own bountie presented unto men ought no more to be inhaunsed by sale then either the light the aire or the water as a certaine King called L. magis puto D. de â—ebus corum Lycurgus in the lesser Asia began to lay some impositions upon the Salt pits there nature as it were impatiently bearing such a restraint of her liberality the springs are said to drie up suddenly Inv. Sat 4. Si quid palphurio si credimus Armillato Quicquid conspicuum palchrum qâ—ex aequoâ—e toâ—o est Res fisci est ubicunque natat Now although certain Marmâ—usets of the Court would perswade us at this day as Juveral complained in his time that the Sea affords nothing of worth or good which falls not within the compasse of the Kings Prerogative He that first brought this taxation into Rome was the Censor Livius who therefore gained the surname of Salter neither was it done but in the Common-wealths extreame necessity And in France King Philip the long for the same reason obtained of the Estates the imposition upon Salt for five years onely what turmoiles and troubles the continuance thereof hath bred every man knowes To be bâ—eife all Tributes were imposed and continued for the provision of meanes and stipends for the men of war so as to make a Province stipendarie or tributarie was esteemed the same with militarie Behold wherefore Solomon exacted Tributes to wit to fortifie 1 King 9. 15. the Towns and to erect and furnish a publick magazine which being accomplished the people required of Reholoam to be freed Postâ—l li. 3 de rep Turc from that burden The Turks call the Tribute of the Provinces the Sacred blood of the people and account it a most wicked crime to implâ—y it in any thing but the defence of the people Wherefore by the same reason all that which the King conquers in warre belongs to the people and nor to the King because the people bore the charges of the war as that which is gained by a factor accures to the account of his master Yea and what advantage he gaines by marriage if it belongs simplie and absolutely to his wife that is acquired also to the Kingdom for so much as it is to be presumed that he gained not that preferment in marriage in quality of Philip or Charles but as he was King On the contrarie in like manner the Queens have interest of indowment in the estates which their husbands gained and injoyed before they attained the Crown and have no title to that which is gotten after they are created Kings because that is judged as the acquist of the Common purse and hath no proper reference to the Kings private estate which was so determined in France betwixt Philip of Valoys and his wife Jedne of Burgundie But to the end that there be no money drawn from the people to be imployed in private designes and for particular ends and purposes the Emperor swears not to impose any Taxes or Tributes whatsoever but by the authority of the Estates of the Empire As much do the Kings of Polonia Hungarie and Denmarke promise the English in like manner enjoy the same unto this day by the Lawes of Henry the third and Edward the first The French Kings in former times imposed no Taxes but in the Assemblies and with the consent of the three Estates from thence sprung the Law of Philip of Valoys that the people should not have any Tribute layd on them but in urgent necessity and with the consent of the Estates Yea and anciently after these monies were collected they were locked in coffers through every Diocesse and recommended to the speciall care of selected men who are the same which at this day are called Esleus to the end that they should pay the souldiers enroled within the Towns of their Diocesses the which was in use in other Countries as namely in Flanders and other neighbouring Provinces At this day though many corruptions be crept in yet without the consent and confirmation of the Parliament no exactions may be collected notwithstanding there be some Provinces which are not bound to any thing without the approbation of the Estates of the Countrey as Languedoke Brittannie Province Daulphinie and some others All the Provinces of the Low Countries have the same priviledges finally lest the Exchequer devour all like the spleen which exhales the spirits from the other members of the body In all places they have confined the Exchequer within its proper bounds and limits Seeing then it is most certaine that what hath been ordinarily and extraordinarily assigned to Kings to wit Tributes Taxes and all the demeanes which compreheâ—d all customes both for importations and exportations forfeitures amercements royall escheates confiscations and other dews of the same nature were configned into their hands for the maintainance and defence of the people and the State of the Kingdom insomuch as if these sinewes be cut the people must nâ—eds fall to decay and in demolishing these foundations the Kingdome will come to utter ruine It necessarily follows that he which layes impositions on the people onely to oâ—presse them and by the publick detriment seeks private profit and with their own swords kills his subject he truely is unworthy the name of a King Whereas concrarily a true King as he is a carefull mannager of the publick affairs so is he a ready protector of the Common wellfare and not a Lord in propriety of the Common-wealth having as little authority to alienate or dissipate the demeans or publick Revenue as the Kingdom it self And if he mis-govern the State seeing it imports the Common-wealth that every one make use of his own talent it is much more requisite for the publick good that he which hath the mannaging of it carrie himself as he ought And therefore if a prodigall Lord by the authority of justice be committed to the tuition of his kinsmen and friends and compelled to suffer his revenues and means to be ordered and disposed of by others by much more reason may those which have interest in the affairs of State whose duty obligeth them thereto take all the Administration and government of the State out of the hands of him which either negligently executes his place ruines the Common-wealth if after admonition he indeavours not to performe his duty And for so much as it is easily to be proved that in all lawfull Dominions the King cannot be held Lord in propriety of the demeane without searching into those elder times whereof we have an apt representation in the Gen. 23. person of Ephron King of the Hittites who durst not sell the Field to Abraham without the consent of the people This right is at this day practised in publick States the Emp of Germany before his Sleyd l. 1. bulla aurea Coronation doth solemly swear that he will neither alienate dismember nor ingage any of the rights or members of the Empire And if he
Vindiciae contra Tyrannos A Defence of Liberty against Tyrants OR Of the lawfull power of the Prince over the people and of the people over the Prince BEING A Treatise written in Latin and French by Junius Brutus and translated out of both into ENGLISH Questions discussed in this Treatise I. Whether Subjects are bound and ought to obey Princes if they command that which is against the Law of God II. Whether it be lawfull to resist a Prince which doth infringe the Law of God or ruine the Church by whom how and how farre it is lawfull III. Whether it be lawfull to resist a Prince which doth oppresse or ruine a publique State and how farre such resistance may be extended by whom how and by what right or law it is permitted IV. Whether neighbour Princes or States may be or are bound by Law to give succours to the Subjects of other Princes afflicted for the cause of true Religion or oppressed by manifest tyranny LONDON Printed by Matthew Simmons and Robert Ibbitson in Smithfield neer the Queens-head Tavern 1648. THE Emperors Theodosias and Valentinian TO VOLVSIANVS Great Provost of the Empire IT is a thing well-becomming the Majesty of an Emperour to acknowledge himself bound to obey the Laws Our authority depending on the authority of the Laws and in very deed to submit the principallity to Law is a greater thing then to beare rule We therfore make it known unto all men by the Declaration of this our Edict that Wee doe not allow Our selves or repute it lawfull to doe any thing contrary to this Justine in the second Book speaks thus of Lycargns Law-giver to the Lacedemonians He gave Laws to the Spartans which had not any and was as much renowned for his diligent observing of them himself as for his discreet Inventing of them For he made no Laws for others to the obedience whereof he did not first submit himself Fashioning the people to obey willingly and the Prince to Govern uprightly The first Question Whether Subjects are bound and ought to obey Printes if they command that which is against the Law of God THIS question happily may seeme at the first view to be altogether superfluous and unprofitable for that it seems to make a doubt of an axiome allways held infallible amongst Christians confirmed by many testimonies in Holy Scripture divers examples of the histories of all ages and by the death of all the Holy Martyrs for it may be well demanded wherefore Christians have endured so many afflictions but that they were alwayes perswaded that God must be obeyed simply and absolutly and Kings with this exception that they command not that which is repugnant to the law of God Otherways wherfore should the Apostles have answered that God must rather be obeyed than men and also Act. 4. 19. seeing that the only wil of God is always just and that of men may be and is oftentimes unjust who can doubt but that we must always obey Gods commandements without any exception and mens ever with limitation But for so much as there are many Princes in these days calling themselves Christians which arrogantly assumes an unlimited power over which God himselfe hath no command and that they have no want of flatterers which adore them as Gods upon earth many others also which for feare or by constraint either seem or else do beleeve that Princes ought to be obeyed in all things and by all men And withall seeing the unhappines of these times is such that there is nothing so firme certain or pure which is not shaken disgraced or polluted I feare me that whosoever shall neerly and throughly consider these things will confesse this question to be not only most profitable but also the times considered most necessary For my owne part when I consider the cause of the many calamities wherewith Christendome hath been afflicted for these late yeares I cannot but remember that of the Prophet Hosea The Princes of Judah were like them Hos 5. 10. 11. that remove the bounds wherefore I will power out my self like water Ephraim is oppressed and broken in judgement because he willingly walked after the Commandement Here you see the sin of the Princes and people dispersed in these two words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Princes exceed their bounds not contenting themselves with that authority which the Almighty and all good God hath given them but seeke to usurpe that sovereignty which he hath reserved to himselfe over all men being not content to command the bodys and goods of their Subjects at their pleasure but assume licence to themselves to inforce the Consciences which appertaines chiefly to Jesus Christ holding the earth not great enough for their ambition they will climbe and conquor heaven it selfe The people on the other side walkes after the commandement when they yeeld to the desire of Princes who command them that which is against the law of God and as it were burn incense to and adore these earthy Gods and instead of resisting them if they have means and occasion suffer them to usurp the place of God making no conscience to give that to Caesar which belongs properly and only to God Now is there any man that sees not this if a man disobey a Prince commanding that which is wicked and unlawfull hee shall presently bee esteemed a Rebell a Traytor and guilty of High Treason our Saviour Christ the Apostles and all the Christians of the Primitive Church were charged with these Calumnies If any after the example of Ezra and Nehemiah dispose himselfe to the building of the Temple of the Ezra 4. Nehe. 5 7. Lord It wil be said he aspires to the Crowne hatches innovations and seeks the ruine of the State then you shall presently see a million of these Minnious and flatterers of Princes tickling their eares with an opinion that if they once suffer this Temple to be re-builded they may bid their Kingdome farewell and never look to raise impost or taxes on these men But what a madnesse is this There are no estates which ought to be esteemed firme and stable but those in whom the Temple of God is built and which are indeed the Temple it selfe and these we may truly call Kings which reigne with God seeing that it is by him only that Kings reign On the contrary what beastly foolishnesse is it to think that the State and Kingdome cannot subsist if God Almighty be not excluded and his Temple demolished From hence proceeds so many Tyrannous enterprises unhappy and tragick death of Kings and ruines of people If these Sicophants knew what difference there is between God and Caesar between the King of Kings and a simple King between the Lord and the Vassal and what tributs this Lord requires of his Subjects and what authority he gives to Kings over those his Subjects certainly so many Princes would not strive to trouble the Kingdome of God and we should not see some of them precipitated from their
much as if the Rom 1. 35. Apostle had said that the obedience of which he speaks ought not to proceed for feare of punishment but from the love of God and from the reverence which we are bound to beare unto the word in the same sence Saint Paul enjoyneth servants in such manner to obey their Masters that it be not with eye service for feare of stripes but in singlenesse of heart fearing Col. 3. 22. God not simply to acquire the favour of men whom they may delude but to bear the burden laid on their shoulders by him whom no man can deceive In briefe there is manifest difference between these two manners of speech to obey for conscience sake and to obey in those thing which concerne the conscience otherwayes those which had much rather loose their lives with infinite torments then obey Princes which command them things contrary to the will of God would have taught us that which these seek to perswade us to Neither doe they expresse themselves Object 2 lesse impudent in that which they are accustomed to object to those which are not so well able to answer them That obedience is better than sacrifice for there is no Text in holy writ that doth more evidently confound them then this which is contained in Samuels reprehension of King Saul for 1 Sam. 15. 