Selected quad for the lemma: truth_n
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A54833
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A correct copy of some notes concerning Gods decrees especially of reprobation / written for the private use of a friend in Northamptonshire ; and now published to prevent calumny.
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Pierce, Thomas, 1622-1691.
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1655
(1655)
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Wing P2170; ESTC R26882
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69,017
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81
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Principle It is taken from the nature and use of Punishment which as soon as it is nam'd doth presuppose a Guilt for as every sin is the * transgression of some Law so every punishment is the revenge of some sin upon which it followes that if a mans sin is from himself 't is from himself that he is punisht And as the Law is not the Cause but the * Occasion only of sin so God is not the Cause but the inflicter only of punishment for so saies the Apostle Sin taking occasion by the Commandement wrought in me all manner of Concupiscence for without the Law sin was dead That which is good not being made death but sin working death by that which is good God and his Law are each of them the Causa-sine-qua-non the Condition without which sin and punishment could not have been for without Law no sin and without God no Reprobation but not the Energetical efficient Cause of which sin and punishment were the necessary effects For if God had made a Hell by an absolute purpose meerly because he would that some should suffer it and not in a praevious intuition of their sins Damnation had been a Misery but not a Punishment as if a Pâ—…tter makes a vessel on purpose that he may break it which yet none but a mad man can be thought to do or if a man meerly for recreation cuts up Animals alive which yet none ever did that I can hear of except a young Spanish Prince it is an Infelicity and a torment but no more a punishment then it is any thing else Indeed the Common people who do not understand the just propriety of words make no distinction many times betwixt Pain and Punishment not considering that Punishment is a Relative word of which the correlative is Breach of Law and therefore is fitly exprest in Scripture by the mutual relation betwixt a Parent and a Childe when lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sin sin being perfected bringeth forth death * Iam. 1. 15. which is as much as to say according to the propriety of the Apostles words sin is the parent and death is the childe Now there cannot be a Childe without a parent for they are relata secundum esse much lesse can the childe be before the parent for sunt simul naturâ dicuntur ad convertentiam Upon which it followes that punishment could not be ordained by God either without sin or before it or without respect and intuition of it which yet the great * Mr. Calvin does plainly say I say it could not because it implies a contradiction For though God could easily make Adam out of the earth and the earth out of nothing yet he could not make a sinful Cain to be the son of sinful Adam before there was an Adam much lesse before there was a sinful one because it were to be and not to be at the same time Adam would be a Cause before an entity which God Almighty cannot do because he is Almighty So that when the Romanists assert their Transubstantiation or the posterity of Marcion their Absolute decree of all the evil in the world both pretending a Reverence to God's omnipotence they do as good as say those things which are true may therefore be false because they are true or that God is so Almighty as to be able not to be God that being the Result of an Ability to make two parts of a contradiction true so said Austin against S. Faustus and Origen against Celsus Whensoever it is said God can do all things 't is meant of all things that become him So Isidore the Pelusiote But to return to argument in the pursuit of which I have stept somewhat too forward if Gods praeordination of mans eternal misery were in order of nature before his praescience of mans sin as Mr. Calvin evidently affirms in his Ideo * praesciverit quia decreto suo praeordinavit setting Praeordination as the Cause or Reason or praevious Requisite to his Praescience either mans Reprobation must come to passe without sin or else he must sin to bring it orderly to passe which is to make God the author either of misery by itself without relation to sin or else of sin in order to misery The first cannot be because God hath * sworn he hath no pleasure in the death of a sinner Ezek. 33. 14. much lesse in his death that never sin'd And because if it were so the Scripture would not use the word Wages and the word Punishment and the word Retribution and the word Reward Hell indeed had been a Torment but not a Recompence a fatal Misery but not a Mulct an Act of power but not of vengeance which yet in many places is the style that God speaks in Vengeance is mine and I will repay Rom. 12. 19. Nor can the second be lesse impossible it having formerly been proved that God is not the Author of sin * he hath no need of the sinful man whereby to bring mans Ruine the more conveniently about and most of them that dare say it are fain to say it in a Disguise Some indeed are for ligonem ligonem but the more modest blasphemers are glad to dresse it in cleaner phrase A strange {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} in Divinity to put the 1 childe before the parent the 2 wages before the work the 3 end before the means the Reprobation before the sin yet so they do who make the Decree of Reprobation most irrespective and unconditional and after that say that whom God determines to the end he determines to the means To put the horse upon the Bridle is a more rational Hypallage for by this Divinity eternal punishment is imputed to Gods Antecedent will which is called the first and sin to his consequent will which is the second The first {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} and the other only {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} punishment chiefly and sin by way of Consecution Men are bid not to sin ex voluntate signi or revelata but are determin'd to it ex voluntate occultâ or beneplaciti Distinctions very good when at first they were invented for better uses The former by S. Chrysostome from whom it was borrow'd by Damascene and from him by the Schoolmen But I say they all were us'd to very contrary purposes by them and by these who endevour'd to repel those Fathers with their own weapons as the elaborate Gerard Vossius does very largely make it appear I am sorry I must say what yet I must saith * Tertullian when it may tend to edification That the Lord God merciful and gracious long-suffering abundant in goodnesse and truth who is all Bowels and no gall who hateth nothing that he hath made who in the midst of Iudgement remembreth mercy ever forgiving iniquity transgression and sin is exhibited to the world
