to doubt I ask him how he will prove that it must needs exclude all reason of Actual Doubt from the Minds even of the wisest Christians unless he can prove those Grounds cannot possibly be doubted of with reason for otherwise if those men may possibly doubt with reason 't is ten to one they will do so actually at one time or other He ought then to say those Motives exclude all possible doubt or are undoubtable of their own nature and so take it out of the Subjects strength or weakness and put it upon the Objects But this he is loth to say dreading the Consequence which is this that he who affirms a Thing can never be possibly doubted of in true reason must affirm withal that he has Motives concluding it absolutely True that is absolutely Impossible to be False and if it depends on Authority Infallible Testimony for it which his superficial Reason fully resolved against First Principles or Identical Propositions can never reach It remains then that he must hold to Actual Not-doubting on the Subjects side that is he must say the Motives are onely such as preservâ— prudent persons from doubt and then he must either make out that Christians have more Natural Prudence than those in those other Sects Natural I say for all Motives Antecedent to Faith must be Objects of our Natural Parts or Endowments or else confess that he knows no difference between the Reasons for those other Sects and those for Christianity according to the Grounds deliver'd by him here Both exclude Actual Doubt in persons as far as appears to us equal in prudence as to other things neither of them exclude possible Rational Doubt each one had as much Evidence of their Deities they ador'd as they could have in their circumstances supposing those Deities were and no True or absolutely Conclusive Evidence appear'd on either side both had as good Proofs as the thing afforded supposing it were and such as excluded Doubting therefore according to Dr. T's Doctrine both had Certainty and all is parallel and so farewel Christianity Religion and First Principles too that is farewel Common Sence and all possibility of knowing any thing All Truth and Goodness must needs go to wrack when Principles naturally self-evident and establish'd by GOD himself the Founder of Nature are relinquish'd and others made up of meer Fancy and Air are taken up in their stead § 10. I know Dr. T. will sweat and fume and bestir all his knacks of Rhetorick to avoid these Consequences of his Doctrine I expect he will pelt me with Ironies and bitter Jeers cavil at unelegant words tell me what some Divines of ours say and perhaps mistake them all the while stoutly deny all my Conclusions instead of answering my discourse nay fall into another peevish fit of the Spleen and say I have no forehead for driving on his Principles to such Conclusions as he who was too busie at Words to mind or amend his Reasons never dream't of Therefore to defend my forehead it were not amiss to make use of some Phylacteries containing such expressions taken out of his First Sermon as best discover to us his thoughts as to the Certainty and Uncertainty of his Positive Proofs and the Point it self as prov'd by them I mean the Existence of a Deity or a Creation Such as are Serm. p. 19. A Being suppos'd of Infinite Goodness and Wisdom and Power is a very LIKELY Cause of these things What more LIKELY to make this Vast World c. What more LIKELY to communicate Being What more LIKELY to contrive this admirable Frame of the World This seems NO UNREASONABLE Account P. 21. The Controversie between Vs and this sort of Atheists comes to this Which is the MORE CREDIBLE OPINION That the World was never made c. or that there was from all Eternity such a Being as we conceive GOD to be Now COMPARING the PROBABILITIES of things that we may know ON WHICH SIDE THE ADVANTAGE LIES c. P. 22. The Question whether the World was created or not can onely be decided by TESTIMONY and PROBABILITIES of Reason Testimony is the PRINCIPAL Argument in a thing of this nature and if FAIR PROBABILITIES of Reason concur with it c. P. 29. The PROBABILITIES of REASON do all likewise FAVOUR the Beginning of the World P. 32. Another PROBABILITY is c. P. 34. These are the CHIEF PROBABILITIES on Our Side which being taken together and in their united sence have A GREAT DEAL of CONVICTION in them § 11. Upon these Words and Expressions of his I make these Reflexions 1. That as appears by his own stating the Point p. 21. he makes it amount to the same Question as indeed it does Whether there were a Creation or a First Being creating the World whom we call GOD so that all his Proofs are indifferently to be taken as aim'd to evince one as well as the other 2. That this being so he stands not heartily to any one Argument he brings as able to conclude the Truth of a Deity 's or Creator's Existence 3. That his words which are expressive of the Evidence of his Gâ—ounds and the Certainty of the Point viz. that there is a GOD manifest too plainly that he judges according to his Speculative Thoughts at least he has neither one nor the other For if it be but Likely though it be exceedingly such yet as common Experience teaches us it may notwithstanding be False If the account he gives of a Deity creating the World be onely no unreasonable one this signifies onely that it has some Reason or other for it and every man knows that seldom or never did two Wits discourse contrary Positions or Lawyers plead for contrary Causes or Preachers preach for contrary Opinions but there was some Reasons produc'd by them for either side and so for any thing he has said the Atheist may come to give no unreasonable account too that there is no Deity though it be something less reasonable than that for a Deity And if the Controversie between Atheists and us be onely this Whether is the MORE CREDIBLE OPINION then the other Opinion viz. that there was no Creation or is no GOD is yielded to be Credible too though not SO Credible as that there is Also if we ought to COMPARE the PROBABILITIES of things that we may know on which side the ADVANTAGE LIES 't is intimated to us and granted that 't is Probable there is no GOD though it be more Probable there is and while 't is but Probable though it be very much more yet it may very easily be False as every days experience teaches us in a thousand Instances wherein our selves were mistaken through the whole course of our lives which commonly happen'd when the far more probable side prov'd False else we had not inclin'd to think it true and by that means been mistaken Again if the PROBABILITIES of Reason do but FAVOUR our side 't is a sign that
a Conclusion of a Syllogism that is they can be concluded or admit of Proof Wherefore since 't is a contradiction to say that the Prime Verities can admit Proof their Terms must be farthest from having any Middle Term coming between them that is imaginable that is must be of the self-same notion and so they must be Identical Propositions The former of these Discourses was put down by me Letter of Thanks p. 10 11 12. which one would think it became a Logician to speak to But my Adversary is of another metal not the very same but near akin to aes sonans aut cymbalum tinniens He never meddles willingly with Premisses or Proofs but denies the Conclusion stoutly never acknowledging what was said in its behalf and tinkles a little Rhetorick against it which done who would think it immediately as with some Charm the Terms unconnect of themselves and miraculously fly asunder and though before it look'd like good honest Reason yet by his giving it a Disguise instead of a Confute 't is turn'd perfect Nonsence But to return to our Argument § 5. Logick tells us moreover that whatever accidental considerations may enhance Opposition 't is agreed by all that a Contradiction is formally and intrinsecally the greatest or First of Falshoods also that a Contradiction is An affirming and denying the same of the same according to all the same respects wherefore the very First Principles being the First of Truths ought to be diametrically opposite to Those that is an Affirming or denying the same of the same according to all the same respects which is impossible to be exprest but by an Identical Proposition § 6. Add that since Contradiction is Faulty and all Fault is a Privation of the opposite Good which it violates it follows that a Contradiction were innocent did it not violate some opposite Truth Since then the Light of Nature teaches every Reflecter that 't is impossible to assign any Truth Opposite to a Contradiction but an Identical Proposition it follows that First Truths or First Principles must be Identical Propositions § 7. To explain this better we shall find by reflexion that two Contradictory Propositions are comprisable into One equivalent to both whose Subject and Predicate contradict one another as Peter here and now runs Peter here and now runs not are necessarily equivalent to this What here and now runs here and now runs not So likewise Scripture's Letter is a Rule Scripture's Letter is not a Rule is equivalent to this Something which is a Rule is not a Rule and so of the rest By which 't is easie to discern how clear a Truth it is that Identical Propositions are the proper opposites to Contradictions or the Truths they directly and immediately violate and consequently First Principles Since 't is impossible mans wit rack'd to its utmost can invent any Opposite to What runs runs not but What runs runs or to What is a Rule is not a Rule but What is a Rule is a Rule Lastly The nature of Contradiction in common puts a thing to be and not be at once and consequently puts this Proposition What is not is to which the onely opposite Truth is What is is which is therefore the First Standard of all Truth and all other First Principles as A Rule is a Rule A Man a Man c. are but particulars subsuming under it and partaking in the most perfect manner of its clearest Light § 8. Farther 't is observable that the more remote the Terms of a Proposition are from Formal Identity the less evident they are and the more proof they require as also that they still grow nearer and nearer to evidence according to the degree of their approach toward the said Identity Wherefore since all Approach of distant things if pursu'd ends in a conjoyning and centering in the same 't is manifest that all distance in notion amongst Terms ends in their being the same in notion that is in an Identical Proposition as also that such Propositions are for the reason given the most evident that may be and so in both regards the very First Principles § 9. Farther All Propositions which are capable of proof or all Conclusions must have their Terms materially Identical that is what corresponds to both their notions must be found in the same Thing else they could not be True nor capable to be proved wherefore the Terms in First Principles must be formally such nay the most formally that is possible but nothing is or can be more formally Identical than to have the Predicate and Subject every way the same such therefore the very First Principles ought necessarily to be § 10. There is also in Logick a way of arguing by bringing one to an Absurdity or Contradiction And this is performed two manner of ways One by forcing the Defendant to contradict himself The other by obliging him to contradict the nature of the Subject in question The former of these is available as an Argument ad hominem but the latter attempt if brought to effect is a perfect Conquest And why but because it puts the Defendant to violate the nature of the Thing under debate that is to thwart this First Principle The same is the same with it self for example to make Quantity not to be Quantity a Rule not to be a Rule Faith not to be Faith as shall be shewn hereafter more clearly when we come to see the use of the First Principles in particular Instances § 11. Moreover if it be well examin'd 't will be found that all Efficiency and Passiveness that is all kind of Operation is nothing but the existence of such a Nature exerting or as it were imprinting it self upon the Subject in which it works its Effect For example when a Brass Seal makes an Impression upon soft Wax no account can be given of this Effect abstracting from Motion which is caus'd by a Nature superiour to Body but onely this that the Agent is of such a degree of Density or Hardness as if mov'd or apply'd to that matter is apt to alter the figure of its parts according to its own mould and the Patient of such a yielding nature in comparison of the other as to receive its Impression and yet not to that degree Rare as to lose it again by the Action of the common Causes in Nature till some more particular Agent comes to efface it 'T is manifest then that all Causality essentially depends on and is finally resolv'd into this Truth that Things are such as they are which is their being in part what they are All knowledge then of Cause and Effect and consequently all Demonstration is ultimately refunded that is primarily built on those Propositions which express Things being what they are that is into Identical Ones § 12. Lastly He who is Essential Wisdom and Truth it self has propos'd to us an Identical Proposition in those words I am what I am which is the First Increated Truth as
't is the first Created one or the First Principle in discoursing about Creatures as to their Natures or Essâ—nces that Every Thing is what it is which is therefore True because God is what He is or because Self-existence is Self-existence as was explicated above § 1. 2. which I hope Dr. T's Goodness will so much prevail above his Ignorance as not to judge ridiculous whatever he thinks of the first Created Truths which immediately depend on the Other § 13. But why must First Principles be necessarily exprest with that most perfectly-formal Identity Or the Subject and Predicate be put in the self-same words Is it not enough the Sence be the same as is found in Definitions but the Words must be the same also Which bears a show of ridiculousness and seems to admit of no possibility of advance towards new Knowledges Why cannot then the Definition serve to principle all our Discourses about the Thing defin'd without recurring to such Propositions as appear little better than flâ—t and insignificant as to that purpose I answer The Objection in great part demands what Use can be made of First Principles which shall be spoken to in the next Discourse But that Definitions are not the very Prime Verities of all appears evidently already because those Propositions which express the Things Possibility to be defin'd must necessarily antecede the Definition And the same will be farther clear'd by these following Considerations 1. That Definitions are often liable to dispute but Identical Propositions never I have heard a certain learned and ingenuous person disallow A Rational Creature to be a right definition of a Man and discourse very soberly how proud a thing Mankind was to arrogate all the Reason to himself whereas diverse Birds and Beasts in their several spheres have as much or more Reason than He. And yet I dare say the same Gentleman would heartily allow the Truth of this Proposition A man is a man Nay indeed all the Scepticks in the world admit Identical Propositions to be True yet the same men quarrel every Definition extant Since then 't is directly against the nature of the very first Principles to be dlsputable 't is evident that Definitions cannot be the very First Principles of all 2. First Principles ought to be Principia Intellectus and naturally ingrafted in us that so they may oblige all under forfeiture of their nature to acquiesce to their verity whereas Definitions are not such but acquir'd by Practical self-evidence For example by a long course of observation heedfuâ—ly attending to the actions of men as men and thence by means of some First Principle evidencing so constant a hitting in so many particulars to be beyond Chance or Accident gathering his primary and proper Operation we come to know the Definition of Man none of which needs to know the Truth of this nature-taught Proposition A Man is a Man or A Rational Creature is a Rational Creature Moreover Definitions generally need some skill of Art to make them and all Art presupposes some First Principles whence 't is impossible Definitions should be the First Principles of all 3. Experience teaches us that words being liable to Equivocation where there are fewer words there is less room for Equivocating wherefore since First Principles ought to be the câ—earest and consequently the most unequivocal that can be imagin'd Definitions which explicate the notion in more words afford more room for Equivocation and consequently are even in this regard less fit to be First Principles 4. Lastly Logical tricks of nicely distinguishing sometimes elude the Truth of a Proposition at least darken it from which Inconveniences First Principles ought to be the most Free that may be Now Definitions yielding more room for Equivocaâ—ness do by consequence give more occasion of distinguishing whereas Identical Propositions afford not the least For example this Proposition A Man is a Rational Creature bears this distinction A man is rational in some things as in discoursing those notions that concern Quantity but not in others e. g. those which concern Being or Rational that is capable to discourse right the nature of some Bodies but not of Spirits Is it not evident hence