them and proceed to action upon that consent Now this knowledge is the most eminent part of deeming and of all our acquisitions the most inseparable from us and indeed in rigour it is absolutely inseparable by direct means however peradventure by indirect means it may be separated Let us then consider how we attain to it and how sometimes we fail in the purchase of it and what degrees of assurance or of probability there are between It and Error To this intent we may observe that the greatest assurance and most eminent knowledge we can have of any thing is of such Propositions as in the Schools are call'd Identical as if one should say John is John or a man is a man for the truth of these propositions is so evident and clear as it is impossible any man should doubt of them if he understand what he saies and if we should meet with one that were not satisfied of the verity of them we would not go about to prove them to him but only apply our selvs to make him reflect on the words he speaks without using any further industry to gain his assent therto Which is a manifest sign that in such Propositions the apprehending or understanding them is the same thing as to know and consent unto them or at the least that they are so necessarily conjoyn'd as the one follows immediately out of the other without needing any other cause to promote this effect more than that a man be disposed and willing to see the truth So as we may conclude that to understand a Proposition which carries its evidence with it is to know it And by the same reason though the evidence of a Proposition should not at first sight be presently obvious to us yet if with unfolding and explicating it we come at length to discern it the apprehending of it is the knowing it We must therfore enquire what it is that causes this evidence And to that purpurpose reflecting upon those instances we have given of Identical Propositions we may in them observe that evidence arises out of the plain Identification of the extremes that are affirm'd of one another so that in what Proposition soever the Identification of the extreme is plain the truth of it is evident to us and our mind is satisfi'd and at quiet as being assured that it knows it to be so as the words say it Now all affirmative Propositions by their form import an Identification of their extremes for they all agree in saying This is that Yet they are not all alike in the evidence of their Identification for in some it shews it self plainly without needing any further help to discover it and those are without any more ado known of themselvs as such Identical sayings we even now gave for examples others require a journey somwhat further about to shew their Identification Which if it be not so hidden but that it may in the end be discover'd and brought to light as soon as that is done the knowledge setled by them in the Soul is certain and satisfactory as well as the other but if it be so obscure that we cannot display the Identification of it then our mind suspends his assent and iâ— unquiet about it and doubts of the truth of it In some Propositions whiles he searches and enquires after the Identification of their extremes peradventure he discerns that it is impossible there should be any between them and then on the other side he is satisfi'd of the falsity of them for if a Proposition be affirmative it must necessarily be a false one if there be no Identification between the extremes of it By this discourse we have found two sorts of Propositions which beget knowledge in us One where the Identification of the extremes is of it self so manifest that when they are but explicated it needs no further proof The other where though in truth they be Identifi'd yet the Identification appears not so clear but that some Discourse is required to satisfy the understanding therin Of the first kind are such Propositions as make one of the extremes the Definition of the other wherof it is affirm'd as when we say A man is a reasonable Creature which is so evident if we understand what is meant by a Man and what by a Reasonable Creature as it needs no further proof to make us know it And knowledge is begotten in us not only by a perfect Identification of the extremes but as well by an imperfect one as when what is said of another is but part of its definition for example if one should say a man is a creature no body that knows him to be a rational creature which is his complete definition could doubt of his being a creature because the being a Creature is partly Identifi'd to being a rational creature In like manner this obvious evidence of Identification appears as well where a compleat Division of a thing is affirm'd of the other extreme as where that affirmation is made by the totall or partial Definition of it as when we say Number is Even or Odd an Enuntiation is True or False and the like where because what is said comprises the differences of the thing whereof it is said 't is plain that one of them must needs be that wherof we speak Peradventure some may expect that we should give Identical Propositions among others for examples of this plain evidence but because they bring no acquisition of new knowledge to the Soul the doing of which and reflecting on the manner is the scope of this Chapter I let them pass without any further mention having produced them once before only to shew by an undeniable example what it is that makes our Soul consent to an enunciation and how knowledg is begotten in her that we might afterwards apply the force of it to other Propositions Let us therfore proceed to the second sort of Propositions which require some Discourse to prove the Identification of their Extreams Now the scope of such