiguous at all and that in themselves and circumstances present they cannot receive the sense that is given them but that they may learn and have it onely by means of some mental restriction or addition such as pleases him who pronounceth them as if any one being alone or in company whether interrogated or of his own proper motion for recreation or for some other motive whatsoever swears he hath not done a thing which truly he hath done intending in his minde some other thing which in truth he hath not done or some other day then that on which he did it or quite another thing and circumstance as he pleases so it be true he doth not lye indeed and he shall not be forsworn but he hath only not said any determined truth which they could conceive who heard him speak which was signified by his words but some other different truth Many observations may be made on this one passage of Sanchez wherein there are many things for them to learn who are curious of the science of equivocations I will onely passe over it cursorily and lightly First of all he speaks of an equivocation the most strange and distant from humane reason that can be imagined t Possunt absque mendacio ea verba usurpari etiamsi ex sua significetione noa sint ambigua nec eum sensum admittant ex se nec ex circumstantiis occurrentibus One may saith he without lying make use of these words though in their signification they be not ambigious and which of themselves and with their present circumstances cannot bear the sense which is given them Whence it follows that these words are indeed not equivocal but openly false since they could not bear the sense given them For an equivocal word is that which hath two sences or which â—ay receive two sences And therefore he who makes use of that as equivocal which is not equivocal and who would give it a sence which it will not bear is surely a lyar signifying one thing by his words and thinking another Also Sanchez affirms and testifies sufficiently himself that this word is no equivocation in saying that it is not ambiguous for an ambiguous and equivocal word are one and the same thing So that what he adds that though these words which he supposes not to be equivocal could not receive the sence he gives them u Sed tantùm eum sensum reddant ex aliquo â—dditomento proferenâ—is retento yet they will never the lesse bear it by adding that which he who speaks them reserves in his thoughts This say I is destroyed by it self the thought of a man which is altogether inward and invisible cannot at all change the sence of words which are all-together outward and sensible nor give them that which they cannot receive otherwise every one may by his will and according to his phantasie give every sort of words all sorts of sences and make them signifie any thing And so it will be impossible for one to understand another and those of the same country shall be as strangers to one another This Doctor gives the same liberty to circumstances as to the substance of words saying that one may give them by thought alone such sence as one will in such time and in such manner and on such subject and motive as one will without other motive or necessity then because he will a Ut si quis solus vel cum altis sive interrogatus sive propria sponte sive recreationis gratia sive alio quocunque fine juret se non fecisse oliquid quod revera fecit As if one saith he being alone or in company whether he be asked or speak of his own accord for recreation or for some other
motive whatsoever it be swear that he hath not done a thing which notwithstanding he hath done indeed It is not sufficient for him to lye formally he will also joyn perjury to lying in saying that one may swear that he hath not done that which he hath done and he would cover this lye and this perjury by the thought of a man onely in what estate and in what circumstances soever he be alone or in company speaking for recreation or for other motive whatsoever it be pretending that he may swear that he hath not done which he hath done without fear of taking a false oath provided b Intelligendo intra se aliud revera fecit that he intend onely in his mind some other thing that he had not done See here Sanchez first method which serves for nothing but to learn to lye purely simply and without equivocation by using words that are not equivocal in themselves at all and which cannot signify that which one saith nor that which is in ones mind at all as he affirms himself So that such words are contrary to the thoughts which he hath and he saith really other things then he thinketh which is to lye formally and simply The second method is no better then the former for he saith one may c Vel intelligendo aliam diem ab ea aqua fecit understand or supply out of ones mind that he hath not done the thing on an other day then that on which he did it or else that he hath not done it in an other place an other time or an other company or with other circumstances of which he gives him choice leaving him entire liberty to make use of which he pleases to deceive without scruple For his words are clear and general d Vel intelligendo aliud quodvis additum verum quodcunque illuct sit Or intending saith he some quite other thing and quite other circumstance which he pleases to add which is true of what sort soever it be And with these precautions if you will believe him e Revera non mentitur nec perjurus est he lyes not at all in effect and is not perjured imagining and pretending to make us believe that he hath spoken no false thing and that he hath spoken the very truth though he say not that which is demanded of him nor that which the words he uttereth signifie of themselves but an other truth altogether different sed aliam veritatem disparatam This is a true way to be able to justifie all manner of lyes and perjuries the greatest lyar and the greatest impostor may make use hereof to justify and to maintain himself in these crimes in saying that his meaning was other than his saying and that so f Revera non mentitur nec perjurus est sed tantum non dicit unam veritatem determinatam qaam auditores concipiunt ac verbo illo significant sed aliam veritatem disparatam He is really neither lyar nor perjured but onely did not speak precisely a truth which they understood who did hear him and which his words signified but another truth which had no thing ommon therewith But that for this they had no cause to complain of what he said to them and answered in this manner they having no right to question him For he presupposeth as a general maxime g Quia alteri respondere non obligatus nec obligatur respondere ad ejus mentem that when one is not obliged to answer a person neither is he obliged to answer according to his thoughts Which he supports by a maxime of Logick which saith h A quo enim removetur genus omnis quoque species removetur That when the general kind of any thing is removed the special sorts are also removed This reasoning he saith he learned from Navarre who saith that when one is not obliged to answer a person he may answer him in what manner he pleases he is not obliged to give him an honest civil true sincere faithful one but that he may make one in all points contrary for that we may make him none if we please There is none that sees not clearly what follows from this that incivil conversation especially amongst equals where one hath no authority over others nor right to question them nor to oblige them to answer to that which is proposed or demanded of them every one may say what he will and understand what he will by his words without apprehending that he lies and believing that he speaks the truth because he represents it in his minde though he hide it or expresse even the contrary in his words But there is great difference betwixt conceiving or thinking the truth and speaking or signifying it to others Those who will follow this Jesuit shall have the truth in their thoughts but not in their words they conceive it well but they do not speak it at all and in this they are lyars and perjured notwithstanding all their intentions and secret thoughts for to lye is no other thing then to speak otherwise then a man thinks and to say one thing having another in his thoughts Filliutius seems at first sight not to agree with Sanchez in this point a Quinto quaeritur quale peccatum sit uti amphibologia absque rationabili causa Filliutius qq mor. tom 2. tract 25. c. 11. n. 330. p. 204. It is demanded saith he what sin it is to make use of equivocations without any reafonable cause His first answer is b Respondeo dico primo probabile esse quod sit mendacium atque adeo perjurium si confirmetur juramento It is probable that it is a lye and by confequence perjury when it is confirmed with an oath But a little after his inclination which he hath for looseness and to flatter the lust and corruptions of men make him say c Dico 2. probabilius videri non esse mendacium nec perjurium Ibid. That it seemeth more probable that in rigour it is no lye nor any perjury His principal reason is d Quia qui sic loquitur jurat non habet intentionem dicendi falsum vel jurandi salsitatem ut supponimus Ibid. because that he who talks and swears after this manner hath no intention as is presupposed to speak nor to swear false though he indeed both speak and swear so He pretends then as Sanchez that the inward will of man alone can change the signification of words and give to them such as he pleases It is true that Sanchez gives not this power to the intention alone without joyning some mental restriction untoâ—t by which he forms in his mind a true sense in saying in himself that he will neither lye nor forswear Filliutius notwithstanding fails not to approve these restrictions and mental additions of Sanchez e Et quod profertur in rigore habet aliquem sensum verum quem talis intendit
must be very dull who cannot make use of this invention since it is not of necessity no not to know in particular nor what he doth nor what he saith whether it be true or not indeed and that it is sufficient to believe or suppose in general that it may be so and that a nimble witted man may finde some sense in which he can make the words true which are false in their natural and onely sense and which by consequence are not equivocations though he who pronounces them cannot do it SECT V. The method of the same Jesuits to hinder their equivocations from being ever discovered and that no person may be deprived of his liberty to make use of them AFter they have made the use of equivocations so free so common and so easie that all the world may make use of them indifferently on all occasions there remains nothing for the Masters of this art that is to say the Jesuits to do but to establish well the practice and to fortify themselves in such sort against all opposition that whatsoever precaution they use no person may be able to hinder them from making use thereof when they will nor to discover it when they have used it This Sanchez hath attempted to do and in this he hath laboured with great care and he hath proceeded therein beyond all other who have written on this matter After he hath established many rules given many advices about equivocations and the manner to form and make use of them he concludes with this advice as the last and most important a Tandem id observandum est quotier licitum est ad se tuendum uti aliqua aequivocatione id quoque erit licitum etsi interrogans urgeat excludens illam aequivocationem Sanch. op mor. l. 3. c. 6. n. 45. p. 30. That so often as it is lawful in our own defence to use equivocations they may be used though he who examines us do presse us to answer him without making use of this very equivocation That is to say that so often as you believe that you may use equivocations which is alway lawful according to this Casuist and his Fraternity as we have already reported on all occasions and even without necessity and reason though you be admonished not to make use of it when it is forbidden you when you are caused to promise and even to swear that you will make no use of it notwithstanding all these precautions these defences these promises and the oath that you have made you have always the liberty to make use thereof None can speak more clearly and more favourably Notwithstanding if the practice of this rule seem to you too hard or too large he will help your understanding by examples which he brings and your belief by the authority of other Casuists whom he cites for you in these terms b Atque idem docent de reo qui rogatus de delicto secreto urgetur ut dicat sive fecerit publice sive occulto sive ipse Judex juridice interroget sive noa dicentes posse adhuc respondere se non fecisse intelligendo non ut tu in iniquitate tua rogas sed ut teneris tanquam Judex rogare Ibid. The Casuists say the same thing of a man accused who being axamined upon any secret crime is prest to answer whether it be publiquely or privately whether it be before a Judge juridically or not For they hold in this very case that he may answer that he hath not done it intending his answer not in that manner as the Judge examines him maliciously but in the manner he ought to examine him in the quality of a Judge It is sufficient that a malefactor or a witness form within himself a probable opinion that the Judge who examine him juridically ought not to examine him in the manner that he doth for to mock him and to elude his interrogatories by equivocation or by confidently denying most clear and certain things so that this mischief cannot possibly be hindred or prevented by him what precaution soever he useth The Judge is malicious and he interrogates this malefactor maliciously according to Sanchez because that in examining he uses the precautions which he believes necessary to draw the truth out of his mouth This malefactor is not malicious he answers not malicously but reasonably and wisely according to the Divinity of this Father because he observes exactly the rules of the equivocations and omits no jugling slight of mind to obscure the truth and to deceive the Judge who interrogates him by lying and perjury He brings also another example of the same subject c Atque idem docet de rogato à custodibus urbis aliqaem locum peste infectum esse falso ex stimantibus rogantibus quempiam an ex co loco venerit sive infectus peste sit five non nempe posse ipsum respondere non venire ex eo intelligendo non ut vos rogatis sed ut deberetis rogare Ibid. He holds the same thing saith he speaking of Navarre touching him who is interrogated by a Town-guard who believe falsely that the Town from whence he comes is infected with the plague and demands from him if he came from thence whether it be infected or it be not infected he may answer that he came not thence making this mental restriction in his minde I came thence not according to the question you make but according to the question you ought to make This method is not very favourable to civil government nor gives it much weight to the authority of Magistrates and their Officers also it is not very favourable for the establishment of Laws and for assuring the obedience which people owe unto Princes When a Soveraign commands any thing to his subjects there is no private man who shall receive his orders who may not promise to obey him though he be resolved to do nothing of that he shall command him by making use of this mental restriction and saying in himself d Non ut tu imperas sed ut deberes imperare I will do this not according as you command me but as you ought to command me Also in like manner when he is demanded any thing whereunto he imagines that he is not obliged to answer according to truth he may speak contrary to that which he thinks and to that which is true by the favour of this equivocation and of this secret thought which he bears in his minde e Non ut tuâ—ogas sed ut debâ—es interragaâ—e In answer saith he in himself not to that which you demand of me but according to that you ought to have demanded of me One may say by proportion the same thing of a child in relation to a Father of a servant in relation to a Master of a Monk or any other inferiour in relation to his Superior and so this rule banisheth absolutely truth and sincerity out of
