which was not True that is you saw it to be otherwise than in Effect and Reality it was And consequently that pretended Sight or Perception is so far from being A Rule of Truth that it is a palpable Errour and Mistake and therefore all the Judgments issuing from it must be False Which instead of Constituting it A Rule of Truth would make it indeed A Rule of Falshood 8. To make this yet plainer please to reflect that this Clear and Distinct Perception is such an Act of your Understanding and that all Acts have their being such from the Object of those Acts. For the Faculty or Power of Understanding was of it self Indifferent and Indetermin'd to All and Every Particular Act And since nothing that is Indetermin'd nor any Act in Common can Be it follows that the Being and being such of each Act depends formally on the Object and is such in particular as that Object which informs the Power is Wherefore when you see a Thing to be True that which you saw thus Clearly and Distinctly True must have been thus True before you saw it to be so Whence we ask What was that which made the Object you perceiv'd-to-be-true to be True Or What was the Rule of Truth to that Object that was True ere you saw it to be such Must not the Object be such ere you can know it to be such Or Clearly and Distinctly Perceptible to be such before you can Clearly and Distinctly Perceive it to be such If not then you must say you can know what is not to be known or Clearly and Distinctly perceive what is not Clearly and Distinctly to be perceiv'd Which is a perfect Contradiction 9. For Instance Since Truth is no where to be found but in such Speeches as Affirm or Deny that is in Propositions let us put some Proposition which you thus Clearly and Distinctly perceive to be True and therefore as was lately demonstrated must have been True before you saw it to be so Does it not clearly follow that Either that Truth must have been made Evident by Another and that again by Another and so in infinitum by which means nothing at all could ever be seen to be True or else there must have been some First kind of Truths whose Noon-day Evidence imparts Evidence to others and is it self Visible or if you please Clearly and Distinctly Perceptible to all Mankind and forces them at first sight to Assent to its Verity Now if some such First kind of Truths can be found which by their Absolute Self-Evidence do as Objects of our Understanding Power necessarily determin the Understandings of all Mankind to Assent and do withall influence All our other Truths and our Knowledge of them then our Act of Perception being clearly Excluded from being the Rule of Truth these First Truths have all the Requisites that can be imagin'd for a Ratio cognoscendi Veritatem or a Rule of Truth since they self-evidently manifest to us their own Truth and by it give us Light to know all others Let us pursue then the Quest of these First Truths Our Discourse because it concerns and antecedes all other Knowledges and all particular Truths must necessarily be fetch'd from the Deepest Grounds and therefore must needs be very Speculative But I know I speak to him whose Piercing Wit will easily comprehend it Only I beseech you so far to bend your Byass which you must needs have contracted by your Long and Steady Meditating on your Way of Ideas till you reduce any Obliquity that may have prepossess'd your good Judgment to a Rectitude or Indifferency and then I cannot doubt but I may do you some Service even perhaps against your Will For Evidence if Clear and well penetrated does oft-times force Assent whether the Will repugns or no. 10. The Ideas or Essences of each Piece of the World's Fabrick were in the Mind of the Divine Architect ere they were made Again Since he did not make them by the Hand of some Bungling Journey-man who might perhaps deviate from his Pattern or Model but immediately by his own Infinite Wisdom and Power it cannot be doubted but that each Part of the Creation was fram'd exactly according to the Archetypes of those Unchangeable Ideas and therefore was perfectly Establish'd in its respective Essence or Nature as those Original Ideas were that is they were fix'd to be what they are by an Inerrable Hand in which consists that which we call their Metaphysical Verity Wherefore since all Truth Originally Primarily and most Fundamentally consists in this Metaphysical Verity of Things it being the Immediate Effect of the Divine Wisdom it follows that the First Formal Truths that can be in our Minds which consequently are the Rules or Principles to all others must be those which speak express or Affirm this Metaphysical Verity or that the Things are what they are Which kind of Self-evident Propositions can therefore be no other than those we call Identical This is most Evident and Incontestable For since this Metaphysical Verity which next to the Divine Maker of all Things from whom it immediately proceeded is the Ground and Cause of all Truth does consist in