Discourse is by comparing them to some other third thing to shew their Identification between themselvs for it shews that each of them apart is identified with that new subject it brings in and then our understanding is satisfied of their identity and our Soul secure of that knowledg it thus acquires as well as it is of that which results out of those Propositions which bear their evidence in their first aspect This negotiation of the understanding to discover the truth of Propositions when it is somwhat hidden which we call Discourse as it is one of the chiefest noblest actions of the Soul So it challenges a very heedful inspection into it and therfore we will allow it a peculiar Chapter by it self to explicate the nature and particularities of it But this little we now have said concerning it is sufficient for this place where all we aim at is to prove and I conceive we have done it very fully that
when Identity between two or more things Presents it self to our understanding it makes forces knowledg in our Soul Whence is manifest that the same power or Soul which in a Single Apprehension is possessed with the Entity or Unity of it is that very power or Soul which apply'd to Enuntiation knows or deemes knowing is nothing else but the Apprehending of manifest Identity in the extreams of Proposition or an effect immediately consequent out of it in the Soul that applyes it self to apprehend that Identity Which apprehension is made either by the force of the extreams apply'd immediately to one another or else by the application of them to some other thing which peradventure may require yet a further application to new apprehensions to make the Identity between the first extreams appear evidently Now as when Identity truly appears it makes evidence to our understanding and begets assured knowledge in our Soul so when there is only an apparent Identity but not a real one it happens that the understanding is quieted without evidence and our Soul is fraught with a wrong or slight belief instead of certain knowledg As for example 't is for the most part true that what Wise Men affirm is so as they say but because wise men are but men consequently not infallible it may happen that in some one thing the wisest men that are may miss though in most generally speaking they hit right Now if any one in a particular occasion should without examining the matter take this proposition rigorously and peremptorily that What wise men affirm is true and ther upon subsume with evidence that Wise men say such a particular thing and should thence proceed to believe it in this case he may be deceiv'd because the first proposition is not verily but only seemingly evident And this is the manner how that kind of deeming which is either opposed or inferiour to knowledg is bred in us to wit when either through temerity in such cases where we may it is just we should examine all particulars so carefully that no equivocation or mistake in any part of them be admitted to pass upon us for a truth and yet we do not or else through the limitedness imperfection of our nature when the minuteness variety of petty circumstances in a business is such as we cannot enter into an exact examination of all that belongs to that matter for if we should exactly discuss every slight particular we should never get through any thing of moment we settle our understanding upon grounds that are not sufficient to move determine it Now in some of these cases particularly in the later it may happen that the understanding it self is aware that it neither hath discover'd nor can discover evidence enough to settle its assent with absolute assurance and then it judges the belief it affords such a proposition to be but probable instead of knowledg hath but opinion concerning it Which Opinion appears to it more or less probable according as the motives it relyes on are stronger and weaker There remains yet another kind of deeming for us to speak of which though it ever fail of Evidence yet somtimes 't is better than Opinion for somtimes it brings certitude with it This we call Faith and it is bred thus when we meet with a man who knows somthing we do not if withal we be perswaded that he neither doth nor will tell a lye we then believe what he saith of that thing to be true Now according to the perswasion we have of his knowledge and veracity our belief is strong or mingled with doubt So that if we have absolute assurance and certainty that he knows the truth and will not lye then we may be assured that the faith we yield to what he saith is Certain as well as Evident Knowledge is Certain and admits no comparison with Opinion be it never so probable But so it may happen that we may be certainly assured that a man knows the truth of what he speaks and that he will not lye in reporting it to us for seeing no man is wicked without a cause that to tell a lye in a serious matter is a great wickedness If once we come to be certain that he hath no causes as it may fall out we may then it follows that we are assured of the thing which he reports to us Yet still such Faith falls short of the evidence of knowledg in this regard that its evidence sticks one degree on this side the thing it self and at the push in such a case we see but with anothers eyes and consequently if any opposition arise against our thought therabout 't is not the beams and light of the thing it self which strengthen us against such opposition but the goodness of the party upon whom we rely Before I goe any further I must needs remember one thing that our Masters teach us which is that Truth and Falshood are first found in Sayings or Enuntiations and that although Single Apprehensions are in our mind before these judgments