must be such and such only as are made up of such Simple ones as have been discovered to co-exist in Nature Wherever then we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas there is Certain Knowledge and wherever we are sure those Ideas agree with the reality of Things there is Certain real Knowledge CHAP V. Of Truth in General TRuth in the proper import of the Word signifies the joyning or separating of Signs as the Things signified by them do Agree or Disagree one with another The joyning or separating of Signs is what we call Propositions so that Truth properly belongs only to Propositions whereof there are Two sorts Mental and Verbal as there are Two sorts of Signs commonly made use of Ideas and Words 'T is difficult to treat of Mental Propositions without Verbal because in speaking of Mental we must make use of Words and then they become Verbal Again Men commonly in their Thoughts and Reasonings use Words instead of Ideas especially if the subject of their Meditation contains in it Complex Ideas If we have occasion to form Mental Propositions about White Black Circle c. we can and often do frame in our Minds the Ideas themselves without reflecting on the Names But when we would consider or make Propositions about the more Complex Ideas as of a Man Vitriol Fortitude Glory c. we usually put the Name for the Idea because the Idea these Names stand for being for the most part confused imperfect and undetermined we reflect on the Names themselves as being more Clear Certain and Distinct and readier to occur to our Thoughts than pure Ideas and so we make use of these Words instead of the Ideas themselves even when we would Meditate and Reason within our selves and make tacit Mental Propositions We must then observe Two sorts of Propositions that we are capable of making First Mental Propositions wherein the Ideas in our Understandings are put together or separated by the Mind perceiving or judging of their Agreement or Disagreement Secondly Verbal Propositions which are Words put together or separated in Affirmative or Negative Sentences So that Proposition consists in joyning or separating Signs and Truth consists in putting together or separating these Signs according as the Things they stand for Agree or Disagree Truth as well as Knowledge may well come under the Distinction of Verbal and Real That being only Verbal Truth wherein Terms are joyned according to the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for without regarding whether our Ideas are such as really have or are capable of having an Existence in Nature But then it is they contain Real Truth when these Signs are joyned as our Ideas agree and when our Ideas are such as we know are capable of having an Existence in Nature which in Substances we cannot know but by knowing that such have Existed Truth is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as it is Falshood is the marking down in Words the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas otherwise than it is and so far as these Ideas thus marked by Sounds agree to their Archetypes so far only is the Truth Real The knowledge of this Truth consists in knowing what Ideas the Words stand for and the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of those Ideas according as it is marked by those Words Besides Truth taken in the strict Sense before-mentioned there are other sorts of Truths As First Moral Truth which is speaking Things according to the perswasion of our own Minds Secondly Metaphysical Truth which is nothing but the Real Existence of Things conformable to the Ideas to which we have annexed their Names These Considerations of Truth either having been before taken notice of or not being much to our present purpose it may suffice here only to have mentioned them CHAP. VI. Of Universal Propositions their Truth and Certainty THE prevailing Custom of using Sounds for Ideas even when Men think and reason within their own Breasts makes the consideration of Words and Propositions so necessary a part of the Treatise of Knowledge that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one without explaining the other And since General Truths which with Reason are most sought after can never be well made known and are seldom apprehended but as conceived and expressed in Words it is not out of our way in the Examination of our own Knowledge to enquire into the Truth and Certainty of Universal Propositions But it must be observed that Certainty is Twofold Certainty of Truth and Certainty of Knowledge Certainty of Truth is when Words are so put together in Propositions as exactly to express the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas they stand for as really it is Certainty of Knowledge is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Propositions This we usually call Knowing or being Certain of the Truth of any Proposition Now because we cannot be Certain of the truth of any General Proposition unless we know the precise Bounds and Extent of the Species its Terms stand for it is necessary we should know the Essence of each Species which is that which constitutes and bounds it This in all Simple Ideas and Modes is not hard to do for in these the Real and Nominal Essence be-being the same there can be no doubt how far the Species extends or what Things are comprehended under each Term which it is evident are all that have an exact Conformity with the Idea it stands for and no other But in Substances wherein a Real Essence distinct from the Nominal is supposed to constitute and bound the Species the extent of the general Word is very uncertain because not knowing this Real Essence we cannot know what is or is not of that Species and consequently what may or may not with Certainty be affirmed of it Hence we may see that the Names of Substances when made to stand for Species supposed to be constituted by Real Essences which we know not are not capable of conveying Certainty to the Understanding Of the Truth of General Propositions made up of such Terms we cannot be sure For how can we besure that this or that Quality is in Gold for Instance when we know not what is or is not Gold that is what has or has not the Real Essence of Gold whereof we have no Idea at all On the other side the Names of Substances when made use of for the Complex Ideas Men have in their Minds thô they carry a clear and determinate Signification with them will not yet serve us to make many Universal Propositions of whose Truth we can be certain because the Simple Ideas out of which the Complex are combined carry not with them any discoverable Connexion or Repugnancy but with a very few other Ideas For Instance All Gold is fixed is a Proposition we cannot be certain of how Universally soever it be believed For if we take the Term