22. his disobedience to the Commandement of God in sacrificing unfittingly If then Saul although he were a King ought to obey God it follows in all good consequence that subjects are not bound to obey their King by offending of God Briefly those which after the barbarous manner of the men of Calcut seek to inthrall the service of God with a necessary dependance on the will of a mutable man and Religion of the good pleasure of the King as if he were some God on earth they doubles little value the testimony of holy Writ But let them at the least yet learn of a Heathen Orator That in every publique state Cicero in the first book of offic there is certain degrees of duty for those that converse and live in it by which may appear wherein the one are obliged to the other Insomuch that the first part of this duty belongs to the immortall God the second concerns the Country which is their common Mother the third those which are of our blood the other parts leading us step by step to our other Neighbours Now although the crime of High Treason be very heinous yet according l. 2. ad leg Jul. majest Digest to the Civilians it alwaies follows after sacriledge an offence which properly pertaines to the Lord God and his service insomuch that they do confidently affirm that the robbing of a Church is by their rules esteemed a greater crime than to conspire against the life of a Prince Thus much for this first Question wherein we perswade our selves that any man may receive satisfaction if he be not utterly voyd of the fear of God The second Question Whether it be lawfull to resist a Prince which doth infringe the Law of God or ruine his Church by whom how and how far it is lawfull THis Question seems at the first view to be of a high and difficult nature for so much as there being small occasion to speak to Princes that fear God On the contrary there will be much danger to trouble the ears of those which acknowledge no other Sovereign but themselves for which reason few or none have medled with it and if any have at all touched it it hath been but as it were in passing by The Question is If it be lawfull to resist a Prince violating the Law of God or ruinating the Church or hindring the restoring of it If we hold our selves to the tenure of the holy Scripture it will resolve us For if in this case it have been lawfull to the Jewish people the which may be easily gathered from the books of the Old Testament yea if it have been injoyned them I beleeve it will not be denyed that the same must be allowed to the whole people of any Christian Kingdom or Country whatsoever In the first place it must be considered that God having chosen Israel from amongst all the Nations of the Earth to be a peculiar people to him and covenanted with them that they should be the people of God This is written in divers places of Douteronomy the substance and tenor of Deut. 7. 6. 14. 2. this alliance was That all should be carefull in their severall lines tribes and families in the land of Canaan to serve God purely who would have a Church established amongst them for ever which may be drawn from the testimony of divers places namely that which is contained in the 27 Chap. of Deuteronomy there Moses and the Levites covenanting as in the name of God assembled all the people and said unto them This day Oh Israel art thou become the people of God obey you therfore his voyce c. And Moses said when thou hast passed the River of Jordan thou shalt set six Tribes on the mountain of Gerizzim on the one side and the six other on the Mountain of Eball and then the Levites shall read the Law of God promising the observers all felicity and threatning woe and destruction to the breakers thereof and all the people shall answer Amen The which was afterwards performed by Joshua at his entring into the Land of Canaan and some few days before his death We see by this that all the people is bound to maintain the law of Jos 5. 24. 24. 20. c. God to perfect his Church and on the contrary to exterminate the Idols of the land of Canaan a Covenant which can no wayes appertain to particulars but only to the whole body of the people To which also it seems the incamping of all the Tribes round about the Ark of the Lord to have reference to the end that all should look to preservation of that which was committed to the custody of all Now for the use and practise of this Covenant wee may produce examples the Inhabitants of Gabaa of the Tribe of Benjamin ravished the wife of a Levite which died through their violence Judg. 19 20. The Levite divided his wife into twelve peeces and sent them to the twelve Tribes to the end that all the people together might wipe away this so horrible a crime committed in Israel All the people met together at Mizpah and required the Benjamites to deliver to be punished those that were culpable of this enormious crime which they refused to performe wherefore with the allowance of God himselfe the states of the people with an universall consent renounce and make war against the Benjamites and by this means the authority of the second Table of the Law was maintained by the detriment and ruine of one entire Tribe which had broken it in one of the precepts For the first we have
which â—ive with out a King but we cannot imagine a King without pâ—ople And those which have bin raised to the Royal dignity were not advanced because they excelâ—ed other men in beauty comeâ—iness nor in some excellency of nature to govern them as shepheards doe their flocks but rather being made out of the same masse with the rest of the people they should acknowledge that for them they as it were borrow their power authority The ancient custome of the French represents that exceeding welâ— for they used to lift up on a buckler saâ—ute him King whom they had chosen And wherefore is it said I pray you that kings hâ—ve an infinite number of eyes a million of ears with extream long hands and feet exceeding swift is it because they are like to Argos Gerion Midas divers others â—o celebrated by the Poets No truly but it is said in regard of all the people whom the busines principalâ—y concerns who lend to the king for the good of the Common-wealth their eyeâ— their ears their means their facuâ—ties Let the people forsake the king he presently fals to the ground although befoâ—e his hearing sight seemed most excellent that he was strong in the best disposition that might be yea that he seemed to triumph in all magnificence yet in an instant he wiâ—l become moâ—t viâ—e contemptible to bee brief instead of those divine honours wherewith all men adored him he shal be compeâ—ed Dionisius for his Tiâ—aâ—â—ie driven oâ—t of Câ—cilâ—e was foâ—sâ—d to taâ—e that course of lifâ— upâ—n hâ—m to become a Pedant whip children in the schooâ— at Corinth Take away but the basis to this Giant lâ—â—e the Rodian Colosse he pâ—esently tumbles on the ground fals into pieces Seeing thâ—n that the King is estabâ—ished in this degree by the people for their sake that he cannot subsist without them who can think it strange then for us to conclude that the peopâ—e are aboue the King Now that which we speak of alâ— the people universally ought also to be understood as hath been delivered in the 2. question of those which in every Kingdom or town do â—â—â—wfully represent the body of the people which ordinarily or at lest should be caâ—ed the officers of the Kingdom or of the crown not of the King For the officers of the â—ing it is he which placeth displaceth them at his pleasure yea after his death they have no more power are accounted as dead On the contrary the officers of the Kingdom receive their authority from the people in the general Assembly of the states or at the least werâ— accustomed so anciently to have done cannot be disauthorised but by them so then the one depends of the King the other of the Kingdom those of tâ—e soveraign officer of the â—ingdom which is the King himself these of the soveraignty it self that is of the people of which soveraignty both the King all his officers and all his officers of the â—ingdom ought to depend the charge of the one hath proper relation to the care of the â—ings person that of the other to look that the common-wealth receive no damage the first ought to serve and assist the King as all domestique servants are bound to doe to their masters the other to preserve the rights priviledges of the people to carefully hinder the Prince that he neither omit the things that may advantage the state nor commit any thing that may endammage the publique Briefly the one are Servants and domestiques of the Kings and received into their places to obey his person the other on the contrary are as Associates to the King in the administration of justice participating of the Royal power and authority being bound to the utmost of their power to be assisting in the managing of the affairs of State as well as the King who is as it were President amongst them and principall onely in order and degree Therefore as all the whole People is above the King and likewise taken in one entire body are in authority before him yet being considered one by one they are all of them under the King It is easie to know how far the power of the first Kings extended in that Ephron King of the Hittites could not grant Abraham the Sepulchre but in the presence and with the consent of the People neither could Hemor the Hevite Gen. 34. King of Sichem contract an alliance with Iacob without the Peoples assent and confirmation thereof because it was then the custome to refer the most important affairs to be dispensed and resolved in the generall Assemblies of the People This might easily be practised in those kingdomes which were then almost confined within the circuit of one towne But since that Kings began to extend their limits and that it was impossible for the People to assemble together all into one place because of their great numbers which would have occasioned confusion the Officers of the kingdome were established which should ordinarily preserve the rights of the People in such sort notwithstanding as when extraordinary occasion required the People might be assembled or at the least such an abridgement as might by the principallest Members be a Representation of the whole Body We see this order established in the kingdome of Israel which in the judgment of the wisest Politicians was excellently ordered The King had his Cupbearers his Carvers his Chamberlains and Stewards The kingdome had her Officers to wit the 71. Elders and the heads and chief chosen out of all the Tribes which had the care of the Publique Faith in Peace and War Furthermore the kingdome had in every town Magistrates which had the particular government of them as the former were for the whole kingdome At such times as affairs of consequence were to be treated of they assembled together but nothing that concerned the publike state could receive any solid determination David assembled the Officers of 1. Chron. 29. 1 1. Chron. 13. 1. his kingdome when he desired to invest his Son Solomon with the Royal Dignity when he would have examined and approved that manner of policy and managing of affairs that he had revived and restored and when there was question of removing the Ark of the Covenant And because they represented the whole people it is said in the History that all the people assembled These were the same Officers that delivered Ionathan from death condemned by the sentence of the King by which it appeares that there might be an appeale from the King to the People After that the kingdome was divided through the pride of Reoboam â— Sam. â—â— 45. the Councel at Ierusalem composed of 71. Ancients seems to have such authority that they might judge the King as well as the King might judge every one of them in particular In this Councel was President the Duke of the house of Iuda to wit â— Chron. 1â—
Neh. 11. 9. some principall man chosen out of that Tribe as also in the City of Ierusalem there was a Governour chosen out of the Tribe of Benjamin residing there This will appear more manifest by examples Ieremy sent by God to denounce to the Jewes the destruction of Ierusalem was therefore condemned first by the Priests and Prophets in whose hands was â—or 16. 9 〈◊〉 the Ecclesiasticall jurisdiction afterwards by all the people of the City that is by the ordinary Iudges of Ierusalem to wit the Milleniers and the Centurions Finally the matter being brought before the Princes of Iuda who were the 71. Elders assembled and set neere to the new Gate of the Temple he was by them acquitted In this very Assembly they did discreetly condemn in expresse terms the wicked and cruell act of the King Ichoiakin who a little before had caused the Prophet Vriah to be slain who also fore-told the destruction of Ierusalem We read in another place that Ledechias held in such reverence the authority of this Councel that he was so far from delivering of Ieremy 〈◊〉 37. 38. from the dungeon wherein to the 71. had cast him that he durst scant remove him into a lesse rigorous prison They perswading him to give his consent to the putting to death the Prophet Ieremy he answered that he was in their hands and that he might not oppose them in my thing The same King fearing least they might make information against him to bring him to an account for certain Speeches he had used to the Prophet Ieremy was glad to feâ—gn an untrue excuse It appeares by this that in the kingdome of Iuda this Councel was above the King in this kingdome I say not fashioned or established by Plato or Arictotle but by the Lord God himself being Author of all their order and supreame Moderator in that Monarchy Such were the seven Magi or Sages in the Persian Empire who had almost a paraleld dignity with the King and were tearmed the ears and eyes of the King who also never dissented from Arist in Pol. lib. â— c. 11. l. 3. c. 7. the judgment of those Sages In the kingdom of Sparta there was the Ephori to whom an appeal lay from the judgment of the King and who as Aristotle sayes had authority also to judge the Kings themselves In Egypt the people were accustomed to chuse and give officers to the King to the end they might hinder and prevent any incroachment or usurpt authority contrary to the Laws Now as Aristotle doth ordinarily tearm those lawfull Kings which have for their Assistants such officers Arist. in pol. l. 5. c. 11. or Councellors so also maketh he no difficulty to say that where they be wanting there can be no true Monarchy but rather a tyranny absolutely barbarous or at the least such a Dominion as doth most neerly approach tyranny In the Romane Common-wealth such were the Senators and the Magistrates created by the people the tribune of those which were called Celerees the Preter or Provost of the City and others insomuch as there lay an appeal from the King to the People as Seneca declares by divers testimonies drawne from Ciceroes bookes of the Common-wealth and the History of Oratius sufficiently shewes who being condemned by the Iudges for killing his sister was acquitted by the people In the times of the Emperours there was the Senate the Consults the Pretors the great Provosts of the Empire the Governours of Provinces attributed to the Senate and the People all which were called the Magistrates and Officers of the people of Rome And therefore when that by the decree of the Senate the Emperour Maximinus was declared enemy Herodi â— 8. of the Common-wealth and that Maximus and Albinus were created Emperours by the Senate the men of war were sworn to be faithfull and obedient to the people of Rome the Senate and the Emperors Now for the Empires and publike States of these times except those of Turquie Muscovie and such like which are rather a rapsody of Robbers and barbarous intruders then any lawfull Empires there is not one which is not or hath not heretofore been governed in the manner wee have described And if through the connivency and sloath of the principall Officers the successors have found the businesse in a worse condition those which have for the present the publike Authority in their hands are notwithstanding bound as much as in them lyeth to reduce things into their primary estate and condition In the Empire of Germany which is conferred by election there is the Electors and the Princes both secular and Ecclesiasticall the Countesse Barons and Deputies of the Imperial Cities and as all these in their proper places are Solicitors for the publike good likewise in the Diets doe they represent the Majesty of the Empire being obliged to advise and carefully fore-see that neither by the Emperours partiality hate nor affection the publike State do suffer or be interressed And for this reason the Empire hath its Chancellour as well as the Emperour his both the one and the other have their peculiar Officers and Treasurers apart And it is a thing so notorious that the Empire is preferred before the Emperour that it is a common saying That the Emperour does homage to the Empire In like manner in the Kingdom of Polonia there is for Officers of the Crown the Bishops the Palatins the Castellains the Nobility the Deputies Speculum saxonicum of Towns and Provinces assembled extraordinarily before whom and with whose consent and no where else they make new Lawes and determinations concerning wars For the ordinary Government there is the Councellours of the kingdom the Chancellour of the State c. although notwithstanding the king have his Stewards Chamberlains Servants and Domestiques Now if any man should demand in Polonia who were the greater the King or all the people of the kingdom represented by the Lords and Magistrates he should do as much as if he asked at Veniâ—e if the Duke were above the Seigniory But what shall wee say of Kingdoms which are said to go by hereditary succession We may indeed conclude the very same The kingdom of France heretofore preferred before all other both in regard of the excellency of their Lawes and Aiâ—oni lib. 5. c. 26. in Carolo â—â—lvâ— maâ—esty of their Estate may passe with most as a ruling case Now although that those which have the publike commands in their hands doe not discharge their duties as were to be desired it followes not though that they are not bound to do it The King hath his high steward of his Houshold his Chamberlains his Masters of his games Cup-bearers and others whose oâ—â—â—ces were wont so to depend on the person of the King that after the death of their Mastâ—r the roâ—â—ces were void And indeed at the Funerall of the King the Lord high Steward in the presence of all the officers and servants of the