yet are they not true or false themselvs nor is the understanding so by them To comprehend the reason of this maxime let us consider what truth and falshood are Surely Truth is nothing else but the conformity of the understanding with the things that make impression upon it and consequently Falshood is a disagreeing between our mind and those things If the Existence which the things have in us be agreeable to the Existence they have in themselvs then our Understanding is true otherwise it is false Now the natural perfection of our Soul or understanding is to be fraught with the rest of the whole World that is to have the knowledge of all things that are the knowledg of their essences natures proprieties operations and of whatever else belongs to them all in general and every one in particular but our Soul cannot be stored or fraught with any thing by other means then by her assent or deeming whence it follows that she cannot have her perfection till her deemings or judgments be perfect that is be agreeable to things in the world when they are so then are they true And this is the reason why Truth is the aim and perfection of the Soul Now then truth residing only in the assents and judgments of the Soul which are the traffick wherby she inriches her self with the rest of the world and they being framed by her discerning an Identity between two things which she expresses by affirming one of them of the other it follows that nothing can be true or false but where there is a composition of two extreams made by the ones being affirm'd of the other which is done only in Enuntiacions or judgments Whiles Single Apprehension assent to nothing and therfore settle no knowledge in the Soul and consequently are not capable of verity or falsity but are like Pictures
it is handled and on occasion return a look back upon it when it may stand him in stead If he thinks this diligence too burthensom let him consider that the writing hereof has cost the Author much more pains Who as he will esteem them exceedingly well employ'd if they may contribute ought to the content or advantage of any free and ingenuous mind so if any others shall express a neglect of what he has with so much labour hew'd out of the hard Rock of Nature or shall discourteously cavil at the Notions he so freely imparts to them all the resentment he shall make therof will be to desire the first to consider that their slight esteem of his Work obliges them to entertain their thoughts with some more noble and more profitable subject and better treated than this is and the Later sort to justifie their dislike of his doctrine by delivering a fairer and more complete body of Philosphy of their own Which if hereupon they do his being the occasion of the ones bettering themselvs and of the others bettering the world will be the best success he can wish his Book To Sir KENELME DIGBY ON His two Incomparable Treatises OF PHILOSOPHY TRuth 's numerous Proselytes in such pompous state With captiv'd judgments on your Triumph wait And mov'd by your clear Copy Wits so rare Blot out their former notions to write fair That 't were a needless duty to set forth In paper-gageants your soul-conquering worth Nor may Truth 's Champion admit a Muse Who feigns his commendation 's but abuse Unless Lucretius had bequeath'd to me His the sworn Maid to Dame Philosophy Yet ther 's a Law of gratitude which says He must pay thanks who may not offer praise When with your work you entertain'd my mind I was your Guest there I at once did find A Banquet and a Meal solid and sweet The rarely mingled in one dish did meet Such diet sure had Mankind scap't offence Had bin his meat i th' State of Ignorance And now I here give thanks which who 'll not give Who your perpetual Boarder means to live The reading your expressions forc't me speak A fancy thus charg'd needs must silence break Wherefore as Brooks to th' Sea return their streams I only here reflect your borrow'd beams Clear-faced Truth that rare unbodied light Sun to our souls wrap't in a sin-caus'd night Of ignorance who from her radiant face Darted forth nought but day had found no place In Nature's Lordships had not you in fine Plac't th' obscur'd Goddess in a Chrystal shrine We stood like men ere they begin the Mask Whose wit doth only serve to doubt and ask Untill your courteous hand remov'd the Screen Withdrew the curtains and reveal'd Truth 's Scene Some quite despairing in her quest did say She in Astraea's Coach was flown away Some said that Nature's work on purpose ti'd Like to the Gordian knot did â—ub'tly hide It's causes and effects none could unty't As if contriv'd to puzzle not delight But most avouch 't Truth in her old pit lay And our Cleantheses did oft assay With huge-long-Cart-rope Arguments to draw Her upwards with their Logick-clunched paw Bur ah their Syllogistick links all brake Yet th' obstinate peece would not her hole forsake Until your Silken Linos or deep Wit whether Reason'd not brawl'd her thence woo'd her hither Trim'd up thus natively she scorns the nighr Nor fears t'intrust her beauty to the light She through your Amber words doth brighter shine Like those in Heav'n at once both nak't and fine Clad in such Tiffany-language she grows proud To see her self in Cloathing without Cloud The Schools drest her in Linsy-Woolsy words A stile not spun of threds but writh'd of cords Expressive barbarisms fancy-woven air Whose uncouth moustrousness would make one stare An antick weed patch't up as they shall please Of Unionss Moods and Senoreities Who if they do not Priscian the disgrace To break his head they fouly scratch his face Tor'tring poor innocent Grammar to confess The truth they hide by their dark wordishness But