and effective as the first By first and Second Notions I both understand Terms or Words and the Notions signified by them 27. So much for the Object of Apprehension which is Sense and Notion and for the Grounds of that Object which is Sentiment Now for the Affections of Apprehension if a good one and they are two namely Cleerness and Distinctness 28. Cleerness of Apprehension which is in the Minde the same that Cleerness of Seeing is in the Eye is opposed to Obscurity and Darkness and presupposes Light 29. Light is that which manifests and consequently Intellectual Light is that means whereby the Understanding comes to See and Apprehend its Objects or that which manifests them to it and is either Light of Revelation which is also called Light of Faith or Light of Nature which is also called Light of Reason where Reason is Appropriately taken and most strictly 30. The Light of Revelation is that Discovery or Manifestation God himself is pleased to make of things by his Spirit and is chiefly in the Holy Scriptures The Light of Nature is All other Light whatever but that of Revelation whereby we See and Apprehend things and is that we have by Sense and Discourse 31. Some things there are that may be seen in both Lights in that of Nature and that of Revelation though more cleerly in the latter than in the former as that God is Good and that he is the Maker and Conserver and supreme Director of All things Other things are onely to be seen in the Light of Revelation being of a nature not to be discovered but in and by it as the Mysteries of Christian Religion the Doctrine of the Trinity the Incarnation of God c. 32. The Lights of Faith and Nature of Revelation and Reason though they be not the same yet are not contrary I mean that what is shewn or seen to be true in one Light can never be shewn or seen to be false in the other What is Apprehended by Sense rightly circumstanced and condition'd to be This or to be That or else by Reason rightly acting to be so or so it is never contradicted by Revelation Things are nothing to a man but as they stand in his Analogie for him to believe against his Faculties is to believe a Contradiction If in the Holy Sacrament of the Lord's Supper the Elements first and last are Bread and Wine to Sense and to Reason judging according to Sense I cannot hold my self obliged by any Revelation to believe them Flesh and Blood but in a Notion consistent with the judgment Sense and Reason make of them that is not flesh and blood substantially but sacramentally not flesh and blood really but only by signification Else Truth might be Incongruity Inconsistency Transubstantiation is to me a Mystery I am so far from making truth of it that I cannot make any sense of it I might as well believe that two and two make not four or three and three six as that it is not Bread or Wine which to my Eye my Taste my Touch in a word which being an Object of Sense to all Examinations of my Sense is so What is against Sense is against Knowledge 33. An Object onely to be seen by the Light of Faith may be said to be seen by Reason above Reason by Reason assisted with the Light of Revelation above Reason not so assisted but acting onely by the Aids of Nature but still it is Reason sees in both As I can see an Object with a Tube that with my naked and unarmed Eye I cannot or see in the Sun-light an Object that I cannot by Moon-light but still it is the Eye that sees in both the Organ is the same although the Lights be not It is the same Reason and Understanding the same Faculty that sees in the Light of Revelation as it is that sees by the Light of Nature and the same that Argues and Discourses in the one as by the other 34. The great Designe of God in all the Doctrines and even in the highest and most sublime Mysteries of our Religion is to affect the hearts of men and therefore as 1. He represents and reveals them in first Notions so 2. He also doth it in sensible and comparative ones and usually 3. He representeth one thing by many Notions 1. To make it more Affective and withal 2. to signifie that no one Notion he represents the thing in is adequate and just to it Thus he represents the great Mystery of our Union unto Christ and our Communion with him by that between the Vine and Branches between the Husband and Wife between the Head and Members As also the great work of Conversion that passes upon Men in the change he makes on them from their Darkness into his most marvellous Light He compares it to Generation to Adoption to Creation In fine the New Covenant is not only stiled a Covenant but also a Testament and a Promise All which resembling and comparative expressions may and ought to be employed and used for the apprehending of the things they are designed to signifie and the making of them more affective but neither of them so to be insisted on as if it were adequate or just 35. The Light of Faith and Revelation must not be confounded with that of Reason and Nature I mean we ought not to consider points of mere Revelation in the light of mere natural Reason Spiritual things cannot be discern'd but spiritually and therefore must not be compared but with Spirituals In Points of mere Revelation we ought entirely to confine our selves to the Notions Comparisons Similitudes and Representations God himself hath made of them without pretending to be wise above what is written and to say or understand just how in themselves the things are abstractly from the Dresses Revelation puts them in 36. He that pretends to understand the Mysteries of Christian