he thinks and which he demands who examines him but to that which he pretends he ought to ask him and to the thought which he thinks he ought to have in examining him And this thought which he imagines that he who examines him ought to have is his own and that which he forms in his own minde to deceive and elude the question of him who examines him So that he speaks truth in lying and swears false without perjury because although he answers contrarily to what he was questioned and to what he hath promised to answer even with an oath notwithstanding he answers conformably to his own intention and to the secret thought which he hath formed in his mind which is that which he ought to have following his own judgement not that of him who examines him which makes his answer to be true Illa responsio juxta debitam ejus mentem vera est So when one is urged by his Father his Superior or by his Confessor to tell something which he would not discover unto them he needs onely to form a thought different from theirs and to imagine that they ought to have it and answering unto them comformably to this thought he shall be covered from lying and falshood Illa responsio juxta debitam ejus mentem vera est The last counsel which Sanchez gives for securing and sacilitating equivocation is this a At oportet ut utens quacunque ex dictis amphibologiis intendat sâ—nsâ—m quem verba vera possunt habere sic opus est ut sciat se aliquo vero sensu posse dâ—cere quamviâ— in spâ—cie illum ignoret Ibid. n. 46. p. 31. It behoves him who will make use of any of these equivocations which we are about to speak of to have an intention to give unto his words the sence which they may truely receive and by consequence he must know that he may speak them in any sence which is true though he know not in particular what that sence is That is to say that a man speaking a falshood so evident that he himself sees no means to excuse or cover it under any equivocation which might give it onely some colour of truth he may nevertheless speak it and for to put his conscience in surety it is sufficient for him to believe that which he saith may absolutely be capable of some true sence though he knows it not By this rare Doctrine all deceivers and lyars have gained their cause and this Jesuit hath given them more than ever they durst hope for for according to this Doctrine they may not onely deceive without punishment and without being discovered which is that which they pretend to but whatsoever deceit lye or perjury they use they lye not nor forswear themselves at all though they may believe themselves that they do seeing clearly that that which they say is not true and being not able so much as to see how it can be true provided onely that they suppose and that they believe in general that it may be so absolutely in some sence which they do not know Sanchez attributes this expedient unto Suarez But to keep always his advantage even above his Fraternity and to hold the rank of a Master in this matter he proposes also another invention or at least he stretches that of Suarez and he expounds it yet more easily b At sat erit ut intendat sensum quem doctus vir illi consulit aut intelligit Ibid. It suffices saith he that he hath an intention to give that sence to his words which a learned man hath counselled him to give it or might understand it in He wills therefore that he should not trouble himself so much as to know whether the evident falsity which he speaks and which he sees himself may be covered by any ordinary or easie equivocation and he believes that it behoves him onely to have an intention to speak in such a sence as a learned man who is experienced in equivocations can give him though it be altogether unknown from common people So important a matter is it to have the counsel of a man who knows all the slights of this mystery and who hath proper ones for all sorts of affairs For we may not onely make use of his counsels when he is present and when we have time to consult him but also in his absence when we make our reference unto him in all sorts of difficulties which we meet with in this matter and make use of his counsel and direction to deceive all men without seeing him or speaking to him purposing onely in our selves to do that which he would do or counsel us supposing that he would finde out some means by his contrivance to justifie the lye and perjury which we are about to fall into although we see not any way at all how this which we are about to speak and to swear can be true in any sence or warranted from lying and perjury according to any rules of Truth and Justice The last ARTICLE A general proof that the Jesuitical Authors favour and nourish the lust of men in all things and the common principle from which they draw all that they say in favour of it BEyond all which we have spoken hitherto it may be known clearly by a general proof that the Jesuits nourish and favour as much as they can the lusts of men by considering what they say to the disadvantage of charity For as charity and lust are two contrary motions and loves which divide our heart in such manner that it is allways possessed and moved by the one or the other and it hath so much more of lust as it hath less of harity lust cannot be favoured more nor established more forcibly in the heart of man to cause it to reign continually through his whole life and all his actions then by chasing charity away from thence for to reduce it to such a streight as that it cannot be more diminished nor have lesse extent without being entirly destroyed And for this reason the Jesuits carry themselves so in this particular and with such a consent of their Authors that it seems that a general conspiracy and resolution hath been taken about in in so general assembly of all their Society There are some who pretend that a man is never obliged upon any occasion nor at any determinate time to love God in all the course of his life nay nor even at death The more religious reduce this great and first commandment to a certain time and certain occasions which are very rare and distant c Quonam tempore per se obligat praeceptum charitatis ad Deum Escob tr 5. exam 4. n. 8. p. 624. At what time inquires Escobar doth the precept of loving God oblige a man in it self He rehearses divers opinions and expresses his own in these terms d Mitto sententiam Azorii octo tempora assignantis Sanchez unicum I
according to the Jesuits and that custom of sinning may make a man uncapable of sinning AS in doing evil we accustom our selves thereunto and in following lusts we cause them to pass into habits which strengthen and increase more the inclination we had unto evil the order of reason requires in the design we have to consider the springs and the principles of sin to make appear how the Jesuits nourish them that after we have treated of Lust we speak also of evil habits I propose for example of habitual sins swearing and blasphemy because these sins of themselves produce neither pleasure nor profit its onely passion which carries men to them and evil custom which nourisheth them So that to speak properly and according to their peculiar nature they are sins of passion and habit Bauny in his summe chap. 4. pag. 60. speaking of a person accustomed to swear who for this reason is always in danger to be forsworn gives this counsel to their Confessours The Confessor to hinder this evil ought to draw from his penitent an act of dislike or to speak better of disavowing this cursed custom For by this means the oaths which follow proceeding from such an habit shall be esteemed involuntary in their cause Suarez l. 3. of Oaths chap. 6 Sanchez in his Summe l. 3. c. 5. n. 11. and by consequence without sin This practice is very easie and very convenient if it be so that one word of disowning sins which a Confessor can draw out of the mouth of a sinner may serve all at once to be a remedy for all the sins which he hath committed and for the justification of all the sins he shall be able to commit for the future by the violence of an evil habit so the simple declaration which a man shall make of his being sorry to see himself subject to such a vice sufficeth to excuse him from all the sins which he shall afterwards commit by that habit which he hath of this vice as the debauches and excesses of the mouth immodest speeches lyes deceits thefts and other such like And so almost all vices of this sort shall be innocent there being few persons that are not sorry for being engaged in them and being unable to avoid them because of their long accustoming themselves unto them or who at least do not or will not sometimes disallow them and testifie some displeasure against them in some good interval And yet if this good Father had been well read in Sanchez whom he cites I am confident he would have been render'd yet more easie and complacent in this point For Sanchez acknowledges no particular sin in Oaths that proceed of an habit though no disavowing them be made to excuse them as Bauny requires See how he speaks herein p Posterior sententia cui tanquam probabiliori accedo ait juramenta prolata sine advertentia formali per se sufficienti ad peccatum mortal non esse in se novum ac proprium ac speciale peccat um propter solam jurandi consuetudinem qualiscumque fit nedum sit retracta Sanchez op mor. part 1. l. 3. c. 5. n. 28. p. 21. The last opinion which I follow as the most probable holds that those Oaths which are made without actual application which of it self were sufficient to a mortal sin are not of themselves new sins properly and particularly onely because of the custom of swearing how great soever it be and though no renunciation or retractation be made of it Escobar is not far off from this opinion where speaking of blasphemy he demands q Num aliquando venialis blasphemia Consuetudo quidem absque advertentia lethale peccatum non facit Escobar tract 1. exam 3. cap. 6. num 28. pag 73. If blasphemy be sometimes a venial sins And he answers absolutely according to his use That such a custom whereof one thinks not at all makes sin not to be mortal But for the most part hinders it from being mortal as it would he if he did swear without being accustomed Filliutius speaks the same more at large and more clearly a Octavo quaero de consuetudine blasphemandi ordine ad malitiam Respendeo dico 1. si desit advertentia plena ca toriatur blasphemia etiamsi adsit consuetudo blasphemandi non commitâ—itur peccatum mortale Filliutius 〈◊〉 qq tom 2 tract 25. cap. 1. num 27. pag 173. It is demanded what sin it is to blaspheme customarily I answer in the first place that when a man blaspames without having full knowledge thereof how much soever he be accustomed thereto he sins not mortally He taken the reason of this conclusion out of a general principle which he presupposeth as assured b Ratio est quia ut diximus de voluntario libero ad â—…ccatum mortale requiritur advertentia plenâ— undecunque oriatur defectus illius excusat a peceato Ibid. The reason is saith he because as we have said handling free and voluntary actions to six mortally it behoves to have a full knowledge for want of which on what account soever it comes sin is thereby bindered He demands in the same place c An jurandi consuâ—tudo constituat hominem in statu peccati If the custom of swearing put a man in the estate of sin First of all he reports the opinion of those who hold the affirmative afterwards he speaks his own in these terms d Dico 2. consuâ—tudinem jurandi sine necessitate vel utilitate sed cum veritate sufficiente advertentia non esse peccatum grave ex se nec constituere hominem in statu peccati mortalis Ibid. cap. 10. n. 313. I say in the second place that the custom of swearing without necessity and without utility but with verity and without sufficient knowledge and reflection is not of it self a great sin and puts not a man into a state of mortal sin He demands again on the same subject e Sitne perjurium cum in advertentia naturali peccatum mortale ob consuetudinem perjurandi Ibid. n. 316. If perjury which one commits through natural inadvertence be a mortal sin because of the custom he hath to forswear And rejecting the opinion of those who believed it to be a mortal sin he answers f Dico 2. Probabilius est non esse peccatum mortale speciale quando est sine advertentia naturali Ibid. I say in the second place that it is more probable that there is no mortal sin particularly when one forsweareth himself without perceiving it at all and by a natural inadvertence And a little after he adds g Etiamsi operans sit cum habituali affectu ad peccatum Ibid. Though he who doth it hath his will effectually addicted to sin by an evil habit So that according to the judgement of this Divine although he swear with full knowledge provided that it be not against truth although he swear against the truth and
Sa to affirm c Fabellam recitare ut auditores excitentur ad pie audiendum non est peccatum Sa verh Praedicare num 5. p. 378. that it was no sin to make fabulous relations in Sermons to stir up the auditors attention and devotion He speaks also more clearly in another place where he saith d Mentiri in concione in pertinentibus ad doctrinam quidam aiunt esse mortale alii non semper quod intellige si sit materia levis Sa verb. Mendacium num 2. pag. 494. that there are some who hold that it is always mortal sin to tell a lye in Preaching on any Doctrinal point but others deny it And he relates the opinion of these latter adding onely that it must be understood onely when the matter is sleight If to lye in the chair in points of Doctrine according to this Jesuit be but a venial sin he without doubt would make no great matter of lyes which a Preacher should speak in other matters and it may be he might give them in this the same liberty that he gives them to tell tales generally and without exception He condemns them not more rigorously who tell lyes in confession e Mentiri in consessions de peccatis venialibus out de aliis confessis mortalibus veniale solum peccatum est etiamsi illa antea apud se proposuisset vere confiteri Sa verb. Confessio n. 12. p. 88. It is but a venial sin saith he to lye unto a Confessor in confessing venial or mortal sins formerly confessed though after resolution to confesse them truly Escobar saith the same and adds some thing f Mendacium de peccaâ—o veniali veniale est nisi illud veniale esset totalis confessionis materia quia tunc daretur absolutio fine materia Sacramentum nullum esset Suarez tom 4. n. 3. par disp 22. sect 10. n. 6. Alii negant quia omne mendacium de veniali est res levis Escob tr 7. ex 4. n. 107. p. 816. Suarez holds saith he that to lye in confessing a venial sin is but a venial sin provided that this venial sin be not all the matter of the confession for in this case the absolution will have no subject and the Sacrament will be nul Others hold the contrary for that a lye which consists in a sleight and venial matter is always sleight A lyetold in confession and which makes the Sacrament null in the judgement of this Jesuit and of those whose judgement he reports seems to him a very sleight thing to furnish matter for a mortal sin though it destroy a Sacrament and turn it into an action profane and sacrilegious It is easie to see if this be to honour the Truth and the Sacrament of penance which by a particular reason may be called the Sacrament of Truth because there a man acknowledgeth that which he is truly confessing himself a sinner before God and confessing his sins before a Priest who holds the place of God nevertheless this Divinity teaches that it is no great matter to lye in this Sacrament and that fault committed herein ought to be considered according to the matter of the sin rather then by the holinesse of the Sacrament in such manner that if the matter about which the lye is told be not an important thing in it self the sin is but sleight though thereby the Sacrament be profaned made nul and sacrilegious This Jesuit commits yet a greater extravagance against the truth when he saith that it may be opposed with a resolution altogether formal that is to say by pure malice though it be acknowledged in the heart without becoming guilty of any great fault g Impugnaeâ—e perspicuam veritatem animo impugnandt contradicendi est peccatum grave aut leve juxta materiae gravitatem aut levitatem Escobar tract 2. exam 2. cap. 1. num 14. pag. 292 To conflict with the truth saith he which is evident with a formal design to oppose and contradict it is great or little according as the truth in hand is of great or little consequence He considers not the greatness of the Majesty of God who is encountred in the Truth and who is Truth it self neither doth he any more consider the wicked disposition of him who impugnes the truth by an aversion or contempt which he hath towards it opposing it by a formal design to resist and destroy it though he know it evidently animo impugnandi contradicendi perspicuam veritatem If when the King speaks any of his Officers should rise up and contradict him publickly in a thing which he knew himself to be just and true being induced to this excesse onely by insolence and to oppose himself against the King and to contradict him without cause it is certain he would be treated as in guilty of high treason and his action would passe in the judgement of all the world for an unsufferable outrage and contempt of Royal Majesty though the subject upon which he thus opposed the King were not of great importance And yet Escobar would that it should be accompted but a sleight fault to deal thus with God and his Truth One passage alone of Sanchez which I will rehearse here may suffice to prove that which I have said that in things purely spiritual the Jesuits find scarcely any sufficent matter for mortal sin h Res quantumvis sacras principal ter ob vanam gloriam officere ut Sacramenta omnia ministrare vel recipere sacram celebrare non excedit culpam venialem Sanchez op mor. l. 1. c. 3. n. 1. p. 9. Et si debitus ordo pervertatur ea tamen perversio non tanti est ut adea gravis injuria rebus spiritualibus inseratur ut poena aeterna digna sit Ibid. To perform of vanity saith he the most sacred actions as to administer the Sacraments or to receive them or to celebrate the most Holy Masse for vain glory can be but a venial sin though vain glory be proposed as the principal end He acknowledges that there is disorder in this action but he pretends that it is of small consequence and that the injury that is done to God and things Spiritual and Divine in making them subservient to vain glory is not a thing so considerable as to merit the disfavour of God and that it conserve for a matter to mortal sin and a cause of eternal damnation It is not an easie thing to judge what reason he may have thus to diminish this sin if he acknowledge that there may possibly be great ones in Spiritual matters For indeed it will be a hard thing to find greater then this considered by the light of Faith then to say Masse for vanity as the principal end thereof this is properly to sacrifice to vanity or to the Devil who is the god of vanity the body of Jesus Christ which is horrible onely to think And if the sacrifice of the Masse may be