were not a murderer Whom he condemns as murderer and not as man For whilest he hath a will to hang the murderer he hath a merciful woulding to save the man He doth not hang the man but only because he is a murderer And if it lay in his power he would destroy the murderer to save the man Both the one and the other is not an absolute but a conditional will He would save the man with an if he were not a murderer And doth destroy the murderer with a because he is a Malefactor Just so God's antecedent will is that every man would repent that they may not perish It is his consequent will that every one may perish who will not repent Both the one and the other is respective and conditional Thirdly I distinguish with Prosper of an inviting and revenging will The inviting will is that by which all are bidden to the Wedding Feast his revenging will is that by which he punisheth those that will not come Or fourthly I distinguish with reverend Anselme of the will of God's mercy and of the will of his Iustice It is the will of his Mercy that Christ should die for the sins of all but 't is the will of his Iustice that all should perish who come not in to him when they are called or who only so come as not to continue and persevere unto the end 41. All these Distinctions come to one and the same purpose and being rightly understood as well as dexterously used do seem to me a Gladius Delphicus sufficient to cut asunder the chiefest knots in this Question For the first will of God may be repealed whereas the second is immutable Which is the ground of that Distinction betwixt the Threats and Promises under God's Oath and those other under his Word only Of which saith the Councel of Toledo Iurare Dei est à seipso ordinata nullatenus convellere Poenitere verò eadem ordinata cùm voluerit immutare When he is resolv'd to execute his purpose he is said to swear and when it pleaseth him to alter it he is said to repent For there are some Decrees of God which being conditional do never come to passe as he thought to have done an Evil of punishment unto Israel which yet he did not Exod. 32. 14. And the reason of this is given us from that distinction before mentioned Which also serveth to reconcile many seeming repugnances in Scripture For when it is said that God repenteth 1 Sam. 16. 35 it is meant of the first nill and when it is said he cannot repent 1 Sam. 16. 29. it is meant of the second In respect of the first we are said to grieve to quench to resist the Spirit of God 1 Thes. 5. 19. but when it is said who hath resisted his will Rom. 9. 19. it is meant of the second God's Mercy is above and before his Iustice and therefore that is his first will that all should be saved and come to the knowledge of the Truth 1 Tim. 2. 4. but yet so as that his Iustice is not excluded by his Mercy and therefore that is his second Will that so many should be damned as hated knowledge and did not choose the fear of the Lord Prov. 1. 29. The will of his Mercy that all should live is from nothing but his goodnesse whereas the will of his Iustice that some should die depends upon something in the Creature So that both parties may be gratified they that are for the dependence and the independency of his Will That the Reprobate is invited is from the mercy of God's Will but that he is punished for not accepting is from the obliquity of his own In respect of the first it is the man that refuseth God Ier. 8. 5. But in respect of the second it is the God that doth reprobate man Rom. 1. 28. The free Love of the Creator is the only motive to his first will but man's ingratitude and rebellion is his impellent to the second The first shewes him a tender and compassionate Father the second speaks him a righteous and an impartial Iudge Both proclaim him a powerful and a provident God Now can any Distinction be better chosen can any word that is aequivocable be more safely understood can any Opinion of God's will or mans be more rationally or more warily or more religiously entertain'd then that wherein God's Mercy doth greet his Iustice and wherein his Love doth kisse his Power I appeal to any man living whether this be an Error or if it is whether it is not a very safe one and if it is so whether it is not a very small one and if so safe that no body can suffer by it if so smal that no body can see it whether the Author of this Appeal is not very excusable both for not being able to see his own Eyes nor to see his own Error with other mens As much as in me lies I would live peaceably with all men With those especially who when I speak unto them thereof make them ready to battle And in order to that Peace I desire them to lay this one thing to heart That as if I were as they I would quit my Opinion so if they were as I they would not long keep their own CHAP. IV. 42. HAving proved hitherto that Sin is really the cause of Punishment that Man is really the cause of Sin and therefore that Man is the grand cause of Punishment as being the cause of the cause of his Damnation intending thereby to secure my self against the errors and blacker guilt of the Manichees the Marcionites the Stoicks and the Turks who do all affirm some directly some by necessary consequence That God's absolute Will is the cause of sin and man's only the instrument the second part of my Task is to be an Advocate for the pleading and asserting the Cause of God too and that against the Opiners of the other Extreme to wit the Pelagians and the Massilienses who to be liberal to Nature do take away from Grace and to strengthen the Handmaid do lessen the forces of the Mistresse And though I think the latter to be the milder Heresie of the two it being lesse dangerous to ascribe too much goodnesse to the Power of Nature which very power is undoubtedly the gift of God then the very least Evil to the God of all Grace and this according to the Judgement of the Synod at Orange which pronounced an Anathema upon the first Heresie whereas it did but civilly reject the second yet in a perfect dislike and rejection of this latter Extremity as well as of the former my second Principle is this That all the good which I do I do first receive not from any thing in my self but from the special Grace and Favour of Almighty God Who freely worketh in me both to will and to do of his good pleasure Phil. 2. 13. 43. That I may not be