Selected quad for the lemma: state_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
state_n	king_n	kingdom_n	monarchy_n	1,065	5	9.3350	5	false

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A91336	A political catechism, or, Certain questions concerning the government of this land, answered in His Majesties own words, taken out of his answer to the 19 propositions, Pag. 17, 18, 19, 20. of the first edition; with some brief observations thereupon. Published for the more compleat setling of consciences, particularly of those that have made the late protestation, to maintain the power and priviledges of Parliament, when they shall herein see the Kings own interpretation what that power and priviledges are. It is this twentieth day of May, Anno Dom. 1643. ordered by the Committee of the House of Commons in Parliament concerning printing, that this book entituled, A Political catechism, be printed. John White.	Parker, Henry, 1604-1652.; Charles I, King of England, 1600-1649.; England and Wales. Sovereign (1625-1649 : Charles I); England and Wales. Parliament.	1643 (1643)	Wing P416; Thomason E104_8b	14,645	17

upon the Restraint of the Kings Exorbitant Power 4. If this mixture and well-poised Constitution have No marvel if Jesuitical Councels be active to overthrow the happiness of this Constitution raised this Kingdom to so great a Degree of Envy no marvell if Jesuitical Councells be Active to overthrow this Happy Constitution Q. 8. What is the Conveniency or Good of Monarchy A. The Uniting of a Nation under one Head to Resist Invasion from abroad and Insurrection at home page 18. The good of Monarchy Observ 1. What Pernicious Councellors are they then to Pernicious Councellors to a Monarch who Councel to bring in strangers c. a Monarch that advise him to bring in from abroad German Horse or an Irish Army or a Fleet of Danes to invade this Kingdom or to imploy Dunkirk Ships to seaze upon his Merchants which is so formally contrary to the proper Good and End of Monarchy it self 2. Or are they better or worse that Advise him to Authorize That advise him to authorize and permit to plunder rob spoil and imprison c. in his name or even permit any in his Name to Plunder Rob Spoil Imprison any of his Subjects whom they have found peaceably in their houses or at work in the Fields and have not disobeyed any Legal Command of his Quest 9. What is the Ill of Absolute Monarchy or the Inconvenience to which it is Lyable A. The Ill of Absolute Monarchy is Tyranny page 18. The ill of absolute Monarchy proness to Tyranny Observ 1. Therefore the more Absolute a Monarch is the more prone to be a Tyrant 2. Therefore also it is safer to Restrain the King of some Safer for the Subject to restrain the King of some power then to grant him too much Power to do us good then to grant him too much opportunity to do us hurt and the Danger is greater to the People in Enlarging the Kings Power then in restraining it some what Q. 10. What is the good or Conveniency of Aristocracy A. The good of Aristocracy is the Conjunction of Councells The good of Aristocracy in the Ablest persons of a State for publick Benefit Good for the publick benefit of the State that conjuction of Councells in Parliament should be made use of more then once in 13 or 14 years page 18. Observ Then surely it is for the Publick Benefit of the State that this Conjunction of Councells in Parliament should be made use of more then once in thirteen or fourteen years and the Law for a Triennial Parliament if there were not others before for the holding of a Parliament yearly was a most necessary Law as also that it should not be dissolved for fifty dayes 2. It was not then Intended in the Constitution of this Government The intention in the constitution of this Government that the King in the greatest matters of Importance for publick benefit should only hear what they say and then follow it or reject it meerly at his own Pleasure for this may be as well done in an Absolute Monarchy 3. Neither is it agreeable to the Constitution of this Kingdom to withdraw the King from affording his presence to his Great Councel of State that so the private Counsels of Not agreeable to the Constitution of this Government to withdraw the King from his great Councel and to prefer private Councels Private men may be preferred before those whom the Law and the Constitution of the Kingdom counts the Ablest to judge of publick benefit Q. 11. What is the Ill of Aristocracy or the Inconvenience to which it is lyable A. The Ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Division p 18 Obs What shall we say then to those Private Councellors The ill of Aristocracy that have abused the King by perswading him first to withdraw himself from his Parliament and then to call away the The mischief of evil