this That Things are Fix'd in their Essences or are what they are 't is Impossible to speak this Truth or make it a Formal Truth by affirming or Denying that is by putting it into a Proposition but by Affirming that they are what they are which is most evidently an Identical Proposition 11. Hitherto then it is undiscernable how it can with any Shew of Reason be deny'd that the Self-Evidence that so visibly shines in Identical Propositions bids fair towards their being the First Rule of Knowing all Truths or which is the same the First Principle to all other Knowledges For 1. There cannot be any so great Clearness or Evidence as is Self-Evidence nor so Close Connexion of the Terms in any Proposition or Speech that expresses Truth as is Perfect Identity or Self-Connexion consisting in this That the Thing or Mode of Thing spoken of is what it is or is its self 2. 'T is Impossible any thing else can be so Solid or so Firmly Establish'd being immediately built on the Unchangeable Metaphysical Verity it self or rather being It spoken and express'd Which Verity as was shewn is imprinted in the Essences of every Created Thing by the Immediate Hand of Essential Truth Whence it is so nearly ally'd to that Infinite Truth it self that it is remov'd but one Degree from it 3. By reason of this Connatural and Immediate Descent from that Brightest and most Glorious Luminary of all Knowledge the Father of Lights who is Candor Aeternae Lucis and Infinitely Intelligible it forces the Assent of all Mankind to its Verity Insomuch that no Disease can so pervert a Rational Being which has the least Use of Reason as to deny it or doubt of it nor suspend their Judgment concerning it Nor can the highest Passion of the most Profligate Wretch
NON VLTRA OR A LETTER TO A Learned CARTESIAN Settling the RULE of TRUTH AND FIRST PRINCIPLES Upon their DEEPEST GROUNDS By I. S. LONDON Printed for A. Roper at the Black-Boy over against St. Dunstan's Church in Fleet-street MDCXCVIII To the Much Honoured Sir EDWARD SOUTHCOT Knight and Baronet SIR 'T IS so Unusual a Complement to make a Person of your Quality a Judge in a Philosophical Controversie that it will be Admir'd at by those who do not know you and I fear scarce Accepted by your self Such Studies do so seldom colour with the Profession of a Gentleman that He must be much rais'd above the Common who can merit the Esteem of being fit for such an Umpirage To be held not only a Lover of Learning but a Discerner too in that Highest Sort of Knowledge is such a Starry Embellishment to a Noble Extraction and sets such a Deep Stamp of Honour upon it that it gives a Double Tincture of Excellency to such Illustrious Persons and ranks them in the First File of Heroes In the Time of Augustus when the Roman Learning was in its Zenith such Famous Worthies might have been easily met with but they are so Rare now-a-days that they seem Uncouth and look like Monsters And such indeed they are in Scaliger's Phrase that is Monsters of Perfection Great Men do generally now so undervalue Learning and 't is so despicably-Little in their Eye as if they took a View of it at the Wrong End of the Prospective The Noble Sir Kenelm Digby the Honourable Mr. Boyle and some few others have rescu'd the Universality of their Peers from this Imputation But now that they have left us such Personages are so very thin-sown that for any thing we see there are but Few left besides your self who give us any Prospect of keeping alive a Succession of Men endow'd with that Renowned Character Yet Ignorance and Folly are such Ignoble Blemishes that KNOWLEDGE in Common does still uphold it self with the Generality of Mankind in a Fair Esteem But this Thing call'd PHILOSOPHY looks like such a Bug-bear to most of our Modern Great Ones that the very Name and Sound of it puts them in a Marvellous Fright whence 't is no wonder Men do not love or esteem Amiable what they fear and look upon as Hideous Whereas indeed the Study of Philosophy is no more but the Improvement of our Reason by which we are Men in Reading and to a fair Degree Understanding the Book of the World or in Knowing those Things with which whether we will or no we must Converse and be Concern'd daily Certainly their Palate is much out of Taste who cannot relish a Benefit so Natural to our Soul but think it below the Station of a Gentleman to regard it I could wish such Men would please to reflect upon what kind of Objects their Thoughts and Affections are employ'd while they neglect This. I believe it would shame their Choice if they duly consider'd what Empty Toys they pursu'd and preferr'd before this Solid and Substantial Good PHILOSOPHY truly such and rightly understood is far from being such a Frightful Thing as their Imagination paints it being only Plain Natural Reason Polish'd Better'd and Elevated by Art and Reflexion So that they who check at the Knowledge of Philosophy ought with much better Reason find fault with the Teaching Persons of Quality to