Gold to stand for a Real Essence it is evident we know not what particular Substances are of that Species and so cannot with certainty affirm any Thing Universally of Gold But if we make the Term Gold stand for a Species determined by its Nominal Essence be its Complex Idea what it will for Instance A Body Yellow Fusible Malleable and very heavy no Quality can with Certainty be Denyed or Affirmed Universally of it but what has a discoverable Connexion or Inconsistency with that Nominal Essence Fixedness for Instance having no necessary Connexion that we can discover with any Simple Idea that makes the Complex one or with the whole Combination together it is impossible that we should certainly know the truth of this Proposition All Gold is fixed But is not this an Universal certain Proposition All Gold is Malleable I answer it is so if Malleableness be a part of the Complex Idea the word Gold stands for But then here is nothing affirmed of Gold but that that Sound stands for an Idea in which Malleableness is contained And such a sort of Truth and Certainty it is to say a Centaur is Four-footed I imagine amongst all the Secundary Qualities of Substances and the Powers relating to them there cannot any two be named whose necessary Co-existence or Repugnance to Co-exist can be certainly known unless in those of the same Sense which necessarily exclude one another Thus by the Colour we cannot certainly know what Smell Tast c. any Body is of 'T is no wonder then that Certainty is to be found but in very few general Propositions concerning Substances Our Knowledge of their Qualities and Properties goes very seldom farther than our Senses reach or inform us Inquisitive and Observing Men may by strength of Judgment penetrate farther and on Probabilities taken from wary Observations and Hints well laid together often guess right at what Experience has not yet discovered to them But this is but guessing still it amounts only to Opinion and has not that certainty which is requisite to Knowledge To conclude general Propositions of what kind soever are then only capable of Certainty when the Terms used in them stand for such Ideas whose Agreement or Disagreement as there expressed is capable to be discovered by us And we are then certain of their Truth or Falshood when we perceive the Ideas they stand for to Agree or not Agree according as they are affirmed or denyed one of another whence we may take notice that general Certainty is never to be found but in our Ideas CHAP. VII Of Maxims THERE are a sort of Propositions which under the Name of Maxims and Axioms have passed for Principles of Science and because they are Self-evident have been supposed Innate It may be worth while to enquire into the reason of their Evidence and examine how far they influence our other Knowledge Knowledge being but the perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas where that Agreement or Disagreement is perceived immediately by it self without the intervention or help of any other there our Knowledge is Self-evident which being so not only Maxims but an infinite number of other Propositions partake equally with them in this Self-evidence For In respect of Identity and Diversity we may have as many Self-evident Propositions as we have distinct Ideas T is the First Act of the Mind to know every one of its Ideas by it self and distinguish it from others Every one finds in himself that he knows the Ideas he has that he knows also when any one is in his Understanding and what it is and that when more than one are there he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another so that all Affirmations or Negations concerning them are made without any possibility of doubt or uncertainty and must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood that is as soon as we have in our Minds the Ideas clear and distinct which the Terms in the Proposition stand for Thus a Circle is a Circle Blue is not Red are as Self-evident Propositions as those general ones What is is and 'T is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be nor can the consideration of these Axioms add any thing to the Evidence or Certainty of our Knowledge of them As to the Agreement or Disagreement of Co-existence the Mind has an immediate perception of this but in very few And therefore in this sort we have very little Intuitive Knowledge thô in some few Propositions we have Two Bodies cannot be in the same place I think is a self-evident Proposition The Idea of fitting a Place equal to the Contents of its Superficies being annexed to our Idea of Body As to the Relations of Modes Mathematicians have framed many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality as Equals taken from Equals the remainder will be Equal c. which however received for Axioms yet I think have not a clearer Self-Evidence than these that One and One are equal to Two that if from the Five Fingers of one Hand you take Two and from the Five Fingers of the other Hand Two the remaining Numbers will be equal These and a thousand other such Propositions may be found in Numbers which carry with them an equal if not greater clearness than those Mathematical Axioms As to Real Existence since that has no Connexion with any other of our Ideas but that of our Selves and of a First Being we have not so much as a Demonstrative much less a Self-Evident Knowledge concerning the Real Existence of other Beings In the next place let us consider what influence these Maxims have upon the other parts of our Knowledge The Rules established in the Schools That all Reasonings are Ex praecognitis praeconceptis seem to lay the foundation of all other Knowledge in these Maxims and to suppose them to be Praecognita whereby I think is meant Two Things First That these Axioms are those Truths that are first known to the Mind Secondly That upon them the other parts of our Knowledge depend First That these Axioms are not the Truths first known to the Mind is evident from Experience For who knows not that a Child perceives that a Stranger is not its Mother long before he knows that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be And how many Truths are there about Numbers which the Mind is perfectly acquainted with and fully convinced of before it ever thought on these general Maxims Of this the reason is plain for that which makes the Mind assent to such Propositions being nothing but the Perception it has of the Agreement or Disagreement of its Ideas according as it finds them affirmed or denied in Words one of another and every Idea being known to be what it is and every two distinct Ideas not to be the same it must necessarily follow that such Self-evident Truths must be first known which consist of Ideas that are first in the
here speaking of has its cause more in the Ideas themselves than in any incapacity in the Sounds to signifie them for in that regard they are all equally perfect That then which makes the difference is the difference of Ideas they stand for which must be learned and retained by those who would discourse together intelligibly Now this is difficult in these cases First Where the Ideas they stand for are very Complex Hence the names of Mixed Modes are liable to great uncertainty and obscurity in their Signification For here the Idea being made up of many Parts it is not easy to form and retain it exactly of this sort chiefly are Moral Words which have seldom in Two different Men the same precise signification Secondly where the Ideas they stand for have no certain connexion in Nature and therefore no settled Standard to rectifie and adjust them by This again is the case of the names of Mixed Modes which are Assemblages of Ideas put together at pleasure Common use indeed regulates the meaning of Words pretty well for common Conversation but it is not sufficient to adjust them to Philosophical Discourses there being scarce a Name of any very Complex Idea which in common use has not a great Latitude and is not made the sign of far different Ideas The way of learning these Names does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their Signification For we may observe that Children are taught the names of Simple Ideas and Substances by having the Things shewn them and then they repeat the Name that stands for it as White Sweet Milk Sugar ctc. But in Mixed Modes the Sounds