who are the first modules to all them that followed in that rule had no other then an humane conduct in instituting and establishing of themselves that which seemed unto them just and reasonable not as instruments animated by Jesus Christ but as the Authors and principals thereof following their own sences and thoughts The Jesuits perhaps will not be much troubled to agree to all those thing which are common enough in their Society and maintained by their most famous Writers who teach that the Laws of the Church are no other then humane that its power and conduct extends onely to the outward man and that the Church it self is onely a politick body as shall be proved elsewhere when we come to make known how pernicious these maximes are to all Religion and overturn the power and authority of the Church After Azor had spoken so basely and so unworthily of the Apostles and Apostolical constitutions we need not think that strange which he saith against the Ancients and Fathers of the Church and would have the opinions of the new writers of these times to have as much weight and credit as they so that if the Fathers sometimes prevail with them against the new Authors the new Authors do as often and more frequently prevail over the Fathers It is in the second Book of his Moral Institutions where after he had demanded q Prime quaeritur an opinio probabilior existimetur ita ut morito praeserri debeat co quod sit antiquorum sententia altera sit recentiorum whether we ought to hold an opinion more probable because it is from the ancient Fathers or Whether for this reason it ought to be preferred before that of the moderns He answers in these terms r Respondâ—o quondâ— revera opiniones sunt pares saepe antiquorum opinio juniorum sententiae praefeatur non tamen lege aut ratione efficaci compellimur ad cam semper anteferendam Inst Moral l. 2. c. 17. q. 1. p. 127. when the opinions are equal themselves those of the ancients are commonly preferred before new writers but there is neither law nor reason sufficient to oblige us to preferre them always This is no great honour to the Fathers to say that we may preferre their opinions before those of modern Authors when the reasons appear equal on both sides since as much may be said of all sorts of Writers following the Jesuits rule of probability But the contempt is more manifest in that which he adds that even in this case there is no obligation to subject our judgements to the opinions of the Holy Doctors of the Church who in important affairs say nothing but what they learned of it and that every one hath liberty to follow them or not to follow them so it shall be lawful to follow the moderns always and never to follow the Fathers when the reasons of the moderns are as likely as those of the Fathers which will easily appear so to those who judge by humane sense and natural reason rather then by the light of Faith as the Casuists of these times and the people of the world commonly do It will also be lawful to preferre the moderns before the Ancients even when the ancients are grounded on more strong and solid reasons according to that maxime of the Jesuits who say that we may prefer an opinion which is lesse before another which is more probable For this is an infallible consequence of this maxime joyned to that other which will have the Fathers and their opinions considered no otherwise then by reason and conformity to humane sense as the Parliament of Paris considers the Laws and opinions of the ancient Roman Lawyers or rather as the hereticks consider the holy Fathers to whom even they render a little more honour and respect in appearance saying that they are to be judged not by reason as all these new Doctors but by the Scriptures though they regard not Scripture but according to their reason and the preoccupation of their spirits But they both agree in the over throw they give the authority of the Fathers subjecting them to their reason and their fancy and giving them onely as much force as they please following the custom of all those who impugn the truths and most assured and inviolable rules of antiquity and Religion Reginaldus handling the same question whether the ancients or the moderns are rather to be believed when they are found in contrary opinions He distinguishes upon the Point saying that Å¿ Quae cirta sidem emergunt difficultates eae funt à veteribus bauriendae quoe vere circa mores homine Christiano dignâ—s à novitiis scriptoribus Reginald praefat ad Lect. in resolving difficulties that arise about faith the right thereof is to be drawn from the ancients but those which regard manners and the life of Christians are to be taken from the modern writers It is ordinary with those who have no right to a thing for which they contest unjustly to endeavour to have it divided to the end that they may have at least one half when they cannot carry all for themselves It was by this rule that Solomon knew that of the two women who disputed in his presence in the case of the Infant either pretending that it belonged to her that she who would have had it cut asunder in the middle ought to have none of it and was not the true Mother So the Jesuits cannot better testifie that they are deprived of truth then by their consenting to divide it in such manner that one half should be to the ancients and the other half to the moderns that is themselves But if it belong to the ancients to determine on questions which arise about matters of Faith it must needs be that they also decide difficult matters of conscience and manners since the faithful ought to live by Faith and if we ought to take from the moderns the rules of manners and not of faith we must have another rule of life given us then faith if faith be not the source and measure of good works nor the principle of Christian life Celot undertaking to defend the Casuists of his company testifies that Reginaldus hath done as he said and having taught moral Divinity twenty years he always made profession to follow the opinions of the newest Authors quidem recentiorum Which he approves and confirms relating that very passage of the Author which we have just now cited in the same terms as we have produced them Celot l. 8. c. 16. p. 714. Quia quae circa fidem emergunt difficultates sunt a veteribus hauriendae quae vero circa mores homine Christiano dignos a novitiis Scriptoribus Which shews that this wicked DOctrine is not peculiar to one or two but comes from the genius of the Society In whose name this Author wrote who seemeth desirous to separate us from the ancients and to hinder us from acknowledging them for
our Fathers that he might set them in their place If it be true then that we ought to take the ancients for the rule of faith onely and not of works the faith which we receive from them will be dead and barren and if the moderns give us onely the rules of manners without those of Faith our life how good soever it appear would be no other then Heathen And if it be pretended that with the rules of manners they give us also them of faith whether they take them from the ancients or make them themselves as they do those of manners to give them us we are more obliged to them then the ancients or rather we hold all of them without having any need of the ancients we receive good life vertue holiness from those who are no Saints and we hold nothing from the Saints from whom we receive onely a dead faith a Faith of Devils as Saint Augustin speaks according to Scripture And to speak truth the children of the Church receive not their life of the Fathers of the Church and are not their children but of the Fathers of this World and Divines of the last times Celot is not contented to follow Reginaldus in this point but he speaks of himself for novelty against antiquity with a sleightness and contempt unsufferable a Quid agas Sic se habent humana omnia vixerunt moribus suis antiqui nos nostris Utri melius Câ—lot in praef l. 5. p. 240. What shall we do saith he all humane affairs are thus the ancients lived after their rules and we after ours And who shall tell us which are the better He acknowledges that which is too true we now live in a manner quite different from that of the ancients and of the Holy Fathers and this is that which should oblige us to address our selves rather unto them then unto the moderns to learn to regulate our manners and to live Christian-like For as in all sorts of professions we seek the best Masters to instruct us so it is clear that those who have lived holily and who are acknowledged for Saints in the Church are more proper to teach holiness and Christian life then they that are no Saints as all the new Divines are not to say no more of them There is none but Celot who seems not willing to confess that the ancients are better then the moderns in saying that we know not whether their conduct and rules be better then that of the moderns But he should at least have considered that we may well sometimes give the moderns the name of Fathers but not of Saints and that by the Holy Fathers we understand always the ancients so that as well the publick voice of the Church as that of the Society it self suffices to convince the blindness of his Pride But he is not content to equal himself and his to the Holy Fathers and ancient Religious who lived in the primitive times of the Church in a holiness and purity altogether extraordinary he hath also the confidence to preferre himself in these strange terms b Inique de nostro saeculo judicarunt qui nostratum Religiosorum mores ex antiquorum factis expendunt ut quod illi faciendum sibi committendumve censuerunt hoc nos confestim pro vo luntate amplexemur aut fugiamus Plane ut si qu is maturi ae â—i hominem ad pueritâ—…m redire compellat quoniam in illo aetatulae slore vinulum clegantulum nounihil habebat quod matri arrideret Celot Ibid. They do wrong saith he to our age who would judge of the life of the Religious of our times by that of the ancients in such sort that what the ancients have believed themselves to be obliged to do or to avoid we ought also to command or forbid Without other reason then because the ancients have ordained it this is as it were to desire them to return to their infancy who are at maturity of age because that in their first years they had somewhat of pleasant and pretty which flattered the eyes of their Mother He could not have discovered himself more nor testifyed more contempt of these great Saints and first Religious then to compare the moderns to men grown ripe and perfect and the ancients to infants who have nothing at all of solid but onely a prettiness proper to content the easiness and foolish affection of women Whence it follows we are no more to consider the ancient Fathers then as children in regard of the moderns who must be the venerable Fathers of the Fathers themselves and by consequence they can be no longer their disciples since it belongs to perfect men to instruct children and not children to instruct men It seems that it is in this same sence that Celot speaking of Saint Paul the first Eremite of Saint Anthony and many other Saints who imitated them in flying the corruption of the world and retiring into the Desart to serve God there he saith that the Church hath rather tolerated then approved those great personages and their manner of life altogether Holy and Evangelical c Alios tulit potius quam expresse probavit Ecclesia homines seculi fastidio amore Dei incitatos statim cursu in solitudinem se abdentes ut sanctum Paulum ut in primis annis sanctum Antonium alios ab Augustino memoratos Celor l. 5. c. 4. p. 257. The Church saith he rather tolerated then approved formally those who being pressed on by the love of God and contempt of the World retired as it were in haste and went to hide themselves in the wildernesse as Saint Paul and Saint Anthony in the first ages and others of whom Saint Augustin speaks We tolerate onely that which is evil or disorderly which comes always from evil or weaknesse This Jesuit therefore must accuse these great Saints of the one or the other and that their actions which were all holy passe in bis mind for disorders or defects if it be true that the Church did tolerate them onely as he saith and not approve them But she could not give them a greater approbation then by Canonizing them and declaring them Saints for that Angelical and admirable life which they led in the Wilderness as also the Church testifies at this day publickly in its office and its mysteries and all the great personages of the Church the Holy Bishops the Popes and the Doctors have published their praises out-vying as it were one another through all ages of Christianity and Celot perhaps is the first amongst Catholicks that hath had the boldness to debase and dispraise them But this contempt and insolence will appear yet more unworthy and unsufferable when he compares them to those who lived in the first ages of the world of whom the Poets speak as of savages and beasts living without Laws without politie and without conduct in such manner that those who came after being formed and regulated by the
follow that which he believes to be less probable and to prove their opinion he lends them a reason of which he oftentimes made use before in like cases about other matters e Quia nec temere nec imprudenter agit utpote qui ratione probabili ducitur Ibid. n. 46. Because a Judge doth not herein behave himself rashly or imprudently guiding himself as he doth by a probable opinion Which obligeth him to approve the opinion of these Authors though he dares not follow it f Quamvis autem hoc sit probabile probabilius judico eum teneri sententiam serre juxta opinionem probabiliorem Ibid. n. 47. Because though it be probable yet he believes it to be more probable that a Judge is obliged to Judge according to the more probable opinion There are none therefore but Casuists and directors of consciences alone that are absolutely exempt from this obligation It is of them alone that we are to understand that which Filliutius said above g Licitum est sequi opinionem minus probabilem etiamsi minus tuta sit It is lawful to follow the less probable opinion though it be also less safe And it is to them onely that we are to referre all those maximes and conclusions which we have seen him and his fraternity draw from this principle And though in this they favour indeed those of other professions in fixing them more unto truth and Justice and leaving them less liberty to depart from it yet it is not this they regard particularly their principal design is to favour themselves in giving to themselves a power to dispose of the power of Jesus Christ of his ministry of the consciences and Salvation of men according to their fancy and do in the Church whatsoever they please without considering that there is no greater misery then to love licence and to be able to do what one will against justice and truth II. POINT The pernicious consequences and effects of the Jesuits Doctrine of probability IF the Tree may be known by its fruit and if a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit as Jesus Christ saith in the Gospel we may confidently affirm that the Doctrine of probability is the most dangerous that ever appeared in the Church and in the world because it overturns all things in them both There is no Chapter in this book that proves not this truth but because it is important and that there are it may be many persons that will hardly believeit and will not easily observe it through the whole extent of this treatise I will represent here some of the principal proofs of the pernicious consequences and unhappy effects of this Doctrine 1. It favours and nurses up weak and disorderly persons in their mistakes and