Councel in withdrawing the King from his Parliament and to call away the Members of both houses to the end to dissolve the Parliament Members of both Houses when yet without the Consent of both Houses this Parliament cannot be Adjourned to another place much less Dissolved Yet if all would have come away at call had it not been Dissolved for want of Legal Numbers Remaining And what greater Faction or Division can there be then such as Divide between King and Parliament and between the House and their Members Are not they most Pernicious Instruments that make Monarchy it self whose end is to unite as was said before thus far guilty of Faction and Division Q. 12 What is the Good or Convenience of Democracy A. The good of Democracy is Liberty and the courage The good of Democracy and Industry which Liberty begets page 18. Observ 1. Then the more Liberties are Encroached upon The more Liberties are incroached upon the more cowardly and poor it renders the Nation the more the people will be rendred Cowardly and Poor as may be plain enough seen by comparing the Valour and Riches of this Nation in Q. Elizabeths days with what hath been of Late Days 2. The King himself when once his Subjects by having lost their Liberties shall lose withall their Courages will In the loss of liberty the King himself shall be the greatest looser prove the greatest Looser for then his Kingdom will be an easie Prey to any Forraign Invader or even to a home-bred Usurper that could gather any sudden Strength and would promise more Liberty Q. What is the Ill of Democracy or the Inconvenience to which it is lyable A. The Ills of Democracy are Tumults Violence and The ills of Democracy Licentiousness page 18. Observ If these be the Evils for which the Peoples Liberty ought to be Restrained by the Mixture in this Government Restraint of liberties should be measured according to the exigency evils then the Restraint of the Liberty should be measured according to the Exigency of these Evils and so much Liberty should be measured according to the Exigency of these Evils and so much Liberty need only be Restrained as is sufficient for the prevention of these Evils Q. 14. What is the mixture of this Kingdom which gives it the Conveniences of all the three forementioned kinds of Government without the Inconveniences of any one A. In this Kingdom the Laws are Joyntly made by a The Laws of this Kingdom made by King Peers Commons gives it the co●veniency of all three kinds of Government King by a house of Peeres and by a house of Commons chosen by the people All having free Votes and particular priviledges page 18. Observ Whereas there hath been great Question made by many what is meant by the Power and Priviledges of Parliament mentioned in the Protestation which hath been so generally made throughout the Kingdom There is no reason The Priviledges of Parliament are their certain Priviledges according to Law and the

Constitution of the Kingdom to doubt but those things which the King grants afterward to be the particular Priviledges of each House and of both are their certain Priviledges according to Law and the Constitution of the Kingdom and to the maintaining of them every one that hath made the Protestation is most strictly bound without peradventure or shift 2. That the Priviledges which the King challenges to Himself The Priviledges that the King challengeth are so far to be yielded unto as they are consistent with the acknowledged priviledges of both Houses are to be yeilded to only so far forth as they are consistent with the acknowledged Priviledges of the two Houses because the Monarchy being acknowledged to be a regulated Monarchy and the Government mixt of Aristocracy and Democracy as well as Monarchy it is the Priviledges of the two Houses of Parliament that makes the mixture and so they must Regulate and Interpret the Priviledges of the King and not the Priviledges of the King Regulate or Interpret theirs save only to the maintaining still the Regal Dignity and the Succession according to Laws Q. 15. What Priviledges doth the King challenge to himself The Government trusted to the King by the Law of the Kingdom and challenged by the King A. The Government according to these Laws is trusted to the King Power of Treaties of War and Peace of making Peers of choosing Officers and Councellors for State Judges for Law Commanders for Forts and Castles giving Commissions for raising men to make War abroad or to prevent or provide against Invasions and Insurrections at home Benefit of Confiscations power The Priviledges above mentioned are only so far trusted as that they be not prejudicial to the priviledges of Parliament in cases of necessity of pardoning and some other of like kind are placed in the King page 18. Observ 1. That all these are ordinarily in