are learned first and Men are to learn afterwards their Signification by their own Observation and Industry or the Explication of others which is the reason that these Words are little more than bare Sounds in the Minds of most because few are at the pains to settle their Ideas and Notions precisely and those which are make them the signs of Ideas different from what others understand by them which is the occasion of most disputes Thirdly Where the signification of a Word is referred to a Standard which is not easily known This is the case of the names of Substances which being supposed to stand for their Real Essences must needs be of uncertain application because these Essences are utterly unknown and it will be impossible to know what is or is not Antimony v. g. when that Word is to stand for the Real Essence of it whereof we have no Idea at all Or suppose these Names only stand for Simple Ideas found to co-exist in Substances yet thus they will be liable to great uncerainty too because these Simple Ideas being very numerous Men frame different Ideas os the same Subjects by putting different Ideas into their Complex one of such Substances Several Men observe several Properties in the same Substance and none of them all who having but imperfect descriptions of Things can have but uncertain significations of Words Fourthly Where the signification of the Word and the real Essence of the Thing are not the same which is still the case of Substances from hence we may observe First That the names of Simple Ideas are least liable to mistakes First Because the Ideas they stand for being each but one single Perception are easier got and more clearly retained than the more Complex ones of Substances and mixed Modes Secondly Because they are not referr'd to any other Essence but barely that Perception they immediately signify Secondly Names of Simple Modes are next to Simple Ideas least liable to Doubt or Uncertainty especially those of Figure and Number of which Men have so clear and distinct Ideas Thirdly In Mixed Modes when they are composed of a few and obvious Ideas their Names are clear and distinct enough otherwise doubtful and uncertain Fourthly The Names of Substances being annexed to Ideas that are neither the real Essences nor exact Representations of Things are liable yet to greater Imperfection when we come to a Philosophical use of them CHAP X. Of the Abuse of Words BEside the natural and unavoidable Imperfections of Languages there are wilful Faults and Neglects which Men are often guilty of in their use of Words For First They use Words without clear and distinct Ideas or which is worse Signs without any thing signified such are for the most part introduced by Sects of Philosopy and Religion either out of an affectation of Singularity or to support some strange Opinion or to cover the weakness of their Hypothesis These are commonly such as had no determinate collection of Ideas annexed to them when they were first invented or at least such as if well examined will be found inconsistent and therefore may justly be called insignificant Terms Instances of this kind may easily be had from the School-men and Metaphysicians Others learn Words which the propriety of Language has affixed to very important Ideas and often upon occasion use them without any distinct meaning at all whence their Notions being unsteady and confused their Discourse must be filled with empty unintelligible Noise and Jargon especially in Moral Matters where the Words stand for Arbitrary and numerous Collections of Ideas not regularly and permanently united in Nature Secondly Another abuse is Inconstancy in the use of Words it is hard to find a Discourse on any Subject wherein the same words are not used sometimes for one collection of Ideas sometimes for another The wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great Folly or greater Dishonesty And a Man in his Accompts with another may with as much fairness make the characters of Numbers stand sometimes for one and sometimes for another collection of Unites as in his Discourse or Reasoning make the same Words stand for different collections of Simple Ideas Thirdly Another is an affected Obscurity either by using old Words in new Significations or by introducing new and ambiguous Terms without defining them or putting them together so as to confound their ordinary meaning Thô the Peripatetick Philosophy has been most eminent in this way yet other Sects have not been wholly clear of it The admired Art of Disputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of Languages whilst it has been made use of and fitted to perplex the signification of Words more than to discover the Knowledge and Truth of Things And he that will look into that sort of Learned Writings will find the Words there much more obscure uncertain and undetermined in their meaning than they are in ordinary Conversation Fourthly Another is the Taking Words for Things This thô it in some degree concerns all Names in general yet more particularly affects those of Substances Thus in the Peripatetick Philosophy Substantial Forms Abhorrence of Vacuum c. are taken for something Real To this Abuse those Men are most subject who confine their Thoughts to any one System and give themselves up into a firm belief of the perfection of
far it may extend This part depending on our Sagacity in finding intermediate Ideas that may shew the Habitudes and Relations of Ideas It is an hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such Discoveries They that are ignorant of Algebra cannot imagine the Wonders in this kind are to be done by it and what farther Improvements and Helps advantageous to other parts of Knowledge the Sagacious Mind of Man may yet find out it is not easy to determine This at least I believe that the Ideas of Quantity are not those alone that are capable of Demonstration and Knowledge and that other and perhaps more useful parts of Contemplation would afford us Certainty if Vices Passions and domineering Interests did not oppose or menace Endeavours of this kind The Idea of a Supream Being Infinite in Power Goodness and Wisdom whose Workmanship we are and on whom we depend and the Idea of our Selves as understanding rational Creatures would I suppose if duly considered afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action as might place Morality among the Sciences capable of Demonstration wherein I doubt not but from Principles as Incontestable as those of the Mathematicks by necessary Consequences the measure of Right and Wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same Indifferency and Attention to the One as he does to the Other of these Sciences The Relations of other Modes may certainly be perceived as well as those of Number and Extension Where there is no Property there is no Injustice is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in Euclid for the Idea of Property being a right to any thing and the Idea of Injustice being the invasion or violation of that Right it is evident that these Ideas being thus established and these Names annexed to them I can as certainly know this Proposition to be true as that a Triangle has three Angles equal to Two right ones Again No Government allows absolute Liberty The Idea of Government being the establishment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws which require Conformity to them and the Idea of Absolute Liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this Proposition as of any in Mathematicks What has given the advantage to the