disorders sinners and libertines in their bad courses hereticks in their heresies and Pagans in their infidelity 2. It teaches to elude the Commandments of God and the Church and it overturns Laws Civil Ecclesiastick and Divine 3. It destroys the authority of Princes over their Subjects of Pastors of the Church over the Faithful of Fathers over their children Masters over their Servants of Superiours in Religious Orders over their Inferiours and generally of all Superiours over their Inferiours 4. It introduces independence and leads to irreligion 5. It cannot be destroyed nor hindred from having course in the world if it be once therein received and taught Every one of these points are handled largely enough in diverse places of this Book where may beseen the passages of the Jesuits Authors which I have cited for their verification Wherefore to avoid repetitions I shall often onely give a short touch here as I passe of what they say upon the most part of these points relating upon the rest some other new passages of their Authors I will also recite some out of one of their principal and most faithful disciples and partakers Caramuel by name This is the onely exception to be found in all this work of my design which I have to rehearse onely the Authors of the Society if yet in this it can be said that I depart from my design since it is still onely the Jesuits that speak by the mouth of one of their disciples who doth nothing but deduce and explicate their opinions But if sometimes he seem to be transported and to expatiate too far in the licence of their Doctrine he draws always his conclusions from their Doctrines and he often supports them by their very reasons and in all the liberty of his stile and spirit he advances nothing but what is comprised and contained in the maximes of the Society which I have represented in the preceding Articles It had not been hard for me to have drawn the very same consequences with him But besides that I make some scruple to aggravate or publish the mischief before it appeares and breaks forth of its own accord it goes sometimes to such an excesse that it seems incredible if they themselves who are the Authors thereof did not both own and publish it And this hath caused me to take this disciple of the Jesuits for the interpreter of their opinions as being proper to represent most clearly and most surely the pernicious effects of their Doctrine of probability But because the matter is of great extent I will divide them into several Paragraphs according to the points I even now observed SECT I. That the Jesuits Doctrine of probability favours disorderly persons libertins and infideles 1. IT favours weak and disorderly persons and nuzzles them in their looseness because according to the rules of this probability there is no person of any condition who may not easily be excused of the most part of his duties general and particular continue to live in his disorder and in the abuse which the corruption of the age hath introduced and exempt himself from alms from fasting and from other good works which he may and ought to do according to the order of God and the Church that he might come out of his weaknesses and disorders since these holy exercises are the strength and nourishment of the faithful soul But all these proofs and others also which might be produced upon this point are contained in one sole maxime of the Jesuits Divinity reported by one of their chiefest disciples and defendours a Omnes opiniones probabiles sunt peraeque tutae ac securae benigniores etsi aliquando siut minus probabiles per accidens sunt semper utiliores securiores Caramuel Comment in Reg. S. Bened. l. 1. d. 6. n. 58. Item Theol. fundam p. 134. That all probable opinions are of themselves as safe the one as the other but the more pleasant although they be less probable are always more profitable and more safe by accident That is to say because of their sweetness which renders them more easie more proportionable to the inclinations of men and more favourable to their interest and softness And
will go on directly to Heaven It would be very hard to reconcile these maximes with those of the Gospel wherein Jesus Christ speaks but of one way to Heaven saying h Quam arcta porta angasta via est quae ducit ad vitam pauci sunt qui inveniunt eam Matth. 7. v. 13. Ego sum via veritas vita Joan. 14. v. 6. that it is very strait and that there are few persons that find it and fewer that enter it walk in it as they ought and persevere therein that this way is the truth which can be but one and that it is himself that is this truth and way And the Jesuits say that God hath discovered of late times by a peculiar providence many ways to Heaven that he would have them made the most convenient and easie that they can be possibly and that the most large and most easie should be the best and most safe Profecto dum video tot diversas sententias in rebus moralibus circumferri divinam reor providentiam fulgurare Benigniores etsi aliquando sunt prababiles per accidens sunt semper utiliores securiores that the world might march in crowds by these new ways unto Heaven and that though there were no other reason this alone would suffice still to enlarge and multiply them more lest men should be therein too much crowded or lest they should stifle and hinder one another in walking together in the same way especially if it were so strait as our Lord representeth it that to prevent and avoid also yet more this inconvenience it was fit that these new ways to Heaven should be not onely different and distant from one another but that they should be also sometimes opposite For by this means they which follow it will be in no danger of pressing or inconveniencing one another in any kind since they can never meet one another in the same way Finally they teach that for fear of pestering one another in walking continually in the same way or for some other reason which you please you may change the way and enter some other and returning by the same path march quite contrary to what you did and turn your back on that part you pursued before and yet never wander or part from the way to Heaven and Salvation Thus they declare that any way is good to walk to Heaven whether we march on the right hand or on the left that we may do what we will by following some probable opinion change our opinion as we please do quite contrary to what we have done some little time before without any fear of departing out of the way to Heaven by all these changes nor to come into the way of perdition So that according to the principles of this new Divinity it is not onely very easie to be saved but it is as it were impossible to be damned Melius viatori plures vias exponi quam si una tantùm reperiretur Certe cam nimis latam esse oporteret aut per eam trauseuntes impediri ac cum molestia peragrare opus esset Ergo superna providentia eautum plures moralium operationum vias exponi Rectamque posse inveniri act oâ—em sive juxta unam sive juxt aliam opinionem homines operentur Vir doctus diversis seâ—undium diversas sententias opposita consilia dare poâ—est Layman sup Poterunt hi modo juxta unam modo jâ—xta contrartam opâ—nion in conjutere Sanchez luâ— Qui ex duabus opimonibus probabilibus non sequitur alteram potest sequenti momeatu licite tenere â—lteram Caramuel Theol. fund pag. 143. * Molina in Concord qu. 23. a 4. 5. Disp 1. memb ult As Molina vaunts himself for having invented that knowledge which he calls the middle knowledge and affirms that it was unknown to the holy Fathers and to all antiquity and that none ever mentioned it before him so far that he hath not scrupled to say that if Saint Augustin had discovered it and the Church in his time had known it they had not had so great trouble to defend themselves from the Pelagians and to refute their errour and heresie In like manner Escobar rejoices himself and attributes it to a particular favour of Gods Providence that he and his Fraternity have discovered in these last days many new ways unto Heaven which have been unknown to all the Saints of the ages past to the Church and to Jesus Christ himself who hath not spoken thereof in his Gospel or if he have it hath been onely to condemn them and to advertise men to flye from them as the broad ways which lead unto damnation This same Jesuit may also say in the transport of his joy and in the consequence of his principles that if his ways to Heaven so sweet and so easie had been sooner discovered the Church would not have been so severe in its disciplice nor Jesus Christ in his Gospel and an infinite of persons might have been saved in following them who are lost and damned eternally not being willing to enter into that way which Jesus Christ hath taught because it seemed to them too hard and too troublesome and so according to this new Doctrine Jesus Christ hath not been in truth the Saviour of men since he knew not or hath not taught the most easie ways of Salvation and the Jesuits may boast in this point also as in many others and say that they properly and those who with them have invented these new ways of Heaven so sweet and so easie by the means of this knowledge of probability are the Saviours of the world 4. The Doctrine of probability is also very proper to nourish the infidels in their infidelity For if it be true that of two opinions we may follow that which is less probable with a safe conscience whatsoever we represent to a Pagan to convert him he may still abide in his Idolatry because although we make the Christian Religion very probable unto him and he see clearly that it is more probable then his yet it is very hard and as it were impossible to convince him in such sort that there should remain no doubt of our faith in his spirit and no reason which may render his Religion probable and by consequence he may persist always in his paganisme without being almost at all obliged on pain of damnation to quit it that he may receive the faith of the Gospel This argumentation is certain and evident after the principles of the Jesuits probability but it will be less suspected when we shall know that it is taken out of Sanchez and others cited by Escobar Sanchez demands when an Heathen is obliged under the guilt of sin to receive the Gospel which is preached unto him And he answers 1. that according to some it is not enough to make him see that the Gospel is credible but that it must be made also more credible unto him
than his own Sect though it do not cease to appear unto him also credible But he answers in the second place that this opinion pleaseth him not at all and pretends that in this very case a Pagan is not bound at all to embrace the Faith a Caeterum hoc non placet it a generaliter dictum quippe dum Infidelis sibi persuasum habet suam sectam esse probabitem quamvis contraria sit probabilior tenetur utique in articulo mortis constitutus veram fidem quam probabiliorem judicat amplecti utpote in coarticulo constitutus in quo de extrema salute agitur ac proinde partem quam tutiorem probabiliorem judicat amplectitenetur At extra eum articulum non tenetur quod adhuc prudenter existimet se posse in sua secta perseverare Sanch. op mor. l. 2. c. 1. n. 6. p. 86. Because that when an Infidel is perswaded that his Sect is probable though the contrary which is the Christian Religion appear unto him more probable it is true that at the point of death when his Salvation is reduced to extremity and when by consequence he is obliged to follow that part which he judges to be more sure and more probable he is bound to embrace the true Faith which he believes to be more probable But out of this extremity he is not obliged because he judgeth prudently that he may persist in his idolatry In pursuance of this rule of probability that he acts prudently who follows a probable opinion I believe this Jesuit would not answer for the Salvation of a man who dyes in this estate since he must then believe that he may be saved without Faith and in Idolatry which is the greatest of crimes So that in saying he acts wisely in persisting in Idolatry he saith in effect that it is wisdom to walk in the darkness of death that it is prudence to destroy and precipitate himself into Hell in persuance of his rules of morality and grounding himself upon the principles of probability SECT II. That this Doctrine of Probability favours the Heretiques and nourisheth them in Heresie THe Doctrine of Probability is no lesse favourable to Heretiques then Infidels in that the ordinary arms whereof the Church makes use to defend it self against Heretiques and to assail them being Scripture Counsels Fathers and all that which we have received from the Ancients by Tradition the Jesuits and those who with them defend this Doctrine of Probability find not these evidences for their advantages and are so far from making use of them that they fear and fly from them all they can They cite in their Schools in their writings in a manner as often the Books of the Pagans as of the Scriptures they professe openly to preferre the new Authors above the Ancient they acknowledge not properly for Masters and Fathers any but those of their Society to the judgement and the censure of whom they submit frequently enough the judgements of the Saints which the Church hath always acknowledged for Masters and Fathers Divine or Ecclesiastick authority as well as Faith have scarce any credit in their Schools all as regulated and resolved by the authority of men and humane reason and in all contests and difficulties which they encounter if they cannot prevail by dispute they have recourse to those whom they regard as their Masters and Soveraign Judges in all sorts of matters They appeal to Suarez to Vasquez Molina Lessius and to others such like without making almost any mention of Jesus Christ the Apostles or the Ancient Fathers unless for form and without producing the definitions of the Councils or Traditions of the Church to determine the questions because they find them not conformable to their Spirit nor their designs some can make no use of them because they understand them not and even will not give themselves the trouble to study them and the others because they find not in them what is for their purpose Besides they wish they could content the whole World and answer all persons that consult them according to their humour and disposition Which obligeth them to look out for a Doctrine that is flexible and manageable and which may be accommodated to all occasions The maximes of Faith seem to them too fixed and the rules of the Church and the Gospel too firm and the opinions of the Holy Fathers too exact and too unmoveable For this cause they being not able to make use of them to establish the maximes of which they have need that they may make their designs to prosper and fearing on the other hand that they might be made use of against them to overturn their naughty maximes they find themselves as it were constrained by necessity to do all that they can directly or indirectly to corrupt them weaken them and to take away all credit from them In this they imitate and favour the hereticks of whom they have learned to reject the Holy Fathers especially in the difficulties which regard manners and the conduct of life and to despise Antiquity and Tradition through a blind love of their own novelties and proper imaginations and they are even in some sort more blameable then the Hereticks because they renounce the Father and the Tradition upon a pretence of holding to Scripture and these to follow their new Authors from whom they declare openly that we ought to take Law and rules for Christians Morals rather then from the Fathers of the Church Quae circa fidem emergunt dissicultates eae sunt ex veteribus hauriendae quae vero circa mores homini Christiano dignos à novitiis scriptcribus Colot l. 8 c. 16. p. 714. And indeed there hath never been any heresie which hath not had at the least some sort of probability because there hath yet never been any which hath not had some appearance of truth without which it could have found no followers the spirit of man not being capable to follow any thing but truth nor to be deceived but by the shaddow of it And it often happens that the greatest Heresies took for their foundation the greatest truths and have built on the strongest reasons Which shews clearly that if to follow a probable opinion be to act prudently and if an opinion be probable when it is grounded on the authority of some learned man or some likely reason as the Jesuits and those who hold their Doctrine of Probability tell us there is no heretick who may not maintain against them that he acts prudently whilest he lives in his heresie It is true that the Hereticks have misconceived the truths of which they would make use and especially those of the Scripture which they have corrupted in their sence and in their words that they might fit them to their thoughts and errours b Communis error ex probabili opinione ortus satu est ad gestorum per Sacerdotem vaâ—…em Sanch. op mor. l. 1. c. 9. n. 35. p.