that this Definition of Man is by this means render'd in show ambiguous And I wish there were not too many in the world who out of their ignorance of the true Method to Science think this distinction both well-grounded and very pertinent Now this being so who sees not that the true limits of the definition of Man become doubtful by such kind of distinctions and consequently the sence of the Definition it self unknown whereas nothing of this can possibly happen in that Identical Proposition A Man is a Man since whatever distinction affects the Predicate must also affect the Subject and so the Proposition remains still intirely Identical and perfectly true and not in part onely as it happens in the other 'T is concluded then from all imaginable considerations that can belong to this peculiar matter that the very First Principles neither are nor can be any thing else but Identical Propositions § 14. As for their seeming ridiculous to some persons the reason is because those men of mirth being led much by Fancy and inur'd all their lives to pretty plausibilities and seldom or never reflecting on or discoursing orderly from such Grounds are hence apt to imagine that First Principles aâ—e Certain great Rarities or Productions of some extraordinary height of Wit when therefore they come to hear Identical Propositions alledged for First Principles seeing their high expectations so strangely disappointed they hereupon grow pleasant at the defeat of their Fancy never considering that because First Principles ground all possible discourse of what nature soever and therefore are common to all Mankind even the rudest in the world and inbred in them they must therefore be the farthest from being the effect of Wit and the most plain down right sayings that can be conceiv'd Whence they are better learn'd from the Vulgar than they are from great Scholars and therefore the most learned men that are if they would go to work solidly ought in such things as are the Results of pure Natural Knowledge attend to such as speak meer nature rather than to those who mingle and perhaps corrupt it with airy speculations which have not that firm Basis to ground their Discourses Now 't is obvious to observe that the nature-instructed Vulgar are apt to deliver themselves in such kind of plain Speeches in due occasions and make use of them as Truths which fix their Judgments in an Unalterableness For example if a man would force one of them to forgo what 's very evident he will stick firmly to the point and tell you soberly that Truth is Truth or that he 's sure a Spade is a Spade or that he knows what he knows or if it be in a point belonging to Justice that Right is Right and brings in these as Evidences from
and adhering to them as such Since on the one side they are of a large extent as Principles use to be and on the other side he sees no Principle they are opposite to and so ought to take them for Truâ—hs When Dr. T. gives the World â—atâ—sfaction in this point I will follow his Nonsensical Admonition and renounce all Prâ—nciples as far as God and Nature will give me leave for in that case Nonsence would be the best Sence and Contradictions the perfectest Truths But till he does this he must remain in his despair of convincing me I cannot for my heart help it § 19. I shall adde one word more to the truly Learned Reader Our imperfect manner of knowing in rhis state obliges us to detail or as it were divide the Object we would know into many abstracted inadequate or partial Conceptions which we use to rank orderly in the ten Predicaments and then to compound those single Conceptions into Propositions and those into Discourses Whereas separated Substances when they know any Object neither compound nor divide at all but with one Intuitive View see the Whole to be as it is Wherefore there is nothing in all our knowledges that in the manner of it comes so near their way of operating as our Act of knowing Identical Propositions It divides as little as is possible for our state for it predicates the Whole of the Whole for which very reason it as little compounds again and did not our Condition here forcibly exact oâ— us to frame a Proposition or connect together inadequate notions by a Copula when we would express a Truth it would be a kind of Intuitive seeing the Thing as it is and so indeed after a sort it is but confused all Clearness here arising from a perfect distinguishing our notions yet it resembles not a little in its absolute Evidence immovable Firmness and its nearest approach possible to Simple Intuition Whence it hints to a Soul deâ—irous of Truth the glorious satisfaction it will enjoy when the Screen of our Body is taken away to have at one Prospect all the whole Creation and each single thing in it presented to her ravish'd Understanding and seen to be what they are with a far greater Evidence possest and held with an incomparably greater Firmness and penetrated by a transcendently more excellent and Simple manner of knowing than whâ—t we now experience here in those weak yet best resemblances our knowledges of the First Principles And indeed ' â—is but fitting that those supreme Knowledges which ground both our Definitions the Matter and all force of consequence the Form of our inferiour way of Knowledge by Reasoning should be nearest ally'd to the manner of Knowing proper to those Higher sort of Intellectual Creatures that so as the wisest order of the World requires the Supremum Infimi may touch or immediately confine upon that which is Infimum Supremi § 20. By this time I hope those Learned and Intelligent Persons to whom I address this Discourse will discern I had some Reason to hold Identical Propositions to be First Principles I beseech them to review all Dr. T. hath said against them either here or in any other place and when they have discover'd it all to be meer empty Drollery they will justly wonder at his Confidence that dare appear before Scholars in Print and think to carry it off with soppish Jests as if his Readers had onely Risibility in them and no Rationality Yet in reliance on these unfailing Grounds he ends with a Declaration to all the World That if there be no other Principles but such as these meaning Identical Propositions he neither has any Principles nor will have any An excellent Resolution and hard to keep Yet I 'll wager ten to one on his head that in despight of both Art and Nature he shall hold it as well as any man living and that when he comes to lay any Principles of his own the Terms shall be so far from Identical that all the Wit of man shall not make them hang together at all § 21. The Sum of thâ—s whole Discourse about Principles is this All Science à Priori is thus originiz'd The First Being is what He is that is Self-Existence is Self-Existence and so Essentially Unchangeable Wherefore the Essences of Things depending solely on the Relation they have to what is in in GOD that is to what is GOD are Unchangeable likewise or are establisht in their own Being that is fixt in their own particular and distinct Natures which we fitly express by Identical Propositions affirming them to be what they are Hence they become capable of having the determinate bounds of their natures described in certain Forms of Speech call'd Definitions which are nothing else but expressions of their Distinction from all other Things in the World The way to make these Definitions is two-fold One by collecting the natural Sayings of the Generality of Mankind about that thing as such and then observing in what notion those several Sayings of theirs do center the distinct Expression of which must needs be the Definition For they knowing through Practical Self-evidence the distinction of one Thing from another by a perpetual converse wâ—th them have the right notion or nature of the Thing in theâ—r Minds and those Sayings genuinely deliver'd are the Proper Effects of that Notion imprinted there by the teaching of Nature The otâ—er way is by sorting all our Notions under certain distinct Heads and then dividing the highest or most General Notion in such a Head by iâ—trinsecal differences till by descending they light on that difference which constitutes and joyn'd with the Genus which it divides defines that Nature The Definition had that is a diâ—â—inct Knowledge being gain'd of what 't is in which any nature agâ—ees with others and in what it differs from them Reason has more room to stir her self in or more matter to work upon in order to bring things to a further distinction and clearness And first by a due consideration and reflexion Practical Self-evidence still assisting for the Greatest Men of Art must nâ—t leave off being Children of Nature nay perhaps 't is their best Title the Proper Causes and Effects of such a nature begin to appear and thence Middle Terms for Demonstrative Syllogisms disclose themselves and Science begins to spread it self and advance Or if two Notions are to be shown connected which seem'd remote the Notions which directly compounded their Definitions are to be resolv'd farther and their resolution pursu'd till something appears in both of them which is formally Identical that is till some Identical Proposition comes to be engag'd For example if one would prove that Virtue is Laudable he will find that Laudable is deserving to be spoken well of and Practical Self-evidence as well as Reason telling us that our Speech being fram'd naturally to express our Thoughts that thing deserves to be spoken well of which deserves to be thought well
virtue of the plain Evidence of this one Paradox to overthrow the Certainty of Tradition nay the Certainty of all Natural Sciences to boot for these according to him are solely built upon Induction which depends on Sensations and These if we may trust him are all possible to be deceiv'd § 19. And is not Faith it self by these Grounds left in the same pickle It s Rule whether it be Tradition or Scriptures Letter evidently depends upon Humane Authority and this says he is all Fallible and what 's built on a Fallible Authority says Common Sence may possibly be an Errour or False therefore 't is most unavoidable from his Principles that all Faith may Possibly be False however the shame of owning so Unchristian and half-Atheistical a Tenet makes him very stifly and angrily deny the Conclusion but he shall never show why 't is not a most necessary and genuine Consequence from his Position of all Humane Authority being Fallible I expect that instead of a direct Answer to the force of my Argument he will tinkle a little Rhetorick against my Conclusion or start aside to a Logical Possibility that men may be deceiv'd and affirm that 't is not a Contradiction in Terms and so may be effected by the Divine Omnipotence But that 's not our point We are discoursing what will follow out of the ordinary Course of Causes the Conduct of which is the work of the Worlds all-wise Governour whence if those Portions of Nature or Mankind cannot be deceiv'd without Miracle and 't is most vnbeseeming GOD to do a Miracle which reaches in a manner a whole Species as that no Fire in the World should burn no Water wet especially if it be most absurd to conceive that GOD the Author of all Truth nay Essential Truth it self should do such a stupendious and never-yet-heard-of Miracle to lead Men into Errour as is our case 't is most manifestly consequent it cannot be effected at all that Mankind should be Fallible in Knowledges built on their constant Sensations § 20. It follows And though none of these be strict Demonstration yet have we an undoubted Assurance of them when they are prov'd by the best Arguments that the nature and quality of the Thing will bear To this we will speak when we come to examine his Firm Principle He proceeds None can demonstrate to me that there is such an Island in America as Jamaica yet upon the Testimony of credible Persons and Authors who have writ of it I am as free from all doubt concerning it as from doubting of the clearest Mathematical Demonstration True none can demonstrate there is either Jamaica or any such Place Yet I see not why they may not demonstrate the Knowledge of the Attesters from the Visibility of the Object and their Veracity from the Impossibility they should all conspire to act or say so without some appearing Good for their Object or intend to deceive in such a matter and so circumstanc'd when 't is evidently Impossible they should compass their intended end As for his affirming that he is as free from all doubt concerning it as he is from doubting of the clearest Mathematical Demonstration I answer that a man may 〈…〉 yet not hold the Thing True as shall presently be shown And if Dr. T. pleâ—se to look into his own Thoughts he shall find instill'd through the goodness of Nature by Practical Self-evidence more than a bare freedom from doubt viz. such a firm Assent Adherence to it as a Certain Truth that he would deem him a Madman or a Deserter of Humane Nature who could doubt of it and in a word as firm an Assent as to any Mathematical Demonstration which why he should according to Maxims of right Reason have unless he had a Demonstration of it or at least saw it by Practical Self-evidence impossible that Authority should hic nunc be deceiv'd or conspire to deceive and so held the Authority Infallible as to this point I expect his Logick should inform me § 21. We are now come to take a View of Dr. T's performances hitherto He hath omitted the proper Science for his purpose Metaphysicks I suppose because it sometimes uses those hard words Potentiality and Actuality which his delicate Ears cannot brook and has secluded Morality Physicks and the Knowledge we have of the Nature which grounds all Humane Authority and Christian Faith from being Sciences allowing it onely to the Mathematicks which would make one verily think the VVorld were perversly order'd and odly disproportion'd to the nature and good of Mankind for which we Christians agree it was created that greater Evidence and Certainty and consequently Power to act aright should be found in those things which are of far less import than in those which are of a Concern incomparably higher Yet it matters less some may think as long as we are not bound to assent to any of those Conclusions in those respectâ—ve Subjects the absolute Certainty of whâ—ch Dr. T's Discourse calls into question or rather denies whence iâ— we have in these and such as thesâ— knowledge enough to determine us to act Exteriourly it may seem to suffice But now when We come to FAITH where We are Oblig'd to Assent or to hold Fâ—rmly and verily judge the Thing True and where Exteriour Acting will not do the Work or carry a Soul to Bliss but Interiour Acts of a Firm Faith a Vigorous Hope built on that Faith and an Ardent and Over-powering Love of Unseen Gooâ—s springing out of both These are Absolutely Necessary to Fit Us for an Union with our Infinitely-Blissful Object and the Strength of all These is Fundamentally built on the SECURENEâ—S of the Ground of Faith In this Case I say a Rational Considerer wouâ—d think it very requiâ—â—â—e that the Reasons of so Hearty an Assâ—nt but especially for that most Fundamental Point of the Existence of a Deity it being of an infinitely-higher nature and import should be fâ—ll as Evident as the most Evident of those Inferiour Concerns and in comparison Trâ—fling Curiosities And not that the World should be manag'd on such a fashion as if Mankinâ— were onely made to study Mathematicks since absolute Evidence his best natural Perfection is according to Dr. T. onely found in These Whence we see that Mathematicians are infinitely beholding to him but Philosophers not at all and I fear Christians as little Now these two points are according to my way of discoursing for this very reason taken from the End and Use of Faith and the Obligation lying on us to hold and profess it True Self-evident Practically to the Generality of the Vulgar and demonstrable to the Learned Let us see what strong Grounds of such an immovably-firm Assent Dr. T. will afford the World for that first and most Fundamental Point of all Religion the Tenet of a Deity of which if we cannot be assur'd all else that belongs to Faith is not worth heeding DISCOURSE V. Dr. T's Firm