Ideas of Quantity and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonstration is First That they can be represented by sensible Marks which have a nearer Correspondence with them than any Words or Sounds Diagrams drawn on Paper are Copies of the Ideas and not liable to the uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification But we have no sensible Marks that resemble our Moral Ideas and nothing but Words to express them by which thô when written they remain the same yet the Ideas they stand for may change in the same Man and it is very seldom that they are not different in different Persons Secondly Moral Ideas are commonly more Complex than Figures whence these two Inconveniencies follow First That their Names are of more uncertain Signification the precise collection of Simple Ideas they stand for not being so easily agreed on and so the sign that is used for them in Communication always and in Thinking often does not steadily carry with it the same Idea Secondly The Mind cannot easily retain those precise Combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in the examination of the Habitudes and Correspondencies Agreements or Disagreements of several of them one with another especially where it is to be judged of by long Deductions and the intervention of several other Complex Ideas to shew the Agreement ' or Disagreement of two remote ones One part of these Disadvantages in Moral Ideas which has made them be thought not capable of Demonstration may in a good measure be remedied by Definitions setting down that collection of Simple Ideas which every Term shall stand for and then using the Terms steadily and constantly for that precise Collection As to the Fourth sort of Knowledge viz. of the real actual existence of Things we have an Intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence a Demonstrative Knowledge of the Existence of God and a Sensitive Knowledge of the Objects that present themselves to our Senses From what has been said we may discover the Causes of our Ignorance which are chiefly these Three First want of Ideas Secondly Want of a discoverable Connexion between the Ideas we have Thirdly Want of tracing and examining our Ideas First There are some things we are ignorant of for want of Ideas All the Simple Ideas we have are confined to the observation of our Senses and the operations of our own Minds that we are conscious of in our Selves What other Ideas it is possible other Creatures may have by the assistance of other Senses and Faculties more or perfecter than we have or different from ours it is not for us to determine but to say or think there are no such because we conceive nothing of them is no better an Argument than if a blind Man should be positive in it that there was no such thing as Sight and Colours because he had no manner of Idea of any such thing What Faculties therefore other species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature and inmost constitutions of Things we know not This we know and certainly find that we want other views of them besides those we have to make discoveries of them more perfect The Intellectual and Sensible World are in this perfectly alike that the parts which we see of either of them hold no proportion with that we see not and whatsoever we can reach with our Eyes or our Thoughts of either of them is but a point almost nothing in comparison of the rest Another great cause of Ignorance is the want of Ideas that we are capable of This keeps us in ignorance of Things we conceive capable of being known Bulk Figure and Motion we have Ideas of yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk Motion and Figure of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe we are ignorant of the several Powers Efficacies and ways of Operation whereby the effects we daily see are produced These are hid from us in some things by being too Remote in others by being too Minute When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the World and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our Ken is but a small part of the immense Universe we shall then discover an huge abyss of Ignorance What are the particular Fabricks of the great Masses of Matter which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal Beings how far they are extended and what is their motion and how continued and what influence they have upon one another are contemplations that at first glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves in If we confine our Thoughts to this little Canton I mean this System of
Mind and the Ideas first in the Mind it is evident are those of particular Things from whence by slow degrees the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense are settled in the Mind with general Names to them Thus particular Ideas are first received and distinguished and so Knowledge got about them and next to them the less general or specifick which are next to particular ones Secondly From what has been said it plainly follows that these magnified Maxims are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Knowledge for if there be a great many other Truths as Self-evident as they and a great many that we know before them it is impossible that they should be the Principles from which we deduce all other Truths Thus that One and Two are equal to Three is as evident and easier known then that the Whole is equal to all its parts Nor after the knowledge of this Maxim do we know that One and Two are equal to Three better or more certainly than we did before For if there be any odds in these Ideas the Ideas of Whole and Parts are more obscure or at least more difficult to be setled in the Mind than those of One Two and Three Either therefore all Knowledge does not depend on certain Praecognita or general Maxims called Principles or else such as these That One and One are Two that Two and Two are Four c. and a great part of Numeration will be so To which if we add all the Self-evident Propositions that may be made about all our distinct Ideas Principles will be almost infinite at least innumerable which Men arrive to the knowledge of at different Ages and a great many of those innate Principles they never come to know all their Lives But whether they come in view earlier or later they are all known by their Native Evidence and receive no Light nor are capable of any Proof one from another much less the more particular from the more general or the more simple from the more compounded the more simple and less abstract being the most familiar and the easier and earlier apprehended These general Maxims then are only of use in disputes to stop the Mouths of Wranglers but not of much use to the discovery of unknown Truths or to help the Mind forwards in its search after Knowledge Several general Maxims are no more than bare verbal Propositions and teach us nothing but the respect and import of Names one to another as The whole is equal to all its Parts What real Truth does it teach us more than what the signification of the word Totum or whole does of it self import But yet Mathematicians do not without reason place this and some other such amongst their Maxims that their Scholars having in the Entrance perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with these Propositions made in such general Terms may have them ready to apply to all particular Cases not that if they be equally weighed they are more clear and evident than the particular Instances they are brought to confirm but that being more familiar to the Mind the very naming