Religion or any Point of meer Revelation stript of those Notions Resemblances and Comparisons when they be not revealed or discovered but in them as he looketh not on these things in the Light of Faith and Revelation but in that of Reason or Nature so not looking on them in their own Genuine and Proper Light no wonder if he either erre or trifle about them 37. Justly liable to this Reproof I judge them that are not content to think and speak of God the proper Object as well as Author of Revelation in that manner that he speaks of himself who Reveals himself to us men in Analogous and Comparative Notions not in such as adequate and adjust him but such as do proportion and suit with us as if he had an Understanding Will and Affections and did purpose Ends and elected Means to compass them did consult and decree and were touched with the Affections of Joy Grief Love Hatred Anger Revenge c. 38. They that tell us that he is not angry that Revenge is an Imperfection not to be imputed to him and
the King-Key unlocking all the Mysteries of Nature The Great Creator framed all things in the Universe in Number Weight and Measure Extremes in it are united by participating Middles and in the whole System there is so admirable Uniformity as ravishes every one that beholds it every thing in its place is aptly knit with what is next it and all together into one most regular Frame of most exact Proportions Every thing we look on affords Examples and Galen in his Books of the use of Parts has a Thousand to whom if in so plain a matter it be necessary I remit the Learned Reader 80. And 't is a common sense that what is congruous is true and what is true is congruous so common that none ever fancied any notion of Truth but in Congruity some School-men in Congruity to the Divine Intellect Others in Congruity to our Faculties and all men though they speak not out and it may be minde not that they do so in Consistence and Congruity of things with one another all generally concluding that Narration for instance to be probable which seems consistent and Probability being appearance of Truth if what seems consistent be probable what is so is true But to give a Mechanical instance one that would repair a broken China-dish or make up a Watch or other Engine taken abroad what Measures doth he naturally take to do so what Rule proceeds he by None verily but by that of Congruity he makes no question but that when he hath found a place for every part wherein it lies consistently and aptly with others so that in the whole there is exact Coherence and Congruity no Flaw no Unanswerableness it is truely set together and every part in its place Truth is Harmony 81. And seeing Truth is Harmony and the Universe it self as it consists in our Analogy is but one System it follows that properly there is but one Science which some will call Pansophy one Globe of Knowledge as there is of Things As also that the partition of Sciences or rather the crumbling of them into so many hath been a great impediment of Science the dependency of Things and their Relations one to another thereby becoming unobserved and unconsidered And in fine that the more large general and comprehensive our Knowledge is the more assured and evident it is It is in Science as it is in Arch-work the Parts uphold one another and mutually contribute strength and beauty The consinement of the Understanding to particular Knowledges as also the limiting of it in any unto certain Methods and Terms of Art is like too straight a swathing of the Childe and spoils its growth 82. So much for the two Topicks of natural speculative Reasoning namely Truth and Falsity It now lies on me more expresly to describe How Reasoning is performed in reference to them and so what the Nature of it is And natural speculative Reasoning is Systematical and Harmonical it is a shewing an evincing the Truth or Falsity of a thing by conferring and comparing thing with thing it is a shewing a Notion to be true or not true by representing of it in a Frame a Scheme of real Notions with all its Relations in it and so by Comparing Evidencing how it squares agrees and harmonizes or otherwise 83. That Natural Reasoning is Harmonical Systematical that it is conferring comparing is evident in the Natural Reasonings of Plain and Illiterate but Understanding men who not having other Logick but that of kinde to verifie their Tales desire but to have them heard out from end to end and who no otherwise confute their Adversaries than by telling over again in their own way the whole Relation that so both may be compared Besides the comparative method of Reasoning used by the Minde in intelligible Objects is no other than that we naturally use in those that are sensible For be it a visible Object we enqure into and examine the truth of we turn it every way and into all postures so to make a certain judgement of it and Circumspection which is Cicero's word for it or the Mindes comparing and conferring of things is no other And if Truth indeed be Harmony Proportion Congruity an Object cannot be evinced true but by being evinced Harmonical Congruous Proportionable and it cannot be evinced Harmonical Congruous Proportionable but by being conferred and compared and upon collation and comparison shewn to be so 84. To prove Harmonically is in a Scheme and Frame of Notions bottomed on things to shew the thing to be proved to quadrate lie even and to be entirely congruous and answerable To disprove a thing Harmonically is in a Frame and Scheme of Notions bottomed on things to shew