Principle examin'd Of Suspence and Assent Of Great Likelihood Freedom from Actual Doubt Fair Probabilities and other Mock-Certainties § 1. HE introduces his Discourse thus So that this is to be entertain'd as a Firm Principle by all those who pretend to be Certain of any thing at all that when any thing is prov'd by as good Arguments as that thing is capable of and we have as great assurance that it is as we could possibly have supposing it were we ought not in reason to make any doubt of the Existence of that Thing This is Dr. T's FIRM PRINCIPLE and it should be a kind of FIRST PRINCIPLE too being so universally necessary that without admitting this no man can be Certain of any Thing at all nor any Thing at all be Certain to any man You see Gentlemen how much depends upon it and I conceive you will easily conclude it ought to be as Evident and as Firm as any First Principle extant since according to his way of Discourse all Truths even the most precious Concerns in the world particularly the possibility of proving a Deity must run its Fate and be establish'd or ruin'd by its standing or falling Now my Judgment of it is this That 't is the most ridiculous piece of Folly and the most pernicious abstract of pithy Nonsence that ever was laid down since Mankind was Mankind by any sober man for such a Principle without which no Certainty at all can be had no not even that there is a God I charge it therefore with four Faults First that 't is Unprov'd next 't is Unevident of it self and so no Principle thirdly that were it evident 't is Impertinent to the end 't is produc'd for and lastly it betrays all Religion into the possibility of being a Lye instead of establishing it § 2. And first it appears that he intends it as a Conclusion by his introducing it with So that c. after his former Discourse But as I have already confuted That so I discern not any title it has to be Sequel from those Premisses in case they were True For what a mad consequence is this Diverse things bear diverse kinds of Proofs some weaker some stronger therefore when we have the best the Object can afford us we are to rest satisfi'd the thing is How I say does this follow unless he had first maâ—e out or at least supposâ—d that the least of those Proofs was satisfactory or that there is no Object in the world but is capable of yielding light enough to satisfie which Position every days experience convinces of Falshood Indeed if he meant by these words that upon our seeing the Thing is capable of no Conclusive Proof it is wisdom in us to sit down satisfy'd that no more is to be had and so surcease our farther quest I understand him very well but that I should be satisfy'd the thing is so or acquiesce to its Truth as he must mean to make it 〈◊〉 for his purpose not from the Conclusiveness of the Grounds it stands under or the prevalence of the Object upon my Understanding subduing it to Assent but because that Object is capable to bear no more or to discover it self no better to my sight is in plain terms to say that because the Objâ—ct affords me no certain light to know whether it be or no therefore I will hold my self well appay'd and think 't is Certain or thus Though I see absolutely speaking 't is Uncertain yet as long as I see withal the Object can bear no more or cannot be made absoluâ—ely Certain I will therefore rest satâ—sfy'd or judge 't is absolutely Certain If this be not his meaning I desire himself to inform me better 'T is evident to me it can be no other if he mean anythâ—ng at all His Intent is to evince a Deity and I declare heartily I have that good opinion of him as to hope that settled perhaps in that Assent by Practical Self-evidence as are the Vulgar and not by Skill or Principles as Scholars are for his Speculation makes it absolutely Uncertain he judges it to be absolutely Certain Either then he judges his Motives he has to evince it Conclusive or no If Conclusive there needs no running about the Bush to tell us of several kinds of Proofs or laying such whimsical Principles fit for nothing but to make the witty Atheist laugh at Christianity but it had been enough to stand to it heartily that the Thing must be so because the Arguments he brings conclude it to be so But in case he fear'd his Motives were not absolutely Conclusive or able to evince the Truth of the Point and that this is his Sentiment appears by his blaming me here p. 20. for pretending to such to ground Faith then indeed it was but good Policy or rather plain Necessity to lay some Principles by means of which he might compound the business between the Object and the Understanding after the same manner though this seems but an odd method of proving as Friends take up differences between good natur'd Creditors and the Debtor when he that owes is williâ—â— to do his utmost but yet is not solvent and 〈◊〉 was said before so to accord the business to avoid rigorous Disputes that though the Understanding sees absolutely speaking the Thing is Vncertain and more Lighâ— if it could be had is in reality due ere it can be satisfy'd of its absolute Certainty yet because the Object is able to afford no more 't is awarded by their Umpire Dr. T. that the kind-hearted Understanding is to be content to rest appay'd and hold it notwithstanding to be absolutely Certain which is the same as to say that though I do not see the Thing to be so yet because the thing it self cannot be seen to be so I will fancy strongly or judge I see it to be so Let us parallel it by Analogy to our Corporal Sight and the Discourse stands thus Though I see not the Wall to be white because 't is so far distant or the Air dusky yet because I can see it no better the Wall thus circumstanc'd not being able to inform my Eye clearly therefore despairing of the Walls affording me any better sight of it self I will piece out that degree of obscurity in the Object with a strong bending my Eyes till I fancy verily I see it to be white or rather out of a civil compliance with it's defect of visibleness I will verily judge and conclude it to be indeed of such a colour and then if any object folly to me for assenting upon infirm Grounds I will tell him he is ill-natur'd and unmerciful the poor Wall has done alas all it can and who can in reason desire more § 3. I expect Dr. T. will pretend degrees of Intellectual Sight and that by a less degree of Evidence he sees the Thing to be though 't is not manifested to him by the greatest but 't is impossible and even contradictory
Light I can have concerning that point Is it therefore past doubt that 't is so Who sees not that witty men find plausible Reasons for any â—hing even though it be most forrein from our Circumstances of knowing it certainly and so in case it were could give us no moâ—e light concerning it self must it therefore be forthwith held undoubtedly so Suppose it were propos'd to debate whether the Stars were even or odd and no better Argument could be found as truly though it be a ridiculous one 't is hard to find a better but onely this that Virgil says Numero Deus impare gaudet And therefore Odd Number is the best and so fitting to be found in such vast and Noble parts of the Universe as the Stars Were it not a wise business now upon so simple a Reason to judge that the Stars are undoubtedly Odd Yet this is perfectly agreeable to Dr. T's First Principle This is all the Light the Stars are capable to give us at this distance and were they indeed Odd yet we could have no knowledge of them by any better Arguments than this so that we must either content our selves with this or take nothing wherefore says Dr. T. unless you will deny a most Firm Principle and by doing so be rendred incapable of being Certain of any thing too great a penalty one would think for so small a fault the Thing must be concluded Certain and Odd they shall be § 6. Be it spoken then with honour to Dr. T. he is the first Author of this All-ascertaining First Principle which by the way is a shrewd Argument 't is none since Nature never instill'd it into all Mankind and of a new method to arrive at Certainty of all things so easie so compendious as the World never heard the like all even the rudest may comprehend it nay perhaps be as wise as the wisest For all can understand as much of the Object as in their circumstances they can do and the wisest can do no more and this rare Method requires no more but that the Object be known as well as 't is capable to be known in every ones circumstances and that the Persons do not doubt of it which the rudest will do the least of all other which done they are according to him Certain of it and all is well § 7. This Principle is moreover utterly Impertinent to the End 't is produc'd for To show which we are to consider that we are bound to Assent to the Existence of a Deity to hold it firmly as a Certain Truth and dy if need were to attest it and not barely not to make any doubt of it To declare this point more fully and so manifest how far short Dr. T. falls when he undertakes to lay Principles we are to reflect that we have two Acts of our Understanding call'd Assent and Disâ—â—â—sent that is an interiour yielding or denying a thing to be between which is plac'd a kind of Neutral Act which is neither one nor the other call'd Suspense Now the two former of these consist in an Indivisible as do their Objects is and is not and so admit no Latitude But Suspense even for that very Reason admits of many degrees which I explain thus If we consider it abstractedly from its differences 't is a meer not yielding to Assent and Diâ—â—ssent and if any where 't is found or at least conceiveable to be found in the very middle between those two Acts now mention'd without the least inclination to either of them wherefore one of its Differences is inclining towards Assent and may perhaps not unfitly be call'd Intellectual Hope because if the thing be our Concern 't is apt to principle that disposition of the Will which we properly call by that name The other Difference is a disâ—inclining to Assent or an Inclining towards Disâ—â—ssent which it were not much amiss to term Intellectual Fear because if we be concern'd in the Being of that Thing 't is apt to excite in us that Passion or disposition of the Will which is call'd by that name whence 't is generally call'd Doubt which includes some degree of Fear These two Differences have innumerable multitudes of other Differences or Degrees compris'd under them according as the Probabilities which here solely reign are apt to beget more or less Appearance of Likelihood that the Thing is but no Probability how high soever can in true Reason beget Assent because the highest Probability that is can only render the thing seen to be highly probable to be which is evidently a different effect from making it seen to be absolutely really and indeed since when I once see this by virtue of some Conclusive that is more than probable motive I see 't is Impossible hic nunc not to be or impossible my Conclusion should be False but I do not see this when I have a very high Probability Experience telling every man who is meanly practis'd in the World that very high Probabilities often deceive us as when a Glass thrown against the Ground breaks no when a House deem'd very strong falls down suddenly and a thousand such-like odd Contingencies But there needs no more to evince that all is to be called Suspense till we arrive at Assent than to reflect that Suspense is relative to Assent as appears by the English phrase To suspend ones-Assent intimating that assoon as Suspense is taken away immediately Assent follows which devolves into this that all is Suspense till we come to Assent Indeed some things so very seldom happen as that a House seemingly firm should fall and such like rare Casualties that unattentive men are apt to assent absolutely upon such a very high Probability and even in the wisâ—st it seems to counterfeit a perfect Assent and to have no degree at all of Suspense in it notwithstanding I absolutely deny any truly-wise or rational man goes to work on that manner but by seeing the Casualties to which our Uncertain state is expos'd and laying to heart the sudden Chances that happen to others which might have been his own case hereupon not with a perpetual anxious doubt the danger is too unlâ—keâ—y to require that but with a prudent care lest it should be his own Lot to be so suddenly surpriz'd he endeavours to stand daily on his guard and out of that consideration to keep a good Conscience and a Will resign'd to Gods in all things which disposition evidently discovers some degree of Suspense As for careless and inconsiderate Livers I doubt not but they often Assent absolutely the world 's their own beyond reason that is out of meer passion and precipitancy till some imminent danger give a check to their blind Security but the Reward of their Unreasonableness and Rashness in assenting absolutely without just ground is this that they have even from hence some less degree of Concern to amend their lives and if they be overtaken with any sudden disaster less if any resignation to
the small strength they have when they do their utmost is not earnestly and heartily engag'd neither in the Patronage of our Cause or in proving it probable there 's a GOD but onely incline favourably towards us rather than the other Besides those who are of moderate tempers use to be favourable to every Body and there is not in the whole World such sweet soft-natur'd melting pliable tender-hearted compassionate and indulgent things as these same Probabilities They are ever at hand to lend their weak help to any body that wants a good Argument and will fit any Cause in the World good or bad Yet for all their kind and gentle behaviour in obliging none to assent to them or say as they do as your rude Demonstrations use I have notwithstanding a kind of prejudice against them which is that they are False hearted and use to play Jack-a-both-sides most egregiously for scarce was there ever any Tenet in the world so absurd but when not one good Reason durst appear for it this tatling Gossip Dame Probability would for all that undertake it and let her have but her neat Chamber-maid Rhetorick to trick her up with Laces Spangles Curles Patches and other such pretty Baubles she will dare to incounter with any Truth in the World or maintain the most absurd Paradox imaginable as Dr. T. and his Friend well know else they would be out of heart ever to write more And this is the Reason I conceive why p. 22. he calls them FAIR saying If FAIR Probabilities of Reason concur with Testimony and no less than thrice in the same page he makes mention of FAIR Proofs He says not GOOD Proofs or CONCLVSIVE that the Thing is TRVE or that there 's a GOD no take heed of that this would quite take the business out of the hand of Probability which a Rhetorical Divine ought not to do for nothing suits with Rhetorick's humour so well as Probabiâ—ity does and Demonstration cares not one straw for her But he gives them their just due and calls them onely Fair Proofs and Fair Probabilities that is Pretty Plausible and Taking and if they were not so of themselves what is there which a little daubing with Rhetorical Varnish will not make FAIR But the Upshot oâ— Sum Total of his Proofs is the best sport if it were not most pernicious 't is this That these Fair Probabilities taken together and in their united force have a great deal of Conviction in them Which amounts to this plain Confession though couch'd in wary Terms that there is not one good Proof amongst them all yet many bad ones put together will make a good one I know indeed that a concurrence of many Likelihoods renders a thing more Probable and encourages us to Outward Action but to think that many Probabilities will reach that Indivisible Point in which Truth and consequently our Assent to any thing as a Truth is found is quite to mistake the nature of Truth and Assent too which consist in Is or Is not and since to convince rationally is to conclude the thing is I desire Dr. T's Logick to inform the World how since a Probable Proof is that which onely concludes the thing Probable and consequently many probable ones are terminated in rendring it MORE Probable how I say many Proofs onely Probable can conclude the thing to be MORE THAN PROBABLE that is to be CERTAINLY or convince the Understanding that 't is unless they happen to engage some Nature or other and consequentâ—y some Identical Proposition which Dr. T. neither pretends nor goes about to show but on the other side declares himself an utter Enemy to such Principles and consequently to such a way of Discourse § 12. In a word Dr. T's Positive Proofs of a Godhead are reducible to these two Heads Humane Testimony and Probabilities of Reason as appears by his own words Serm. p. 22 23. and Testimony which p. 22. he tells us is the Principal Argument in a thing of this nature he divides into Vniversal Tradition and Written History Now Written History is not therefore True because 't is writ but depends upon Living Authority or Tradition to authenticate it and how ridiculous he would make the Certainty of Tradition even that which is confessedly grounded on the Sensations of great multitudes which is vastly above this here spoken of is seen in hâ—s Rule of Faith and here again he tells us Pref. p. 16. All Humane Testimony is Fallible and so all built on it is possible to be False for this plain reason because all men are Fallible Wherefore according to his Grounds 't is concluded there may possibly be No GOD for any thing Humane Testimony says to the Point And 't is as evident from the very word that Probabilities of Reason though never such Fair ones conclude as little Lastly he tells us Serm. p 22. that Fair Probabilities of Reason concurring with Testimony this Argument has all the strength it can have and thus Dr. T. instead of proving there is a GOD has endeavour'd to make out very learnedly that it may be there 's no such Thing and that neither Reason nor Authority can evince the Truth of the Point § 13. I omit his abusing the word Testimony which is built on Sensations in alledging it to prove a Creation which neither was nor could be subject to the Senses of the first Mankind nor consequently could the persuasion of future Deliverers and Writers have for its Source Attestation or Testimony I omit also his negâ—ecting to make use of Testimony to prove Miracles GOD's proper Effect which are subject to Sense and which both Christians Jews and Heathens of all Nations and Times both unanimously have and the first Seers could properly attest I suppose his Confidence in his Rhetorick made him chuse the worser Arguments to show how prettily he could make them look or perhaps the Genius of Things lie so that the slightest Arguments most need and so best suit with Rhetorical Discoursers § 14. By this time I suppose Gentlemen there will appear just reason for that moderate and civil hint I gave Dr. T. in my Introduction to Faith Vindicated of the weakness of his Grounds in these words In which Sermon under the Title of the Wisdom of being Religious and a great many seeming shows and I heartily think very real Intentions of impugning Atheism by an ill-principled and in that circumstance imprudent and unnecessary Confession in equivalent Terms of the possible Falsehood of Faith nay even as to the Chiefest and most Fundamental Point the Tenet of a Deity Religioâ— receives a deep wound and Atheism an especial advantage as may perhaps be more particularly shown hereafter After which I give his Sermon all its due Commendations and then subjoyn Onely I could wish he had right Principles to ground his discourse without which he can never make a Controvertist but must needs undermine the solid Foundation of Christianity if he undertake to meddle with