Sing Dance or Play on the Lute Unless they think it very Prudent and Expedient to give our Voice Feet and Fingers the best Advantages we can to perform their Actions artificially and exactly but that 't is a very Needless Folly to perfect the Knowing Power of our Soul and wondrous Wise to let it still doze on sluggishly in its Home-spun Native Rudeness and lie wholly Uncultivated Nay such Gentlemen would be much offended their Houses should not be clean Swept and Garnish'd yet they are not in the least concern'd that Cobwebs should hang in the Windows of their Intellect and Dusty Ignorance dim and blear the Sight of the Noble Inhabitant But where is this Philosophy all this while Or Is there indeed any such Thing in Nature Whatever Glorious Attributes some have given it they all Agree in this that it is the Knowledge of Truth If so then as Truth can be but One so it should follow that â—either can there be more than One â—â—ilosophy which is the True One and that all others are but 〈◊〉 Pretended and consequently in reality Fabulous and Erroneous Where then shall we certainly find this One or only-True Philosophy Multitudes of Sects did of old set up to drive the Trade and Profession of Philosophizing But they all Broke and shut up Shop having but a very few Chance-Customers except that Great Man whom St. Hierome calls Ingenii Humani Finis ARISTOTLE He I say alone has got Quiet Possession of the Schools for a long time and haâ— now strengthen'd his Title by an Immemorial Prescription Nor did any Pretender of Note put in his Claim against him till in our Days the admirably-Ingenious CARTESIUS declared himself his Competitor Till then Aristotle being drawn into different Senses by his Many-minded Commentators amongst the Modern School-men those Men who were of Sharp Wits and hated jurare in verba were in danger to turn Scepticks and began to think that Truth was either flown to Heaven in Astraea's Coach or as some Antients thought was in puteo defossa or else if she were above-ground that she was sequester'd in some Terrestrial Paradise so that none could get Knowledge of her Habitation or come at her In this juncture to rescue the Flower of Mankind from falling into perfect Scepticism and to encourage them still to hope for Truth in Philosophy there arose very opportunely those Great Men Thomas Albius Sir Kenelm Digby and Cartesius who were all of them in a manner Contemporary All of them promis'd Science which kept up those Men's drooping Spirits from Despair of Truth The former Two of these in many of their main Principles declar'd themselves Aristotelians as also did those who follow'd their Philosophy Whereas Cartesius ravell'd all the Schemes hitherto woven by others moulded all the World in a New Frame and set up for his Single Self without any Copartner By which you see Sir that your Task which seem'd at first so Vast and Endless is reduc'd and confin'd to this One Enquiry viz. to determin in your own Thoughts at least whether you think fit to pronounce Sentence or no which Party viz. these Followers of Aristotle or of Cartesius are True Philosophers On which side soever the Lot falls it follows of course that since they contradict one another the Other let them Talk and Write as long as they will are in reality None Still you will complain that even This is beyond the Extent of your Narrow Province and exceeds the Purlew of your Reading and Thinking too But I dare assure you Sir that this present Debate is of that nature
be said of a Proposition both as to its Pâ—â—â—s and the Connexion or Identity of its two Terms the Subject and Prâ—â—icate in which consists its Truth Aâ—â— which I hope I have shewn very parâ—â—cularly in the Second and Third Books of my METHOD to SCIENCE Moreover Because I saw your Prejudice against our Way was taken from the Insignificant Iargon of some of our School-men I take leave to add that let others talk as superficially of those Matters as they please and disparage the true Way of Art by mis-managing it and making it look Phantastick yet I am not conscious to my self that I have any thing in my Method but what is entirely built on the Nature of the Thing in hand I mean Notions Propositions and Rational Discourses found in the Minds of all Mankind Which Way of Building on the Nature of the Subject of which we are speaking is the only Ground that can give Solidity to any Discourse At least I am sure that if I have any Argument there which has any other Fountion I shall renounce it as swerving from my Method and my Intention And I do candidly here declare that I am oblig'd either to bring a more Solid Proof for that Point or I ought not to expect it should be well receiv'd by any Man of Learning Which being so I have that good Opinion of your Equity that you will not therefore discard a Way which is thus willing to approve it self to be Solid and to subsist by Arguments built on the Firm Ground of the Nature of the Thing because some slight Understanders