it not to quadrate but to be incongruous unanswerable and unadequate 85. The best way of Confuting Errour is to do it by shewing the Truth There is so great a delicacy in Proportions that a Scheme of Thoughts may seem congruous and agreeing by it self which compared with another is observed no longer so as two pieces of fine Cloath looked on at a distance and not compared together may be judged equally fine and one no better than the other whereas when put together and felt and so compared the difference is plain and discernible 86. The Effect of Reasoning and as it were the Conclusion is Assent or Dissent according to evidence Evidence is the Assurance we have a thing is true or false and so is either of Truth or of Falsity and answerably bottomes either Assent or Dissent 87. Assent is the judgement of the Minde upon evidence of Truth that the thing is true Dissent is the judgement of the Minde upon evidence of Falsity that the thing is false 88. Evidence of Truth is either certain or probable Certain Evidence is full Assurance Probable Evidence is good Assurance but not full Certain Evidence is evidence of certain Truth Probable Evidence is evidence of probability Probable Evidence is now a-days termed a Motive of Credibility 89. In Proportion as the Evidence is so is the Assent If the Evidence be certain that is indubitable and unquestionable and that is to be understood to be so of which there is no cause to doubt or make any Question then the Assent is firm and certain and without doubting but if the Evidence be but probable the Assent then is infirm and with doubting more or less as the Evidence is lesser or greater To Doubt is to fear lest the thing to which Assent is given should not be true 90. Evidence of Certainty is to the Minde as to its Assent all as much as Evidence of Infallibility For the Minde as firmly adheres to what it hath all reason for and no reason against all reason to believe it to be so or so and no reason to believe it to be otherwise as to what it apprehends impossible to be otherwise seeing it were unreasonable and contradictious for Reason any wise to doubt when it hath no reason at all
be Falsity 64. Wherefore to prove a Truth to be one is but in a right method to shew it to the Minde the Understanding apprehending a thing to be true when rightly shewed as the Eye doth see the shew to be white that is duely held before it A Notion may be true yet not acknowledged to be so because not rightly apprehended or seen and it is not rightly seen or apprehended because not rightly shewed Then Truth is rightly shewed or shewed to be Truth when 't is shewed Systomatically or Harmonically The like is to be said of Falsity But to enlighten this Point I am to shew at large what Truth and consequently what Falsity is 65. Truth in the apprehensions of some of the School-men and of others is that conformity which is in things to their original Ideas in the Divine Intellect All second Beings are but Copies of the Minde of the first in which they have their Exemplars and wherein doth the verity the truth of Copies consist but in a conformity to their Originals 66. But this notion of Truth however true it may be is not pertinent to us 't is Metaphysical Truth that it relates unto a Truth of things as standing in the Analogy of God but the Truth we treat of and whose notion we are enquiring after is Logical a Truth of things as standing in our Analogy and which is the ground of Assent Certain it is this notion that the Schools afford us is not nor can it be to us a Medium of Reasoning since we cannot say what is conformable or what is not unto the divine Exemplars He must see the Original and compare the Copy with it that on knowledge will affirm this to be true 67. Of late the old Catalepsis has seen the light again that comprehension discoursed of by Cicero in his Lucullus The meaning of which is that there is no other Criterium no other judicial note of Truth no other Rule Mark or Measure whereby to know a thing to be true than clear and distinct Perception And thus also the Cartesians 68. But on the contrary clear and distinct Perception is not the Cause and Ground of Assent but onely a Condition of causing Truth is the onely Adequate and effectual Motive or Reason of Assent but to be so it must be clearly and distinctly perceived Truth as whiteness is something in the Object that invites Assent clear and distinct Perception is not in the Object but of it and consequently is not Truth but conversant about Truth Sight is not Colour but of Colour so neither is Perception Truth but of Truth Besides that cannot be a certain mark of Truth which may be affirmed as well of Errour as of Truth I may as clearly and distinctly perceive a thing to be false as to be true A thing may be evidently false as well as evidently true 69. If any say as doubtless some will that by clear and distinct Perception they mean nothing but a clear and evident apprehension of the truth of things I answer That then either they know what Truth is by its mark and definition and by the impression that it makes on the Minde as well as what Whiteness is by the impression made thereby on the Eye or they do not If they do not how can they say they clearly and distinctly perceive a thing to be true who know not Truth They might as well say they clearly and distinctly see a thing to be white when they know not whiteness Or if they know what Truth is then that Impression that Form that Notion of Truth they have ought rather to be insisted on and not the bare Perception