and the Book it self to merit no Reply You see here Gentlemen how great stress I lay upon Dr. T.'s confession that the Ground of his Faith and consequently his Faith it self is possible to be False And really if he clears himself of it I must acknowledg I suffer a very great Defeat because I so much Build upon it If he does not he is utterly overthrown as to all intents and purposes either of being a good Writer or a solid Christian Divine and he will owe the World satisfaction for the Injury done to Faith and the Souls of those whom his Doctrine has perverted by turning their Faith which ought to be an Assent whose Grounds and consequently it self are Impossible to be an Error or False into Opinion whose Grounds and by consequence it self are possible to be such and lastly unless he Avoids or Râ—â—ants this Error objected all he has Written 〈◊〉 â—â—nvinc't without any more ado to be againâ—â—â—ith and its true Grounds and so it will be quite overthrown in the Esteem of all those who have the Nature of Faith writ in their hearts and that 't is Impossible an Act of right Faith that is an Asseâ—â— built on those Grounds God has left in the Church for Mankind to embrace Faith and commanded them to believe upon those Grounds whether Scripture's Letter or the Churches Voice should be an Error or the Profession of it a Lye which all sober Protestants Presbyterians nay almost all Sects except some few witty men inclining much by reading such Authours to Scepticism that is inclining to be nothing at all perhaps some Socinians reject abhominate and hate with all their hearts The Charge is laid and the Case is put now let us come to the Trial Which ere we do I desire those Readers who have Dr. T.'s Preface by them to read his 9 th page or else his whole page 118. in his Rule of Faith lest either of us may injure him by a wrong Apprehension I discourse thus § 2. First 't is Evident that he who makes the Ground and Rule of Faith possible to be False makes Faith it self such likewise since nothing is or can be stronger than the Grounds it stands on Next the Rule of Faith to Dr. T. is the Scripture's Letter and consequently that what he conceives the Sense of the Scripture is God's Sense or Faith Lastly that in the place now Cited and Related by him he speaks of the Authority of the Book of Scripture and of its Sence as he acknowledges here page 15. These things thus premised I put him this Dilâ—mma Either he holds what he conceives to to be the Sence of Scripture that is his Faith True or he does not If he holds it not to be True then 't is unavoidable he must hold it at least possible to be False if not actually such But if he says he holds it to be True then since after he had spoke of the security he had or had not of the Book and Sense of Scripture he immediately subjoyns these very words It is possible all this â—ay be otherwise He as evidently says that what he conceives the Book of Scripture and Sence of such or such passages in it that is his Faith is possible to be False as 't is that what 's OTHERWISE THAN TRVE is False I do not know how Dr. T. could possibly speak more plainly what I charge him with than he has done in those words unless he should use the word False which too Candid and Rude expression would expose him openly to the dislike of all Sober mâ—n and therefore he disguiz'd it in its more moderate Equivalent otherwise I say Equivalent And if it be not I would gladly know of him what the word otherwise relates to Human Language forbids that any thing can be said to be otherwise unless it be otherwise than something I ask then otherwise than what does he mean when being in the Circumstance of Discoursing what security he had of the Antiquity Writers and Sence of Scripture he told us It is possible to may be otherwise Is it not as evident as words can express he must mean It is possible the Book of Scripture is not so antiâ—nt as the Apostles time It is possible it was not Writ by the Apostles and Evangelists It is possible this is not the Sence of it in such passages as concern Faith for to these and these only our Discourse and the Nature and Title of his Book determin'd it which amounts to this that none has absolute Certainty of either Letter or Sence of Scripture nor consequently of his Faith in case it be solely grounded upon that as he professes See Reader how all Truths even the most Sacred ones go to wrack when men fram'd only for fine Talk undertake to prove and how parallel his defence of the Ground of all Christian Faith is to that he gave us lately of the Existence of a Deity He so prov'd a God that he granted it possible there might be none and now he so proves Scripture to be a Rule that he grants it possible it may be no Rule since common Sence tells us that can never be an Intellectual Rule which followed may lead into Errour By which we see Dr. T. needed here the Blessing as he calls it of that Identical Proposition A Rule 's a Rule else he would not write a Book to prove Scripture a Rule and then ever and anon in equivalent Language tell us 't is none I wish he would now and then reflect upon such Evident Truths and not out of an openly-declar'd Feud against those First Principles fall thus perpetually into manifest Contradictions § 3. But how does Dr. T. clear himself of this Charge of mine or how comes he off from his own words First he again puts down those very words which say over and over what I charge upon him and then asks very confidently where he says any such thing which is just as wise a craft as Children use when they hoodwink themselves and then tell the By-standers they shall not see them Next he tells us that All he sayes is that we are not Infallible in judging of the Antiquity of a Book or the sence of it meaning that we cannot demonstrate these things so as to to shew the contrary necessarily involves a contradiction but yet c. Is this all he sayes What then is become of those famous words It is possible all this may be otherwise which were onely objected But let us examine what he does acknowledge Whether he be Infallibly certain or no it matters not but it should be shewn why if Scripture be the sole Ground of Faith some at least in the World who are to Govern and Instruct the Church should not be thus certain of both in case we be bound to assent and as we questionless are dy to attest the Points of our Faith to be absolutely-certain Truths Again if Dr. T. be not Infallibly certain
whatever is good in those Acts of Faith is refunded into God the Author of every good Gift as its Original Cause what Defective into the Limitedness and Imperfection of Creatures § 5. This Tenet of Infallibility which unprejudic'd Nature teaches even the rudest in things subject to Sense and common Reason and Learned men in things provable by exact Art the Adversaries of true Certainty our Scepticks in Religion endeavour to render ridiculous and cast a mist about it by the most unreasonable pretence that ever was invented which is to affirm that a man cannot be Infallible in one thing but he must be so in all As if I could not infallibly know what 's done in my Chamber or practic'd openly amongst those I converse with but I must be likewise infallible in knowing what is done in the Moon And Dr. T. is one of these for Contradiction is as natural to him as 't is to a fish to swim who tells us here pag. 19. That Omniscience within a determinate Sphere is an Infinite within a finite Sphere as if it were very evident that to know All in such a matter is to know Infinit or all things in the World or so hard to comprehend that one may know all the money in ones Purse without knowing all the money that is extant or all the men in the room without knowing all Mankind I wish Dr. T. would shew us why knowing all in such a particular matter must needs argue an Infinit knowledg or why the knowing all things in a determinate Sphere which last words when he came to answer that is break his Jests our Prevaricator prudently omitted may not consist with an ignorance of many things out of that Sphere Must the word All in such a matter needs signifie Infinit or did the commonest Reason ever thus go wrack I suppose my Friends resolute hazard against Identical Propositions made him fall into this more than childish mistake For this plain Truth What 's all but in one matter onely is all but in one matter onely had preserv'd him from this Nonsense but he took this for his Ground to proceed upon that All in one matter onely 〈◊〉 All in every matter or which is more is Infinit and so still he continues most learnedly to lay Contradictions for his First Principles because their Interest and his are inseparably linkâ— against the Common Enemy Identical Propositions This I must confess is a very smart and ingâ—nious kind of reasoning and proper to Dr. T. unless perhaps his sworn Brother at hating First Principles and Papists put in for a share It appears by a certain Paper called Dr. Stillingfleet against Dr. Stillingfleet he is a strong pretender and will cry halfs But 't is time now to return to examine his Answer § 6. It is not necessary indeed to Truth that every one should demonstrate a thing so as to shew that the contrary necessarily involves â— Contradiction for the same thing may be known also through Practical Self-evidence to those who cannot demonstrate but yet the thing must be demonstrable else 't is not Knowable or Ascertainable For Demonstrable is a plain honest word what game soever Dr. T. and his Friend make at it and imports no more abstracting from subtle quirks but only Capable to be known or Intellectually seen by way of Proof whence a Learned man who goes about to prove any thing by strength of severe Reason ought either to demonstrate it or he falls short of his Dâ—â—y Once more I desire Dr. T. to take me right and to reflect that when I say The Thing is Demonstrable or pretend to demonstrate I do not take the word Demonstration with all those many subtleties and perquisits the Schools require I as little love niceties as any man living and can as easily dispense with them so the solid part be well provided for and the Truth of the Thing establisht which if it be not done I make account nothing is done in these cases in which Assent dying to attest things to be Truths are required I onely mean then by Demonstration such a Proof as is taken not from any Exrinsecal consideration as is Authority which grounds Belief but from the intrinsecal Nature of the Thing or Subject in Dispute and such a Proof as necessarily concludes the Thing to be which cannot be possibly done without engaging finally some Identical Proposition or that Things being what it is on which all is built Now this being evidently so and if it be not let Dr. T. shew the contrary I would ask our verbal Divine why he ought not to demonstrate that is prove by necessary concluding Argument both the Letter and Sence of Scripture if he would have men assent most firmly to Faith built according to him solely upon their Certainty Is it not his intent in his Discourses to Conclude what he speaks of How can he do this unless he shews the Conclusion necessarily follows Again does he not intend to conclude 't is a Truth that this is the Letter and Sence of Scripture He must do so or else he can never pretend that Faith built upon it is Truth And if he proves it Truâ— must he not at the same time prove it's Contradictory False And is any thing False but what says a Thing is so when indeed 't is not so or is not so when indeed 't is so which is a direct Contradiction Wherefore Dr. T. can never Conclude a thing to be True unless he brings a Proof necessarily engaging the Nature of the Thing that is unless according to my sence of the Word he both Demonstrates and also shews the contrary necessarily to involve a Contradiction Both these satisfactory Certainties my Grounds attribute to Scriptures Letter and Sence See Surâ—f pag. 116 117 in points appertaining to Faith and he here denies both pag. 10. whence is seen which of us two has more real Honour and Respect for Scripture He who makes neither its Letter or Sence to have any Grounds able to ascertain them that is as to our purpose makes them good for nothing or I who grant and prove both § 7. I suppose Dr. T will say again as he did in that point of a Deity that the nature of the Thing will not bear a Certainty of Scriptures Letter or Sence that so he may be true to his firm Principle and make all Faith alike uncertain I answer the more blame will fall to their share who take away the Certainty of that which is the first Principle in way of Authority or First Authority namely TRADITION which and onely which can Authenticate Books and the thing being of high Concern Practically carry down the same Doctrine and so easily preserve the Book significative of the same Sence Noâ— doubt I but 't is demonstrable that the Practice of England and the Concern of the thing joyn'd with the necessary Evidence of any Alteration in a matter daily so nicely Canvast and continually Us'd can and
tell him the firmness of a Rational Assent ought to be taken from Principles or the Object not from the Subject's firmly adhering to it and admonish him that this later sort of Firmness without the other signifies nothing but an Irrational Resolution to hold a thing right or wrong he cuts you off short and blames the Grounds of Christian Faith telling you the nature of the Things will bear no more At which if your Reason repines and begins to despair of satisfaction he tells you smartly that you contradict a First and Firm Principle that to have as much Assurance as the thing affords you is to be Certain of it Prodigious folly not to distinguish between these two most evident Notions I am fully perswaded and the Thing is certainly so And alledging our not doubting or strong adhesion to a thing for an competent Explication of that Certainty which ought to be the greatest in the whole world since more Sacred Concerns than any the world can shew are built upon it which adhesion also as Nature teaches us is very frequently an effect of Passion Common Experience manifesting it to be a fault annext to the very Nature of Man that his Uâ—derstanding is liable to be byast by his Will where his very Essence is not concern'd so as not to make the least doubt of may more oftentimes to hold firmly whatever habitual Prejudice Affection to Friends precipitate hast or fullen Ignorance has once addicted him to All I can imagine in Dr. T's behalf is this that he must alledge he conceives this Assurance or Firm Adhesion is a proper Effect of the Object working it in his Understanding and that therefore he could not have this firm Assurance or Adhesion to it unless the Thing were indeed such in it self This every Intelligent man sees is his only way to come off but this he neither has attempted to do nor ever shall be in the least able to compass till he retract his costly anger against First Principles his drollish Abuses against Demonstration his Accusing the things of Invisibleness instead of blaming his own bad Eyes and lastly his miscall'd Firm Principle which makes all built upon it no better than empty Contradiction Yet if he pleases to shew us that the Object doth rationally assure him the thing is so by affording such proofs as of their own nature are able to make us assent firmly to it as a Truth and not only incline us towards it as a Likelihood let him go to work Logically that being the proper Science in this case and shew us how and by what virtue any proof of his is able to effect this and I promise him faithfully to respect and treat him with a great deal of Honour though his performance comes off never so short But I foresee three Insuperable difficulties lie in his way first that he sees his Cause cannot bear it for which he still blames the Nature of the Thing Next that the deep Study or the most Learned Science of Elegant Expressions so totally possesses his Mind it will not let Logick have any part in his thought And lastly if it does yet he may hap to meet there with some unelegant Terms of Art which will quite fright him from his business and make him forswear the most evident Truths in the world § 9. But he hath only skirmish'd hitherto now â—he comes to close Dispute and will prove that take Faith how I will he does not in these words avow the possible falshood of Faith and that he may