of it have us'd it triflingly Nor would you think it reasonable that the Cartesian Hypothesis should be quite rejected upon no other Reason but because you think some late Writers have not done it the Right they ought 6. In order to your Clear and Distinct Perception which you therefore judg'd to be the Rule or Test of all Truth because we cannot but Assent to that as True which we Clearly and Distinctly see to be so I make these Preliminary Remarks 1. That this is the main Hinge of all the Cartesian Hypothesis which persuades them to place the Ground of Truth within their own Minds and its Productions and not in the Things themselves 2. That this is the most Ingenious and Plausible Conception which the Great Wit of Cartesius ever advanc'd and therefore it most deserves Clearing Which is indeed one main Reason why I strain'd Courtesie a little in publishing this Paper 3. That the Plausibility of it lies chiefly in this That every Man must grant the Truth of that Proposition as it lies For Who can deny but that what I see to be True is True This being full as Evident as that I cannot see what is not This then is a plain Truth and might deserve the Name of a Subordinate Rule were it Certain or prov'd first that we could not possibly be Mistaken in thinking we have a Clear and Distinct Perception of a Thing when we have it not Mr. Le Grand confesses this may happen when the Will is Byass'd or Men are Unskilful and how frequent is that And we shall give many Instances afterwards how we are deceiv'd in many other Occasions 4. That this Clear and Distinct Perception the Cartesians so much speak of and value themselves upon tho' the Expression be New is no more in reality but Perfect Evidence of an Object For the seeing any Object Clearly is the seeing it Evidently nor can we see It evidently if that Object or It be Confounded with others and not seen to be Distinct from them Wherefore this Phrase of Clear and Distinct Perception is a meer Amuzement and being New makes the Readers apt to conceit that it is a lately-found-out Discovery of some unheard of Thing or some New Method of which all former Philosophers were hitherto ignorant whereas 't is the self-same with Perfect Evidence of some Particular Object which all the Learned Part of Mankind have ever us'd before Cartesius was born nay have allow'd and held also That no Man could refrain from Assenting that the Thing or Mental Proposition is True when with Perfect Evidence It is seen to be so Wherefore this last Point will not I hope break Squares between the Cartesians and me for thus far we agree in our Meanings however I except against the Novelty of the Expression which would seem to intimate something Extraordinary in the Method you pretend to have first found out and introduced and which by your Carriage you seem to appropriate to your selves as singularly yours 5. These Things being so it follows that the First Rule of our Knowledge of all Truths whatever must be Common to all Knowing Natures in the World It must also be the most Evident that can be or Self-evident so that none can disagree dissent or be Deceiv'd in it but must See and Assent to it in despite of any Weakness of the Understanding or any Byass or Obliquity of the Will as we shall see hereafter our Rule is and must be And the Reason is because this Rule being that by means of which a Creature made for Knowledge is capable of knowing any thing it follows that if it lay in any Man's power to be Ignorant of this Rule or to dissent from it or be deceiv'd in it it would be in his power not meerly to pervert but utterly to destroy and unmake the Nature given him by God and of Cognoscitive or Capable of Knowledge make it Uncognoscitive or Incapable of Knowing any thing which the Natures of Things being fix'd by God's Wisdom to be what they are 't is as impossible for any Man to do as it is for him to put off his own Individuality and not be the same Person he is 7. These Notes premis'd I come closer to examine your Rule of Truth You say If you Clearly and Distinctly see that a Thing is True you do thence certainly know it to be so I allow the Conditional Proposition for 't is Impossible to see that which is not to be seen or â—o know that to be True which is not-True The only Question then is Whether this be a Rule of Truth Mr. Le Grand very rationally granting p. 92. there goes more to constitute a Rule of Truth than to be True In order to the Clearing of which I ask Was it True before you saw Clearly and Distinctly it was True Or Did it become True by your seeing it as you phrase it Clearly and Distinctly to be True If it were True before you thus saw it to be True then 't is unavoidable there was Another Rule or Reason for that Truth which anteceded your Seeing it to be such and therefore your Clear and Distinct Perception could not be the Rule of Knowing that Truth being Subsequent to it And if you say it became True by your Seeing it Clearly and Distinctly then it was not True before and then you saw that to be True