house-hold breakes his staffe of office and sayes Our Master is dead let every one provide for himselfe On the other side the kingdom hath her officers to wit the Mayor of the Palace which since hath been called the Constable the Marshals the Admirall the Chancellour or great Referendary the Secretaries the Treasurers and others which heretofore were created in the Assembly of the three Estates the Clergy the Nobility and the People Since that the Parliament of Paris was made Sedentary they are not thought to be established in their places before they have beene first received and approved by that course of Parliament and may not be dismissed nor deposed but by the authority and consent of the same Now all these officers take their oath to the Kingdome which is as much as to say to the people in the first place then to the King which is protector of he Kingdome the which appears by the tenour of the oath Above all the Constable who receiving the Sword from the King hath it girded unto him with this charge That he maintain and defend the Common-wealth as appears by the words that the King then pronounceth Besides the kingdome of France hath the Peers so called either for S. Filius fam instit quib mod jus patriae pot solvitur that they are the Kings companions or because they are the Fathers of the Common-wealth taking their denominations from the severall Provinces of the kingdome in whose hands the King at his inauguration takes his oath as if all the people of the kingdome were in them present which shews that these twelve Peers are above the King They on the other side swear That they will preserve not the King but the Crown that they will assist the Common-wealth with their councell and therefore will be present with their best abilities to councell the Prince both in peace and war as appears plainly in the Paitentee of their Peership And they therefore have the same right as the Peers of the Court Renatus châ—pinus ' lib. 3. which according to the Law of the Lumbards were not only associates to the Lord of the Fee in the judgment of cauâ—es but also did take an â—ccount and judge the differences that happenod between the Lord and his vassall We may also know that those Peers of France did often discusse suits and differences between the King and his Subjects Insomuch that when Charles the 6. would have given sentence against the Duke of Brittain they opposed it alleadging that the discussing of that businesse belonged properly to the Peers and not to the king who might not in any 〈◊〉 derogate from their authority Therefore it is that yet at this day the Parliament of Paris is called the Court of Peers being in some sort constituted Judge between the king and the people yea between the king and every private person and is bound and ought to maintain the meanest in the kingdome against the kings Attorney if he undertake any thing contrary to law Furthermore if the king ordain any thing in his Councell if he treat any agreement with the Princes his neighbours if he begin a Warre or make peace as lately with Charles the 5. the Emperour the Parliament ought to interpose their authority and all that which concerns the publike State must be there inregistred neither is there any thing firm and stable which the Parliament doth not first approve And to the end that the Councellours of that Parliament should not fear the king formerly they attained not to that place but by the nomination of the whole body of the Court neither could they be dismissed for any lawfull cause but by the authority of the said Body Furthermore if the Letters of the King be not subsigned by a Secretary of the Kingdom at this day called a Secretary of State and if the Letters Pattents be not sealed by the Chancellour who hath power also to cancell them they are of no force or value There is also Dukes Marquesses Earls Vicounts Barons Seneschabs and in the cities and good towns Mayors Baylistes Lieutenants Capitols Consuls Sindiques Sheriffs and others which have speciall authority through the Circuit of some countries or towns to preserve the people of their jurisdiction Time it is that at this day some of these dignities ere become hereditary Thus much concerning the ordinary Magistrates The Assembly of the three Estates Besides all this anciently every yeer and since lesse often to wit when some urgent necessity required it the generall or three Estates were assembled where all the Provinces and Townes of any worth to wâ—t the Burgesses Nobles and Ecclesiasticall persons did all of them send their Deputies and there they did publikely deliberate and conclude of that which concerned the publike state Alwayes the authority of this Assembly was such that what was there determined whether it were to treat peace or make war or create a Regent in the Kingdom or impose some new tribute it was ever held firm and inviolable nay which is more by the authority of this Assembly the Kings convinced of loose intemporancy or of insufficiency for so great a charge or tyranny were disthronized yes their whole Races were for ever excluded from their succession to the Kingdome no more nor lesse as their Progenitors were by the same authority formerly called to the administration of the same Kingdome Those whom the consent and approbation of the Estates had formerly raised were by the dissent and disallowing of the same afterwards cast down Those which tracing in the vertuous steps of their Ancestors were called to that dignity as if it had been their inheritance were driven out and dis-inherited for their degenerating ingratitude for that being tainted with insupportable vices they made themselves uncapable and unworthy of such honour This shews that succession was tollerated to avoid practises close and under-hand canvasing discontents of persons refused contentions interraines and other discommodities of elections But on the other part when successiou brought other mischiefes more pernicious when tyrannie trampled on the Kingdome and when a Tyrant possessed himselfe of the Royal Throne the Medicine proving much worse then the Disease then the Estates of the Kingdome lawfully assembled in the name of all the people have ever maintained their authority whether it were to drive out a Tyrant or other unworthy King or to establish a good one in his place The ancient French had learned that of the Gauses as Caesar shewes in his Commentaries For Ambiorix King of the Eburons or Leigeons confesseth That such were the condition of the Gaulish Empire that the people lawfully assembled had no lesse power over the King then the Caes l. 5. 7. de bello Gal. lico King had over the people The which appears also in Vircingentorix who gives an account of his actions before the Assembly of the people In the kingdoms of Spain especially Aragon Valentia and Catalonia there is the very same For
that which is called the Iustitia Major in Aragon hath the Soveraign authority in it selfe And therefore the Lords which represent the people proceed so far that both at the inaugaration of the King as also at the Assembly of the Estates which is observed every tâ—ird yeer to say to the King in expresse words that which follows We which are as much worth as you and have more power then you chuse you King upon these and these conditions and there is one between you and us which commands over you to wit the Iustitia Major of Aragon which oftentimes refuseth that which the King demands and forbids that which the King â—njoynes In the kingdoms of England and Scotland the Soveraignty seemes to be in the Parliament which heretofore was held almost every yeere They call Parliaments the Assembly of the Estates the kingdome in the which the Bishops Earles Barons Deputies of Towns and Provinces deliver their opinions and resolve with a joynt consent of the affaires of State the authority of this Assembly hath been so sacred and inviolable that the King durst not abrogate or alter that which had been there once decreed It was that which heretofore called and installed in their charges all the chief officers of the kingdome yea and sometimes the ordinary councellers of that which they call the Kings privie Councels In sum the other christian Kingdoms as Hungary Bohemia Denmarke Swedea and the rest they have their officers apart from the Kings and Histories together with the examples that we have in these our times suffâ—ciently demonstrate that these Officers and Estates have knowne how to make use of their authoriâ—y even to the deposing and driving out of the tyrannors and unworthy Kings We must nor therefore esteem that this cuts too short the wings of Royal authority and that it is as much as to take the Kings head from his shoulders We believe that God is Almighty neither think we it any thing diminisheth his power because he cannot sin neither say we that his Empire is lesse to be esteemed because it cannot be neither shaken nor cast downe neither also must we judge a King to be too much abused if he be withheld by others from falling into an errour to which he is over-much inclined or for that by the wisdome and discretion of some of his Councellors his kingdome is preserved and kept intire and safe which otherwise happily by his weaknesse or wickednesse might have been ruined Will you say that a man is lesse healthfull because he is invironed with discreet Physitians which councell him to avoid all intemperance and forbid him to eat such meats as are obnoxious to the stomack yea and which purge him many times against his will and when he resists which will prove his better friends whether these Physitians which are studiously carefull of his health or those Sicophants which are ready at every turn to give him that which must of necessity hasten his end We must then always observe this distinction The first are the friends of the King The other are the friends of Francis which is King The friends of Francis are those which serve him The friends of the King are the officers servants of the kingdom For seeing the King hath this name because of the kingdom and that it is the people which give being and consistence to the kingdome the which being lost or ruined bee must needs ceaâ—e to be a King or at the least not so truly a King or else wee must take a shadow for a substance Without question those are most truly the Kings friends which are most industriously carefull of the welfare of his kingdom and those his worst enemies which neglect the good of the Common wealth and seek to draw the King into the same lapse of errour And as it is impossible to separate the kingdom from the people nor the King from the Kingdome in like manner neither can the friends of the King be dis-joyned from the friends of the people and the Kingdome I say further that those which with a true affection love Francis had rather see him a King then a Subject Now seeing they cannot see him a King it necessarily followes that in loving Francis they must also love the Kingdome But those which would be esteemed more the friends of Francis then of the kingdome and the people are truly flatterers and the most pernitious enemies of the King and publike State Now if they were true friends indeed they would desire and endeavour that the King might become more powerfull and more assured in his estate according to that notable saying of Theopompus King of Sparta after the Ephores or Controllers of the Kings were instituted Tkemore said he are appointed by the People to watch over and look to the affaires of the Kingdome the more those that govern shall have credit and the more safe and happy shall be the State Whether prescription of time can take away the right of the people But peradventure some one will reply you speak to us here of Peers of Lords and Officers of the Crown But I for my part see not any but only some shewes and shadows of antiquity as if they were to be represented on a stage I see not for the present searce any tract of that ancient liberty and authority nay which is worse a great part if not all of those officers take care of nothing but their particular affairs and almost if not altogether serve as flatterers about those Kings who joyntly tosse the poor people like â—ennice bals hardly is there one to be found that hath compussion on or will lend a helping hand to the miserable subjects fleaed and scorched to the very bones by their insolent and insupportable oppression If any be but houth to have such a desire they are presently condemned as Rebels and seditious and are constrained either to fly wiâ—h much discommodity or else must run hazard both of life and liberty What can be answered to this the businesse goes thus The outragiousnesse of Kings the ignorance of the party together with the wicked connivence of the great ones of the kingdome hath been for the most part such throughout the World that the licentious and unbridled power wherewith most kings are transported and which hath made them insupportable hath in a manner by the length of continuance gained right of prescription and the people for want of using it hath incitely quit if not altogether lost their just ancient authority So that it ordinarily happens that what all mens care ought to attend on is for the most part neglected by every man for what is commited to the generalty no man thinkes is commended to his custody Notwithstanding no such prescription nor praevarication can justly prejudice the right of the people It is commonly said that the Exchequers doe admit no â—ale of prescription against it much lesse against the whole body of the people whose power transcends the