in a Collection which he hath made of the principal decisions which are drawn from the principles of the Doctrine of Probability where after he had reported a great quantity according to the order of the Alphabet he declares that there are an infinite of others which he hath not nor can report because that would be very difficult and tedious and the maxims and use of the Rules of Probability extending themselves in a manner unto all sorts of matters there would need an entire Volume wherein to collect and report them simply Operosum id ita est prolixum quippe per omnes fere materias est percurrendum ut integrum merito volnmen exposcat yet I cannot abstain from reporting here also three taken out of this Author which shew an extraordinary and palpable corruption and a very peculiar deprivation of reason in those who are capable to approve or follow them 1. n Probabile est v. c. hoc vectigal injuste esse impositum probabile item esse impositum juste possumne ego bodie quia sum exocto Regius vectigalium exigere ejusmodi vectigal sequendo opinionem asserentem illud juste esse impositum atque adeo licere mihi sine injustiâ—ia illud exigere cras imo etiam hâ—die quia sum Mercator illud occulte defraudare sequendo opinionem asserentem illud à justitia deficere It is probable saith he for example that an Excise is justly established it is probable on the other side that it is unjust may I being at present established by the King to raise this Impost exact it according to the opinion which maintains that it is just and therefore lawfull for me to levy without doing any injustice and to morrow or the same day being I am a Merchant may I secretly defraud this very Impost following the opinion which condemns it of injustice 2. o Secundo probabile rursus est ablationem famae pecunia compensari probabile non compensari Possumne ego bodie infamatus velle ab infamante compensationem in pecunia cras imo bodie ego ipse alium insamans nolle famam proximi à me ablatam compensare pecunia It is probable that the loss of reputation may and may not be compensated with money May I to day being defamed desire satisfaction in money and to morrow or this very day having defamed another not be willing to allow him the same compensation 3. In the third place p Tertio probabile item reo licere aequivocare in judicio probabile non licere Possumne ego reus bodie aequivocare cras vero creatus Judex urgere reum ut non aequivocet Haec innumerabilia ejusdem generis hic in controversiam narrantur In casibus relatis num 1. 2. 3. atque in similibus licitam esse ejusmodi mutationem concedimus Tamb. l. 1. Theol. c. 3. sect 5. num 1. 2. 3. 21. It is probable that a Defendant may use equivocations in Justice May I being this day Defendant use equivocations and to morrow being chosen Judge constrain the Defendants not to make use of them In the process he answers In this case and other such like I grant that it is lawfull to change opinion He believes therefore that these persons may do that justly unto others which they would not have done unto themselves and which they would free themselves from as much as possible and he sees not that this is to overturn the prime Law of Nature and the Gospel which ordains That we should do unto others that which we would they should do unto us and not to do unto others that which we would not they should do unto us and that this is at once to violate all the Commandments of God which are founded on this principle of Nature and all the Law and Prophets which according to Jesus Christ's saying depend upon this rule and all the Holy Scripture which are nothing else but an extension and explication of this same principle SECT IV. That the Jesuits Doctrine of Probability ruines entirely the Authority of the Church of Pastors and Superiors of all sorts TO make this truth appear we must observe that there are four sorts of Principles for ruining the Authority of Superiors 1. By corrupting or destroying the principle of it 2. By bounding it and encroaching upon it 3. By rejecting or weakning its commands 4. By hindring Subjects from obeying The Jesuits by the Doctrine of Probability corrupt the Authority of the Church in the original of it in attributing to it no other than a mere humane power They retrench and destroy it in not consenting that it may prescribe the inward actions of vertue they bound it and encroach upon it by the irregularity of their Priviledges which they abuse to the contempt of the commands and Ordinances of Bishops and invading their Jurisdiction they utterly abolish some of their Laws and they weaken others of them and there are hardly any unto which they have not given some assault by the multitude of inventions they have found out to defeat and elude them These points are entirely verified in the whole process of this Book and some of them in entire Chapters But that which is remarkable and very proper to justifie what I pretend here is this that the means and the armes which they and those who follow their opinion make use of to fight against the Authority of the Church in all these manners are the maxims of their Doctrine of Probability The Authority of the Church is of it self assured and uncontroulable being supported by the firm rock of Gods Word For this cause there cannot be found a means more ready or more infallible to ruine or weaken it than to undermine its foundation and to make it depend on humane reason and authority submitting its Jurisdiction and its power to the disputes and contests of the Schools and rendring in that manner every thing probable that respects its power that they may afterwards become the Arbitrators and Masters thereof It is not needfull here to repeat all that is found in the body of this Book to prove this truth it is sufficient only to report some passages of their Authors and their Disciples in which they avow themselves that the Doctrine of Probability doth absolutely ruine the Authority of the Church and of all sorts of Superiors and they make it so clear in the examples that they produce that after they are read it seems not that any person can doubt thereof Hereof see one manifest proof in the case which Caramouel propounds in these terms q Petrus secutus opinionem benignam probabilem non satissacit mandato sui Abbatis in casu in quo probabiliter non tenetur obedire probabilius tenebatur Praelatus supscribens sententiae severiori judicat illum debuisse obedire proinde peccasse Petitur an possit contra illum procedere punire tanquam inobedientem Caram in com in reg S. Bened. l. 1. n.
rule of Truth the Doctrine from whence issues by infallible consequence so great errours is truly pernicious and entirely false because it is indubitable in Logick that from a true conclusion nothing but truth can follow and likewise that that from whence false and pernicious conclusions may be drawn must needs be false and pernicious it self without troubling ones self to seek other reasons to prove it this same being evident and certain by the light of Nature only and by the acknowledgement of them who are the Authors and Defenders of this Doctrine We need no other proofs to make appear that this Doctrine introduceth Independency and the ruine of all sorts of Authority since the principal Defenders of it acknowledge it and by the same reason it is entirely opposed to the spirit and conduct of Faith and leads to Irreligion For the true Faith and true Religion being nothing but Obedience and being given us of God to captivate our understanding to revealed Truths the one and the other keeps our spirit under a perpetual dependance and voluntary submission unto the Word and Will of God But the Jesuits Doctrine of Probability gives the spirit of man a Soveraign liberty which submits it self to nothing and reserves alwayes to it self a power not only to condemn and approve what it pleases but also to condemn that which it approves and to approve what it condemns passing from one to another and even from the more probable to the less probable without fearing to engage it self at all in the least sin and pretending alwayes to walk in an assured way and more then probable in the midst of Probabilities which environ us on every side since they have made probable almost all the rules of life and humane converse and have even elevated mens spirits above all these Probabilities to a Soveraign Independance Caramouel expresses this in this manner y Fidei Orthodoxae dogmatibus demonstrationibus ac principiis per se notiâ— subest ingenium probabilibus sententiis superest Caram Theol. fund p. 138. The wit of man is subject to the Doctrines of Orthodox Faith and the evident principles of natural reason which it cannot resist but it is above all probable opinions So that to reduce the substance of this Article into a few words the Doctrine of the Jesuits Probability withdraws the Spirit from all sorts of obedience from that which is due to Superiors by giving it power to resist them upon the least appearance of reason from that which is due unto God himself by permitting to dispense with a great part of his Commandments and from that which is due to the Church teaching to deride its Laws and clude its Ordinances from that which is due to reason by giving liberty to follow that which is less probable if it please better and be more conformable to our interests and also attributing unto it an Empire greater than that of God himself who can never depart from that which is most just and most reasonable and giving it an incomparable power and Independance in the Kingdom of Probabilities SECT V. That an opinion probable being once received all the Prelates of the Church and all the men in the World cannot hinder that it should be probable and safe in conscience according to the Jesuits THere is nothing more easie than to introduce into the Schools a new opinion and to make it probable according to the Jesuits and their followers because they hold that it needs only one reason by which it may be maintained or one Author that approves it There is also nothing more easie than to cause it to be received in the World because they believe that the most pleasant which are those that all enquire after are the best and most safe Finally there is nothing more easie than to uphold and bring it in credit it s own pleasantness and the approbation that some give it being sufficient to acquire unto it new Partizans and new Defenders who will publish it and induce it unto practice and so it will have for it the approbation of Divines the example of private persons and plausible reasons which are all foundations of Probability And being once established in this manner it will as it were be impossible to destroy and discredit it and consequently there will be no means to hinder the World from following it or the Authors who have undertaken its defence to teach and publish it For 1. It is well known what trouble it is to undo things that are passed into custom and evil things rather than good and amongst evil things those which are most pleasing and favourable to the corrupt inclinations of nature give most trouble in rooting them out and we hardly ever obtain our design therein 2. When a custom which hath taken birth from an evil maxim is also propped up by apparent reasons and the authority of those that have reputation of being vertuous and learned the evil becomes as it were incurable and without remedy And this is that which we have seen to happen to the most part of the new and pernicious opinions under which the Church groans at this day whilst it endures them 3. The Authors of these opinions make use of no other armes commonly to defend them nor admit of others to oppose them than reason they submit all to dispute they examine all by the rules of Logick by Syllogismes and Subtilties So that he who is most proper to catch at niceties and contest about them carries it commonly though his cause be the weaker and less reasonable 4. It is clear that there is scarcely any that will give way to another in wit and reason especially in the heat of a dispute but the opinions which carry men on to looseness and vice have yet more advantage in this kind of combat which is made by reason and disputation that they are there as it were invincible because of the force which the natural corruption of our spirits give them It were easie to produce many proofs hereof if one of the newest and withall of the most eager defenders of Probability did not testifie it openly by his words a Qui rem dicit esse illicitam ad multa tenetur Primo enim debet ostendere rationes quae malitiam probant esse demonstrativas nempe tales quibus dari responsio probabilis noâ— possit 2. Debet etiam ostendere rationes quae bonitatem probant ne quidem probabilem esse ostendet si omnibus ad unam dederit solutionem quae evidenter sit vera 3. Etiam debebit ostendere partem illam quae bonitatem astruit non haâ—ere sufficientes authoritates ut dicâ—tur probabilis Haec omnia tria simul ostendere debet casurus causa etsi duâ— ex illis ostâ—ndat modo unum non ostendat Caram Theol. fund p. 138. He that saith that an action is evil and unlawfull is obliged unto many things 1. To make appear that the reasons which prove
the malice of the action be demonstrative that is that they be such as whereto no probable answer can be given 2. And in the second place he ought also shew that the reasons which prove this same action to be good and lawfull be not so much as probable which cannot be done but by giving to every one in particular a solution which is indubitable and evident 3. In the third place he is also obliged to make appear that the opinion which maintains that this action is good hath not sufficient authority to be held probable He is obliged to prove these three things together and if he fails but in one though he prove the other two he will lose his cause There needs nothing more to make invincible all sorts of wicked opinions and which lead men unto looseness and vice it being certain that it is impossible to convince them by the rules and conditions which this Disciple of the â—efuits prescribes For there being no reasons so evident which the wit of man can not obscure and entangle by his passion and artifices it is clear that if evil mexionâ— must be judged by reason and dispute none will ever be convict because the animosity of men may alwayes maintain them by contrary reasons And if we cannot be assured of any truth unless we can entirely salve all the difficulties which occurre therein as this same Author pretends it will follow that there shall never be any thing assured in Morality nor in Doctrine nor in Faith nor in Nature since it is manifest that the greatest and most indubitable Truths are subject to innumerable difficulties which the most learned and the most ingenious know not oftentimes how to explicate And so every thing shall be uncertain and probable There shall be no difference betwixt good and bid Doctrine and it shall be lawfull for all men to follow what they please in every kind of matter which is the proper scope of these Doctors of Probabilities The evil Doctrine shall have even all sorts of advantage above the good because according to this Casuist he that maintains it needs prove nothing of that he saith nor answer to any thing that can be said against him but by Probabilities And on the contrary he that speaks for truth and who condemns errour looseness and vice is obliged to prove all that he saith by demonstrations and to answer and refute all that which his adversary can say with reasons so clear and cogent that he cannot reply any thing that hath so much as an appearance of truth And when he hath entirely disarmed him and destroyed all his reasons making him see clearly that they are of no value and that they are not so much as probable only he hath yet gained nothing at all For if you believe this Casuist he must besides this take from him all his Authority of every sort and reduce him to that pass that he may be able to find none sufficient to support his opinion and render it probable which is in a manner impossible because it suffices as to this to have one single Casuist that teaches it and though none have yet ever taught it he that invents and first maintains it may make it