the King Experience and Custom Teaches even those that know not the Law by reading but by what hath been noted before and follows after it is to be understood only so as not to prejudice the Priviledges of the Houses of Parliament especially in cases of Necessity of which hereafter Also 2. It is acknowledged here that the Government Trusted is to be according to the Laws and so all these Things The Government trusted to be according to the Laws are not absolutely in the King as for instance Pardons the Law denies power of Pardoning wilful Murther And Benefit of some Confiscations belongs to some private Lords of Mannours 3. If Government only according to Law be trusted to To resist notorious illegal violences is not to resist Kings Authority the King then to resist Notorious Illegal Violences is not to resist the Kings Authority Q 16. For what end is this Authority trusted to the King and placed in him For the Subjects sake their Rights are vested in the King A. For our Subjects sake these rights are vested in us page 17. The Prince may not make use of this high and perpetual power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it page 19. The good of the Subject is to be preferred Observ 1. Then the Good of the Subjects is ever to be preferred before the Monarchial Greatness of the King the End is ever more considerable then the Means Salus Populi Whosoever councells the King against the good of Subject is an enemy to King and Common-wealth is suprema Lex 2. Whosoever counsels the King to any Thing against the good of his Subjects is the Kings Enemy as well as the Common wealths by attempting to turn him from that which is the end of his Authority Q. 17. To what purpose especially are the priviledges of the The purpose and intention of the priviledges of both Houses house of Commons and the house of Peers A. That the Prince may not make use of this High and perpetual power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it and make use of the name of publick necessity for the gain of his private Favorites and Followers c. page 19. The Law presupposes such cases to fallout and on whom the blame is imposed Observ 1. The Law then supposes that such Cases fall out though it then Charge the Blame upon those Favorites and Followers and not upon the King as we shall see by and by 2. We need not wonder then why Private Frivorites and No wonder if Favorites be such Enemies to Parliaments priviledges Followers are such Enemies to Parliaments and their Priviledges which are on purpose to hinder their gains Of which also more anon 3. The two Houses are by the Law it seems to be Trusted The trust to be reposed in the two houses by Law when they declare that Power is made use of for the hurt of the People and the Name of publick necessity made use of for the Gain of Private Favorites and Followers and the like Quest 18. What are the special priviledges of the House of The special priviledges of the house of Commons Commons towards this A. The House of Commons an Excellent conserver of The House of Commons more caareful for the Subjects then the King c. Liberty is solely intrusted with the first propositions concerning the Leavies of Moneys which is the Sinnews as welt of Peace as of War c. page 19. Observ 1. It seems then the House of Commons is presumed to be more careful for the Subjects Liberties then either the King or the House of Peers Strange that the house of Commons should fight against liberty and propriety of the Subject 2. Then it must needs be strange for any to conceive as the Kings Declarations would perswade that the House of Commons would Fight against and Subvert the Liberty and Propriety of the Subject and the Kings Favorites and Followers Fight for them and protect them 3. Then no Moneys may be Levyed neither for Peace nor No moneys may be levyed either for Peace or War or under pretence of publick necessity without the Commons first propound it War no not under Pretence of Publick Necessity as Ship-money and Monopolies were without the House of Commons first propound and grant it 4. If the House of Commons be an Excellent Conserver of Liberty it must needs have some Power in some Cases to Levy Money even without the Kings consent or else it will be utterly unpossible to conserve Liberty at all Of If the house of Commons be a Conserver of Liberty it must have power in some cases to leavy Money c. which likewise more anon Q. 19. But if the Kings Private Favorites and Followers have actually perswaded him to any Thing against the Laws and Liberties of the Subject with what further Power and Priviledge is the House of Commons Intrusted toward the Conserving of Liberty A. With the Impeaching of those who for their own The House of