Now although some Citizens say that by decree of Senate the Emperour Augustus was declared to be exempt from obedience to Lawes yet notwithstanding Theodosius and all the other good and reasonable Emperours have professed that they were bound to the Lawes lest what had been extorted by violence might be â—cknowledged and received instead of Law And for Augustus Caesar in so much as the Roman Common wealth was en thralled by his power and violence she could â—ay nothing freely but that she had lost her freedome And because they durst not call Augustus a tyrant the senate said he was exempt from â—ll obedience to the lawes which was in effect as much as if they plainely should have said â—he Emperour was an outlâ—w The same right â—â—â—h ever beene of force in all well governed states and Kingdâ—mes of Chrâ—stâ—ndome For neither the Emperour the King of France nor the Kings of Spain England Polander Hungarie and all other lawfull Princes as the Areh Dukes of Austriae Dukes of Brabante Earles of Flanders and Holland nor other Princes are not recreated to the government of their estates before they have promised to the Electours Peeres Palaâ—ins Lords Barons and Governours that they will render to every one right according to the lawes of the Country yea so strictly that they cannot alter or innovate any thing contrary to the priviledges of the countries without the consent of the â—ownes and provinces If they do it they are no lesse guilty of rebellion against the lawes then â—he people is in their kind if they refuse obedience when they command according to law briefly lawfull princes receive the lawes from the people as well as the crown in lieu of honour and the scepter in liue of power which they are bound to keep and maintain and therein repose their chiefest glory If the Prince may make new lawes What then shall it not be lawfull for a Prince to make new lawes and abrogate the old seeing it belongs to the King not onely to advise that nothing be done neither against nor to defraud the lawes but also that nothing be wanâ—ing to them or any thing to much in them briefly that neither age nor lapse of time do abolish or entombe them iâ— there be any thing to abridge added or taken away from them â—t is his duty to assemble the estates and to demand their advise and resolution without presuming to publish any things beâ—ore the whole have beene first duâ—y examined and approved by them after the lâ—w is once ennacted and published there is no more dispute to be made above it all men owe obedience to it and the prince in the first place to teach other men their duty and for that all men are caâ—iâ—ier led by example then by precepâ—s the prince must necessarily expresse his willingnesse to observe the lawes or else by what equity can he require obedience in his subjects to that which he himselfe conâ—â—mnes For the disterence which is betwixt Kings and subjects ought not to consist in impurity but in equity and justice And thereâ—ore although Augustus was esteemed to be exempt by the dâ—cree of the Sâ—nate notwithstanding reproving of a young man that had broken the Iulian law concerning adultery he boldly replyed to Augustus that he himself had transgressed the same laws which condemnes adulâ—eries the Emperour acknowledged his fault and for grief forbore to late So convenient a â—hing it is in nature to practise by example Demoth in oratio con Timocrat that which we would teach by precipt The Lawgicer Solon was wont to compare laws to mony for they mâ—â—nâ—ain human societies as many preserves traffick neither improperly then if they Kings may not lawâ—ully or at the least heretofore could not mannace or imbase good mony without the consent of the Common wealth much more â—eiâ—e can he have power to make and Innocen 3. ad regem Fam. in ca. quado dâ—â—ure juando unmake lawes without the which noâ— Kings nor subjects can coha bite in security buâ— must beforâ—â— to live brutâ—shly in caves and deserts like wild beast wherefore also the Emperour of Germany esteeme it needful to make some law for the good of the empire first he demands the advise of the estates if it be there approved the Princes Barons Deputies of the towns signeiâ— and then the law is ratified for he solemnly swears to keep the laws already made and to introduce no new ones without a generall consent There is a Law in Poloniae which hath beene renewed in the yeere 1454. and also in the yeere 1538. and by those it is decreed that no new Lawes shall be made but by a common consent nor no where else but in the Generall Assembly of the Estates For the Kingdome of France where the Kings are thought to have greater authority then in oâ—her places anciently all Lawes were onely made in the Assembly of the Estates or in the ambulatory Parliament But since this Parliament hath been Sedentary the Kings edâ—cts are not received as authentically before the Parliament hath approved them Whereas on the contrary the decrees of this Parliament where the Law is defective have commonly the power and effect of Law In the Kingdomes of England Spain Hungary and others they yet enjoy in some sort their ancient priviledges For if the welfare of the Kingdom depends of the observation of the Laws and the Lawes are enthralled to the pleasore of one man is it not most certain that there can be no permanent stability in that government Must it not then necessarily come to passe that if the King as some have been be infected with Lunacie either continually or by intervales that the whole State fall inevitably to ruine But if thâ— Laws be superiour to the King as we have already proved and that the King be tyed in the same respect of obedience to the Lawes as the Servant is to his Master who will be so senslesse that will not rather obey the Law then the King or will not readily yeeld his best assistance against those that seek to violate or infringe them Now seeing that the King is not Lord over the Lawes let us examine how far his power may be justly extended in other things Whether the Prince have power of life and death over his Subjects The Minnions of the Court hold it for an undeniable Maxime That Princes have the same power of life and death over their Subjects as anciently Masters had over their slaves and with these false imaginations have so bewitched Princes that many although they put not in ure with much rigour this imaginary right yet they imagine that they may lawfully do it and in how much they defist from the practise thereof insomuch that they quit and relinquisite of their right and due But we affirme on the contrary that the Prince is but as the Minister and Executor of the Law and may only unsheath the Sword against those whom the Law hath
condemned and if he do otherwise he is no more a King but a Tyrant no longer a Judge but a Malefactor and instead of that honourable Title of Conservatour he shal be justly branded with that foule terme of Violator of the Law and Equity We must here first of all take into our consideration the foundation on which this our disputation is built which we have resolved into this head That Kings are ordained for the benefit and profit of the publike State this being granted the question is soon discust For who will believe that men sought and desired a King who upon any sudden motion might at his pleasure cut their throats or which in colour or revenge might when he would take their heads from their shoulders Briefly who as the wise man sayes carryes death at his tongues end we must not think so idely There is no man so vain which would willingly that his welfare should depend of anothers pleasure Nay with much difficulty will any man trust his life in the hands of a friend â—r a brother much lesse of a stranger be he never so worthy Seeing that Envie Hare and Rage did so far transport Athanas and Ajax beyond the bounds of reason that the one killed his children the other fayling to effect his desire in the same kind against his friends and companions turned his sury and murtherous intent and acted the same revenge upon himself Now it being naturall to every man to love himselfe and to seek the preservation of his own life In what assurance I pray you would any man rest to have a Sword continually hanging over his head by a small threed with the point towards him Would any mirth or jollity relish in such a continuall affright Can you possible make choyce of a more slender threed then to expose your life and welfare into the hands and power of a man so mutable that changes with every puft of wind Briefly which almost a thousand times a day shakes off the restraint of reason and discretion and yeelds himself slave to his own unruly and disordered passions Can there be hoped or imagined any profit or advantage so great or so worthy which migâ—t equalize or counterpose this feare or this danger Let us conclude then that it is against Delinquents onely whom the mouth of the Law hath condemned that Kings may draw forth the Sword of Authority If the King may pardon those whom the Law condemnes But because life is a thing precious and to be favoured peradventure it will be demanded whether the King may not pardon and absolve those whom the Law hath condemned I answer no Otherwise this cruell pitty would maintain Theeves Robbers Murtherers Ravisters Poysoners Sorcerers other plagues of Mankind as we may reade Tyrants have done here afore in many places and to our wofull experience wee may yet see at this present time And therefore the Beast of Law in this kind will by impurity much encreise the number of offendors So that he which received the Sword of Authority from the Law to promise offence will arme offenders therewith against the Lawes and put himselfe the Woolfe into the Fold which hee ought to have warranâ—ed from their ravenous outrages But for so much that it may chance in some occasions that the Law being mute may have need of a speaking Law and that the King being in some cases the aptest Expositor a king for the Rule of his actions Equity and Reason which as the soule of the Soule may so cleere the intention thereof as where the offence is rather commited against the words then the intendment of the Law hee may free the innocent Offendor from the guilt thereof because a just and equitable Exposition of the Law may in all good reason be taken for Law it selfe as neerest concurring with the intention of the Law makers Notwithstanding least passion should preposse the place of reason I. Nomims res S. verbum ex lâ—ge D. de verb signif Kings should in this fashion themselves to the ordinary practise of the Emperour severns not to determine absolutely any thing before it were maturely discussed by upright and discreet men in that facultie And so the King may rigorously punish the Murtherer and yet notwithstanding pardon him which casually and without any such purpose killeth one He may put to death the Thiefe and yet pardon that man which in â—is own defence killeth him that would have robbed him Briesly in all other occurrences hee may distinguish as being established Aroitrator and Newter Chaunce medly from malice fore-thought a good purpose from the Rigour of the Law without favouring at any time Malice or Treason Neither can the omission of this duty gain to him any true esteeme of mercifull for certainly that Shepherd is much more pitifull which kils the Woolf then he which lets him escape the clemencie of that King is more commendable which commits the malefactor to the hangman then he which delivers him By puâ—â—ing to death the murtherer many Innocents are delivered from danger whereas by suffering him escape both he and others through hope of the like impunitie are made more audacious to perpetrate farther mischief so that the immediate act of saving one Delinquent arms many hands to murther divers Innocents there is therefore both truly mildnesse in putting to death some and as certainly cruelty in pardoning of others Therefore as it is permitted the King being as it were Custos of the Law in some cases to interpret the words thereof so in all well ordered Kingdoms it is enjoyned the Counsell of State and their duty obligeth them to examine the Kings interpretation and to moderate both his seleritie and facilitle If through the corruption and weaknes of men this have not been so really and throughly observed as it ought yet notwithstanding the right alwayes remains intire and there wants onely integritie and courage in the parties to make it effectuall But not to heap up too many examples in a matter so manifestly clear it hath been in this manner practised in the Realm of France For we have there oftentimes seen those put to death to whom the King had granted his Charter of pardon and those pardoned whom He commanded should be put to death And sometimes offences committed in the Kings presence remitted because there was no other witnesse but himself The which happened in the time of Hen 2. to a certain stranger who was accused by the King himself of a grievous offence If an offendor by the intercession of friends have his pardon granted by the king the Chancellor upon sufficient cause may cancell it if the Chancellor connive yet mâ—â—t the crimined present it before the Judges who ought not onely carefully to consider whether the Pardon were gotten by surâ—eptitious or indirect means but also if it be legall and in due form neither can the De inquent that hath obtained his Chaâ—ter of Pardon make use of it untill first he appeal
gardens and patrimoniall lands are distinstuished from those of the publick the one serving for the provision of the Sultans table the other imploied onely about the Turquish affaires of State There be notwithstanding Kingdomes as the French and English and others in which the King hath no particular patrimony but onely the publick which he received from the people there this former distinction hath no place For the goods which belongs to the Prince as a quaere of what nature the ancient demeane is in England private person there is no question he is absolute owner of them as other particular persons are and may by the civill Law sell ingage or dispose of them at his pleasure But for the goods of the Kingdome which in some places are commonly called the demeanes the Kings may not be esteemed nor called in any sort whatsoever absolute Lords Proprietors of them For what if a man for the flocks sake have made thee Shepheard doth it follow L. cum servus 39. Sec vlt. D. de leg 1. l. universi 9. â— seq C de fundo patrim that thou hast libertie to flea pill sell and transport the Sheepe at thy pleasure Although the people have established thee Judge or Governour of a Citie or of some Province hast thou therefore power to alienate sell or play away that City or Province And seeing that in alienating or passing away a Province the people also are sold have they raised thee to that authority to the end thou shouldest seperate them from the rest or that thou shouldest prostitute and make them slaves to whom thou pleasest Furthermore I demand if the Royall dignity be a patrimony or an Office If it be an Office what Community hath it with any propriety If it be a Patrimony is it not such a one that at least the paramount propriety remaines still in the people which were the doners Briefly if the revenue of the Exchequer or the demeanes of the Kingdome be called the dowrie of the Common-wealth and by good right and such a dowrie whose dismembring or wasting brings with it the ruine of the publick State the Kingdom and the King by what Law shall it be lawfull to alienate this dowrie Let the Emperor Wencislaus be infatuated the French King Charles the sixt lunatick and give or sell the Kingdom or part of it to the English let Malcolme King of the Scots lavishly dissipate the demeanes and consume the publick treasure what followes for all this Those which choose the King to withstand the invasions of forrein enemies shall they through his madnesse negligence be made the slaves of strangers and those meanes wealth which would have secured them in the fruition of their own estates and fortunes Shall they by the election of such a King be exposed to the prey rapine of all commers and that which particular persons have saved from their own necessities and from those under their tutorship and government as it hapned in Scotland to indew the Common-wealth with it shall it be devoured by some Pandar or Broker for unclean pleasures But if as we have often said that Kings were constituted for the peoples use what shall that use be if it be perverted into abuse What good can so much mischiefe and inconvenience bring what profit can come of such eminent and irreparable dammages and dangers If I say in seeking to purchase my own liberty wellfare I ingage my selfe into an absolute thraldome and willingly subject my self to anothers Yoake and become a fettered slave to another mans unruly desires therefore as it is imprinted in all of us by nature so also hath it by a long custome been approved by all Nations that it is not lawfull for the King by the counsel of his own fancie and pleasure to diminish or waste the publick revenue and those which have run a contrarâ—e course have even lost that happy name of a King