as is the Settling the First Rule of all Knowledge or what is the very First Self-evident and most Firmly-Grounded Truth no Speculation resolving all Dependent Truths into that which is Absolutely-Independent as the Rule of all Truth must be can be too Accurate or laid too Deep 'T is not then any Humour of mine or a kind of Trial of Skill which mov'd me to this very Abstracted and Metaphysical Way of Discoursing but it was the very Nature of the present Subject that forc'd me upon it 19. Nor was it any Care of over-reaching your Acuteness nor the Desire of Opposing the Rule of Knowing Truth introduc'd by the Great Cartesius which put me upon this Unusual piece of Doctrine I had above twenty Years ago upon some Hints given me by that Second Aristotle the profoundly-Learned Albius apply'd my Speculative Thoughts to dig very deep into this Subject to find out the Immoveable Center of all Truth and I had begun to write a very Speculative Treatise shewing how to reduce every Truth into an Identical Proposition and every Errour to a Contradiction which I saw lay hid at the Bottom of every Truth and Falshood This I say was an Old Design of mine before I thought of Opposing any or of being Oppos'd by any I foresaw also while I was writing my Method that it being more easie to be Witty than to be Solid Identical Propositions would be look'd upon by very Ingenious Men who were not thorow-Speculators as Sapless Useless and Insignificant Wherefore I did there take some Occasions which lay in the Track of my Thoughts while I was settling the Grounds to True Science to clear those First Truths from such Unworthy Misapprehensions To this End I demonstrated there B. 3. Less 1. § 3. That all the Force of Consequence in which consists our Rationality can only be built upon such Propositions I shew B. 2. L. 2. in what their Self-evidence consists What is the First of them and their several Sorts and Degrees I set my self to Demonstrate by many Arguments from § 11. to the End of that Lesson that all First Principles must be Identical Propositions and § 19. that plain Reason teaches us it must be so Which evinced it follows that whoever denies these to be Useful must with the same Breath affirm that all First Principles are Useless and good for nothing which is a strange Position Nay since there is an Order in Truths and therefore all Second Principles have their Force from the First it follows that we can have no Use of Second Principles if the First be Useless and so we must talk ramblingly and at random all our Lives without any Principles at all I manifest the same L. 3. by Instances fetch'd from the Mathematicks and other Sciences and shew what Use is to be made of them which is not to make them either of the Premisses in a Syllogism but to avail our selves of them in a higher nature I shew B. 2. L. 2. § 18. that even plain Uncultivated Nature makes the Vulgar recurr to them as their First Principles when they would express that which is decisive of the Dispute and Undeniable I prove that all Middle Terms which are Proper are built upon the same Ground with them I endeavour B. 3. L. 3. §§ 16 17 18. to evince clearly that All Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions and are Reducible to them and I attempt to shew Less 4. the Way how to reduce Inferiour Truths to those Highest ones All which if I have fully prov'd especially that All First Principles are Identical Propositions which bears all along with it and is concluded there by divers Demonstrations on which I dare venture my whole Cause that they are impossible to be solv'd then I may safely presume I have evinc'd that the Intelligibility and Light of Identical Propositions is most Self-evident the Ground on which they are built most Solid and the Usefulness or Influence of them upon all other Truths most Universal And therefore that they are every way qualify'd to be the First and Only Rule of Knowing all Truths whatever 20. To comprehend better the Evidence of this Discourse let us imagine a Man devested of the Knowledge of Identical Propositions and then let us consider whether he could know any thing at all or what he is good for To instance in one of them Let us suppose him Ignorant that A Thing is what it is or a Cartesian that Each Idea is it self and no other and Common Sense will tell every one that such a Man could know nothing nor make any Judgment or Discourse concerning any Thing or Idea either since that Thing or Idea he would Judge or Discourse of is perhaps all the while for ought he knows Another Whoever would see farther the Use of Identical Propositions brought to Practice may please to observe how they are serviceable in many places of my three Treatises here mention'd Not by proposing them first and then Deducing and Arguing from them as some may mistake but by Reducing the Truth of my Discourses up to those Standards of all Truth and by shewing these to be engag'd in the