them is enough to satisfy the Understanding But this I say is more from our Custom of using them than the different Evidence of the Things So that if rightly consider'd I think we may say that where our Ideas are clear and distinct there is little or no use at all of these Maxims to prove the Agreement or Disagreement of any of them He that cannot discern the Truth or falshood of such Propositions without the help of these and the like Maxims will not be helped by these Maxims to do it He that needs any proof to make him certain and give his assent to this Proposition that Two are equal to Two or that White is not Black will also have need of a proof to make him admit that What is is or That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be And as these Maxims are of little use where we have clear and distinct Ideas so they are of dangerous use where our Ideas are confused and where we use words that are not annexed to clear and distinct Ideas but to such as are of a loose and wandring signification sometimes standing for one and sometimes for another Idea from which follows Mistake and Error which these Maxims brought as proofs to establish Propositions wherein the Terms stand for confused and uncertain Ideas do by their Authority confirm and rivet CHAP. VIII Of Trifling Propositions THere are Universal Propositions which thô they be certainly true yet add no Light to our Understandings bring no increase to our Knowledge such are First All Purely Identical Propositions These at first blush appear to contain no Instruction in them for when we affirm the same Term of it self it shews us nothing but what we must certainly know before whether such a Proposition be either made by or proposed to us Secondly Another sort of trifling Propositions is when a part of the Complex Idea is praedicated of the name of the whole a part of the definition of the word defined as Lead is a Metal Man an Animal These carry no Information at all to those who know the Complex Ideas the Names Lead and Man stand for Indeed to a Man that knows the signification of the word Metal and not of the word Lead it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word Lead by saying it is a Metal than by enumerating the Simple Ideas one by one which make up the Complex Idea of Metal Alike trifling it is to predicate any one of the Simple Ideas of a Complex one of the name of the whole Complex Idea as All Gold is fusible for fusibility being one of the Simple Ideas that goes to the making up the Complex one the Sound Gold stands for what can it be but playing with Sounds to affirm that of the name Gold which is comprehended in its received signification What instruction can it carry to tell one that which he is supposed to know before For I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me or else he is to tell me The general Propositions that are made about Substances if they are certain are for the most part but Trifling And if they are Instructive are Uncertain and such as we have no knowledge of their real Truth how much soever constant Observation and Analogy may assist our Judgments in Guessing Hence it comes to pass that one may often meet with very clear and coherent Discourses that amount yet to nothing For names of Substantial Beings as well as others having setled Significations affixed to them may with great Truth be joyned Negatively and Affirmatively in Propositions as their Definitions make them fit to be so joyned and Propositions consisting of such Terms may with the same clearness be deduced one from
another as those that convey the most real Truths and all this without any knowledge of the Nature or Reality of Things existing without us Thus he that has learnt the following words with their ordinary Acceptations annexed to them viz. Substance Man Animal Form Soul Vegetative Sensitive Rational may make several undoubted Propositions about the Soul without any Knowledge at all of what the Soul really is And of this sort a Man may find an infinite number of Propositions Reasonings and Conclusions in Books of Metaphysicks School-Divinity and some part of Natural Philosophy and after all know as little of God Spirits or Bodies as he did before he set out Thirdly The worst sort of Trifling is To use words loosely and uncertainly which sets us yet farther from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain to by them or find in them That which occasions this is That Men may find it convenient to shelter their Ignorance or Obstinacy under the Obscurity or Perplexedness of their Terms to which perhaps Inadvertency and ill Custom does in many Men much contribute To conclude barely Verbal Propositions may be known by these following marks First All Propositions wherein two Abstract Terms are affirmed one of another are barely about the signification of Sounds For since no Abstract Idea can be the same with any other but it self when its Abstract Name is affirmed of any other Term it can signifie no more but this that it may or ought to be called by that name or that these two Names signify the same Idea Secondly All Propositions wherein a part of the Complex Idea which any Term stands for is predicated of that Term are only Verbal and thus all Propositions wherein more comprehensive Terms called Genera are affirmed of Subordinate or less Comprehensive called Species or Individuals are barely Verbal When by these two Rules we examine the Propositions that make up the Discourses we ordnarily meet with both in and out of Books we shall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspected are purely about the signification of Words and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these Signs CHAP. IX Of our Knowledge of Existence HItherto we have only considered the Essences of Things which being only Abstract Ideas and thereby removed in our Thoughts from particular Existence give us no Knowledge of Existence at all We proceed now to enquire concerning our Knowledge of the Existence of Things and how we come by it I say then that we have the Knowledge of our own Existence by Intuition of the Existence of God by Demonstration and of other Things by Sensation As for our own Existence we perceive it so plainly that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof I think I reason I feel Pleasure and Pain Can any of these be more evident to me than my own Existence If I doubt of all other Things that very Doubt makes me perceive my own Existence and will not suffer me to doubt of that If I know I doubt I have as certain a Perception of the Thing Doubting as of that Thought which I call Doubt Experience then convinces us that we have an Intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence and an Internal Infallible Perception that we are In every act of Sensation Reasoning or Thinking we are conscious to our selves of our own Being and in this matter come not short of the highest Degree of Certainty CHAP X. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God THO' God has given us no innate Ideas of himself yet having furnished us with those Faculties our Minds are endowed with he hath not left himself without a Witness since we have Sense Perception and Reason and cannot want a clear proof of him as long as we carry our selves about us nor can we justly complain of our Ignorance in this great point since he has so plentifully provided us with means to discover and know him so far as is necessary to the end of our Being and the great concernment of our Happiness But thô this be the most obvious Truth that Reason discovers yet it requires Thought and Attention and the Mind must apply it self to a Regular deduction of it from some part of our Intuitiv Knowledge or else we shall be as ignorant of this as of other Propositions which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration To shew therefore that we are capable of Knowing that is being certain that there is a God and how we may come by this Certainty I think we need go no farther than our selves and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own Existence I think it is beyond question that Man has a clear Perception of his own Being he knows certainly that he Exists and that he is Something In the next place Man knows by an Intuitive Certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any real Being than it can be equal to two Right Angles If therefore we know there is some Real Being it is an evident Demonstration that from Eternity there has been Something since what was not from Eternity had a Beginning and what had a Beginning must be produced by something else Next it is evident that what has its Being from another must also have all that which is in and belongs to its Being from another too All the Powers it has must be owing to and received from the same Source This Eternal Source then of all Being must he also the Source and Original of all Power and so this Eternal Being must be also the most powerful Again Man finds in himself Perception and Knowledge we are certain then that there is not only some Being but some Knowing Intelligent Being in the World There was a time then when there was no knowing Being or else there has been a knowing Being from Eternity If it be said there was a time when that Eternal Being had no Knowledge I reply that then it is impossible there should have ever been any Knowledge It being as impossible that Things wholly void of Knowledge and operating blindly and without any Perception should produce a knowing Being as it is impossible that a Triangle should make it self Three Angles bigger than Two Right ones Thus from the Consideration of our selves and what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions our Reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident Truth that there is an Eternal most Powerful and Knowing Being which whether any one will call God it matters not The thing is evident and from this Idea duly consider'd will easily be deduced all those other Attributes we ought to ascribe to this Eternal Being From what has been said it is plain to me we have a more certain Knowledge of the Existence of a God than of any thing our Senses have not immediately discovered to us Nay I presume I may say that we more certainly know that there is a God than that there is any thing else without
Repugnancy of other Ideas which cannot be immediately compared That these Two and not the relying on Maxims and drawing Consequences from some general Propositions are the right method of improving our Knowledge in the Ideas of other Modes besides those of Quantity the consideration of Mathematical Knowledge will easily inform us Where First We shall find that he that has not clear and perfect Ideas of those Angles or Figures of which he desires to know any thing is utterly thereby incapable of any knowledge about them Suppose a Man not to have an exact Idea of a Right Angle Scalenum or Trapezium and it is clear that he will in vain seek any Demonstration about them And farther it is evident that it was not the influence of Maxims or Principles that hath led the Masters of this Science into those wonderful Discoveries they have made Let a Man of good Parts know all the Maxims of Mathematicks never so well and contemplate their Extent and Consequences as much as he pleases he will by their assistance I suppose scarce ever come to know that the Square of the Hypotenuse in a Right Angl'd Triangle is equal to the Squares of the Two other sides This and other Mathematical Truths have been discovered by the Thoughts otherwise applied The Mind had other Objects other views before it far different from those Maxims which Men well enough acquainted with those received Axioms but ignorant of their method who first made these Demonstrations can never sufficiently admire CHAP. XIII Some farther Considerations concerning Knowledge OUR Knowledge as in other things so in this has a great conformity with our Sight that it is neither wholly Necessary nor wholly Voluntary Men that have Senses cannot chuse but receive some Ideas by them and if they have Memory they cannot but retain some of them and if they have any distinguishing Faculty cannot but perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of some of them one with another As he that has Eyes if he will open them by day cannot but see some Objects and perceive a difference in them yet he may chuse whether he will turn his Eyes towards an Object curiously survey it and observe accurately all that is visible in it But what he does see he cannot see otherwise than he does it depends not on his Will to see that Black which appears Yellow Just thus it is with our Understanding All that is voluntary in our Knowledge is the employing or with-holding any of our Faculties from this or that sort of Objects and a more or less accurate Survey of them But they being employed our Will hath no power to determine the Knowledge of the Mind one way or other That is done only by the Objects themselves as far as they are clearly discovered Thus he that has got the Ideas of Numbers and hath taken the pains to compare One Two and Three to Six cannot chuse but know that they are equal He also that hath the Idea of an Intelligent but weak and frail Being made by and depending on another who is Eternal Omnipotent perfectly Wise and Good will as certainly know that Man is to Honour Fear and Obey God as that the Sun shines when he sees it But yet these Truths being never so certain never so clear he may be ignorant of either or both of them who will not take the pains to employ his Faculties as he should to inform himself about them CHAP. XIV Of Judgment THE Understanding Faculties being given to Man not barely for Speculation but also for the conduct of his Life A Man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true Knowledge he that will not Eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him nor Stir till he is infallibly assured of Success in his Business will have little else to do but Sit still and perish Therefore as God has set some things in broad Day-light as he has given us some certain Knowledge thô limited to a few Things in comparison probably as a Taste of what Intellectual Creatures are capable of to excite in us a Desire and Endeavour after a better State so in the greatest part of our concernment he has afforded us only the Twilight as I may so say of Probability suitable to that state of Mediocrity and Probationership he has been pleased to place us in here The Faculty which God has given Man to enlighten him next to certain Knowledge is Judgment whereby the Mind takes its Ideas to Agree or Disagree without perceiving a demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs The Mind exercises this Judgment sometimes out of necessity where demonstrative Proofs and certain Knowledge are not to be had and sometimes out of Laziness Unskilfulness or Haste even where they are to be had This Faculty of the Mind when it is exercised immediately about Things is called Judgment when about Truths delivered in Words is most commonly called Assent or Dissent Thus the Mind has Two Faculties