and stood bâ—â—â—â—ded with the infamous title of a Tyrant I confesse that when Kings were instâ—uted there was of nâ—cessity means to be assigned for them as well to maintain their Royall dignity as to furnish the expence of their teaine and Officers Civility and the wellfare of the publick State seeme to require it for it was the duty of a King to establish Judges in all places who should receive no presents nor sell Justice and also to have power readie to assist the execution of their Ordinances and to secure the waies from dangers that commerce might be open and free c. If there were likelihood of warrs to fortifie and put Garrisons into the frontier places and to hold an Armie in the field and to keep his Magazins well stored with munition It is commonly said that peace cannot be well maintained without provision for wars nor warrs managed without men nor men kept in discipline without pay nor mony gotten without Subsidies and Tributes To discharge therfore the burden of the State in time of Peace was the demeane appointed and in time of warrs the tributes and imposts yet so as if any extraordinary necessity required it mony might be raised by Subsidies or other fitting meanes The finall intendment of all was ever the publick utility in so much as he which converts any of these publick Revenues to his own private purposes much more he which mispends them in anyunworthy or loose occasions no way merits the name of a King for the Prince saith the Apostle is the minister of God for the good of the people and for that cause is Tribute paid unto them Rom. 13. This is the true originall cause of the customes and imposts of the Romans that those rich merchandises which were brought The same reason is recorded for all our imposts in England with which a Navy was wont to be maintained at Sea from the Indies Arabia Ethiopia might be secured in their passage by land from theeves and robbers in their transportation by Sea from Pirats insomuch as for their security the Common-wealth maintained a Navy at Sea In this rank we must put the Custome which was payd in the red Sea and other Imposts of gates bridges and passages for the securing of the great road waies therfore called the Pretorian consular and the Kings high-waies from the spoile of theeves and free-booters The care also of the reparation of bridges was referred to Commissaries deputed by the King as appeares Archi in Caâ— fi qois Romi pâ—â—â—s pereg 24. q 3. Bâ—lam câ—â— Sect. conventicula de pace iure iurfir l. 2. D. ne quid in loto publ viarum by the Ordinance of Lewis the Courteous concerning the 12. bridges over the River of Seyne commanding also boats to be in a readinesse to ferrie over passingers c. For the tax laid upon Salt there was none in use in those times the most of the Salt pits being injoyed by private persons because it seemed that that which nature out of her
like The which is the rather to be allowed in that Subjects are neither slaves nor intraâ—châ—â—de servants but brothers and not onely the Kings bâ—ethren taken one by one but also considered in one body they ought to be eâ—â—eâ—nâ—ed absolute Lords and owners of the Kingdom Whether the King be the usufruictuor of the Kingdom But if the King be not Lord in proprietie yet at the least we may esteeme him usufruictuor of the Kingdom and of the Demean nay truly we can allow him to have the usufruit for being usufruictuor though the proprietie remain in the people yet may he absolutely dispose of the profits and ingage them at his pleasure Now we have already proved that Kings of their own Authority cannot ingage the Revenues of the Exchequer or the Demain of the Kingdom The usufroictuor may dispose of the profits to whom how and when he pleaseth Contrarily the excessive gifts of Princes are ever judged void his unnecessary expences are not allowed his superfluous to be cut off and that which is expended by him in any other occasion but for the publick utilitie is justly esteemed to be unjustly extorted And is no lesse liable to the Law Cincea then the meanest Roman Citizen formerly was In France the Kings gifts are never of force untill the Chamber of Accounts have confirmed them From hence proceed the postils of the ordinarie Chamber in the giving up of the Accounts in the Reigns of prodig all kings Trop donne soyt repele which is excessive gifts must be recalâ—ed The Judges of this Chamber solemnly swear to passe nothing which may prejudice the Kingdom or the publick State notwithstanding any letters the King shall write unto them but they are not alwayes so mindfull of this oath as were to be desired Furthermore the Law takes no care how a usufruictuor possesseth and governes his revenues but contrariwise she prescribes unto the King how and to what use he shall imploy his For the ancient Kings of France were bound to divide their royall revenues into foure parts The first was imployed in the maintaining of the Ministers of the Church and providing for the poore The second for the Kings table The third for the wages of his Officers and houshold servants The last in the repairing of bridges castles and the royall Palaces And what was remaining was layd up in the treasurie to be bestowed Monstrel in Car. 6. on the necessities of the Common-wealth And Histories do at large relate the troubles and tumults which hapned about the yeer 1412 in the Assemblie of the Estates at Paris because Charles the sixt had wasted all the money that was raised of the revenues and demean in his own and his minnions loose pleasures and that the expences of the Kings houshold which before exceeded not the summe of 94000. francks did amount in that miserable estate of the Common wealth to five hundred and fourty thousand francks Now as the demeane was imploied in the before mentioned affaires so the aydes were onely for the war and the taxes assigned for the payment of the men at armes and for no other occasion In other Kingdomes the King hath no greater authority and in divers lesse especially in the Empire of Germanie and in Poland But we have made choise of the Kingdome of France to the end it be not thought this hath any speciall prerogative above others because there perhaps the common-wealth receiveth the most detriment Briefly as I have before said the name of a King signifieâ— not an inheritance nor a Propriety nor a usufruict but Ex concil Valem in c. 1. â—e his quae fiunt a praelat abque consenlucapit a charge office and procuration As a Bishop is chosen to look to the wellfare of the soul so is the King established to take care of the body so far forth as it concerns the publick good the one is dispensor of the heavenly treasure the other of the secular and what right the one hath in the Episcopall revenues the same hath the other and no greater in the Kingdoms demean If the Bishop alien the goods of the Bishoprick without the consent of the Chapter this alienation is of no value If the King alien the demeane without the approbation of the Estates that is also void one portion of the Eclesiasticall goods ought to be imployed in the reparation of the Churches the second in releiving of the poore the third for the maintenance of the Church-men and the fourth for the Bishop himself We have seen before that the King ought to divide into foure parts the Râ—venues of the Kingdoms demeane The abuse of these times cannot infringe or annihilate the right for although the most part of the Bishops steale from the poor that which they profusely cast away on their pandars and ruine and destroy their lands and woods the calling of the Bishop is not for all that altered Although that some Emperors have assumed to themselves an absolute power that cannot invest them with any further right because no man can be judge in his own cause What if some Caracalla vaunt he will not want money whilest the sword remaines in his custodie The Emperor Adrian will promise on the contrary so to discarge his office of Principalitie that he will alwaies remember that the Common-wealth is not his but the peoples which one thing almost distinguisheth a King from a Tyrant Neither can that act of Aâ—talus King of Pergomus designing the Roman people for heires to his Kingdome nor that of Alexander for Egypt nor Pâ—olom for the Cyrenians bequeathing their Kingdomes to the same people nor Praesutagus King of the Icenians which left his to Caesar draw any good consequence of right to those which usurpe that which by no â—ust title belongs to them nay by how much the intrusion is more violent by so much the equity justice of the cause is more perspicuous for what the RomaÌ„s assumed under the colour of right they would have made no difficulty if that pretext had been wanting to have taken by force we have seen almost in our daies how the Venetians possest themselves of the Kingdom of Ciprus under pretence of an imaginarie adoption which would have proved rediculous if it had not been seconded by power and armes To which also may be not unfitly resembled the pretended donation of Constantine to Pope Silvester for that straw of the decretist Gratian was long since consumed and turned to ashes neither is of more validity the grant which Lewis the courteous made to Pope Paschal of the Citie of Rome and part of Italy because he gave that which hee possessed not no man opposed it But when his Father Volater l. Geogr 3. Charlemain would have united subjected the Kingdome of France to the Germane Empire the French did lawfully oppose it and if he had persisted in his purpose they were resolved to have hindered him and defended themselves by armes There can be to as
to cure the dâ—seases of the people Certainely I had rather that a Tâ—iefe shâ—uld feede me than a Shepherd devoure me I had rather receive justice from a Râ—bber than out-rage from a Judge I had better be healed by an Empirick than poysoned by a Doctâ—â— in Physicke It were much more profitable for me to have my estate carefully managed by an intruding Guardian than to have it wâ—sted and dissipated by one legally appointed And although it may be that ambition was his first solicitor to enter violently into the government yet may it perhaps appeare he affected it the rather to give testimonie of his equity and moderation Zenophon Plutaâ—chus in Alexand in Aemiâ—co Caesare Liv us lib. 1. Suâ—conius in Caesare c. 75. in governing witnesse Circus Alexander and the Romans which ordinarily accorded to those people they subdued permission to governe themselves according to their owne lawes customes and priviledges yea sometimes incorporated them into the body of their owne state on the contrary the Tyrant by practice seemes to extend the priviledge of his legall succession the better to execute violence and extortion as may be seene in these dayes not only by the examples of the Turkes and Moscovites but also in diverâ— Christian Princes therefore the act of one which at the first was ill is in some reasonable time rectified by justice whereas the other like an inveterate disease the elder it growes the worse it affects the Patient Now if according to the saying of Saint Augustine those kingdomes August in lib. 4. c. 4. de c. vi â—es where justice hath no place are but a rapsodie of free-booters they are in that both the Tyrant without title and he by practise alike for that they are both thieves both robbers and both unjust possessors as he certainly is no lesse an unjust detayner which takes another mans goods against the owners will than hee which employes it ill when it was taken before But the fault is without comparison much more greater of him which possesseth an estate for to ruine it than of the other which made himselfe Master of it to preserve it Briefely the Tyrant by practise vainely colouring his unjust extortions with the justice of his title is much more blameable then the Tyrant without title who recompenceth the violence of his first intrusion in a continued course of a legall and upright government But to proceed there may be observed some difference amongst Tyrants without title Tyrants without title For there are some which ambitiously invade their neighbours Countreyes to enlarge their owne as Nimrod Minus and the Canaanites have done Although such are term'd Kings by their owne people yet to those on whose confines they have encroached without any just right or occasion they will be accounted Tyrants There be others which having attained to the government of an elective Kingdome that endeavour by deceitfull meanes by corruption by present and other bad practises to make it become hereditary For witnesse whereof wee neede not make search into elder times these are worse than the former for so much as secret fraud as Cicero saith is ever more odious than open force There be also others which are so horribly wicked that they seeke to enthrall their own native Countrey like the viperous brood which goaw through the entralls of their mother as be those Generals of Armies created by the people who afterwards by the meanes of those forces make themselves masters of the State as Caesar at Rome under pretence of the Dictatorship and divers Princes of Italy There be women also which intrude themselves into the government of those kingdoms which the lawes only permit to the males and make themselves Queenes and Regents as Athalia did in Judab Semiramis in Assyria Agripina in the Roman Empire in the Reign of her sonne Nero Mammea in Alexander Severus his time Semiamira in Heliogabalusses and certaine Brunichildes in the kingdome of France who so educated their sonnes as the Queens of the house Medicis in these latter times during their minority that attaining to more maturity their only care was to glut themselves in pleasures and delights so that the whole management of affaires remain'd in the hands of their Mothers or of their Minions servants and Officers Those also are Tyrants without title who taking advantage of the floath weakenesse and dissolute courses of those Princes which are otherwise lawfully instituted and seeking to enwrap them in a sleepy dreame of voluptuous idlenesse as under the French Kings especially those of the Merovingian line some of the Mayres of the Palace have beene advanc'd to that dignity for such egregious services transferring into their owne command all the royall authority and leaving the King only the bare name All which Tyrants are certainly of this condition that if for the manner of their government they are not blameable Yet for so much as they entered into that jurisdiction by tyrannous intrusion they may justly be termed Tyrants without title Concerning Tyrants by practise it is not so easie to describe Tyrants by practise them as true Kings For reason rules the one and selfe-will the other the first prescribes bounds to his affections the second confines his desires within no limits what is the proper rights of Kings may be easily declared but the outragious insolencies of Tyrants cannot without much difficulty be express'd And as a right angle is uniforme and like to it selfe one and the fame so an oblique diversifies it selfe into various and sundry species In like manner is justice and equity simple and may be deciphered in few words but injustice and injury are divers and for their sundry accidents not to be so easily defin'd but that more will be omitted then express'd Now although there be certaine rules by which these Tyrants may be represented though not absolutely to the life yet notwithstanding there is not any more certaine than by conferring and comparing a Tyrants fraudulant sleights with a Kings vertuous actions A Tyrant lops off those eares which grow higher then the rest of the corne especially where vertue make them most conspicuously eminent oppresseth by calumnies and fraudulent practises the principall officers of the State gives out reports of intended conspiracies against himself that he might have some colourable pretext to cut them off witnesse Tiberius Maximinius others which spared not their own kinsmen cozens and brothers The King on the contrary doth not onely acknowledge his brothers to be as it were consorts unto him in the Empire But also holds in the place of brothers all the principall Officers of the Kingdom is not ashamed to confesse that of them inquality as deputed from the generall Estates he holds the Crown The tyrant advanceth above and in opposition to the ancient and worthy Nobility mean and unworthy persons to the end that these base sellowes being absolutely his creatures might applaud and apply themselves to the fulfilling of all his