probable if he be accounted a man of learning and piety and there are none but such amongst the Masters of this Science So his opinion shall be alwayes probable and though false and pernicious it shall be shot-free under probability 5. This is one rule of these great Doctors that b Benigniores eisi aliquando sint minus probabilts per accidens sunt sempâ—r utiliores securiorâ—s Caram Theol. fued p. 134. the opinion more sweet is alwayes better and more safe though it be less probable By this rule the opinions which favour looseness and corrupt inclinations will be more safe and their probability alwayes invincible For if the reasons which are applyed against them be more forcible and pressing they will thereby become indeed less probable but they will not thereby become less pleasing and consequently they will become alwayes better and more sure according to the maxims of this marvellous Science 6. But if you oppose against them the authority of the Saints and Antient Fathers they will say that their opinions are very probable but those of the Casuists of these times are no less probable that the Moderns carry it even above the Antients c Quod ownia quae pulcbie cogitarunt jâ—m sunt à junioribus summo sludio ingenio elimata Ibid. p. 22. Quae circa sidem emergunt difficultates eae sunt à veteribus hauriendae quae vero circa mores homine Christiano dignos à novitiis scriptoribus Celor l. 8. c. 16. p. 714. because their best thoughts are cleared up and perfected by those that followed them But though the opinion of the Antients be more probable that of the Moderns being more pleasant they conclude by their principles that it is better and more safe They maintain also that when the question is about Faith we may well have recourse unto the Antients and hold that which they have believed and taught in their Writings but in matter of manners and the conduct of life we must take our rules from the new Casuists 7. One of the most certain wayes to know that an opinion is bad are the bad consequences and pernicious effects which naturally follow thereupon but this is not capable to stay the defenders of the Jesuits probability They acknowledge the dangerous consequences and pernicious effects which issue infallibly from many Novel opinions which they teach and they for bear not to maintain them at all and protest that they will maintain them alwayes because they seem probable and no person can condemn them d Multa inoonvenientia suboriuntur ex restrictionibus mentalibus multae â—x occultis compensationibus multa ex licentia occidendi injustum Judicem aut teslem quam nonnulli concedunt multa ex illa opinione quae docer de occultis non judicare Reelesiam multa ex aliis Quibus tamen non obstantibus inconvenientibus illae sentensiae in terminis quibus bodie traduntur in Scholis sunt ut minimum probabilissimae à nemine damnari pessunt Caram Theol. fund p. 549. Hereupon follow many inconveniences saith Caramouel which arise from these mental restrictions secret compensations the liberty which some give to kill an unjust Judge or Witness the opinion which holds that the Church cannot judge of secret things and other like opinions and yet all these inconveniences hinder not but that these opinions so as they are taught at this day in the Schools are at the least very probable and cannot be condemned by any 8. If it be represented unto them that a good part of these Novel opinions are contrary to the Laws of the Church and some of them to the Civil Laws also they pretend that because they be Novel they are exempt from the censure
it is not only lawfull to accept but also to offer them And one of the Casuists of the Society who taught publickly at Caen of late years after he had endeavoured to justifie this brutal madness by many reasons which we shall represent in their place concludes in this manner e Qui haec responsa non probaâ—t ignari sunt communis consuctudinis vitae Licet enim homini hac ratione honorem suum tutari These who approve not these answers know not the manner of living and the ordinary custom of those who are in the world For it is lawfull for a man to maintain his Honour by this way There is no custom more wicked nor more general amongst people of base condition than to swear blaspheme and to break out into curses and imprecations against cattel men and every thing that gives them trouble Bauny considering this cursed custom saith according to his ordinary lenity Bauny Sum. c. 6. p. 73. For my part I believe that it may be said with truth that it is their choler by which such people suffer themselves to be transported it is no fault neither mortal nor venial to curse Dogs Hawks and other such things as are without reason The abuse which Merchants ought most to fear and avoid in their Traffick and which yet is very common at this day is falshood and deceit whether it be in falsifying and altering Merchandizes or in selling them dearer than they are worth or selling them by false weights and false measures But Layman following this custom saith f Mercatores statim injustitiae damnari non possunt si merci substantiam alienam puta tricico secale vino aquam picem cerae admisceant modo inde emptoribus nullum damnum inferatur merces proportione pretii quo venditur satis idonea sit ad consuetum usum Layman l. 3. tr 4. c. 17. n. 15. That we must not alwayes condemn the injustice of the Merchants when they mingle in their Merchandizes things of different kinds as Rye amongst Wheat Water with Wine and Pitch amongst Wax provided that this do not damnifie them that buy it and that the Merchandize be good enough of the price it costs and proper enough for common usage And he confirms his opinion by that of Lessius and Lopez saying g Addit Lessius n. 83. cum Lopez loco citato si additio materiae secundum se deterioris eò artificio industria fiat ut merces non sit minus bona idonea ad usum quam sine tali admixtione posse tunc consueto pretio divendi luerum majus repoâ—tari quippe quod industriae esse censetur sine damno emptorum percipitur Ibid. that Lessius and Lopez assure us that if the mixture of the matter which of it self is of less value be done with such artifice and industry that the Merchandize is not less good nor proper for mans use than it would be without this mixture it may be sold at the ordinary price and take more than it is worth because this gain belongs to the address and industry of the Merchant and is no wrong to those that buy it The ordinary vice of women and principally of those of Quality is luxury and vanity They cannot have a fairer pretence for to nourish nor a better excuse to justifie themselves in the excess they commit therein and the scandals which fall out thereupon than to say that it is the custom and that they do nothing but what is commonly done in the World by women of their condition Bauny approves this reason and makes use of it in his Summe ch 46. p. 717 718. where he proposes this question If maids and women who exceed modesty and duty and as we may say necessity of decency in their habits because they seek out therein curiosities not suitable to their estates may be thought capable of absolution when they know that some take thence occasion of sinning He acknowledgeth that many condemn this insupportable vanity and maintain that maids and women who are so disposed and will so continue are uncapable of absolution but he declares against their judgement and concludes in these terms Nevertheless we must say 1. that the woman who trims and adorns her self to please her Husband ought not to be blamed though she doth it as he saith through vanity and curiosity and against modesty knowing well that some draw from thence occasion of sin He saith moreover that neither is she more to be blamed if she trim her self in this sort with scandal when she doth it to satisfie the custom of the Countrey and not to be singular unlike and inferiour to those of their own sex He would then that the pretence of pleasing her Husband and a disorderly and shamefull custom should give liberty to a woman to break out into all sorts of luxury and vanity without being blameable and that custom hath power to change the nature of things to cause that it shall be lawfull to transgress the bounds of modesty that vanity shall be no longer vanity that luxury shall not be longer luxury and that scandal shall be no longer scandal He continues speaking in this manner 2. I say though this said woman had knowledge of the bad effects which her diligence in trimming her self would cause in the body and soul of those who behold her adorned with rich and precious clothes nevertheless she sins not in making use thereof The reason is Because to prevent the offence of another this woman is not bound to deprive her self of what the Law of the Countrey and nature it self permits That is to say that as custom makes luxury and vanity lawfull for her so it makes scandal also lawfull for her and that the abuses which happens very frequently in this point by the corruption of the World are just and true Laws and proper to regulate all things in a Country I might speak here of Usury and Symony which are two vices so common at this day that the Jesuits cover them much easier than others because that custom hath made them publick But I referr these disorders to be represented in the places proper for these matters that I may avoid repetitions CHAP. III. Of the Occasions of Sin That the Jesuits retain men in them and that according to their maxims there can be no next occasions of Sin ONE of the most important and most necessary counsels which can be given to a person who would avoid sin is that he fly the occasions and if we observe it we shall find that the most ordinary cause why the most part of those who have some good desire and care for their salvation attain not to a true and solid conversion or fall back after a while is because they have not received this advice or have not been faithfull in the observation of it This is such that the Jesuits acknowledge well indeed the importance and necessity
their Benefice is or to the pâ—or the fruits received according to the rate of their omissions as he collects from the Bull of Pius V. So his mind appears floating betwixt errour and truth which dazles his eyes and constrains him to acknowledge and confess it and it would be hard to judge what may be concluded of Propositions so different and contrary if he did not himself discover throughout his Book a design he hath to let the Reins loose unto the corrupt inclinations of Nature and to give men liberty to follow their desires and lusts as well in Civil as Religious matters For there is nothing but the consideration of men and the fear of scandal that holds him back a little and hinders him from doing it so openly and this fear and this carriage engages him continually in these manifest contrarieties which are inevitable unto those who would flatter men and corrupt the truth Here would be a proper place to speak of the Dispensations which the Jesuits give Ecclesiasticks from reciting the Office upon Reasons so slight and oftentimes so ridiculous that they themselves unto whom this obligation seems most grievous and troublesom durst not demand them if they did not by offering them unto them prevent them and in some sort force them to receive them by assuring them that they may make use of them with a safe conscience though their own altogether corrupt as it is reproach them for it and that the light of Nature only suffices to discover that they ought not do it But because we have already produced some in the Treatise of Probability for Example sake I will content my self to add only one more here in this place out of Tambourin who saith 1 Hinc luscus quicunque ex oculis laborat si timet legendi vim ta legendo paulatim deperdere horas canonicas non legat 14. Quid si hic luscus vel ille valetudinarius legat voluntariè fabulas vel historias omittit autem officium peccabitne Respondeo non peccaturum contra obligationem recitandi officium peccaturum non ambigo illum quia fabulas cum sanitatis detrimento legit quod tamen detrimentum saltem notabile rarò eveniet quia hisce lectionibus quantum ex hoc capite recreatur animus non multum opprimitur Tambur l. 2. decal c. 5. sect 8. n. 14. That he who is purblind or any other who hath any disease in his eyâ—s if he fears to lose his sight by little and little in reading is not obliged to read his Breviary But if this purblind or otherwise of weak eyes do voluntarily read Fables or Histories whilst he dispenses with himself for reading his Breviary doth he sin I answer that he sins not against his obligation of saying his prayers But I am assured he sins in reading these Fables to the prejudice of his health which yet will rarely happen because that sort of reading is recreative and hurts not much This Ecclesiastick who hath eyes to read Fables and hath not to read his Office will easily be confirmed in so good a disposition by Tambourin This Jesuit is not troubled at all to dispense with the obligation of rehearsing his Office because of the weakness of his sight and though after that he durst not openly justifie him that weakens it yet more by reading of Fables yet to leave him this liberty nevertheless he pretends that he will not weaken it by this reading as by that of the Breviary or at least that this will rarely happen quod detrimentum saltem notabile rarò evenit And the reason is because he recreates his spirit and finds pleasure in reading Fables supposing that he cannot take any in that of his Office Which agrees very well with what he and his Fellows do commonly call the Divine Service the Charge the Burthen the Drudgery onus diei the load of the day Whence it comes that they teach the Ecclesiasticks to discharge themselves thereof the most they can as of some burthensom and odious thing assuring them as we have made appear that they sufficiently satisfie their obligation and the intent of the Church in reciting them externally without any attention with voluntary distraction and busying themselves with all sorts of extravagant dishonest impious thoughts and even with design not to satisfie the Precept of the Church CHAPTER IV. Of Good Works That the Jesuits Maxims destroy them GOod Works may be destroyed two ways either by inclining men to do them ill or by diverting them from doing them at all It would be easie to prove that the Jesuits teach to do them ill in this that they maintain that such may be done as are truly good without any succour of Grace and that we may do those which are ineritorious of eternal life without respect had unto God or eternal life and without once thinking thereof provided that in doing them we be not under mortal sin But because this Point is more subtle and I have spoken thereof already before I will not insist on it here contenting my self to make appear that they excuse and justifie those who do no good Works at all though they be able testifying unto them that they are not bound thereunto and by this means they divert men from the practice of them removing from them the obligation and abolishing the Commandment as much as in them lyes Escobar after he had acknowledged that there is a Commandment which obligeth us by divine and natural light to do alms inquires 1 Quandonam hoc obligat praeceptum Respondeo quaestioni teneri nos elâ—…mosynam exhibere in necessitate extrema ex rebus vitae superfluis licet statul sint necessariae quia proximi vita superat mei status decentiam Escob tr 5. ex 5. n. 43. p. 632. When this Precept obligeth He answers That in extream necessity we are obliged to do alms of such things as are not necessary unto life though they be needful to support us in our condition His Reason is Because the life of our neighbour ought to be preferred to the decency of our condition He presupposeth as he expounds himself before that by extream necessity we are to understand that on which the life of man depends So that if he be not assisted he will surely dye and in this estate he believes that we are obliged to give of what we have superfluous and which may help him to live more commodiously This is no great excess of Charity to give for saving our neighbours life what is not at all necessary unto us But he extends not this Charity much farther demanding concerning the same subject 2 Qâ—i vero statui habet superfluâ— teneturne communibus necessitatibus subvenite Probabile est teueri probabilius non teneri Ibâ—n 47. p. 633. If he that hath more than he needs for to live according to his condition be obliged to help the common necessities He answers That it is probable that he