Patronage and Support of my Thesis by which means they smartly clinch the Force and Evidence of my Arguments by bearing up to them and relying on them 21. It was a well-aim'd Reach of Speculation in Mr. Locke Essay concerning Humane Understanding B. 2. Ch. 32. § 2. where he says that the Metaphysical Verity of Things contains in them a Tacit Proposition Which I would understand not to be meant of that Verity as it is in the Thing it self but as it is in our Understanding where only Propositions are or can be For since this Metaphysical Verity is not a Natural Notion imprinted directly by our Senses it can only be known by Reflexion The Mind then careful to be well assur'd of the Subject of which it is to Judge or Discourse without which Pre-assurance it could do neither reviews it heedfully and steadily and then says of it within it self 'T is this and no other Which is an Identical Proposition in Substance tho' for a Reason we shall give shortly we put it afterwards into an Expression more formally Identical Why the Soul does this springs hence because being naturally made to see Truth and no Truth in the First and Proper Signification of that Word being possible to be had without Affirming or Denying hence 't is Natural and Necessary that when it comes to review the Object in order to see its Truth or Falshood it should put it into the Frame of an Identical Proposition only which kind of Speeches are capable to Affirm or Deny And this is that I mean when I use to say as I do frequently that the Nature of the Soul is Comparative or Relative For when a Proposition is molded in the Mind the Predicate of it is Compar'd or Related to the Subject in order to see their Agreement or
and sounded to the bottom nothing will be found to support its Truth but it will appear Plain Bald Nonsense en cuerpo On the other side it lights so that Discourses that are Solid and built all along on Evident Principles only which can clear the Truth of the Point do want the other sort of Clearness which consists in Explicating to recommend them to the Liking of the Reader And this happens for Two Reasons One because Principles do consist of Few Words or Notions and those too such as are General or Universal ones which do not admit such varying the Phrase or Smooth Explications to make them more Knowable their Clearness consisting only in the greater Simplicity of those General Terms and their Close Connexion The Second Reason is that those Writers who endeavour to look deep into the Foundation and Principles on which Truth is Grounded and are not satisfy'd with Skimming over Questions superficially do not care to avail themselves by Explications and the Way of Smooth Expressions but quite dis-regard them and judge them only Luke-warm Words in their present Circumstances because they neither conduce to the Attainment of Science nor to Settle and Clear the Truth of the Thesis which such Men see can only be done by the Strict and Evident Connexion of their Notions To apply this Discourse I intreat you Sir to consider whether the Former Sort of Clearness be not that which the Cartesians affect the Second that which we take and pursue I shall hope that whoever peruses my METHOD to SCIENCE with an Attentive and Indifferent Eye will easily observe that I first put my Thesis and then endeavour to establish it by rigorous Proofs drawn from the Nature of the Thing or Subject treated of in those respective Places And that the Cartesians do not use to take any such Method but place their Hopes of recommending their Tenets to the Reader 's Approbation in their Explications Which makes it so difficult for a Logician to find where their Arguments lie hid or where they press of which with just Reason I so often complain 36. Thus much concerning your Method of Proving by Explicating or rather of substituting Explications in the place of Proofs As for the other part of your Method which is your putting Learners to Meditate long and seriously upon what you have propos'd to them I lik'd that as ill as I did that of Explicating And my Reason is because unless Men take Principles along with them to guide their Thoughts right and keep an Attentive Eye to them while they thus Meditate 't is to be fear'd their long Meditating will by its frequent Dints so imprint and fix what you have told them in their Brain and at length make it sink so deep into their Minds that whether it be Right or Wrong it will stick there as daily Experience shews us Custom a Second Nature having a very powerful Ascendent over the Understanding to imbue us with False Impressions by the oft-reiterated Thinking upon any Point that is Disputable especially Ingenious Explications as was shewn lately too often serving for Reasons to those who are not well vers'd in True Logick 37. But the main Objection I make is That this Method of yours quite overthrows the Rule of Truth which you intended to establish by it For this Rule being that upon which all all our Knowledge of