no such stuff your noble Treatise wears It neither injures Languages nor ears Yours is a Flower-pot pav'd by Truth 's rich Gold While they in Dunghils rake for th' precious mold Your Stile 's both pure and gallant in such sort Iâ— makes the Schools speak finer than the Court With such enlihtning Metaphor as teach What sense-deluded fancy could not reach Such moving Rhetorick needs no Truth desire Such conquering Truths no Rhetorick's aid require Yet here both joyntl ' embrace as if it was Truth 's Legend writ by Sun-beams on clear Glass So that your Work all points of art affords Where equally are learn'd neat Truths true Words Fancy our Moon as Reason is our Sun Which wax't and wan'd still as she wandring run Whose visage with unconstant Aspects shone Now shuffling many things now cutting one Is taught at once 'to acknowledge and correct Her fault which gull'd the credulous Intellect And now at length is shown her double errour In the smooth steady Glass of Reason's mirrour Here Words whose whistle call'd us oft awry Are taught their Origin true sense and why Blind Prejudice cur'd by a blest amaze Opes wide her sullen eyes and stands at gaze All what the Universal Womb doth spawn Is by your Pen thence to the Life out-drawn Your Grounds are firm and sure who stirs the same May shake the World's or stronger Reason's frame Nature asserts them whose Daedalean hand Changing Particulars makes your Generals stand Here we may learn the antientest Descents And the cross Marriage of the Elements Whence Nature's numerous Family is bred In Kindred's different lines distinguished You show the secret gins the springs and wires Which the vast Engine 's motion requires You nought suppose but start your early quest Where Phoenix Nature first doth build her Nest Thence trace her laying hatching until she Brings her raw Embryo to maturity The sprouting Sap we without fiction see Creepingly metamorphos'd to a Tree We see how Eggs yield Flesh and Bone and Blood Like creatures peece-meal shap't in Nile's fat mud Our quivering grounds might have driv'n some perforce To believe A sop and grant beasts discourse Had not your Art the pretty Knack unscrew'd And it's wheeles driv'n by bloud in order shew'd Now their strange actions we may freel admire Yet not about an hidden Soul enquire No more than once Architas ' wooden Dove Ask't an Intelligence to make it move Imaginary Uacuums which are New terms for nothings emptier than air With Moods and Qualities now pack away To lurk at home in Terr' Incognita Crab'd Aristotle who did make 't his sporr Industrious wits should his obscureness court Whom like a darksome Cave none durst adventure Without a Lantern and a Guide to enter Your grounds enlightning him doth easier sound As Hebrew Conso'nants when the Points were found The Soul of Man that intellectual All Whose recreation is the World 's great Ball
Reading her self at large here doth descry An object worthy her far-spreading eye And of her nature such true notions frame That she salutes her self with a new name Here she may scan her Thoughts view either State How link't to matter how when Separate Through Fancie's glass her noble Essence spy A shoreless Sea of Immortality In which unbounded Main you sail so fast Till you both lose and find your self at last Yet Sir you 'r justly accused by this age Plain truths in difficulties to engage What needed you to such nice cost proceed A Quality at first word had done the deed But you may nobly pity them and grant Nought's easier than to be ignorant They take the surface of the doubt while you Laboriously first pierce then dig it through In moving questions Talk not Truth 's their aim As Lords start Hares not for the prey but game They spring then stoop at some slight Butter-fly Thus some in hunting only love the Cry This is the utmost art with which they 're stor'd To call Truth some unanswerable word Which holds the field untill some active wit Working at Fanci's mintage chance to hit Upon a quainter which cuts that in twain And triumphs till a third cleaves it again Thus these Tenedian Axes hew each other Like Cadmu's armed crop each slays his brother Since with Distinctions they so nicely pare They subtilize it quite away to air These Authors yet voluminously-vain Stuff Libraries With Monsters of their brain Whose fruitless toil is but the same or less To plant bryar-fields t' enlarge a wilderness How hard to rectifie that ravell'd clue On your own bottom winding't up a new Yet this you did by th'guidance of his light Who was your Plato you his Stagyrite Save that his Doctrine's such you could invent In Truth 's behalf no reason to dissent Even That Great Soul which fathoms th' Universe Doth to the center Natures entrails pierce Girdles the World and as a pair of beads On Reason's link the Starry bodies threads Uuspells the Heaven's broad volume views so clear Of active Angels th' higher Hemisphere And this of Bodies 'cause he first begun His search by studying Man their Horizon Whom Heaven reserves Divinity to weed From Words o'regrowing the Diviner Seed To use your own 'cause no expression's higher These sparks you kindled at his great fire And round about in thorow-light papers hurl'd Will shortly enlighten and enflame a World Iohn Serjeant FIRST TREATISE DECLARING THE NATURE and OPERATION OF BODIES CHAP. I. A Preamble to the whole discourse Concerning Notions in general IN delivering any Science the clearest and smoothest Method and most agreeable to Nature is to begin with the consideration of those things that are most Common and obvious and by the dissection of them to descend by orderly degrees and Sâ—epps as they lye in the way to the examination of the most Particular and remote ones