conversant about Truth and Falshood First Knowledge whereby it certainly perceives and is undoubtedly satisfied of the Agreement or Disagreement of any Ideas Secondly Judgment which is the putting Ideas together or separating them from one another in the Mind when their certain Agreement or Disagreement is not perceived but presumed to be so And if it so unites or separates them as in Reality Things are it is right Judgment CHAP. XV. Of Probability PRobability is nothing but the appearance of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas by the intervention of Proofs whose connexion is not constant and immutable or is not perceived to be so but is or appears for the most part to be so and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition to be true or false rather than the contrary Of Probability there are Degrees from the neighborhood of Certainty and Demonstration quite down to Improbability and Unlikeliness even to the confines of Impossibility And also degrees of Assent from certain Knowledge and what is next it full Assurance and Confidence quite down to conjecture Doubt Distrust and Disbelief That Proposition then is Probable for which there are Arguments or Proofs to make it pass or be received for True The Entertainment the Mind gives to this sort of Propositions is called Belief Assent or Opinion Probability then being to supply the defect of our Knowledge is always conversant about a Thing whereof we have no Certainty but only some Inducements to receive it for true The Grounds of it are in short these Two following First The Conformity of any thing with our own Knowledge Experience or Observation Secondly The Testimony of others vouching their Observation and Experience In the Testimony of others is to be considered First The Number Secondly The Integrity Thirdly The Skill of the Witnesses Fourthly The Design of the Author if it be a Testimony cited out of a Book Fifthly The consistency of the Parts and Circumstances
it are these First Because Syllogism serves our Reason but in one only of the fore-mentioned parts of it and that is to shew the Connexion of the proofs of any one Instance and no more but in this it is of no great use since the Mind can perceive such Connexion where it really is as easily nay perhaps better without it We may observe that there are many Men that reason exceeding clear and rightly who know not how to make a Syllogism and I believe scarce any one makes Syllogisms in reasoning within himself Indeed sometimes they may serve to discover a Fallacy hid in a Rhetorical Flourish or by stripping an absurdity of the cover of Wit and good Language shew it in its naked deformity But the Mind is not taught to reason by these Rules It has a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of its Ideas and can range them right without any such perplexing Repetitions and I think every one will perceive in Mathematical Demonstrations that the Knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without Syllogism Secondly Because thò Syllogism serves to shew the force or fallacy of an Argument made use of in the usual way of Discoursing by supplying the absent Proposition and so setting it before the view in a clear Light yet it no less engages the Mind in the perplexity of obscure and equivocal Terms wherewith this artificial way of reasoning always abounds it being adapted more to the attaining of victory in Dispute than the discovery or confirmation of Truth in fair Enquiries But however it be in Knowledge I think it is of far less or no use at all in Probabilities For the Assent there being to be determined by the Preponderancy after a due weighing of all the proofs on both sides nothing is so unfit to assist the Mind in that as Syllogism which running away with one assumed Probability pursues that till it has led the Mind quite out of sight of the Thing under Consideration But let it help us as perhaps may be said in convincing Men of their Errors or Mistakes yet still it fails our Reason in that part which if not its highest perfection is yet certainly its hardest Task and that which we must need its help in and that is The finding out of Proofs and making new Discoveries This way of Reasoning discovers no new proofs but is the Art of Marshalling and Ranging the old ones we have already A Man knows first and then he is able to prove Syllogistically so that Syllogism comes after Knowledge and then a Man has little or no need of it But it is chiefly by the finding out those Ideas that shew the Connexion of distant ones that our stock of Knowledge is increased and that useful Arts and Sciences are advanced Reason Thô of a very large Extent fails us in several Instances as First Where our Ideas fail Secondly It is often at a loss because of the Obscurity Confusion or Imperfection of the Ideas it is employed about Thus having no perfect Idea of the least Extension of Matter nor of Infinity we are at a loss about the Divisibility of Matter Thirdly Our Reason is often at a stand because it perceives not those Ideas which would serve to shew the certain or probable Agreement or Disagreement of any two other Ideas Fourthly Our Reason is often engaged in Absurdities and Difficulties by proceeding upon false Principles which being followed lead Men into Contradictions to themselves and inconsistancy in their own Thoughts Fifthly Dubious Words and uncertain Signs often puzzle Mens Reason and bring them to a Non-plus In Reasoning Men ordinarily use Four sorts of Arguments The First is to alledge the Opinions of Men whose Parts Learning Eminency Power or some other Cause has gained a Name and settled their Reputation in the common Esteem with some kind of Authority This may be called Argumentum ad Verecundiam Secondly Another way is to require the Adversary to admit what they alledge as a proof or to assign a better This I call Argumentum ad Ignorantiam A Third way is to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles or Concessions This is already known under the name of Argumentum ad hominem Fourthly The using of Proofs drawn from any of the foundations of Knowledge or Probability This I call Argumentum ad Judicium This alone of all the Four brings true Instruction with it and advances us in our way to Knowledge For First It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right because I out of respect or any other consideration but that of Conviction will not contradict him Secondly It proves not another Man to be in the right way nor that I ought to take the same with him because I know not a better Thirdly Nor does it follow that another Man is in the right way because he has shewn me that I am in the wrong This may dispose me perhaps for the reception of Truth but helps me not to it that must come from Proofs and Arguments and Light arising from the nature of Things themselves not from my shame facedness Ignorance or Error By what has been said of Reason we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of Things into those that are according to above and contrary to Reason According to Reason are such Propositions whose Truth we can discover by examining and tracing those Ideas we have from Sensation and Reflection and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable Above Reason are such Propositions whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles Contrary to Reason are such Propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct Ideas Thus the Existence of one God is according to Reason the Existence of more than one God contrary to Reason the Resurrection of the Body after Death above Reason Above Reason may be also taken in a double Sense viz. Above Probability or Above Certainty In that large Sense also Contrary to Reason is I suppose sometimes taken There is another use of the word Reason wherein it is opposed to Faith which thô authorized by common use yet is it in it self a very improper way of Speaking For Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind which if it be regulated as is our Duty cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good Reason and so cannot be opposite to it He that believes without having any Reason for believing may be in love with his own Fancies but neither seeks Truth as he ought nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him to keep him out of Mistake and Error But since Reason and Faith are by some Men opposed we will so consider them in the following Chapter CHAP XVIII Of Faith and Reason and their distinct Provinces REason as contra-distinguished to Faith I take to be the discovery of the Certainty or