A POLITICAL CATECHISM OR Certain Questions concerning the Government of this Land Answered in His Majesties own words taken out of His Answer to the 19 Propositions Pag. 17 18 19 20. of the first Edition with some brief Observations thereupon Published for the more compleat setling of Consciences particularly of those that have made the late Protestation to maintain the Power and Priviledges of Parliament when they shall herein see the Kings own Interpretation what that Power and Priviledges are We can do nothing against the Truth but for the Truth 2 Cor 13. 8. It is this twentieth day of May Anno Dom. 1643. Ordered by the Committee of the House of Commons in Parliament concerning Printing that this Book Entituled A Political Catechism be Printed John White LONDON Printed for Samuel Gellibrand at the Brazen-Serpent in P●●…'s Churc● Yard 1643. A Political Catechism Serving to instruct those that have made the Protestation concerning the power and priviledges of Parliament taken out of His Majesties Answer to the 19 Propositions Question HOW many simple kinds are there of Civil Government of States and Common-wealths Answer There are three kinds of Government Three kinds of Government amongst men among men Absolute Monarchy Aristocracy and Democracy page 17. Qu. 2. Are there any of these simple Forms perfect Ans All these have their particular Convenicuces and Inconvenieuces page 17. Observ 1. Experience hath taught men every where Never any of these kinds of Government continued long exactly simple to acknowledge this and accordingly there never was long if at all continued any of these Forms exactly Simple though some have more seemed such then others Also in all mixtures there is commonly some one of these Forms more The Government of England moulded out of a mixture of Monarchy Aristocracy and Democracy conspieuous then the rest from whence such a particular Governtment hath its denomination Quest 3. Is the State of England governed by any one of these kinds simply A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath moulded this Government out of a mixture of these p. 18. Quest 4. What a kind of Government then is that of the State If England be governed by a regulated Monarchy then it is vain and meer flattery to talk of an absolute Monarchy of England Ans Regulated Monarchy page 18. Observ 1. If this Government be a mixture of all these and a Regulated Monarchy then it is a ●ond thing with us to talk of an Absolute Monarchy and what an Absolute Monarch is or may do And it is only the language of Flattery that holds such Discourses 2. It needed not to be counted Solecism as some would perswade us to speak of Free Subjects in a Monarchy such Free Subjects a Monarchy as ours is 3. If this Government be a mixture of all three then the The House of Commons hath a share in this Government House of Commons the Representative Body of the people must needs be allowed a share in Government some at least which yet is denyed page 19. 4. If this Government be a mixture then is not the Government The Government not to be trusted in the King according to th●se Laws solely trusted to the King as seems to be affirmed page 18. 5. If the Government be regulated why do men tell us The King not above Law that the King is above all Law for it is by Laws that he is Regulated 6. If the King be Regulated by the Law then is the The King accountable to Law King accountable to the Law and not to God only as men would make us believe 7. If the Monarchy or Regal Authority it self be regulated Whatsoever is done by the King beyond the limits of Law is not regal Authority then whatsoever is done by the King undeniably without and beyond the limits of that Regulation is not Regal Authority And therefore 8. To resist the Notorious Transgressions of that Regulation is no Resisting of Regal Authority And No resistance of the Ordinance of God 9. It is so far from being a Resisting of the Ordinance of God that it is not so much as Resisting the Ordinance of man Quest 5. By whom was this government framed in this sort or who is to be accounted the Immediate Efficient of the Constitution This Government was moulded by the wisdom of your Ancestors thereof A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this page 18. Observ 1. If our Ancestors were the moulders of this Government then the King hath not his power solely or The King hath not his power solely and immediatly by Divine Right much less by right of Conquest immediately by Divine Right 2. Much less hath he his Power or Authority by Right of Conquest 3. But the Immediate Original of it was from the people And if so Then 4. In questioned cases the King is to Produce his Grant for he hath no more then what was granted and not the The King to produce his grant if his power be questioned People to shew a Reservation For all is presumed to be Reserved which cannot be proved