contradict and clude this last and dreadful sentence than by correcting his errour to submit himself thereunto for he is not ashamed to say that the reason which Jesus Christ alledges and whereupon he grounds his judgment is not true and takes not place in the matter wherein he alledges it that is to say in the last Judgment It is not to purpose 1 Nec refert quod Dominus Matth. 25. formam judicii describens meminerit potius operum misericordiae quam aliorum Id enim fecit ut homines praesertim plebeios qui ad majora spiritualia parum sunt comparati in hec vita ad ea excitaret haec autem ratio cessat in extremo judicio quia tunc homines non erunt amplius ad optra misericordiae exciâ—tandi Lessim de perfect divin lib. 13. tract 22. pag. 142. saith he to alledge that our Lord in the 25. of S. Matthew representing unto us the form of the last Judgment speaks of the works of mercy rather than others For he doth it only to stir up men and especially the common people who are not capable of comprehending spiritual things to exercise these works in this life Now this reason cannot take place at the last Judgment because then there will be no need to excite men unto works of mercy I will not stay here to examine this excess which will appear strange enough of it self to them who are not void of the common resentments of Christianity because it will be more proper to do it elsewhere We will only observe in this place that one Jesuit hath undertaken to fight and destroy Gods first Commandment and another his last Judgment They who can have the patience to behold a multitude of Expositions of Scripture Councils and Holy Fathers false extravagant unheard of and many times impious need only read Poza's Book which he entituled Elucidarium Deiparae A Volume as big as his would be needful to represent all his excesses I have related some of them in the Chapter of Novelty and elsewhere which I repeat not here to avoid tediousness Father Adam hath surpassed all his Brethren in the same excess For he destroys not only the letter and the sense of Scripture he fights with the Authors themselves whom God hath made use of to impart them to us He decrys them and deprives them of all that authority and credit which is due unto sacred Writers and who were no other than the hand and tongue of the Holy Ghost by attributing unto them weaknesses and extravagancies and affirming by an horrible impiety that following their own imaginations and passions they are sometimes transported beyond truth and have written things otherwise than they were and that they did neither conceive nor believe them themselves in their consciences It will not easily be imagined that this conceit could ever come into the mind of a Monk I will not say but of a Christian who had not entirely renounced the Faith and Church if this Father had not written it in manifest terms and more forcibly than I can represent it in a Book whereto he gives this Title Calvin defeated by himself In the third Part of this Book Chap. 7. he saith That it is not only in criminal matters that zeal and hate inflame a Soul and transport it unto excest and violence but that the Saints themselves acknowledge that they are not exempt from this infirmity And flagrant passions sometimes push them on to actions so strange and ways of expressing themselves so far removed from truth that those who have written their lives have called them holy extravagancies innocent errours and Hyperboles more elevated than their apprehensions and which expressed more than they intended to say He adds also in the same Chapter and in the progress of the same discourse That this infirmity is not so criminal but that God did tolerate it in the person of those Authors whom he inspired and whom we call Canonical whom he left to the sway of their own judgments and the temper of their own spirits He compares the Saints and Fathers of the Church to persons full of passions and violence he excepts not the Canonical Authors themselves and he makes them all subject to the same infirmities and the Canonical Authors also to the greater and more inexcusable For if they be vicious in others they are yet more in these in whom the least faults and the least removes from the truth which in ordinary persons were but marks of infirmity would be as notorious and criminal as the greatest because they would be imputed unto God whose words the Canonical Authors have only rehearsed and it is as unworthy of God contrary to his nature and power to depart a little as much from the truth It is therefore manifest that what this Jesuit saith tends directly to destroy all Holy Scripture Faith and Religion For if the Canonical Writers could exceed and depart a little from the truth in one single point they were subject to do it in all the rest So their discourse is not of divine Authority neither are their Books the Books or Word of God because God is always equally infallible and can never go beyond or depart from the truth in the least whether he speaks himself or by the mouth of his Prophets CHAPTER II. Of the Commandments of God ARTICLE I. Of the first Commandment which is that of Love and Charity THis first Commandment of Love contains in it and requires of us three things to wit that we love God above all Creatures our selves for God and our neighbour as our selves These three coming from one and the same trunk and root shall make three Articles of this Chapter and I will handle all three severally that I may more distinctly represent the Jesuits opinions upon every obligation of the first Commandment and to make it evidently appear that they destroy it in every part I. POINT Of the Command to love God I will relate nothing here save only from Father Anthony Sirmond because he seems particularly to have undertaken to destroy this Precept and because he hath said upon this Subject alone all that may be found in the worst Books of his Fraternity 1. That he abolishes the Command of loving God and reduces it to a simple counsel 2. That according to him the Scripture hardly speaks at all of divine Love and Charity and that our Lord hath very little recommended it 3. That he declares that the love of God may very well consist and agree with the love of our selves 4. And that it is nothing else but self-love SECTION I. That there is no Command to love God according to the Maxims of the Jesuits Divinity OUr Lord speaking of the double Commandment of Love saith That all the Law and the Prophets do depend thereon In his duobus mandatis universa lex pendet Prophetae Matth. 22. He saith not that the command to love God doth depend on and is
the Church nor of Princes to punish Blasphemers nor count that amongst the Commandments of God which forbids blasphemy since according to the Divinity of this Father there will be none in effect they will be only sins of irreverence and venial The other Jesuits seem more moderate on this subject but if they appear in this less to blame they are it may be more indeed and they are much more dangerous than Bauny For the vice that proceeds to extremity and is visible in its excess is only for them that have no conscience but it surprises and insensibly engages those who have yet some fear of God when it is propounded with some temperament and when it is covered with some pretence which serves as a reason to commit it without scruple Escobar by Example in his Moral Divinity places amongst Problematick Questions whether all blasphemy be mortal sin And though he rank himself indeed amongst them that hold the affirmative yet he forbears not to say that it is no blasphemy when 1 Amans amasism Deam suam suum vocitat idolum a Lover calls his Mistress his Goddess and his Idol For after he had related divers opinions about this question according to his custom he joyns himself to those who excuse it from blasphemy and saith 2 Si coram medioctiter prudentibus obloquatur nullatenus blasphemiae nota afficiendus est hujusmodi utens locutionibus quia amanti a peria est adulatio at coram ruâ—icis haud cum omnino a gravi materialis blasphemiae piaculo liberarim Escob tom 1. Theol Mor. lib. 4. probl 21. If this Lover speak before persons of indifferent discretion be ought not in any sort be esteemed a Blasphemer because it is clear that it is only flattery but if he speak before gross witted persons he would not altogether exempt him from a grand material blasphemy If this reason take place there will be no blasphemy at all unless he who hears it believe that he who utters it speaks according to his judgment so this shall be only a material blasphemy that is the matter of blasphemy only So that there will be no true blasphemies but what are uttered by Infidels and impious persons who believe they speak truth when they blaspheme And according to this Rule the Tyrians and Sidonians blasphemed not when they said unto King Herod to flatter him that he spoke as a God and not as a man And this proud King ought not to have been eaten of worms as he was by the just Judgment of God for suffering these blasphemous words since the flattery was altogether manifest This reason may be made use of for a foundation of the Proposition of Tambourin and Azor who hold that to say This is as true as the Gospel or this is as true as God is no blasphemy And their reason is because it is visible that this is an excess against the divine Truth That is to speak properly that this is no blasphemy because it is visible that it is one Sanchez saith that he who swears lightly and unconcernedly without thinking on what he saith or through vanity sins only venially 3 Juramentum cui desuit tertius comes nempe judicium quod attinet ad necessariam jurandi causam debitam reverentiam est sola venialis culpa 3 siquidem sollus vanitatis superffuitatis peccatum est Sanch. op mor lib. 3. cap. 4. num 35. p. 17. The oath saith he whereunto the third condition is wanting to wit judgment when men swear without necessity or without the respect and reverence that is requisite is but a venial sin because the irreverence herein committed is not great being only a sin of vanity or of superfluity Filliutius saith the same thing and almost in the same words 4 Si desit juramento tantum judicium hoc est si fiat absque necessitate aut utilitate peccatum aliquod committitur Tale juramentum non est mortale si desit contamptus Filliut tom 2. qq mor. tr 25. cap. 11. num 332. 333. pag. 205. If judgment only be wanting to an oath that is to say if it be uttered without necessity or utility there is in it some fault And a little after An oath is not a mortal sin if it be without contempt We must not then say any longer in the Commandment that forbids Swearing Thou shalt not swear by God in vain but only thou shalt not swear falsely since that according to these new Divines we may without great sin swear in vain and out of vanity without necessity profit occasion or reverence which in swearing is due to God whom we take for Judge and Witness Filliutius's reason is 5 Licet aliquo modo sit contra Dei authoritatem tamen quia non fit contra illam in se sicut destruitur veritas ejus per mendacium sed tantum fit contra illam non tractando illam cum debita reverentie 3 ideo tantum committitur culpa venialis Ibid. num 333. Because though this oath thus made without necessity or reverence be in some sort against the Authority of God nevertheless because it destroys it not in it self as a lye destroys his truth and is not contrary unto him otherwise than as it renders him not all the respect that is due unto him it is but a venial sin As if it were a small matter to fail of our respect towards God and to demean our selves irreverently towards him and not to be troubled for offending against his Authority provided we do not absolutely destroy it This Author considers not that to destroy truth in our selves is no less a mortal sin than to destroy it in it self which is impossible For we are obliged to have it in us as our life by loving and honouring it and to chase it from us by contempt or negligence or by preferring other things before it which please us more can be no other than a mortal sin since this is truly to kill our selves and it in us And for the Authority of God it is certain that we cannot indeed deprive him of it any more than of his Power and to deny it were to become a Fool or an Atheist Since then it cannot be destroyed in it self nor in the opinion and judgment of men that have their reason found there remains but one way to destroy it so much as may be which is by contempt and irreverence which is committed against it by using it indifferently without respect to confirm what we say swearing without necessity or occasion and even of meer vanity So that if in this case and these circumstances the sin committed against the Authority of God and the reverence which is due unto him be a slight one as these Jesuits say it is it seems that there can never be any great one according to them in this matter Filliutius proceeds farther and maintains that to swear not only without occasion and reverence but
2 Notat Azor quod licâ—t testis pâ—cunia corruptus sese occultet nec dilcedat an tequam juridice rogetur aut ad judicium vocetur non peccat contâ—… Justitiam nic tenetur restituere pecuniam sic acceptam nisi vero similiter crederet esse furtivam Dicost lib. 2. tract 2. disp 4. dub 8. num 156. That if a witness corrupted by money bide or retire himself before he hath been legally examined or cited into the Court he is not obliged to restore the money he receives in this manner As if Justice were no other thing than the formalities and outward appearance of Law A man is in danger to lose his life for not having witnesses of his innocency if being able to deliver him by your testimony you take money not to render him your due assistance you take it to put him to death since not he only who deposes against the truth but he also who conceals a truth whereon the life of an innocent depends is the true cause of his death Which is so much more true or at least more criminal and unjust when he suffers himself to be corrupted by money Tambourin saith 3 Hinc sequâ—tur 1. cum qui accusatur de crimine qued juridice ab accusatore probari nequit non lolum posse negate crimen sed â—tiam dicere accusatorem calumniari mentiti Ita Petrus Navarra lib. 2. cap. 4. num 34. Lege etiam S. Thomam 2.2 q. 69. artz Qui eâ—im â—ccusat de crimine quod probari non potest calumniator est mentiri praesumiâ—ur Tambur lib. 9. decal cap. 2. sect 2. num 2. That he who is accused of a crime which cannot be legally proved by the Accuser may not only deny the crime but say that the Accuser lyes and slanders him He sends us to S. Thomas in his 2.2 q. 69. art 2. This is without doubt that we may see his condemnation For S. Thomas proves in that Article That it is not lawful for the accused to defend himself by a slander and that even when he is not legally examined it is not lawful for him to speak an untruth Falsitatem tamen proponere in nullo casu licet alicui Tambourin for all that finds there is no difficulty in his opinion as if this were no lye to say unto a man that he lyes when we know he speaks the truth and to slander an accuser as a slanderer when he accuses us of a crime which we have committed Of two accusers the one speaks the truth the other lyes the one objects a true crime and the other a false and according to Tambourins admirable Divinity he who saith the truth is the lyar and he who objects a true crime is a slanderer of which he doubts not at all But 4 Haec passim in ore sunt omnium illud singulate difficile An si alio modo tâ— ab injusto teste tueri nequeas licite falsa crimina illi possis objicere quanta sufficiunt ad tuam justam defensionem Duo assero Unum satis mihi probabile est alterum satis incertum Probabile mihi est te si id facias non peccare contra justitiam unde nec obligari ad restitutionem