not fail to hit right on my meaning of the word Faith he divides the Text and gives us many Senses of that word those as ridiculous as he could imagine which would make the unexamining Reader judg verily that I were out of my Wits to take the word Faith in such absurd meanings and then hold it Impossible to be False This done he shews himself a most Victorious Conquerour and Confutes me powerfully from pag. 10. to pag. 13. At least would not Dr. T's best Friend so he were but any thing Ingenuous think he might safely swear that either he did not know what I meant by the word Faith when I say Faith is impossible to be False or else candidly acknowledg that he is strangely Insincere to counterfeit so many Imaginary Tenets and then one by one confute them Read them here from the middle of pag. 10. to pag. 12. and then reflect on my words found in my Introduction to Faith Vindicated pag. 17 which are these To ask then if Faith can possibly be False is to ask whether the Motives laid by Gods Providence for Mankind or his Church to embrace Christian Faith must be such as of their own Nature cannot fail to conclude those Points True and to affirm that Faith is not possible to be False is equivalently to assert that those Motives or the Rule of Faith must be thus absolutely Conclusive Firm and Immovable Hence is seen that I concern not my self in this Discourse with how perfectly or imperfectly divers Persons penetrate those Motives or how they satisfie or dissatisfie some particular Persons since I only speak of the Nature of those Motives in themselves and as laid in second Causes by Gods Providence to light Mankind in their way to Faith To which the dimness of Eye-sight neglect to look at all or looking the wrong way even in many particular men is Extrinsecal and Contingent Observe Gentlemen what exquisite Care I took to declare my meaning so perfectly that the common regard to Readers and his own Reputation might restrain Dr. T. from imposing wilfully a wrong sence to which habitual fault I knew he had otherwise most strong Inclinations Observe next that all his confute is wholly built on this known mistake Hence his objecting the weak Understandings of some Believers which is both forestal'd by the woâ—ds now cited declaring that I only speak of the Motives to light Mankind or the Church to Faith and what they are of their own Nature or in themselves not how perfectly or imperfectly others penetrate them besides I put this very Objection against my self Faith Vindicated p. 164. and answer it which he never acknowledging it was mine puts here as his own against me without taking the least notice of my Answer there given The last meaning he gives of the word Faith which is the Means and Motives to Faith is nearest to mine But because he leaves out the consideration of their being ordained by God for his Church as also of what they are in their own Nature or by virtue of the Object and speaks of them only as in the worst Subject viz. in weak Persons which penetrate them very little he misses wholly my Sense and so impugns me nor at all but skirmishes with his own shadow For what kind of consequence is this St. Austin says Some Persons are sav'd not by the quickness of their Vnderstandings but by the Simplicity of their Belief Therefore
Object 't is possible or within the compass of Gods power to make all Mankind err yet taking in his other Attributes which determin his Omnipoence to do only what 's Wise and Good and according to Truth it cannot be God should either will or do it and so it cannot be effectively done at all § 18. He objects that the Church of Rome challenges Infallibility upon no other account but that of Supernatural Assistance I answer the Church had her Rule of Faith left to her hand by Jesus Châ—ist who founded and constituted her and found it not out by Speculative Reason Whence 't is not the proper Concern of a Church to discourse very particularly about the manner and nature of the Rule of Faith but of Speculative Divines who look into the natures of things and there find the Reasons of those Truths God has barely told us Next 't is only of Faith that Christ has promis'd to assist his Church but whether Supernaturally only or also by Natural means is no where defin'd my Tenet is that he assists his Church both ways as I at large defend in Surefooting and that the best strength of Nature and Grace are both of them exerted to their utmost to ascertain the Infallible Authority on whose Testimony we receive our Faith But with this difference that the Supernatural Assistance exceedingly comforts Faith in those who are True Believers already and the Natural Assistance as far as concerns the due Satisfaction of Reason informs the Understanding of those who yet discern no Supernatâ—rality at all in the Church and have nothing but their Natural Reason to guide themselves by without which I see not how either a Circle is avoidable or rational Satisfaction to such men possible for were not a Natural Assistance admitted to introduce the knowledge of the other Supernaturals would be the way to Supernaturals and Faith the means to arrive at Faith which would confound the Means with the End I wish Dr. T. would leave off this new way of confuting by telling me still I am the only man or first man that said he should have said proov'd such or such a thing which cavil if he answer not my Argument as he seldome thinks of that duty signifies either nothing at all or else a high Commendation to me as improving Knowledge to some degree But more of this point when I come to defend my Method § 19. Hitherto then Dr. T. has given us no Absolute Certainty either of the Existence of a Deity oâ— of Christian Faith as far as it depends on the Letter of Scripture but onely such miscall'd Certainty as means Vncertainty whence his pretended Certainty of its Sence falls to the Ground But let us see how he vindicates the Certainty of Faith and himself not to hold it possible to be false by ascertaining at least the Sense of it supposing the Letter were right He tells us pag. 20. That as for the Sense of Books 't is plainly impossible any thing should be delivered in such clear and Certain words as are absolutely incapable of any other Sense And what 's the natural Sequel of this appli'd to Scripture but that 't is plainly Impossible Faith built on thaâ— Sense or rather which is that Sense should not be possible to be False and consequently the Letter can never be a competent Rule of Faith whereas in this way of conveying iâ— down by Living Voice and Practise of the Church that is â—y Cateâ—hizing publike Preaching private Discoursing consonant Living 't is made so manifest to the Generality what was held in each year immemediately before that no prejudice can make them all so mad as either to mistake or misrepresent it as 't is for Example in England for the Generality of Protestants to err or impose this this year upon the Belief of England that last year they held and practic'd Prayer for the Dead or assisting at the Christian Sacrifice By which 't will be easily seen whether of us two makes better provision for the Certainty of Faith He proceeds Yet notwithstanding this the meaning of them may be so plain as that any unprejudic'd and reasonable man may certainly understand them Let him apply this to Scripture the discourse stands thus All men are unreasonable and prejudic't who take not Scripture in my sense If this be not the meaning of his words let him tell us by what other Maxims he guides himself in judging who are such when he tells us any unprejudic't and rersonable man may certainly understand the Sense of Scripture If he can assign no other reason of those mens Faultiness but their disagreeing with him in the meaning of Scripture I doubt his Readers will scarce believe him that all Socinians and other Sects who differ from him in main Points are Passionate and Prejudic't If an indifferent man stood by while D. T. and a Socinian disputed and heard one of them cite place after place compare one place to another and use all the means he could to make out the right sense of the words and the other use the self-same Method and yet nothing concluded decisively as it never was in this way of managing disputes I fear he would be little the nearer satisfaction and embracing Dr. T's Tenet upon his saying that his Adversary was passionate and prejudic't He parallels the Certainty of Scripture Sence to that of Euclids Definitions and Axioms in the sense of which men are universally agreed and think themselves undoubtedly Certain of it and yet the words in which they are exprest may possibly bear another sence He trifles Let him show me the Generality of Scripturists as unanimously agreeing in the sense of Scripture as Geometricians do in those Axioms and Definitions or let him leave of bringing such disagreeing Parallels importing that there are not men of all Sides and Sects as willing to see Truth in things belonging to their eternal Salvation as to see the Truth in Mathematicks How many Interpretations are there of This is my Body and of those many Texts which signifie Christ to be true God Both of main Concern the understanding them wrong being on one side Idolatry on the other Blasphemy Yet we have Eminent Learned men Acute Wits Excellent Linguists Good Logicians and Historians and lastly very great Scripturists who compare also place to place yet all this notwithstanding nothing is decided finally still they Debate Write Quote Interpret and will do while this Method is taken to the Worlds End Does Dr. T. find such a disagreement amongst men Learned in the Mathematicks in the understanding the Axioms and Definitions of Euclid Add that those men in other matters are not Passionate or Prejudic't but are held Prudenâ— and Sober by great portions of Mankind nor do they lose their Repute amongst Indifferent Judges as renouncing their Manhood or perfectly deserting Reason that is they are not held Madmen for not adhering to such a determinate Sense of those places which argues
the former Proof as put down by himself here pag. 24. is to conclude it Impossible that THESE Points of Faith should be False that is SVCH points as express only the An est of a thing and so have for their Predicate Existent as I exprest my self in that Argument And my Conclusion of the 2 d. Proof is this as put down by himself here pag. 25. 'T is impossible therefore that what is thus affirm'd to be True that is in such words as can bear no pertinent distinction should in any regard be affirm'd possible to be False the impossibility of distinguishing the Predicate pertinent ly excluding here all possibility of diverse respects Is this barely to go about to prove that what 's True is Impossible to be False or rather that no different regards or respects can in such Faith-propositions as these be made use of to elude or diminish the granting their Intire Truth The Proposition An Ethiopian is black is but in part True because it can bear diverse respects or regards to distinguish it pertinently viz. according to his Teeth and his Skin But in those Propositions which have Existent for their predicate no imaginable regards can be found appliable to it so to distinguish it pertinently The next Falsification of my Intention is to pretend that I argue barely out of the nature of Subject Copula and Predicate whereas by my whole Discourse 't is most evident that I argue precisely from their being such Subjects and Predicates that is such as could bear no pertinent Distinction diminishing the Integrity of their Truth In a word the Question was about the Truth or which is all one Impossibility of Falshood in Faith-Propositions and I was there treating it Logically I would gladly then have any sober and Intelligent man inform me why it was not as proper and pertinent for me to argue out of the nature of Propositions in which only Truth is found and particularly out of the nature of such Propositions that is those who have such Subjects such Predicates in them as it is for a Mathematician writing a Discourse of Trigonometry to argue out of the nature of such a kind of Angle or a Triangular Figure Or why in so doing I can justly be thought to have deflected from the Rules or Method of exactest Art § 8. In a word had I in a Christian English Sermon stood very gravely repeating Sixteen verses out of a Heathenish Latin Poet or had I after I had so often mock't at others for bumbast Rhetorick and so indirectly extoll'd my self for my smooth style talkt of persons of a PROFLIGATE TEMPER as did Dr. T. here pag. 33. and pag. 163. Some idle Wit who had nothing else to do might perhaps have taken just occasion to sport himself with my imperfection But to mock at a Writer for using the Terms proper to the Art he is discoursing in seems to argue a very Profligate temper of Levity at least that I may say no worse § 9. Thus much for his first Answer to faith Vindicated consisting wholly of Drollery Neglects and other worse Faults His second is that the main of that Book being to prove that what 's True is Impossible to be False I oppose no body that â—e knows of in this matter I answer whoever pleases to run over the several Heads from which I argue in Faith Vindicated hinted briefly in the Margent will see that that which he pretends in a manner the only point is but once designedly made use of and very rarely toucht at in other places and that there are near forty Proofs of another nature though sometimes all Truths being connected they happen to be partly coincident into the same Sometimes also I suppose it but it bears no show of reason that most of my Book is spent in proving it But is it so clear that I oppose no body he knows of in proving that what is True is Impossible to be False Does not he know one Dr. T. That same person I suppose will tell us soberly that he can prove his Faith True relying on what he conceives to be the Letter and Sense of Scripture and yet speaking of the Certainty he had of both these he told us expresly Rale of Faith pag. 118. All this may possibly be otherwise that is that possibly he has neither right Letter nor right Sense of Scripture and consequently that what he affirms to be his Faith and True is notwithstanding Possible to be False The same man being to vindicate himself in this Pref. pag. 10. explain'd his meaning to be that he could not demonstrate those things so as to shew that the Contrary necessarily involves a Contradiction Now if he cannot prove that the Contrary to any thing involves a Contradiction he can never prove that contrary to be False nothing being False which clashes not by consequence at least with some First Principle or involves a Contradiction and as long as he cannot prove it False 't is possible to be True for any thing he knows and if the Contrary to Faith be affirm'd possible to be True Faith it self must be possible to be False and yet though his discourses make it Possible to be False the obligation incumbent on him as a Christian forces him 〈◊〉 affiâ—m that 't is notwithstanding True So that the Goodness of Christianity joyn'd with the Badness of his Grounds oblige him to grant equivalently though he be warier than to do it directly that what is True is possible to be False § 10. Now because 't is against the very grain of Rational nature to admir of such a palpable Contradiction if the word Truth be rightly and properly understood hence I am Certain he and such as he are provided with a dâ—stinction at the bottom of their hearts and only hold that their Faith is morally True that is some great Likelihood or as True as many things are of which we judg our selves morally Certain and did not in the least doubt of them yet oftentimes upon clearer Information have found our selves deceiv'd in our Opinion of them and the Thing to be False And that this is Dr. T's sentiment in this matter appears farther besides what hath been now said from his owning such a moral Certainty only for the Grounds of his Faith as frees one from doubt from his feeble and dwindlings Expressions of his Certainty of a Godhead and lastly from his blaming me pag. 29. for râ—sting contented with no less Certain Grounds than such as are absolutely Conclusive of the thing And how one who relies on his Speculative Proofs for the Renouncers of Tradition can have no claim to Practical Self-evidence can be thought to hold Faith absolutely True and yet disclaim himself and blame in others the pretending to such Motives as absolutely conclude or prove it to be True or how a man can with honesty affirm a thing is absolutely True and yet deny he is absolutely Certain of it I must confess