They should say The thing is true we see clearly the Form and Notion of Truth in it For indeed nothing makes a thing true but the Form and Notion of Truth therein For did I apprehend a thing to be true never so clearly and distinctly yet if I did but apprehend it so as I may and many do and that the Notion and Form of Truth were no wise in it it were not true by vertue of the Apprehension I had of it but onely seemed so As I clearly and distinctly see an Image in the Glass when indeed it is not there or an Oar in the Water bowed and crooked when indeed it is not so It is an Errour and a most dangerous one too to assert that seeming or intellectual sense for clear and distinct Perception signifies no more is the measure of Truth There are so many ways wherein a thing may be seen clearly and distinctly that is may seem true and yet not be so No convincing Hereticks or opinionate Philosophers if Seeming be the mark of Truth 70. To this Opinion I am now to adde another much of kin to it That of the truly-Noble and Learned the late Lord Herbert namely That Truth consisteth in the Analogy Agreement Harmony of things to our Faculties inviting a most free and full Assent Or in his own Terms Veritas est Harmonia inter object a Facultates habens sensum gratissimè lubentissimè sine ulla haesttatione Respondentem 71. All the difference between the Former and the Latter Opinion is that in the former Apprehension clear and distinct in the latter Assent Free and Full is made the Mark and Measure of Truth Of this Latter Opinion as that eminent Person last mentioned among the Moderns so among the Antients were a many noble Philosophers in Tully it is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and as described by him it hath the same Foundation that his Lordship builds on namely the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Truth That Truth is so Domestical and Congruous to the Faculty so Analogous and fit to it that the Inclination of the Minde thereto in Nà ture and Necessity resembles that of a Stone or whatever or other heavy Body you 'll imagine to the Center 72. But 1 a bare Congruity between the Object and the Understanding is not the ground of Truth but of Sense or Intelligibility and though there be a Congruity in all Truth because there is a sense in it and happily more Congruity because a more agreeable Sense Yet since that Congruity is unobservable unremarkable but by Assent and Assent of it self is no sufficient Evincement of Truth I lay it by as Illogical and useless 2 Nor doth the Understanding blindly incline to Truth and as it were by Sympathy or a natural Motion of Aggregation its Assent is an act of Judgement The Minde proceeds therein judicially upon Allegations and Proof judging a thing to be true that is assenting to it onely because it sees therein the Form Notion and Mark of Truth as it judges a thing to be white wherein the Eye assures it there is the form of Whiteness And 3 one may readily and chearfully assent to Falsities and Errours and mistake them for Truths and therefore free and full Assent is no sufficient evincement of Truth Not to urge that chearfulness
and Method I proceeded by in framing it which to the former will afford a greater Confirmation if it be Right and to the latter a fairer rise of Assaulting me if it be not 1. Before I can proceed to shew what Reason is I am first to shew the many sences the Word is taken in which not done by most is one occasion of the great Confusion in their talks about it And Reason to omit some other sences not so necessary here is in ordinary Language taken either largely or strictly or appropriately and most strictly 2. Reason largely taken is the same with Minde or Understanding and so is commonly affirmed to exert it self in three Acts the Apprehension of simple Terms the Composition of those Terms by way of Affirmation and Negation and Discourse or illation of one thing from another Reason strictly taken is the Understanding as it issues out in its third Act not in the Apprehension of simple Terms nor in the Composition of them but in Discourse and Illation and so Reason is the Understanding as it argues discourses infers But Reason is appropriately taken or most strictly as it is oppos'd to Faith and Revelation of which hereafter 3. Reason taken for the Minde or Understanding is that Faculty whereby a man is said to be Reasonable Intelligent Understanding as Sight is that Faculty whereby an Animal is said to be Seeing or 't is that Faculty whereby a man is said to Elicite Acts of Reason or to Understand as Sight is that Faculty whereby an Animal is said to See I so define it by the Act for that the Act is better known than the Faculty To Understand as well as to see is a first Notion and he must be very simple that understands not what is meant by it nor are there any Notions more intelligible whereby to mark Faculties than those of their Acts. Acts we see being conscious of them when we exert them but Faculties we see not we know not but by their Acts. 4. The Acts of Reason in this large sence as the same with Minde or Understanding to speak of them as they offer and present themselves to mine without confining of my self to Notions of the Schools or common Logicians are Two Apprehension and Judgement 5. Apprehension is that Act of Understanding whereby it is said to See or Perceive things and is the same in relation to the Minde that Seeing is in relation to the Eye 6. Apprehension is Conversant with things either as in themselves or as they are noted and they are