Probability of such Propositions or Truths which the Mind arrives at by deductions made from such Ideas which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties viz. by Sensation or Reflection Faith on the other side is the Assent to any Proposition upon the credit of the Proposer as coming immediately from God which we call Revelation concerning which we must observe First That no Man inspired by God can by any Revelation communicate to others any new Simple Ideas which they had not before from Sensation or Reflection Because Words by their immediate Operation on us cannot cause other Ideas but of their natural Sounds and such as Custom has annexed to them which to us they have been wont to be signs of but cannot introduce any new and formerly unknown Simple Ideas The same holds in all other Signs which cannot signify to us Things of which we have never before had any Idea at all For our Simple Ideas we must depend wholly on our natural Faculties and can by no means receive them from Traditional Revelation I say Traditional in distinction to Original Revelation By the One I mean that impression which is made immediately by God on the Mind of any Man to which we cannot set any bounds And by the Other those Impressions delivered over to others in Words and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another Secondly I say that the same Truths may be discovered by Revelation which are discoverable to us by Reason but in such there is little need or use of Revelation God having furnished us with natural means to arrive at the knowledge of them and Truths discovered by our natural Faculties are more certain than when conveyed to us by Traditional Revelation For the Knowledge we have that this Revelation came at first from God can never be so sure as the Knowledge we have from our own clear and distinct Ideas Thâ—s also holds in matters of Fact knowâ—â—le by our Senses as the History of the Deluge is conveyed to us by Writings which had their Orignal from Revelation and yet no boâ—y I think will say he has as certain and clear Knowledge of the Flood as Noah that saw it or that he himself would have had had he then been alive and seen it For he has no greater assurance than that of his Senses that it is writ in the Book supposed to be writ by Moses inspired But he has not so great an assurance that Moses writ that Book as if he had seen Moses write it so that the assurance of its being a Revelation is still less than our assurance of his Senses Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of Reason For since no evidence of our Faculties by which we receive such a Revelation can exceed if equal the Certainty of our Intuitive Knowledge we can never receive for a Truth any that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge The Ideas of One Body and One Place do so clearly agree that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms the same Body to be in two distinct places at once however it should pretend to the Authority of a Divine Revelation Since the Evidence First That we deceive not our Selves in ascribing it to God Secondly That we understand it right can never be so great as the Evidence of our own Intuitive Knowledge whereby we discern it impossible for the same Body to be in two places at once In Propositions therefore contrary to our distinct and clear Ideas it will be in vain to urge them as matters of Faith For Faith can never convince us of any thing that contradicts out Knowledge Because thô Faith be founded upon the Testimony of God who cannot lye yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a Divine Revelation greater than our own Knowledge For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer Evidence of any thing to be a Divine Revelation than it has of the Principles of its own Reason it can never have a ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reason to give place to a Proposition whose Revelation has not a greater Evidence than those Principles have In all things therefore where we have clear Evidence from our Ideas and the Principles of Knowledge above-mentioned Reason is the proper Judge and Revelation cannot in such cases invalidate its Decrees nor can we be obliged where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reason to quit it for the contrary Opinion under a pretence that it is Matter of Faith which can have no Authority against the plain and clear dictates of Reason But Thirdly There being many Things of which we have but imperfect Notions or none at all and other things of whose past present or future Existence by the natural use of our Faculties we can have no knowledge at all These being beyond the discovery of our Faculties and above Reason when revealed become the proper matter of Faith Thus that part of the Angels rebelled against God that the Bodies of Men shall rise and live again and the like are purely matters of Faith with which Reason has directly nothing to do First then Whatever Proposition is revealed of whose Truth our Mind by its natural Faculties and Notions cannot judge that is purely Mater of Faith and above Reason Secondly All Propositions whereof the Mind by its natural Faculties can come to determine and judge from natural acquired Ideas are Matter of Reason but with this difference that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence and so is perswaded of their Truth only upon probable grounds in such I say an Evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent even against Probability Because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive But yet it still belongs to Reason to judge of the truth of its being a Revelation and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered Thus far the Dominion of Faith reaches and that without any violence to Reason which is not injured or disturbed but assisted and improved by new discoveries of Truth coming from the Eternal Fountain of all Knowledge Whatever God hath Revealed is certainly true no doubt can be made of it This is the proper object of Faith But whether it be a Divine Revelation or no Reason must judge which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident nor prefer less Certainty to the greater There can be no Evidence that any Traditional Revelation is of Divine Original in the words we receive it and the Sense we understand it so clear and so certain as those of the Principles of Reason and therefore Nothing that is contrary to the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason has a right to be