loose and unruly desires The King maintains every man in his Rank honours and respects the Grandies as the Kingdomes friends desiring their good as well as his own The tyrant hates and suspects discreet and wise men and fears no opposition more than vertue as being conscious of his owne vitious courses and esteeming his owne security to consist principally in a generall corruption of all estates introduceth multiplicity of Tavernes Gaming-houses Maskes Stage-playes Brothel-houses and all other licencious superfluities that might effeminate and bastardize noble spirits as Cyrus did to weaken and subdue the Sardiens The King on the contrary allureth from all places honest and able men and encourageth them by pensions and honours and for seminaries of vertue erects Schooles and Universities in all convenient places A tyrant as much as in him lies prohibites or avoids all publick Machiavil in principe Assemblies feares Parliaments Diets and meâ—tings of the generall Estates flies the light affecting like the Bâ—t to converse onely in darknesse yea he is jealous of the very gesture countenance and discourse of his subjects The King because he converses alwayes as in the presence of Men and Angels glories in Arist lib. 5. c. 11. polit the multitude and sufficiency of his Councellors esteeming nothing well done which is ordered without their advice and is so farre from doubting or distasting the publick meeting of the generall Estates as he honours and respects those Assemblies with much favour and affection A tyrant nourisheth and feedeth factions and dissenâ—ions amongst his subjects ruines one by the help of another that he may the easier vanquish the remainder advantaging himselfe by this division like those dishonest Surgeons which lengthen out their cures Briefly after the manner of that abominable Vitellius he is not ashamed to say that the karkasse of a dead enemy especially a subjects yeelds a good savour On the contrary a good King endeavours alwayes to keep peace amongst his subjects as a father amongst his children choakes the seeds of troubles and quickly heals the scarre the execution even of justice upon rebels drawing teares from his compassionate eyes yea those whom a good King maintains and defends against a forrain enemy a tyrant the enemy of nature compels them to turn the points of their swords into their own proper intrails A tyrant fils his Garrisons with strange Souldiers builds Citadels against his subjects disarmes the people throwes down their forts makes himselfe formidable with guards of strangers or men onely fit for pâ—llage and spoyle gives pensions out of the publick Treasury to spies and calumniating informers disperst through all Cities and Provinces Contrariwise a King reposeth more his safety 1. vi lib. 2 c. 1. Dionys â—â—aiâ—â— l. 5. de Arunte filio Porsennae in the love of his subjects than in the strength of his Fortresses against his enemies taking no care to inroll Souldiers but accounts every subject as a man at arms to guard him builds forts to restrain the irruptions of forraine enemies and not to constrain his subjects to obedience in whose fidelity he putteth his greatest confidence Therefore it is that tyrants although they have such numberlesse guards about them to drive off throngs of Prov. 14. 28. people from approaching them yet cannot all those numbers secure them from doubts jealousies and distrusts which continually afflict and terrifie their timerous consciencese yea in the middest of their greatest strength the tyrannizer of tyrants fear mamaketh prize of their souls and there triumphs in their affliction A good King in the greatest concourse of people is freest from Bartol in tract de tyrannide doubts or fears nor troubled with solicitous distrusts in his solitary retirements all places are equally secure unto him his own conscience being his best guard If a tyrant want civill broyles to exercise his cruell disposition in he makes warres abroad erects idle and needlesse trophees to continually imploy his tributaries that they might want leasure to think on other things as Pharaoh did the Jews and Polierates the Samiens therefore he alwayes Aâ—gid Rom. de reg prin prepares for or threatens war or at least seemes so to doe and so stil rather draws mischief on than puts it further off A King never makes war but compeld unto it and for the preservation of Cicero de offic lib. 1. the publick he never desires to purchase advantage by treason he never entreth into any war that exposeth the Common-wealth to more danger than it affordeth probable hope of commodity A Tyrant leaves no designe unattempted by which he may fleece his Subjects of their substance and turne it to his proper benefit that being continually troubled in gaining meanes to live they may have no leasure nor hope how to regaine their liberty On the contrary the King knowes that every good Subjects purse will be ready to supply the Common-wealths occasion and therefore believes he is possest of no small treasure whilst through his good governement his Subjects flow in all aboundance A Tyrant extorts unjustly from many to cast prodigally upon two or three Minions and those unworthy hee imposeth on all and exacteth from all to furnish their superfluous and riotous expences he builds his owne and followers fortunes on the ruines of the publique he drawes out the peoples blood by the veines of their means and gives it presently to carouse to his Court-leeches But a King cuts off from his ordinary expences to ease the peoples necessities neglecteth his private state and furnisheth with all magnificence the publique occasions briefely is prodigall of his owne blood to defend and maintain the people committed to his care If a Tyrant as heretofore Tiberius Nero Commodus and others did suffer his Subjects to have some breathing time from unreasonable exactions and like spunges to gather some moysture it is but to squeese them out afterwards to his owne use on the contrary if a King doe sometimes open a vaine and draw some blood it is for the peoples good and not to be expended at his own pleasure in any dissolute courses And therefore as the holy Scripture compares the one to a Shepheard so doth it also resemble the other to a roaring Prov. 8. 15. Lion to whom notwithstanding the Foxe is oftentimes coupled For a Tyrant as saies Cice is culpable in effect of the greatest injustice that Cicer. de offic lib. 1. may be imagined and yet he carrieth it so cunningly that when hee most deceives it is then that hee maketh greatest appearance to deale sincerely And therefore doth hee artificially counterfeit Religion and devotion wherein saith Aristotle hee expresseth one of the most absolute Arist lib. 5. polit c. 11. subtleties that Tyrants can possibly practise hee doth so compose his countenance to piety by that meanes to terrifie the people from conspiring against him who they may well imagine to be especially favoured of God expressing in all appearance so
reverently to serve him He fains also to be exceedingly affected to the publique good not so much for the love of it as for feare of his owne safety Furthermore he desires much to be esteemed just and loyall in some affaires purposely to deceive and betray more easily in matters of greater consequence much like those thieves which maintaine themselves by thefts and robberies cannot yet long subsist in their trade without exercising some parcell of justice in their proceedings Hee also counterfeits the mercifull but it is in pardoning of such malefactors in punishing whereof he might more truly gaine the reputation of a pittifull Prince To speake in a word that which the true King is the Tyrant would seeme to be and knowing that men are wonderfully attracted with and inamoured of vertue hee endeavours with much subtilty to make his vices appeare yet masked with some shadow of vertue but let him counterfeit never so cunningly still the Fox will be known by his taile and although he fawne and flatter like a Spannell yet his snarling and grinning will ever bewray his currish kind Furthermore as a well-ordered Monarchy partakes of the principall Tho. Aquin. in secund secund q. 12. aâ—t 11. commodities of all other governements So on the contrary where tiranny prevailes there all the discommodities of confusion are frequent A Monarchy hath in this conformity with an Aristocraty that the most able and discreet are called to consultations Tiranny and Oligarchy accord in this that their counsels are composed of the worst and most corrupted And as in the Councell Royall there may in a fort seeme many Kings to have interests in the government so in the other on the contrary a multitude of Tyrants alwayes domineers The Monarchy borrowes of the popular government the assemblies of the Estates whither are sent for Deputies the most sufficient of Cities and Provinces to deliberate of and determine matters of State the tiranny takes this of the Ochlocracie that if shee be not able to hinder the convocation of the Estates yet will she endeavour by factious subtilties and pernicious practices that the greatest enemies of Order and Reformation of the State be sent to those Assemblies the which we have known practised in our times In this manner assumes the Tyrant the countenance of a King and tyranny the semblance of a Kingdome and the continuance succeeds commonly according to the dexterity wherewith it is managed yet as Aristotle says we shal hardly reade of any tyranny that hath out-lasted a hundred yearee briefely the King principally regards the publique utility and a Tyrants chiefest care is for his private commodity But seeing the condition of men is such that a King is with much difficulty to be found that in all his actions only agreeth at the publique good and yet cannot long subsist without expression of some speciall care thereof we will conclude that where the Common-wealths advantage is most preferr'd there is both a lawfull King and Kingdome and where particular designes and private ends prevaile against the publique profit there questionlesse is a Tyrant and tiranny Thus much concerning Tyrants by practise in the examining whereof wee have not altogether fixed our discourse on the loose disorders of their wicked and licentious lives a Bartol in tract de tiranct de regim Civt which some say is the character of a bad man but not alwayes of a bad Prince If therefore the Reader be not satisfied with this description besides the more exact representations of Tyrants which he shall finde in histories he may in these our dayes behold an absolute modell of many living and breathing Tyrants whereof Aristotle in his time did much complaine Now at the last we are come as it were by degrees to the chiefe and principall point of the question We have seene how that Kings b To whom it belongs to resist suppresse TyraÌ„ts without title have beene chosen by God either with relation to their Families or their persons only and after installed by the people In like manner what is the duty of the King and of the Officers of the Kingdome how farre the authority power and duty both of the one the other extends and what and how sacred are the Covenants and contracts which are made at the inauguration of Kings and what conditions are intermixt both tacite and express'd finally who is a Tyrant without title and who by practise seeing it is a thing unquestionable that we are bound to obey a lawfull King which both to God and people carrieth himselfe according to those Covenants whereunto he stands obliged as it were to God himselfe seeing in a fort he represents his divine Majestie It now followes that we treate how and by whom a Tyrant may be lawfully resisted and who are the persons that ought to be chiefely actors therein and what course is to be held that the action may be managed according to right and reason we must first speak of him which is commonly called a Tyrant without title Let us suppose then that some Ninus having neither received outrage nor offence invades a people over whom he hath no colour of pretension that Caesar seekes to oppresse his Countrey c Otto Frising Chron. l. 3. c. 7. and the Roman Common-wealth that Popiclus endeavours by murthers and treasons to make the elective Kingdome of Polonia to become hereditary to him and his posterity or some Brunichilde drawes 〈◊〉 lib. â— c. 1. 〈◊〉 Tâ—uâ—on lib. 4. c. 51. lib. 5. c. 1â— lib. 8. c. 29. to her selfe and her Protadius the absolute government of France or Ebroinus taking advantage of Theodericks weaknesse and idlenesse gaineth the intire administration of the State and oppresseth the people what shall be our lawfull refuge herein First The law of nature teacheth and commandeth us to maintaine and defend our lives and liberties without which life is scant worth the enjoying against all injury and violence Nature hath imprinted this by instinct in Dogs against Wolves in Buls against Lions betwixt Pigeons and Spar hawkes betwixt Pullen and Kites and yet much more in man against man himselfe if man become a beast and therefore he which questions the lawfulnesse of defending ones selfe doth as much as in him lies question the law of nature To this must be added the law of Nations which distinguisheth possessions and Dominions fixes limits and makes our confiâ—â—s which every man is bound to defend against all invaders And therefore it is no lesse lawfull to resist Alexander the great it without any right or being justly provoked he invades a Countrey with a mighty Navy as well as Diomedes the Pirate which scoures the Seas in a small vessell For in this case Alexanders right is no more than Diâ—medes his but only hee hath more power to doe wrong and not so easily to be compeld to reason as the other Briefely one may as well oppose Alexander in pillaging a Country as a Theefe in