noted either by simple words or else by Propositions which are words joyned by way of Affirmation or Negation both which the Minde sees or apprehends but as it hath the Sense of them Sence or Meaning is the Motive and immediate Object of Apprehension as Colour is of Seeing The Eye sees nothing but under Colour the Minde apprehends nothing but under Sense 7. I know well that Truth is usually affirmed the proper adequate immediate formal Object of the Intellect but it is not so Not Truth but Sence or Meaning is the proper adequate immediate Object of the Minde as to its first Act that of Apprehension Truth is onely the proper adequate immediate Object of it as to another which is called Assent and is a kind of Judgement I understand and apprehend a Proposition which is false that is I have a Sence and Meaning of it though when I Understand or Apprehend it I refuse my Assent So that it is not Verity that is the Motive and immediate Object of Understanding in its Acts of Apprehension but Sence or Meaning 8. Sence or Meaning is that Conception or Notion that is formed in the Minde on a proposal to it of an Object a Word or Proposition as Colour is that Sentiment begotten and caused in the Eye upon the impression of its Object on it 9. To understand this we are to consider That to us men things are nothing but as they stand in our Analogie that is are nothing to us but as they are known by us and they are not known by us but as they are in the Sense Imagination or Minde in a word as they are in our Faculties and they are in our Faculties not in their Realities as they be without them no nor so much as by Picture and proper Representation but onely by certain Appearances and Phaenomena which their impressions on the Faculties do either cause or occasion in them 10. Every Faculty hath a hand though not the sole hand in making its immediate Object as the Eye makes the Colours it is said to see the Ear the Sounds the Fancy the Idols and so the Understanding the Conceptions or Notions under which it apprehends and sees things So that all the immediate Objects of Humane Cogitation to use the word in its largest sence are Entia Cogitationis All Appearances which are not properly and may I use a School-term formally in the things themselves conceived under them and consequently conceiv'd as if they had them but so onely in the cogitative Faculties No such thing as Colour but in the Eye nor as Sound but in the Ear nor as Notion Sense or Meaning but in the Minde These though they seem in the Objects and without the cogitative Powers yet are no more in them than the Image that seemeth in the Glass is there indeed 11. So that all immediately cogitable beings that is all immediate Objects of Humane Cogitation are either Entities of Sense as the immediate Objects of Sense Colour Sound c. or of Imagination as the Images therein the Idols it frames or of Reason and Understanding Mental Entities the Meanings or Notions under which the Understanding apprehends its Objects which Notions though they seem to the Understanding to be without it and to be in the things understood yet as I said before are no more without it or in the things themselves than Colours are without the Eye or Sounds without the Ear or Sapours without the Tongue although they seem so to Sense 12. Faculties and Powers Good Evil Virtue Vice Verity Falsity Relations Order Similitude Whole Part Cause Effect c. are Notions as Whiteness Blackness Bitterness Sweetness c. are Sentiments and the former own no other kind of Existence than the latter namely an Objective one A Notion that will free the Minde of much Intanglement in framing Notions We generally conceive Faculties Good Evil and other Notions under which the Minde apprehends things to be Realities and to have an Existence of their own without the Minde and though there were no Minde to think of them when indeed they are but Noemata Conceptions and all the formal being any of them have is onely in it And no wonder if he that takes Noemata to be Realities findes himself confounded by that mistake in forming his Conceptions about them Notions therefore are very aptly though somewhat barbarously stiled by the School-men Conceptus Objectivi Notions of the
of Assent that readiness and promptness we many times observe in it is oftner an effect of a Passion bribing of the Understanding than of a pure clear impartial Reason 73. Wherefore others of the Antients as well as of the Moderns abundantly convinced of the insufficiency both of Perception clear and distinct and of Assent free and full to ascertain them of Truth and yet unwilling to have Nature so liberal in other matters exposed to the reproach of Deficiency in One so important as intellectual Judgement They have conceited humane understanding furnish'd by her with certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Anticipations that is with Connatural and Ingrafted Notions Principles designedly implanted in the Minde to be a rule to it to direct it Thus in the speculative Understanding they have set up a habit which they call Intelligence in the Practical another which is called Synteresis in both a Constellation of Principles shining with their own Light and imparting it to others that want it not much unlike to what is affirmed of Dionysius in his Celestial Hierarchy concerning Spirits that those of superiour Orders enlighten all beneath them in the inferiour 74. But were there really such a System of Notions and first Principles ingrafted in the Minde by Nature in whose Light all others were