Incertum mihi est an id possit licite fieri sine ulla culpa Ut quid enim 〈◊〉 Sodomitam oportet probari esse illum testem si excommunicatum si haereticum Quid enim si sit necesse publicas Scripturas ementiri Possetne Notarius publicus adhuc induci Libenter noâ—um hunc in aliud tempus exolvendum reservo num 4 5 6 7. There is saith he more difficulty in another case It is demanded if you cannot defend your self against an unjust witness but by slandering him may you do it without sin and impose on him so many false crimes as will be necessary for your just defence I say two things one is that it seems to me probable enough the other is that I find it doubtful enough It is to me sufficiently probable that if you do it you sin not against Justice and by consequence that you are not obliged to restitution but I do not know certainly whether this may be done without any sin For if it be needful to prove that this witness is a Sodomite excommunicated an Heretick if it be necessary to this purpose to counterfeit publick Kecords may we sollicite a Notary hereunto I leave this difficulty to be resolved another time It must be observed that he speaks not of a false Witness who charges with false crimes but of an unjust Witness ab injusto teste who accuses of true crimes but secret or which he cannot prove according to the forms of Justice For thus these Doctors expound themselves what they mean by an unjust Witness or Accuser 1 Hic acâ—usator sibi imputer si ex hoc calumniator habeatur immo cum probare non possit atque adeo injuste accusaverit tenetur restituere accusator Dicast lib. 2. tract 2. disp 12. pag. 3. dub 18. n. 285. That this Witness saith Dicastillus may thank himself if in the conclusion he be held for a slanderer since he could not prove the crime and by consequence having accused unjustly he is obliged unto restitution So that according to this Divinity to defend our selves from true but secret crimes and whereof there are no publick prooss we may say to the honestest man in the world who would inform against us in a Court of Justice that he is a Sodomite Heretick Excommunicate c. and we may for proof of this slander make use of false Witnesses counterfeit false Deeds and Writings and corrupt publick Notaries to subscribe them without committing any injustice in all this though according to Scripture those who do evil and those who cause it to be done or only consent thereto commit the same fault But after he hath maintained that herein there is no injustice Tambourin doubts if at least there be not some sin in an action which contains so many crimes because that he knows it not certainly that is to say according to the Principles of his Divinity that it is also probable that there is none therein For a Doctor so learned as he is remains not easily in suspence concerning things which he hath well examined and he doubts not thereof without reason And therefore his doubting of it is a sufficient ground whereon to establish a probable opinion He holds then indeed though he dare not declare it that it is also probable that one may without any sin as well as in justice commit all sorts of crimes to hide one he hath committed and to oppress by slanders false Witnesses forged Writings corruption of Courts and publick Persons him who would discover it because he is perswaded he accuses him unjustly that is to say he cannot prove what he saith by the ways and formalities commonly used in Courts of Justice though it be true and certain Tambourin
Church and Nature it self since it can prevail without incurring any penalty against the Laws of the one and the other And since the Laws of the Church are also the Holy Ghost's who by it hath given us them and who guides it in all it doth and ordains if custom carry it against the Laws of the Church as this Casuists pretends it must needs be according to him that it hath more power than the Holy Ghost and that the Authority it hath in their School is more to be considered than that of 〈◊〉 himself since he believes that we ought to yield to the abuses it hath introduced into the Church to the prejudice of the primitive Orders and Laws which the Holy Ghost hath established But if these things seem extraordinary and incredible in themselves and considered according to the Rules of Truth and natural Sense alone yet they are not so in the Maxims of these new Doctors For it is not in this case only but in occasions of all other sorts that the custom being sound opposed and contrary to the Laws of God and the Church it ordinarily gains the cause by their Judgment as hath been observed in many places of these Writings Escobar follows the same Rules with Layman to determine what labour is lawful or forbidden on Feast-days that is 1 Servile opus est ad quod servi deputati sunt Nec opus servile fit quia â—b lucrum est factum si de se servile ante non erat Escobar tract 7. exam 5. cap. 2. num 4. pag. 99. Servile work saith he which is for servants and slaves And he adds as Layman that if a work be not servile in it self it doth not become servile when it is done for gain He afterwards sets down in the number of actions which are not servile studying writing travelling dancing And although he affirm that hunting and painting are servile actions he forbears not to say afterwards 2 Pingere ex suo genere servile est Venatio si fist ex officio servile est ut pictura ob voluptatem recrcaâ—ionem minime Ibid. num 8. Mundare scopis tapetibus vestire parietes Ecclesiarum hujusmodi nisi aliqua intercedat excusatio saltem venislia sunt Ibid. n. 6. Num misericordiae opera exercenda De se servilia non licent ut consuere vestem pauperi deferre ligna eidem c. Ibid. num 7. That if hunting be followed upon obligation and of duty as when a Hunts-man or a servant hunts at the command of his Master it is servile as well as painting but that it is not so if it be pursued of pleasure and for pastime That is to say that a servant may not go on hunting in obedience to his Master when he sends him but the Master may go for his pleasure and the servant also and by consequence that obedience in labour profanes a Holy day but pleasure in the same work profanes it not Speaking in the same place of those who labour in cleansing hanging and trimming Churches on Feast-days he saith that they sin at the least venially if they have not some lawful cause He saith the same thing of the outward works of mercy which are exercised towards our neighbour as to mend the cloaths of the poor to carry them wood or other things whereof they have need these actions according to him are servile and forbidden on Feast-days He would have it lawful to paint and hunt for pleasure on Feast-days and he will not have it lawful to sweep hang and adorn the Church for the Service of God He would have us have power to walk dance travel and go whither we will for our pastime but he will not have it lawful to visit the poor and sick and to give them some assistance pretending that works of mercy are more contrary to the Sanctification of Feasts than the sports and pastimes of the world He will not have it lawful to carry alms themselves unto the poor on Feast-days as he saith expresly a little after For having put the Question if those who by a motive of piety do actions which are called servile sin against this Commandment of the Church he answers in these terms 3 Excuiandine aliqui ratione pietatis Aliqui liberant à reatu exercentes die Festo opera servilia ad templa aedificanda vel resicienda gratis ad â—lâ—emosynam gerendam ad ornanda delubra c. At ego cum illis sentio qui laborantes vel hoc praetextu sint necessitate non excusant There are some who exempt them from sin who busie themselves in servile works on Feast-days to build or re-edifie Churches gratis to carry alms to the poor to adorn Temples c. But as for me I am of the opinion of those who exempt them not who labour without necessity on Feast-days though they do it under this pretence that is to say by a motive of piety He believes then that it is lawful to play dance walk abroad without necessity and for pleasure only on Feast-days because according to the Jesuits Divinity these actions are not servile He pretends also though painting and hunting be servile of themselves yet the motive of pleasure and contentment which we look for in them hinders them from being so and makes them lawful And yet he maintains that to sweep a Church for devotion or to take delight to dress an Altar to hang a Chappel to carry alms unto the poor are actions prohibited on Feast-days and that necessity only not pleasure can hinder them from being servile As if the pleasure taken in hunting or painting were more noble and holy â—…an that which is taken in serving the poor and God himself in the Churches He finds it difficult to exempt these actions of Piety and Religion from mortal fin so rigorous would he appear in this point They are saith he at the least venial sins Saltem venialia sunt Filliutius had said it before him in the same terms and yet more clearly 1 Mundate scopis templum vestice parietes tapetibus hâ—jusmedi vidertur servilia nisi aliqua excusatio intercedat erit saltem peccatum veniale non motrale secluâ—o contemptu Filliutius qq moral tom 2. tract â— cap. 9. n. 156. pag. 267. It seems that to sweep Churches to hang them and other such like actions are servile and to do them without lawful excuse is at least a venial sin though not mortal if not done through contempt Strange Divinity that we need not to fear to contemn the Command of God forbidding us to work on the Feast and Lords-days by working for our selves because we take our pleasure in the work as in hunting and that we ought to fear contempt and mortal sin in working only for the Service of God and the Church So that these days which God hath ordained particularly for his Service may be employed according to this Divinity to serve any thing but
and to be content with one meal a day which sometimes is not taken till in the evening after Even-song or at least after Noon in certain less solemn Fast-days as in the Vigils of Festivals which was practised also in the days of S. Bernard and long after as the Casuists themselves agree In our days they have anticipated the time of repast changing supper into dinner and they have of late introduced the custom of making Collations at night There is none who sees not that this change hath brought great relaxation in Fasting according to what was observed and instituted by all Antiquity and it is not without great condescension that the Church suffers that it should be discharged by such an observation The Jesuits in the mean time find it to severe and to sweeten and accommodate it to the world they have reduced it to such a point that to fast according to their Maxims is in truth not to fast at all and to make good chear To make this more clearly appear we will divide this Article into three Points In the first we shall see how they regulate eating and the hour of repast on Fasting-days In the second what they say of drinking and of the Collation at night And in the third their easieness to dispense with all sorts of persons for Fasting and upon all sorts of occasions even the most criminal and infamous I. POINT That according to the Jesuits Divinity we may prevent the hour of Repast make it as long and great as we please eat more than on another day and break out into all excess and intemperance without breaking our Fast BAuny in his Sum Chap. 16. pag. 251. declares that at present the hour of repast is at Noon but he adds that we may advance and anticipate this time one hour without sin and he cites for this opinion Layman Binsfield and Diana who saith that the Religious have this priviledge This is no great advantage nor honour for the Religious that they are the first to favour themselves and demand priviledge to fast more at their case But if we may prevent and anticipate the time of refection by an hour as he saith without sin there is no need of priviledge for this and the Religious do ill employ their credits to obtain it This Jesuit also seems not to make any great account of it saying afterwards that without any regard thereof they do it and all others also without fault and that altogether that is Seculars and Monasticks may prevent that time by two or three hours when necessity or convenience requires it That is that we may break fast on Fast-days instead of dining and sit down at the table at eight or nine of the clock in the morning Escobar saith the same thing in a manner He demands 1 Anticipaâ—ur sine causa hora comedendi die jejunii solviturne Whether the Fast be broken by anticipating the bour of refreshment on a Fast day without cause He answers 2 Minime quia determinatio horae non est de essentia jejunil Escobar tract 1. exam 3. num 72. pag. 213. That it is not broken because it is not of the essence of a Fast to eat at a determined hour This answer gives an absolute liberty and without bounds and first of all to prevent the hour of repast on Fast-days not only two or three hours as Bauny saith but more also and it gives power to eat absolutely at what hour we will because as this Casuist saith to eat at one or other determinate hour is not of the essence of a Fast But if any fault be committed in this disorder it can be at the most but a venial one according to this Doctor himself 1 Delinquetur vâ—nisliter nisi sit exigua anticipatio ut dimidiae horae Ibid. Colligo Religiosos habentes privilegium anticipandi prandium per horem posse sine ulla culpa per horam mediam ante meridiem prandere Ibid. It will be but a venial sin saith he if this anticipation be but a small one as of half an hour Whence he concludes in favour of the Religious who have the priviledge to prevent dinner-time by an hour that they may without sin dine at half an hour past ten The corrupt custom and loosness of the time gives them half an hour and their priviledges give them an hour to anticipate their repast So that they may dinc without scruple at half an hour past ten on Fast-days thereby giving a great example of Penance and Austerity to Seculars and ordinary Christians who prolong their Fast an hour and a half or two hours longer than they and in these times dine not till after-noon Tambourin flies yet higher than Escobar and maintains that the Religious may dine on Fast-days at nine of the clock and a half in Winter and at half an hour past eight in the Summer saying 2 Pro iis quos juvat putare meridiem esse horam le reficiendi stâ—…utam sub meresli nota eos posse prandere una hora circiter ante meridiem in hyeme Sanchâ—… d. 53. num 7. Trul. in d. n 3. cap. 2. dub 4. num 2. duabus in aestate Ita 2305. s 4. cap. 18. num 100. hine quoniam Mendicantes qui corum privilegia participant gaudent privilegio anticipandâ— refectionem per horam ita Comp privilegiorum Societatis Jesu ideo poterunt prandere duabus hotis hyeme tribus aestate ante meridiem Nam unam aut alteram dat moralitas meridiei reliquas Papae concessio Et quia multi probabiliter censent comedere semi-hora ante statutum vel concessum tempus etiam sine causa non esse notabilem culpam quia parum pro nihilo reputatur Dian. p. 5. tract 5. num 10. p. 1. tract 9. num 27. p. 2.19 num 53. idcirco hyeme poterunt hi duâ—bus horis cum dimidia aestate tribus cum dimidia ante folarem meridiem mensae accumbere Et quidem ex cause studiâ— icineris negotli c. â—…iam sine veniali Tambur decal lib. 4. cap. 5. sect 4. num 3. As for them who imagine that mid-day is appointed for repast under pain of mortal sin it is to be observed that they may dine an hour before noon in Winter and two hours in Summer Whence it follows that the Mendicant Fryars and those who participate of their priviledges to anticipate their dinners one hour on Fast-days as it is contained in the Abrigdment of the Priviledges of the Society of Jesus may by this reason dine two hours by the Sun before mid-day in Winter and three in Summer because the moral duration of Noon gives them one or two and the Papal Priviledge another And because many do grant with probability that to eat half an hour before the time appointed even without cause is no notable fault because a little matter is considered as nothing thence it comes that in Winter they may dine