Truth depends must be so very Clear of it self above any thing we can add to its Highest Evidence that it cannot possibly need any Explication nor Meditation neither Nor consequently can any stronger Argument be brought to Demonstrate that this Rule of yours is not the Right one than 't is to confess or pretend that it stands in need of or even can admit Assistance or Light either from the one or the other For if it can need any Explication it follows that it must be something Obscure And if it can need Poring and Meditating upon it ere it be admitted or can be known then 't is far from being most Self-evident Both which utterly destroy the Nature of such a Rule For since we must know all other Truths by It its Evidence must be the First Thing to be known and therefore the Knowledge of its Truth must antecede the Knowlege of all other Truths whatsoever and be Clearer than They. Which being so manifest I wonder what Thoughts or Considerations our Explicating or Meditating can suggest that can do this First Rule of Truth any Service or give it any Advantage since all others being more Obscure than It they may indeed could they affect it impart to it their own greater Obscurity and make it less Clear and Intelligible than it was but can never make it Clearer as having no greater but far less Clearness themselves Lastly As this pretended Necessity of Explicating and Meditating quite degrades yours from being the Genuin First and consequently the Right Rule of Knowing Truth so it abets ours and gives it a Clear Title to be such a Rule since the Self-evidence of those First Truths express'd by Identical Propositions which is our Rule is such as is both Impossible to be Explicated and Impossible to need Meditating to clear it to us but at the first Instant we open the Eye of our Mind it discovers it self fully to all Mankind to be most True and withall begets forces and fixes us in a Full and Firm Assent to its Verity 38. Perhaps it will be alledg'd notwithstanding what I have said above That this Clear and Distinct Perception is not pretended to be a Rule of Truth in it self so that it establishes Truth Fundamentally but of Truth to us or as the Schools phrase it quoad nos that is a Rule whereby we may know what 's Truth what not And it seems that it cannot be deny'd to be such a Rule in regard 't is Evident that we must Assent or hold a Thing True when we see clearly and distinctly it is so nor ought we to Assent or hold it to be True unless we do clearly and distinctly see it to be so I answer That this Pretence is already fore-stalled in divers places of my former Discourse where it was shewn by many Instances that even in the Opinions Learned Men held this Guiding our Thoughts and Judgments by what appears to us a Clear and Distinct Perception is Uncertain and Fallacious Whence in the Thesis constituting this to be your Rule there is tacitly involv'd a False Supposition vâ—z That that Perception on which we solely rely is Unmistakable by us For if we may mistake it to be really a Perception thus qualify'd when it is not then our Assent may be Erroneous and how can an Erroneous Judgment in any Sense be True to us or make us know a Thing to be True If I am to draw a straight Line and the Rule by which I guide my self be sometimes Straight and sometimes Crooked how is it a RULE to me in that Action or Draught 2. In
in plain Words To which Reflexion of his if this Learned Gentleman pleases to add That whoever discourses False on any Subject does at the same time make that Subject not to be what it is or if the Question be of some Mode as it is his Penetrative Judgment cannot but discern that Identical Propositions are Equally Useful in all Questions all Disputes nay all Discourses whatsoever if the Way of Reducing Inferiour Truths to Them were but well improv'd and cultivated 50. I much value your good Opinion and I perceiv'd I was in danger of losing it by a hint you gave me with a Dis-relishing Air that I call'd Cartesius a Fanatick which you thought very harsh In Answer I deny the Charge 'T is one Thing to say that when Cartesius was laying his Method to Science by denying his Senses and devesting himself of all his former Knowledges which as my Author expresses it was no less than to Unman himself he fell for some few Days into a Spice of Enthusiasm nay was brim-full of it and fancy'd he had Visions and Revelations so that he seem'd Crack-brain'd or to have drunk a Cup too much which are the very Words a Cartesian who wrote his Life has given us p. 34 35 36. And 't is another Thing to say he was habitually a Fanatick or Enthusiast all his Life and in every Action he did or Book he writ the Former of which can neither be deny'd with Truth nor the Later objected with any Degree of Modesty Nor does it sute with the high Character I have given of him in the Preface to my Method and the Encomiums I have upon Occasion bestowed on divers of his Books I beseech you Sir be so Just as to stare my