to be granted away Quest 6. Is this Regulated and mixt Monarchy as good as an Absolute Monarchy or better or worse A. This Excellent Constitution of this Kingdom the This excellent constitution of Government hath made this Nation famous and happy Ancient Equal Happy Well-poysed and never enough Commended Constitution of the Government of this Kingdom page 17. hath mad● 〈◊〉 Nation so many years both Famous and Happy and to ● 〈◊〉 Degree of Envy pag. 20. Quest 7. How comes it to pays that this Constitution is so Excellent This kingdom hath the conveniences of all three kinds of Government A. The Experience and Wisdom of your Ancestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these as to give to this Kingdom as far as Humane Prudence can provide the Conveniences of all three without the Inconvenience of any one page 18. Observ 1. Then those that would place in the King an Absolute Arbitrary Power destructive to the Kingdom Absolute and Arbitrary Power to do what he List are Destructive to the Nations Happiness and Enemies to the Kingdom It is not the greatness of the Kings power over his people but the restraint of that power that hath made this Kingdom happy 2. If this mixture cause this happiness then it is not the greatness of the Kings Power over his People but the Restraint of that Power that hath made this Kingdom famous and Happy for other Kings have Power as large but not so much restrained which largeness of their Power hath raised those Kings indeed but not their Kingdoms to a great degree of Envy 3. Hence we discern that it is possible for Kings to envy their Peoples Happiness because the largeness of the Peoples Whereon the largeness of peoples hapness depends Happiness depends much

be obeyed for Preventions as well as Res●●rint of Tyranny 4. Then it is lawful for them to provide for their own and the Kingdoms safety and they have Legal Power to command the People to this purpose not only when Arms are actually raised against them but when they Discern and accordingly declare a Preparation made towards it for if they let alone altogether the Exercise of their power til Arms are Actually raised against them they may in all likelihood find it too late not only to Prevent but even to Restrain the Power of Tyranny 5. Then they have Legal Power in such Times of danger to put into safe hands such Forts Ports Magazines Ships and Power of the Militia as are intended or likely to be ●ntended to Introduce a Tyranny for else they cannot have Legal power in times of danger to put into safe hands Forts Ports Magazines ships c. Power sufficient to Prevent or Restrain the Power of Tyranny 6. Then they have Legal Power to Levy Moneys Arms Legal power to leavy moneys Arms Horse Ammunition of the subjection such cases of danger without or against the consent of the King c. Horse Ammunitions upon the Subjects in such cases of Danger even without or against the Kings Consent for it cannot be imagined that in such cases when the Kings Favourites and Followers have gotten Commands from him to protect them in their Delinquencies and Attempts to Introduce Tyranny that ever he will consent to Levies of Moneys against those Favorites and Followers of his or to the raising Arms against them especially he being still in their hands and among them and not with his Parliament and without such Levies of Moneys c. it is not possible for the two Houses of Parliament to prevent or restrain sufficiently the Power of Tyranny 7. They that have made the Protestation to maintain and In all these things acknowledged by the King clearly following from his acknowledgments all men may see the power and priviledges of Parliment defend the Power and Priviledges of Parliament may see in all these Things acknowledged by the King and clearly Following from his acknowledgeenents what is that Power and what are Priviledges of Parliament which they have so solemly in the presence of Almighty God Vowed Promised and Protested to maintain c. 8. And finally since the two Houses of Parliament have so often and fully declared their Intentions in settling the Militia securing Hull and the Magazine there and the Navy That since the two houses have so often declared their intentions in settling the Militia s●●uing of Hull c. at Sea with Ports and Forts and afterward in Raising Arms under the Commanp of the Earl of Essex and last of all Levying Moneys by voluntary Contributions and Assessments they have only used that Legal Power which is in them for the Punishment of Delinquents and for the Prevention and Restraint of the power of Tyranny of all which they are the All men may see that they have only used that legal power which is in them for punishing delinquents prevention and restraining of Tyranny c. Legal Judges and all the Subjects of this Kingdom are bound