to shine and to be seen it would follow that Contemplation of our own mindes acquainting us with the Chain Concatenation and Sorites of the Principles therein and Propositions deducible therefrom would more import to the rendring us Philosophers not to say Divines also than observation of the World and Experience and so the greatest School-men those Metaphysical Alchymists that insisted much on this Method and spun out all their notions of their own Bowels should have been the wisest and most fruitful of men Whereas we know the men and the manner of their Communication all their Discourses are indeed subtle and acute but also empty and barren and no more agreeing with Realities and in our Analogy than Light with Darkness Again the Soul in its state of Union and Conjunction with the Body is so dependent on it in all its Operations that it exercises none without the Aids of it Ratiocination it self it is an Animal act not an abstract Action of the Soul but a Concrete act of the Animal it is the Man reasons And in the ordinary method of Nature we receive into our Mindes no Impressions no Images but what are handed to them by our Senses I am apt to think that person who should never have seen nor heard nor tasted nor smelt nor felt any thing would have his minde as little furnish'd with Idea's or Notions as his Memory with Images and would understand as little as he had sensed Besides those very Principles themselves we call First ones or Anticipations shining with their own lustre and light Propositions which we cannot but assent to assoon as we hear them or minde them It will appear if we reflect warily on what doth pass in our Mindes that even these are not assented to but on the Evidence they bring I mean not assented to naturally but as other Propositions are judicially For instance that the whole is greater than the part we assented not unto it on the first hearing but first considering what was meant by Whole what by Part what by Greater what by Lesser and then having sensibly either by Eye-sight or by Imagination compared one unto the other we evidently saw it to be so that the Notion of Greater even to Sense ever agreed to the whole and that of Less to the Parts The like that Two and Two make Four This is the way we first admitted to belief the Propositions which are called Principles and it is no other than that wherein we admit all others Onely the Propositions which are call'd Anticipations or first Principles are Propositions of so easie sensible and plain an evidence and so obvious that we early admitted them so early that we cannot well remember when we first did so and therefore they are stiled Anticipations or proleptick Notions for being of so early an admission and existence in our Mindes they preceded all our after knowledges whose acquirement we well remember Further Beings are not to be multiplied without Necessity and there is none of faigning such Anticipations and Habits of Principles to direct the Minde in inquisitions after Truth since all acknowledge there are no such principles in the Eye the Ear the Nose the Tongue to direct them and why then in the Minde Besides Reflection on our ordinary reasonings evinces that in them we seldom attend to such Principles but to the Object discoursed of nor need we to do otherwise if it can be evidenced that there is a certain Notion Form Ground of Truth that runs through all things true which Form or Notion of Truth assoon as the Understanding rightly circumstanced and conditioned apprehends in an Object it cannot but acknowledge it to be true as it would another to be white or black wherein it is assured by the Eye rightly circumstanced and conditioned that there is the Form of Whiteness or Blackness As for Anticipations they are too particular and not of a nature so large and comprehensive as to be the Rules and Measures of Truth which is infinite Let those Anticipations be reckoned and then Experiment be made upon comparison with the immense Latitude of Questions and of Truth relating to them 75. Thus I have shewn the Indications Marks and Notions of Truth that in my judgement are not proper adequate or useful it now remaineth that I shew one that is And Truth as it is the Ground Motive and Reason of Assent is objective Harmony or the Harmony Congruity Even-lying Answerableness Consistence Proportion and Coherence of things each with other in the Frame and Scheme of them in our Mindes Truth is universal and exact Agreement or Harmony 76. On the other hand Falsity as the ground motive and reason of Dissent is Objective Disharmony or the disharmony incongruity inequality unanswerableness inconsistence disproportion and incoherence of things in the Frame and Scheme of them in our Mindes Any Disagreement or Disharmony is Falsity 77. Probability or Likelihood of Truth is an appearance of Congruity A thing is probable when it hath some consistence and agreement it Quadrates and lies even with what we do know but in regard there are particulars relating to the same Systemes and Frames of Thoughts which yet we do not know therefore we know not if it will lie even and square with them Improbability is apparent Incongruity 78. That Truth is Harmony and Proportion and consequently that Probability is apparent Harmony apparent Proportion and Falsity Disharmony Disproportion cannot be but very evident to him that shall consult with Nature and common sense 79. In Nature it is plain For Harmony it is the Reason of the World the World was made by it cannot be known but by it The rule of Proportion is