obligation of no force Then the King if he governe unjustly is perjur'd and the people likewise forsworne if they obey not his lawfull commands but that people is truly acquit from all perfidiousnesse which publiquely renounce the unjust dominion of a Tyrant or he striving unjustly by strong hand to continue the possession doe constantly endeavour to expulse him by force of armes It is therefore permitted the Officers of a Kingdome either all L. 106. D. de reg jur or some good number of them to suppresse a Tyrant And it is not only lawfull for them to doe it but their duty expressely requires it and if they doe it not they can by no excuse colour their basenesse For the Electors Palatines Peers and other Officers of State must not thinke they were established only to make pompeous paradoes and showes when they are at the Coronation of the King habited in their robes of State as if there were some Masque or Interlude to be represented or as if they were that day to act the parts of Roland Oliver or Remaldo and such other personages on a Stage or to counterfeit and revive the memory of the Knights of the round Table and after the dismissing of that dayes assembly to supposâ— they have sufficiently acquit themselves of their duty untill a recesse of the like solemnity Those solemne Rites and Ceremonies were not instituted for vaine ostentation nor to passe as in a dumme show to please the spectators nor in childrens sports as it is with Horace to create a King in jest but those Grandees must know that as well for office and duty as for honouâ— they are called to the performance of those Rites and that in them the Common wealth is committed and recommended to the King as to her supreame and principall tutor and protector and to them as Coajutors and assistants to him And therefore as the Tutors or Guardlans yea even those Vlp. l. 3. D. de adm et peric tut et curat that are appointed by way of honour are chosen to have care of observe the actions and importments of him which holds the principall ranke in the tutor-ship and to looke how he carrieth himselfe in the administration of the goods of his pupill so likewise L. 27. D. cod are the former ordained to have an eye to the courses of the King for with an equivolent authority as the others for the pupill so are they to hinder and prevent the dammage and detriment of the people the King being properly reputed as the prime Guardian and they his Coadjutors In like manner as the faults of the principall tutor who manages L. 14. D. de administ ct peric tut l. 3. D. de suspec tut et cur the affaires are justly imputed to the coadjoyntâ— in the tutorship if when they ought and might they did not discover his errors and cause him to be deposed especially failing in the main points of his charge to wit in not communicating unto them the affaires of his administration in dealing unfaithfully in his place in doing any thing to the dishonour or detriment of his pupill in imbessilling of his goods or estate or if hee be an enemy to his pupill briefly if either in regard of the worthlessenesse of his person or weaknesse of his judgment he be unable well to discharge so weighty a charge So also are the Peeres and principall Officers of the Kingdome accountable for the government thereof and must both prevent and if occasion require suppresse the tyranny of the Prince as also supply with their care and diligence his inability and weaknesse Finally If a Tutor omitting or neglecting to doe all that for his pupill which a discreet Father of a family would and might conveniently performe cannot well be excused and the better acquitting him selfe of his charge hath others as concealers and associates joyned with him to oversee his actions with much more reason may and ought the Officers of the Crown restraine the violent irruptions of that Prince who insteed of a father becomes an enemie to his people seeing to speake properly they are as well accountable for his actions wherein the publique hath interests as for their owne Those officers must also remember that the King holds truly l. 10. ct 33. D. de adm et peric tutor et Cur. the first place in the administration of the State but they the second and so following according to their ranks not that they should follow his courses if he transgresse the lawes of equity and justice not that if he oppresse the Common-wealth they should connive to his wickednesse For the Common-wealth was as well committed to their care as to his so that it is not sufficient for them to discharge their owne duty in particular but it behoves them also to containe the Prince within the limits of reason Briefly they have both joyntly and severally promised with solemn oaths to advance and procure the profit of the Common-wealth although then that he forsweare himselfe yet may not they imagine that they are quit of their promise no more then the Bishops and Patriarks if they suffer an hereticall Pope to ruine the Church yea they should esteeme themselves so much the more obliged to the observing of their oath by how much they finde him wilfully dispos'd to rush on in his perfidious courses But if there be collufion betwixt him and them they are prevaricators if they dissemble they may justly be called forsakers and traytors If they deliver not the Common-wealth from tiranny they may be truly ranckt in the number of Tyrants as on the contrary they are protectors tutors and in a sort Kings if they keepe and maintain the State safe and intire which is also recommended to their care and custody Although these things are sufficiently certain of themselves yet may they be in some sort confirmed by examples The Kings of Canaan which pressed the people of Israel with a hard both corporall and spirituall servitude prohibiting them all meetings and use of armes were certainly Tyrants by practice although they had some pretext of title For Eglon Jabin had peaceable reigned almost the space of twenty yeares God stirred up extraordinarily Iudg. 4. 3. Ehud which by a politique stratagem killed Eglon and Debora which overthrew the Armle of Jabin and by this service delivered the people from the servitude of Tirants not that it was unlawfull for the ordinary Magistrates the Princes of the Tribes and such other Officers to have performed it for Debora doth reprove the sluggish idlenesse of some and flatly detests the disloyalty of otherâ— for that they failed to perforforme their duty herein But it pleased God taking commiseration of the distresse of his people in this manner to supply the defects of the ordinary Magistrates Reboboam the sonne of Solomon refused to disburthen the people 1 King 12. 6 c. of some unnecessary imposts and burthens and being petitioned by the
people in the generall Assembly of the States he grew insolent and relying on the counsell of his Minions arrogantly threatens to lay beavier burthens on them hereafter No man can doubt but that according to the tenour of the contract first passed betweene the King and the people the prime and principall Officers of the Kingdome had authority to represse such insolence They were only blameable in this that they did that by faction and division which should more properly have beene done in the generall Assembly of the States in like manner in that they transferred the Scepter from Juda which was by God onely confin'd to that Tribe into another linage and also as it chances in other affaires for that they did ill and disorderly manage a just and lawfull cause Prophane histories are full of such examples in other Kingdomes Brutus Generall of the Souldiers and Lueretius Governour of the Citie of Rome assemble the people against Tarquinius Superbus Titus Livi. lib. 1. and by their authority thrust him from the royall Throne Nay which is more his goods are confiscated whereby it appeares that if Tarquinius had beene apprehended undoubtedly hee should have beene according to the publique lawes corporally punished The true causes why Tarquinius was deposed were because he altered the custome whereby the King was obliged to advise with the Senaâ—e on all weighty affaires that he made Warre and Peace according to his owne fancie that he treated confederacles without demanding counsell or consent from the people or Senate that he violated the Lawes whereof he was made Guardian briefly that he made no reckoning to observe the contracts agreed between the former Kings and the Nobility and people of Rome For the Roman Emperours I am sure you remember the sentence pronounced by the Senate against Nero wherein he was judged enemie to the Common-wealth and his body condemned to be ignominiously cast on the dung-hill and that other pronounced against Vitellius which adjudge him to be shamefully dis-membred and in that miserable estate trayled through the Citie and at last put to death another against Maximinius who was dispoild of the Empire and Maximus and Albinus established in his place by the Senace There might also be added many others drawne from unquestionable Historians The Emperour Trajan held not himselfe exempt from lawes neither desired he to be spared if he became a Tyrant for in delivering the Sword unto the great Provost of the Empire he sayes unto him If I command as I should use this sword for mee but if I doe otherwayes unsheath it against me In like manner the French by the authority of the States and solicited thereunto by the Officers of the Kingdome deposed Childerick the first Sigisbert Theodoricke and Childericke the third for their tyrannies and chose others of another Family to sit on the Royall Throne Yea they deposed some because of their idlenesse and want of judgment who exposed the State in prey to Panders Curtesans Flatterers and such other unworthy mushromes of the Court who governed all things at their pleasure taking from such rash Phaetous the bridle of government left the whole body of the State and people should be consumed through their unadvised folly Amongst others Theodoret was degraded because of Ebroinus Dagobert for Plectude and Thiband his Pander with some others the Estates esteeming the command of an effeminate Prince as insupportable as that of a woman and as unwillingly supporting the yoke of tyrannous Ministers managing affaires in the name of a loose and unworthy Prince as the burden of a tyrant alone To be briefe no more suffering themselves to be governed by one possessed by a Devill than they would by the Devill himselfe It is not very long since the Estates compeld Lewis the eleventh a Prince as subtile and it may be as wilfull as any to receive thirtie six Overseers by whose advise he was bound to governe the affaires of State The descendants from Charlemaine substituted in the place of the Merovingiens for the government of the kingdome or those of Capet supplanting the Charlemains by order of the Estates and raigning at this day have no other nor better right to the Crowne than what wee have formerly described and it hath ever been according to Law permitted the whole body of the people represented by the counsell of the Kingdome which are commonly called the Assembly of the States to depose and establish Princes according to the necessities of the Common-wealth According to the same rule wee reade that Adolph was removed from the Empire of Germany Anno 1296. because for covetousnesse without Anno 1296. any just occasion he invaded the Kingdome of France in favour of the English and Wenceslaus was also deposed in the yeare of our Lord 1400. Yet were not these Princes exceeding bad ones 1400. but of the number of those which are accounted lesse ill Elizabeth the wife of Edward the second King of England assembled the Parliament Froisard li. 1. cap. 1. against her husband who was there deposed both because he tyrannized in generall over his Subjects as also for that he cut Reade the manner of the deposing of Richard the second off the heads of many noble men without any just or legall proceeding It is not long since Christierne lost the Crowne of Denmarke Henry that of Sweden Mary Steward that of Scotland for the same or neere resembling occasions and the most worthy Histories relate divers alterations and changes which have hapned in like manner in the Kingdomes of Polonia Hungarie Spaine Portugall Bohemia and others But what shall we say of the Pope himselfe It is generally held Ant de But. confil quod positum est inter consil Paul de Castro vel antiq nu 412. incip viso puncto that the Cardinalls because they doe elect him or if they fayle in their dutie the Patriarkas which are next in ranke to them may upon certaine occasions maugre the Pope call a Councell yea and in it judge him As when by some notorious offence he scandalizeth the universall Church if he be incorrigible if reformation be as necessary in the head as the members if contrary to his oath he refuse to call a generall Councell And we reade for certaine that Mar. Laudâ—ns in tract de Card. 1. l. 2. q. 35. Phâ—lip Deciâ—s in quodan co â—iâ—o cujus verbs suerunt Andr. Bâ—â—h in d. conâ—â— 1. lib. 1. 〈◊〉 6. 〈…〉 de major obed divers Popes have been deposed by generall Councells But if they obstinately abuse their authoritie there must saith Baldus first be used verball admonitions secondly herball medicamentâ— or remedies thirdly stones or compulsion for where vertue and faire meanes have not power to perswade there force and terror must be put in ure to compell Now if according to the opinions of most of the learned by decrees of Councels and by custome in like occasions it plainly appeares that the Councell may depose the Pâ—pe
who notwithstanding vaunts himselfe to be the King of Kings and as much in dignitie above the Emperour as the Sunne is above the Moone assuming to himselfe power to depose Kings and Emperours when he pleaseth Who will make any doubt oâ— question that the generall Assembly of the Estates of any kingdome who are the representative body thereof may not onely degrade and disthronize a tyrant but also even disauthorize and depose a King whose weaknesse or folly is hurtfull or pernicious to the State But let us suppose that in this our Ship of State the Pilot is Simile drunke the most of his associates are asleepe or after large and unreasonable tipling together they regard their imminent danger in approaching a rocke with idle and negligent jollitie the Ship in the meane season in stead of following her right course that might serve for the best advantage of the owners profit is ready rather to split her selfe What should then a Masters-mate or some other under-Officer doe who is vigilant and carefull to performe his dutie Shall it be thought sufficient for him to pinch or poule them which are asleepe without daring in the meane time to put his helping hand to preserve the Vessell which runnes on a course to destruction least he should be thought to intermeddle with that which he hath no authoritie nor warrant to doe What mad discretion nay rather notorious impietie were this Seeing then that Tyranny as Plato saith is a drunken frenfie or frantick drunkennesse Plato lib. 8. 9. de repub if the Prince endeavour to ruine the Common-wealth and the principall Officers concurre with him in his bad purposes or at the least are luld in a dull and drowsie dreame of securitie and the people being indeed the true and absolute owner and Lord of the State be through the pernicious negligence and fraudulent connivency of those Officers brought to the very brim of danger and destruction and that there be notwithstanding amongst those unworthy Ministers of State some one that doth studiously observe the deceitfull and dangerous encroachments of tyranny and from his soule deteste it What opposition doe wee suppose best befits such a one to make against it Shall he consent himselfe to admonish his associates of their dutie who to their utmost abilitie endeavour the contrary Besides that such an advertisement is commonly accompanied with too much danger and the condition of the times considered the very solliciting of reformation will be held as a capitall crime so that in so doing he may be not unfitly Simile resembled to one that being in the middest of a desert environed with theeves should neglect all meanes of defence and after he had cast away his Armes in an eloquent and learned discourse commend justice and extoll the worth and dignitie of the Lawes This would be truly according to the Proverbe To run mad with reason What then Shall he be dull and deafe to the groanes and cries of the people Shall he stand still and be silent when he sees the theeves enter Shall he onely hold his hands in his bosome L. 3. l. Omne delictum â—â—ult D. de re milit and with a dâ—mure countenance idlely bowaile the miserable condition of the times If the Lawes worthily condemne a Souldier which for feare of the enemies counterfeits sicknesse because in so doing he expresseth both disloyaltie and treachery What punishment can we invent sufficient for him who either maliciously or basely betrayes those whose protection and defence he hath absolutely undertaken and sworne Nay rather then let such a one cheerefully call one and command the Mariners to the performance of their dutie let him carefully and constantly take order that the Common-wealth be not indamaged and if need so require even in despite of the King preserve the Kingdome without which the kingly title were idle and frivolous and if by no other meanes it can be effected let him take the King and binde him hand and foote that so he may be more conveniently cured of his frensie and madnesse For as wee have already said all the administration of the Kingdome is not by the people absolutely resigned into the hands of the King as neither the Bishopricke nor care of the universall C. Nullus in Carthagin Council