Now in our present intended Survey of a Body the first thing which occurs to our Sense in the perusal of it is its Quantity bulk or magnitude And this seems to be conceiv'd by all Mankind so inseparable from a Body as that when a man would distinguish a Corporeal Substance from a Spiritual one which is accounted indivisible he naturally pitches on an apprehension of its having bulk and being solid tangible and apt to make impression on our outward senses according to that expression of Lucretius who studying Nature in a familiar and rational manner tells us Tangere enim tangi nisi Câ—rpus nulla potest res And therfore in our inquiry of Bodies we will observe that plain Method which Nature teaches us and begin with examining what Quantity is as being their first and primary affection and that which makes the things we treat of be what we intend to signifie by the name of Body But because there is a great 〈◊〉 of Apprehensions framed by learned men of the nature of Quantity though indeed nothing can be more plain and simple then it is in it self I conceive it will not be amiss before we enter into the explication of it to consider how the mystery of discoursing and expressing our Thoughts to one another by Words a prerogative belonging only to Man is order'd and govern'd among us that so we may avoyd those rocks which many and for the most part such as think they spin the finest threds suffer shipwrack against in their subtilest discourses The most dangerous of all which assuredly is when they confound the true and real Natures of things with the Conceptions they frame of them in their own minds By which fundamental miscarriage of their reasoning they fall into great errours and absurdities and whatever they build on so ruinous a foundation proves but useless cobwebs or prodigious Chymaeras 'T is true words serve to express things but if you observe the matter well you will perceive they do so onely according to the Pictures we make of them in our own thoughts and not according as the Things are in their proper natures Which is very reasonable it should be so since the Soul that gives the Names has nothing of the things in her but these Notions and knows not the Things otherwise then by these Notions and therefore cannot give other Names but such as must signifie the Things by mediation of these Notions In the Things all that belongs to them is comprised under one entire Entity but in Us there are fram'd as many several distinct formal Conceptions as that one Thing shews it self to us with different faces Every one of which conceptions seems to have for its object a distinct Thing because the Conception it self is as much sever'd and distinguish'd from another Conception or Image arising out of the very same Thing that begot this as it can be from any image painted in the understanding by an absolutely other Thing It will not be amiss to illustrate this matter by some familiar Example Imagin I have an Apple in my hand the same Fruit works different effects upon my several Senses my Eye tells me 't is green or red my Nose that it hath a mellow scent my Taste that it is sweet and my Hand that it is cold and weighty My Senses thus affected send messengers to my Phantasie with news of the discoveries they have made and there all of them make them several and distinct pictures of what enters by their doors So that my Reason which discourses on what it finds in my phantasie can consider greenness by it self or mellowness or sweetness or coldness or any other quality whatever singly and alone by it self without relation to any other that is painted in me by the same Apple in which none of these have any distinction at all but are one and the same Substance of the Apple that makes various and different impressions on me according to the various dispositions of my several Senses as hereafter we shall explicate at large But
again into the phantasie they move likewise successively So that in truth all our memory will be of motion or at least of bodies in motion yet it is not chiefly of motion but of the things that are moved unless it be when we remember words and how those motions frame bodies which move in the brain we have already touched CHAP. XXXIII Of Memory BUt how are these things conserv'd in the brain And how do they revive in the phantasie the same motions by which they came in thither at the first Monsir des Cartes hath put us in hope of an explication and where I so happy as to have seen that work of his which the world of learned men so much longs for I assure my self I should herein receive great help and furtherance by it Although with all I must profess I cannot understand how it is possible that any determinate motion should long be preserv'd untainted in the brain where there must be such a multitude of other motions in the way to mingle with it and bring all into confusion One day I hope this Jewel will be exposed to publique view both to do the Author right and to instruct the World In the mean time let us see what our own Principles afford us We have resolv'd that Sensation is not a pure driving of the animal Spirits or of some penetrable body in which they swim against that part of the brain where knowledge resides but that it is indeed the driving thither of solid material bodies exceeding little ones that come from the Objects themselvs Which position if it be true it follows that these bodies must rebound from thence upon other parts of the brain where at length they find some vacant Cell in which they keep their Ranks and Files in great quiet and order all such sticking together and keeping company with one another that enter'd in together and there they lye still and are at rest till they be stir'd up