Case right I was writing a METHOD to SCIENCE and two other Methods if indeed they do not fall into the same which look'd very Extravagant did lie cross my Way which unless I remov'd my whole Design had been spoil'd and of no Effect I mean that of Malbranche which makes all Humane Science come by Divine Revelation And that of Cartesius that we must deny all our Knowledge of Natural Truths had by our Senses The settling this Later Method had confessedly lost Cartesius his Wits for some time and therefore I had good reason to fear that the following the same Method might do a greater Mischief to others who had not such Strong Brains as that Great Man had of which too there do not want Instances The former Method advanced by Malbranche I saw evidently brought a kind of Fanaticism into Philosophy For I believe no Man doubts but that the Genius of Fanaticks is to over-leap all Humane Means and to pretend that their Light of Knowledge comes to them immediately from GOD. My Fault then only consisted in this that I was such a Friend to Truth and to Mankind as to endeavour to my Power to avert such Mischiefs from young Students by fore-warning them of what had prejudic'd others and therefore might highly prejudice them and to confute those Ways to Science that so directly thwarted mine which my best Judgment told me was the True one Now this being a Task so Unavoidable to one in my Circumstances and the Confuting such strange Methods being with good Reason judg'd by me to be so Beneficial to others it cannot without Rashness be thought I did this out of a Desire of Opposing other Learned Men but purely out of Duty to my Reader and a just Regard to my self Yet for pursuing this Laudable and in my Case Necessary Intention I am persecuted with the highest Malice by two over-zealous Cartesians who to uphold these Aukward and Pernicious Methods make no Scruple to break in upon the most Sacred Methods of Christianity tho' I have done no more but cite the Words of their own Authors Besides every Candid Reader will hence easily discern that it is not out of Pique against their Persons but purely out of my Dis-like of their Unprincipl'd and Dangerous Methods that I have oppos'd them at all Nor have I any Personal Reflexions upon their Morality Nor do I charge them with Impiety but of Folly which every Antagonist in Philosophical Debates is forc'd to object to his Adversary 51. But am I the only Man of our Moderns here in England who have thought it the Interest of Philosophy and of Truth to oppose Malbranche and Cartesius Mr. Iohn Keyll of Oxford a Person of Great Wit and Greater Hopes being as I am informed scarce arriv'd yet at the Summer of his Age has lately put forth An Examination of Dr. Burnet's Theory of the Earth where after he had in his Introduction discover'd the Fopperies of divers of the Antient Philosophers and of three of our Moderns Spinoza Dr. More and Mr. Hobbs not much less Ridiculous than the former he lays open that superlatively absurd Opinion of Malbranche which I noted above He gives us a Summary and Parallel Consequences of his Doctrine in that particular which is That We see not the Things themselves but only their Ideas which the Soul sees in GOD And that there is no possibility of seeing any Bodies except in that Being GOD which contains them after an Intelligible manner Bodies therefore and their Properties are only seen in GOD so that says he a Man who reads this Book does not really see the Book it self but the Idea of it which is in GOD. Which he deservedly characters to be Unintelligible Iargon and a Solid piece of Nonsense He exposes that equally-senseless Opinion That Bodies of their own Nature are neither heard seen smelt nor tasted and that when for Example we Taste any thing the Body Tasted cannot produce any Savour in us but GOD Almighty takes that Occasion to stir up that Sensation in us to which the Body does not really concurr So that Mankind has it seems quite lost its Animality at least that we are not Naturally Sensitive Creatures but only Supernaturally or by GOD's Immediate Power making us such every time we are to use our Senses He proceeds According to him it is impossible for any Man to move his own Arm but when he is Willing to move it GOD takes it and moves it up and down as the Man Wills If a Rebellious Son or Subject murther his Father or his Prince by stabbing him the Man himself does not thrust the Ponyard into his Father's or Prince's Breast But GOD Almighty does it without any other Concurrence of the Man but his Will. It seems our Laws are very Unjust which do not Hang Men for meerly Intending or Willing but for Ouvert Acts in which the Man himself has no hand at all they being all of them entirely of GOD's doing Whence we see that with the Cartesians such Doctrine as this has no Impiety in it at all against GOD It comes from Them and so 't is all Sacred He proceeds and affirms that no Second Causes act So that no Body tho' mov'd with never so great a