both passes my Imagination and I am confident every man's living who considers well what he says 'T is Evident then from Dr. T's whole Carriage in this business that unless perhaps the natural force of Tradition work a Practical-self evidence in him of those points in which they who hold to Tradition and He agree which he is not aware of Dr. T. does not hold his Faith absolutely but morally True which is a very strong piece of Nonsence as was shown in Faith Vindicated and will be seen hereafter and therefore it was but â—itting and necessary that I should clear the word Truth from a ridiculous Equivocation or impertinent Distinction put upon it by such Sceptical pretenders to Christianity and manifest that the word Truth in those Propositions which express the An est of a thing speaks Being and so necessarily involves Impossibility of not being or Impossibility of Falshood in its notion or which is all one materially though formally 't is different that what 's True must be Impossible to be False § 11. Hence will appear the reason why I affirm'd that discourse more than Mathematically-demonstrative because it was immediately built on that First Principle in Metaphysicks 'T is impossible the same thing should be and not be at once Which is Superiour to and clearer than any Mathematical Principle since the verity of all the Maxims of This depend on the Truth of the Other Or to explain my self more fully because 't is intirely built on the notion or nature of Being which is more Evident than any Mathematical one If he denies it he is desir'd to produce any Mathematical notion which is of equal clearness which done a little reflexion will teach him that that Mathematical notion whatever it is can bear a Definition that is can be represented or made clearer than it was while exprest by that single word defin'd whereas the notion of Being cannot possibly bear any but while we go about to explicate it better we are forc't to put its own notion in its definition and other notions besides less Evident than it self and so while we go about to explicate it better we explain it worse whence it will appear evidently by our defeat when we attempt to clear it better that 't is the clearest notion that is or clearer than Mathematical ones and consequently the discourses grounded on the Nature of Being are more than Mathematically demonstrative But I pardon this mistake to Dr. T. whom I verily judg to be sincerely Ignorant in such kind of speculations and not affectedly only as he discovers himself to be in multitudes of others Hence by the way is seen also how strangely the World is mistaken in Metaphysicks esteeming that highest Science intolerably obscure and impenetrably difficult whereas its Object being those notions that concern Being all its Obscurity and Hardness to one whom right Logick hath taught accurately to distinguish and steadily to keep distinct his notions consist only in this that 't is too Luminous and Intelligible in the same manner as the Sun is hard to be seen at Noon-day whence it happens that because we are inur'd by custome to make Definitions or Explications of what we are discoursing about and here the Subject not needing nor bearing it we can make none of Being which is the Principal Object in that Science hence being put out of our road we are at a puzzle and seem to have lost our way through too much light But 't is time now to return to his Confutation of Faith Vindicated § 12. His next Answer is that in asserting Infallibility to be necessary to the true nature of Faith I have the Generality of my own Church my professed Adversaries That is Dr. T. will say any thing Let him show me I will not say the Generality or any great number but even any one particular Catholick professing either that he relies not on the Church for his Faith or that the Church he relies on is not Infallible and I here declare that he is no Catholick and doubt not but â—ll good Sons of the Church will joyn with me in looking upon him as such I hope those Readers who are Scholars will by the way reflect how solid a Method Dr. T. still takes to confute my Discourse which is to let all my Proofs or Premises alone untoucht and fall to combat my Conclusion with Extrinsecal Mediums Next he tells â—s the Church of Rome pretends only to Infallibility founded on Christs Promise to secure the Church from Errour by a Supernatural Assistance which is evidently different from Mr. S ' s. Rational Infallibility of Tradition In which discourse are almost as many faults as words For 1. It supposes the Church excludes the concurrence of natural means to her Infallibility which he shall never show Next it supposes I exclude Supernatural Assistance and admit only Natural whereas I expresly include and openly vouch it in Sure footing from pag. 85. to pag. 93. And 3 ly He supposes that Supernatural and Rational are Inconsistent whereas in the place now cited and never spoke to in his much applauded Rule of Faith I all a long prove the Supernatural means to be very Rational and have so good an Opinion of God's Government of the World as to make account that Supernatural things have far more excellent Reason for them than Natural ones and that God does not enviously hide from us the sight of those Reasons but permits and wills they should be seen and penetrated by those who are disposed and capable by the antecedent Illumination of Faith assisted by other Natural Knowledges to look into them § 13. After this he tells us That the Divines of our Church before this new way was found out did generally resolve Faith into the Infallible Testimony of the Church and this into our Saviours promise and the Evidence of the â—rue Church into motives onely Prudential So that what he lately put upon our Church is now come to signifie Divines of oâ—a Church which gives us to understand Dr. T. makes account that Faith and School-Divinity Church and Schools Humane deduction and Divine Revelation signifie one and the same thing Next he â—cquaints us that this new way of ours was the old way in case the Divines did generally before this new way was found out resolve Faith into the Infallible Testimony of the Church For nothing is more Evident than that all the late Explicaters of Tradition make it the same with the Attestation or Testimony of the Church In that which follows I partly agree with that other sort of Divines partly I dissent from them I agree with them that our Saviour promist Infallibility to his Church as also that the knowledge of this Promise had by Faith is an excellent satisfaction to those who are already Faithful but I say withal that being a Point of Faith it can be no part of the Rule of Faith for so the same thing would in the same respect be
before and after it self as also that for the same Reason it can have no force upon one not yet arriv'd at Faith as the Rule of Faith ought to have because 't is as yet unknown to him § 14. Again I agree with them that there are ought to be many several Prudential Reasons suted to men of several Capacities and Circumstances moving them to disquisition and inclining them to embrace the right Faith and joyn themselves to the true Church but I say withal that 't is one thing to move a man to enquire and incline him to Assent another thing to settle him in a most firm Assent to such and such Points as absolutely Certain Truths which is requisit to Faith Hereupon I affirm that this later Effect cannot be wrought rationally without Grounds truly Evident and absolutely Conclusive of the thing and Knowable either by Practical Self-evidence to men of all sorts or also to the Learned by a certainly concluding Proof which I call a Demonstration I affirm moreover with due respect to those Divines that Motives onely Prudential seem improper to be named in this Case and that they must be Principia Sapientiae and not Prudentiae which can rationally make us absolutely Certain of the being or not-being of any thing that is of its Truth or Falshood the Object of Prudence being Agibilia and not Intelligibilia as such and its proper Exercise and Use being to determine a man to act exteriorly or to act thus in Circumstances where Contingency and hazard is found and not to act interiorly or meddle in the affair of Intellectual Certainty or Truth depending solely on the Principles of our Vnderstanding which are Impossible to be False and therefore plac't beyond all Contingency and Hazard In a word I shall not fear to be thought singular in my Principles while I ground my self on the nature of Faith which both all Catholicks and the Generality of those who are call'd Christians hold and St. Thomas of Aquin the Prince of School-Divines asserts as I shew'd Faith Vindicated pag. 130. § 14. As for all Objections of this nature once more I request Dr. T. to make good this Consequence that my Discourse cannot be true unless all our Divines even of the same way in common agree with me and I promise him this done to reply distinctly to all his Extrinsecal and Impertinent Exceptions which waving in the mean time my Premises he so constantly lelevels against my Conclusions And whereas he sayes I cannot reasonably charge him with those things till I have vindicated our own Divines I desire him to consider that I could not were I their Adversary charge them with what I can justly charge him They all to a man hold the Catholick Church on which they rely Infallible and hold this more firmly than they do any of their Speculations and consequently they hold their Faith Impossible to be False and so preserve the true Nature of Faith Inviolate whereas what he is to hold to most firmly according to his Principles is his own private Interpretation of Scripture which he himself and all the world besides see and hold to be Fallible and so he must say that all his Faith built upon it is possible to be a Ly for any thing he knows by which means he destroyes the nature of Faith as far as Gods Goodness will give him leave in himself and others and corrupts it into Opinion They produce Motives which though they call them Prudential are indeed some of them Demonstrative and coincident in part with Tradition whereas Dr. T. has nothing at all in his Grounds taking him as opposing Catholicks or standing to his own Rule of Faith which rightly stated has even the least shâ—w of Prudential to an unbyast man much less of Demonstrative Lastly were it a proper place to handle the point at large it were easy to shew they differ onely in a word but Dr. T. errs in the whole Thing though indeed in most of our Divines here cited he mistakes them and not they the main point whatever he pretends for however they make Prudential Motives sufficient to find the Church yet not one of them but makes the Authority of the Church when found on which they ground their Faith of far greater weight than such an Evidence as does ordinarily satisfie prudent men in humane affairs since they all hold it Infallible which is vastly more than Dr. T. holds to ground his Faith § 15. His third Answer is that this Principle of mine makes every true Believer Infallible in matters of Faith which sayes he is such a Paradox as I doubt whether ever it enter'd into any other mens mind Now this Charge of his joyn'd with my true Tenet that true Believers are those who rely on the Motives or Means left by God in his Church to light mankind in their way to Faith signifies thus much that 't is a wonderful and strange Paradox that those that follow and rely on the Motives laid by Gods Providence to direct them to Truth should in so doing not possibly be led into Error that is 't is a most absurd Paradox to say that Essential Truth should not be the Immediate and Proper Cause of Falshood But he discourses still upon this point as if I had held that the Vulgar are preserv'd from possibility of Errour or are Infallible not through the Goodness of the Grounds left by God to preserve them from Erring but from the strength of their own Vnderstanding which I do not remember I ever thought or said even of the most Learned He asks If this be true what need then of my Infallibility of Pope or Council And I ask him what need Governors when people know their Duty or Judges seeing the main of the Common Law is Traditionary to men verst in such affairs Self-known practically Let him but assure the world that no Upstart shall have an humour to rebel and innovate but that all Christians shall practice and hold to what they know evidently was practic'd and held by the immediately foregoing Church and I will assure him there will need no Infallible Desiner not any at all as to such points But Dr. T. discourses still as if there were no difference between the rude dim degree of Knowledge in the Vulgar and the accurate exact and oft-reflâ—cting Knowledge of those who by their great Learning their Education their Posture and Office are particularly verst and most deeply insighted into the affairs of Faith and all that belongs to the right explaining or wording it thence declaring it authentickly so to keep its distinct Sense clear in the minds of the Faithful which the Equivocating Witty Heretick endeavours to render confus'd and obscure I wish he would study our Tenets a while and understand them ere he undertakes to confute us He is very raw in things of this nature § 16. His next Errour is worse than the former He would fain perswade Catholicks if any
do that which before he comes to he makes such a pother and still hangs back and pretends to hold the contrary even there where he grants it as is seen in his Title But I am not so peevish and so the Truth be agreed mean not to fall out about the words let him use what he pleases in God's Name Marry I suspect his Friends will not so easily be satisfied perhaps be apt to think that this is a more speedy way of answering than a good way of confuting for in truth 't is an odd way of shewing That the Properties of a Rule of 〈◊〉 do not belong to Oral Tradition which he undertook in his Title to grant c. that it can do what a Rule should do that is has all the Properties of a Rule of Faith All I have to complain of is he recals his grant and will not stand to his word given publickly and after sufficient consideration but after he has acknowledged the Truth continues still to contradict it and bear others in hand that he has sufficiently answered what he has plainly granted This cross proceeding is a thing which as well as he has deserv'd of Truth and me I cannot approve and I heartily wish for his own and the worlds sake he would stedily own at least his own concessions In the mean time let us see if the thing be not as plain as plain may be In stead of sâ—ven Properties prov'd in my Discourse to belong to Tradition he puts two of his own First that it be plain and intelligible and this he grants here pag. 149. is found in Tradition His Second is that we must be sufficiently assured That the Doctrine delivered down by Oral Tradition hath receiv'd no corruption or change in the conveyance And here he sayes is the difficulty Where good Dr We are inquiring which is the Rule must we before we can find it be assured of the Doctrine when the Rule is the very thing which gives us this assurance If we must before-hand be assured of the Doctrine we need a Rule no more for the business is done already or if we did it is impossible to find one for Assurance of the Doctrâ—ne being the effect of the Rule we make the Rule the effect of this Assurance and so can have no Assurance till we have a Rule and no Rule till we have this Assurance This indeed is a Dâ—fficulty and I think an Insuperable one But all proceeds from his jâ—mbling two distinct Questions and confounding the First which alone I treat and he pretends to answer there namely which is the Rule of Faith with the other which I treat afterwards and examine Whether it have been alwayes followed For nothing can be more plain than that the two ways by which Christiâ—â— Doctrine may have received corruption or change are these either a defect of power or aptitude in the Rule to convey it or defect of will in the Persons who were to have been guided by it and make use of the power it has And 't is no less plain that in case we be sufficiently assured that Tradition has power and is apt to convey it uncorrupted down we are sufficiently assured that it has all that is requisite to a Rule And since Dr. T. grants 't is plain and intelligible he must grant the Persons and not the Thing or Tradition is to blame if it have not done what 't is qualified to doe To have a will to follow Tradition is the Property of the Persons or good Christians and not of the Thing they are to follow or of the Rule which if it be plain they might have followed it if they would A Sword is a Sword whether men cut with it or no and a Pen is a Pen though no man write with it Distinguishing then the Properties of of a Rule from the properties of the Persons who are to use it 't is plain that his Second Qualification sufficiently certain agrees no less to Tradition than his First sufficiently plain For what can sufficiently certain signifie more than that in case it have been used Christian Doctrine neither has nor can have received any change Both these he grants and plainly and readily and these two are all himself requires Wherefore 't is as plain as can be that there is no difficulty about the point I there treated Whether Tradition have all the properties belonging to a Rule of Faith Dr. T. his difficulty is this Whether 〈◊〉 have been followed which belongs to the Persons who should be guided by it and is wholly extrinsecal to the Nature and Constitution of a Rule § 3. The Dr. then had good Reason to say her was not concern'd to take notice of this point so when a thing is granted there is in truth little more to be said to it I for my part finde some difficulty how to reconcile his difficulty and his ready grant and make them hang together with Sense The difficulty is sayes he Whether we have sufficient assurance that the Doctrine delivered down by Oral Tradition hath received no corruption or change in its conveyance He puts it then delivered by Tradition that is he puts this Rule has been followed and before he sayes that if this Rule has been follow'd Christian Doctrine neither has nor can have received any change and then makes a difficulty whether there have been a change where there neither is nor can be any This I must confess is something difficult to apprehend Otherwise there is no difficulty at all in conceiving that if there have been any change in Christian Doctrine this must have happened not by defect of the Rule which if follow'd he sayes leaves not so much as a possibility of it but of the Persons who were deficient in their Duty and would not follow it He may perhaps say that by Delivered down he meant no more but pretended to be delivered down but to omit that by delivered to mean not delivered is something uncouth this is plainly to fasten the difficulty upon the Doctrine not the Rule and â—o doubt whether it have been follow'd not whether it be a Rule And so we have sufficient assurance at least as far as the Dr. can give it us that Tradition is as well sufficiently certain as sufficiently plain since he assures us that if it be follow'd no change in the Doctrine either is or can be which being all the Certainty can possibly be expected from or desired in a Rule his difficulty such as it is belongs to another place where 't is expresly treated And this is Dr. T's sufficient consideration of the point § 4. What pretty fantastical things these words are and how apt they are to trapan a man who looks not narrowly into their Sense One would have thought I imagine the Dr. intended men should think that his sufficiently consider'd meant sufficiently confuted When alas they signify plainly and readily granted 'T was a neat and a