either by the natural appetite which is the ordinary course of Beasts or by chance or by the will of the Man in whom they are upon the occasions he meets with of searching into them Any of these three Causes raises them up and gives them the motion that is proper to them which is the same with that wherby they came in at the first for as Galilaeus teaches us every body hath a particular motion peculiarly proper to it when nothing diverts it and then they slide successively through the phantasie in the same manner as when they presented themselvs to it the first time After which if it require them no more they return gently to their quiet habitation in some other part of the brain from whence they were call'd and summon'd by the phantasies messengers the Spirits but if it have longer use of them and would view them better then once passing-through permits then they are turn'd back again and lead a new over their course as often as is requisite like a Horse that a Rider paces sundry times along by him that he shews him to whiles he is attentive to mark every part and motion in him But let us examine a little more particularly how the Causes we have assign'd raise these bodies that rest in the memory and bring them to the phantasie The middlemost of them namely Chance needs no looking into because the principles that govern it are uncertain ones But the first and the last which are the Appetite and the Will have a power which we will explicate hereafter of moving the brain and the nerves depending of it conveniently and agreeably to their disposition Out of which it follows that the little similitudes in the caves of the brain wealing and swimming about almost in such sort as you see in the washing of Currants or of Rice by the winding about and circular turning of of the Cooks hand divers sorts of bodies go their courses for a pretty while so that the most ordinary objects cannot choose but present themselves quickly because there are many of them and are every where scatter'd about but others that are fewer are longer ere they come in view much like as in a pair of Beads that containing more little ones then great ones if you pluck to you the string they all hang upon you shall meet with many more of one sort then of the other Now as soon as the brain hath lighted on any of those it seeks for it puts as it were a stop upon the motion of that or at least it moves it so that it goes not far away and is revocable at will and seems like a bait to draw into the fantasie others belonging to the same thing either through similitude of nature or by their connexion in the impression and by this means hinders other objects not pertinent to the work the fansie hath in hand from offering themselves unseasonably in the multitudes that otherwise they would do But if the fansie should have mistaken on object for another by reason of some resemblance they have between themselves then it shakes again the liquid medium they all float in and rouse's every species lurking in remotest corners and runs over the whole Beadroul of them and continues this inquisition and motion till either it be satisfied with retriving at length what it required or that it be grown weary with tossing about the multitude of little inhabitants in its numerous empire and so gives over the search unwillingly and displeasedly Now that these things be as we have declared will appear out of the following considerations First we see that things of quite different natures if they come in together are remembred together upon which principle the whole art of memory dependeth Such things cannot any way be comprised under certain Heads nor be link'd together by order and consequence or by any resemblance to one another and therfore all their connexion must be that as they came in together into the fantasie so they remain together in the same place in the memory and their first coupling must proceed from the action that bound them together in driving them in together Next we may observe that when a man seeks and tumbles in his memory for any thing he would retrive he hath first some common and confused notion of it and somtimes he hath a kind of flasking or fading likeness of it much like as when in striving to remember a Name men use to say it is at their tongues end and this shews that he attracts those things he desires and hath use of by the likeness of somthing belonging to them In like manner when hunger makes one think of meat or thirst makes one dream of drink or in other such occasions wherin the natural appetite stirs objects in the memory and brings them to the fantasie 't is manifest that the spirits informing the brain of the defect and pain which several parts of the body do endure for want of their due
this end That we may live well wheras these immediately teach it These are the fruits in general that I hope may in some measure grow out of this discourse in the hands of equal and judicious Readers but the particular aim of it is to shew what actions can proceed from a Body and what cannot In the conduct wherof one of our chief endeavours has been to shew that those actions which seem to draw strongly into the order of bodies the unknown nature of certain Entities named Qualities either do or may proceed from the same causes which produce those known effects that all sides agree do not stand in need of any such mystical Phylosophy And this being the main hinge upon which hangs and moves the full and clear resolving of onr main and great question Of the immortallity of the Soul I assure my self the pains I have taken in this particular will not be deem'd superfluous or tedious and withall I hope I have employ'd th'em with so good succes as henceforward we