Doctores pontificii Church is totally committed to the Pope but also to the care and custody of all the principall Officers of the Kingdome Now for the preserving of peace and concord amongst those which governe and for the preventing of jealousâ—â—s factions and distrusts amongst men of equall ranke and dignitie the King was created as prime and principall Superintendent in the government of the Common-wealth The King sweares that his most speciall care shall be for the welfare of the Kingdome and the Officers of the Crowne take all the same oath If then the King or divers of them falsifying their faith ruine the Common-wealth or abandon her in her greatest necessitie must the rest also fashion themselves to their base courses and quit all care of the States safetie as if the bad example of their companions absolved them from their oath of fidelitie Nay rather on the contrary in seeing them neglect their promise they shall best advantage the Common-wealth In carefully observing theirs chiefly because for this reason they were instituted as in the steads of Ephori or publick Controllers and for that every thing gaines the better estimation of just and right in that it is mainly and principally addressed to that end for which is was first ordained Furthermore if divers have joyntly vowed one and the same thing is the obligation of the one annihilated by the perjurie of the other If many become bound for one and the same summe can the banquerouting of one of the obligees quit the rest of their ingagement If divers tutors administer ill the goods of their pupill and that there be one amongst them that makes conscience of his actions can the bad dealing of his companions acquit him Nay rather on the contrary he cannot free himselfe from the infamie of perjurie if to the utmost of his power he doe not truely dilcharge his trust and perform his promise neither can the others defalliancy be excused in the bad managing of the tutorship if they likewise accuse not the rest that were joyned with them in the administration for it is not onely the principall tutor that may call to an account those which are suspected to have unjustly L 3. D. de administ peric tutor cur lib. 3. D. de suspect tus cura or indiscreetly ordered the affaires of their pupill but even those which were formerly removed may also upon just occasion discharge and remove the delinquents therein Therefore those which are obliged to serve a whole Empire or Kingdome as the Constable Marshals Peeres and others or those which have particular obligations to some Provinces or Cities which make a part or
to determine all the suits and differences of their Subjects although in the causes of greatest importance they received an appeal alwayes to themselves as appears in Samuel 2 Sam. 15. 2. 1 chrou 23. 4. 26 29 2 Chron. 19. It Rom. 13. had ever above all things a speciall care to establish in all places just and discreet Judges and principally still to have an eye to the right administration of justice knowing themselves to carry the sword as well to chastise wicked and unjust Subjects as to repulse forreigne Enemies Briefly as the Apostles sayes The Prince is ordained by God for the good aâ—d profit of the people being armed with the sword to defend the good from the violence of the wicked and when he dischargeth his duty therein all men owe him honour and obedience Seeing then that Kings are ordained by God and established by no people to procure and provide for the good of those which are commitâ—ed unto them and that this good or profit be principally expressed in two things to wit in the administration of justice to their subjects and in the managing of armes for the repulsing their ennemies certainly wee must inferre and conclude from this that the Prince which applies himself to nothing but his peculiar profits and pleasures or to those ends which most readily conduce thereunto which contemnes and perverts all lawes which useth his subjects more cruelly then the barbarest enimy would do he may truly and easly be called a Tyrant and that those which in this manner govern their Kingdomes be they of never so large an extent are more properly unjust pillagers and boose-haiers then lawfull governours Whether the Kings be above the law Wee must here yet proceed a little further for it is demanded whether the King which presides in the administration of justice have power to resolue and determine businesse according to his owne will and pleasure most the Kings be subject to the law or doth the law depend August 1. 4. c. 4. 6. to â—ivita Dei upon the King the law saith an ancient is respected by those which otherwayes contemne vertue for it inforceth obedience and ministreth conduct in warfaring and gives viger and luster to justice and equity Pausanias the Spartane will answer in a word that it becomes lawes to direct and men to yeeld obedience to their authority Agositaus King of Sparta says that all commanders must obey the commandements of the lawes But it shall not be amisse to claâ—â—ume this matter a little higher when people began for justice to seek to determine their differences if they met with any private man that did justly appoint them they were satisfied with it now for so much as such men were rarely and with much difficulty met withall and for that the judgements of kings received as lawes were oftentimes found contrary and difficult then the Magistrates and others of great wisdome invented lawes which might speak to all men in one and the same voice This being done it was expressly injoyned to kings that they shold be the gardiens and administrators And somtimes also for so much as the lawes could not fore see the perticularities of actions to resolve exactly it was permitted the king to supply this defect by the same naturall equity by which the lawes were drawn and for feare least they should go against law the people appointed them from time to time associates counsellors of whom we have formerly made mention wherefore there is nothing which exemples the King from obedience which he owes to the law which he ought to acknowledge as his Lady and Mistris esteeming nothing can become him worse then that feminine of which Iurinall speakes Sic volo Sic jubeo sic pro ratione voluntas I will I command my will shall serve instead of reason neither should they think their authority the lesse because they are confind to laws for seeing the law is a divine gift comming from above which human societies are happily governed and adddressed to their best and blesseddest end those Kings are as ridiculous and worthy of contempts which repute it a dishonour to conform them selves to law as those surveyors which think themselvs disgraced by using of a rule a compasse a chaine or other instruments which men understanding the art of surveying are accustomed to do or a Pilot which had rather sayle according to his fantasie and imagination then steere his course by his needle and Sea lard who can double but that it is a thing more profitable coÌ„venieÌ„t to obey the law then the King who is but one man the law is the soul of a good king it give him motion sence and life The King is the Organ and as it were the body by which the Law displays her forces exercises her function and expresses her conceptions now it is a thing much more reasonable to obey the soule then the body the law is the wisdom of divers sages recollected in few words but many see more cleere and further then one alone It is much better to follow the Law then any one mans opinion be he never so acute the law is reason and wisdom it self â—ee from all perturbation not subject to be moved with choller ambition hate or acceptances of personâ— Intreaties nor threates cannot make it bow nor bend on the contrary a man though inducd with reason suffers him selfe to be lead and transported with anger desire of revenge and other passions which perplex him in such sort that he looseth his understanding because being composed of reason and disordered affections he cannot so conâ—aine himself but some times his passions becomes his Master Accordingly wee see that Valentinian a good Emperour permits those of the Empire to have low wines at once because he was misled by that impure affection Because Cambises the sonne of Gyms became inamored of his own sister he would therefore have marriages betweene brother and sister be approved and held lawfull Cabades King of the Persians prohibites the punnishment of adulteries we must looke for such lawes every day if we will have the law subjects to the King To come to our purpose the law is an understanding mind or rather an obstacle of many understandings the mind being the seal of all the intelligence faculties is if I may so terme it a parcell of divinity in so much as he who obeys the law seemes to obey God and receive him for Arbitrator of the maâ—â—ets in controversie But on the contrary insomuch as man is composed of this divine understanding and of a number of unruly passions so losing himselfe in that brutishnesse as he becomes void of reason and being in that condition he is no longer a man but a beast he then which desires rather Aristo lib. de mundo lib 3 poli caâ— to obey the King then the Law seemes to preser the commandement of a heast before that of God And furthermore though Aristotle were the Tutor
of Alexander yet he confesseth that the divinity cannot so properly be compared to to any thing of this life as to the ancient Lawes of well-governed States he that prefers the Commonwealth applyes himself to Gods Ordinance but he that leans to the Kings fancies instead of Law prefers brutish sensuality before well-ordered discretion To which also the Prophers seemes to have respect who in some places describe these great Empires under the representation of ravening Beasts But to go on is not he a very Beast who had rather have for his guide a blind and mad man then he which sees both with the eyes of the body and mind a beast rather thâ—n god Whence it comes that though kings as saith Aristotle for a while at the first commanded without restraint of Laws yet presently after civilized people reduced iâ—â—â—em to a lawfull condition by biâ—ding them to keep and observe the Lawes and for this unruly absolute authority iâ— remained only amongst those which commanded over barbarons Nations He sayes afterwards that this absolute power was the next degree to plain tyrannie and he had absolutely called it tyrannie had not these beasts like Barbarians willingly subjected themselves unto it But it will be replyed that it is unworthy the majesty of Kings to have their wills bridled by Laws but I will say that nothing is more royall then to have our unruly desires ruled by good lawes It is much pitty to be restrained from that which we would doe it is much more worse to will that which we should not do but it is the worst of all to do that which the Laws forbid I hear me thinks a certain Furionius tribune of the people which opposed the passing of a Law that was made against the excesse which then reigned in Rome saying My Masters you are bridled you are idle and settered with the rude bonds of servitude your liberty is lost a Law is laid on you that commands you to be moderate to what purpose is it to say you are free since you may not live in what excesse of pleasure you like This is the very complaint of many Kings at this day and of their Mignior and Flatterers The Royall Majesty is abolished if they may not turn the kingdom topsâ—e turvie at their pleasure Kings may go shake their eaâ—es if Laws must be observed Pâ—radventure it is a miserable thing to live if a mad man may not be suffered to kill himself when he will For what else do those things which violate and abolish Lawes without which neither Empires no nor the very Societies of free-booters Cicero I. â— ossicii can at all subsist Let us then reject these deâ—estable falsinesse and impious vanities of the Court-Marmonsists which make kings gods and receive their sayings as Oracles and which is worse are so shamelesse as to perswade Kings that noâ—hing is just or equitable of it selfe but takes its true forme of justice or injustice according as it pleaseth the King to ordain as if he were some god which could neither erre nor sinne at all Certainly all that which Gods will is iust and therefore suppose it is Gods will but that must be just with the Kings will before it is his will For it is not just because the King hath appointed it but that King is just which appoints that to be held for just which is so of it self We will not then say as Anaxarchus did to Alexander much perplexed for the death of his friend Clitus whom he had killed with his own hands to wit that Themis the Goddesse of Justice fits by Kings sides as she does by Jupiters to approve and confirme whatsoever to them 〈◊〉 seem good but rather she sits as President over kingdoms to severely chastise those Kings which wrong or violate the majesty of the Laws we can no wayes approve that saying of Thrasimacus the Chaldoncan That the profit and pleasure of Princes is the rule by which all Laws are defined but rather that right must limit the profit of Princes and the Laws restrain their pleasures And instead of approving that which that vilâ—ainous woman said to Caracalla that whatsoever he desired was allowed him We will maintain that nothing is lawful but what the law permits And absolutely rejecting that detestable opinion of the same Caracalla that Princes gives Laws too hers but receive none from any we will say that in all kingdomes well established the King receives the Laws from the people the whâ—ch he ought carefully to consider and maintain and whatsoever eâ—ther by force or frâ—ud he does in prejudice of them must alwayes be repuâ—ed unjust Kings receive Lawes from the people These may be sufficiently verified by examples Before there was a King in Israel God by Moses prescribed to him both sacred and evill Deut. 17 Ordinances which he should have perpetually before his eyes but after that Saul was elected and established by the people Samuel delivered it to him written to the end he might carefully observe it neither were the succeeding Kings received before they had sworn to keepe those Ordinances The Ceremony was this that together with the setting of the crown on the Kings head they delivered into his hands the Book of the Testimony which some understand to be the right of the people of the Land others the Law of God according to which he ought to govern the people Cirus acknowledging himself conservator of his Countries Lawes obliegeth himself to opposE any man that would offer to infringe them and at his mauguration tyes himself to observe them although some flatterers tickled the eares of his Son Cambises that all things were lawfull for him The Kings of Sparta whom Aristotle calls lawfull Princes did every moneth renew their oaths promising in the hands of the Ephori Zeneph de Reb. Laced procures for the kingdome to rule according to those Lawes which they had from Lieurgus Hereupon it being asked Archidamus the Son of Zeuxidamus who were the Governours of Sparta he answered the Laws and the lawfull Magistrates and least the lawes might grow into contempt these people bragged that they received them from heaven and that they were inspired from above to the end that men might beleeve that their determinations were from God and not from man the Kings of Egypt did in nothing vary from the tennour of the lawes and confessed that their principall â—elicity consisted in the obedience thâ—y yeelded to them Romulus at the institution of the Roman kingdome made this agreement with senators the people should make lawes and he would take both for himselfe and others to see them observed and kept Antiochus the third of that name King of Asia writ unto all the Cities of his 〈◊〉 of lib 5. ca. 6. kingdome Tâ—at if the letters sent unto them in his name there were any thing found repugnant to the lawes they should beleeve they were no act of the Kings and therefore yeeld no obedience unto them