by some Natural and therefore more easily-known Assistances belonging to the Church those out of her are brought to the knowledge that she is Supernaturally assisted This is the Method I take in resolving Faith If any man can show me any other that is either more solid more orderly more connatural and agreeable to the nature of Faith or more honourable to Gods Church I shall as willingly and easily quit it as I now out of long and serious consideration embrace and firmly adhere to it But it appears plain to me that whoever contradicts this especially as to that point which occasion'd this Discourse must withal contradict a Maxim on which all Science is principally built namely that The Definition is more known than the Notion defin'd which I take to be understood not onely of the Whole Definition but of each single part of it for if any one part be more obscure than the thing defin'd the whole Definition as having that obscure part in it must necessarily be more obscure likewise Wherefore the Definition of a Church being Coetus Fidelium c. A Congregation of Faithful c. the notion of Faithful and consequently of Faith must either be more Known and Knowable than that of Church and consequently antecedent to it in right method of Discourse or the Definition would be obscurer than the Thing defin'd which if it be said I must confess I know not to what end Definitions are or why they do not rather conduce to Ignorance than to Science Add that True Faith being most Intrinsecal and Essential to a Church 't is by consequence a more forcible and demonstrative Argument to convince inevitably that such a Body in which 't is found is the True Church than is any Extrinsecal Mark whatsoever And if it be objected that Extrinsecal Marks are more easily Knowable I doubt not but in those who are led away by superficial Appearances there is some show of Reason in this Objection but I utterly deny that if we go to the bottom to settle the Absolute Certainty of any of these Marks any of them can be known at all much less more easily known if the Certainty of Tradition in visible and practical matters of Fact be questionable and that neither Scripture Fathers Councils Histories Monuments or any thing else of that nature can pretend to Absolute Certainty if Tradition be Uncertain or can pretend to be known unless Tradition be first that is more known as is shown particularly in the Corollaries to Sure-footing § 11. Hence is seen that the word Tradition is taken in a threefold sence For the Way of Tradition or Delivery taken at large For the Humane or Natural Authority of the Church as delivering And lastly for its Divinely-assisted or Supernatural Authority call'd properly Christian. When 't is taken in one fence when in another the nature of the matter in hand and the concomitant circumstances will evidently determine Onely we must note that these three Notions are not adequately contradistinct the later still including the former as Length Breadth and Depth do in Continu'd Quantity For The Humane Authority of the Church includes Tradition taken at large and adds to it the best Assistances of Nature as is shown Sure-f p. 82 83. The Supernatural Authority includes all found in the other two and adds to it the best Assistances of Grace as is particularly declared there from p. 84. to p. 93. So that all the Perfection of Tradition that is imaginable is to be found in that which we call Christian or in the Testifying Authority of Christs Church § 12. But because 't is still D. T 's best play to make use of Extrinsecal Exceptions so to divert the Readers Eye and avoid answering my Intrinsecal Reasons taken from the nature of the Things with which he is loth to grapple and since amongst the rest he is very frequent at this Impertinent Topick of my discoursing the Grounds of Faith after a different manner than other Divines do it were not amiss omitting many pregnant Instances which might be collected out of Dr. Stratford the Learned Author of Protestancy without Principles and many others to the same purpose to show how far he mistakes in this point by instancing in one Controvertist of eminent both Fame and Learning as any in his time one who writ before Rushworth's Dialogues appeared or perhaps were thought of and so cannot be suspected a Follower of that New Way as Dr. T. call it I mean Mr. Fisher. This able Controvertist in his Censure of Dr. White 's Reply p. 83 84 maintains that VNWRITTEN that is Oral and Practical TRADITION is the PRIME GROVND OF FAITH more Fundamental than Scripture and shows how his Adversary Mr. White the Minister grants in effect the same In his Answer to the nine Points p. 27. he concludes strongly that Scriptures are not the Prime Principles of Faith supposed before Faith which Infidels seeing to be True resolve to believe the Mysteries of Faith but onely are secondary Truths dark and obscure in themselves believed upon the Prime Principles of Faith Which words as amply and fully express that Scripture is not the express Rule of Faith as can be imagin'd For how should that have in it self the nature of an Intellectual Rule which in it self is dark and obscure Or how can that which is believed upon the Prime Principles that is partly at least upon the Ground or Rule of Faith be any part of that Rule since what 's believ'd is the Object of Faith and so presupposes the Rule of Faith Also in the beginning of his Argument he makes the Prim◠Principles of Faith or Vnwritten Tradition as he elsewhere calls it that is the same we mean by Oral and Practical evident in it self And p. 40. he puts the Question between us and Protestants to be what is the external Infallible Ground unto which Divine Inspiration moveth men to adhere that they may be settled in the true saving Faith Where first besides Gods grace moving us to every good Act which all Catholicks hold to be necessary there is requisite according to him an External Infallible Ground next that without such a Ground a man cannot be settled in true saving Faith Again p. 38 coming to lay the ground of knowing any Doctrine to be Apostolical he mentions none but onely Publick Catholick Tradition taught unanimously and perpetually by Pastors which p. 37. he calls a Rule Infallible and says that onely Hereticks charge it to be Fallible where also he explains the meaning of his Principle that The Apostolical Doctrine is the Catholick after this manner The Doctrine which is deliver'd from the Apostles by the Tradition of whole Christian Worlds of Fathers unto whole Christian Worlds of Children c. Of this Tradition which by the words now cited appears to be evidently the same I defend he affirms p. 38. that 't is prov'd to be simply Infallible by the very nature thereof and quotes Suarez to
say that 't is the highest degree of humane Certitude of which it may simply or absolutely be said Non posse illi falsum subesse that 't is IMPOSSIBLE IT SHOULD BE FALSE Can any thing be produc'd more expresly abetting my way of Discoursing the Grounds of Faith Nothing certainly unless it be that which immediately follows containing the reason why Tradition is by the very nature of it simply Infallible For says he Tradition being full Report about what was EVIDENT UNTO SENSE to wit what Doctrines and Scriptures the Apostles publickly deliver'd unto the World it is IMPOSSIBLE it should be FALSE Worlds of Men CANNOT be uniformly mistaken and deceiv'd about a matter Evident to Sense and not being deceiv'd being so many in number so divided in place of so different affections and conditions IT IS IMPOSSIBLE they should so have agreed in their Tale had they so maliciously resolv'd to deceive the World Observe here 1. That he alledges onely Natural Motives or speaks onely of Tradition as it signifies the Humane Authority of the Church that is as taken in the same sense wherein I took it in my Method 2. He goes about to show out of its very nature that is to demonstrate 't is absolutely Infallible 3. He makes this Tradition or Humane Authority of the Church an Infallible Deriver down or Ascertainer that what is now held upon that tenure is the Apostles Doctrine or the first-taught Faith which once known those who are yet Unbelievers may infallibly know that Body that proceeds upon it to possess the true Faith and consequently infallibly know the true Church which being the very way I took in my Method and other Tâ—eatises it may hence be discern'd with how little reason Dr. T. excepts against it as so superlatively singular But to proceed Hence p. 40. he avers that the proof of Tradition is so full and sufficient that it convinceth Infidels that is those who have onely natural Reason to guide themselves by For though saith he they be blind not to see the Doctrine of the Apostles to be Divine yet are they not so void of common sense impudent and obstinate as to deny the Doctrine of Christian Catholick Tradition to be truly Christian and Apostolical And p. 41. The ONELY MEANS whereby men succeeding the Apostles may know assuredly what Scriptures and Doctrines they deliver'd to the Primitive Catholick Church is the Catholick Tradition by Worlds of Christian Fathers and Pastors unto Worlds of Christian Children and Faithful People Which words as fully express that Tradition is the ONELY or SOLE Rule of Faith as can be imagin'd And whereas some hold that an Inward working of God's Spirit supplies the Conclusiveness of the Motive this Learned Writer p. 46 on the contrary affirms that Inward Assurance without any EXTERNAL INFALLIBLE Ground to assure men of TRVTH is proper unto the Prophets and the first Publishers of Christian Religion And lastly to omit others p. 47. he discourses thus If any object that the Senses of men in this Search may be deceiv'd through natural invincible Fallibility of their Organs and so no Ground of Faith that is altogether Infallible I answer that Evidence had by Sense being but the private of one man is naturally and physically Infallible but when the same is also Publick and Catholick that is when a whole World of men concur with him then his Evidence is ALTOGETHER INFALLIBLE And now I would gladly know what there is in any of my Books touching the Ground of Faith which is not either the self-same or else necessarily consequent or at least very consonant to what I have here cited from this Judicious Author and Great Champion of Truth in his Days whose Coincidency with other Divines into the same manner of Explication argues strongly that it was onely the same unanimous Notion and Conceit of Faith and of true Catholick Grounds which could breed this conspiring into the same way of discoursing and almost the self-same words § 13. Hence is seen how justly D. T. when he wanted something else to say still taxed me with singularity in accepting of nothing but Infallibility built on absolutely-conclusive Motives with talking such Paradoxes as he doubts whether ever they enter'd into any other mans mind that all mankind excepting J. S have hitherto granted that no Humane Vnderstanding is secur'd from possibility of Mistake from its own nature that my Grounds exclude from Salvation and excommunicate the Generality of our own Church that no man before J. S. was so hardy as to maintain that the Testimony of Fallible men which word Fallible is of his own adding mine being of Mankind relying on Sensations is Infallible that this is a new way and twenty such insignificant Cavils But the thing which breeds his vexation is that as my Reason inclines me I joyn with those who are the most solid and Intelligent Party of Divines that is indeed I stick to and pursue and explain and endeavour to advance farther those Grounds which I see are built on the natures of the Things Would I onely talk of Moral Certainty Probabilities and such wise stuff when I am settling Faith I doubt not but he would like me exceedingly for then his own side might be probable too which sandy Foundation is enough for such a Mercurial Faith as nothing but Interest is apt to fix DISCOURSE VIII In what manner Dr. T. Answers my Letter of Thanks His Attempt to clear Objected Faults by committing New Ones § 1. MY Confuter has at length done with my Faith Vindicated and my Methed and has not he done well think you and approv'd himself an excellent Confuter He onely broke his Jests upon every passage he took notice of in the former except one without ever heeding or considering much less attempting to Answer any one single Reason of those many there alledg'd and as for that one passage in which he seem'd serious viz. how the Faithful are held by me Infallible in their Faith he quite mistook it throughout Again as for my Method he first gave a wrong Character of it and next pretended it wholly to rely upon a point which he had sufficiently considered that is which he had readily granted but offer'd not one syllable of Answer to any one Reason in It neither My Letter of Thanks is to be overthrown next And First he says he will wholly pass by the Passion of it and I assure the Reader so he does the Reason of it too for he speaks not a word to any one piece of it Next he complains of the ill-Language which he says proceeded from a gall'd and uneasie mind He says partly true For nothing can be more uneasie to me than when I expected a Sober and Scholar-like Answer to find onely a prettily-worded Fardle of Drollery and Insincerity I wonder what gall'd him when he lavish'd out so much ill-language in Answer to Sure footing in which Treatise there was not one passionaâ—e word not one syllable