shall not be any more troubled with objections drawn from their hidden and incomprehensible nature and that we stand upon even ground with those of the cnotrary opinion for since we have shew d how all actions may be perform'd among Bodies without having any recourse to such Entities and Qualities as they pretend and paint out to us 't is now their parts if they will have them admitted to prove that in nature there are such Having then brought the Phylosophy of Bodies to these terms that which remains for us to perform is to shew that those actions of our Souls for which we call her a Spirit are of such a nature as cannot be reduced to those principles by which all corporeal actions are effected For the proof of our original intent no more than this can be exacted at our hands so that if our positive proofs shall carry us yet beyond this it cannot be denyd but that we give over-measure and illustrate with a greater light what is already sufficiently discerned In our proceeding we have nature preceding as for laying for our ground the natural conceptions which mankind makes of Quantity we find that a Body is a meer passive thing consisting of divers parts which by motion may be diversly ordered and consequently that it is capable of no other change or operation than such as Motion may produce by various ordering the divers parts of it And then seeing that Rare and Dense is the primary and adequate division of Bodies it follows evidently that what cannot be effected by the various disposition of rare and dense parts cannot proceed or be effected by a pure body And consequently it will be sufficient for us to shew that the Motions of our Soules are such And they who will not agree to this conclusion must take upon them to shew that our first premise is defective by proving that other unknown ways are necessary for bodies to be wrought on or work by and that the motion and various ordering of rare and dense parts in them is not cause sufficient for the effects we see among them Which whoever shall attempt to do must remember he has this disadvantage before he begins that whatever has been hitherto discover'd 〈◊〉 the science of Bodies by the help either of Mathematicks or Physicks has all been resolvd and faln into this way which we declare Here I should set a period to all further discourse conceurning this first Treatise of Bodies did not I apprehend that the prejudice of Aristotle's Authority may dispose many to a harsh conceit of the draught we have made But if they knew how little reason they have to urge that against us they would not cry us down for contradicting that Oracle of nature not only because he himself both by word and example exhorts us when verity leads us another way to forsake the tracts which our Forefathers have beaten for us so we do it with respect and gratitude for the much they have left us nor yet because Christian Religion as it will not hear of any man purely such free from sin so it inclines to perswade us that no man can be exempt from errour and therfore it savours not well to defend peremptorily any mans sayings especially if they be many as uncontroulable howbeit I intend not to prejudice any person that to defend a worthy Authors honour shall indeavour to vindicate him from absurdities and gross errors nor lastly because it ever hath been the common practice of all grave Peripateticks and Thomists to leave their Masters some in one article some in another But indeed because the very truth is that the way we take is directly the same solid way which Aristotle walked in before us and they who are scandalised at us for leaving him are exceedingly mistaken in the matter and out of the sound of his words not rightly understood frame a wrong sense of the doctrine he hath left us which generally we follow Let any unpartial Aristotelian answer whether the conceptions we have delivered of Quantity of Rarity and Density of the four first Qualities of the combinations of the Elements of the repugnance of vacuities be not exactly and rigorously Aristotles Whether the motion of weighty and light things and of such as are forced be not by him as well as by us attributed to extern causes In which all the difference between us is that we enlarge our selvs to more particulars than he hath done Let any man read his Books of Generation and Corruption and say whether he doth not expresly teach that Mixtion which he delivers to be the generation or making of a mixt body is done por minima that is in our language and in one word by Atomes signifies that all the qualities which are natural ones following the composition of the Elements are made by the mingling of the least parts or atomes of the said Elements which is in effect to say that all the Nature of Bodies their Qualities and their Operations are compassed by the mingling of atomes the shewing and explicating of which hath been our labour in this whole Treatise Let him read his Books of Meteors and judg whether he doth not give the causes of all the effects he treats of there by mingling and separating of great and little gross and subtile fiery and watery aiery and earthy parts just as we do The same he doth in his Problems and in his Perva naturalia and in all other places wherever he hath occasion to render Physically the causes of Physical effects The same do Hippocrates and Galen the same their Master Democritus and with them the best sort of Physicians The same do Alchymists with their Master Geber whose Maxime to this purpose we cited above the same do all natural Philosophers either antient Commentators on Aristotle or modern enquirers into natural effects in a sensible and understandable way as who will take the paines to look into them will