by the Laws to obey them herein and those doubly bound that have made the late Protestation That the Reader may the better discern how the Answers here applyed do agree with the words of his Majesties answer the to 19 Propositions I have here transcribed so much of it as concerns this particular Page 17. We call God to witness that as for our subjects Conceening the Government of the Kingdom sake these Rights are vested in Us so for their sakes as well as for our own we are resolved not to quit them nor to subvert though in a parliamentary way the ancient equal happy well-poysed and uever-enough-commended Constitution of the Government of this Kingdom Three kinds of Government amongst men There being three kinds of Government amoust men Absolute Monarchy Aristoceacy and Democracy and all these having their particular conveniences and inconveniences The providence of our Ancestors hath so moulded the Government of this Kingdom as by a mixture of all three kinds to give the conv●●iences of them all c. page 18. The experience and wisdom of your Aucestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these as to give to this Kingdom as far as humane prudence can provide the conveniences of all three without the inconveniences of any one as long as the Ballance bangs even between the three Estates and they run joyntly on in their proper channel begetting Uerdure a Fertility in the meadows on both sides and the over-flowing of either on either side raise no Deluge or Inunda●ion The ill of Absolute Monarchy is Tyranny The ill of Aristocracy is Faction and Divi●ion The Ills of Democracy are Tumuls Violence and Licentiousness The good of Monarhy is the Vniting a Nation under one Head to Resist Invasion from abroad and Insurrection at home The good of Aristocracy is the conjunction of Councel in the Ablest persons of a State for the publick benefit The good of Democracy is Liberty and the courage and industry which Liberty begets In this Kingdom the Laws are Joyntly made by a King How the Laws of this Kingdom are made by a house of Peeres and by a house of Commons chosen by the people all having free Votes and particular priviledges The Government according to these Laws is trusted to the Trust ●eposed in the King King Power of Treaties of War and Peace of making Peers of choosing Officers and Councellors for State Judges for Law Commanders for Forts and Castles giving Co●missions for raising men to make War abroad or to provent and provide against Invasions or Insurrections at hom● benefit of Confiscations power of pardoning some more of Concerning the extent of the Princes liberty the like kind are placed in the King Again page 19. that the Prince may not make use of this ●igh and perpetual power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it and make use of the name of publick necessity for the gain of his privats Favorites Followers to the dotriment of his people the house of Commons an excellent conserver of Liberty but never intended for any share in Government or the chusing of them that should govern is solely intrusted with the first Propositions concerning the Levies of Moneys which is the sinews as well of peace as war and the impeaching of those The Trust reposed in the house of Commons who for their own ends though countenanced by any surreptitiously-gotten command of the King have violated that Law which he is bound when he knows it to protect and to the protection of which they were bound to advise him at least not to serve him to the contrary and the Lords being trusted The Trust of the Lords with a Judicatory power are an excellent screen bank between the Prince people to assist each against any incroachments of the other by just judgments to preserve that Law which ought to be the Rule of every one of the three Page 20. Since therefore the Power Legally placed in both The sufficiency of the power placed in both houses Houses is more then sufficient to prevent and restrain the power of Tyrauny since this would be a total Subversion of the Fundamental Laws and that excellent constitution of this Kingdom which hath made this Nation so many years both Famous and Happy to a great degree of envy since to the power of punishing which is already your hands according Incroachment of Power to Law if since the encroaching of one of these Estates upon the power of the other is unhappy in the effects both to them and all the rest Page 22. Our answer is Nolumus Leges Angliae mu●ari But this we promi●e that Careful to preseeve Laws we will be as careful of preserving the Laws in what is supposed to concern wholly our Subjects as in what most concerns our self For indeed we profels to believe that the preservation of every Law concerns Vs those of obedience being not secure when those of protection are violated FINIS