of Irony or any thing in the least of an impertinent nature but a serious pursuâ—t of the Point by way of Reason from the beginning to the end It seems there being in it no show of Passion it was the Reason of it which gall'd and was so uneasie to him What need was there to fall into such down right Rudeness as to call a Proposition of mine for which I offer'd my Reasons most impudent as did Dr. T. Rule of Faith p. 173. and in forty other places to make the Droll supply the Divine Was it not enough to answer the Reasons and let the World judge If he can show any such rude Language in my Letter of Thanks I here blame my self for it though it be responsum non dictum The worst word I use is charging hâ—m with falsifying my words and sense and it seems to me but hard Law if he may take the liberty to commit such Faults frequently and I may not so much as name his Faults when 't is my Duty as his Answerer to discover them § 2. He would clear himself of some Faults objected to do which he summons together all his best Arts First he picks out generally what can best bear a show of Reply Next he counterfeits a wrong Objection and lastly conceals in what manner and for what Reasons it was prest against him and by this means he hopes to escape blame § 3. First he would justifie himself for saying I went about to explain words because my self said I would examine well what is meant by them which seems equivalent to explaining them but he conceals what kind of explications I deny'd my self to mean and what he unjustly imputed twice in one page p. 3. namely Definitions he conceals how he would needs make me intend to define and yet most disingenuously put down himself at the same time my very words in which I disclaim'd any pretence to define but onely to reflect on some Attributes Predicates or Properties of what was meant by those words that is some pertinent and true Sayings concerning Rule and Faith which though they in part explicate them which I never deny'd yet they are far from looking like those compleat Explications call'd Definitions or even like those less artificial ones call'd Descriptions or like those Explications industriously compil'd which was the word I us'd to adequate the intire notion of the word under consideration For example Faith being there taken for Believing I come to discover it imports some kind of knowledge and then argue from it as such § 8. Again I affirm § 12. that the notion of the word Faith bears that 't is a Perfection of the Soul or a Virtue and thence discourse from it as it imports a Virtue Also § 16. I affirm that Faith mainly conduces to Bliss or Salvation c. and thereupon frame such a Discourse as is apt to spring out of such a Consideration Now all these in part explicate the Thing that is disclose or say some Truth that belongs to its nature yet not one of those sayings looks like an Explication of the word FAITH for this speaks an Intireness and an Adequateness to the notion explicated which 't is evident not one of these particular Affirmations or Sayings have the least show of He conceals also what was aâ—ledg'd Letter of Thanks p. 6. for indeed 't was not creditable that candid Scholars should reflect on it viz. that the word Faith being Equivocal and sometimes signifying Conscience sometimes Fidelity or Honesty c. I was necessarily to explain my self in what sense I understood it there and to declare that I took it for Belief and accordingly said Faith is the same with Believing which no sooner done but my pleasant Confuter will needs have that expressing or clearing its distinct sense in one single word to be a Definition too and plays upon it p. 3. with such affected Raillery as would make any sober man unacquainted with the Arts he uses to escape the duty of replying justly wonder But I shall easily satisfie our Readers what 's the true reason of this Carriage He thought it not fit to give one word of a sober and solid Reply to any one of thoâ—e many Reasons in that first discourse of mine built all upon those Affirmations or Predications now spoken of though this be the substantialest part of my Book and the Foundation of the rest on whâ—ch I ground rhe Properties of a Rule of Faith importing its Absolute Certainty but neglecting all my Premisses and Proofs he falls to deny my Conclusion and talk something against it in his own way So that 't is evident these Jests were to divert the Reader from the Point and so serve instead of a Confute to that whole Discourse A rare Method signifying thus much if candidâ—y and plainâ—y laid open and brought to Termâ— of Reason Because I can pretend any thing and play upon it with Ironies prettily exprest therefore my kind unexamining friends being inur'd to believe all I say to be Gospel let my Adversary say what he will he shall never be held to discourse solidly I charge him then afresh with an affected Disingenuity design'd to palliate hâ—s â—eglect of answering and let him know that as 't is manifest out of my Book I built not there those seven Properties of the Rule of Faith â—he Reasons for which he no where refutes on the Exactness Intireness or Goodness of any falsely-pretended Definition or Explication but on the Truth of those Propositions or the Agreement of those Attributes or Properties to the respective natures of Rule and Faith as their Subjects Also he may please to reflect that these being involv'd in the signification of those words by discovering and then dilating upon each of those singly I declare by consequence what is meant by those words as far as concerns my present purpose without compiling Explications or framing Definitions which onely were the Things I deny'd Lastly I charge this Insincerity far more home upon him now than ever that whereas in my Letter of Thanks from p. 5. to p 9. I had at large refuted these ridiculous Exceptions of his he in this very place where he pretends to speak particularly to my Letter of Thanks never takes notice of any one word there alledg'd but conceals all that had been produc'd to answer those Exceptions and bears himself as if no such Answers had been given This I must confess falls much short of either nibbling or gnawing and I am forc'd to declare that this constant carriage of his discovering too openly a perfect disregard of Truth abates in me much of that respect which otherwise his good Endowments would naturally give me § 4. His second Remembrance of my Letter of Thanks for though he says here p. 32. he must not forget it yet he haâ— been perfectly unmindful of it hitherto is that I say My Testimonies were not intended against the Protestants whereas my Book was writ
another ought to be allow'd the liberty of taking those words which express his Sentiments without putting them always in the very method and posture in which they are found in the Author while there is no ambiguity or doubt of the Authors sense in that place yet where 't is at least doubtful that the sence is otherwise as is manifest to any one who reads that Preface which as I alledg'd though Dr. T. never takes notice of it was wholly intended to evince the Absolute Certainty of Faith 't is not so fairly and clearly candid to introduce it as a most express saying of an Author and putting it directly upon him as his Saying whereas there at least needs a Discourse and the drawing some Consequences to prove it his Sense and Doctrine as will appear shortly and on the other side 't is opposite to the whole strain and scope of the Treatise in which 't is found Thus far then I conceive my self in rigorous Truth justifiable namely for imputing to Dr. T. that he left out the words Some understood for he did so and by so doing put that saying directly upon the Prefacer himself and expresâ— not that himself onely gather'd it by consequence from his words § 8. The chief and main part of the Charge is That the imputed Tenet is not the sence of the Prefacers words in that place and since he does not directly say it but 't is inferr'd onely from his approving an others Tenet either in whole or in part the Point is to be decided by such Reflexions as give us best Light of his Sense In order to which I alledge 1. That the whole Scope of that Treatise is aim'd to prove the quite contrary Position which Consideration being confessedly the best Interpreter of any Author to neglect that and catch at any little semblance in two or three particular words and then force upon that Author a Tenet perfectly contrary to what his whole Discourse is bent to prove favours too strong of a Wit resolv'd to cavil This I objected in my Letter of Thanks and this Dr. T. thought it his best play not to take notice of here for it was unanswerable and too evidently concluded him Injurious to the Prefacer First then I desire the Reader to reflect that there is not any show of relating the possibility there spoken of to the Divine Omnipotence but onely to the natures of Second Causes next that since every thing is what 't is made to be if those Causes can possibly work otherwise the thing may be otherwise These due Reflexions made and settled to those who have not leasure to read the whole Preface I offer these particularities P. 6. he blames those who bring not an ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY or COACTIVE of the Vnderstanding and at the end of that § he presses those who say those Moral Motives are such as all are oblig'd to yield to to show how all can be bound to believe that which they evidently see MAY BE FALSE And which is remarkable these Expressions are found in the § immediately before the Citation D.T. so misrepresents whence 't is likely he could not but see and reflect on them Again p. 10. Else you will be forc'd to say that the very way God Himself has shewn to Heaven MAY POSSIBLY lead to Hell P. 13. The formal part of our Action unless it carry EVIDENCE and Certainty with it cannot be ventur'd on vvithout reproach Now as appears p. 12 he ayms this discourse at Actions belonging to Faith and answers that is opposes those who say the Reason or Ground of our Action need be no more but a high Probability or Contingent as a Thousand to One c. P. 14. This necessity binds God to put an INEVITABLE CERTITUDE in the Motives of Faith P. 16. There is NOTHING advanc'd towards the TRUTH of the ASSENT since this remains known that the Position MAY BE FALSE c. And to omit others p. 20. he puts the Question whether a desultory Assent which so agrees to this side that the Believer sees it FALLIBLE be sufficient for Christian Life and Action and coming in the next § to answer it he calls this an INCERTITUDE or defect of Certitude and declares that it makes a Religion either absolutely NONE or not a RATIONAL one but a MEER FOLLY These Citations duely reflected on it will appear very strange to any ingenuous man that Dr. T. could easily imagine an Author never noted till now to be given to contradict himself who so expresly in such and so many signal passages and in the whole Tenour of that Discourse nay the very immediately foregoing § manifests himâ—elf to hold that the Grounds of Faith cannot possibly lead men the wrong way that they must be Evident and Inevitably Certain that if it may be False we cannot assent to it at all as a Truth that if the Believer sees 't is Fallible 't is Irrational a meer Folly to hold it or else destructive of Religion 'T is strange I say to imagin that a Writer who is any thing in his wits should put forth a Treatise purposeâ—y to evince the Absolute Certainty or Impossibility of Falsehood in the Grounds and Motives to Faith and in it so often and so particularly avow it and yet in the same Treatise confess that what 's possible to be false is True Certainty and so a competent Ground to establish Faith on that is maintain the contrary Position to what he intended or pretended § 9. Having thus amply made good this part of my charge laid against Dr. T. Letter of Thanks p. 63. viz. That 't is the plain tenour of the Prefacers Discourse and the whole scope of that Preface to force the direct contrary Position to what Dr. T. would so disingenuously have put upon him of which he here takes no notice nor gives account why he hapt not to mind or regard that best way of interpreting an Authors words or not to see so many clear Expressions against his Interest rather than one obscure one seemingly for it we come next to consider the particular words in the place cited and see whaâ— strong temptation they could give Dr. T. to take him in a sense never intended notwithstanding so many pregnant Evidences to the Contrary § 10. The Prefacer said that Some understood by Moral Certainty such a Certainty as makes the Cause always work the same Effect though it take not away the Absolute Possibility of working otherways He adds afterwards that this ought absolutely to be reckoned in the degree of true Certainty and the Authors considered as mistaken in undervaluing it And I must confess that to one who lights by accident on this single passage taken abstractedly from the rest and could reach no deeper than the Grammar or superficial placing of words it bears at first sight a show as if the Prefacer had approv'd that to be a True Certainty not onely when the Cause always works the same Effect as I
of these things then let him say he is fallibly certain of it which done Nature will shew him how perfect Nonsence he speaks whence the same Nature will tell him with a little reflexion that since the word Infallibly can with good sence be joyn'd with the word Certain either 't is adeqaate to that word and extends its sence as far as the others and then there is no Certainty where there is not Infallibility or it does not extend as far as the word Certain and then we may be Certain of some things yet not-Infallibly Certain which since not-Infallibly means Fallibly signifies clearly we may be fallibly certain of those things But common sence teaches us how ridiculous 't is to say we are fallibly certain of any thing 'T is most evident therefore and demonstrable that there is no Certainty but where there is Infallibility and that we can never be said to be truly Certain of any thing till all circumstances consider'd we see our selves out of possibility of being deceived hic nunc in that very thing Whence Dr. T. denying Infallible assurance of both Letter and Sence of Scripture is convinc'd to deny all true Certainty of either and so to render all Faith built upon it Uncertain that is possible to be false and could he with sense take the other part of the distinction and say he is fallibly certain of it yet the guilt of the same Position will still remain with him This Logical Demonstration I produc'd in Faith Vindicated pag. 37. of which Dr T. takes notice here pag. 17 thus Mr. S. is plâ—as'd to say that Certainty and Infallibility are all one concealing thus from his Reader I had ever prov'd it lest he should be oblig'd â—o speak to my Proofs which he neither likes nor uses and bears himself as if I had only said it which suppos'd then indeed his bare saying the contrary was a competent Answer This done he confutes it manfully with telling his Readers I am the first man that evâ—r said it and that 't is foolish I beseech you Gentlemen is it the fashion in the Univeesities to solve Arguments on this manner That is to neglect the Premisses call the Conclusion foolish and think to overthrow the Reason in the Opinion of his Readers because 't is not some hackney Argument brought into play perhaps an hundred times over and ninety nine times answer'd but now produc'd first Certainly one would think in reason that what has been many times alledg'd should rather be slighted because it may have received already many Answers and not such Pcoofs as first appear because 't is certain they never yet had any at all nor do I conceive that the Noble and Learned Virtuosi of the ROYAL SOCIETY use to reject any Production because the Author of it is the first that invented it but they allow it Examination and if it hold the Trial approve it and commend the Author § 4. I shall endeavour to give him another Argument of the Necessity of admitting Infallibility though I have good reason to fear he will afford it again no other Answer but only this that I am the first man that ever produc'd it 'T is this Taking the word False or Falsus subjectively or as in the Subject that is as making the Jugment False or Erroneous 't is a Participle of the Verb Fallor and signifies deceived actually to which corresponds as its proper Power Fallible or capable to be deceived Now the contrary to False thus understood is True taken also subjectively or as making the Judgment which in it is True or Un-erroneous in that its Act. Wherefore the proper Power corresponding to that Act must necessarily be that which is oppos'd to Fallible that is Infallible Again taking the word False Objectively or as found in the Proposition which is the Object or Cause of our Judgment as 't is false or actually deceived It s proper Power corresponding to it is Capable to deceive Wherefore also taking its Opposit Truth Objectively or for the Object of our Judgment when 't is True the proper Power corresponding to it must be Incapable to deceive 'T is concluded then from both these Considerations that we can neither affirm Points or Propositiont of Faith which are the Objects of such Acts True but we must affirm withal that they are Incapable to make us judge erroneously while we assent to them nor that our Judgment or Act of Faith can be True or Un-erroneous but we must be Infallible in so judging Thus far concerning the necessity of admitting Infallibility if we once put our Assents or Acts of Faith to be true Judgments From which 't is a different Question to ask how we become thus Infallible onely 't is Evident that in case the former Proposition be put viz that we must affirm our Acts of Faith True Infallible we must be or Impossible to be in an Errour when we make those Acts. But now to this Infallibility in those Acts God's Providence leads men diversly according to their several degrees of Capacity Those who are arriv'd to a great pitch of Learning come to it by absolutely-concluding proofs call'd Demonstrations that is by penetrating the nature of the Authority on which it is built and such men can make out clearly and distinctly to their own Thoughts the Certainty of that Authority by discoursing it to themselves others they can resolve it into its Grounds meet with and answer Objections and in a word see themselves to be Infallibly Certain of it In these men therefore though the Truth of their Tenet be indeed taken from the Object as 't is always yet the Clearness Distinctness and firm Strength of it springs from the Perfection of their well-cultivated Understanding Those who are of a weak pitch are led to it by Practical Self-evidence of the nature of Authority and of the way in common by which they receive Faith which dim rude sight even in the simplest serves to carry them on to act according to right nature when they assent but they cannot discourse their thoughts nor resolve them into Principles nor answer Objections nor see themselves clearly to be infallibly Certain Nay more the greatest part of these especially if very simple do by some lucky chance or rather by a particular disposition of Gods good Providence light upon this right way more than by any strength of their own wit looking into Grounds but being in it once they find that which satisfies them according to knowledges familiariz'd to them by converse with the World and which are of themselves solid and satisfactory In a word it became Gods goodness so to order things that the Acts of all the Faithful might be as much as was possible in men of every pitch and capacity Rational or Virtuous whatever Contingency may happen in some particulars Original Sin and by it Passion Ignorance or Interest sometimes byassing them and making them act with precipitancy In which case